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DOCUMENTS ON CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS

DOCUMENTS RELATIFS AUX RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES DU CANADA



CANADA

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THE VIETNAM WAR
LA GUERRE DU VIETNAM
1963–1968

VOLUME 1
THEMATIC SERIES
SÉRIE THÉMATIQUE

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GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA
AFFAIRES MONDIALES CANADA

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Catalogue No.: FR5-241/2026 (bound)
Catalogue No.: FR5-241/2026-PDF
ISBN 978-0-660-78369-7 (bound)
ISBN 978-0-660-78367-3 (PDF)

N° de catalogue : FR5-241/2026 (relié)
N° de catalogue : FR5-241/2026-PDF
ISBN 978-0-660-78369-7 (relié)
ISBN 978-0-660-78367-3 (PDF)

Canada

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This volume of *Documents on Canadian External Relations* (DCER) examines Canadian diplomacy during the Vietnam War, specifically from 1963 to 1968. A second volume will cover the period from 1968 to 1973. Since DCER's inception in 1967, three thematic volumes have appeared.[1] The present work marks the reorientation of the series from a "comprehensive self-contained record of the major foreign policy decisions taken by the Government of Canada, and of the reasons for taking them, as well as of the major international events and trends affecting Canada"[2] (usually over a year or so) to a more flexible thematic approach that studies key issues and events in greater depth, whether they occurred in a short time frame or, as in this volume, over a much longer period.

Such a shift, which aligns DCER with similar diplomatic document collections in other countries, has narrative advantages insofar as readers can chart in a single volume how Canadian foreign policy on a major topic evolved. It also addresses a significant challenge DCER increasingly faces in documenting the 1960s and beyond: the sheer amount of material produced by the Department of External Affairs (DEA), a reflection of advances in technology and of an ever-expanding and increasingly complex international agenda that continues today. The adoption of the thematic approach is designed to ensure the feasibility of DCER and thus to preserve its long-term viability as an important scholarly resource. As a result, this book is the first volume in a new thematic series within DCER that will focus primarily on the period after the middle of 1963, where the last strictly chronological DCER volume ended.

The Vietnam conflict was a defining event of the Cold War. In the 1960s and early 1970s, it also had a major impact on Canada's relations with the United States (US), the country's neighbour and closest ally. As such, Vietnam involved some of Canada's most senior and influential diplomats. As previous DCER volumes have documented, Canada was a member, with communist Poland and non-aligned India, of the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Vietnam. The ICSC had been created by the Geneva

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1 *Documents on Relations between Canada and Newfoundland*, Vol. 1, ed. Paul Bridle (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974); *Documents on Relations between Canada and Newfoundland*, Vol. 2, Parts 1–2, ed. Paul Bridle (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984); *Documents on Canadian External Relations: The Arctic, 1874-1949*, ed. Janice Cavell (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada, 2016).

2 "Introduction," in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol. 7, ed. David R. Murray (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), p. ix.

Agreements of 1954 to supervise the ceasefire that led to France's withdrawal from its former colonies in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (three separate agreements on the cessation of hostilities in each of these three states set up three separate commissions there). By 1963, the situation in Vietnam, which had been temporarily divided at the 17th parallel between the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) in the north and the non-communist Republic of Vietnam in the south, was deteriorating, despite the growing military assistance the US was sending South Vietnam to bolster it against the National Liberation Front (NLF, or Viet Cong), a communist-led insurgency.

Part 1: ICSC Frustrations and a Secret Channel (1963–1965)

This volume is divided into two parts. The first, "ICSC Frustrations and a Secret Channel (1963–1965)," features documents from April 1963 to November 1965, a period in which the erosion of security in South Vietnam prompted the US in early 1965 to initiate a gradual and sustained bombing campaign of targets in North Vietnam, a dramatic (and controversial) escalation. In the Canadian government's view, the main cause of the instability roiling South Vietnam was North Vietnam's covert aggression and subversion. In 1962, in a Special Report signed by Indian-Canadian majority (Poland dissented), the ICSC accepted the findings of a separate report by its Legal Committee that "armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies" had been sent from North Vietnam to South Vietnam "with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration" of South Vietnam and that the North Vietnamese army had allowed North Vietnamese territory to be used for "inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities" in South Vietnam "aimed at the overthrow of the Administration" there.[3] The Special Report also concluded that South Vietnam had violated the Geneva Agreement by receiving military aid from the US exceeding what was permitted and by making military arrangements with that country that amounted to a "factual military alliance."[4]

Chapter 1. The ICSC and the Subversion Issue (April 1963–June 1965)

As chapter 1 documents, Canada laboured within the Commission to focus attention on North Vietnamese subversion. In its report quoted above, the ICSC's Legal Committee had pledged a full report on the complaints made by the South

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3 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 1755, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), p. 7.

4 Ibid., p. 10.

Vietnamese Liaison Mission to the ICSC, including the evidence supporting them and the committee's assessment. "On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents," the ICSC promised in paragraph 10 of its Special Report, "the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case."[5]

By the spring of 1963, a draft of the full Legal Report (as it became known), written by the ICSC's Indian and Canadian legal advisers, was ready. From Saigon, Canadian Commissioner Gordon Cox informed the DEA that his Indian counterpart saw the report as a "veritable bombshell" that could exacerbate the situation in Vietnam. By contrast, Cox believed that "if the Commission took action on Legal Report and if its active concern with subversion cases became public, this would have a beneficial effect and might contribute to abatement of these activities" (doc. 1). He and the DEA were particularly interested in highlighting the Legal Report's general conclusions that North Vietnam and the NLF were working together to overthrow the South Vietnamese government. The ICSC's formal adoption of the Legal Report, which included evidence of North Vietnam's violations of the Geneva Agreement from 1955 to 1961, would also establish a blueprint for Commission action on new South Vietnamese complaints of subversion submitted to the ICSC (doc. 2).

For almost two years, Canada tried in vain to convince India to process the Legal Report within the ICSC. Initially there was hope, as when the Indian commissioner told Cox in April 1963 that, while he had reservations about certain sections of the report, he generally endorsed it and believed the ICSC would have to adopt it by majority decision (doc. 4). Since the draft was lengthy, however, the Indians wanted a joint revision of it. This "line-by-line examination" lasted until the end of the year (doc. 53). Meanwhile, there were disquieting signs India might renege on its commitment to adopt the Legal Report as an official Commission document and to forward it to the co-chairs of the 1954 Geneva Conference (Britain and the Soviet Union). The DEA attributed this reversal to India's bowing to the wishes of the Soviet Union, whose support India sought in its rivalry with China (doc. 13). According to Chester Ronning, Canada's High Commissioner in India, "inaction in the Commission" was more to the liking of Indian Foreign Secretary Y.D. Gundevia than "action" (doc. 19).

By 1964, the Indians' approach to the ICSC in Vietnam had provoked "a sense of futility and discouragement" in Cox, who argued that they "have clearly adopted a 'do-nothing-and-hold-our-breath' policy and as long as this remains in effect, our position here will remain difficult, frustrating and in a sense degrading" (doc. 28). The DEA was also vexed: "We are inclined to regard inaction as

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5 Ibid., p. 7.

dereliction of our responsibilities in light of what is known of increasing support being received from North Vietnam by Viet Cong." The ICSC's failure to act on the 1962 Special Report, not to mention on the new cases of subversion referred to its Legal Committee, reflected badly on the "very principle of international peacekeeping" (doc. 31). Summarizing the situation in July 1964, Blair Seaborn, Cox's successor as commissioner, observed, "Probably never since 1954 has so much public interest been centered on Indochina as over the past year, and never has the Commission been so lethargic and tongue-tied" (doc. 37).

Reported North Vietnamese attacks on US naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, which prompted the first US bombing of North Vietnam, captured worldwide attention and jolted the ICSC out of its lethargy. It became clear that India and Poland wanted to send a message on the Gulf of Tonkin incidents to the co-chairs of the Geneva Conference, an initiative Canada firmly opposed given that the ICSC's total silence since the Special Report of 1962 meant that it could hardly "act promptly…without presenting a distorted and out of context picture" (doc. 45). Instead, Canadian diplomats pushed for a comprehensive (and long overdue) ICSC Interim Report that gave due weight to subversion. Unmoved by their arguments, the Indians voted with the Poles in mid-November for an ICSC Special Message (or "Report") on the Gulf of Tonkin incidents (doc. 58).

Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin instructed Roland Michener, the new high commissioner in India, to inform the Indians that this *fait accompli* in Saigon had not lessened Canadian determination to have the ICSC deal fully with subversion and the Legal Report, if need be unilaterally (doc. 59). This was a guarded reference to what Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Marcel Cadieux had told Martin was an "extreme position" but "perhaps the strongest card in our hand," that is, Canada's appending to any Special Message a minority statement of which the still unadopted Legal Report would form a key part (doc. 50). In January 1965, after Canadian and Indian diplomats failed to reach a compromise, Cadieux informed Martin in the margin of one document that such action was "painful but necessary" and would "be good for the Indians themselves" since "in the past their role in the Commission has been too often geared to their shifting political objectives rather than to the higher requirements of serving the world community firmly and fairly" (doc. 67 n. 41).

Ultimately, it was not the Gulf of Tonkin incidents that prompted a Special Report from the ICSC but the US and South Vietnamese air strikes on North Vietnam of 7–8 February 1965, retaliation for Viet Cong attacks on US military installations. "By restricting itself to consideration of activities by the USA and South Vietnam," Cadieux told Martin, the Indian draft "implies that the full responsibility for the dangerous situation in Vietnam rests with these two countries alone" (doc. 71). When the statement was approved by Indian-Polish majority at the ICSC's meeting on 13 February, Seaborn tabled a Canadian minority response

that placed the air strikes in the broader perspective of North Vietnamese subversion, unilaterally quoting extracts from the general conclusions of the Legal Report (doc. 72). In tabling the ICSC's Special Report in Parliament, Martin was advised "to bring into sharp focus the role of North Vietnam as the disturbing force" in Vietnam, this being "an aspect of the situation which is badly misunderstood by the public" (doc. 74).

The ICSC's Special Report of 13 February 1965 was arguably the Commission's last major act. Nevertheless, Martin engaged in a frank exchange with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on its recent performance, especially its tendency (at least in Canadian eyes) to focus more on obvious South Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Agreement (well-publicized US assistance being one example) than on covert North Vietnamese ones (docs 77, 84, 86). In Ottawa, Cadieux candidly told the Indian high commissioner that a whole generation of Canadian diplomats had served alongside the Indians in Indochina, a "very sobering" experience that had influenced the "quality of relationship between Indian and Canadian officials" (doc. 87).

Meanwhile, concerned about Canada's dependence on external sources of information (a reliance stemming from obstructionism within the ICSC itself, the weaknesses of its investigative powers, and the ease with which they could be evaded), Martin instructed Canada's ICSC delegation in Vietnam to develop its own assessments of North Vietnamese subversion. "Americans…should appreciate," the minister observed, "that, if Canadian Government can say it has evidence of its own (i.e., not derived from U.S.A. or SVN intelligence reports), it will be in a much better position to give support … to purposes and objectives of U.S.A. policy in Vietnam" (doc. 83). Explaining Martin's orders to Seaborn, R.L. Rogers, the head of the DEA's Far Eastern Division, stressed that no one doubted "the fact or the scale" of North Vietnam's intervention, or mistrusted the figures provided to the delegation in Saigon by the US military. "Unfortunately," Rogers predicted, "I think that this problem is about to move out of the classified domain of government officials into a more public forum, where our judgment of U.S. integrity may not carry the necessary weight" (doc. 82).

Chapter 2. Operation Bacon: The Seaborn Channel (April 1964–November 1965)

If the subversion issue preoccupied Canada on the ICSC, it concerned the US even more. In April 1964, the Americans asked if Seaborn, soon to replace Cox in Saigon, could serve as a channel of communication between the US and North Vietnam, a role documented in chapter 2. Meeting with Martin and Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson in Ottawa, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk was recorded as saying about Hanoi's leaders that "it was important for them to realize that if they did not put a stop to their operations they would be in trouble." Rusk wondered if

Seaborn's posting to Vietnam could be expedited so that he could speak with leaders in Hanoi, probe their thinking, and dispel any misunderstandings about US policy. Pearson agreed. Experts would also come from Washington to discuss Vietnam with Seaborn (and his DEA colleagues) (doc. 89).

A month later, as the experts gathered in Ottawa, Pearson and US President Lyndon B. Johnson met in New York City. As US National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, who was present, informed Basil Robinson of the Canadian embassy, Johnson had urged Seaborn's early departure. When Pearson and Johnson discussed potential military measures against North Vietnam, Pearson clearly distinguished between non-nuclear and nuclear ones: use of the latter would totally isolate the US, whereas the former, if used against carefully selected military targets, would not cause the same difficulties. Fully agreeing, Johnson stressed that the US aimed to avoid an uncontrollable escalation. As Robinson noted parenthetically, "It will be important to get the Prime Minister's version of this part of the conversation since Bundy was not too precise as to exactly how far the Prime Minister had gone in his response to the idea of direct measures" (doc. 92). Regrettably, no such account has been found.

Meanwhile, in Ottawa, the experts discussed Vietnam over two days (doc. 94). The Americans subsequently provided Seaborn with guidance and talking points for use in Hanoi. This document included the statement that he need not agree or associate himself with the messages passed, but only transmit them faithfully. He was to report on North Vietnamese attitudes and establish himself as an authoritative channel of communication with the US. Seaborn, the Americans hoped, "would assume the posture that the decision as to the future course of events in Southeast Asia rests squarely with Hanoi" (doc. 93).

In mid-June, Seaborn met with North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in Hanoi. The gist of the US position was that the United States sought neither military bases nor the overthrow of North Vietnam's regime, but simply South Vietnam's preservation from the guerilla subversion Hanoi directed, a commitment of worldwide significance. The US had established peaceful relations with other communist countries to the latter's economic benefit, but US patience with North Vietnamese aggression was growing very thin. As Seaborn warned Pham Van Dong, who listened attentively, military escalation would devastate North Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese leader merely reiterated Hanoi's general position, seeming unconcerned when Seaborn remarked that the US might be forced to carry the war to North Vietnam (doc. 96). Seaborn's tentative conclusion was that "we would be unwise at this stage to count on war weariness or factionalism within leadership or possible material advantages to DRVN or kind of Asian Tito-ism as of such importance to cause DRVN to jump at chance of reaching accommodation with USA in this area" (doc. 97).

While State Department experts described Seaborn's reports as "superb" (doc. 98) and "sobering" (doc. 99), Washington was in no hurry to re-open the dialogue with Hanoi. However, when it seemed as though the Americans might discuss the contents of a future message directly with Seaborn in Saigon (doc. 103), the State Department was reminded that the agreed channel of communication was via Ottawa: "Americans are aware that we may have to defend or explain our role in exchange with North Vietnamese if it became public" (doc. 104). By late July that exchange was, to quote Far Eastern Division, "in the doldrums," Hanoi having declined to respond and Washington, in a puzzling shift, now downplaying its concern about North Vietnam's support of the Viet Cong (doc. 107). Seaborn wondered "whether USA has, after initial enthusiasm and excitement, now lost interest in Operation Bacon," the codename for his mission (doc. 108).

The Gulf of Tonkin incidents led to the Bacon channel's reactivation. Aware that Seaborn would soon be in Hanoi for an ICSC meeting, the State Department at the last minute gave the Canadians a document asking him to repeat the US government's basic position on Vietnam (doc. 112). Of the ostensibly new points Seaborn was to make, the DEA instructed him to omit two (doc. 113) because, as the Department later explained, they seemed vaguely ominous and compromising (doc. 115). When Charles Ritchie, Canada's Ambassador to the United States, recommended the Americans be informed of its decision (doc. 114), Ottawa agreed but stressed that "our commitment to pass messages faithfully does not mean we can be expected to play the role of unthinking mouthpieces" (doc. 115). In conversation with Seaborn in Hanoi, Pham Van Dong was infuriated with the US, although he wanted the channel to remain open (doc. 117).

It went dormant again until December, when the Americans, while not giving Seaborn a specific message for Hanoi, asked him to state that the time was ripe for any message Hanoi itself wished to send (doc. 128). Since there was little substance in the US approach, the DEA decided that Seaborn's role would have to be similarly passive. In particular, he would be unable to seek an audience with Pham Van Dong simply to express personal views (doc. 130). In the event, Seaborn met only with Ha Van Lau, the head of the North Vietnamese Liaison Mission to the ICSC, who did not react when US policy on Vietnam was reiterated (doc. 132). Informed of the meagre results of the visit, Rusk's special assistant on Vietnam observed that even North Vietnamese silence was useful information (doc. 133). In Ottawa, a gossipy US diplomat dismissed the value of the whole exercise, prompting Rogers to opine to a member of his division that "we should do nothing whatsoever to try to keep Operation 'Bacon' alive" (doc. 134).

But the operation continued. In late February 1965, the State Department requested that Seaborn repeat to the North Vietnamese a US statement on Vietnam

made in Warsaw to Chinese representatives (doc. 138). Increasingly disenchanted with the exercise, the DEA replied that such a message did not warrant a trip to Hanoi and might "clog" the Seaborn channel. The Americans suggested Seaborn tell Pham Van Dong that it was hoped the latter would make substantive comments on the US position (doc. 139). But, in Hanoi, Seaborn was once again only allowed to meet with Ha Van Lau, who pointedly remarked that the US message contained nothing new, further proof to Seaborn the North Vietnamese had little interest in a Canadian channel of communication with the US (doc. 140).

Undeterred, the Americans asked in late May if, during his next visit to Hanoi, Seaborn could deliver a new message, one that essentially restated US policy and reviewed recent events. But he was to deliver it only if granted a meeting with a senior member of the North Vietnamese government, for which he was not to press. If his interlocutor raised Pham Van Dong's recent "Four Point" summary of North Vietnamese policy – that is, US withdrawal from Vietnam, no foreign bases and alliances, the settling of South Vietnam's internal affairs by its people in accordance with the NLF's program, and the peaceful reunification of Vietnam as determined by its citizens – Seaborn was asked to express his personal interest in whether these points were considered pre-conditions to any discussions (doc. 142).

Instead, Martin instructed him to seek a meeting with the North Vietnamese prime minister or foreign minister to convey the Canadian government's concern about the situation in Vietnam, its interest in facilitating negotiations, and its desire to be helpful. After delivering the proposed US message, he would seek clarification of the status of the Four Points, noting that, based on its discussions with Washington, Ottawa believed they were of mixed acceptability to the Americans (doc. 143). These instructions concerned Seaborn and the Americans, conveying far more eagerness to deliver messages and to probe than the latter wished. "We consider that in using Bacon channel so ultra-cautiously," the DEA explained to Seaborn, "there is danger that its usefulness will be completely destroyed, if it has not…been destroyed already." While the Department argued that a less passive stance would reflect Canada's more active approach towards negotiations, it reluctantly accepted the "more timid" US line (doc. 146). Following developments closely, Pearson wrote of Seaborn at the top of one document, "I'll wager 1 piastre that no one in Hanoi will talk to him" (doc. 148 n. 62).

In fact, Seaborn met with Nguyen Duy Trinh, the North Vietnamese foreign minister (and deputy prime minister). A close reading of his report makes clear that the DEA's interest in giving greater Canadian emphasis to the deliberations was partly satisfied, but, when Trinh raised the Four Points, Seaborn sought clarification as per US instructions. Trinh refused to elucidate whether the points were pre-conditions to or the basis for negotiations. He also expressed little interest in the message Seaborn delivered from the US, whose aggression Trinh

condemned (doc. 149). "All in all," Seaborn observed, "prospects for negotiations or even preliminary talks seem very bleak indeed" (doc. 150).

This was also the US assessment, but, in Washington, Ritchie was told the French were spreading (or so it seemed) a different view of Hanoi's position based on recent comments made to them by its representative in Paris, a North Vietnamese approach the Americans had not wanted to share with the Canadians before Seaborn's last visit (doc. 151), reticence that troubled Pearson and Martin (doc. 158). Seaborn hoped the Americans could be dissuaded from using the channel, which was only "exacerbating DRVN antagonism to USA and annoyance with Canada." Moreover, recent government comments in both Ottawa and Washington about the essence of his conversations (but not messenger role) had likely "'blown' or at least seriously compromised" the operation, especially since the press had wrongly concluded from such disclosures that North Vietnam's Four Points were definite pre-conditions to any discussions (doc. 154). The DEA agreed that public interest in the channel should be allowed to "lapse for a while" (doc. 155).

That proved impossible when Rusk, in an off-the-record briefing for journalists, referred appreciatively to Seaborn's efforts to sound out Hanoi. Although Rusk did not mention that Seaborn had been acting on behalf of the US, when President Johnson offered a "thinly veiled paraphrase" at a news conference of portions of Seaborn's report from Hanoi, Canadian correspondents, as the embassy in Washington informed the DEA, "rapidly put two and two together" (doc. 159). If questioned about his messenger role, Seaborn was instructed to reply that his periodic conversations with authorities in Hanoi reflected the Canadian government's interest in contributing to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam and that Ottawa conveyed to interested governments such information as might be useful in promoting an understanding of the situation and thus ultimately peace (doc. 161).

Seaborn received no special instructions for what, in early autumn 1965, proved to be his last visit to Hanoi, where no senior leader spoke with him (doc. 164). In late November, however, under intense pressure from news reports alleging that it had rejected various attempts to stimulate negotiations, including one by Secretary-General of the United Nations U Thant, Washington sought permission from Ottawa to release a fuller account of Seaborn's role in discerning North Vietnamese attitudes. In a lengthy but highly revealing analysis of the implications for Ottawa of the US request, the DEA recommended against disclosing that Seaborn had acted on behalf of the US, pitting his views against those of U Thant, and referring to the Canadian channel as "a major third party" approach (doc. 169). The State Department took the hint: Rusk confined himself publicly to what was already known about Seaborn's conversations in Hanoi (docs 170–172).

Chapter 3. Reviewing Participation on the ICSC (September 1964–September 1965)

The rapidly diminishing returns of Operation Bacon and the ICSC's failure to deal adequately with North Vietnamese subversion factored into the major reappraisal between September 1964 and September 1965 of Canadian participation on the Commission. Intermittent reviews of Canada's international commitments were not unusual, but this one was particularly searching, as chapter 3 documents. The impetus for the review originated with Seaborn, who in a trenchant dispatch from Saigon argued that the Commission created in 1954 was powerless to address the current deteriorating situation in Vietnam. The idea that it restrained the belligerents was dubious at best, prompting the question, "If we are not doing anything really useful, why do we not pull out, if need be unilaterally?" (doc. 173).

While conceding that Seaborn's case for a "radical re-examination" of ICSC participation had merit, Martin warned that withdrawal would be misunderstood by Canadians who valued the country's peacekeeping role. Foreseeing a future diplomatic conference on Vietnam where the ICSC would be asked to describe the "true nature of problem in Vietnam" and the challenges the Commission faced, Martin believed that this could be helpful "in strengthening hands of everyone opposed to a Communist take-over in Southeast Asia." Seaborn was thus instructed to make the ICSC function "as effectively as possible" and, if this failed, to establish clearly where the blame lay. That said, Martin was prepared to consider reductions to Canada's personnel and financial commitments in Vietnam so long as the Commission's political organs were preserved (doc. 175).

By year's end, following the visit to Indochina of a special liaison team from Ottawa, the Canadian government was seriously considering pushing for the elimination of all of the ICSC's team sites in North and South Vietnam save the one in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); a group of officers would be left in Hanoi and Saigon for emergency investigations (doc. 181). But US intelligence authorities had reservations about the proposal since first-hand Canadian reports on conditions in North Vietnam were one of their main sources of information on that almost totally closed country. Far Eastern Division expressed skepticism to Cadieux about the value of such intelligence, given the severe restrictions placed on freedom of movement there (doc. 182), prompting, in turn, Defence Liaison (2) Division to advise the under-secretary that US views should not be lightly dismissed (doc. 183). The question of withdrawal from the team sites, at least in North Vietnam, was unexpectedly settled in February 1965, when the North Vietnamese demanded it on the grounds that the ICSC's security could not be guaranteed given the recent US and South Vietnamese air strikes (docs 186, 188). Seizing tactical advantage of the situation, Canada joined with India in submitting

an ICSC Special Report to the Geneva Conference co-chairs that placed the onus for the withdrawal squarely on North Vietnam (the fixed teams in South Vietnam remained) (doc. 192).

In June, describing the most recent frustrations with the Indians on the subversion question, Seaborn opined that it was "now established beyond all reasonable doubt that this Commission is very close to unworkable in the sense of being able to do anything useful to document the case of DRVN aggression against the South." The Canadian delegation could either be maintained, reduced to token size, or withdrawn unilaterally (doc. 199). Seaborn urged using both the Commission's current financial crisis (docs 194–198, 202, 206–207, 215–216) and South Vietnam's disillusionment with its performance to make a "bold move" (doc. 201). Sharing Seaborn's recommendation with Martin, Cadieux noted that, after eight months of trying to make the ICSC work more objectively, the DEA was re-examining Canada's position on it (doc. 203). In mid-July, Far Eastern Division's draft paper on the subject recommended that Canada suspend its participation on the ICSC in Vietnam (and Cambodia) and withdraw its personnel (doc. 204). A.E. Ritchie, Cadieux's deputy under-secretary, disagreed, warning that such a decision would delight communist countries but be panned in Canada as an abdication of responsibility for the world's most dangerous trouble spot. While Far Eastern Division stressed the savings in money and personnel that would be achieved from withdrawal, Ritchie argued that the Commission had in fact reduced Canada's expenditures in this area since, without it, the country would have been urged to make a much greater contribution to the Western cause in Vietnam (doc. 210).

In the end, the minister's views mattered most. As he told Klaus Goldschlag, who would soon replace Rogers as head of Far Eastern Division, Martin opposed withdrawal for several reasons: unilateral action would complicate the situation in Vietnam; membership gave Canada a "*locus standi*" in international discussions on the subject; it also allowed Canada to resist pressure for direct involvement; finally, the Commission might have a future role to play in resolving the conflict (doc. 213). In a personal letter, Rogers informed Seaborn that "six weeks, several drafts and thousands of words later we have come up with – precisely nothing new," resulting in "more of the same for you and more of the same for us." He added, "I am sure you are as uncertain as we are about how it will all end, but perhaps when the awful day comes, some of us at least can take comfort at having effectively discharged the role of Bagehot's constitutional monarch – to advise, to be consulted and to warn" (doc. 218).

The result of the DEA's review was a foregone conclusion by August 1965. Sharing it with Martin, Cadieux advised him that "there is no feasible readjustment in our activity in the Vietnam Commission that we can make at this time which

would not create serious disadvantages in terms of broader Canadian policy objectives." The goal of trying to make the ICSC operate more fairly was thus reaffirmed. The minister was warned, however, that success was unlikely in a tripartite Commission where Canada was increasingly isolated. The attached review was a lengthy but clear-eyed analysis by the DEA of Canada's difficulties within the ICSC and possible courses of action (doc. 219). In September, Martin officially informed Seaborn that Canada was staying in Vietnam (doc. 220).

Part 2: Escalation and the Search for Peace (1965–1968)

As noted, one of the reasons advanced for remaining on the ICSC was that Commission membership gave the Canadian government standing in international discussions on the Vietnam War. Part two of this book, "Escalation and the Search for Peace (1965–1968)," documents how Canada both spearheaded and was involved in various attempts to stimulate negotiations. The US air strikes on North Vietnam of February 1965, which in March morphed into Operation Rolling Thunder, a gradual but sustained bombing campaign, transformed the war and complicated the position of Western governments like Canada's that sympathized with US objectives.

Chapter 4. Responding to US Bombing (February 1965–January 1966)

Chapter 4 documents the first year of this new reality. As the DEA noted in talking points for Martin, it was not in the Canadian interest to push for an early peace conference that might eliminate the US presence in Vietnam or, more likely, fail and worsen things. But "continued implicit support for the American position is difficult in the face of Canadian public opinion, the articulate section of which seems uniformly against the United States" (doc. 236). As a result, Martin wanted to be kept informed of US intentions in Vietnam: "…our willingness to support USA position to best of our ability is made difficult if we are faced with new departures without being satisfied that we know real reason for them," a case in point being the recent landing of 3,500 US Marines in South Vietnam (doc. 244).

Pearson was also following events in Vietnam closely. In a speech in New York in early March, he floated the idea of an international police force in Southeast Asia that senior US officials praised (doc. 239). Speaking with U Thant, Pearson, drawing a parallel with the 1956 Suez Crisis, hoped the United Nations (UN) might play a useful role in Vietnam when the time came (doc. 240). Afterwards, in a supposedly off-the-record conversation with select journalists, he expressed serious doubts about US policy: the Americans in South Vietnam were acting like an army of occupation; South Vietnam should be allowed to become communist

if it wished; and the US wrongly believed that air strikes could force North Vietnam to negotiate. In Pearson's view, the US had backed itself into a corner and it was important to help them out of it (doc. 241).

The prime minister tried to do just that in a speech at Temple University in Philadelphia on 2 April 1965. A DEA draft suggested the US consider suspending its air strikes for a certain period to give North Vietnam a chance to respond without seeming to do so because of military pressure. "This suggestion … attempts to meet your desire for a more positive and independent approach," Martin informed Pearson. "You may consider, however, that a proposal of this kind would be more effective if it were put forward, in the first instance, privately to President Johnson" (doc. 248). Pearson, who earlier that year had told the Indian high commissioner that it was better to discuss such matters quietly and confidentially with the Americans (doc. 232), wrote "yes" in the margin (doc. 248 n. 41). Visiting Ottawa, the US columnist Marquis Childs met with Pearson and then, at Pearson's request, with Martin. Childs remarked that, in the absence of any real debate on Vietnam in Washington, Canada could play a key role by making practical suggestions, but Martin cautioned that Canada's public position should not run "strongly and obviously counter" to that of the US, which was shouldering the West's responsibilities in Vietnam (doc. 249). On the eve of Pearson's speech, Childs assured the Canadians that its main points would not be resented in Washington (doc. 250).

In fact, Johnson was incensed by the speech, which included the bombing-pause proposal. In an evocative diary entry about his meeting with him at Camp David the next day, Pearson quoted the president's blunt assessment of the speech: "It was bad." For an hour, Johnson told Pearson why it was so bad, barely letting him speak. "If there had not been a kind of '*et tu, Brute*' feeling about the assault, without any personal unpleasantness of any kind," Pearson observed, "I would have felt almost like Schuschnigg before Hitler at Berchtesgaden!" Johnson was furious Pearson had given such a speech on US soil, insisting that, faced with extreme calls for either total withdrawal or all-out war, his was a restrained policy of steadily destroying the military infrastructure on which North Vietnam's assistance to the rebellion in the South was based. Although Pearson was reassured by this exposition, he could see that the war was already taking a toll on Johnson: "This crisis over Vietnam is going to be a great test for L.B.J. I'm not now certain that he is going to be successful in meeting it" (doc. 253).

Back in Ottawa, Pearson wrote to Johnson to explain the carefully qualified nature of his bombing suspension proposal, which was meant to be helpful and thus might eventually prove useful. As the leader of the United States' "closest neighbour and friend," he wanted to assist Johnson to the extent he could: "But Canada is a political democracy too, with an active and often divided public opinion; sensitive that its leaders do not appear to be merely echoes of the United States but anxious,

I believe, to back up their neighbour when required to do so, as an independent friend should." To that end, in the postscript to his letter, he termed "magnificent" Johnson's speech the day before in Baltimore declaring US willingness to enter unconditional discussions towards a peaceful settlement in Vietnam (doc. 256).

That spring the Canadian government stated, both publicly and privately, its general position on the Vietnam War: it backed the purposes and objectives of US policy in Vietnam which aimed to let South Vietnam decide its own fate free from external aggression, urged restraint on the combatants since a purely military solution to the conflict was neither possible nor desirable, and, to that end, hoped for negotiations (docs 251, 260, 270). Martin told Cabinet in late May that he was convinced this was the right stance, even if US policy had prompted much "soul-searching" on both sides of the 49th parallel. Summing up the discussion, Pearson noted that a five-day bombing pause earlier that month, among other US olive branches, had only emboldened the other side, which clearly refused to negotiate (doc. 272). Nevertheless, as he told visiting Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, Ottawa was very worried where US involvement in Vietnam might lead (doc. 281). Martin probed the Soviet Union's position on negotiations (doc. 275) and pursued an initiative related to a forthcoming conference of African and Asian countries (docs 277–279, 284); Pearson, for his part, supported the idea of a Commonwealth peace mission (docs 280, 283, 285). But these efforts proved either unfruitful or abortive.

In late July, Johnson wrote to Pearson and other allied leaders to announce a US troop increase in Vietnam and to request "assistance," prompting debate in Ottawa on how to respond (docs 293–294). In Washington, a presidential assistant spoke at length with Charles Ritchie, who saw this as part of a broader diplomatic push by the administration as it bolstered the US military presence (doc. 298). Replying to Johnson, Pearson called the situation in Vietnam "deeply troubling," warned that the new US response might "occasion concern," but welcomed Johnson's pledge to pursue "a political resolution to this dangerous conflict." While reaffirming Canada's support for US goals, Pearson stressed it would be exercised within the "Geneva framework" (i.e., the ICSC), although he raised the possibility of increasing Canadian economic assistance to South Vietnam. Finally, he urged an early UN role in Vietnam (doc. 301). Given that there was some controversy in Canada about the type of aid that the president had requested, Pearson wanted to publish their exchange, but Johnson refused (doc. 306). A different approach was eventually taken (doc. 310), but only after McGeorge Bundy, according to Ritchie, accused Ottawa of trying to "dump our problems in the lap of the White House," dismissed Pearson's "patronizing" reply as "95% aimed at Canadian public opinion," and warned that the publication issue had irritated Johnson and risked reigniting the tensions between the two leaders caused by Pearson's speech at Temple University (doc. 308).

Meanwhile, Martin instructed the DEA to devise a peace plan for Vietnam (doc. 290). Elements of it appeared in an August memo to him warning of a dangerous stalemate and suggesting a change or end to a US bombing that had failed to force negotiations (doc. 305). Agreeing, Martin informed the Canadian embassy in Washington that it was time to play a "more active role diplomatically." He wondered if the lack of a predicted Viet Cong offensive during the current monsoon season signalled an interest in reducing hostilities, possibly enabling "a series of gestures and counter-gestures." In the circumstances, the Americans might test a bombing reduction or longer pause, leading ultimately to cessation (doc. 309). When Ritchie explored these ideas with William P. Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the State Department, the latter accepted their potential validity but was awaiting hard evidence that a reduction in Viet Cong military activity was politically motivated (doc. 312). Rusk later noted that Washington was not prepared to draw any such conclusions (doc. 317). As for North Vietnam, both US and Canadian officials agreed that fall that its stance remained rigid (docs 319–320, 323).

Nevertheless, as 1965 ended, the DEA suggested several Vietnam-related diplomatic initiatives, the most attractive being one within the ICSC (doc. 332). Martin discussed this possibility with British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart in London, expressing concern about the war's escalation ("God knows where it will end") and wondering how much longer they could support US goals in Vietnam if Canada and Britain were not seen to be doing their utmost to initiate negotiations. In a recurring complaint, Martin noted that Washington's failure to keep allies fully informed of its intentions was causing political difficulties for Ottawa (doc. 334). The minister was attracted to the DEA's idea that the ICSC call for a new Geneva Conference to revise its original terms of reference (doc. 335), such an approach being, from the perspective of others, as the DEA explained, "much less controversial and less difficult to accept in political terms than a more overt call for negotiations" (doc. 336). Meeting with Martin in Paris on the margins of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting, Rusk was non-committal on the ICSC idea, adding that the current prospects for negotiations were dim (doc. 337).

After Christmas, Johnson informed Pearson that the US would extend its most recent bombing pause into the New Year to give North Vietnam every chance to respond (doc. 338). After discussing matters with McGeorge Bundy in Ottawa, Pearson instructed the Canadian High Commission in India to tell Shastri that Pearson believed Johnson's move was serious. However, if it failed, Pearson was sure the US would intensify its war effort. He thus encouraged Shastri to use any channels available to him to elicit a positive reaction from North Vietnam or its allies, including the Soviet Union (doc. 340). Pearson's action was appreciated in Washington (doc. 341), including by Johnson, with whom he had a friendly

telephone conversation (doc. 342). Although Martin urged the Americans to prolong the pause to allow for a diplomatic breakthrough (doc. 344), bombing resumed at the end of January 1966. Told of the US decision by Ambassador W.W. Butterworth, Pearson "regretted the circumstances" that had prompted it, warning that the communists were counting on the world turning against the US and on a weak, unpopular South Vietnamese government. He opined that it would be harder for the president to resist US hawks than doves; nor would he easily find international backing for an indefinite and growing military intervention (doc. 348).

Chapter 5. Operation Smallbridge: The Ronning Visits (January–June 1966)

One reason Martin had hoped the US would extend its bombing pause was that he had decided to send Chester Ronning, who had retired from the Canadian diplomatic service in 1965, on special visits to Hanoi and Beijing (Ronning was born in China) (doc. 344). What would become known as "Operation Smallbridge" – Smallbridge being the apt codename given Ronning – is the focus of chapter 5. The idea was Martin's, but he refused to call it a "mission." Nor was it a bold effort to end the war; it was simply an attempt to gauge the views of key leaders in both capitals. Ronning himself was modest in his expectations (doc. 349). In Martin's view, both Canadian public opinion and the US government would welcome an initiative focused on achieving peace in Vietnam (doc. 350). Secrecy, however, was paramount, so much so that he did not want the project discussed by memorandum (doc. 350 n. 2).

The groundwork for the Smallbridge visits was laid over the next few weeks, as the North Vietnamese and Chinese were asked to receive him. In Washington, Ronning had informative talks with Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman and Bill Bundy (docs 352, 354). Although Rusk welcomed "any constructive initiative that might indicate a glimmer of light on the situation," he expressed concern to Martin that the subject of the People's Republic of China's representation (or lack thereof) at the UN might come up in Ronning's discussions (doc. 359). In mid-February, Pham Van Dong told Victor Moore, Canada's new commissioner on the ICSC, that the DRVN would be happy to receive Smallbridge, although he doubted the usefulness (doc. 361). Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, however, deemed Ronning's visit "inopportune," citing Canada's support of the US war in Vietnam (doc. 364). In the DEA's view, Chinese refusal to receive Ronning and recent publicity about Canada's interest in using the ICSC to stimulate negotiations meant that the exercise's original "cover" – that Ronning was in Vietnam to discuss the ICSC – was now closer to its true purpose, especially since Martin had authorized Ronning to meet with authorities in Saigon (doc. 366). In Hanoi, he was mandated to present Pearson's

reply to a recent letter from North Vietnamese president Ho Chi Minh, to outline Ottawa's views on the war, and (above all) to probe Hanoi's attitude to negotiations (doc. 369) through a set of DEA talking points (doc. 370).

In March 1966, Ronning visited Hanoi, where he met with several important figures, including, on the last day, Pham Van Dong. The North Vietnamese prime minister was as rigid as his colleagues about negotiations during most of the two-hour conversation with Ronning, which Moore recorded roughly verbatim (doc. 375). But, near the end, repeatedly questioned by Ronning about what it would take to begin some form of talks with the US, he suddenly became more accommodating. After stipulating that the US desist for good from attacking North Vietnam, he confirmed, when queried, that this condition did not apply to US military activity in South Vietnam. It was, in Ronning's words, a "very slight glimmer of hope" (doc. 373). To Moore, Ronning's performance was "brilliant," especially his "adroitness, persistence and sincerity" (doc. 374), praise echoed by Pearson in Cabinet: "Mr. Ronning, with his vast experience and knowledge of the Orient, had handled the discussions with great skill and intelligence." It was crucial, Pearson added, that their contents not be disclosed, since this would likely prompt the North Vietnamese to disavow them (doc. 377).

Hoping Pham Van Dong's proposition would be considered "at the highest level and with a sense of urgency" in Washington (doc. 378), the DEA distilled it into a short document Ronning took there (doc. 379). Meeting inconspicuously with Bundy at Ambassador Ritchie's residence, Ronning recounted his conversations in Hanoi, volunteering the view that North Vietnam was separating the bombing issue from the Four Points. According to Ritchie, Bundy remarked that, while Ronning's account and document would be studied closely, they "constituted hard cards to play" (doc. 380).

When, a month later, the Americans, dealing with a political crisis in South Vietnam, had still not devised a response to Pham Van Dong's proposition, Martin telephoned Bundy himself to stress the importance the Canadian government attached to the Ronning channel and the need for a reply (doc. 386). The démarche worked: within days, the State Department sent the DEA its assessment of what Ronning had uncovered, expressing skepticism that Pham Van Dong had in fact detached the bombing from the Four Points. The Canadians were asked to explore this question further in Hanoi – "smoke it out a bit," as Bundy had said earlier that month (doc. 383) – while stressing that Washington refused to cease its attacks without reciprocal action by Hanoi (doc. 387).

The US response initiated a second Ronning visit to Hanoi. In early May, he and Goldschlag met in Washington with Bundy and Paul Kreisberg of the State Department, the Americans declining to specify a price for a bombing halt (doc. 389). The Canadians left a redraft of the proposed US message to Hanoi (for the final version of this important document, see doc. 393). Later that month,

US Permanent Representative to the UN Arthur Goldberg told Martin that the Ronning exercise was the only significant sounding underway. Martin noted that Ottawa had known Ronning's "liberal views" on Vietnam and China might prompt concern in Washington but had full confidence in him, which led to Goldberg's reassurance that the US was solely concerned that the mission's exposure might complicate its relations with South Vietnam (doc. 390).

In early June, Ronning's prospects for success suffered a major blow when news leaked that the US had delivered a message to Chinese diplomats in Warsaw stating that it would stop bombing North Vietnam if its infiltration of the South ceased and it agreed to international verification. As the DEA informed Martin, in Brussels for a NATO meeting, "we find it difficult to comprehend why a message on these lines should be conveyed to Hanoi through the intermediary which is known to be most vehemently opposed to any form of accommodation in Vietnam." There were now two parallel US communications: the one Ronning would deliver studiously avoided naming a price for the bombing halt, whereas the message now given to the Chinese did just that (doc. 394). Martin worried aloud to Rusk about Smallbridge's credibility (doc. 395). Warning that "we shall be going to Hanoi with an empty bag," Moore argued that the Americans seemed to be "putting Hanoi behind the eight-ball again" for domestic propaganda (doc. 396). "We should take this message seriously," Pearson remarked. "It would be a sad ending to our initiative in this matter if we became merely an instrument of US propaganda or for putting the DRVN on the spot" (doc. 397).

Harbouring no illusions about its success, Martin still wanted Ronning's visit to Hanoi to occur since Rusk had told him that it was the "only" channel available and since it would allow the North Vietnamese to respond privately to the US proposals and to suggest ideas of their own (doc. 398). Crucially, Ronning was instructed to "do everything to keep open the contact, regardless of result" (doc. 401). In Washington, Bundy asked if Ronning could give the US ambassador in Vientiane the gist of his conversations in Hanoi. Since the bombing was reportedly starting to take a major toll on North Vietnam, the US was considering "playing about with pace of its actions" (doc. 402). Troubled by this request, Martin insisted Ronning brief the Canadian government first, giving only the "general flavour" of his conversations to US diplomats in the field (doc. 405).

The "glimmer of hope" Ronning saw on his first visit to Hanoi in March vanished during his second in June. Having delivered the US reply to Pham Van Dong's proposition, Ronning met with Deputy Prime Minister Trinh, who dismissed it as nothing new and refused to respond to the US insistence on military concessions to stop a bombing he termed "unjust." However, when he impugned Canadian good faith in delivering US "threats" and Ronning objected, Trinh softened, agreeing to keep the channel open (doc. 406). Moore, who recorded the lengthy exchange (doc. 408), noted in an explanatory telegram to

Ottawa that North Vietnam's leaders had had high expectations for the visit (doc. 409). The visit was discussed in Cabinet (doc. 410) and with US officials (in Ottawa), Martin warning them of the "adverse effects which an early escalation of USA activities against North Vietnam is likely to have both retroactively on the Ronning mission and potentially on the future use of the Canadian channel" (doc. 412). He was thus disturbed when in late June 1966 the US bombed oil depots in the country (doc. 414). Although Pearson greatly doubted North Vietnam would submit to this new show of force, he saw no point in criticizing the US decision (doc. 415).

Chapter 6. An ICSC Initiative? (February 1966–January 1967)

The Ronning visits to Hanoi were the most dramatic Canadian diplomatic initiative during the Vietnam War, but for a full year Ottawa pushed for a "good offices" role for the ICSC, the main topic of chapter 6. As Martin explained (separately) to U Thant and Rusk in February 1966, the Commission had no power to facilitate a conference through peace probes, but it was well suited to the task because it reflected the Cold War's three main blocs and maintained regular contact with the belligerents. However, rather than call for a diplomatic conference, as Ottawa had envisioned in late 1965, the ICSC instead might quietly explore the positions of the combatants, helping to narrow the gap between them and ultimately to enable negotiations (docs 417, 418).

U Thant and Rusk were encouraging, but Warsaw's and New Delhi's cooperation was required. To that end, Martin wrote to Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki (doc. 416), Singh (doc. 419), and, significantly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko (doc. 420). Rapacki was opposed, deeming the time not ripe (doc. 421); Singh was skeptical, noting the limits of the ICSC's powers (doc. 423); and Gromyko was simply unhelpful, urging Canada instead to convince the US to cease its aggression in Vietnam (doc. 428). Meanwhile, Moore sought guidance regarding Canada's approach to the ICSC's work (doc. 425), eliciting an important reply from the DEA (doc. 427). Disappointed but not defeated by Gromyko's response, Martin told Ambassador of the Soviet Union to Canada Ivan Shpedko, who dismissed as "useless" ICSC initiatives in the face of the United States' continued aggression, that an unsuccessful attempt was better than none, pledging the Canadian government would continue its efforts (doc. 429).

The visit to Canada in late June by First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Dmitri Polyansky gave the Canadians another opportunity to press their case. Although the largely successful trip earned him the nickname "the Canadian" back in Moscow (doc. 473), in Ottawa Polyansky restated the established Soviet position on Vietnam (doc. 431). During a dinner at 24 Sussex Drive, Pearson warned Polyansky that fruitful approaches to ending

the Vietnam War could not be based on the idea that the US was solely responsible for it, though Pearson conceded the Americans had made a mistake. Bemoaning Vietnam's destructive effect on the previous good relations between the US and the Soviet Union, he even offered to arrange for a senior US official – or officials – to meet quietly with Polyansky in Ottawa, but the latter refused (docs 433–434). In late July, Martin returned to the charge with Shpedko, noting that, as an example of what the ICSC might achieve, a joint declaration by Indira Gandhi, Wladyslaw Gomulka, and Pearson would be hard for the world to ignore (doc. 437).

The Canadians also stayed in close touch with the Americans about Vietnam. In his first meeting with Johnson, Canada's new ambassador to the United States, A.E. Ritchie (no relation of Charles), was granted more insight into the president's thinking than he bargained for. As usual, Johnson stressed the precision of US bombing, criticizing foreign leaders who denounced such careful operations but said nothing about the other side's atrocities. When Johnson singled out Canada in this respect, Ritchie suggested this was inaccurate. "I like Mr. Pearson," Johnson said, but not speeches "in his own yard" telling him what to do. Later, putting his hand on Ritchie's shoulder, he asked him to tell Pearson and Martin to continue to understand the US position in Vietnam and to pursue the kind of work Ronning had done "if only to make sure that nothing is missed" (doc. 435). But the president knew such efforts were unlikely to succeed, a view US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara echoed to Ritchie (doc. 440), although Rusk had expressed optimism to Martin about an eventual diplomatic breakthrough (doc. 436). Having recently returned from a new visit to Hanoi, Moore doubted whether any advance would occur via the Canadian channel to that city (doc. 442), prompting Martin's disagreement (docs 444–445).

The DEA's analysis of various ideas for ending the war confirmed its preference for realistic approaches. Instructed by Martin to review suggestions that Pearson had advanced in an earlier speech, the Department conceded that a public "peace plan" was attractive but warned that it "would probably be less productive of real results over the longer term than our current, more flexible approach" (doc. 432). Similarly, the DEA advised Martin against pursuing Rusk's idea of an "expanding" conference on Vietnam in Geneva since such diplomatic "optical illusions" risked tarnishing Canada's more "seriously intentioned … efforts" (doc. 438). The DEA was also skeptical about U Thant's three-point peace proposal, which seemed to lean towards Hanoi (doc. 446).

At the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that autumn, Martin discussed Vietnam with, among others, Gromyko, Goldberg, Rapacki, Singh, U Thant, and Stewart (docs 447–450, 455, 456). He informed Stewart that Canada had hoped the ICSC could facilitate disengagement in Vietnam's DMZ, the scene of recent heavy fighting, but had been stymied by Poland. There was little progress anywhere, Martin concluded. He was particularly disturbed that Gromyko had

raised with him the spectre of a Soviet-Chinese-US military confrontation in Vietnam. One of the problems was that the Russians and Eastern Europeans seemed to doubt the United States' word that it did not seek a permanent presence in Vietnam. From Moscow, Canadian Ambassador Robert Ford argued, in an analysis Pearson suggested be shared with a few Americans, that convincing the Russians of US sincerity was the "hub of matter" (doc. 452). Ambassador Ritchie disagreed: even if the Russians could be persuaded that US intentions were genuine and would agree to urge the North Vietnamese to negotiate, any settlement based on a neutral and independent South Vietnam was anathema to Hanoi (doc. 458). Echoing this view, George Ignatieff, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, observed, "Main problem seems to be how compromise can be found between divergent political aims of Hanoi and Washington regarding Vietnam" (doc. 459).

Martin's visits to Poland and to the Soviet Union in November 1966 were marked by intensive discussions on Vietnam. The ICSC loomed large in Warsaw, but the more active diplomatic role Martin sought for it clashed with Rapacki's preference that it lay mostly dormant for now (docs 465–467). In Moscow, Martin was well received by Soviet leaders, including Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev, but achieved no breakthroughs. As had the Poles, the Russians insisted the US cease bombing but declined to say how, aside from an improvement in the general atmosphere, either the North Vietnamese or they themselves would respond (docs 470–474). Nevertheless, Martin told Pope Paul VI in Rome that, while DEA officials might disagree, he believed leaders in Warsaw and Moscow were interested in peace and in assisting if the bombing stopped. Asked by the Pope how the war could be ended, Martin suggested first asking the US to suspend its bombing, then appealing to Soviet leaders to pressure Hanoi (doc. 475). In Washington later that month, he did just that with (a skeptical) Rusk, who incidentally had been alarmed by an earlier press report from Moscow indicating that Canada might join the Soviet Union and other countries in calling for a unilateral end to the bombing (doc. 477). Rusk queried Martin whether there was any merit in asking Canadian, Indian, and Polish officials to meet in Geneva to see if they could "start something going" on Vietnam (doc. 480). As Cadieux reminded his minister, Rusk had made similar suggestions over the last year (doc. 481).

Hope for ICSC action was rekindled in early December when the Indians suggested to the Canadians and Poles a preliminary meeting in New Delhi to discuss a recent proposal by a Harvard University professor for a Commission-sponsored diplomatic conference on Vietnam (doc. 482). Fearing Canada's isolation by India and Poland on the bombing question, the DEA sought to ensure that any ICSC initiative was unanimous and balanced (doc. 485). While Rusk was "inherently sympathetic" to the Canadian ideas (doc. 488), when Goldberg publicly appealed to U Thant to facilitate ceasefire talks Martin sought (and

received) confirmation from Rusk that the Americans had not meant to cut across the Canadian-Indian project, the details of which Martin now asked Ignatieff to share with U Thant (doc. 492). Since Polish participation was essential to any ICSC initiative, Martin urged from Rapacki a favourable response (doc. 496).

Shortly after Christmas, U Thant shared with Ignatieff for Martin's benefit "very secret" information from the Poles about their recent efforts to arrange direct talks between the US and North Vietnam, an operation they claimed had been scuttled by the US bombings of Hanoi that month (doc. 499). As Cadieux told Martin, it was difficult to understand why Rusk had been silent about the Americans' discussions with the Poles, nor "what advantage the United States could see in pursuing at least three separate and simultaneous approaches to a Vietnam settlement … which could not readily be reconciled with one another and which were being conducted in circumstances where some of the intermediaries concerned did not know what undertakings might have been given and what mandates might have been entrusted to others" (doc. 501). When Ritchie, on DEA instructions, sought Rusk's reaction to U Thant's account, Rusk replied that the Poles had demanded secrecy, that their version of events had inaccuracies and was incomplete, and that US officials saw no conflict between such soundings and a possible ICSC initiative (doc. 503). That initiative collapsed in New Delhi in January 1967 (doc. 508). Recapping this latest disappointment in a letter to Martin, Michener appended to it his own proposal for ICSC action (doc. 509). But the DEA advised the minister "that, for the time being at least, it might be more profitable to look for progress in another direction" (doc. 510).

Chapter 7. Final Efforts (January 1967–April 1968)

By 1967, public pressure on the Canadian government to condemn the US war in Vietnam was mounting. Instead, Ottawa redoubled its efforts to find a peaceful resolution, as documented in chapter 7. When the Faculty Committee on Vietnam, a group of Canada-based academics, called on the government to "demand" a permanent end to the US bombing and to consider banning weapons exports to the United States (doc. 511), Pearson and Martin met with its spokesmen. While the government might not agree with everything the committee believed it "ought to do," Pearson insisted it was doing "*everything* it *could* do." Simply demanding an end to the bombing would achieve little and damage Canada's credibility in Washington (and, by extension, Martin added, in Hanoi). While some Canadian military equipment sold to the US ended up in Vietnam – "there is no use kidding ourselves" Pearson said (doc. 513) – in his formal reply to the Faculty Committee he stressed the far-reaching economic and political consequences of Canada's trying to impose restrictions on military exports to the US (doc. 526), a viewpoint fully shared by DEA officials, as their analyses of the issue make clear (docs 512,

523, 527). In Cabinet, a day after making an important public statement on the government's policy on the Vietnam War in which he stressed his preference for "quiet diplomacy," Martin predicted that "Canada's record would look very good when the full story could be told" (doc. 520).

Although proactive, the DEA and Martin found it hard to know where and when to jump in next. For example, in early February, Cadieux suggested to Martin two possible formulae for bridging the gap between the US and North Vietnam but warned that "we may well be at the periphery of a real negotiation which is going on without our full knowledge" (doc. 515). Indeed, later that month, important but ultimately abortive conversations on Vietnam were held in London between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, details of which Goldberg shared with Martin and Pearson (doc. 525). Although the trio agreed to let the dust settle, Martin engaged in some personal diplomacy of his own with the Polish and Soviet ambassadors in Ottawa (docs 532, 534, 536). The idea of an ICSC initiative still appealed to Canadian, Indian, and US diplomats, but the DEA believed that the timing had to be right: "We would hope that this technique might be held in reserve for possible use when conditions suggest that it might offer prospects for success" (doc. 537).

In mid-April, speaking before the House of Commons External Affairs Committee, Martin proposed a four-stage return to the Geneva Agreement of 1954, beginning with a cessation of US bombing and restoration of the *status quo ante* in the DMZ. Since no other diplomatic initiatives seemed underway, the DEA argued that it was "useful to throw out some kind of lifeline" (doc. 541). South Vietnam and the US responded favourably, but not North Vietnam. Rusk, reported Ritchie, "hoped that Canadians would draw the right conclusion from this incident but he rather doubted that we would do so" (doc. 544). However, as the DEA informed the Americans, the latter had only offered to suspend their military activity in the DMZ, despite the proposal's first stage entailing an end to *all* US bombing (doc. 554). Martin also had frank conversations with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow and Goldberg (docs 548, 545). Although Rostow described the Canadian attitude as too "pious," he confirmed that the US would be prepared to stop the war if Canada could "deliver the goods" by getting North Vietnam to agree to reciprocal action of some kind. In Martin's view, US authorities sought almost any pretext to de-escalate the war, even if their current military response suggested otherwise.

The Vietnam War exposed cracks in Cabinet solidarity in May when President of the Privy Council Walter Gordon publicly criticized the US. At an unusual Cabinet meeting, Pearson read a prepared statement on the government's policy that he had shown in advance to Martin and whose last line stressed that every member of the government endorsed that policy and would not hinder its pursuit (doc. 555). But it was an earlier sentence, expressing the hope that the US, as the

strongest belligerent, would take the initiative to cease bombing and to demand immediate negotiations, that caught the DEA's eye. As Cadieux and Assistant Under-Secretary Ralph Collins warned Martin, since the US would hardly agree, it was one thing to take such a position privately, quite another publicly. Thomas Delworth, the DEA's Vietnam desk officer and the unacknowledged author of numerous documents printed in this volume, wanted to ensure that Martin grasped the line's departure from the government's previous insistence on a balance between what was asked of Washington and Hanoi (doc. 556). No doubt to the DEA's relief, the Cabinet statement was not made public.

In private, in late May, Pearson pressed his case with President Johnson at the prime ministerial retreat at Harrington Lake, northwest of Ottawa (earlier, Johnson had visited Expo 67 in Montreal). As Pearson wrote in his diary, Johnson recited his usual "*apologia pro mea guerra*" but reacted calmly to the suggestion that ending the bombing would deprive the communists of their last excuse for refusing to negotiate. When the pair joined their advisors, however, Johnson vigorously defended US policy, warning of the American "boys" who would be killed during any pause or cessation and dismissing such a move's potential diplomatic benefits. "He has an intense human emotionalism about the conflict which does him credit as a man, but could be a great handicap in dealing with international political strategy and tactics," observed Pearson, whose account of the conversation (doc. 560) should be read with Ritchie's own (doc. 561). Days later, during Wilson's visit to Ottawa, Martin regretted not knowing more about how the United States envisioned an end to the Vietnam War (doc. 563).

At a NATO meeting in Luxembourg in mid-June, Martin urged a frank exchange on Vietnam (doc. 567) and met individually with Rusk, who seemed unusually worried about the war and thus more receptive to bombing-related suggestions, himself floating the idea of its permanent end if North Vietnam accepted an international force in the DMZ (doc. 564). The DEA found this "extremely interesting" since it evoked the first stage of Martin's own proposal that spring (doc. 565). But a month later Bill Bundy informed Ritchie that the State Department found the timing not right for such an initiative. Frustrated, Martin wrote in the margin of the relevant telegram, "The idea, of course, was Rusk's" (doc. 571 n. 80).

As the DEA had known since Ronning's first visit to Hanoi, ending the bombing was key to initiating negotiations, but everything hinged on how North Vietnam would respond. This unknown confounded proposals for ending the war, as analyses of ideas advanced by Canadian missions in London and Paris and by others make clear (docs 547, 551–552, 557). There was also the thorny question of whether to use private or public diplomacy. As Cadieux advised Martin that summer, "I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by putting public pressure on the Americans to stop the bombing without reciprocity." Any

unreciprocated end to the bombing should both be – and appear to be – an autonomous US action rather than the result of international pressure (doc. 570).

But Martin was increasingly leaning towards a public stand. He warned Goldberg and Rusk against a possible resolution in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) advocating negotiations since Canada (which was serving a term there) would be hard pressed not to support any amendment that urged an unconditional cessation of the bombing (docs 575, 578). After telling British Foreign Secretary George Brown that the time had come for "drastic steps" to end the war (doc. 582), Martin used his speech before the UNGA in late September to call for an end to the bombing as the first step in starting negotiations, a policy shift US embassy officials confirmed with the DEA (doc. 585). Concerned about the direction of Canadian-American relations, Rusk remarked to Ritchie during an important exchange in mid-November that the ICSC now had two neutral countries (i.e., India and Canada), a claim Ritchie challenged. Rusk had been "shaken" by Martin's stance on the UNSC resolution. He also queried why government and public opinion in Canada differed so much from that in countries nearer Vietnam, prompting Ritchie to stress a North American truth: that the spectrum of opinions in Canada and the United States was very similar (doc. 595).

The prospects for peace in Vietnam in the fall of 1967 seemed as bleak as ever. After visiting Hanoi, O.W. Dier, Canada's new commissioner on the ICSC, warned that "it would be a mistake to question either the sincerity or fortitude of DRVN leaders" (doc. 583). Nevertheless, the Canadian government remained interested in schemes for stimulating negotiations. Pearson responded to one by the president of the World Federation of United Nations Associations that, after failing to gain traction, took an unrealistic turn (docs 577, 579, 590, 603, 612). The DEA was more focused on a Japanese-Canadian project originating with Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki for "mutual guarantees," one designed to overcome the evident distrust between the United States and North Vietnam (docs 594, 596–598, 606–607). In early January 1968, however, Martin asked Miki to postpone work on it since he had sent Dier to Hanoi to clarify a reported statement by Trinh that North Vietnam would engage in talks with the US if the bombing stopped (docs 609–610). However, Trinh told Dier that the (more ambiguous) North Vietnamese position remained the same (doc. 615). "If words mean anything in Hanoi," Cadieux informed Martin, "the change from 'could' to 'will' is clearly a substantive one, yet this is not the emphasis the Foreign Minister has put on it" (doc. 616). Still, Dier urged the DEA to "keep trying to do what we can to try to bring this grisly war to an end" (doc. 617).

That war became especially grisly in late January 1968 when North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched a surprise offensive in South Vietnam during the Vietnamese Lunar New Year holiday of Tet. Meeting afterwards in Ottawa, Pearson and Wilson agreed that, for the time being, there was little hope for a

political solution to the conflict. The Tet Offensive failed militarily but profoundly influenced public opinion in the US and elsewhere: "Mr. Pearson pointed out that one of the weaknesses in the U.S. position was a tragic and developing credibility gap. Their friends could hardly believe some of the figures they were releasing concerning casualties" (doc. 621). With emotions running high in Washington, neither Pearson nor Martin was inclined to pursue Official Opposition Leader John Diefenbaker's suggestion in Parliament of an all-party resolution urging a cessation of the US bombing (docs 628–629).

In a televised address on 31 March 1968, President Johnson announced that the US had unilaterally ceased all attacks on North Vietnam except in an undefined area north of the DMZ. Raising the possibility of a complete bombing halt, he called on the North Vietnamese to engage in talks to end the war. He also stated that he would not stand for another term as president. Writing to Johnson, Pearson (who himself would resign as prime minister in mid-April) noted "how deeply grateful I think the whole world should be for the proposals you have made and for the courage and wisdom you have shown in making them" (doc. 631). The next day, however, he was gravely concerned about reports US planes were continuing to bomb deep in North Vietnam. He even wondered if the US military was defying the president (doc. 632). As it turned out, in briefing Ambassador Ritchie before Johnson's speech, Bill Bundy had failed to mention that the northern limit of the bombing would be the 20th parallel (doc. 633). This contretemps was overshadowed by news on 3 April that North Vietnam had agreed to direct contact with the US about the bombing (doc. 635) so that more expansive talks could begin.

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As stated, the focus of this volume is on Canadian diplomacy during the Vietnam War, from Canada's stance on the ICSC to the broader initiatives the country pursued to end the conflict. Thus, and for reasons of length, certain topics, such as Canada's small development assistance program to South Vietnam (which, as readers will see, is referenced in passing in certain documents), do not receive dedicated coverage. Within the confines of the selected theme, the volume aims to be as comprehensive as possible in its selection of the most important documents; it is also designed to better acquaint readers with the breadth of archival material available. As with previous DCER entries, this volume is overwhelmingly based on the records of the DEA. It is supplemented as necessary by material from the Privy Council Office and from the private papers of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and senior officials. In conducting our research, we had complete access to the files of the DEA and were given generous access to other collections. A complete list of the archival sources used in this volume can be found on page lxxi. I remain solely responsible for the final selection of the documents.

The editorial apparatus in this volume is similar to that described in the Introduction to Volume 9 (p. xix). A dagger (†) indicates a document that is not printed. Editorial excisions are shown by an ellipsis ([…]). The phrase "group corrupt" or "group missing" indicates decryption problems in the transmission of the original telegram. Words and passages that were struck out by the author, marginal notes, and distribution lists are reproduced as footnotes only when important. Unless otherwise indicated, it is assumed that documents were read by the intended recipient. Efforts have been made to remain as faithful to the original documents as possible, including maintaining the terse style of telegrams. The editor has silently emended spelling, capitalization, and punctuation only when necessary to ensure comprehension and readability. All other editorial changes to the documents are indicated with square brackets. Documents are reprinted in either English or French, depending on the original language in which they were written.

Every DCER volume is a collective effort, and this one was no different. I am particularly indebted to my colleagues in the Historical Section of Global Affairs Canada (GAC). Jennifer Anderson, the assistant editor of the volume, conducted most of the archival research for it and played a pivotal role in every editorial task. Lisa Komar sacrificed precious time from our work on the next DCER volume to skillfully copyedit the manuscript. Jennifer and Lisa also coordinated the production of the volume. Before her retirement in 2022, Janice Cavell, a long-time DCER editor, provided valuable advice, including an indispensable 50-page guide she wrote for future series editors. This being the first DCER volume since the premature death of Greg Donaghy, my predecessor as head of the Historical Section and a former editor and general editor of the series, I would also like to pay tribute to his remarkable contribution to the field of Canadian diplomatic history.

In preparing this book, the Historical Section was well served by various archivists, librarians, and research assistants. We are grateful to Library and Archives Canada (LAC), especially its consultation staff and research support teams, including the ever-helpful Alix McEwen. Élizabeth Mongrain, Geneviève Couture, and David Rajotte of LAC's Science, Governance and Political Private Archives Division facilitated our access to important private fonds and, with Renaud Séguin of the Government Records Branch, responded quickly to reference requests. Similarly, Sylvia Lassam, who in 2025 retired as archivist of the University of Toronto's Victoria College, aided our consultation of the J. Blair Seaborn fonds. Researchers will be interested to know that LAC's Block Review team, in a project led by declassification expert Paul Marsden, reviewed and opened most of those files on Canada and Vietnam that were still restricted, allowing readers to pursue the archival leads suggested in the documents printed here. We also received valuable research support from Kaelyn Hunter of GAC's Jules Léger Library, Emma Kuiack of CDCI Research, and Christopher Cook.

We have benefited as well from the assistance of historians near and far, including John MacFarlane and Jean-Michel Turcotte of the Directorate of History and Heritage of the Department of National Defence, co-authors of the forthcoming official history of Canadian military observers on the ICSC in Indochina. I am also grateful to my counterparts on the International Committee of Editors of Diplomatic Documents for generously sharing with me their own experiences and best practices. Richard Smith of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Miruko Atsuta of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Piotr Dlugolecki of the Polish Institute of International Affairs helpfully identified individuals in our List of Persons. I am fortunate as well to have the continued advice and encouragement of many academic historians, including (but not limited to) Robert Bothwell, Norman Hillmer (a former DCER editor), Stephen Azzi, and Tim Sayle.

This volume's production relied on certain key people and groups. Publishing expert Carolyn Brown examined our processes and offered valuable advice on them. The transcription of the archival documents was carefully overseen by Data Conversion Laboratory Inc. Anne Louise Mahoney copyedited an early version of this manuscript. Translators Katerine Arpin, Tarik Brahmi, Louis Ménard, and Étienne Rancourt of the Translation Bureau within Public Services and Procurement Canada supplied the French versions of the footnotes, captions, and ancillary texts. The volume was proofread by Joel Kropf of CDCI Research and indexed by Donald Howes of DH Indexing. Marquis Book Printing handled the book's layout and printing. Our divisional colleague Jaime Cote helpfully assisted with contracting-related work. The Canadian Research Knowledge Network hosts the GAC Digital Library, where the digital editions of every DCER volume can be viewed and downloaded.

The DCER series would not be possible without the continued support of our management at GAC. In particular, we thank Assistant Deputy Minister Catherine Jobin, Director General Nadia Ahmad, and successive Foreign Policy Research Division directors Pegatha Taylor, Martin Roy, and Mark McLaughlin for their steadfast backing. Now part of GAC's Open Insights Hub, the Historical Section owes a special debt of gratitude to our Executive Director, Christopher Burton.

Finally, my family, especially my wife, Michelle, and my daughter, Amelia, were a constant source of strength and happiness throughout this project. My heartfelt thanks to them both.

Brendan Kelly

INTRODUCTION

Le présent volume des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* (DRREC) examine la diplomatie canadienne pendant la guerre du Vietnam, plus précisément de 1963 à 1968. La période allant de 1968 à 1973 fera l'objet d'un deuxième volume. Depuis la création des DRREC en 1967, trois volumes thématiques ont été publiés[1]. Le présent ouvrage marque la réorientation de la série, passant d'un « dossier complet des principales décisions prises par le gouvernement canadien en matière de politique étrangère, des raisons qui ont amené le gouvernement canadien à les prendre ainsi que des grands courants et événements internationaux qui ont touché le Canada »[2] (portant en général sur une période d'environ un an) vers une démarche thématique plus souple visant à étudier en profondeur les principaux enjeux et événements, qu'ils soient survenus sur un court laps de temps ou (comme c'est le cas dans le présent volume) sur une période beaucoup plus longue.

Un tel changement permet d'harmoniser les DRREC avec des collections de documents diplomatiques similaires rassemblées dans d'autres pays et présente des avantages narratifs en expliquant dans un seul volume l'évolution de la politique étrangère du Canada sur un sujet majeur. Il permet également de relever un important défi auquel les DRREC sont de plus en plus confrontés pour documenter les années 1960 et au-delà, à savoir la quantité impressionnante de documents produits par le ministère des Affaires extérieures (MAE). Cette augmentation s'explique par les avancées technologiques et par des enjeux toujours plus nombreux et complexes sur la scène internationale, une tendance qui se poursuit aujourd'hui. L'adoption de la démarche thématique vise à assurer la faisabilité des DRREC et ainsi à préserver leur viabilité à long terme en tant que ressource scientifique essentielle. Par conséquent, ce livre constitue le premier volume d'une nouvelle série thématique des DRREC, qui porte principalement sur la période commençant après le milieu de l'année 1963, c'est-à-dire là où s'est arrêté le dernier volume strictement chronologique de cette collection.

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1 *Documents relatifs aux relations entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve*, vol. 1, compilé par Paul Bridle (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1974); *Documents relatifs aux relations entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve*, vol. 2, parties 1-2, compilé par Paul Bridle (Ottawa, Ministère des Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1984); *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada : l'Arctique, 1874-1949*, sous la direction de Janice Cavell (Ottawa, Affaires mondiales Canada, 2016).

2 « Introduction », dans *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*, vol. 7, compilé par David R. Murray (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1974), p. ix.

Le conflit au Vietnam fut un événement déterminant de la Guerre froide. Dans les années 1960 et au début des années 1970, il eut également une incidence considérable sur les relations du Canada avec les États-Unis, son voisin et allié le plus proche. Ainsi, la guerre du Vietnam sollicita la participation de certains des diplomates canadiens les plus hauts placés et les plus influents. Comme il est documenté dans les volumes précédents des DRREC, le Canada était membre, avec la Pologne communiste et l'Inde non alignée, de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle (CISC) au Vietnam. La CISC avait été créée en application des Accords de Genève de 1954 pour superviser un cessez-le-feu débouchant sur le retrait de la France de ses anciennes colonies au Vietnam, au Cambodge et au Laos (trois accords distincts sur la cessation des hostilités dans chacun de ces trois États donnèrent lieu à la création de trois commissions distinctes). En 1963, la situation se détériorait au Vietnam, qui avait été temporairement divisé le long du 17e parallèle en un État communiste au nord – la République démocratique du Vietnam (RDVN) – et un État non communiste au sud – la République du Vietnam. Cette dégradation se produisit malgré l'aide militaire croissante fournie par les États-Unis au Sud-Vietnam pour renforcer sa lutte contre le Front national de libération (FNL, ou Viêt-cong), un mouvement d'insurrection dirigé par les communistes.

Partie 1 : La frustration à l'égard de la CISC, et un intermédiaire secret (1963-1965)

Le présent volume est divisé en deux parties. La première, intitulée « La frustration à l'égard de la CISC, et un intermédiaire secret (1963-1965) », présente des documents datés d'avril 1963 à novembre 1965, une période durant laquelle l'érosion de la sécurité au Sud-Vietnam poussa, au début de 1965, les États-Unis à lancer une campagne de bombardements progressive, mais soutenue, sur des cibles au Nord-Vietnam, ce qui constitua une escalade dangereuse (et controversée). Selon le gouvernement du Canada, la principale cause de l'instabilité qui secouait le Sud-Vietnam était l'agression et la subversion menées en secret par le Nord-Vietnam. En 1962, dans un rapport spécial signé par la majorité constituée de l'Inde et du Canada (la Pologne étant dissidente), la CISC accepta les conclusions d'un rapport distinct rédigé par son Comité juridique. Selon ces conclusions, « du personnel armé et non armé, des armes, des munitions et d'autres fournitures » avaient été envoyés du Nord-Vietnam vers le Sud-Vietnam « afin de soutenir, d'organiser et de mener des activités hostiles, notamment des attaques armées, dirigées contre les forces armées et l'administration » du Sud-Vietnam, et l'armée nord-vietnamienne avait permis l'utilisation du territoire du Nord-Vietnam pour « inciter, encourager et soutenir

des activités hostiles » au Sud-Vietnam « visant à y renverser l'administration »[3]. Le rapport spécial mentionnait également que le Sud-Vietnam avait violé les Accords de Genève en recevant une aide militaire des États-Unis dépassant la limite autorisée, et en concluant avec ce pays des accords militaires équivalant à une « alliance militaire de fait » [4].

Chapitre 1. La CISC et la question de la subversion (avril 1963-juin 1965)

Comme le montrent les documents du chapitre 1, le Canada s'efforça d'attirer l'attention de la Commission sur la subversion fomentée par le Nord-Vietnam. Dans son rapport cité ci-dessus, le Comité juridique de la CISC s'était engagé à rédiger un rapport complet sur les plaintes formulées par la Mission de liaison du Sud-Vietnam auprès de la CISC, en y intégrant les preuves à l'appui et l'évaluation du comité. Au paragraphe 10 de son rapport spécial, la CISC prit un engagement : « En fonction du rapport complet, que le Comité juridique rédige actuellement sur toutes les allégations et tous les incidents, la Commission prendra les mesures appropriées à chaque cas particulier »[5].

Au printemps 1963, une version provisoire du rapport juridique (comme il fut appelé) complet, rédigée par les conseillers juridiques indiens et canadiens de la CISC, était prête. Depuis Saïgon, le commissaire canadien Gordon Cox informa le MAE que son homologue indien considérait le rapport comme une « véritable bombe » qui risquerait d'aggraver la situation au Vietnam. En revanche, Cox pensait que « si la Commission prenait des mesures pour donner suite au rapport juridique et que sa vive préoccupation quant aux cas de subversion devenait publique, cela pourrait avoir un effet bénéfique et contribuer à réduire ces activités » (doc. 1). Cox et le MAE souhaitaient vivement souligner les principales conclusions du rapport juridique selon lesquelles le Nord-Vietnam et le FNL travaillaient ensemble pour renverser le gouvernement du Sud-Vietnam. L'adoption officielle par la CISC du rapport juridique, qui contenait des preuves de violations des Accords de Genève commises par le Nord-Vietnam de 1955 à 1961, permettrait aussi à la Commission d'établir un plan d'action pour les nouvelles plaintes de subversion qui lui seraient présentées par le Sud-Vietnam (doc. 2).

Pendant près de deux ans, le Canada tenta en vain de convaincre l'Inde d'examiner le rapport juridique au sein de la CISC. Au départ, il était permis d'espérer, notamment en avril 1963, lorsque le commissaire indien indiqua à Cox

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3 Royaume-Uni, Documents parlementaires, Cmnd. 1755, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (Londres, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), p. 7.

4 Ibid., p. 10.

5 Ibid., p. 7.

que, malgré ses réserves sur certaines sections du rapport, il l'appuyait en général et pensait que la CISC devrait l'adopter par une décision majoritaire (doc. 4). Toutefois, comme la version provisoire était longue, les Indiens voulaient qu'elle soit révisée conjointement. Cet « examen ligne par ligne » dura donc jusqu'à la fin de l'année (doc. 53). Par ailleurs, il existait des signes inquiétants que l'Inde pourrait revenir sur son engagement d'adopter le rapport juridique comme document officiel de la Commission et de le transmettre aux coprésidents de la Conférence de Genève de 1954 (la Grande-Bretagne et l'Union soviétique). Le MAE attribua ce revirement à la volonté de l'Inde de se plier aux souhaits de l'Union soviétique, dont l'Inde cherchait le soutien dans sa rivalité avec la Chine (doc. 13). Selon Chester Ronning, haut-commissaire du Canada en Inde, le secrétaire aux Affaires étrangères de l'Inde, Y.D. Gundevia, préférait « l'inaction de la Commission » à « l'action » de celle-ci (doc. 19).

En 1964, le comportement des Indiens au sein de la CISC au Vietnam avait suscité « un sentiment d'inutilité et de découragement » chez Cox, qui affirma : ils « ont clairement adopté une attitude consistant à attendre sans rien faire, et tant qu'il n'y aura pas de changement, notre position restera difficile, frustrante et, d'une certaine façon, dégradante » (doc. 28). Le MAE était également contrarié : « Nous avons tendance à considérer l'inaction comme un manquement à nos responsabilités, compte tenu de ce que l'on sait du soutien croissant fourni au Viêt-cong par le Nord-Vietnam. » L'incapacité de la CISC de donner suite au rapport spécial de 1962, sans parler des nouveaux cas de subversion présentés à son Comité juridique, porta gravement atteinte au « principe même du maintien de la paix internationale » (doc. 31). En juillet 1964, Blair Seaborn, le successeur de Cox à titre de commissaire, résuma la situation ainsi : « Depuis 1954, l'intérêt du public n'a probablement jamais été autant centré sur l'Indochine que durant la dernière année, et la Commission n'a jamais été aussi léthargique et muette » (doc. 37).

Le signalement d'attaques nord-vietnamiennes contre des navires de guerre américains dans le golfe du Tonkin en août 1964, qui avaient provoqué le premier bombardement américain du Nord-Vietnam, attira l'attention du monde entier et sortit la CISC de sa léthargie. Il devint clair que l'Inde et la Pologne voulaient envoyer un message sur les incidents du golfe du Tonkin aux coprésidents de la Conférence de Genève. Le Canada s'opposa fermement à cette initiative, puisque le silence total de la CISC depuis le rapport spécial de 1962 signifiait qu'elle ne pouvait guère « agir rapidement… sans présenter une image déformée et hors contexte de la situation » (doc. 45). Au lieu de cela, les diplomates canadiens insistèrent pour que la CISC produisît un rapport provisoire complet (et attendu depuis longtemps) qui donnerait à la question de la subversion l'importance qu'elle méritait. Impassibles face à leurs arguments, les Indiens votèrent avec les Polonais, à la mi-novembre, en faveur d'un message spécial de la CISC (ou « rapport ») sur les incidents du golfe du Tonkin (doc. 58).

Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Paul Martin, chargea Roland Michener, le nouveau haut-commissaire en Inde, d'informer les Indiens que ce *fait accompli* à Saïgon n'avait pas diminué la détermination du Canada à demander à la CISC de s'occuper entièrement du rapport juridique et de la question de la subversion, si nécessaire de façon unilatérale (doc. 59). Il s'agissait d'une allusion voilée à ce que le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Marcel Cadieux, avait décrit à Martin comme une « position extrême », mais « peut-être le principal atout disponible », c'est-à-dire que le Canada ajoutait à tout message spécial une déclaration minoritaire dont l'un des principaux éléments serait le rapport juridique, qui n'avait toujours pas été adopté (doc. 50). En janvier 1965, après l'échec des diplomates canadiens et indiens à parvenir à un compromis, Cadieux informa Martin en marge d'un document qu'une telle action était « douloureuse, mais nécessaire » et « bénéfique pour les Indiens eux-mêmes », puisque « par le passé, leur rôle au sein de la Commission avait trop souvent été orienté vers leurs objectifs politiques changeants plutôt que vers l'intérêt supérieur de servir la communauté internationale de manière ferme et équitable » (doc. 67 n. 41).

En fin de compte, ce ne furent pas les incidents du golfe du Tonkin qui motivèrent la rédaction d'un rapport spécial de la CISC, mais plutôt les frappes aériennes menées par les États-Unis et le Sud-Vietnam sur le Nord-Vietnam les 7 et 8 février 1965, en représailles aux attaques du Viêt-cong contre des installations militaires américaines. Comme Cadieux le fit remarquer à Martin, « en se limitant à prendre en compte les activités des États-Unis et du Sud-Vietnam », la version de l'Inde « laisse entendre que l'entière responsabilité de la situation dangereuse au Vietnam n'incombe qu'à ces deux pays » (doc. 71). Lorsque la déclaration fut approuvée par la majorité constituée de l'Inde et de la Pologne lors de la réunion de la CISC du 13 février, Seaborn présenta la réponse minoritaire du Canada. Cette réponse replaçait les frappes aériennes dans le contexte général de la subversion fomentée par le Nord-Vietnam, en citant unilatéralement des extraits des principales conclusions du rapport juridique (doc. 72). Lors du dépôt du rapport spécial de la CISC au Parlement, il fut conseillé à Martin « de faire clairement ressortir le rôle de force perturbatrice joué par le Nord-Vietnam » au Vietnam, ce qui était « un aspect de la situation très mal compris par le public » (doc. 74).

Le rapport spécial de la CISC du 13 février 1965 fut sans doute la dernière action importante de la Commission. Toutefois, Martin eut un dialogue franc avec le ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Inde, Swaran Singh, sur ses récentes performances, notamment sa tendance (du moins aux yeux du Canada) à se concentrer davantage sur les violations évidentes des Accords de Genève commises par le Sud-Vietnam (p. ex., l'aide américaine largement médiatisée) que sur celles menées en secret par le Nord-Vietnam (doc. 77, 84, 86). À Ottawa, Cadieux déclara franchement au haut-commissaire de l'Inde qu'une génération entière de diplomates canadiens avait servi aux côtés des Indiens en Indochine,

une expérience qui les avait « beaucoup fait réfléchir » et avait influencé la « qualité des relations entre les représentants de l'Inde et du Canada » (doc. 87).

Pendant ce temps, Martin était préoccupé par la dépendance du Canada à des sources d'information externes (une dépendance découlant de l'obstructionnisme au sein même de la CISC, des faiblesses de ses pouvoirs d'enquête et de la facilité avec laquelle ceux-ci pouvaient être contournés). Il chargea donc la délégation canadienne auprès de la CISC au Vietnam d'élaborer ses propres évaluations de la subversion fomentée par le Nord-Vietnam. Le ministre fit remarquer : « Les Américains… devraient comprendre que, si le gouvernement du Canada peut affirmer qu'il possède ses propres preuves (c'est-à-dire qui ne proviennent pas de rapports de renseignement des États-Unis ou du SVN), il sera en bien meilleure position pour appuyer… les buts et objectifs de la politique américaine au Vietnam » (doc. 83). Dans son explication des ordres donnés par Martin à Seaborn, R.L. Rogers, le chef de la Division de l'Extrême-Orient du MAE, souligna que personne ne doutait « de la réalité ou de l'ampleur » de l'intervention nord-vietnamienne, ni des chiffres fournis à la délégation à Saïgon par l'armée américaine. « Malheureusement, prédit Rogers, je pense que ce problème est sur le point de sortir du domaine classifié des fonctionnaires gouvernementaux pour toucher un public plus large, dans un contexte où notre jugement sur l'intégrité des États-Unis risque de ne pas avoir le poids nécessaire » (doc. 82).

Chapitre 2. Opération Bacon : Seaborn, l'intermédiaire (avril 1964-novembre 1965)

Si la question de la subversion préoccupait le Canada au sein de la CISC, elle inquiétait encore plus les États-Unis. En avril 1964, les Américains demandèrent si Seaborn, qui s'apprêtait à remplacer Cox à Saïgon, pouvait servir d'intermédiaire entre les États-Unis et le Nord-Vietnam, un rôle documenté au chapitre 2. Lors d'une rencontre avec Martin et le premier ministre Lester B. Pearson à Ottawa, le secrétaire d'État américain Dean Rusk déclara à propos des dirigeants de Hanoï qu'ils « devaient absolument réaliser que s'ils ne mettaient pas fin à leurs opérations, ils auraient des problèmes ». Rusk se demandait s'il était possible d'accélérer l'affectation au Vietnam de Seaborn pour que celui-ci puisse discuter avec les dirigeants de Hanoï, sonder leur opinion et dissiper tout malentendu sur la politique américaine. Pearson était d'accord avec ce principe. En outre, Washington envoya des experts pour discuter du Vietnam avec Seaborn (et ses collègues du MAE) (doc. 89).

Un mois plus tard, alors que les experts se réunissaient à Ottawa, Pearson et le président américain Lyndon B. Johnson se rencontrèrent à New York. Comme le conseiller à la sécurité nationale des États-Unis McGeorge Bundy, qui était présent, l'indiqua à Basil Robinson de l'ambassade du Canada, Johnson avait encouragé le départ anticipé de Seaborn. Lors de la discussion de Pearson et

Johnson sur les éventuelles mesures militaires contre le Nord-Vietnam, Pearson fit nettement la distinction entre les mesures non nucléaires et nucléaires : le recours à ces dernières isolerait totalement les États-Unis, tandis que l'utilisation des premières contre des cibles militaires soigneusement choisies ne causerait pas les mêmes difficultés. Entièrement d'accord avec cette analyse, Johnson souligna que les États-Unis voulaient éviter une escalade incontrôlable. Par ailleurs, comme l'indiqua Robinson : « Il sera important d'obtenir la version du premier ministre de cette partie de la conversation, puisque Bundy n'a pas précisé jusqu'où le premier ministre était allé dans sa réponse à l'idée de mesures directes » (doc. 92). Malheureusement, il s'est avéré impossible de trouver un tel compte rendu.

Pendant ce temps, à Ottawa, les experts discutèrent du Vietnam pendant deux jours (doc. 94). Les Américains fournirent ensuite à Seaborn des conseils et des points de discussion à utiliser à Hanoï. Ce document comprenait une déclaration stipulant qu'il n'était pas obligé d'être d'accord avec le message ou de s'y associer, mais qu'il devait seulement le transmettre fidèlement. Il devait également faire rapport du comportement des Nord-Vietnamiens et s'imposer comme un intermédiaire fiable avec les États-Unis. Les Américains espéraient que Seaborn « adopterait une position selon laquelle la décision concernant le déroulement des événements à venir en Asie du Sud-Est incombe entièrement à Hanoï » (doc. 93).

À la mi-juin, Seaborn rencontra le premier ministre nord-vietnamien Pham Van Dong à Hanoï. Dans les grandes lignes, la position des États-Unis était qu'ils ne cherchaient ni à installer des bases militaires ni à renverser le régime nord-vietnamien, mais simplement à protéger le Sud-Vietnam de la guérilla de subversion dirigée par Hanoï, un engagement important sur la scène internationale. Les États-Unis avaient établi des relations pacifiques avec d'autres pays communistes au bénéfice économique de ces derniers, mais leur patience face à l'agression nord-vietnamienne s'amenuisait. Seaborn avertit Pham Van Dong, qui l'écoutait attentivement, qu'une escalade militaire serait dévastatrice pour le Nord-Vietnam. Pourtant, le dirigeant nord-vietnamien se contenta de rappeler la position générale de Hanoï et sembla indifférent lorsque Seaborn lui fit remarquer que les États-Unis pourraient être forcés de porter la guerre au Nord-Vietnam (doc. 96). Dans sa conclusion provisoire, Seaborn indiqua : « à ce stade, nous serions imprudents de compter sur la lassitude de la guerre ou le factionnalisme chez les dirigeants, sur d'éventuels avantages matériels pour la RDVN ou encore sur une sorte de "titisme asiatique" qui soient d'une ampleur suffisante pour pousser la RDVN à sauter sur l'occasion de parvenir à un accord avec les États-Unis dans ce domaine » (doc. 97).

Même si les experts du département d'État qualifiaient les rapports de Seaborn de « remarquables » (doc. 98) et « édifiants » (doc. 99), Washington n'était pas pressé de rouvrir le dialogue avec Hanoï. Toutefois, après que les Américains eurent donné l'impression qu'ils pourraient discuter directement du contenu d'un

futur message avec Seaborn à Saïgon (doc. 103), on rappela au département d'État que le canal de communication convenu passait par Ottawa : « Les Américains savent que nous pourrions devoir défendre ou expliquer notre rôle dans le dialogue avec les Nord-Vietnamiens, s'il devenait public » (doc. 104). À la fin juillet, ce dialogue était, selon la Division de l'Extrême-Orient, « au creux de la vague », car Hanoï avait refusé de répondre et Washington, dans un changement déroutant, minimisait désormais son inquiétude concernant le soutien du Nord-Vietnam au Viêt-cong (doc. 107). Seaborn se demanda alors « si les États-Unis avaient, après l'enthousiasme et l'effervescence des débuts, perdu tout intérêt pour l'Opération Bacon », le nom de code de sa mission (doc. 108).

Les incidents du golfe du Tonkin conduisirent à la réactivation de l'Opération Bacon. Sachant que Seaborn se rendrait bientôt à Hanoï pour assister à une réunion de la CISC, le département d'État remit à la dernière minute aux Canadiens un document lui demandant de répéter la position fondamentale du gouvernement américain sur le Vietnam (doc. 112). Parmi les points apparemment nouveaux que Seaborn devait soulever, le MAE lui ordonna d'en omettre deux (doc. 113) car, comme le Ministère l'expliqua plus tard, ils semblaient vaguement inquiétants et compromettants (doc. 115). Lorsque l'ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis, Charles Ritchie, recommanda d'informer les Américains de la décision du MAE (doc. 114), Ottawa accepta, tout en soulignant : « notre engagement à transmettre fidèlement les messages ne signifie pas que nous devrions les répéter comme un perroquet » (doc. 115). Lors d'une conversation avec Seaborn à Hanoï, Pham Van Dong était furieux contre les États-Unis, même s'il souhaitait que le dialogue restât ouvert (doc. 117).

Ce canal de communication redevint inactif jusqu'en décembre, lorsque les Américains, sans donner à Seaborn de message précis à l'intention des dirigeants de Hanoï, lui demandèrent de dire à ces derniers que s'ils souhaitaient envoyer un message, le moment était venu de le faire (doc. 128). Comme la démarche des États-Unis était assez superficielle, le MAE décida que le rôle de Seaborn devrait être tout aussi passif. En particulier, il n'était pas autorisé à demander audience à Pham Van Dong simplement pour exprimer son opinion (doc. 130). Finalement, Seaborn ne rencontra que Ha Van Lau, le chef de la mission de liaison du Nord-Vietnam auprès de la CISC, qui resta impassible lorsque la politique américaine sur le Vietnam lui fut réitérée (doc. 132). Informé des maigres résultats de cette visite, l'adjoint spécial pour le Vietnam de Rusk mentionna que même le silence des Nord-Vietnamiens était une information utile (doc. 133). À Ottawa, un diplomate américain bavard minimisa la valeur de toute l'opération, ce qui incita Rogers à dire à un membre de sa division qu'ils ne devraient « absolument rien faire pour essayer de maintenir l'Opération Bacon en vie » (doc. 134).

Pourtant, l'opération se poursuivit. À la fin février 1965, le département d'État demanda à Seaborn de répéter aux Nord-Vietnamiens une déclaration des

États-Unis sur le Vietnam faite à Varsovie à des représentants chinois (doc. 138). De plus en plus désabusé par cette opération, le MAE répondit qu'un tel message ne justifiait pas un voyage à Hanoï et risquait d'« affaiblir » le rôle d'intermédiaire de Seaborn. Les Américains suggérèrent que Seaborn informât Pham Van Dong qu'on espérait que ce dernier ferait des commentaires de fond sur la position américaine (doc. 139). Mais une fois de plus, à Hanoï, Seaborn ne fut autorisé à s'entretenir qu'avec Ha Van Lau, qui lui répondit que le message américain ne contenait manifestement rien de nouveau. Pour Seaborn, il s'agissait d'une preuve supplémentaire qu'un intermédiaire canadien avec les États-Unis présentait peu d'intérêt aux yeux des Nord-Vietnamiens (doc. 140).

À la fin mai, les Américains, imperturbables, demandèrent si, lors de sa prochaine visite à Hanoï, Seaborn pouvait transmettre un nouveau message qui, dans les grandes lignes, réaffirmait la politique américaine et passait en revue les événements récents. Cependant, il ne devait le faire que s'il réussissait à s'entretenir avec un haut responsable du gouvernement nord-vietnamien, sans toutefois insister sur ce point. Dans le cas où son interlocuteur évoquerait les « quatre points » de la politique nord-vietnamienne – à savoir le retrait des États-Unis du Vietnam, l'absence de bases ou d'alliances étrangères, le règlement des affaires internes du Sud-Vietnam par son peuple conformément au programme du FNL et la réunification pacifique du Vietnam selon les choix de ses citoyens – qui avaient été énoncés récemment par Pham Van Dong, il était demandé à Seaborn d'exprimer son intérêt personnel quant à savoir si ces points étaient considérés comme des conditions préalables à toute discussion (doc. 142).

Au lieu de cela, Martin lui demanda de solliciter une rencontre avec le premier ministre ou le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Nord-Vietnam afin de transmettre l'inquiétude du gouvernement du Canada concernant la situation au Vietnam, son intérêt à faciliter les négociations et son désir d'être utile. Après avoir transmis le message proposé par les États-Unis, Seaborn devait demander des éclaircissements sur l'état des quatre points, étant donné que, d'après ses discussions avec Washington, Ottawa estimait que l'acceptabilité de cette proposition pour les Américains était mitigée selon les points (doc. 143). Ces instructions, qui concernaient Seaborn et les Américains, exprimaient bien plus d'empressement à livrer des messages et à sonder l'opinion que ces derniers le souhaitaient. « Nous estimons qu'en utilisant la voie de l'Opération Bacon avec une telle extrême prudence, expliqua le MAE à Seaborn, il y a un risque que son utilité soit anéantie, si ce n'est pas déjà le cas. » Bien que le Ministère eût soutenu qu'une position moins passive correspondrait à la démarche plus active du Canada envers les négociations, il accepta à contrecœur la ligne américaine « plus timide » (doc. 146). Suivant de près ces développements, Pearson écrivit à propos de Seaborn, en haut d'un document : « Je parierais 1 piastre que personne à Hanoï ne lui parlera » (doc. 148 n. 62).

En fait, Seaborn rencontra Nguyen Duy Trinh, le ministre des Affaires étrangères (et vice-premier ministre) du Nord-Vietnam. En lisant attentivement son rapport, on comprend bien que l'intérêt du MAE pour le fait que le Canada accorde plus d'importance aux délibérations fut en partie satisfait, mais, lorsque Trinh évoqua les quatre points, Seaborn lui demanda des éclaircissements, conformément aux instructions américaines. Trinh refusa d'expliquer si ces points étaient des préconditions ou la base de négociations. Par ailleurs, Trinh montra peu d'intérêt pour le message que Seaborn venait de lui transmettre de la part des États-Unis et condamna l'agression perpétrée par ceux-ci (doc. 149). « Dans l'ensemble, observa Seaborn, les perspectives de négociations, voire de pourparlers préliminaires, semblent vraiment très sombres » (doc. 150).

Cette évaluation correspondait aussi à celle des États-Unis, mais, à Washington, Ritchie apprit que les Français diffusaient (ou du moins le semblait-il) une vision différente de la position de Hanoï, fondée sur des commentaires récents faits par le représentant du Nord-Vietnam à Paris. Les Américains n'avaient pas voulu parler aux Canadiens de cette position nord-vietnamienne avant la dernière visite de Seaborn (doc. 151), et cette réticence préoccupait Pearson et Martin (doc. 158). Seaborn espérait que les Américains pourraient être dissuadés d'utiliser ce canal, ce qui ne faisait qu'« aggraver l'antagonisme de la RDVN envers les États-Unis et son agacement à l'égard du Canada ». En outre, les récents commentaires gouvernementaux à Ottawa et à Washington sur la teneur de ses conversations (mais pas sur son rôle de messager) avaient probablement « fait capoter, ou du moins sérieusement compromis » l'opération, d'autant que la presse s'était fondée sur ces révélations pour conclure à tort que les quatre points du Nord-Vietnam étaient sans aucun doute des conditions préalables à toute discussion (doc. 154). Le MAE convenait du fait qu'il fallait laisser l'intérêt du public pour la mission de Seaborn « retomber pendant un certain temps » (doc. 155).

Cela s'avéra impossible lorsque Rusk, au cours d'une séance d'information officieuse à l'intention des journalistes, évoqua avec reconnaissance les efforts de Seaborn pour sonder l'opinion de Hanoï. Bien que Rusk n'eût pas mentionné que Seaborn avait agi au nom des États-Unis, lorsque le président Johnson utilisa une « paraphrase à peine voilée » pendant une conférence de presse sur des extraits du rapport rédigé par Seaborn à Hanoï, les correspondants canadiens, comme l'ambassade à Washington en informa le MAE, « firent rapidement le lien » (doc. 159). Si on lui posait des questions sur son rôle de messager, Seaborn devait répondre que ses conversations périodiques avec les autorités de Hanoï illustraient l'intérêt du gouvernement du Canada à contribuer à un règlement pacifique au Vietnam et qu'Ottawa transmettait aux gouvernements concernés des informations susceptibles de favoriser la compréhension de la situation et, en fin de compte, la paix (doc. 161).

Seaborn ne reçut aucune instruction spéciale pour ce qui, au début de l'automne 1965, s'avéra être sa dernière visite à Hanoï, au cours de laquelle aucun haut dirigeant ne lui parla (doc. 164). À la fin novembre, toutefois, sous la pression intense de reportages selon lesquels les États-Unis avaient rejeté plusieurs tentatives visant à favoriser les négociations, notamment une par le secrétaire général des Nations Unies U Thant, Washington demanda à Ottawa la permission de publier un compte rendu plus complet du rôle de Seaborn dans la compréhension de l'attitude des Nord-Vietnamiens. Dans une analyse longue, mais très révélatrice des répercussions pour Ottawa de la demande américaine, le MAE recommanda de ne pas divulguer que Seaborn avait agi au nom des États-Unis, s'opposant ainsi à l'opinion de U Thant, et qualifiant l'intermédiation canadienne de démarche « par une tierce partie importante » (doc. 169). Le département d'État comprit le message, puisque Rusk se limita à évoquer publiquement ce qui était déjà connu des conversations de Seaborn à Hanoï (doc. 170-172).

Chapitre 3. La participation à la CISC réexaminée (septembre 1964-septembre 1965)

La diminution rapide des retombées de l'Opération Bacon et l'échec de la CISC à traiter adéquatement la question de la subversion fomentée par le Nord-Vietnam contribuèrent à la sérieuse réévaluation de la participation canadienne à la Commission qui eut lieu de septembre 1964 à septembre 1965. Les examens intermittents des engagements internationaux du Canada n'étaient pas inhabituels, mais celui-ci était particulièrement approfondi, comme le montrent les documents du chapitre 3. Cet examen fut entrepris sous l'impulsion de Seaborn, qui, dans une dépêche tranchante envoyée de Saïgon, soutint que la Commission créée en 1954 était impuissante à régler la situation au Vietnam, qui à l'époque se détériorait. Seaborn trouvait pour le moins douteux que la Commission permît de freiner les belligérants, ce qui le mena à se poser la question : « Si nous n'y faisons rien de vraiment utile, pourquoi ne pas s'en retirer, si nécessaire de façon unilatérale? » (doc. 173).

Tout en reconnaissant que l'argument de Seaborn en faveur d'une « réévaluation totale » de la participation à la CISC était fondé, Martin avertit qu'un retrait serait mal compris par la population canadienne, qui attachait de l'importance au rôle de maintien de la paix joué par le Canada. Prévoyant une future conférence diplomatique sur le Vietnam où la CISC serait invitée à décrire la « véritable nature du problème au Vietnam » et les défis auxquels la Commission faisait face, Martin pensait que ce processus pourrait être utile pour « prêter main-forte à tous ceux qui s'opposent à une prise de pouvoir communiste en Asie du Sud-Est ». Seaborn reçut donc pour instruction de faire fonctionner la CISC « aussi

efficacement que possible » et de désigner clairement les responsables d'un éventuel échec. Cela dit, Martin était prêt à envisager de réduire les engagements du Canada au Vietnam en matière de personnel et de budget pour autant que les organes politiques de la Commission soient préservés (doc. 175).

À la fin de l'année, à la suite de la visite en Indochine d'une équipe de liaison spéciale d'Ottawa, le gouvernement du Canada envisageait sérieusement de demander la suppression de tous les sites d'équipes de la CISC au Nord-Vietnam et au Sud-Vietnam, mis à part celui de la zone démilitarisée (ZDM). Un groupe d'agents resterait à Hanoï et à Saïgon pour s'occuper des enquêtes d'urgence (doc. 181). Toutefois, les services de renseignement américains avaient des réserves quant à cette proposition, car les rapports canadiens de première main sur la situation au Nord-Vietnam constituaient l'une de leurs principales sources d'information sur ce pays presque totalement fermé. La Division de l'Extrême-Orient exprima à Cadieux son scepticisme quant à la valeur de ce type de renseignement, compte tenu des sévères restrictions imposées à la liberté de circulation sur place (doc. 182), ce qui poussa la 2e Direction de liaison avec la Défense à conseiller au sous-secrétaire de ne pas rejeter à la légère l'opinion des Américains (doc. 183). De manière inattendue, la question du retrait des sites d'équipes, du moins au Nord-Vietnam, fut réglée en février 1965, lorsque les Nord-Vietnamiens l'exigèrent au motif que la sécurité de la CISC ne pouvait pas être garantie, compte tenu des récentes frappes aériennes menées par les États-Unis et le Sud-Vietnam (doc. 186, 188). Profitant de l'avantage tactique de la situation, le Canada se joignit à l'Inde pour présenter un rapport spécial de la CISC aux coprésidents de la Conférence de Genève, qui imputait l'entière responsabilité du retrait au Nord-Vietnam (les équipes fixes au Sud-Vietnam furent conservées) (doc. 192).

En juin, Seaborn décrivit ainsi les plus récentes frustrations envers les Indiens sur la question de la subversion : « [il est] désormais établi hors de tout doute raisonnable qu'il est presque impossible de faire fonctionner cette commission, c'est-à-dire d'y faire quoi que ce soit d'utile pour documenter les cas d'agression de la RDVN contre le Sud-Vietnam ». La délégation canadienne pouvait soit être maintenue et réduite à la taille minimale, soit être retirée unilatéralement (doc. 199). Seaborn suggéra d'utiliser la crise financière en cours à la CISC (doc. 194-198, 202, 206-207, 215-216) ainsi que la désillusion du Sud-Vietnam face aux résultats de la Commission pour faire un « coup audacieux » (doc. 201). Dans une communication à Martin de la recommandation de Seaborn, Cadieux nota qu'après huit mois à essayer de faire fonctionner la CISC de façon plus objective, le MAE réexaminait la position du Canada à cet égard (doc. 203). À la mi-juillet, la version du document rédigée par la Division de l'Extrême-Orient sur le sujet recommanda que le Canada suspendît sa participation à la CISC au Vietnam (et au Cambodge) et en retirât son personnel (doc. 204). A.E. Ritchie, le sous-secrétaire adjoint de Cadieux, n'était pas d'accord et avertit qu'une telle

décision ferait plaisir aux pays communistes, mais serait critiquée au Canada comme une abdication de ses responsabilités à l'égard de la zone de conflit la plus dangereuse au monde. Même si la Division de l'Extrême-Orient insistait sur les perspectives d'économies de budget et de personnel réalisées par le retrait, Ritchie soutenait que la Commission avait en fait permis au Canada de réduire ses dépenses dans ce domaine puisque, sans elle, il aurait été incité à contribuer bien davantage à la cause occidentale au Vietnam (doc. 210).

Finalement, l'opinion du ministre compta plus que tout. Comme il le confia à Klaus Goldschlag, qui allait bientôt remplacer Rogers à la tête de la Division de l'Extrême-Orient, Martin s'opposait au retrait pour plusieurs raisons : une action unilatérale compliquerait la situation au Vietnam; le statut de membre donnait au Canada un « *locus standi* » dans les discussions internationales sur le sujet; ce statut permettait aussi au Canada de résister à la pression en faveur d'une participation directe; enfin, la Commission pourrait avoir un rôle à jouer dans la résolution du conflit à l'avenir (doc. 213). Dans une lettre personnelle, Rogers écrivit à Seaborn : « six semaines, plusieurs versions provisoires et des milliers de mots plus tard, nous n'avons absolument rien obtenu de nouveau. Nous en sommes toujours au même point : toujours la même chose, pour vous comme pour nous ». Il ajouta : « Je suis sûr que vous êtes aussi incertains que nous de la façon dont tout cela se terminera, mais peut-être que, lorsque ce jour terrible viendra, certains d'entre nous pourront au moins se consoler en ayant efficacement rempli le rôle de monarque constitutionnel selon Bagehot – conseiller, être consulté et avertir » (doc. 218).

En août 1965, l'examen du MAE aboutit à une conclusion inéluctable. Dans une communication de ce résultat à Martin, Cadieux écrivit : « pour l'instant, nous ne pouvons faire aucun réajustement de notre activité au sein de la Commission au Vietnam sans subir de graves inconvénients en ce qui concerne les grands objectifs stratégiques du Canada ». Par conséquent, l'objectif d'essayer de rendre le fonctionnement de la CISC plus équitable fut réaffirmé. Toutefois, le ministre fut averti que l'atteinte de cet objectif était peu probable dans une Commission tripartite où le Canada était de plus en plus isolé. En annexe figurait une analyse longue, mais lucide du MAE sur les difficultés du Canada au sein de la CISC et le plan d'action possible (doc. 219). En septembre, Martin informa officiellement Seaborn que le Canada resterait au Vietnam (doc. 220).

Partie 2 : L'escalade et la recherche de la paix (1965-1968)

Comme déjà mentionné, l'une des raisons avancées pour rester à la CISC était que le statut de membre donnait au gouvernement du Canada la capacité de participer aux discussions internationales sur la guerre du Vietnam. La deuxième partie de ce livre, intitulée « L'escalade et la recherche de la paix (1965-1968) »,

documente comment le Canada mena plusieurs tentatives visant à favoriser les négociations, et y participa. Les frappes aériennes effectuées par les États-Unis sur le Nord-Vietnam en février 1965 – qui devinrent l'opération *Rolling Thunder* en mars – constituèrent une campagne de bombardements progressive, mais soutenue, transformèrent la guerre et compliquèrent la position de gouvernements occidentaux comme celui du Canada, favorable aux objectifs américains.

Chapitre 4. La réponse aux bombardements américains (février 1965-janvier 1966)

Le chapitre 4 documente la première année de cette nouvelle réalité. Comme le souligna le MAE dans ses points de discussion fournis à Martin, le Canada n'avait pas intérêt à prôner une conférence de paix rapide qui pourrait éliminer la présence américaine au Vietnam ou, plus probablement, échouer et aggraver la situation. Le Ministère précisa toutefois : « Le soutien implicite et constant à la position américaine est difficile à justifier face à l'opinion publique canadienne, dont le segment le plus éloquent semble unanimement opposé aux États-Unis » (doc. 236). Par conséquent, Martin voulait être tenu informé des intentions américaines au Vietnam : « … notre volonté de soutenir la position des États-Unis du mieux possible est rendue difficile si nous sommes confrontés à de nouveaux départs sans être convaincus d'en connaître la véritable raison », comme dans l'exemple concret du récent débarquement de 3 500 Marines américains au Sud-Vietnam (doc. 244).

Pearson suivait aussi de près les événements au Vietnam. Dans un discours à New York au début mars, il lança l'idée d'une force policière internationale en Asie du Sud-Est, qui fut saluée par de hauts responsables américains (doc. 239). Lors d'un entretien avec U Thant au cours duquel il établit un parallèle avec la crise du canal de Suez en 1956, Pearson déclara espérer que l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) pourrait jouer un rôle utile au Vietnam le moment venu (doc. 240). Par la suite, lors d'une conversation soi-disant privée avec certains journalistes, il exprima de sérieux doutes sur la politique américaine : les Américains se comportaient comme une armée d'occupation au Sud-Vietnam; le Sud-Vietnam devrait pouvoir devenir communiste s'il le souhaitait; et les États-Unis croyaient à tort que des frappes aériennes pourraient forcer le Nord-Vietnam à négocier. Selon Pearson, les États-Unis s'étaient placés dans une impasse dont il fallait absolument les aider à se sortir (doc. 241).

Ce fut exactement ce que le premier ministre tenta de faire dans son discours du 2 avril 1965 à l'Université Temple, à Philadelphie. Dans un document provisoire, le MAE suggéra de demander aux États-Unis d'envisager de suspendre leurs frappes aériennes pendant un certain temps pour donner au Nord-Vietnam la possibilité de répondre sans donner l'impression de le faire sous pression militaire.

« Cette suggestion… tente de répondre à votre désir d'adopter une démarche plus positive et plus indépendante », indiqua Martin à Pearson. « Vous pouvez toutefois estimer qu'une proposition de ce genre serait plus efficace si elle était présentée, dans un premier temps, en privé au président Johnson » (doc. 248). Pearson, qui, plus tôt cette année-là, avait dit au haut-commissaire de l'Inde qu'il valait mieux discuter de ces questions de manière indépendante et confidentielle avec les Américains (doc. 232), écrivit « oui » dans la marge (doc. 248 n. 41). En visite à Ottawa, le chroniqueur américain Marquis Childs rencontra Pearson puis, à la demande de Pearson, Martin. Childs fit remarquer qu'en l'absence de véritable débat sur le Vietnam à Washington, le Canada pouvait jouer un rôle essentiel en faisant des suggestions pratiques, mais Martin émit une mise en garde quant au fait que la position publique du Canada ne devait pas aller « fortement et manifestement à l'encontre » de celle des États-Unis, qui assumaient les responsabilités de l'Occident au Vietnam (doc. 249). À la veille du discours de Pearson, Childs assura aux Canadiens que les principaux points ne seraient pas mal vus à Washington (doc. 250).

En fait, Johnson fut indigné par le discours, qui comportait la proposition de suspendre les bombardements. Dans un passage évocateur de son journal sur sa rencontre avec Johnson à Camp David le lendemain, Pearson cita l'évaluation brutale de son discours par le président : « Il était mauvais. » Pendant une heure, Johnson expliqua à Pearson pourquoi son discours était si mauvais, en le laissant à peine parler. Pearson écrivit : « Si je n'avais pas éprouvé un sentiment de culpabilité (“*toi aussi, Brutus?*”) à l'égard de cette agression commise sans ressentir la moindre gêne, je me serais presque senti comme Schuschnigg devant Hitler à Berchtesgaden! » Johnson était furieux que Pearson eût prononcé un tel discours sur le sol américain et souligna que, face à des appels extrêmes à un retrait total ou à une guerre totale, sa politique était mesurée et consistait à détruire progressivement l'infrastructure militaire sur laquelle reposait l'aide fournie par le Nord-Vietnam aux rebelles du Sud. Bien que Pearson eût été rassuré par cette déclaration, il voyait bien que la guerre avait déjà des répercussions sur Johnson : « Cette crise au Vietnam va être une épreuve importante pour L.B.J. Je ne suis pas certain qu'il réussira à la surmonter » (doc. 253).

De retour à Ottawa, Pearson écrivit à Johnson pour lui expliquer la nature soigneusement nuancée de sa proposition de suspendre les bombardements, qui était censée être utile et pourrait en fin de compte donner des résultats. En tant que dirigeant du « voisin et ami le plus proche » des États-Unis, il voulait aider Johnson autant que possible : « Mais le Canada est aussi une démocratie politique, dont l'opinion publique est active et souvent divisée. Il est sensible au fait que ses dirigeants ne donnent pas l'impression de simplement faire écho aux États-Unis, mais sont désireux, je crois, de soutenir leur voisin lorsque nécessaire, comme un ami indépendant devrait le faire. » À cette fin, dans le post-scriptum de sa lettre,

il qualifia de « magnifique » le discours de la veille à Baltimore, dans lequel Johnson avait déclaré la volonté des États-Unis d'engager des discussions inconditionnelles en vue d'un règlement pacifique au Vietnam (doc. 256).

Ce printemps-là, le gouvernement du Canada exprima, publiquement et en privé, sa position générale sur la guerre du Vietnam : il appuyait les buts et objectifs de la politique américaine au Vietnam, qui visait à permettre au Sud-Vietnam de décider de son propre sort à l'abri de toute agression extérieure, exhortait à la retenue des belligérants – puisqu'une solution purement militaire au conflit n'était ni possible ni souhaitable – et, par conséquent, espérait des négociations (doc. 251, 260, 270). À la fin mai, Martin dit au Cabinet qu'il était convaincu que c'était la bonne position, même si la politique américaine avait suscité beaucoup d'« introspection » des deux côtés du 49e parallèle. Pour résumer la discussion, Pearson nota qu'une pause de cinq jours dans les bombardements plus tôt ce mois-là, parmi d'autres rameaux d'olivier offerts par les États-Unis, n'avait fait que renforcer l'autre camp, qui refusait clairement de négocier (doc. 272). Néanmoins, comme il le confia au premier ministre indien Lal Bahadur Shastri, Ottawa était très inquiet des conséquences possibles de l'intervention américaine au Vietnam (doc. 281). Martin sonda la position de l'Union soviétique sur les négociations (doc. 275) et mena une initiative liée à une conférence à venir des pays africains et asiatiques (doc. 277-279, 284), tandis que Pearson appuyait l'idée d'une mission de paix du Commonwealth (doc. 280, 283, 285). Mais ces efforts ne donnèrent pas les résultats escomptés ou se soldèrent par un échec.

À la fin juillet, Johnson écrivit à Pearson et à d'autres dirigeants alliés pour leur annoncer une augmentation du nombre de troupes américaines au Vietnam et pour leur demander « de l'aide », ce qui suscita un débat à Ottawa sur la réponse à donner (doc. 293-294). À Washington, un adjoint du président s'entretint longuement avec Charles Ritchie, qui estima que cette démarche faisait partie d'une pression diplomatique plus vaste de l'administration américaine pour renforcer sa présence militaire (doc. 298). Dans sa réponse à Johnson, Pearson qualifia la situation au Vietnam de « profondément préoccupante » et avertit que la nouvelle réponse américaine pourrait « susciter des inquiétudes », tout en saluant la promesse de Johnson de s'efforcer de parvenir à « une résolution politique de ce dangereux conflit ». Tout en réaffirmant l'appui du Canada aux objectifs américains, Pearson souligna que ce soutien serait exercé dans le « cadre des Accords de Genève » (c'est-à-dire la CISC), bien qu'il évoquât la possibilité d'augmenter l'aide économique canadienne au Sud-Vietnam. Enfin, il exhorta l'ONU à rapidement jouer un rôle au Vietnam (doc. 301). Étant donné qu'il existait au Canada une certaine controverse sur le type d'aide demandée par le président, Pearson voulut publier sa conversation avec Johnson, mais celui-ci refusa (doc. 306). Finalement, une autre démarche fut adoptée (doc. 310), mais seulement après que, selon Ritchie, McGeorge Bundy eut accusé Ottawa de

vouloir « mettre les problèmes du Canada sur le dos de la Maison-Blanche », rejeté la réponse « condescendante » de Pearson au motif qu'elle était « à 95 % destinée à l'opinion publique canadienne » et averti que la demande de publication avait irrité Johnson et risquait de raviver les tensions entre les deux dirigeants causées par le discours de Pearson à l'Université Temple (doc. 308).

Pendant ce temps, Martin demanda au MAE d'élaborer un plan de paix pour le Vietnam (doc. 290), dont certains éléments figuraient dans une note d'août qui lui était adressée pour le mettre en garde contre une impasse dangereuse et suggérer un changement ou la fin de bombardements américains qui n'avaient pas réussi à forcer les négociations (doc. 305). Martin, qui était d'accord, informa l'ambassade du Canada à Washington qu'il était temps de jouer un « rôle diplomatique plus actif ». Il se demandait si l'absence d'offensive du Viêt-cong prévue pendant la saison de la mousson en cours indiquait un intérêt à réduire les hostilités, ce qui permettrait « une série de mesures et de contre-mesures ». Dans ces circonstances, les Américains pourraient essayer de réduire les bombardements, voire de les suspendre plus longtemps, et aboutir à y mettre fin (doc. 309). Lorsque Ritchie étudia ces idées avec William P. Bundy, secrétaire d'État adjoint aux affaires de l'Asie de l'Est et du Pacifique au département d'État, ce dernier reconnut leur éventuelle validité, mais attendait des preuves concrètes qu'une réduction de l'activité militaire du Viêt-cong était motivée politiquement (doc. 312). Plus tard, Rusk indiqua que Washington n'était pas prêt à tirer de telles conclusions (doc. 317). Quant au Nord-Vietnam, les responsables américains et canadiens convinrent, cet automne-là, que sa position restait rigide (doc. 319-320, 323).

Néanmoins, à la fin de 1965, le MAE suggéra plusieurs initiatives diplomatiques liées au Vietnam, dont la plus attrayante provenait de la CISC (doc. 332). Martin discuta de cette possibilité, à Londres, avec le secrétaire aux Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni, Michael Stewart. Il lui fit part de son inquiétude quant à l'escalade de la guerre (« Dieu seul sait où elle finira ») et se demanda combien de temps encore ils pourraient appuyer les objectifs américains au Vietnam si le Canada et la Grande-Bretagne ne donnaient pas l'impression de faire tout leur possible pour entamer des négociations. De nouveau, Martin se plaignit du fait que Washington ne tenait pas ses alliés pleinement informés de ses intentions, ce qui causait des difficultés politiques à Ottawa (doc. 334). Le ministre était séduit par l'idée du MAE que la CISC appelât à une nouvelle Conférence de Genève pour réviser son mandat original (doc. 335). Comme l'expliqua le MAE, une telle démarche était, selon d'autres opinions, « beaucoup moins controversée et moins difficile à accepter politiquement qu'un appel explicite à des négociations » (doc. 336). Lors d'une rencontre avec Martin à Paris en marge d'une réunion de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN), Rusk se montra évasif sur l'idée de la CISC, ajoutant que les perspectives de négociations étaient alors minces (doc. 337).

Après Noël, Johnson informa Pearson que les États-Unis prolongeraient leur plus récente pause dans les bombardements jusqu'au Nouvel An afin de donner au Nord-Vietnam toutes les chances de réagir (doc. 338). Après une discussion avec McGeorge Bundy à Ottawa, Pearson demanda au haut-commissariat du Canada en Inde de dire à Shastri que Pearson pensait que le geste de Johnson était sérieux. Toutefois, en cas d'échec, Pearson était persuadé que les États-Unis intensifieraient leur effort de guerre. Il encouragea donc Shastri à utiliser tous les moyens à sa disposition pour susciter une réaction positive du Nord-Vietnam ou de ses alliés, notamment l'Union soviétique (doc. 340). L'action de Pearson fut appréciée à Washington (doc. 341), notamment par Johnson, avec qui il eut une conversation téléphonique amicale (doc. 342). Bien que Martin eût exhorté les Américains à prolonger la pause pour permettre une percée diplomatique (doc. 344), les bombardements reprirent à la fin janvier 1966. Informé de la décision américaine par l'ambassadeur W.W. Butterworth, Pearson déclara qu'il « regrettait les circonstances » ayant motivé cette reprise et avertit que les communistes comptaient sur le fait que le monde se retournât contre les États-Unis, ainsi que sur la faiblesse et l'impopularité du gouvernement sud-vietnamien. Il estima que le président des États-Unis aurait plus de difficulté à tenir tête aux faucons qu'aux colombes dans son pays, et qu'il aurait également du mal à trouver facilement un soutien international pour une intervention militaire croissante et sans fin (doc. 348).

Chapitre 5. Opération Smallbridge : les visites de Ronning (janvier-juin 1966)

Une des raisons pour lesquelles Martin avait espéré que les États-Unis prolongeraient leur pause dans les bombardements était qu'il avait décidé d'envoyer Chester Ronning, retraité du service diplomatique canadien depuis 1965, en visites spéciales à Hanoï et à Pékin (Ronning était né en Chine) (doc. 344). Le chapitre 5 porte sur ce qui allait être connu sous le nom d'« Opération Smallbridge » – Smallbridge étant le nom de code approprié donné à Ronning. Cette idée venait de Martin, mais il refusait de la qualifier de « mission ». Il ne s'agissait pas non plus d'un effort audacieux pour mettre fin à la guerre, mais plus simplement d'une tentative d'évaluer l'opinion des principaux dirigeants dans les deux capitales. Ronning lui-même avait de modestes attentes (doc. 349). Selon Martin, tant l'opinion publique canadienne que le gouvernement américain accueilleraient favorablement une initiative axée sur la paix au Vietnam (doc. 350). Toutefois, il pensait que le secret était primordial, à tel point qu'il ne voulait pas que le projet fût discuté par mémorandum (doc. 350 n. 2).

Les bases des visites de Smallbridge furent posées au cours des semaines suivantes, lorsqu'on demanda aux Nord-Vietnamiens et aux Chinois de le recevoir. À Washington, Ronning participa à des séances d'information avec l'ambassadeur

itinérant W. Averell Harriman et Bill Bundy (doc. 352, 354). Bien que Rusk eût salué « toute initiative constructive susceptible d'apporter une lueur d'espoir à la situation », il fit part à Martin de ses préoccupations quant au risque que le sujet de la représentation de la République populaire de Chine (ou plutôt de son absence) à l'ONU fût abordé dans les discussions de Ronning (doc. 359). À la mi-février, Pham Van Dong dit à Victor Moore, le nouveau commissaire du Canada à la CISC, que la RDVN serait heureuse de recevoir Smallbridge, même si Pham doutait de son utilité (doc. 361). Toutefois, le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Chine, Chen Yi, estima que la visite de Ronning était « inopportune », compte tenu du soutien du Canada à la guerre au Vietnam menée par les États-Unis (doc. 364). Selon le MAE, le refus de la Chine de recevoir Ronning et la récente publicité concernant l'intérêt du Canada à utiliser la CISC pour favoriser les négociations signifiaient que la « couverture » initiale de cette opération – à savoir que Ronning se trouvait au Vietnam pour discuter de la CISC – était désormais plus proche de son véritable objectif, surtout depuis que Martin avait autorisé Ronning à rencontrer les autorités de Saïgon (doc. 366). À Hanoï, Ronning avait pour mandat de présenter la réponse de Pearson à une récente lettre du président nord-vietnamien, Ho Chi Minh, d'expliquer l'opinion d'Ottawa sur la guerre et (surtout) de sonder la position de Hanoï sur les négociations (doc. 369) au moyen d'un ensemble de points de discussion du MAE (doc. 370).

En mars 1966, Ronning se rendit à Hanoï, où il rencontra plusieurs personnalités importantes, dont Pham Van Dong, le dernier jour. Le premier ministre du Nord-Vietnam était aussi rigide que ses collègues sur les négociations pendant la majeure partie de la conversation de deux heures avec Ronning, que Moore consigna à peu près mot pour mot (doc. 375). Toutefois, vers la fin, après plusieurs questions de Ronning sur ce qu'il faudrait pour entamer une forme de pourparlers avec les États-Unis, il devint soudainement plus accommodant. Après avoir stipulé que les États-Unis devaient s'abstenir définitivement d'attaquer le Nord-Vietnam, il confirma, lorsqu'on lui demanda, que cette condition ne s'appliquait pas à l'activité militaire américaine au Sud-Vietnam. Selon les mots de Ronning, il s'agissait d'une « très faible lueur d'espoir » (doc. 373). Moore qualifia la performance de Ronning de « brillante », en particulier « son habileté, sa persévérance et sa sincérité » (doc. 374). Cet éloge fut repris par Pearson au Cabinet : « Grâce à sa vaste expérience et connaissance de l'Orient, M. Ronning a mené les discussions avec une grande habileté et intelligence. » Pearson ajouta qu'il était crucial que leur contenu ne fût pas divulgué, car cela inciterait probablement les Nord-Vietnamiens à les démentir (doc. 377).

Espérant que la proposition de Pham Van Dong serait examinée « au plus haut niveau et avec un sentiment d'urgence » à Washington (doc. 378), le MAE la résuma dans un document que Ronning apporta dans la capitale (doc. 379). Lors d'une rencontre discrète avec Bundy à la résidence de l'ambassadeur Ritchie, Ronning raconta ses conversations à Hanoï, affirmant que le Nord-Vietnam

séparait la question des bombardements des quatre points. Selon Ritchie, Bundy fit remarquer que, malgré le fait que le récit et le document de Ronning seraient étudiés de près, ils « constituaient des cartes difficiles à jouer » (doc. 380).

Un mois plus tard, alors que les Américains, confrontés à une crise politique au Sud-Vietnam, n'avaient toujours pas rédigé de réponse à la proposition de Pham Van Dong, Martin téléphona lui-même à Bundy pour souligner l'importance que le gouvernement du Canada accordait à l'intermédiation de Ronning et la nécessité d'une réponse (doc. 386). Cette démarche fut couronnée de succès, puisqu'en quelques jours, le département d'État envoya au MAE son évaluation des révélations de Ronning, dans laquelle il exprimait son scepticisme quant au fait que Pham Van Dong eût réellement dissocié les bombardements des quatre points. Les Américains demandèrent aux Canadiens d'approfondir cette question à Hanoï – « essayez d'éclaircir un peu la situation », comme Bundy l'avait dit plus tôt au cours de ce mois (doc. 383) – tout en soulignant que Washington refusait de mettre fin à ses attaques sans une action réciproque de Hanoï (doc. 387).

La réponse américaine provoqua une seconde visite de Ronning à Hanoï. Au début mai, Ronning et Goldschlag rencontrèrent à Washington Bundy et Paul Kreisberg du département d'État : les Américains refusèrent de fixer le prix d'un arrêt des bombardements (doc. 389). Les Canadiens laissèrent une nouvelle version du message américain proposé à Hanoï (pour lire la version définitive de cet important document, voir le doc. 393). Plus tard au cours du même mois, le représentant permanent des États-Unis à l'ONU, Arthur Goldberg, dit à Martin que la mission de Ronning était à ce moment-là le seul moyen concret de sonder les opinions. Martin nota qu'Ottawa savait que les « vues libérales » de Ronning sur le Vietnam et la Chine pouvaient susciter des inquiétudes à Washington, mais avait une confiance totale en lui. Par conséquent, Goldberg rassura Martin quant au fait que les États-Unis craignaient uniquement que la divulgation de la mission pût compliquer leurs relations avec le Sud-Vietnam (doc. 390).

Au début juin, les perspectives de succès de Ronning subirent un coup dur lorsqu'on apprit, après une fuite d'information, que les États-Unis avaient transmis un message aux diplomates chinois à Varsovie indiquant qu'ils arrêteraient de bombarder le Nord-Vietnam si celui-ci cessait ses infiltrations au Sud et acceptait un contrôle international. Le MAE mentionna à Martin, qui était à Bruxelles pour une réunion de l'OTAN : « nous avons du mal à comprendre pourquoi un message de ce type devrait être transmis à Hanoï par l'intermédiaire qui est connu pour être le plus farouchement opposé à toute forme d'accord au Vietnam ». Les États-Unis envoyaient désormais deux messages en parallèle : le message que Ronning allait délivrer évitait soigneusement de fixer un prix pour l'arrêt des bombardements, tandis que celui qui était désormais transmis aux Chinois faisait exactement le contraire (doc. 394). Martin déclara ouvertement à Rusk qu'il s'inquiétait de la crédibilité de Smallbridge (doc. 395). Avertissant que les Canadiens « allaient se

rendre à Hanoï les mains vides », Moore soutint que les Américains semblaient « mettre à nouveau Hanoï dans une position délicate » pour des raisons de propagande nationale (doc. 396). Pearson écrivit : « Nous devons prendre ce message au sérieux. Ce serait une triste fin pour notre initiative dans cette affaire si nous devenions simplement un instrument pour diffuser la propagande américaine ou mettre la RDVN sous les projecteurs » (doc. 397).

N'ayant aucune illusion sur le succès de la visite de Ronning à Hanoï, Martin voulait néanmoins qu'elle eût lieu, puisque Rusk lui avait dit qu'elle était le « seul » moyen disponible et qu'elle permettrait aux Nord-Vietnamiens de répondre en privé aux propositions américaines et de proposer leurs propres idées (doc. 398). Fondamentalement, Ronning reçut l'instruction de « tout faire pour garder les voies de communication ouvertes, peu importe le résultat » (doc. 401). À Washington, Bundy demanda à Ronning s'il pouvait donner à l'ambassadeur américain à Vientiane les grandes lignes de ses conversations à Hanoï. Comme les bombardements commençaient apparemment à avoir de graves répercussions sur le Nord-Vietnam, les États-Unis envisageaient de « jouer avec le rythme de leurs actions » (doc. 402). Troublé par cette demande, Martin insista pour que Ronning informât d'abord le gouvernement du Canada et se limitât à donner un « aperçu » de ses conversations aux diplomates américains sur le terrain (doc. 405).

La « lueur d'espoir » que Ronning avait entrevue lors de sa première visite à Hanoï en mars disparut lors de sa deuxième en juin. Après avoir remis la réponse des États-Unis à la proposition de Pham Van Dong, Ronning s'entretint avec le vice-premier ministre Trinh, qui rejeta cette réponse parce qu'elle ne comportait rien de nouveau et refusa de répondre à l'insistance américaine sur les concessions militaires pour arrêter des bombardements qu'il qualifiait d'« injustes ». Toutefois, après que Trinh eut mis en doute la bonne foi du Canada accusé de transmettre les « menaces » américaines et que Ronning eut protesté contre cette accusation, il s'adoucit et accepta de garder les voies de communication ouvertes (doc. 406). Moore, qui enregistra cette longue conversation (doc. 408), nota dans un télégramme explicatif à Ottawa que les dirigeants nord-vietnamiens avaient eu de grandes attentes pour cette visite (doc. 409). La visite fit l'objet d'une discussion au Cabinet (doc. 410), ainsi que d'une conversation, à Ottawa, avec des responsables américains, au cours de laquelle Martin attira leur attention sur « les effets néfastes qu'une escalade précoce des activités américaines contre le Nord-Vietnam risque d'avoir, tant rétroactivement sur la mission de Ronning que dans l'avenir sur l'intermédiation canadienne » (doc. 412). Il fut donc troublé lorsque, fin juin 1966, les États-Unis bombardèrent des dépôts pétroliers dans le pays (doc. 414). Bien que Pearson doutât fortement de la volonté des Nord-Vietnamiens de se soumettre à cette nouvelle démonstration de force, il ne voyait aucun intérêt à critiquer la décision américaine (doc. 415).

Chapitre 6. Une initiative de la CISC? (février 1966-janvier 1967)

Les visites de Ronning à Hanoï constituèrent l'initiative diplomatique canadienne la plus marquante durant la guerre du Vietnam, même si, pendant toute une année, Ottawa encouragea la mission de « bons offices » de la CISC (le principal sujet du chapitre 6). Comme Martin l'expliqua à U Thant et à Rusk (à deux occasions distinctes) en février 1966, la Commission n'avait pas le pouvoir d'organiser une conférence par des initiatives de paix, mais elle était bien adaptée à cette tâche parce qu'elle représentait les trois grands blocs de la Guerre froide et maintenait un contact régulier avec les belligérants. Toutefois, au lieu de convoquer une conférence diplomatique, comme Ottawa l'avait envisagé à la fin de 1965, la CISC pourrait plutôt sonder discrètement la position des belligérants, ce qui contribuerait à réduire l'écart entre ces positions et à permettre finalement des négociations (doc. 417, 418).

U Thant et Rusk étaient encourageants, mais la coopération de Varsovie et de New Delhi était nécessaire. À cette fin, Martin écrivit au ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Pologne, Adam Rapacki (doc. 416), à Singh (doc. 419) et, en particulier, au ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Union soviétique, Andrei Gromyko (doc. 420). Rapacki s'opposa à cette idée, estimant que le temps n'était pas encore venu (doc. 421); Singh était sceptique, notant les limites des pouvoirs de la CISC (doc. 423); et Gromyko ne fut tout simplement d'aucune aide, exhortant plutôt le Canada à convaincre les États-Unis de cesser leur agression au Vietnam (doc. 428). Pendant ce temps, Moore demanda des conseils sur la démarche du Canada envers le travail de la CISC (doc. 425), ce qui suscita une réponse importante du MAE (doc. 427). Déçu, mais pas démoralisé par la réponse de Gromyko, Martin dit à l'ambassadeur de l'Union soviétique au Canada, Ivan Shpedko, qui avait qualifié d'« inutiles » les initiatives de la CISC face à l'agression constante des États-Unis, qu'une tentative infructueuse valait mieux que rien, en promettant que le gouvernement du Canada poursuivrait ses efforts (doc. 429).

À la fin juin, la visite au Canada du premier vice-président du Conseil des ministres de l'Union soviétique, Dmitri Polyansky, offrit aux Canadiens une nouvelle occasion de promouvoir leur cause. Bien que ce voyage, en grande partie réussi, lui eût valu le surnom du « Canadien » à Moscou (doc. 473), à Ottawa, Polyansky réaffirma la position soviétique établie sur le Vietnam (doc. 431). Lors d'un dîner au 24, promenade Sussex, Pearson avertit Polyansky que des démarches fructueuses pour mettre fin à la guerre du Vietnam ne pouvaient pas reposer sur l'idée que les États-Unis en étaient les seuls responsables, bien que Pearson eût reconnu que les Américains avaient commis une erreur. Déplorant l'effet destructeur du Vietnam sur les bonnes relations antérieures entre les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique, il proposa même d'organiser une rencontre discrète entre un

haut responsable américain – ou plusieurs – avec Polyansky à Ottawa, mais ce dernier refusa (doc. 433-434). À la fin juillet, Martin revint à la charge avec Shpedko, notant que, comme exemple de ce que la CISC pourrait accomplir, il serait difficile pour le monde d'ignorer une déclaration conjointe d'Indira Gandhi, Wladyslaw Gomulka et Pearson (doc. 437).

Les Canadiens restèrent également en contact étroit avec les Américains au sujet du Vietnam. Lors de sa première rencontre avec Johnson, le nouvel ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis, A.E. Ritchie (sans lien de parenté avec Charles), obtint plus d'informations que prévu sur la pensée du président. Comme d'habitude, Johnson souligna la précision des bombardements américains et critiqua les dirigeants étrangers qui dénonçaient de telles opérations prudentes sans jamais évoquer les atrocités commises par l'autre camp. Lorsque Johnson désigna le Canada à cet égard, Ritchie répondit que c'était inexact. Johnson déclara qu'il « aimait bien M. Pearson », mais pas les discours prononcés « sur son propre terrain » pour lui dire quoi faire. Plus tard, posant sa main sur l'épaule de Ritchie, il lui demanda de dire à Pearson et à Martin de continuer à comprendre la position américaine au Vietnam et de poursuivre le genre de travail que Ronning avait accompli, « ne serait-ce que pour s'assurer de ne rien manquer » (doc. 435). Mais le président savait que de tels efforts avaient peu de chances de réussir, un point de vue que le secrétaire à la Défense américain Robert McNamara répéta à Ritchie (doc. 440), bien que Rusk eût mentionné à Martin son optimisme quant à une percée diplomatique finale (doc. 436). Étant récemment revenu d'une nouvelle visite à Hanoï, Moore doutait du fait que l'intermédiation canadienne dans cette ville produisît la moindre avancée (doc. 442), ce qui suscita le désaccord de Martin (doc. 444-445).

Dans son analyse des différentes idées pour mettre fin à la guerre, le MAE confirma sa préférence pour les démarches réalistes. À la demande de Martin d'examiner les suggestions avancées par Pearson dans un discours antérieur, le Ministère reconnut qu'un « plan de paix » public était attrayant, mais avertit qu'il « donnerait probablement moins de résultats concrets à long terme que [leur] démarche actuelle, qui était plus souple » (doc. 432). De même, le MAE conseilla à Martin de ne pas donner suite à l'idée de Rusk d'une conférence « élargie » sur le Vietnam à Genève, car de telles « illusions d'optique » diplomatiques risquaient de ternir les plus « sérieux efforts » déployés par le Canada (doc. 438). Le MAE était également sceptique quant à la proposition de paix en trois points d'U Thant, qui semblait favoriser Hanoï (doc. 446).

À l'automne, lors de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, Martin discuta du Vietnam avec, entre autres, Gromyko, Goldberg, Rapacki, Singh, U Thant et Stewart (doc. 447-450, 455, 456). Il informa Stewart que le Canada avait espéré que la CISC pourrait faciliter le désengagement dans la ZDM du Vietnam, théâtre de récents combats violents, mais qu'il avait été contrecarré par la Pologne.

Martin en conclut donc que peu de progrès avaient été accomplis où que ce soit. Il trouvait particulièrement inquiétant que Gromyko eût évoqué avec lui le spectre d'une confrontation militaire soviéto-sino-américaine au Vietnam. L'un des problèmes était que les Russes et les Européens de l'Est semblaient douter de la promesse des États-Unis de ne pas chercher à avoir une présence permanente au Vietnam. Depuis Moscou, l'ambassadeur du Canada Robert Ford affirma, dans une analyse que Pearson suggéra de communiquer à quelques Américains, que convaincre les Russes de la sincérité des États-Unis était le « cœur du sujet » (doc. 452). Toutefois, l'ambassadeur Ritchie n'était pas d'accord avec cette analyse, car, même si les Russes pouvaient être convaincus de la sincérité des intentions américaines et acceptaient d'inciter les Nord-Vietnamiens à négocier, tout règlement fondé sur un Sud-Vietnam neutre et indépendant était une abomination aux yeux de Hanoï (doc. 458). Exprimant une opinion semblable, le représentant permanent du Canada à l'ONU, George Ignatieff, écrivit : « Il semble que le principal problème consiste à trouver un compromis entre les objectifs politiques divergents de Hanoï et de Washington concernant le Vietnam » (doc. 459).

En novembre 1966, les visites de Martin en Pologne et en Union soviétique furent marquées par des discussions intensives sur le Vietnam. La CISC occupait une place importante à Varsovie, mais le rôle diplomatique plus actif que Martin souhaitait lui voir jouer entrait en conflit avec la préférence de Rapacki, qui voulait qu'elle restât plutôt inactive pour l'instant (doc. 465-467). À Moscou, Martin fut bien accueilli par les dirigeants soviétiques, notamment le secrétaire général Leonid Brezhnev, mais ne réussit aucune percée diplomatique. Comme les Polonais, les Russes insistèrent pour demander aux États-Unis de cesser leurs bombardements, mais refusèrent de dire comment – à part en améliorant l'ambiance générale – les Nord-Vietnamiens ou eux-mêmes réagiraient (doc. 470-474). Néanmoins, Martin confia au pape Paul VI à Rome que, même si les fonctionnaires du MAE pouvaient ne pas être d'accord, il croyait que les dirigeants de Varsovie et de Moscou souhaitaient contribuer à la paix et apporter leur aide si les bombardements cessaient. Interrogé par le pape sur la façon dont la guerre pourrait se terminer, Martin répondit qu'il faudrait d'abord demander aux États-Unis de suspendre leurs bombardements, puis à l'Union soviétique de faire pression sur Hanoï (doc. 475). C'est exactement la demande qu'il fit à Rusk (qui était sceptique) plus tard au cours du même mois, à Washington. D'ailleurs, Rusk avait été alarmé par un article de presse publié plus tôt par Moscou, qui indiquait que le Canada pourrait se joindre à l'Union soviétique et à d'autres pays pour demander la fin unilatérale des bombardements (doc. 477). Rusk demanda à Martin s'il y avait un intérêt à demander aux responsables canadiens, indiens et polonais de se rencontrer à Genève pour voir s'ils pouvaient « lancer une initiative » sur le Vietnam (doc. 480). Comme Cadieux le rappela à son ministre, Rusk avait fait des suggestions similaires au cours de la dernière année (doc. 481).

Début décembre, l'espoir d'une action de la CISC fut ravivé lorsque les Indiens suggérèrent aux Canadiens et aux Polonais de participer à une réunion préliminaire à New Delhi pour discuter d'une récente proposition d'un professeur de l'Université Harvard visant à organiser une conférence diplomatique sur le Vietnam parrainée par la Commission (doc. 482). Craignant l'isolement du Canada par l'Inde et la Pologne sur la question des bombardements, le MAE chercha à s'assurer que toute initiative de la CISC serait unanime et équilibrée (doc. 485). Même si Rusk était « intrinsèquement favorable » aux idées du Canada (doc. 488), lorsque Goldberg demanda publiquement à U Thant de faciliter les pourparlers de cessez-le-feu, Martin chercha (et réussit) à obtenir la confirmation de Rusk que les Américains n'avaient pas voulu court-circuiter l'initiative du Canada et de l'Inde, dont Martin demandait désormais à Ignatieff de communiquer les détails à U Thant (doc. 492). Comme la participation de la Pologne était essentielle à toute initiative de la CISC, Martin exhorta Rapacki à donner une réponse favorable (doc. 496).

Peu après Noël, U Thant communiqua à Ignatieff, au bénéfice de Martin, des renseignements « très secrets » des Polonais sur leurs récents efforts pour organiser des pourparlers directs entre les États-Unis et le Nord-Vietnam, une opération qui, selon eux, avait été anéantie par les bombardements américains de Hanoï ce mois-là (doc. 499). Comme Cadieux l'indiqua à Martin, il était difficile de comprendre la raison pour laquelle Rusk était resté silencieux sur les discussions des Américains avec les Polonais, ainsi que « l'avantage que les États-Unis pourraient trouver à adopter au moins trois démarches distinctes et simultanées en vue d'un règlement au Vietnam… qui étaient difficilement conciliables et menées dans un contexte où certains intermédiaires concernés ignoraient quels engagements auraient pu être donnés et quels mandats auraient pu être confiés à d'autres » (doc. 501). Lorsque Ritchie, sur instructions du MAE, demanda à Rusk sa réaction face au récit d'U Thant, Rusk lui répondit que les Polonais avaient exigé le secret, que leur version des faits comportait des inexactitudes et était incomplète, et que les responsables américains ne voyaient aucun conflit entre ces sondages d'opinion et une possible initiative de la CISC (doc. 503). Cette initiative échoua à New Delhi en janvier 1967 (doc. 508). Résumant cette dernière déception dans une lettre à Martin, Michener y ajouta sa propre proposition d'action pour la CISC (doc. 509). Mais le MAE informa le ministre « que, pour l'instant du moins, il pourrait être plus rentable de chercher des progrès dans une autre direction » (doc. 510).

Chapitre 7. Les derniers efforts (janvier 1967-avril 1968)

En 1967, la pression publique sur le gouvernement du Canada pour condamner la guerre du Vietnam menée par les États-Unis augmentait. Au lieu de cela, Ottawa

redoubla d'efforts pour trouver une résolution pacifique, comme en témoignent les documents présentés au chapitre 7. Lorsque le comité universitaire sur le Vietnam, un groupe d'universitaires canadiens, appela le gouvernement à « exiger » une fin permanente des bombardements américains et à envisager d'interdire l'exportation d'armes vers les États-Unis (doc. 511), Pearson et Martin rencontrèrent ses porte-parole. Même si le gouvernement n'était pas d'accord avec tout ce qu'il « devrait faire », selon l'opinion du comité, Pearson insista sur le fait qu'il faisait « *tout* ce qu'il *pouvait* faire ». Martin ajouta qu'exiger simplement la fin des bombardements ne servirait à rien et nuirait à la crédibilité du Canada à Washington (et, par extension, à Hanoï). Alors que certains équipements militaires canadiens vendus aux États-Unis se retrouvèrent au Vietnam – comme le déclara Pearson, « il est inutile de se raconter des histoires » (doc. 513) –, dans sa réponse officielle au comité universitaire, Pearson souligna les importantes conséquences économiques et politiques d'une tentative du Canada d'imposer des restrictions aux exportations militaires vers les États-Unis (doc. 526). Les fonctionnaires du MAE étaient tout à fait d'accord avec cette opinion, comme leurs analyses de la question le montrent clairement (doc. 512, 523, 527). Lors d'une réunion du Cabinet, un jour après avoir fait une importante déclaration publique sur la politique du gouvernement concernant la guerre du Vietnam, dans laquelle il avait indiqué sa préférence pour la « diplomatie discrète », Martin prédit que « le bilan du Canada serait très positif lorsque toute l'histoire pourrait être racontée » (doc. 520).

Malgré leur proactivité, le MAE et Martin eurent du mal à savoir où et quand intervenir par la suite. Par exemple, début février, Cadieux suggéra à Martin deux formules possibles pour combler le fossé entre les États-Unis et le Nord-Vietnam, mais fit une mise en garde : « nous pourrions tout à fait nous retrouver à la marge d'une véritable négociation qui se poursuit sans que nous en ayons pleinement connaissance » (doc. 515). En effet, plus tard ce mois-là, d'importantes conversations – mais finalement avortées – sur le Vietnam eurent lieu à Londres entre le premier ministre soviétique Alexei Kosygin et le premier ministre britannique Harold Wilson, dont Goldberg communiqua le contenu à Martin et à Pearson (doc. 525). Bien que le trio eût accepté de laisser retomber la poussière, Martin mena sa propre diplomatie avec les ambassadeurs de la Pologne et de l'Union soviétique à Ottawa (doc. 532, 534, 536). L'idée d'une initiative de la CISC séduisait toujours les diplomates canadiens, indiens et américains, mais le MAE pensait qu'elle devait arriver au bon moment : « Nous espérons pouvoir garder cette technique en réserve pour un usage éventuel lorsque les conditions laisseront penser qu'elle pourrait offrir des perspectives de succès » (doc. 537).

À la mi-avril, Martin, qui s'exprimait devant le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures de la Chambre des communes, proposa un retour en quatre étapes aux Accords de Genève de 1954, en commençant par la cessation des bombardements américains et le rétablissement du *statu quo ante* dans la ZDM. Comme aucune autre initiative diplomatique ne semblait active, le MAE suggéra qu'il était « utile

de lancer une sorte de bouée de sauvetage » (doc. 541). Le Sud-Vietnam et les États-Unis répondirent favorablement, mais pas le Nord-Vietnam. Selon Ritchie, Rusk « espérait que les Canadiens tireraient la bonne conclusion de cet incident, mais doutait [qu'ils] le feraient » (doc. 544). Toutefois, comme le MAE l'indiqua aux Américains, ces derniers n'avaient proposé de suspendre leur activité militaire que dans la ZDM, tandis que la première étape de la proposition exigeait la fin de *tous* les bombardements américains (doc. 554). Par ailleurs, Martin eut des conversations franches avec le sous-secrétaire d'État aux affaires politiques Eugene Rostow et Goldberg (doc. 548, 545). Bien que Rostow eût qualifié l'attitude canadienne de trop « pieuse », il confirma que les États-Unis seraient prêts à arrêter la guerre si le Canada pouvait « livrer la marchandise » en obtenant que le Nord-Vietnam acceptât une action réciproque de quelque forme que ce soit. Selon Martin, les autorités américaines cherchaient presque n'importe quel prétexte pour désamorcer la guerre, même si leur intervention militaire en cours suggérait le contraire.

En mai, la guerre du Vietnam révéla des failles dans la solidarité du Cabinet lorsque le président du Conseil privé, Walter Gordon, critiqua publiquement les États-Unis. Lors d'une réunion extraordinaire du Cabinet, Pearson lut une déclaration préparée sur la politique du gouvernement qu'il avait déjà montrée à Martin et dont la dernière ligne soulignait que chaque membre du gouvernement appuyait cette politique et ne s'y opposerait pas (doc. 555). Or, le MAE remarqua une phrase précédente, qui exprimait l'espoir que les États-Unis, en tant que belligérants les plus forts, prendraient l'initiative de cesser les bombardements et d'exiger des négociations immédiates. Comme Cadieux et le sous-secrétaire adjoint Ralph Collins le mentionnèrent à Martin, puisque les États-Unis ne seraient guère d'accord sur ce point, il y avait une différence importante entre prendre une telle position en privé et en public. Thomas Delworth, le chargé de dossier pour le Vietnam au MAE (et auteur non crédité de nombreux documents reproduits dans le présent volume), voulait s'assurer que Martin comprenait bien que cette phrase s'écartait de la ligne politique précédente du gouvernement, qui avait insisté sur l'équilibre entre ce qui était demandé à Washington et à Hanoï (doc. 556). Au grand soulagement du MAE, cette déclaration du Cabinet ne fut pas rendue publique.

À la fin mai, Pearson défendit, en privé, son argument auprès du président Johnson lors d'une séance de réflexion du premier ministre à la résidence du lac Mousseau, au nord-ouest d'Ottawa (plus tôt, Johnson s'était rendu à l'Expo 67 de Montréal). Comme Pearson l'écrivit dans son journal, Johnson récita son habituelle « *apologia pro mea guerra* », mais réagit calmement à la suggestion que la fin des bombardements priverait les communistes de leur dernière excuse pour refuser de négocier. Toutefois, lorsque les deux dirigeants rejoignirent leurs conseillers, Johnson défendit vigoureusement la politique des États-Unis, en mettant en garde contre les « boys » américains qui risquaient d'être tués pendant

une pause ou une fin des bombardements et en rejetant les éventuels avantages diplomatiques d'une telle initiative. « Il fait preuve d'une grande émotivité humaine face au conflit qui l'honore en tant qu'homme, mais qui pourrait s'avérer un gros handicap pour gérer la stratégie et les tactiques politiques internationales », écrivit Pearson, dont le récit de la conversation (doc. 560) doit être lu avec celui de Ritchie (doc. 561). Quelques jours plus tard, pendant la visite de Wilson à Ottawa, Martin regretta de ne pas en savoir plus sur la façon dont les États-Unis envisageaient la fin de la guerre du Vietnam (doc. 563).

À la mi-juin, lors d'une réunion de l'OTAN au Luxembourg, Martin préconisa un dialogue franc sur le Vietnam (doc. 567) et s'entretint individuellement avec Rusk. Ce dernier semblait anormalement inquiet de la guerre – et donc plus réceptif aux suggestions liées aux bombardements – et évoqua lui-même l'idée de sa fin définitive si le Nord-Vietnam acceptait la présence d'une force internationale dans la ZDM (doc. 564). Le MAE trouva cette idée « extrêmement intéressante » puisqu'elle reprenait la première étape de la proposition faite par Martin au printemps (doc. 565). Mais un mois plus tard, Bill Bundy informa Ritchie que le département d'État estimait que ce n'était pas le bon moment pour une telle initiative. Frustré, Martin écrivit dans la marge du télégramme correspondant : « Bien sûr, c'était l'idée de Rusk » (doc. 571 n. 80).

Comme le MAE le savait depuis la première visite de Ronning à Hanoï, il était essentiel de mettre fin aux bombardements pour entamer des négociations, mais tout dépendait de la réaction des Nord-Vietnamiens. Cette inconnue fit échouer les propositions visant à mettre fin à la guerre, comme le montrent clairement les analyses des idées avancées, entre autres, par les missions du Canada à Londres et à Paris (doc. 547, 551-552, 557). Il y avait aussi la question épineuse de savoir s'il fallait recourir à la diplomatie privée ou publique. Comme Cadieux le conseilla à Martin cet été-là : « Je ne crois pas qu'on servirait un quelconque intérêt en exerçant une pression publique sur les Américains pour qu'ils mettent fin aux bombardements sans réciprocité. » L'arrêt unilatéral des bombardements devrait être – et sembler être – une action autonome des États-Unis plutôt que le résultat d'une pression internationale (doc. 570).

Martin, quant à lui, penchait de plus en plus vers une position publique. Il mit en garde Goldberg et Rusk contre la possibilité d'une résolution au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (CSNU) prônant des négociations, puisque le Canada (qui y siégeait à ce moment-là) aurait du mal à ne pas appuyer un amendement appelant à une cessation inconditionnelle des bombardements (doc. 575, 578). Après avoir dit au secrétaire aux Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni George Brown que le moment était venu de prendre des « mesures drastiques » pour mettre fin à la guerre (doc. 582), Martin utilisa son discours devant l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU à la fin septembre pour demander un arrêt définitif des bombardements comme première étape pour entamer les négociations, ce qui

constituait un changement de politique que des responsables de l'ambassade des États-Unis se firent confirmer par le MAE (doc. 585). Préoccupé par l'orientation des relations canado-américaines, Rusk fit remarquer à Ritchie, lors d'une importante conversation à la mi-novembre, que la CISC comptait désormais deux pays neutres (c'est-à-dire l'Inde et le Canada), une affirmation contestée par Ritchie. Rusk avait été « ébranlé » par la position de Martin sur la résolution du CSNU. Il se demandait aussi pourquoi l'opinion du gouvernement et du public au Canada était si différente de celle de pays plus proches du Vietnam, ce qui poussa Ritchie à souligner une vérité nord-américaine, à savoir que le spectre des opinions au Canada et aux États-Unis était très similaire (doc. 595).

À l'automne 1967, les perspectives de paix au Vietnam semblaient plus sombres que jamais. Après une visite à Hanoï, O.W. Dier, le nouveau commissaire canadien à la CISC, avertit que « ce serait une erreur de remettre en question la sincérité ou la force mentale des dirigeants de la RDVN » (doc. 583). Néanmoins, le gouvernement du Canada était toujours intéressé par des initiatives visant à stimuler les négociations. Pearson répondit à un projet du président de la Fédération mondiale des associations pour les Nations Unies qui, après avoir échoué à obtenir des appuis, prit une tournure irréaliste (doc. 577, 579, 590, 603, 612). Le MAE se concentrait davantage sur un projet nippo-canadien de « garanties mutuelles », lancé par le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Japon, Takeo Miki, et visant à surmonter la méfiance évidente entre les États-Unis et le Nord-Vietnam (doc. 594, 596-598, 606-607). Cependant, au début de janvier 1968, Martin demanda à Miki de reporter les activités du projet, parce qu'il avait envoyé Dier à Hanoï pour éclaircir une déclaration dans laquelle Trinh aurait dit que le Nord-Vietnam engagerait des pourparlers avec les États-Unis si les bombardements cessaient (doc. 609-610). Toutefois, Trinh précisa à Dier que la position nord-vietnamienne (plus ambiguë) n'avait pas changé (doc. 615). Cadieux écrivit à Martin : « Si la grammaire a un sens à Hanoï, le passage du conditionnel au futur est tout à fait fondamental, mais ce n'est pas sur ce point que le ministre des Affaires étrangères a insisté » (doc. 616). Pourtant, Dier exhorta le MAE à « continuer à essayer de faire tout le possible pour mettre fin à cette guerre atroce » (doc. 617).

Cette guerre devint particulièrement atroce à la fin janvier 1968, lorsque les forces du Nord-Vietnam et du Viêt-cong lancèrent une offensive surprise au Sud-Vietnam pendant le Têt (la fête du Nouvel An lunaire au Vietnam). Lors d'une rencontre ultérieure à Ottawa, Pearson et Wilson convinrent que, pour l'instant, il y avait peu d'espoir de trouver une solution politique au conflit. Bien que l'offensive du Têt eût échoué militairement, elle influença profondément l'opinion publique aux États-Unis et ailleurs : « M. Pearson a souligné que l'une des faiblesses de la position américaine était un déficit de crédibilité tragique et croissant. Leurs amis avaient du mal à croire certains des chiffres qu'ils publiaient

sur les pertes » (doc. 621). À un moment où les esprits s'échauffaient à Washington, ni Pearson ni Martin n'étaient enclins à donner suite à la suggestion faite par le chef de l'opposition officielle John Diefenbaker au Parlement d'une résolution multipartite appelant à l'arrêt des bombardements américains (doc. 628-629).

Dans une allocution télévisée du 31 mars 1968, le président Johnson annonça que les États-Unis avaient unilatéralement cessé toutes les attaques contre le Nord-Vietnam, sauf dans une zone non définie au nord de la ZDM. Évoquant la possibilité d'un arrêt complet des bombardements, il appela les Nord-Vietnamiens à participer à des pourparlers pour mettre fin à la guerre. Il déclara également qu'il ne serait pas candidat à l'élection présidentielle suivante. Dans une lettre à Johnson, Pearson (qui lui-même allait démissionner de son poste de premier ministre à la mi-avril) écrivit : « je pense que le monde entier devrait vous être profondément reconnaissant pour les propositions que vous avez faites et pour le courage et la sagesse dont vous avez fait preuve en les faisant » (doc. 631). Le lendemain, pourtant, il fut vivement préoccupé par des rapports selon lesquels des avions américains continuaient à bombarder en profondeur le Nord-Vietnam. Il se demanda même si l'armée américaine défiait le président (doc. 632). Il s'avéra qu'en informant l'ambassadeur Ritchie avant le discours de Johnson, Bill Bundy avait omis de mentionner que la limite nord des bombardements serait le 20e parallèle (doc. 633). Ce malentendu fut éclipsé par la diffusion, le 3 avril, d'une nouvelle selon laquelle le Nord-Vietnam avait accepté de communiquer directement avec les États-Unis au sujet des bombardements (doc. 635) afin de pouvoir commencer des pourparlers plus larges.

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Comme mentionné précédemment, le présent volume porte sur la diplomatie canadienne pendant la guerre du Vietnam, qui va de la position du Canada sur la CISC aux initiatives de plus grande envergure menées par le pays pour mettre fin au conflit. Ainsi, et pour des raisons de longueur, certains sujets, comme le petit programme d'aide au développement offert par le Canada au Sud-Vietnam (les lecteurs noteront qu'il est mentionné en passant dans certains documents), ne sont pas traités explicitement. Dans le cadre du thème choisi, le présent volume vise à proposer un choix aussi complet que possible des principaux documents et à permettre aux lecteurs de mieux se familiariser avec l'ampleur des archives disponibles. Comme pour les précédents livres des DRREC, le présent volume comporte des documents provenant principalement des archives du MAE. Il est complété, le cas échéant, par des archives du Bureau du Conseil privé ainsi que des dossiers personnels du premier ministre, du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et de hauts fonctionnaires. Pour mener nos recherches, nous avons eu un accès complet aux dossiers du MAE et un accès généreux à d'autres collections. Une liste complète des sources archivistiques utilisées dans ce volume figure à la page lxxi. Je reste le seul responsable du choix final des documents.

Les conventions utilisées dans le présent volume sont semblables à celles décrites dans l'introduction du volume 9 (p. xix). La croix (†) indique que le document n'a pas été imprimé et les ellipses ([…]) que des passages ont été supprimés. L'expression « groupe corrompu » ou « groupe manquant » révèle l'existence de problèmes de déchiffrage dans la transmission du télégramme original. Les mots et passages supprimés par l'auteur, les notes en marge et les listes de diffusion ne sont reproduits dans les notes de bas de page que lorsqu'ils revêtent une certaine importance. Sauf indication contraire, on suppose que les documents ont été lus par leur destinataire. Des efforts ont été faits afin de rester aussi fidèle que possible aux documents originaux, notamment en conservant le style concis des télégrammes. Le rédacteur a amélioré discrètement l'orthographe, les majuscules et la ponctuation des textes, mais uniquement lorsque cela était nécessaire à leur compréhension et à leur lisibilité. Toutes les autres modifications aux documents apportées par le rédacteur sont indiquées par des crochets. Les documents sont reproduits en français ou en anglais, selon la langue dans laquelle ils ont été rédigés.

Chaque volume des DRREC est le fruit d'un effort collectif, et celui-ci n'a pas fait exception. Je suis particulièrement reconnaissant envers mes collègues de la Section des affaires historiques d'Affaires mondiales Canada (AMC). Jennifer Anderson, la rédactrice adjointe du volume, a mené la plupart des recherches archivistiques et a joué un rôle essentiel pour toutes les tâches de rédaction. Lisa Komar a sacrifié un temps précieux de notre travail sur le prochain volume des DRREC pour corriger le manuscrit avec doigté. Jennifer et Lisa ont également coordonné la production du volume. Avant sa retraite en 2022, Janice Cavell, éditrice de longue date des DRREC, nous a donné de précieux conseils, dont un guide indispensable de 50 pages qu'elle a écrit à l'intention des futurs rédacteurs de la collection. Étant donné qu'il s'agit du premier volume des DRREC publié depuis le décès prématuré de Greg Donaghy, mon prédécesseur à la tête de la Section des affaires historiques et ancien rédacteur et rédacteur en chef de la série, je tiens également à rendre hommage à sa contribution exceptionnelle au domaine de l'histoire diplomatique du Canada.

Pour la rédaction de ce livre, la Section des affaires historiques a bénéficié de la contribution de divers archivistes, bibliothécaires et assistants de recherche. Nous sommes reconnaissants envers Bibliothèque et Archives Canada (BAC), en particulier son personnel de consultation et ses équipes de soutien à la recherche, comme l'infatigable Alix McEwen. Élizabeth Mongrain, Geneviève Couture et David Rajotte de la Division des archives privées de science, gouvernance et politique de BAC nous ont facilité l'accès à d'importants fonds privés et, avec Renaud Séguin, de la Direction des documents gouvernementaux, ont répondu rapidement à nos demandes de référence. De même, Sylvia Lassam, qui a pris sa retraite en 2025 comme archiviste du Collège Victoria de l'Université de Toronto, nous a aidés à consulter le fonds J. Blair Seaborn. Les chercheurs seront intéressés

d'apprendre que, dans le cadre d'un projet dirigé par l'expert en déclassification Paul Marsden, l'équipe de l'examen en bloc de BAC a vérifié et déclassifié la plupart de ces archives sur le Canada et le Vietnam, dont l'accès était encore restreint, ce qui permet aux lecteurs de suivre les pistes archivistiques suggérées dans les documents reproduits ici. Dans nos recherches, nous avons également reçu le soutien précieux de Kaelyn Hunter de la bibliothèque Jules-Léger d'AMC, d'Emma Kuiack de CDCI Research, et de Christopher Cook.

En outre, nous avons bénéficié de l'aide d'historiens plus ou moins proches, dont John MacFarlane et Jean-Michel Turcotte de la Direction de l'histoire et du patrimoine du ministère de la Défense nationale, qui sont les coauteurs du prochain ouvrage sur l'histoire officielle des observateurs militaires canadiens à la CISC en Indochine. Je suis également reconnaissant envers mes homologues du Comité international des éditeurs de documents diplomatiques de m'avoir généreusement confié leurs propres expériences et leurs pratiques exemplaires. Richard Smith du Bureau des Affaires étrangères, du Commonwealth et du Développement du Royaume-Uni, Miruko Atsuta du ministère des Affaires étrangères du Japon et Piotr Dlugolecki de l'Institut polonais des affaires internationales nous ont aidés en identifiant des individus dans notre liste de personnes. J'ai aussi la chance de bénéficier des conseils et de l'encouragement constants de nombreux historiens universitaires, notamment Robert Bothwell, Norman Hillmer (ancien rédacteur des DRREC), Stephen Azzi et Tim Sayle.

La production de ce volume s'est appuyée sur certaines personnes et certains groupes essentiels. L'experte en édition Carolyn Brown a examiné nos processus et nous a donné de précieux conseils à leur sujet. La transcription des documents d'archives a été soigneusement supervisée par la société Data Conversion Laboratory. Anne Louise Mahoney a corrigé une version préliminaire du manuscrit. Les traducteurs Katerine Arpin, Tarik Brahmi, Louis Ménard et Étienne Rancourt du Bureau de la traduction de Services publics et Approvisionnement Canada, ont fourni la version française des notes de bas de page, des légendes et des textes annexes. La relecture du volume a été réalisée par Joel Kropf (CDCI Research) et son indexation par Donald Howes (DH Indexing). Marquis Book Printing s'est occupé de la mise en page et de l'impression du livre. Notre collègue de division, Jaime Cote, nous a gentiment aidés pour les activités liées aux contrats. Le Réseau canadien de documentation pour la recherche héberge la Bibliothèque numérique d'AMC, où la version numérique de chaque volume des DRREC peut être consultée et téléchargée.

La série des DRREC ne pourrait pas être produite sans l'appui constant de la haute direction d'AMC. Nous tenons en particulier à remercier de leur soutien indéfectible la sous-ministre adjointe Catherine Jobin, la directrice générale Nadia Ahmad, ainsi que les directeurs successifs de la Direction de la recherche sur les politiques étrangères, Pegatha Taylor, Martin Roy et Mark McLaughlin.

La Section des affaires historiques, qui fait désormais partie du Pôle ouvert d'analyse d'AMC, est particulièrement reconnaissante envers son directeur exécutif, Christopher Burton.

Enfin, j'aimerais ajouter que ma famille – notamment ma femme Michelle et ma fille Amelia – a été une source constante de force et de bonheur tout au long de ce projet. Je tiens à leur adresser à toutes les deux mes plus sincères remerciements.

Brendan Kelly

LIST OF ARCHIVAL SOURCES
LISTE DES SOURCES ARCHIVALES

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Government Records/Archives gouvernementales :
RG2, Privy Council Office/Bureau du Conseil privé
RG25, Department of External Affairs/Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Personal Papers/Archives privées :
MG26-N3, MG26-N4, MG26-N6, MG26-N9, Lester B. Pearson
MG31-E44, Albert Edgar Ritchie
MG31-E83, H. Basil Robinson
MG32-B12, Paul Joseph Martin

University of Toronto/Université de Toronto

Trinity College Archives, F2368, J. Blair Seaborn

LIST OF PERSONS
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Acharya, B.K., High Commissioner of India (May 1964–Jul. 1966)

Acheson, Dean, former Secretary of State of United States

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany (–Oct. 1963)

Alexander, N.P., Deputy Secretary for Indochina, Ministry of External Affairs of India (–ca. 1965)

Anderson, David A., Legal Adviser, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Apr. 1963–Aug. 1964)

Arora, R.C., Deputy Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of India (May 1964–1967)

Ayub Khan, Muhammad (Field Marshal), President of Pakistan

Bain, George, Canadian journalist, *Globe and Mail*

Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State, Department of State of United States (–Sep. 1966)

Barbis, George M., Officer-in-Charge of Lao Affairs, Department of State of United States (–Jul. 1966)

Bauer, William E., Officer, Far Eastern Division (Sep. 1964–Aug. 1967)

Beaulne, J.C.L. Yvon, Minister, Embassy to United States (Sep. 1964–Sep. 1967)

Bebler, Ales, President of the World Federation of United Nations Associations (1966–)

Ben Bella, Ahmed, President of Algeria (Sep. 1963–Jun. 1965)

Acharya, B.K., haut-commissaire de l'Inde (mai 1964-juil. 1966)

Acheson, Dean, ancien secrétaire d'État des États-Unis

Adenauer, Konrad, chancelier de la République fédérale d'Allemagne (-oct. 1963)

Alexander, N.P., secrétaire adjoint pour l'Indochine, ministère des Affaires extérieures de l'Inde (-v. 1965)

Anderson, David A., conseiller juridique, délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle (CISC), Vietnam (avr. 1963-août 1964)

Arora, R.C., secrétaire adjoint, ministère des Affaires extérieures de l'Inde (mai 1964-1967)

Ayub Khan, Muhammad (maréchal), président du Pakistan

Bain, George, journaliste canadien, *Globe and Mail*

Ball, George W., sous-secrétaire d'État, Département d'État des États-Unis (-sept. 1966)

Barbis, George M., officier chargé des Affaires laotiennes, Département d'État des États-Unis (-juil. 1966)

Bauer, William E., officier, Direction de l'Extrême-Orient (sept. 1964-août 1967)

Beaulne, J.C.L. Yvon, ministre, ambassade aux États-Unis (sept. 1964-sept. 1967)

Bebler, Ales, président de la Fédération mondiale des associations pour les Nations Unies (1966-)

Ben Bella, Ahmed, président de l'Algérie (sept. 1963-juin 1965)

Berlis, Norman Frederick Henderson, Ambassador to Poland (Sep. 1965–Nov. 1967)

Black, Eugene, Special Adviser to the President for Southeast Asia (later, Adviser to the President on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development) (Apr. 1965–)

Brezhnev, Leonid I., First Secretary, Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union (Oct. 1964–)

Bridle, Paul A., Commissioner, ICSC, Laos (–Jun. 1964)

Brown, Douglas James, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office of United Kingdom (–ca. 1966)

Brown, George, Foreign Secretary of United Kingdom (Aug. 1966–Mar. 1968)

Brown, H.E. (Brigadier), Alternate Delegate and Senior Military Adviser, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Sep. 1964–Sep. 1966)

Brown, Kenneth C., Counsellor, Embassy to United States (Jul. 1963–Jun. 1967)

Bunche, Ralph Johnson, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs of United Nations (–1967)

Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to President of United States for National Security Affairs (–Feb. 1966)

Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State of United States (Mar. 1964–)

Bunker, Ellsworth, Ambassador of United States to Republic of Vietnam (Apr. 1967–)

Burchett, Wilfred Graham, Australian journalist

Butterworth, W. Walton, Ambassador of United States

Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador of United States to Burma (Sep. 1963–)

Berlis, Norman Frederick Henderson, ambassadeur en Pologne (sept. 1965-nov. 1967)

Black, Eugene, conseiller spécial du président pour l'Asie du Sud-Est (plus tard, conseiller du président pour le développement économique et social de l'Asie du Sud-Est) (avr. 1965-)

Brezhnev, Leonid I., premier secrétaire, Comité central du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique (oct. 1964-)

Bridle, Paul A., commissaire, CISC, Laos (-juin 1964)

Brown, Douglas James, Département de l'Asie du Sud-Est, Foreign Office du Royaume-Uni (-v. 1966)

Brown, George, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni (août 1966-mars 1968)

Brown, H.E. (brigadier), conseiller militaire principal, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (sept. 1964-sept. 1966)

Brown, Kenneth C., conseiller, ambassade aux États-Unis (juil. 1963-juin 1967)

Bunche, Ralph Johnson, secrétaire général adjoint aux Affaires politiques spéciales des Nations Unies (-1967)

Bundy, McGeorge, adjoint spécial du président des États-Unis pour les Affaires de sécurité nationale (-fév. 1966)

Bundy, William P., secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires de l'Extrême-Orient, Département d'État des États-Unis (mars 1964-)

Bunker, Ellsworth, ambassadeur des États-Unis auprès de la République du Vietnam (avr. 1967-)

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Butterworth, W. Walton, ambassadeur des États-Unis

Byroade, Henry A., ambassadeur des États-Unis en Birmanie (sept. 1963-)

Cadieux, Marcel, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (May 1964–)

Cameron, Robert P., Counsellor, Embassy to United States (–Aug. 1966)

Campbell, Ross, Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Jul. 1964–May 1967)

Chagla, M.C., Minister of External Affairs of India (Nov. 1966–Sep. 1967)

Chaudhuri, J.N. (General), High Commissioner of India (Jul. 1966–)

Chen Yi (Marshal), Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Premier of People's Republic of China

Childs, Marquis, American journalist and syndicated columnist

Chou En-lai, Premier of People's Republic of China

Chubb, Arthur Gerald (Brigadier), Senior Military Adviser, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Sep. 1966–Sep. 1967)

Clarizio, Emanuele (Monsignor), Apostolic Delegate to Canada (Jun. 1967–)

Cleveland, James Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Department of State of United States (–Sep. 1965); Permanent Representative of United States to North Atlantic Council (Sep. 1965–)

Collins, Ralph Edgar, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Aug. 1965–)

Cooper, Chester, Senior official, Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council of United States (–Apr. 1966); Special Assistant to Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman, Department of State of United States (Sep. 1966–)

Corbeil, J. Jacques H., Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs (1966)

Cadieux, Marcel, sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (mai 1964-)

Cameron, Robert P., conseiller, ambassade aux États-Unis (-août 1966)

Campbell, Ross, ambassadeur en Yougoslavie (juil. 1964-mai 1967)

Chagla, M.C., ministre des Affaires extérieures de l'Inde (nov. 1966-sept. 1967)

Chaudhuri, J.N. (général), haut-commissaire de l'Inde (juil. 1966-)

Chen Yi (maréchal), ministre des Affaires étrangères et vice-premier ministre de la République populaire de Chine

Childs, Marquis, journaliste et chroniqueur d'agence américain

Chou En-lai, premier ministre de la République populaire de Chine

Chubb, Arthur Gerald (brigadier), conseiller militaire principal, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (sept. 1966-sept. 1967)

Clarizio, Emanuele (monseigneur), délégué apostolique pour le Canada (juin 1967-)

Cleveland, James Harlan, secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires des organisations internationales, Département d'État des États-Unis (-sept. 1965); représentant permanent des États-Unis auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord (sept. 1965-)

Collins, Ralph Edgar, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (août 1965-)

Cooper, Chester, haut fonctionnaire, Central Intelligence Agency et Conseil de sécurité nationale des États-Unis (-avr. 1966); adjoint spécial de l'ambassadeur itinérant W. Averell Harriman, Département d'État des États-Unis (sept. 1966-)

Corbeil, J. Jacques H., adjoint au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1966)

Corcoran, Thomas J., Director, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State of United States (1964–Jul. 1965)

Coutts, James A., Appointments Secretary to Prime Minister (–1966)

Couve de Murville, Maurice, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France

Cox, Gordon E., Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam (–Jun. 1964); Minister and Deputy Permanent Representative to United Nations (Jun. 1964–)

Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, Prime Minister of Poland

David, Vaclav, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia

Davies, Harold, Member of Parliament, United Kingdom; special envoy of British government to Vietnam (Jul. 1965)

de Buzon, Jacques, Delegate General ad interim of France to Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi) (Jul. 1963–Nov. 1965)

de Gaulle, Charles (General), President of France

de Goumois, Michel, former Legal Adviser, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (–Jan. 1963); Second Secretary, High Commission in United Kingdom (Jan. 1963–Apr. 1966)

Delworth, W. Thomas, Senior Political Adviser, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (May 1963–Jun. 1964); Vietnam Desk Officer, Far Eastern Division (Sep. 1964–)

Desai, M.J., former Indian Commissioner and Chairman, ICSC, Vietnam

Diefenbaker, John G., Leader of the Opposition (Apr. 1963–Sep. 1967)

Diem, see **Ngo Dinh Diem**

Dier, Ormond W., Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam (ca. Feb. 1967–Apr. 1968)

Corcoran, Thomas J., directeur, groupe de travail sur le Vietnam, Bureau des affaires de l'Extrême-Orient, Département d'État des États-Unis (1964-juil. 1965)

Coutts, James A., secrétaire aux nominations du premier ministre (-1966)

Couve de Murville, Maurice, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la France

Cox, Gordon E., commissaire, CISC, Vietnam (-juin 1964); ministre et représentant permanent adjoint auprès des Nations Unies (juin 1964-)

Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, premier ministre de la Pologne

David, Vaclav, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Tchécoslovaquie

Davies, Harold, député, Royaume-Uni; envoyé spécial du gouvernement britannique au Vietnam (juil. 1965)

de Buzon, Jacques, délégué général par intérim de la France auprès de la République démocratique du Vietnam (Hanoï) (juil. 1963-nov. 1965)

de Gaulle, Charles (général), président de la France

de Goumois, Michel, ancien conseiller juridique, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (-janv. 1963); deuxième secrétaire, haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni (janv. 1963-avril 1966)

Delworth, W. Thomas, conseiller politique principal, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (mai 1963-juin 1964); chargé de dossiers pour le Vietnam, Direction de l'Extrême-Orient (sept. 1964-)

Desai, M.J., ancien commissaire indien et président, CISC, Vietnam

Diefenbaker, John G., chef de l'opposition (avr. 1963-sept. 1967)

Diem, voir **Ngo Dinh Diem**

Dier, Ormond W., commissaire, CISC, Vietnam (v. fév. 1967-avr. 1968)

Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Ambassador of Soviet Union to United States

D'Orlandi, Giovanni, Ambassador of Italy to Republic of Vietnam (–Aug. 1967)

Emery, Eleanor J., Counsellor, High Commission of United Kingdom (1964–)

Erhard, Ludwig, Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany (Oct. 1963–Nov. 1966)

Estabrook, Robert H., American journalist, *Washington Post*

Etherington-Smith, Raymond Gordon A., Ambassador of United Kingdom to Republic of Vietnam (Aug. 1963–1966)

Fanfani, Amintore, Foreign Minister of Italy (Mar.–Dec. 1965, Feb. 1966–)

Fedorenko, Nikolai T., Permanent Representative of Soviet Union to United Nations (–Mar. 1968)

Fisher, Roger, Professor, Harvard Law School

Ford, Robert A.D., Ambassador to Soviet Union (Jan. 1964–); Acting Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (ca. summer 1965)

Forrestal, Michael V., Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs to Secretary of State of United States (Jul. 1964–1965)

Fortier, D'Iberville, Head, Press and Liaison Division (Jul. 1964–)

Fraser, John M., Assistant Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong (Jul. 1965–Apr. 1966); Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong (Apr. 1966–Dec. 1967)

Frederick, Pauline, American broadcast journalist for NBC

Freedman, Max, Canadian journalist, Washington correspondent and syndicated columnist

Freifeld, Sidney A., Counsellor, Permanent Mission to United Nations (Aug. 1964–)

Dobrynin, Anatoly F., ambassadeur de l'Union soviétique aux États-Unis

D'Orlandi, Giovanni, ambassadeur d'Italie auprès de la République du Vietnam (-août 1967)

Emery, Eleanor J., conseiller, haut-commissariat du Royaume-Uni (1964-)

Erhard, Ludwig, chancelier de la République fédérale d'Allemagne (oct. 1963-nov. 1966)

Estabrook, Robert H., journaliste américain, *Washington Post*

Etherington-Smith, Raymond Gordon A., ambassadeur du Royaume-Uni auprès de la République du Vietnam (août 1963-1966)

Fanfani, Amintore, ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Italie (mars-déc. 1965, fév. 1966-)

Fedorenko, Nikolai T., représentant permanent de l'Union soviétique auprès des Nations Unies (-mars 1968)

Fisher, Roger, professeur, Faculté de droit de Harvard

Ford, Robert A.D., ambassadeur en Union soviétique (janv. 1964-); sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures par intérim (v. l'été 1965)

Forrestal, Michael V, adjoint spécial pour les Affaires du Vietnam auprès du secrétaire d'État des États-Unis (juil. 1964-1965)

Fortier, D'Iberville, chef, Direction de la presse et de la liaison (juil. 1964-)

Fraser, John M., délégué commercial adjoint à Hong Kong (juil. 1965-avr. 1966); délégué commercial à Hong Kong (avr. 1966-déc. 1967)

Frederick, Pauline, journaliste américaine pour NBC

Freedman, Max, journaliste canadien, correspondant à Washington et chroniqueur d'agence

Freifeld, Sidney A., conseiller, Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies (août 1964-)

Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D. – Arkansas); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate of United States

Gandhi, Indira, Prime Minister of India (Jan. 1966–) and Minister of External Affairs of India (Sep. 1967–)

Gayn, Mark, Canadian-American journalist, foreign correspondent and Asian Bureau Chief, *Toronto Star*

George, James, Head, European Division (Mar. 1964–Sep. 1966)

Giap, see **Vo Nguyen Giap**

Goburdhun, Ramchundur, Indian Commissioner and Chairman, ICSC, Vietnam (–Apr. 1964)

Goldberg, Arthur J., Permanent Representative of United States to United Nations (Jul. 1965–)

Goldschlag, Klaus, Head, Far Eastern Division (Sep. 1965–Aug. 1967)

Goldwater, Barry, Senator (R. – Arizona) of United States; Republican presidential candidate (1964)

Gomulka, Wladyslaw, First Secretary of Central Committee, United Workers Party (Communist) of Poland

Gordon, Walter, Minister of Finance and Receiver General (Apr. 1963–Nov. 1965); Minister without Portfolio (Jan.–Apr. 1967); President of the Privy Council (Apr. 1967–Mar. 1968)

Gordon Walker, Patrick C., Special Representative of British Co-Chairman of 1954 Geneva Conference (1965)

Green, Marshall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, State Department of United States (Sep. 1963–Jun. 1965)

Gromyko, Andrei A., Foreign Minister of Soviet Union

Gronouski, John A., Ambassador of United States to Poland (Dec. 1965–)

Fulbright, J. William, sénateur (D. – Arkansas); président du Comité des relations étrangères du Sénat, Sénat des États-Unis

Gandhi, Indira, premier ministre de l'Inde (janv. 1966-) et ministre des Affaires extérieures de l'Inde (sept. 1967-)

Gayn, Mark, journaliste canado-américain, correspondant à l'étranger et chef du bureau pour l'Asie, *Toronto Star*

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Goldberg, Arthur J., représentant permanent des États-Unis auprès des Nations Unies (juil. 1965-)

Goldschlag, Klaus, chef, Direction de l'Extrême-Orient (sept. 1965-août 1967)

Goldwater, Barry, sénateur (R. – Arizona) des États-Unis; candidat républicain à la présidence (1964)

Gomulka, Wladyslaw, premier secrétaire du Comité central du Parti des Ouvriers unifiés (communiste) de la Pologne

Gordon, Walter, ministre des Finances et receveur général (avr. 1963-nov. 1965); ministre sans portefeuille (janv.-avr. 1967); président du Conseil privé (avr. 1967-mars 1968)

Gordon Walker, Patrick C., représentant spécial du coprésident britannique de la Conférence de Genève de 1954 (1965)

Green, Marshall, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint pour les Affaires de l'Extrême-Orient, Département d'État des États-Unis (sept. 1963-juin 1965)

Gromyko, Andrei A., ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Union soviétique

Gronouski, John A., ambassadeur des États-Unis en Pologne (déc. 1965-)

Gundevia, Y.D., Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of India (Dec. 1963–Feb. 1965)

Guthrie, John C., Deputy Ambassador of United States to Soviet Union (Jun. 1965–1967)

Ha Van Lau (Colonel), Head, Liaison Mission of People's Army of Vietnam to ICSC

Hadwen, John G., Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs (Jun. 1964–Aug. 1967)

Halstead, John G.H., Head, European Division (Sep. 1966–)

Harmel, Pierre, Prime Minister of Belgium (Jul. 1965–Mar. 1966)

Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Chairman of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency (Apr. 1963–Mar. 1965); Ambassador at Large of United States (Mar. 1965–)

Healey, Denis, Secretary of State for Defence of United Kingdom (Oct. 1964–)

Hipwell, E.C. (Major), Acting Permanent Representative, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Hanoi) (Jan.–May 1966)

Ho Chi Minh, President of Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Hoang Van Tien, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Holt, Harold, Prime Minister of Australia (Jan. 1966–Dec. 1967)

Holyoake, Keith, Prime Minister of New Zealand

Hughes, Peter, Professor, Victoria College, University of Toronto; Faculty Committee on Vietnam, Victoria College, University of Toronto (1967–)

Ignatieff, George, Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council (–Jul. 1966); Permanent Representative to United Nations (Jul. 1966–)

Gundevia, Y.D., secrétaire aux Affaires extérieures, ministère des Affaires extérieures de l'Inde (déc. 1963-fév. 1965)

Guthrie, John C., ambassadeur adjoint des États-Unis en Union soviétique (juin 1965-1967)

Ha Van Lau (colonel), chef, mission de liaison de l'Armée populaire du Vietnam auprès de la CISC

Hadwen, John G., adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (juin 1964-août 1967)

Halstead, John G.H., chef, Direction européenne (sept. 1966-)

Harmel, Pierre, premier ministre de Belgique (juil. 1965-mars 1966)

Harriman, W. Averell, sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires politiques et président du groupe spécial en matière de contre-insurrection (avr. 1963-mars 1965); ambassadeur itinérant des États-Unis (mars 1965-)

Healey, Denis, secrétaire d'État à la Défense du Royaume-Uni (oct. 1964-)

Hipwell, E.C. (major), représentant permanent par intérim, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (Hanoï) (janv.-mai 1966)

Ho Chi Minh, président de la République démocratique du Vietnam

Hoang Van Tien, vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République démocratique du Vietnam

Holt, Harold, premier ministre d'Australie (janv. 1966-déc. 1967)

Holyoake, Keith, premier ministre de Nouvelle-Zélande

Hughes, Peter, professeur, Victoria College, Université de Toronto; comité des professeurs sur le Vietnam, Victoria College, Université de Toronto (1967-)

Ignatieff, George, représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord (-juil. 1966); représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies (juil. 1966-)

Jackson, Robert David, Political Adviser, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Sep. 1963–Jun. 1965); Permanent Representative, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Hanoi) (Jun. 1964–Jun. 1965)

Jha, C.S., Commonwealth Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs of India (Jun. 1964–Feb. 1965); Foreign Secretary of India (Feb. 1965–Aug. 1967)

Jha, L.K., Principal Secretary to Prime Minister of India (1964–Jul. 1967)

Johnson, Lyndon B., President of United States (Nov. 1963–)

Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State of United States (–Jul. 1964); Deputy Ambassador of United States to Vietnam (Jul. 1964–Sep. 1965)

Johnson, William M., Jr., Counsellor (Political Affairs), Embassy of United States (1964–)

Kannampilly, K.M., Joint Secretary, South Asia Division, Ministry of External Affairs of India (1965–ca. Jul. 1967)

Kaul, T.N., Secretary EA-1, Ministry of External Affairs of India (1966–)

Kennedy, John F., President of United States (–Nov. 1963)

Kennedy, Robert F., Senator (D. – New York) of United States (Jan. 1965–)

Kenyon, Lloyd E. (Brigadier), Senior Military Adviser, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Sep. 1963–Sep. 1964)

Kerfoot, R.J. (Lieutenant-Colonel), Permanent Representative, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Hanoi) (Oct. 1965–Apr. 1966)

Khanh, see **Nguyen Khanh**

Khrushchev, Nikita, First Secretary, Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union (–Oct. 1964)

Jackson, Robert David, conseiller politique, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (sept. 1963-juin 1965); représentant permanent, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (Hanoï) (juin 1964-juin 1965)

Jha, C.S., secrétaire du Commonwealth, ministère des Affaires extérieures de l'Inde (juin 1964-fév. 1965); secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères de l'Inde (fév. 1965-août 1967)

Jha, L.K., secrétaire principal du premier ministre de l'Inde (1964-juil. 1967)

Johnson, Lyndon B., président des États-Unis (nov. 1963-)

Johnson, U. Alexis, sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires politiques, Département d'État des États-Unis (-juil. 1964); ambassadeur adjoint des États-Unis au Vietnam (juil. 1964-sept. 1965)

Johnson, William M., Jr, conseiller (Affaires politiques), ambassade des États-Unis (1964-)

Kannampilly, K.M., co-secrétaire, Direction de l'Asie du Sud, ministère des Affaires extérieures de l'Inde (1965-v. juil. 1967)

Kaul, T.N., Secrétaire EA-1, ministère des Affaires extérieures de l'Inde (1966-)

Kennedy, John F., président des États-Unis (-nov. 1963)

Kennedy, Robert F., sénateur (D. – New York) des États-Unis (janv. 1965-)

Kenyon, Lloyd E. (brigadier), conseiller militaire principal, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (sept. 1963-sept. 1964)

Kerfoot, R.J. (lieutenant-colonel), représentant permanent, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (Hanoï) (oct. 1965-avr. 1966)

Khanh, voir **Nguyen Khanh**

Khrushchev, Nikita, premier secrétaire, Comité central du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique (-oct. 1964)

Kidd, George P., Minister, Embassy to United States (Mar. 1964–Oct. 1967)

Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany (Dec. 1966–)

Kiselyak, Charles A., Second Secretary, Embassy of United States (–1965)

Kiuchi, Akitane, Director, Southeast Asia Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Apr. 1966–Dec. 1967)

Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador of United States to Soviet Union (–Nov. 1966)

Kosygin, Alexei N., Premier of Soviet Union (Oct. 1964–)

Kreisberg, Paul, Officer, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State of United States (May 1965–)

Kuznetsov, Vasily V., First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Union

Langille, Gilbert C., Counsellor, Embassy to United States (Oct. 1963–Sep. 1967)

Langley, James C., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Jul. 1966–)

Le Duan, First Secretary, Lao Dong (Vietnam Workers') Party of Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Le Tan, Deputy Director for South America, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Republic of North Vietnam

Leech, G.C. (Brigadier), Member of the DEA-DND Liaison Team that visited the ICSCs in Indochina in October–November 1964

LePan, Douglas V., Principal, University College, University of Toronto (1964–); former Canadian diplomat

Lett, Sherwood (Brigadier), former Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam

Lewandowski, Janusz, Polish Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam (Mar. 1966–Apr. 1967)

Kidd, George P., ministre, ambassade aux États-Unis (mars 1964-oct. 1967)

Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, chancelier, République fédérale d'Allemagne (déc. 1966-)

Kiselyak, Charles A., deuxième secrétaire, ambassade des États-Unis (-1965)

Kiuchi, Akitane, directeur, Direction de l'Asie du Sud-Est, ministère des Affaires étrangères du Japon (avr. 1966-déc. 1967)

Kohler, Foy D., ambassadeur des États-Unis en Union soviétique (-nov. 1966)

Kosygin, Alexei N., premier ministre de l'Union soviétique (oct. 1964-)

Kreisberg, Paul, officier, Bureau des Affaires de l'Extrême-Orient, Département d'État des États-Unis (mai 1965-)

Kuznetsov, Vasily V., premier vice-ministre, ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'Union soviétique

Langille, Gilbert C., conseiller, ambassade aux États-Unis (oct. 1963-sept. 1967)

Langley, James C., sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (juil. 1966-)

Le Duan, premier secrétaire, Parti Lao Dong (Parti des travailleurs) de la République démocratique du Vietnam

Le Tan, directeur adjoint pour l'Amérique du Sud, ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République démocratique du Nord-Vietnam.

Leech, G.C. (brigadier), membre de l'équipe de liaison du MAE et du MDN qui a visité la CISC en Indochine en octobre et novembre 1964.

LePan, Douglas V., directeur, University College, Université de Toronto (1964-); ancien diplomate canadien

Lett, Sherwood (brigadier), ancien commissaire, CISC, Vietnam

Lewandowski, Janusz, commissaire polonais, CISC, Vietnam (mars 1966-avr. 1967)

Lintott, Sir Henry John Bevis, High Commissioner of United Kingdom (May 1963–)

Lippmann, Walter, American syndicated columnist

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Ambassador of United States to Vietnam (–Jun. 1964, Aug. 1965–Apr. 1967)

Lucet, Charles E., Director of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France (–Dec. 1965)

Macdonald, Mary E., Executive Assistant and Private Secretary to Prime Minister

MacFie, James (Captain), Senior Military Representative, Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Hanoi) (Jul. 1967)

MacLellan, Keith William, Commissioner, ICSC, Laos (Feb. 1965–Aug. 1966)

Mai Lam (Lieutenant-Colonel; Colonel), Deputy Head, Liaison Mission of People's Army of Vietnam to ICSC

Mai Van Bo, Delegate General and Commercial Representative of Democratic Republic of Vietnam to France

Maneli, Mieczyslaw, Senior Political Adviser, Polish Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (–May 1964); Polish Acting Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam (–Jan. 1964)

Marder, Murrey, American journalist, *Washington Post*

Martin, Paul, Secretary of State for External Affairs (Apr. 1963–)

McCardle, James J., Head, Defence Liaison (2) Division

McCarthy, Eugene, Senator (D. – Minnesota) of United States; Democratic presidential candidate (Nov. 1967–)

McCloskey, Robert J., Spokesman, Department of State of United States (1964–)

Lintott, Sir Henry John Bevis, haut-commissaire du Royaume-Uni (mai 1963-)

Lippmann, Walter, chroniqueur d'agence américain

Lodge, Henry Cabot, ambassadeur des États-Unis au Vietnam (-juin 1964, août 1965-avr. 1967)

Lucet, Charles E., directeur des Affaires politiques, ministère des Affaires étrangères de la France (-déc. 1965)

Macdonald, Mary E., adjointe exécutive et secrétaire privée du premier ministre

MacFie, James (capitaine), haut représentant militaire, délégation auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (Hanoï) (juil. 1967)

MacLellan, Keith William, commissaire, CISC, Laos (fév. 1965-août 1966)

Mai Lam (lieutenant-colonel; colonel), chef adjoint, mission de liaison de l'Armée populaire du Vietnam auprès de la CISC

Mai Van Bo, délégué général et représentant commercial de la République démocratique du Vietnam en France

Maneli, Mieczyslaw, conseiller politique principal, délégation polonaise auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (-mai 1964); commissaire intérimaire polonais, CISC, Vietnam (-janv. 1964)

Marder, Murrey, journaliste américain, *Washington Post*

Martin, Paul, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères (avr. 1963-)

McCardle, James J., chef de la 2e Direction de liaison avec la Défense

McCarthy, Eugene, sénateur (D. – Minnesota) des États-Unis; candidat démocrate à la présidence (nov. 1967-)

McCloskey, Robert J., porte-parole, Département d'État des États-Unis (1964-)

McDougall, Pamela A., Deputy Head, Far Eastern Division (Aug. 1963–Jan. 1968)

McGill, Allan S., Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs (Jul. 1967–)

McKellar, Peter L., Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs (1966–Aug. 1967)

McNamara, Robert, Secretary of Defense of United States (–Feb. 1968)

McNaughton, John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense of United States (Mar. 1964–Jul. 1967)

Mendenhall, Joseph A., Director, Vietnam Working Group, Department of State of United States (Jan.–Jul. 1964)

Menzies, Sir Robert Gordon, Prime Minister of Australia (–Jan. 1966)

Michalowski, Jerzy, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland (–Aug. 1967)

Michener, Roland, High Commissioner in India (Jul. 1964–Apr. 1967)

Miki, Takeo, Foreign Minister of Japan (Dec. 1966–)

Miller, Robert H., Director, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State of United States (Jul. 1965–1967)

Moore, Victor C., Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam (Nov. 1965–Feb. 1967)

Moran, Herbert Owen, Ambassador to Japan (Feb. 1966–)

Mucha, Bohumil, Ambassador of Czechoslovakia to Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Oct. 1964–Jul. 1967)

Mukhi, Jai M., former Chairman, Legal Committee of ICSC, Vietnam

Murray, Donald Frederick, Assistant Head, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office of United Kingdom (1964–1966)

McDougall, Pamela A., chef adjointe, Direction de l'Extrême-Orient (août 1963-janv. 1968)

McGill, Allan S., adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (juil. 1967-)

McKellar, Peter L., adjoint du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1966-août 1967)

McNamara, Robert, secrétaire à la Défense des États-Unis (-fév. 1968)

McNaughton, John T., secrétaire adjoint à la Défense pour les Affaires de sécurité internationale, département de la Défense des États-Unis (mars 1964-juil. 1967)

Mendenhall, Joseph A., directeur, Groupe de travail sur le Vietnam, Département d'État des États-Unis (janv.-juil. 1964)

Menzies, Sir Robert Gordon, premier ministre d'Australie (-janv. 1966)

Michalowski, Jerzy, directeur général, ministère des Affaires étrangères de la Pologne (-août 1967)

Michener, Roland, haut-commissaire en Inde (juil. 1964-avr. 1967)

Miki, Takeo, ministre des Affaires étrangères du Japon (déc. 1966-)

Miller, Robert H., directeur, groupe de travail sur le Vietnam, Bureau des affaires de l'Extrême-Orient, Département d'État des États-Unis (juil. 1965-1967)

Moore, Victor C., commissaire, CISC, Vietnam (nov. 1965-fév. 1967)

Moran, Herbert Owen, ambassadeur au Japon (fév. 1966-)

Mucha, Bohumil, ambassadeur de Tchécoslovaquie en République démocratique du Vietnam (oct. 1964-juil. 1967)

Mukhi, Jai M., ancien président, comité juridique de la CISC, Vietnam

Murray, Donald Frederick, chef adjoint, département de l'Asie du Sud-Est, Foreign Office du Royaume-Uni (1964-1966)

Murray, Geoffrey S., Deputy High Commissioner, High Commission in United Kingdom (Sep. 1964–Oct. 1967)

Muthamma, Chonira B., Deputy Secretary, Indochina Desk, Ministry of External Affairs of India (–Jul. 1963)

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, President of Egypt

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Prime Minister of India (–May 1964)

Ngo Dinh Diem, President of Republic of Vietnam (–Nov. 1963)

Nguyen Cao Ky (Vice Air Marshal), Prime Minister of Republic of Vietnam (Jun. 1965–Oct. 1967); Vice-President of Republic of Vietnam (Oct. 1967–)

Nguyen Co Thach, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Nguyen Duy Trinh, Deputy Prime Minister of Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Foreign Minister of Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Apr. 1965–)

Nguyen Khanh (Major-General), Prime Minister of Republic of Vietnam (Feb.–Oct. 1964); Commander in Chief of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (Oct. 1964–Feb. 1965); Ambassador at Large of Republic of Vietnam (Feb. 1965–)

Nguyen Thom, interpreter, Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Nguyen Van An (Colonel), Head, Liaison Mission of Republic of Vietnam to ICSC (–ca. Mar. 1966)

Nguyen Van Thieu (General), Chief of State of Republic of Vietnam (Jun. 1965–Oct. 1967); President of Republic of Vietnam (Oct. 1967–)

Nguyen Xuan Oanh, Deputy Prime Minister of Republic of Vietnam (Feb. 1964–Feb. 1965)

Nikezic, Marko, Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia (Apr. 1965–)

Murray, Geoffrey S., haut-commissaire adjoint, haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni (sept. 1964-oct. 1967)

Muthamma, Chonira B., secrétaire adjoint, Bureau de l'Indochine, ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'Inde (-juil. 1963)

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, président de l'Égypte

Nehru, Jawaharlal, premier ministre de l'Inde (-mai 1964)

Ngo Dinh Diem, président de la République du Vietnam (-nov. 1963)

Nguyen Cao Ky (vice maréchal de l'air), premier ministre de la République du Vietnam (juin 1965-oct. 1967); vice-président de la République du Vietnam (oct. 1967-)

Nguyen Co Thach, sous-ministre, ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République démocratique du Vietnam

Nguyen Duy Trinh, vice-premier ministre de la République démocratique du Vietnam et ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République démocratique du Vietnam (avr. 1965-)

Nguyen Khanh (major-général), premier ministre de la République du Vietnam (fév.-oct. 1964); commandant en chef des forces armées de la République du Vietnam (oct. 1964-fév. 1965); ambassadeur itinérant de la République du Vietnam (fév. 1965-)

Nguyen Thom, interprète, République démocratique du Vietnam

Nguyen Van An (colonel), chef, mission de liaison de la République du Vietnam auprès de la CISC (-v. mars 1966)

Nguyen Van Thieu (général), chef d'État de la République du Vietnam (juin 1965-oct. 1967); président de la République du Vietnam (oct. 1967-)

Nguyen Xuan Oanh, vice-premier ministre de la République du Vietnam (fév. 1964-fév. 1965)

Nikezic, Marko, ministre des Affaires étrangères de Yougoslavie (avr. 1965-)

Nixon, Richard M., former Vice President of United States; Republican presidential candidate (1968)

Nkrumah, Kwame, President of Ghana (–Feb. 1966)

Norstad, Lauris (General), former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO

Nyerere, Julius, President of Tanzania

Ochab, Edward, Chairman of the Council of State of Poland (Aug. 1964–)

Ogrodzinski, Przemyslaw, Ambassador of Poland to India

Parthasarathi, Gopalaswami, Permanent Representative of India to United Nations (Aug. 1965–)

Paul VI, Pope, Head, Catholic Church (Jun. 1963–)

Pearson, Lester B., Prime Minister (Apr. 1963–)

Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Phan Huy Quat, Foreign Minister of Republic of Vietnam (Feb.–Nov. 1964)

Phoumi Nosavan (General), former Deputy Premier of Laos, in exile from Feb. 1965

Pignedoli, Sergio (Monsignor), Apostolic Delegate to Canada (Jun. 1964–Jun. 1967)

Plumptre, A.F.W., Principal, Scarborough College, University of Toronto (1965–); former Canadian public servant

Podgorny, Nikolai V., Chairman, Presidium of Supreme Soviet of Soviet Union (Dec. 1965–)

Polyansky, Dmitri S., First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers of Soviet Union (Oct. 1965–)

Ponsonby, Myles Walter, Consul General of United Kingdom to Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Oct. 1964–1965)

Nixon, Richard M., ancien vice-président des États-Unis; candidat républicain à la présidence (1968)

Nkrumah, Kwame, président du Ghana (-fév. 1966)

Norstad, Lauris (général), ancien commandant suprême des Forces alliées en Europe, OTAN

Nyerere, Julius, président de la Tanzanie

Ochab, Edward, président du Conseil d'État de la Pologne (août 1964-)

Ogrodzinski, Przemyslaw, ambassadeur de la Pologne en Inde

Parthasarathi, Gopalaswami, représentant permanent de l'Inde auprès des Nations Unies (août 1965-)

Paul VI, pape, chef de l'Église catholique (juin 1963-)

Pearson, Lester B., premier ministre (avr. 1963-)

Pham Van Dong, premier ministre de la République démocratique du Vietnam

Phan Huy Quat, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République du Vietnam (fév.-nov. 1964)

Phoumi Nosavan (général), ancien vice-premier ministre du Laos, en exil depuis fév. 1965

Pignedoli, Sergio (monseigneur), délégué apostolique pour le Canada (juin 1964-juin 1967)

Plumptre, A.F.W., directeur , Scarborough College, Université de Toronto (1965-); ancien fonctionnaire canadien

Podgorny, Nikolai V., président, Présidium du Soviet suprême de l'Union soviétique (déc. 1965-)

Polyansky, Dmitri S., premier vice-président du Conseil des ministres de l'Union soviétique (oct. 1965-)

Ponsonby, Myles Walter, consul général du Royaume-Uni en République démocratique du Vietnam (oct. 1964-1965)

Pope, T.M., Vietnam Desk Officer, Far Eastern Division (–Sep. 1964)

Quat, see **Phan Huy Quat**

Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, President of India (–May 1967)

Raffaelli, Jean, French journalist, Agence France-Presse correspondent

Rahman, Mohammed A., Indian Commissioner and Chairman, ICSC, Vietnam (Apr. 1964–1967)

Rangarajan, L.N., Senior Political Adviser, Indian Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (–ca. Jan. 1964)

Rapacki, Adam, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland

Reece, D.C., Officer, African and Middle Eastern Division (1965–Aug. 1967)

Reedy, George, White House Press Secretary, United States (Mar. 1964–Jul. 1965)

Reid, Escott, Principal, Glendon College, York University (1965–); former Canadian diplomat

Rettie, Edward R., Acting High Commissioner in India (ca. Jun.–Sep. 1964); Minister-Counsellor, High Commission in India (Jul. 1964–Sep. 1965)

Ritchie, Albert Edgar, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (–Jun. 1964); Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Jun. 1964–Jul. 1966); Ambassador to United States (Jul. 1966–)

Ritchie, Charles S.A., Ambassador to United States (–Jun. 1966)

Roberts, George B., Jr., Personnel officer, staff aide, State Department of United States (–1965)

Roberts, Peter M., First Secretary, Embassy to United States (Sep. 1965–1966); Counsellor, Embassy to United States (1966–)

Pope, T.M., chargé de dossiers (Vietnam), Direction de l'Extrême-Orient (-sept. 1964)

Quat, voir **Phan Huy Quat**

Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, président de l'Inde (-mai 1967)

Raffaelli, Jean, journaliste français, correspondant de l'Agence France-Presse

Rahman, Mohammed A., commissaire indien et président, CISC, Vietnam (avr. 1964-1967)

Rangarajan, L.N., conseiller politique principal, délégation indienne auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (-v. janv. 1964)

Rapacki, Adam, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Pologne

Reece, D.C., officier, Direction de l'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient (1965-août 1967)

Reedy, George, attaché de presse de la Maison-Blanche, États-Unis (mars 1964-juil. 1965)

Reid, Escott, directeur, Glendon College, Université York (1965-); ancien diplomate canadien

Rettie, Edward R., haut-commissaire par intérim en Inde (v. juin-sept. 1964); ministre-conseiller, haut-commissariat en Inde (juil. 1964-sept. 1965)

Ritchie, Albert Edgar, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (-juin 1964); sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures (juin 1964-juil. 1966); ambassadeur aux États-Unis (juil. 1966-)

Ritchie, Charles S.A., ambassadeur aux États-Unis (-juin 1966)

Roberts, George B., Jr, officier du personnel, aide de cabinet, Département d'État des États-Unis (-1965)

Roberts, Peter M., premier secrétaire, ambassade aux États-Unis (sept. 1965-1966); conseiller, ambassade aux États-Unis (1966-)

Robertson, Norman A., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (–May 1964)

Robertson, R. Gordon, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet

Robinson, H. Basil, Minister, Embassy to United States (–Aug. 1964); Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Aug. 1964–Dec. 1966); Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Dec. 1966–)

Rogers, R. Louis, Head, Far Eastern Division (Jul. 1963–Aug. 1965)

Rolz-Bennett, José, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs of United Nations (Jan. 1965–)

Ronning, Chester A., High Commissioner in India (retired Jul. 1964); Special Representative of Canadian Government (1966)

Rostow, Eugene, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State of United States (Oct. 1966–)

Rostow, Walt W., Special Assistant to President of United States for National Security Affairs (Mar. 1966–)

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State of United States

Safronchuk, Vasily S., Deputy Chief, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Union (1964–1967)

Salisbury, Harrison E., American journalist, foreign correspondent, *New York Times*

Saragat, Giuseppe, President of Italy (Dec. 1964–)

Sato, Eisaku, Prime Minister of Japan (Nov. 1964–)

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., American historian, public intellectual and political commentator

Scott, Joseph W., Minister, Embassy of United States (Sep. 1964–)

Seaborn, James Blair, Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam (Jun. 1964–Nov. 1965); Head, Eastern European Section, European Division (Jan. 1966–Aug. 1967); Head, Far Eastern Division (Aug. 1967–)

Robertson, Norman A., sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (-mai 1964)

Robertson, R. Gordon, greffier du Conseil privé et secrétaire du Cabinet

Robinson, H. Basil, ministre, ambassade aux États-Unis (-août 1964); sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (août 1964-déc. 1966); sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures (déc. 1966-)

Rogers, R. Louis, chef, Direction de l'Extrême-Orient (juil. 1963-août 1965)

Rolz-Bennett, José, secrétaire général adjoint aux Affaires politiques spéciales des Nations Unies (janv. 1965-)

Ronning, Chester A, haut-commissaire en Inde (retraité depuis juil. 1964); représentant spécial du gouvernement canadien (1966)

Rostow, Eugene, sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires politiques, Département d'État des États-Unis (oct. 1966-)

Rostow, Walt W., assistant spécial du président des États-Unis pour les Affaires de sécurité nationale (mars 1966-)

Rusk, Dean, secrétaire d'État des États-Unis

Safronchuk, Vasily S., chef adjoint, Deuxième département européen, ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'Union soviétique (1964-1967)

Salisbury, Harrison E., journaliste américain, correspondant étranger, *New York Times*

Saragat, Giuseppe, président de l'Italie (déc. 1964-)

Sato, Eisaku, premier ministre du Japon (nov. 1964-)

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr, historien américain, intellectuel public et commentateur politique

Scott, Joseph W., ministre, ambassade des États-Unis (sept. 1964-)

Seaborn, James Blair, commissaire, CISC, Vietnam (juin 1964-nov. 1965); chef, Section de l'Europe de l'Est, Direction européenne (janv. 1966-août 1967); chef, Direction de l'Extrême-Orient (août 1967-)

Senanayake, Dudley, Prime Minister of Ceylon (Mar. 1965–)

Sevareid, Eric, American broadcast journalist and political commentator

Shastri, Lal Bahadur, Prime Minister of India (Jun. 1964–Jan. 1966)

Shelepin, Aleksandr N., Member, Presidium of Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union (1964–)

Shenstone, Michael, First Secretary, Embassy to United States (Aug. 1963–Apr. 1964); Counsellor, Embassy to United States (Apr. 1964–Aug. 1967)

Shiina, Etsusaburo, Foreign Minister of Japan (Jul. 1964–Dec. 1966)

Shpedko, Ivan F., Ambassador of Soviet Union

Sieradzki, Mieczyslaw, Deputy Director, Department III, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland (1964–)

Sihanouk, Norodom, Head of State of Cambodia

Singh, Swaran, Minister of External Affairs of India (Jul. 1964–Nov. 1966)

Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Department of State of United States (Sep. 1965–)

Smith, Arnold C., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Sep. 1963–Aug. 1965); Secretary-General of the Commonwealth (Aug. 1965–)

Smith, Bromley, Executive Secretary, National Security Council of United States

Smith, Rufus Z., Director, Office of Canadian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State of United States (Mar. 1966–)

Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos

Spasowski, Romuald Franciszek, Polish Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam (Dec. 1963–Sep. 1964)

Senanayake, Dudley, premier ministre de Ceylan (mars 1965-)

Sevareid, Eric, journaliste et commentateur politique américain

Shastri, Lal Bahadur, premier ministre de l'Inde (juin 1964-janv. 1966)

Shelepin, Aleksandr N., Membre, Présidium du Comité central du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique (1964-)

Shenstone, Michael, premier secrétaire, ambassade aux États-Unis (août 1963-avr. 1964); conseiller, ambassade aux États-Unis (avr. 1964-août 1967)

Shiina, Etsusaburo, ministre des Affaires étrangères du Japon (juil. 1964-déc. 1966)

Shpedko, Ivan F., ambassadeur de l'Union soviétique

Sieradzki, Mieczyslaw, directeur adjoint, département III, ministère des Affaires étrangères de la Pologne (1964-)

Sihanouk, Norodom, chef d'État du Cambodge

Singh, Swaran, ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Inde (juil. 1964-nov. 1966)

Sisco, Joseph J., secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires des organisations internationales, Département d'État des États-Unis (sept. 1965-)

Smith, Arnold C., sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (sept. 1963-août 1965); secrétaire général du Commonwealth (août 1965-)

Smith, Bromley, secrétaire exécutif, Conseil de sécurité nationale des États-Unis

Smith, Rufus Z., directeur, Bureau des affaires canadiennes, Bureau des affaires européennes, Département d'État des États-Unis (mars 1966-)

Souvanna Phouma, premier ministre du Laos

Spasowski, Romuald Franciszek, commissaire polonais, CISC, Vietnam (déc. 1963-sept. 1964)

Stawicki, Ryszard, Senior Political Adviser, Polish Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Dec. 1963–Jun. 1965); Polish Acting Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam (Sep. 1964–Mar. 1965)

Stevenson, Adlai E., Permanent Representative of United States to United Nations (–Jul. 1965)

Stewart, Michael, Foreign Secretary of United Kingdom (Jan. 1965–Aug. 1966, Mar. 1968–)

Stoessel, Walter J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Department of State of United States (Sep. 1965–)

Stoner, Oliver Gerald, Assistant Clerk of the Privy Council and Senior Assistant Secretary to Cabinet (1964– 1967); Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council and Deputy Secretary to Cabinet (1967–)

Stradowski, Marian, Ambassador of Poland (Jan. 1967–)

Sukrisno, Ambassador of Indonesia to Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Nov. 1964–Jun. 1966)

Sullivan, William H., Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to Secretary of State of United States and Head, Interagency Vietnam Coordinating Committee, Department of State of United States (Mar. 1964–Nov. 1964); Ambassador of United States to Laos (Nov. 1964–)

Suzuki, Takashi, Director General, Research and Analysis Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Dec. 1966–)

Taylor, Maxwell D. (General), Ambassador of United States to Republic of Vietnam (Jun. 1964–Jul. 1965)

Thach, see **Nguyen Co Thach**

Thomson, George Morgan, Minister of State, Foreign Office of United Kingdom (Oct. 1964–Apr. 1966, Jan.–Aug. 1967)

Stawicki, Ryszard, conseiller politique principal, délégation polonaise auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (déc. 1963-juin 1965); commissaire polonais par intérim, CISC, Vietnam (sept. 1964-mars 1965)

Stevenson, Adlai E., représentant permanent des États-Unis auprès des Nations Unies (-juil. 1965)

Stewart, Michael, ministre des Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni (janv. 1965-août 1966, mars 1968-)

Stoessel, Walter J., sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires européennes, Département d'État des États-Unis (sept. 1965-)

Stoner, Oliver Gerald, greffier adjoint du Conseil privé et secrétaire adjoint principal du Cabinet (1964-1967); greffier adjoint du Conseil privé et secrétaire adjoint du Cabinet (1967-)

Stradowski, Marian, ambassadeur de la Pologne (janv. 1967-)

Sukrisno, ambassadeur de l'Indonésie auprès de la République démocratique du Vietnam (nov. 1964-juin. 1966)

Sullivan, William H., assistant spécial pour les Affaires vietnamiennes auprès du secrétaire d'État des États-Unis et chef du comité de coordination interagences pour le Vietnam, Département d'État des États-Unis (mars 1964-nov. 1964); ambassadeur des États-Unis au Laos (nov. 1964-)

Suzuki, Takashi, directeur général, Direction de la recherche et de l'analyse, ministère des Affaires étrangères du Japon (déc. 1966-)

Taylor, Maxwell D. (général), ambassadeur des États-Unis auprès de la République du Vietnam (juin 1964-juil. 1965)

Thach, voir **Nguyen Co Thach**

Thomson, George Morgan, ministre d'État, ministère des Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni (oct. 1964-avr. 1966, janv.-août 1967)

Thomson, Robert K., Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong (–1966)

Ting Ke-chien, General Manager of China Resources Company

Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia

Tomorowicz, Bohdan, Permanent Representative of Poland to United Nations (Sep. 1966–)

Tran Van Do, Deputy Prime Minister of Republic of Vietnam (Feb.–Jun. 1965); Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Vietnam (Feb. 1965–)

Tremblay, Paul, Permanent Representative to United Nations (–Jun. 1966)

Truong Chinh, Chairman of National Assembly, Democratic Republic of Vietnam

U Thant, Secretary-General of United Nations

Unger, Leonard S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State of United States (Jan. 1965–Aug. 1967)

Ushiba, Nobuhiko, Deputy Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Jun. 1964–Apr. 1967)

Valenti, Jack, Special Assistant to President of United States (Nov. 1963–May 1966)

Vaz, A.W.B., Senior Political Adviser, Indian Delegation to ICSC, Vietnam (Mar. 1964–ca. 1965)

Vo Nguyen Giap (General), Vice-Premier and Minister of National Defence of Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Commander-in-Chief, People's Army of Vietnam

Vu Anh (Lieutenant-Colonel), Deputy Head, Liaison Mission of People's Army of Vietnam to ICSC

Vu Van Mau, Foreign Minister of Republic of Vietnam (–Aug. 1963)

Thomson, Robert K., délégué commercial à Hong Kong (-1966)

Ting Ke-chien, directeur général de la China Resources Company

Tito, Josip Broz, président de la Yougoslavie

Tomorowicz, Bohdan, représentant permanent de la Pologne auprès des Nations Unies (sept. 1966-)

Tran Van Do, vice-premier ministre de la République du Vietnam (fév.-juin 1965); ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République du Vietnam (fév. 1965-)

Tremblay, Paul, représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies (-juin 1966)

Truong Chinh, président de l'Assemblée nationale, République démocratique du Vietnam

U Thant, Secrétaire général des Nations Unies

Unger, Leonard S., sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint pour les Affaires de l'Extrême-Orient, Département d'État des États-Unis (janv. 1965-août 1967)

Ushiba, Nobuhiko, vice-ministre adjoint, ministère des Affaires étrangères du Japon (juin 1964-avr. 1967)

Valenti, Jack, assistant spécial du président des États-Unis (nov. 1963-mai 1966)

Vaz, A.W.B., conseiller politique principal, délégation indienne auprès de la CISC, Vietnam (mars 1964-v. 1965)

Vo Nguyen Giap (général), vice-premier ministre et ministre de la Défense nationale de la République démocratique du Vietnam; commandant en chef de l'Armée populaire du Vietnam

Vu Anh (lieutenant-colonel), chef adjoint, mission de liaison de l'Armée populaire du Vietnam auprès de la CISC

Vu Van Mau, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République du Vietnam (-août 1963)

Vu Van Thai, Adviser, Secretariat of United Nations (–Dec. 1965); Ambassador of Vietnam to United States (Dec. 1965–Dec. 1966)

Warner, Frederick Archibald, Head, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office, United Kingdom (–1964)

Wendrowski, Henryk, Polish Commissioner, ICSC, Vietnam (Feb. 1965–Jun. 1966)

Westmoreland, William C. (General), Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Jun. 1964–)

Williams, Anthony James, Assistant, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office of United Kingdom (–1963)

Wilson, Harold, Prime Minister of United Kingdom (Oct. 1964–)

Winiewicz, Jozef, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland

Wolniak, Zygfryd, Ambassador of Poland (–Jan. 1967)

Wyszynski, Stefan (Cardinal), Prelate of Poland

Zhukov, Yuri, member, editorial board of Soviet newspaper *Pravda*

Zimyanin, Mikhail V., Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Union (Apr.–Sep. 1965)

Zorin, Valerian A., Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Union (–1965)

Vu Van Thai, conseiller, secrétariat des Nations Unies (-déc. 1965); ambassadeur du Vietnam aux États-Unis (déc. 1965-déc. 1966)

Warner, Frederick Archibald, chef, département de l'Asie du Sud-Est, Foreign Office, Royaume-Uni (-1964)

Wendrowski, Henryk, commissaire polonais, CISC, Vietnam (fév. 1965-juin 1966)

Westmoreland, William C. (général), commandant, Commandement d'aide militaire des États-Unis, Vietnam (juin 1964-)

Williams, Anthony James, adjoint, département de l'Asie du Sud-Est, ministère des Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni (-1963)

Wilson, Harold, premier ministre du Royaume-Uni (oct. 1964-)

Winiewicz, Jozef, sous-ministre, ministère des Affaires étrangères de la Pologne

Wolniak, Zygfryd, ambassadeur de la Pologne (-janv. 1967)

Wyszynski, Stefan (cardinal), prélat de la Pologne

Zhukov, Yuri, membre, comité éditorial du journal soviétique *Pravda*

Zimyanin, Mikhail V., sous-ministre, ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'Union soviétique (avr.-sept. 1965)

Zorin, Valerian A., sous-ministre, ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'Union soviétique (-1965)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
LISTE DES ABRÉVIATIONS

ABC: American-British-Canadian

AFP: Agence France-Presse

ANZUS: Australia, New Zealand, and the United States Security Treaty

AP: Associated Press

ARVN: Army of the Republic of Vietnam

Candel: Canadian Delegation

CANFORCEHED: Canadian Forces Headquarters

CBC: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

CCOS: Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

CDS: Chief of the Defence Staff

CENTO: Central Treaty Organization

CFA: Cease-Fire Agreement

CFHQ: Canadian Forces Headquarters

CGS: Chief of the General Staff

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency, United States

CONGEN: Consul General or Consulate General

CP: Canadian Press

CPs: Communist parties

CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union

DEA: Department of External Affairs

DGI: Director General Intelligence

DGPO: Director General, Plans and Operations

DISARMDELGNEVA/DISARMDELGVE: Disarmament Delegation (Geneva/Genève)

D.L.(2): Defence Liaison (2) Division

DM/DND: Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence

DMZ/DZ: Demilitarized Zone

DOPS: Director Operations and Plans

DRV/DRVN: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

FGR: Federal German Republic

FLS: Front for Liberation of South Vietnam

FM: Foreign Minister

FSO: Foreign Service Officer

FT: Fixed Team

GNP: Gross National Product

GRVN/GVN: Government of Republic of Vietnam

HQ: Headquarters

IC: International Commission (see/voir ICSC)

ICC: International Control Commission (see/voir ICSC)

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

ICSC/CISC: International Commission for Supervision and Control/Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle

Indel: Indian Delegation

MEA: Ministry of External Affairs

MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MiG: Soviet military fighter aircraft

MLF: Multilateral Force

MT 76: Mobile Team 76

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC: National Broadcasting Corporation

NDP: New Democratic Party

NEFA: North-East Frontier Agency

NLF/FNL: National Liberation Front/Front national de libération

NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty/Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NVN: North Vietnam

NZ: New Zealand

OAS: Organization of American States

ONU: Organisation des Nations Unies

O/SSEA: Office of the Secretary of State for External Affairs

OTP/OTLP: One-Time (Letter) Pad

O/USSEA: Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

PAVN: People's Army of (North) Vietnam

PCO: Privy Council Office

Permdel: Permanent Delegation

Permis: Permanent Mission

Permrep: Permanent Representative

PM: Prime Minister

PMO: Prime Minister's Office

POL: Petroleum, oil, and lubricants

Poldel: Polish Delegation

PT boat: Patrol torpedo boat

PX: Post exchange

RCAF: Royal Canadian Air Force

RLG: Royal Lao Government

ROK: Republic of Korea

RVN: Republic of Vietnam

SAM: surface-to-air missile

SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SMA: Senior Military Adviser

SSEA: Secretary of State for External Affairs

SVM: South Vietnam (Liaison) Mission

SVN: South Vietnam

SVNLF: (see/voir NLF)

TASS: *Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza* (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union/ Agence télégraphique de l'Union soviétique)

Telecon: Telephone conversation

UAR: United Arab Republic

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNA: United Nations Association

UNdel: United Nations delegation

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

UPI: United Press International

US/USA: United States (of America)

USG: United States Government

USSEA: Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VC: Viet Cong

VCDS: Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

VN: Vietnam

VPA: Vietnam People's Army

WFUNA: World Federation of United Nations Associations

ILLUSTRATIONS

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LAC/BAC, Acc. 1986-148, e999922276-u

Gordon E. Cox, Canada's Commissioner to the ICSC in Vietnam (1962–1964).

Gordon E. Cox, commissaire du Canada auprès de la CISC au Vietnam (1962-1964).



LAC/BAC, Acc. 1987-146, e999923071-u

James Blair Seaborn, Canada's Commissioner to the ICSC in Vietnam (1964–1965).

James Blair Seaborn, commissaire du Canada auprès de la CISC au Vietnam (1964-1965).



United Nations/Nations Unies Photo 7516412

Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin meeting with Secretary-General of the United Nations U Thant, New York, 12 March 1964.

Rencontre entre le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Paul Martin, et le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, U Thant, à New York, le 12 mars 1964.



Courtesy of the/Avec l'aimable autorisation du Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, Penn.

Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson prepares to speak after receiving the Temple University World Peace Award, Philadelphia, 2 April 1965.

Le premier ministre Lester B. Pearson se prépare à prendre la parole après avoir reçu le prix de la paix mondiale de l'Université Temple, à Philadelphie, le 2 avril 1965.



Associated Press/CP

Pearson and President of the United States Lyndon B. Johnson speak with the media after meeting at Camp David, Maryland, 3 April 1965.

Lester B. Pearson et le président des États-Unis Lyndon B. Johnson s'adressent aux médias après leur rencontre à Camp David, au Maryland, le 3 avril 1965.



Photo from *External Affairs*, vol. 18, no. 4 (April 1966), p. 175 courtesy of Global Affairs Canada/Photo tirée d'*Affaires extérieures*, vol. 18, nº 4 (avril 1966), p. 182 avec l'aimable autorisation d'Affaires mondiales Canada.

Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Pham Van Dong receives Chester A. Ronning, Special Representative of the Canadian Government (left), and Victor C. Moore, Canada's Commissioner to the ICSC in Vietnam (1965–1967) (right), in Hanoi, 10 March 1966.

Le premier ministre de la République démocratique du Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, reçoit Chester A. Ronning, représentant spécial du gouvernement canadien (à gauche), et Victor C. Moore, commissaire du Canada auprès de la CISC au Vietnam (1965-1967) (à droite), à Hanoï, le 10 mars 1966.



Duncan Cameron; LAC/BAC, PA-169895

Pearson speaking with Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg in Ottawa, 16 May 1966.

Lester B. Pearson s'entretenant avec le représentant permanent des États-Unis auprès des Nations Unies, Arthur J. Goldberg, à Ottawa, le 16 mai 1966.



LAC/BAC, Acc. 1973-395, e999917763-u

Martin meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Adam Rapacki, Warsaw, 7 November 1966. To Martin's right is Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Marcel Cadieux, Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs John G. Hadwen, and Seaborn, now head of the Eastern European Section of the European Division of the DEA. Canada's Ambassador to Poland, Norman Frederick Henderson Berlis, is mostly obscured but seated to Martin's left.

Paul Martin rencontre le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Pologne, Adam Rapacki, à Varsovie, le 7 novembre 1966. À la droite de M. Martin se trouvent le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures Marcel Cadieux, l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures John G. Hadwen et James Blair Seaborn, qui dirige désormais la section de l'Europe de l'Est de la Direction européenne du ministère des Affaires étrangères. L'ambassadeur du Canada en Pologne, Norman Frederick Henderson Berlis, en grande partie caché, est assis à la gauche de M. Martin.



LAC/BAC, Acc. 1973-395, e999917770-u

Martin meeting with First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Dmitri S. Polyansky, Moscow, 10 November 1966. To Martin's right is Cadieux and Canada's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Robert A.D. Ford.

Entretien entre Paul Martin et le premier vice-président du Conseil des ministres de l'Union soviétique, Dmitri S. Polyansky, à Moscou, le 10 novembre 1966. À la droite de M. Martin se trouvent Marcel Cadieux et l'ambassadeur du Canada en Union soviétique, Robert A.D. Ford.



NATO Archives OTAN; LAC/BAC, e011916919_s1

Martin meeting with United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk at a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris, 14 December 1966.

Entretien entre Paul Martin et le secrétaire d'État américain Dean Rusk lors d'une réunion ministérielle de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord à Paris, le 14 décembre 1966.



LAC/BAC, Acc. 1986-148, e999922283-u

Ormond W. Dier, Canada's Commissioner to the ICSC in Vietnam (1967–1968).

Ormond W. Dier, commissaire du Canada auprès de la CISC au Vietnam (1967-1968).

PART 1/PARTIE 1

ICSC FRUSTRATIONS AND A SECRET CHANNEL (1963–1965)

LA FRUSTRATION À L'ÉGARD DE LA CISC, ET UN INTERMÉDIAIRE SECRET (1963-1965)

Chapter 1/Chapitre 1

THE ICSC AND THE SUBVERSION ISSUE (APRIL 1963–JUNE 1965)

LA CISC ET LA QUESTION DE LA SUBVERSION (AVRIL 1963-JUIN 1965)

1.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/3

No. 67
Saigon, April 17, 1963
Secret. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 62† Apr 11.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris from Ottawa; Delhi, CCOS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

LEGAL REPORT

Goburdhun has now told me he has received copy of report and its appendices. He said his instructions leave him degree of discretion and he intends to exercise this discretion. It is clear he is going to Delhi on April 22 primarily to discuss his instructions.

2. Because of his preoccupation in studying report and making arrangements for trip, I have only been able to have brief and disjointed discussions with him. Goburdhun realizes report is veritable bombshell and apparently does not repeat not want it produced in its present form as Commission document. Only specific objection which he has made to date is to last section confronting Poldel with evidence of bad faith and plain lying, which he considers both unessential and counter-productive. As was suggested in Delhi telegram 364[1] April 3, we could probably agree to amendment or deletion of this part since it is peripheral to main body of report, but I am even more concerned after talking to Goburdhun that his attack on this specific part will be expanded into attack on report as a whole.

3. Goburdhun has made aspersions on Mukhi in stating that he was "young and inexperienced", that he was independent adviser and had no repeat no political responsibility, that his draft of last part of report was subjective. His senior adviser has added that main body of report would also have to be reviewed to see whether the same subjective approach

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[1] See/Voir vol. 29, doc. 585.

had influenced conclusions. Goburdhun may not repeat not know of course that last part was prepared by Mukhi only at the specific request of Parthasarathi when latter examined report last September. I have also refrained from mentioning that if Mukhi had, as he implied, no repeat no political judgment this surely did not repeat not apply to Gundevia, Miss Muthamma and other officers in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs who have had ample time to study report and come to a decision on it.

4. I feel certain that Goburdhun is going to Delhi with purpose of getting his instruction revised to the extent that at best there will be considerable delay. He has even suggested that he will go to length of asking to be relieved if he does not repeat not succeed in having his views sufficiently taken into account. Although he has stated at some point that he wanted to preserve substance of the report, I suspect that he will do everything possible to persuade Gundevia to abandon his commitment to Mr. Ronning to take action on it. His view is that to proceed with report now will unnecessarily disturb situation in Vietnam at time when there are indications that some sort of stabilization may be possible. I could not repeat not disagree more with this point of view but I would not repeat not be surprised if Goburdhun claimed as part of his argument with Gundevia that I have indicated my agreement with his assessment of situation here.

5. In my view there are no repeat no signs that DRVN subversive activities are decreasing. I believe on the contrary that if the Commission took action on Legal Report and if its active concern with subversion cases became public, this would have a beneficial effect and might contribute to abatement of these activities. As yet I have read only some sections of report including summary of conclusions and rebuttal of Polish position, but my present view is that Commission should accept report as a whole (with possible omission of rebuttal of Polish position which could be kept in reserve) and act on all its recommendations in fulfilment of commitment contained in paragraph 10 of Special Report of last June.[2]

6. Goburdhun's argument that action on report will only exacerbate the situation in Vietnam has no repeat no real merit and is certainly not repeat not consistent with his efforts to proceed with citation against South for importation of arms as hastily as possible. He of course fears the inevitable strong and well-organized reaction which will come from North Vietnam when it learns that Commission is proceeding to act. However, as you have pointed out in the past, the Commission has the responsibility to deal honestly and effectively with both kinds of violations it has reported to Co-Chairman in Special Report.

7. Goburdhun will also discuss question of procedure on report in Delhi. If finally faced with obligation to pass it in Commission I gather that he would much prefer to introduce it as a Legal Committee Report than as an Indian draft.

8. To guard against any possibility of loss and to ensure that you have copy, I am taking steps to have the report reproduced here. While reproduction of complete report will of course take some time, part containing summary of conclusions will be sent to you as soon as possible.

[Gordon] Cox

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[2] See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 1755, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), p. 7.

2.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/3

No. 68
Saigon, April 19, 1963
Confidential. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel Y-80† Apr 11.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris from Ottawa; Delhi, CCOS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM – NEW SUBVERSION CASES

We should not repeat not want of course to miss opportunity of discussing subversion and Northern aggression in general terms as Poldel intends to raise whole question of American intervention in Vietnam under Article 19 as well as 16 and 17 during our Hanoi meetings. At the moment, however, we see serious disadvantages in presenting new subversion cases for consideration in Commission in advance of Legal Committee Report. We fear, in particular, that Chairman might use this to bolster his argument that action is no repeat no longer necessary on cases included in report. Chairman might also like to see subversion cases dealt with in such a way that cause-and-effect argument would not repeat not come out as clearly or could even be twisted around. His senior adviser once argued that American presence was real cause of difficulty in Vietnam, and that Special Report tended to show wrong cause-and-effect relationship. It would seem important, therefore, if, as much as possible, we tried to deal with subversion cases in chronological order.

2. Report establishes blueprint for Commission action and new subversion cases will normally fall within pattern of cases analyzed in it. We would stand much better chance to have appropriate action taken on new subversion cases if action recommended in report is established as precedent in Commission. If we propose now to refer these cases to Legal Committee, Indians would probably agree but might also be inclined to refer them under terms of reference used as a matter of routine before Legal Committee study of subversion cases: to determine whether or not repeat not they attract Geneva Agreement. This would be wrong as Legal Report makes clear that allegations of subversion and aggression attract Geneva Agreement.

3. In short, while we see merit in discussing subversion in general terms, it would seem much preferable not repeat not to put up individual subversion cases until Indians have clarified and confirmed their intentions concerning the report. If, on the other hand, it becomes clear that they intend to stall indefinitely, we might revise our tactics.

3.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/3

No. 69
Saigon, April 22, 1963
Secret. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, CCOS from Ottawa; Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

LEGAL REPORT

We had a rather disturbing conversation with Rangarajan, Senior Political Adviser Indel. He said that he was only speaking for himself and not repeat not for his delegation. It is clear that he is completely opposed to report in present form. He thought that Mukhi's draft exceeded terms of reference given to the Legal Committee by the Commission. He pointed out, as an example, Mukhi's definition of the Commission task in introduction to report as completely inappropriate and unasked for. In introduction, Mukhi examines rights and duties of Commission in light of relevant articles of Geneva Agreement. It was pointed out that this was necessary in order to determine acceptable quantum of evidence for Commission as well as to make recommendations for action. Rangarajan also thought that the link section which analyzes texts and official publications of the North as well as propaganda documents found in the South in the light of conclusions already reached on sending to show the relationship between the Lao Dong Party in the Front for the Liberation of the South, forces for the liberation of the South (and?) the People's Self-Defense Forces [*sic*]. He said that Mukhi clearly had no repeat no understanding of Communist documents and that for any of his quotes he could find 10 orders proving the contrary. He disagreed with the conclusions reached in this section without, however, specifying precisely which ones.

2. Rangarajan then proceeded to attack Mukhi's approach in rebuttal of Poldel position as showing prejudice and partiality. He thought particularly obnoxious Mukhi's statement that Poldel position was wholly political and had no repeat no relation to merits of case. When asked whether he doubted that this was true he said that he did not repeat not but he added that it was not repeat not the majority's task, and particularly not repeat not that of India, as neutral member, to cast aspersions on motives of another delegation. He hinted also that all three delegations could be open to this sort of accusation. He was then asked whether he had read the Polish member's minority opinion of May 28 where majority motives and actions were questioned and whether he would agree that an answer such as Mukhi has prepared was in order. Rangarajan simply said that there was no repeat no need to provoke unnecessary bad feeling. He repeated his statement that report would have to be carefully examined and revised if necessary to see whether same prejudice had not repeat not prevailed elsewhere. He said that it was very bad for Mukhi not repeat not to have kept his emotions in check. He added candidly that he himself had had 2 strong emotional reactions during his stay here but that he had managed to keep his own emotions in check. The first was after the Special Report, the second was after the attack on border by China. When it was hinted gently that perhaps he was having a third emotional reaction on reading this report, Rangarajan replied somewhat defensively that his reactions were simply based on substance of text and not repeat not emotions.

3. Rangarajan proceeded to say that report was unduly lengthy and that it would take probably 18 months to process it through the Commission. He thought that it would take 3 to 4 months to get it reproduced by Secretariat and the rest of the time would be taken by Poldel to consider it and prepare a rebuttal. He suggested that report could be processed much faster if it was cut down to about 300 pages by eliminating all unnecessary material. When asked what he meant by that, he specified that the case-by-case analysis should remain and that all the extraneous comments contained in report should be taken out. It was pointed out to him that besides destroying structure and coherence of report, such revision of text would take much more time and that it would be much faster if Secretariat set upon the task of reproducing it immediately in its present form. Rangarajan then said that his delegation had not repeat not come to any firm views on report and that something could be done only when it had done so. He added that report had been sent to Indel in order to obtain their views on it as no repeat no one had had time to consider it in Delhi. He ended by wondering whether we should not repeat not put it up as a Canadian draft. We pointed out to him, of course, that this was not repeat not a Canadian but an Indian draft. Rangarajan retorted that this was not an Indian draft and that it would be severely mangled before it became one. He added "this is at least my guess".

4.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/3

No. 70
Saigon, April 23, 1963
Secret. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 67 Apr 17.
Repeat for Information: Delhi (OpImmediate); London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, CCOS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

LEGAL REPORT

Goburdhun left early this morning via Bangkok arriving Delhi April 25. In a farewell chat I had with him yesterday he said that he had been called back for consultations and would not repeat not be able to return until May 7. Preparing the way for possible visit to Delhi by myself following the suggestion in our telegram 1† January 4, that Mr. Ronning had supported in his telegram 33† January 9, I told the Chairman several weeks ago that I would find such a visit useful at an appropriate time. Goburdhun mentioned this yesterday by suggesting that I accompany him or follow him in a few days. I said that I would welcome a visit to Delhi at any time, but I did not repeat not think this was an appropriate time and Poldel would draw inferences that might make action on Legal Report more difficult. However, I left the matter open in case you and Mr. Ronning would like me to go. Goburdhun said he intended to call on Mr. Ronning in Delhi.

2. I told Chairman that I had completed a first reading of the report and that I considered it a thorough, objective and restrained study of great value which gave an honest and clear picture of the facts the Committee had been asked to examine, and which I was prepared to endorse in its entirety. With regard to his objection to the rebuttal at the end of the report of Poldel's position in Legal Committee, I said that I had also read the record of Poldel's attitude in the Committee and that I thought that part of the report was no repeat no more than an honest rebuttal of their position. I nevertheless understood and respected his views on the presentational problem this raised in the Commission and I would like to discuss this aspect with him after he had reviewed the matter in Delhi.

3. Goburdhun then raised another specific objection to the report by pointing out that the first part, which reviews the obligations of the Commission itself, could only be taken as a criticism or even condemnation of the Commission's inaction over a long period, and that he would not repeat not endorse such a criticism. He did assure me, however, that apart from these two general reservations he fully endorsed the substance of the report and its findings on the cases referred to it. He said that report could be "pruned" to meet these objections and when this had been done he thought that the report should be proceeded with as a majority report of the Legal Committee which the Commission would have to adopt by majority decision. He says that he has told Poldel that he has received a draft of the report and would distribute it when he had reviewed it and decided what procedure should be followed. He says that he also told them that in view of their position adopted last May they could expect only a limited time to state their views.

4. We will send three copies to Ottawa and two copies to Delhi by airbag April 24 of part eight of the report (summary of the conclusions and notes on opinion of Poldel). Like Mr. Ronning I should like to know as soon as possible your views on what should be done with the rebuttal section as well as what might be done to meet Goburdhun's objection to the first part. Rather than scrapping the former entirely I should think it might be held in part in reserve for use in rebutting minority report Poldel may decide to put forward.

5. While I continue to think that our position on action on the Legal Report should remain as outlined in paragraph 2 above and in paragraphs 5 and 6 of our reference telegram, I have not repeat not rejected Chairman's views out of hand, and we must continue to give consideration to them. Moreover, as Mr. Ronning has pointed out, final Indian decision will be taken at least partly within the context of Indian relations with the Soviet bloc. The closest Goburdhun has come to stating this is his reference to Mukhi's "lack of political responsibility" mentioned in paragraph 3 of our telegram, but his strong objection to last section of report condemning Poldel position is based on this factor as much as on relations within the Commission. However, I am somewhat relieved to find that, on the whole, Chairman's views on report seem to be more favorable than those of his Senior Political Adviser. He did not repeat not mention in particular the need to revise conclusions in key link section (see paragraph 1 our immediately preceding telegram and paragraph 1585 subparagraph 6 of the conclusive findings in part VIII of report).

6. I would be more impressed with the Chairman's argument that action on the Legal Committee Report is bound to stir up trouble if he were less inclined to proceed hastily with citations against the South and if he showed any real interest in evidence of continuing subversion and interference by the North. However, in our conversation yesterday Goburdhun also mentioned that we will also have to consider what is to be done with the report when it emerges as a Commission document. He suggested that it might be appended to another Interim Report and he is obviously looking for something to give such a report "balance". As you know, we have a good deal of well-advertised evidence of importation of military personnel and equipment, very little of which has been recorded with the Commission and which the Commission has taken no repeat no action to cite except in the sense of citation for non-cooperation. Moreover, the whole picture has been somewhat confused by the detailed references to such importation in the Special Report and I think that we must be prepared in next report to make a general survey along the general lines of the Special Report of the "special measures" the GRVN has taken, including if possible specific reference to the GRVN reiterated undertaking to abandon these measures when the subversion and the aggression have ceased.

7. I should add that Col. An has mentioned privately, both to me and de Goumois, that he has some doubt about the necessity of publicising the Legal Committee Report as it could be argued that the Special Report accomplished all that was necessary in this regard. Without revealing to Col. An that I have the report or anything more than a general knowledge of its contents, I have suggested that the GRVN should examine this question very carefully and let us know their views. In this connection, I have pointed out that lack of or inadequate action on the report, in the face of the Commission's commitment to take action in each individual case, might be taken as an indication of a lack of substance on which action could be taken. I have also suggested that pending development of their considered views, they should be very cautious in expressing any opinion in this regard. We should also keep in mind that the GRVN may be reluctant or unable to expose some of the cases considered in the report to the closer examination required.

[Gordon] Cox

5.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/3

No. Y-211
Ottawa, May 9, 1963
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Delhi Tel 491† May [7].
Repeat for Information: Delhi (OpImmediate); London, Paris, Washington, NATO Paris, Geneva, Permis New York (Priority); CCOS, CGS, DGPO, DM/DND.
By Bag: Canberra, Wellington, Moscow, Warsaw, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Tokyo, Phnom Penh, Vientiane.

VIETNAM – LEGAL REPORT

Having now examined final section of draft (paragraphs 1591 to 1646) devoted to rebuttal of Polish position of May/62, we agree with Ronning (Delhi telegram 346 [364?] April 3) that, though devastating, it is perhaps unnecessarily provocative, and with you (your telegram 67 April 17) that this section is peripheral and might better be omitted from report when tabled but held in reserve for such use in whole or in part as might seem appropriate in light of position adopted by Poldel. If necessary, it could be condensed and modified for inclusion in report at a later stage. Goburdhun might also find its contents useful for bargaining purposes in connection with Polish note of dissent if latter attacks procedures adopted by majority.

2. We have not yet seen text of introductory section concerned with responsibilities of ICSC and our only knowledge of its contents is paragraph 3 Delhi telegram 661† September 13/62. In general, it seems to us that a definition of categories of evidence and an analysis of principles governing interpretation of evidence with particular reference to cases under review would be useful basis for more detailed examination in body of report. We are not much impressed with Rangarajan's comment (your telegram 69 April 22) that this section was unasked for, or with Goburdhun's comment (your telegram 70 April 23) that it could only be interpreted as criticism of Commission's long delay in dealing with subversion. These criticisms could equally well be applied to Commission's decision of June/61 on competence or to Legal Committee's preliminary report of last year. Indeed, such an introductory section would seem to be only an elaboration of paragraph one of that earlier report. We are not, however, disposed to quibble over unessentials and would be prepared in principle to agree to some "toning down" of these introductory paragraphs if Indians attach importance to this.

6.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/3

No. 501
Delhi, May 9, 1963
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: My Tel 491 May 7.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (OpImmediate); London, Washington, Paris from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM LEGAL COMMITTEE REPORT

According to Gundevia, Goburdhun in his conversation with him about Legal Report concentrated on fact that Mukhi had gone overboard in Polish section and had exceeded his terms of reference in connection with his comments on Commission's responsibilities. Gundevia said he had agreed with Goburdhun's views. He said he had told Goburdhun that Canadians had helped prepare draft report and that they should be consulted about any amendments. On procedure, he had nothing to add to what we have reported in our reference telegram. He simply said he had told Goburdhun that main part of report was a solid piece of work, it would have to be an Indian-Canadian majority, and he should proceed with its processing in Commission.

2. Negotiations regarding amendments or deletions will therefore take place in Saigon. I hope that, provided Goburdhun is not repeat not angling for considerable reduction or change in main part of report, we can quickly agree to deletion of Polish section in order to get on with processing while Indians are still in their present frame of mind regarding North Vietnamese.

[C.A.] Ronning

7.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/3

No. Y-121
Ottawa, May 18, 1963
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tels 79† May 11 and 73† Apr 27.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Paris, Washington, NATO Paris, Geneva, Permis New York, CCOS, CGS, DGPO, DM/DND.
By Bag: Canberra, Wellington, Moscow, Warsaw, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Tokyo, Phnom Penh, Vientiane.

VIETNAM ICSC PRIORITIES

We are in general agreement with objectives outlined in your telegram 73 April 27. Goburdhun's remark to Ronning (Delhi telegram 491 May 7) – presumably repeated to you (your telegram 79 May 11) – that eventual report to Co-Chairmen would have to deal with both subversion and military assistance is of course in line with our own thinking (our telegram Y-56 March 12 paragraph 6).[3] We are encouraged by his statement that it should not repeat not take more than two or three weeks to deal with Legal Committee draft report and by fact that he has already informed Poldel it can expect only limited time to state its views (your telegram 70 April 23). We are also glad to have Gundevia's assurance that we will be consulted about any amendments (Delhi telegram 501 May 9).

2. It seems to us that evident determination of Indians to proceed with Legal Committee Report minimizes risks foreseen in your telegram 68 April 19 in submitting new subversion cases. We agree that in dealing with these new cases Legal Committee would find it most helpful to have report available as guide to procedure and practice. But if this can now be assumed, would it not repeat not be useful for purposes of public presentation to give priority

[3] See/Voir vol. 29, doc. 583.

in detailed examination and disposal of cases to more recent complaints rather than to complaints considered in report, some of which are years old? Surely this would have advantage that in report to Co-Chairmen emphasis could be placed on fact that grave subversion charges against DRVN continue to be received and that these are under study by ICSC.

3. We remain inclined therefore, as suggested in our telegram Y-80 April 11, to place recent subversion cases on agenda of next meeting simply in order to have them referred to Legal Committee. We would hope that this might be decided as matter of routine. Action on them in Legal Committee could then await disposal of report.

4. Since Poldel is planning to raise at this meeting whole question of USA intervention under Articles 16, 17, and 19, we think it would be tactically wise for you to raise simultaneously all outstanding RVN complaints of DRVN violations of these articles. You should of course press strongly for immediate citation of DRVN on gunboat cases (our telegram Y-15 January 17).

5. Are we correct in assuming that formal meeting will now be deferred until after Goburdhun's return from regional conference in Delhi?

For London and Washington:

In conformity with our undertaking to keep Foreign Office/State Department informed of progress of our discussions with Indians concerning Vietnam Legal Report (our telegram Y-56 March 12), please convey to them gist of this telegram and of our telegram Y-211 May 9.

For Paris:

You may outline present position to Quai (your telegram 296† March 19 refers).

8.

Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/4

No. 1702
London, June 10, 1963
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority.
Reference: Saigon Tel 81 May 17 and Delhi Tel 550† May 22.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Permis New York, Paris, NATO Paris, Moscow, Delhi, CCOS (Priority); Saigon (Priority) from Delhi; CGS, DGPO, DM/DND (Priority) from CCOS.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Canberra, Wellington, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Warsaw from London.
From de Goumois.

VIETNAM: LEGAL MATTERS

Stopover in Delhi afforded useful occasion to visit Mukhi and obtain his reaction to recent developments concerning report. Mukhi's position was that we should be adamant and refuse to accept any change in report. He even commented that we had perhaps been over hasty in agreeing to hand over Caribou aircraft to India.[4] I told him about Indel's view that amended report would be sent back to him and eventually to me in London for signature. Mukhi first

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[4] See *Canada Treaty Series*, 1963, no. 4.
Voir *Recueil des traités du Canada*, 1963, nº 4.

said he would refuse to sign report if it contained any amendments but later added that for the sake of report he might agree to amendments which appeared reasonable and did not repeat not affect its value. I gather that Mukhi would not repeat not be too sanguine about removal of observations on Polish Delegation, particularly as he prepared this section only at request of Parthasarathi when latter read report last September.

2. Altho Mukhi complained that his relations with Ministry were still strained, it is interesting to see that he was asked by Gundevia to prepare legal opinion on chemical defoliants and other problems arising mainly from PAVN complaints to Commission. Request had been made following letter from Rangarajan to Miss Muthamma in which he asked what attitude Indel should take towards these problems. Mukhi showed me opinion which he handed himself to Goburdhun during his visit in Delhi early May. It is a 30-page-long document through which I was only able to glance quickly. As I recall it concerns accusations from PAVN that SVN is committing genocide; violating Article 14(c); violating Geneva Convention concerning use of toxic chemicals in warfare and considers also whether Commission's task is governed by Final Declaration of 1954 Geneva Conference. General impression is that it would provide Goburdhun with sufficient ammunition to meet any verbal onslaught of PAVN. Opinion stresses that Commission's task is governed solely by Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and not repeat not by Final Declaration. As agreement concerns obligation of the two parties towards each other, Commission is not repeat not concerned with internal administration of each zone. In this perspective, accusation of genocide in South as well as use of toxic chemicals in South by Government of SVN clearly have nothing to do with Agreement. Mukhi indicated also that Article 14(c) gave protection to "former resistance members" prior to cessation of hostilities but did not repeat not cover them for any anti-governmental and criminal activities they might indulge in afterwards. Opinion stresses generally right of Government of South to maintain and affirm its authority in its zone as well as to take means against threat to its security. Mukhi warned that Poles may be manoeuvring to have Commission declare that state of war exists in South Vietnam and consequently accept that law of war incorporated in all relevant Geneva Conventions would be applicable to members of forces for liberation of South, in particular convention concerning toxic chemicals. It was stated that present war in Vietnam was civil war in which rebels or bandits were not repeat not recognized any status whatsoever under international law.

3. As [for] forecast in paragraph 3 of Delhi reference telegram, I have given further thought to amendments envisaged by Rangarajan. As mentioned in paragraph 9 Saigon reference telegram, most of amendments struck me as being matter of presentation which, except for those related to paragraph 5 of report, did not repeat not detract from essential value of document as coherent and objective legal analysis of allegations and evidence concerning subversion and guerilla warfare. While amendments in introduction seem to be mainly a matter of form, it seems to me that introduction contains useful observations particularly concerning Commission's task which we should strive to retain. I am thinking in particular of paragraphs 47, 48 and 49 which Rangarajan considered irrelevant. We might, however, agree to deletion of paragraph 51 which is not repeat not essential. We could agree also to elimination from paragraph 64 of suggestion that South may have obtained evidence as result of mission of espionage. We might agree also in paragraph 67 to deletion of one sentence which indirectly is an indictment of Commission's record on subversion ("it cannot repeat not take half a decade to declare itself...") and ask that rest of paragraph be retained. We may conceivably also agree that reference enquiry on death of Lumumba in paragraph 66 is not repeat not essential. We should be wary of redrafting asked for in paragraph 17. We should resist any amendments to part 5 of report on grounds that they attack its very substance and weaken its coherence.

4. On the whole, however, I believe that, if we are satisfied the substance is retained, our approach should be flexible enough to permit adoption in Legal Committee and tabling of this report in Commission as quickly as possible. Apart from general consideration that considerable

length of time has elapsed since this report has been terminated and that Commission consideration of subversion problem has remained virtually at a standstill in the meantime it is clear that Indian approach to this report depends in no repeat no small degree on personalities involved and on their assessment of surrounding political factors and is consequently subject to variations. We already know that Miss Muthamma will be leaving her post shortly. Altho Rangarajan affirms that he is committed to report (he even confided at some point that he had been annoyed by what he thought was suggestion that he and Goburdhun were out to destroy report), I suspect that his natural inclination would be to temporize and delay as much as he can. He probably would not repeat not dislike to get us entangled in prolonged discussions over possible amendments.

5. Williams, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office, asked me for latest info on report. After outlining briefly recent events I told him what we now had reasonable grounds to hope that Indians will want to proceed with report in coming months. His reaction was that there was no repeat no particular hurry and that it was very nice to have prospect of such a rich plum slowly ripening in the sun. I briefed him also on latest Commission action concerning chemical defoliants (see Saigon telegram 78† May 11). He thought that Goburdhun's approach in postponing statement that Commission was not repeat not competent to deal with this matter was politic in circumstances. Denial of competence at this stage might have prompted DRVN to renew propaganda attacks and to portray Commission in bad light.

9.

Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/4

No. 95
Saigon, June 17, 1963
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
Reference: Your Tels 20† Feb 13, 68 Apr 19, Our Tel 90† Jun 10, Your Tels Y-121 May 18, Y-80 Apr 11.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, CCOS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hanoi from Saigon.

LEGAL COMMITTEE REPORT

After short chat with Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau in which I gave him general impressions of my recent trip to Hanoi confined to appropriate parts of my reference telegram, and emphasized the way I had responded to comments in Hanoi on the current difficulty with the Buddhists here, Mr. Mau said he wished to let me know how he felt about the Legal Committee Report and the action that the Commission might take on it.

2. Foreign Minister said first that he hoped we would take a long time in dealing with the report. My questions developed that his main concern was that whatever action the Commission took should not repeat not draw attention to second part of the Special Report (on USA assistance which was so demonstrably continuing) as no repeat no causal connection between the two parts of the Special Report had been expressed by the Commission. He seems to think that in its next Interim Report it would be most helpful if the Commission could merely state that it had received and approved the Legal Committee Report appending appropriately conclusive passages, and merely adding that it was continuing a detailed study of the other individual cases in the Committee report (which

Foreign Minister hopes would take a long time). He also hoped that we will broadly proceed with consideration and action on cases of infiltration and subversion since the Special Report is counter-balance to the well-advertised continuations of USA support.

3. I said that I would certainly take these views into account and that I would like to discuss them further when we could see more clearly where consideration of the Legal Report would lead us. I added that while I could understand the point he made, we must also take into account the effect of delaying [*sic*] down the importance of the Legal Committee Report and of the probable importance of establishing a continuing history of infiltration and direction of subversion from Hanoi.

4. We have proposed that all allegations of infiltration and subversion since the Special Report be discussed at the next meeting of the Commission and we are now drafting proposals for Legal Committee action on them and recommendations for procedure for dealing [with] them. Chairman is reluctant to discuss details of editing of Legal Report until Rangarajan's return in a week or so.

5. We would be glad to have your comments on GRVN Foreign Minister's views about this general problem.

10.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/4

No. 113
Saigon, July 18, 1963
Confidential. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, NATO Paris, Permis New York, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS, DGPO, DM/DND from CCOS.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Tokyo from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hong Kong from Saigon.

LEGAL REPORT

Goburdhun has informed me that Gundevia intends to visit this area [in] immediate future: he plans to be in Saigon overnight July 28 and again from August 6 to 9. It would be useful if Delhi could confirm these plans and provide if possible any further info about purposes of Gundevia's visit.

2. According to Rangarajan, Indians intend to take advantage of Gundevia's visit to discuss thoroughly with him the modifications to Legal Report which they believe are necessary, thus obtaining at least preliminary clearance for a final text. This procedure would help minimize delay between completion of current review of text by Legal Committee (which we anticipate can be done before Gundevia's visit) and presentation of final text of report to Commission. Indians here estimate that if Gundevia gives go-ahead signal now, final approval could be arranged by end of August.

3. In our telegram 110† July 18, I reported on type of changes with examples which the continuing review of text by Anderson and Rangarajan has indicated might be desirable. This review is now about half completed and so far no repeat no major amendments or deletions to structure, substance or intent of report have been suggested by Indians, nor does it seem likely that any major changes will be proposed in remainder of review. Changes

recommended so far are entirely editorial and organizational in character. Without detracting in any way from the impressive work of the authors as represented by the original text, I believe that a certain amount of "tightening up", rearrangement of material and general editing can usefully be introduced without affecting substance in the interests of making the report more hard-hitting and more unassailable on technicalities.

4. If Indian plans materialize and Gundevia is prepared to indicate preliminary concurrence when in Saigon, I should like to be able to indicate at the same time Canadian agreement in principle that we would be prepared to go along with these changes. Such approval of course would be given in a general way and on the understanding that it would be *ad referendum*. It is quite clear that Indians (at least those here) now wish to move ahead quickly in the matter and I believe that we should take every advantage of this frame of mind on their part. Your authorization to proceed as above would be appreciated in the interests of accelerating this matter towards its long-awaited conclusion.

5. Once the Legal Report has been approved, thought will have to be given to presentation to Commission and further to manner in which it should be forwarded to Co-Chairmen. In this connection, terminal date of next Interim Report will be of some importance. Indians will not repeat not wish to forward Legal Report to Co-Chairmen except in a context which involves balancing citation of South on importations of armed personnel and war materials. But since Legal Report covers "old" cases from which main "mileage" has already been derived from Special Report, our preliminary thinking is that next Interim Report should cover Legal Report and some substantive material relating to new cases [of] continuing subversion. Our present estimate indicates that it will be some time before War Materials Subcommittee can produce substantive report [on] GRVN implications against which Indians can balance subversion cases, old or new. On the other hand, although Commission has called for monthly reports, there is little likelihood that Ad Hoc Legal Committee will get very much useful material on (new?) cases before late autumn at best. Indications here are that the Indel representative on Ad Hoc Committee will be new Legal Adviser due [in] Saigon early August (rather than Rangarajan whose tour ends early in new year) and it will probably take him a month or six weeks to familiarize himself with background before Committee's work can proceed. It thus appears to us that useful material dealing with new cases will not repeat not be forthcoming for some months.

6. If you have any comments on procedures for handling Legal Report and on the scope and timing of next Interim Report, they would be of interest and assistance to us at this stage in attempting to forecast our future objectives.

[Gordon] Cox

11.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 4643, 50052-A-6-40/4

No. 126
Saigon, August 16, 1963
Secret. Priority from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS from CCOS.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

NEW SUBVERSION CASES

Since July 10 meeting we have been trying to get Committee convened to deal with new subversion cases. Rangarajan has repeatedly told Anderson that only after the new Indian Legal Adviser had fully briefed himself on Legal Report could action be expected. Thus, date for first meeting was expected to be first week of September.

2. August 14 we learned that new Indian Legal Adviser died of a heart attack en route here two weeks ago. We have no repeat no idea when he will be replaced but we have no repeat no reason to expect any speed on part of Indians in this matter. Fact that we were informed of his death by Col. An, not repeat not Indians, despite Indian awareness of our keen interest in his arrival, leads us to suspect the Indians are attempting to delay consideration of new subversion cases. Gundevia was severely criticized in DRVN for Indian vote at 663rd meeting to have allegations considered by Ad Hoc Legal Committee. This may have influenced Indians.

3. Col. An has requested that in meantime Anderson examine new cases with a view to informing SVM of evidence and testimony that Committee is likely to wish to examine when it eventually meets. Suggestion seems reasonable. Preparation now by SVM may reduce delays when Indian appears. We propose to follow this suggestion unless you instruct otherwise.

[Gordon] Cox

12.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9474, 8-1-6/2.2

No. 853
Delhi, August 20, 1963
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Longer Indochina list.
By Bag: Phnom Penh from Saigon.

ICSC-VIETNAM: INDIAN VIEWS

I had a talk with Gundevia yesterday about his visit to Vietnam.

2. Gundevia said that in Hanoi he was criticized by North Vietnamese Foreign Minister for taking sides with Canada in support of South Vietnam and the West against North Vietnam. Gundevia responded with argument that Indian policy was not repeat not to take sides with anyone. During the nine years of Commission they had found it possible on basis of evidence to support North Vietnam for seven years but during past two years India had no repeat no alternative but to support accusations against North Vietnam on *prima facie* evidence in absence of North Vietnamese reply to accusations which had been made.

3. Gundevia said he then accused DRVN of "supporting wrong side", i.e., China, which had attacked India. Foreign Minister retorted that China being a socialist country would not repeat not and had not repeat not attacked. He asked Gundevia if India was accepting arms from West. Gundevia affirmed this and said India was receiving arms from USSR also and would accept arms from any source, North Vietnam, to repel Chinese aggression. Foreign Minister suggested that arms supplied by USSR were not repeat not for use against China to which Gundevia says he retorted "Do you think we are getting MiGs for joy rides?"

4. Foreign Minister then asked Gundevia whether India would support Canada in citing "forty new accusations" against DRVN which Canadian Commissioner "had up his sleeve". Gundevia responded that he had not repeat not heard of these, but India would support them

only if they were justifiable accusations. Foreign Minister warned that majority action by Indians and Canadians would split Commission and possibly terminate its existence. Gundevia replied that if North Vietnam desired termination of Commission, Foreign Minister should say so bluntly and India would be glad to pull out. Foreign Minister then apparently assured Gundevia that he had no repeat no such desire.

5. In Saigon Gundevia said he had talked with Polish Commissioner and found him "reasonable and ready to cooperate". Pole cautioned Gundevia against majority decision by India and Canada which could have no repeat no effect upon Co-Chairmen as USSR would pay attention only to unanimous decisions and recommendations. Gundevia was apparently impressed by Pole who said that in turn he would be prepared to draw as little attention as possible to South Vietnam's violation of Geneva Agreement by massive importation of USA arms. Pole also indicated his opposition to Legal Committee Report which he hoped would be dropped as it would have no repeat no greater impression on Co-Chairmen than Special Report last year.

6. Gundevia said South Vietnamese Foreign Minister had also urged that Commission should forget about Legal Committee Report. Foreign Minister was completely satisfied (with last?) June's Special Report but said that further efforts along same line would be counter-productive. Gundevia then referred approvingly to Goburdhun's view[5] that nothing would be gained at present by forcing adoption of Legal Report by Indian-Canadian majority vote. Gundevia concluded that such action would embarrass Russians and hamper them in dealing effectively with Chinese.

7. I was left with clear impression that India had reversed its attitude to Legal Report and Gundevia had lost enthusiasm he had expressed when he told me he would process Legal Report and send it to Co-Chairmen – let the chips fall where they will.

[C.A.] Ronning

13.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in United Kingdom
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 9486, 17-1-1/5.2

No. Y-323
Ottawa, August 29, 1963
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Vientiane, Saigon and longer Indochina list.
By Bag: Phnom Penh from Saigon.

INDOCHINA: INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS

Refusal of Pathet Lao authorities to permit ICSC teams to conduct meaningful investigations in their zone combined with uncooperative attitude of Polish Commissioner has prevented International Commission in Laos from functioning in anything like way we and our Western allies intended it should when we signed Geneva Agreements. To date only four investigations have taken place, each one severely limited in scope and hedged about with restrictions.

2. At present no repeat no investigations are under way or in prospect although Commission team of special kind is stationed with Kong Laen neutralist HQ on Plain of Jars. This team, which was set up to try to prevent further deterioration of neutralists' military situation, and

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5 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
! [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

which has been in position since April 29, consists of a Canadian and an Indian officer only, Poles having refused to provide a member. Because Poles refuse to recognize legality of this team and because, under agreement, conclusions on major questions must be adopted unanimously by Commission, reports of team are of limited usefulness though their physical presence has probably been helpful.

3. About middle of June, Indians approached us with project which they thought Commission might undertake in spite of negative attitude of Pathet Lao and Polish Commissioner. After some discussion we agreed with their proposal that Commission attempt to exert inhibiting influence on further Pathet Lao advances by setting up of teams along line separating Pathet Lao forces from those of neutralists and right wing. It was understood that teams would have to be stationed on neutralist/right wing side of line in view of Pathet Lao opposition to them and that they would consist solely of Canadian and Indian officers because Poles would refuse to cooperate. Three sites for teams had been decided upon and their deployment seemed imminent when, in first week of August, Indians without prior consultation with us reversed their position and indicated that they were no repeat no longer willing to act with us in setting up teams.

4. Several of reasons they gave to explain their action, such as that Poles would not repeat not supply team members and that Soviet Co-Chairman would ignore any resultant reports, were based on facts known all along and are not repeat not particularly convincing. Similarly, we do not repeat not think Poles would have carried out their threat to withdraw from Commission. It is Ronning's view, with which we agree, that Indians' initial eagerness to cooperate with us in firm action to contain Pathet Lao and their later about-face can be explained in terms of their relations with China and USSR. In their desire to "get back" at China for humiliating defeat of last October,[6] they seized on Laos as providing situation in which they could frustrate Chinese aims not repeat not by direct confrontation but through Pathet Lao. This spirit was soon dampened, however, when the Russians indicated to Indians that USSR, despite, or perhaps because of, its current dispute with China, was not repeat not prepared to go out of its way to oppose China on China's doorstep. Indians, anxious to cultivate Soviet support in their own contest with China, will not repeat not now take any decisive action in Laos or Vietnam which might antagonize Chinese and thereby create difficulties for USSR in its relations with China.

5. Given this new Indian policy not repeat not only will Commission action by unanimous agreement continue to be impossible in Laos, but Canadian-Indian majority action will also be out of question. Since Communists favour "do nothing" Commission, it looks very much as though ICSC in Laos is headed for a period of stagnation.

6. Workings of ICSC in Vietnam will also undoubtedly be affected by new Indian position. Vietnam Commission has always been busier than one in Laos but most of its activity, including "controls" performed by its teams, has over the years come to be rather a routine affair. This activity will presumably not repeat not be affected by Indians' new policy. Where we may expect to notice change will be in Indian attitude to more important projects which touch on matters about which North Vietnamese or Chinese are sensitive. One such project is report of Legal Committee [which], *inter alia*, indicates North Vietnamese involvement in subversive activities in South Vietnam. Although we had had assurances from Indians that this report (which was prepared by Canadian and Indian Legal Advisers) would become an official Commission document and be sent to Co-Chairmen, we have now had indications from Delhi that Indians may reverse their attitude to report, in which case it will probably be shelved. If this happens it will be clear indication that Vietnam Commission, too, has been reduced to impotence at least for time being.

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[6] This is a reference to the Sino-Indian War of October-November 1962.
Il s'agit de la guerre sino-indienne d'octobre-novembre 1962.

7. Cambodian Commission is in class by itself as it has not repeat not for several years conducted much business and our delegation has been cut to irreducible minimum (one Foreign Service Officer). We have acquiesced in continued existence of Cambodian Commission because of strong desire of Cambodian Government that it remain in existence.

8. It is our view that in present situation there is no repeat no point in arguing with Indians to try to persuade them to change their mind. Their decision seems too solidly based in their own self-interest for our arguments or those of our friends to be of any avail. We are therefore considering extent to which under these circumstances International Commissions can perform useful function.

9. Could you please pass gist of above orally to Foreign Office/State Department/Quai, invite their comments, and suggest that we should be glad to keep in close touch with them as situation develops.

14.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9474, 8-1-6/2.2

No. 929
Delhi, September 10, 1963
Confidential.
Repeat for Information: Saigon and shorter Indochina list.
By Bag: Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon.

VIETNAM LEGAL REPORT

We asked Alexander today whether Indian authorities had given any further consideration to Legal Report. He said that in view of attitude of SVN Foreign Minister that report would serve no repeat no useful purpose he thought matter would be "placed on ice" for some time. I suspect that Indians are using remarks allegedly made to Gundevia by SVN Foreign Minister as convenient excuse for not repeat not pushing ahead with Legal Report. Real reason, of course, is decision not repeat not to embarrass Russians and Poles in Indochina.

[C.A.] Ronning

15.
Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10609, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-1/1

No. 2600
London, September 11, 1963
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-323 Aug 29.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, CCOS (Priority); Delhi (Priority); Vientiane, Saigon from Ottawa; CGS, DGPO, DM/DND from CCOS.
By Bag: Geneva, Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Jakarta; Phnom Penh, Hong Kong from London.

INDOCHINA INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS

We had exchange of views with Warner and Williams on basis of your reference telegram. Warner wondered whether our concern about the usefulness of Commissions implied even remotely that we might be considering pulling out of them. He considered Commissions to be of immense value "whether they do anything or not repeat not". Their very presence is important factor in uncertain or troubled situation of Indochina countries. We said that this possibility had not repeat not been raised and that we were more concerned with usefulness of Commission in present circumstances. Warner said that he appreciated Commissions did not repeat not live up to expectations. It was not repeat not always easy for them to fulfill their terms of reference. This, however, was rarely the case for this sort of organization. He said that Commission had been very helpful during last incidents which occurred in Vientiane and that he would hate to see Commission removed from troubled Vietnam scene.

2. With regard to Laos Commission he went on to question our assessment of Indian thinking and wondered whether it was so clear that Indians had definitely shifted away from their previous position. Williams voiced the opinion that Indian change of attitude may be due to their assessment that situation had evolved from a "military dynamic one" to a new climate, literally as well as politically, which was more favourable to negotiations. Warner wondered whether it was right to suppose that Soviets would be reluctant to see Commissions take actions which might antagonize Chinese. He said that in present state of Sino/Soviet relations he should have thought that Soviets would be most happy to see Commissions causing annoyance to Chinese. He said that it might be of interest to sound out Indians a little more on these matters and to find out what sort of story they would give to Foreign Office. If we agreed it would be opportune, an approach at a high level could be made by British High Commissioner in Delhi. He said that he would like to have your views on this point.

3. Turning to the Vietnam Commission, Warner expressed doubts as to whether this was the right time to press for Legal Report. In present muddy political situation, report might only create additional difficulties. This was certainly not repeat not right time to take up cause of SVN Government with USSR and neither did Foreign Office feel too eager to do so after they had told SVN that they were not repeat not too happy with their policies. Generally Warner felt that Legal Report should be sent to Co-Chairmen and thought it could very well be published as a white paper. He said that their Embassy in Saigon had written recently to the effect that it was perhaps better to let sleeping dogs lie and forget about Legal Report since latter was only extension of Special Report of June 2/62. Foreign Office however disagreed with this line. We said that in any event we had doubts as to whether Indians would wish to push ahead with report in present situation. We pointed out, however, that this report was a necessary follow-up to Legal Committee Report requested in Special Report of June 2/62 and that it was very difficult for the Commission to make any progress in investigating subversion problem in South Vietnam until it was adopted. We pointed out also that report would conceivably be adopted by Commission at one point and referred to Co-Chairmen at later date. Once adopted, report would be safely and securely in books of Commission and latter could proceed to act on it, even if for political reasons publicity was delayed. Warner thought this was interesting possibility perhaps worth exploring with Indians.

4. Warner said that he would like to take a few days to consider whether they could make practical suggestions. He asked us in the meantime to pass their remarks concerning possibility of consulting Indians and Vietnam Legal Report.

5. In view of Indian attitude, we do not repeat not see much point in pursuing with Foreign Office discussion on opportuneness of publication of Legal Report at this moment. It seems to us, however, that Legal Report might be politically useful at least in one respect: it would contribute in dispelling impression that Front for Liberation of South is genuine neutral grouping of opposition to Diem regime. This is the image which FLS is actively trying to

project and which seems to find some adhesion in international public opinion. If in event of coup d'état FLS should ever come to be considered *interlocuteur valable*, it would be of some importance that it should be known under its true colours.

16.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10609, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-1/1

No. 170
Saigon, September 18, 1963
Confidential. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel Y-323 Aug 29, London Tel 2600 Sep 11.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Permis New York, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS, DGPO, DM/DND from CCOS.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION PRIORITIES

We were most interested to receive the general review in your reference telegram on the work of the three Commissions in Indochina, and London's reply under reference, particularly as these relate to current problems confronting the Vietnam Commission. These two messages arrived just as we had completed memo and related despatch dealing with possible future courses of action open to us. As mentioned in my telegram 169† September 17 requesting authorization to return to Ottawa early in October for consultation, this despatch number 373† left here today by courier. Suggested consultations would provide excellent opportunity to review with you in detail the tentative assessment of Commission objectives and priorities we have arrived at in course of recent review here and I would hope that no repeat no firm instructions are formulated until I have had an opportunity to discuss these problems with you.

2. In particular I am thinking of Foreign Office suggestion outlined in paragraph 2 of London's reference telegram. We too wonder whether Indians are not repeat not assuming too much, for their own reasons, with regard to implications of a "hard line" Commission policy for the Sino-Soviet dispute. While I agree in principle that it might be useful if the British could take a high-level sounding of opinion in Delhi on this problem, there is a question in my mind as to timing. The so-called Buddhist crisis in SVN has so inflamed world opinion (rightly or wrongly) that I believe there would be considerable merit in allowing tempers and emotions to cool and the situation here to settle down before attempting to ask others, especially India, which has co-sponsored request for inscription on UN agenda of Buddhist item, to think objectively about anything dealing with Vietnam. Moreover, and equally important, before proceeding with a preliminary approach such as Foreign Office has in mind, I believe we should have a clearer and firmly agreed understanding of what our precise objectives should be to enable UK to "follow through" immediately and smoothly. I suspect we are going to meet Indian resistance in proposing constructive action here and I think it would be a mistake to dissipate our efforts by beginning to make piecemeal approaches now.

3. You and London may be interested to know that views of British Embassy here as quoted in paragraph 3 of London's reference telegram were not repeat not arrived at after close consultation with this delegation and we were heartened to know that Foreign Office did not repeat not share assessment of British Embassy. The fine Indian hand of Goburdhun will doubtless be as evident to you as it is to us.

4. In general terms I might observe that there would appear to be large area of agreement between our views and those outlined in London's reference telegram in context of conversation at Foreign Office.

[Gordon] Cox

17.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9486, 17-1-1/5.2

No. 3086
Washington, September 24, 1963
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-323 Aug 29.
Repeat for Information: Vientiane, Saigon and longer Indochina list.
By Bag: Phnom Penh from Vientiane.

INDOCHINA: INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS

We put your basic points regarding Indochina Commissions recently to Sullivan, Special Assistant to Harriman for Asian and other special political affairs, and subsequently to Barbis, Laos Desk Officer.

2. Informants both took line, as Barbis had done in earlier conversation (our telegram 2824† September 7), that USA was not repeat not yet as completely convinced as Canada that fundamental shift had taken place in Indian policy in Indochina. They certainly did not repeat not dismiss our theory that Indian-USSR relations in context of Sino-Indian dispute were the governing factor in Indian ICSC policy at present, and they were willing to admit that we might well be in better position to judge Indian attitude, but they regarded case as still not repeat not definitely proven by reference to chapter and verse. Sullivan, for example, referred at some length to possible importance of such special factors as Gundevia's own personality, and recent departure of his redoubtable assistant Miss Muthamma from scene. On same general issue Barbis said that since our previous conversation and his parallel discussion with British Embassy, telegrams had been sent out to several USA missions asking for their assessment of current Indian policy, and that, returns being still not repeat not all in, USA was not repeat not yet completely sure that our analysis of Indian motive – and therefore of ICSC prospects – was fully correct, although State Department had open mind on subject. He made no repeat no mention of USA "confirmation from Delhi of correctness of Canadians' assessment" mentioned to Bridle by USA Ambassador (Vientiane telegram 651† September 19). He read to us, however, portion of Unger's report to State Department on conversation with Indian Laos ICSC Chairman Singh, mentioned in paragraph 2 of same telegram, which we had not repeat not yet seen. As far as we were able to note it, gist of Unger's report was that Singh had said that if Canadians or Souvanna Phouma were ready to take initiative to propose despatch of teams, and were prepared to take risk of Polish withdrawal which such ICSC action might entail, Indians would probably give serious consideration to proposal.

3. Barbis did not repeat not put this Unger-Singh conversation to us as a definite refutation of Canada's pessimistic thinking about Commission prospects, but he obviously thought it highly relevant. We think that before American doubts about Canadian analysis can be laid to rest, it will have to be clearly demonstrated to them that Singh's remarks are not repeat not in accord with Delhi's attitude – if such is the case.

4. When we discussed the more general aspects of current stagnation in Laos Commission, and mentioned your current doubts about whether it would be good tactics to let Canadian complaints and proposals pile up in Commission in large numbers in knowledge that virtually none of them would be acted on, prompt reaction from Barbis was that acquiescence in situation of stalemate would in effect mean acceptance of conditions of other side (i.e., Pathet Lao) as to how ICSC should operate. Submission of proposals, when justified, would at least make it clear that malefactors in Laos situation were not repeat not neutralists and not repeat not right-wing forces. Barbis saw some point, however, in our rejoinder that there was little propaganda advantage to be derived from making proposals which not repeat not even Indians were willing to entertain, that it might be desirable to save our fire for really vital issues that might come up, and that it seemed best to "play it cool" so as not repeat not to irritate Indians fruitlessly at a time when, according to Bridle, Singh's own mistrust of Pathet Lao was increasing. At the same time Barbis emphasized view that complete silence was useless and that contentious matters, even if unsuitable at present for full-dress ICSC discussion, should at least be brought up between Bridle and Singh. He also asked whether our doubts about current feasibility of obtaining agreement on despatch [of] further teams meant that we were considering withdrawal of existing Indian-Canadian team in PD area;[7] he thought presence of this team highly useful despite severe limitations on its activity. We assured him that there was no repeat no thought whatever of withdrawal of this team, that every advantage already gained must be hung on to; and that despite Canadians' fears about a coming period of stagnation for ICSC, Canadian policy would continue to be to exploit in favour of Western side any breach in situation which might open up.

5. We have outlined this conversation at some length not repeat not because its details are important, but because of manner in which it illustrates American thinking about ICSC functioning. Incidentally, Barbis went to some length to expatiate on the highly satisfactory working relationship established between Bridle and Unger; and both he and Sullivan had words of praise for ICSC and Canadian role in facilitating settlement of September 9 Vientiane incident.[8] All officials concerned have emphasized to us their belief in the usefulness of the mere presence of the various Commissions, even if these Commissions are unable to take as much positive action as would be desirable. There is also general agreement on value of conciliatory role of Commissions.

6. Slight variation between Canada and USA views of Commission functioning is perhaps inevitable result of differing USA and Canadian roles in Indochina, and is not repeat not of great significance at present, in our opinion. It should be borne in mind that while USA is fully conscious, and appreciative, of Canada's constructive role in Indochina, Commissions are for Americans only one of many elements in what they tend to see as the duel with Communists in area. If Commissions can be used to help against Communists in public relations operations or to stabilize a situation, well and good; if circumstances prevent such activities, this is unfortunate, but USA has many other instruments available. It follows that USA officials – at any rate those in Washington – are rarely inclined to give Commissions' problems and prospects same kind of sustained, detailed and thoughtful consideration which Canadian authorities are in position to give, because of our daily involvement. USA officials inevitably tend to think about Commission mostly in terms of what it can deliver for the Western team today, and not repeat not to worry quite as much about where it may be tomorrow. They therefore tend in direction of professional optimism on Commission matters. A measure of USA appreciation of Commissions' value is that officials tend to show great spontaneous concern at any implication that Canada might be thinking of withdrawal. Naturally we have strongly emphasized absence of any such idea from Canadian thinking.

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7 This may have been a reference to the Plaine des Jarres area in Laos.
Il pourrait s'agir de la région de la plaine des Jarres, au Laos.

8 See/Voir "Flurry in Laos," *Washington Post*, 14 September 1963, p. A8.

18.
Telegram from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10609, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-1/1

No. Y-386
Ottawa, October 19, 1963
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority.
Reference: Your Despatch 373 Sep 17, 1963.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London (OpImmediate); Vientiane, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, CCOS, CGS, DGPO, DM/DND (Routine).
By Bag: Geneva, Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Djakarta, Hong Kong, Phnom Penh.

COMMISSION PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES

We are in agreement with principal recommendations (paragraph 22) of your reference despatch and would like you to proceed basically as recommended therein.[9]

2. We think that there is no point at this stage in attempting any sudden forward movement, but that important thing is to be prepared to take advantage of opportunities which may offer themselves. Thus, unless you find on your return that Indians are ready to continue editorial revision of Legal Committee's report, we think that first problem is to cut ground from under Indian argument that South Vietnamese are themselves opposed to any further use of that report. This will mean an effort to get South Vietnamese to withdraw or supersede their statements to which the Indians have referred more than once (e.g., Delhi telegram 929 of September 10/63). We leave method of doing this to you, but question whether it would be advisable to show report in its present form to SVN authorities to dispel their doubts. (Perhaps they could see it after process of editorial revision is completed, but even then only with Indian agreement.) With this problem cleared away, it should be difficult for Indians to refuse to continue with editorial revision of report.

3. Next stage, as we see it, would be to decide what to do with revised report. It could be held in abeyance for presentation to Commission for acceptance in normal way at more propitious time than present, i.e., when there is less criticism of Diem regime both at home and abroad. Better still, it could be presented to Commission for acceptance as soon as it is ready, as you have suggested, without publicity but in such a manner as to form basis for Commission examination of more recent subversion cases. This would have two-fold advantage, namely, it would allow next Interim Report to contain reference to Commission action on Legal Report as counterbalance to references which may appear in it to illegal importation of arms into SVN and, in addition, provide prospect of continuing references to subversion cases in future Interim Reports to counterbalance continuing references to illegal arms importations which will no doubt also figure in those future Interim Reports.

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[9] This despatch recommended that Canada's priorities on the Commission be the following: to reactivate its work, especially completion of the editorial revision of the Legal Report; to remind the Indians of their earlier interest in the next Interim Report; to review with the Indians what the Interim Report might cover; and to explore with Col. Nguyen Van An what use should be made of the Legal Report.
Il était recommandé dans cette dépêche que les priorités du Canada soient les suivantes concernant la Commission : relancer ses travaux, et notamment terminer la révision de forme du rapport juridique; rappeler aux Indiens leur intérêt antérieur pour le prochain rapport provisoire; examiner avec les Indiens la portée possible du rapport provisoire; examiner avec le colonel Nguyen Van An l'utilisation recommandée du rapport juridique.

4. In our view, however, exact use to be made of report is something to be decided at later stage. In discussion with Indians you may, if your consultations in Delhi suggest that it would be wise to do so, mention both possibilities described above, but in manner which would make it clear that we have no intention of trying to use Legal Committee Report unilaterally.

5. You will have seen from Vientiane telegram 691† of October 12/63 that Poles have become curious about your trip to Ottawa and may be wondering about our attitude towards continuation of Commissions generally and prolongation of mandate of Laos Commission beyond mid-1965 in particular. We have no present intention of disturbing prevailing arrangements, but we see no reason to reveal this fact to Poles (or to Indians either, for that matter). We would not wish you to suggest that we are actively considering termination of either Commission (although this is [a] question which is naturally reviewed from time to time), but we cannot see why we should deprive ourselves of whatever small measure of leverage spontaneous doubts based on our attitude in 1958 may provide.[10]

7.[11] Events of past summer have caused us to give consideration to longer-term role of Commission in Vietnam, and we shall be communicating with you further on this subject shortly.

[N.A.] Robertson

19.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. 1104
Delhi, October 25, 1963
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: My Tel 1101† Oct 24.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (OpImmediate); London, Washington, Permis New York, Paris, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS from CCOS.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: FUTURE COMMISSION ACTION

When we saw Desai and Gundevia October 24 (my reference telegram), Cox at my suggestion put to each of them in turn the view that all three members of ICSC had common desire to put end to hostilities in SVN and had grounds for cooperation to this end. Pole could therefore be expected to cooperate to greater extent in SVN than in Laos. However, in any future action contemplated in Commission it would have to be borne in mind that in last few months Commission had concentrated almost exclusively on scrutinizing and tabulating American military assistance to SVN. Little had been done to further Commission action on other main aspect of current tensions in SVN, viz. Northern aid to VC and subversion. Hence before Commission went on record again, e.g., in Twelfth Interim Report, it would be best to balance record by showing that Commission had acted on new cases of subversion or infiltration presented by SVN.

2. Desai was rather uncommunicative in response to this line of thought and it was inopportune to draw him out, though he said nothing to suggest it appealed to him at all. Gundevia, on other hand, though protesting that he was not repeat not replying either

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[10] See/Voir vol. 25, docs 389, 390.

[11] The original document skipped from paragraph 5 to paragraph 7.
Le document original passait du paragraphe 5 au paragraphe 7.

affirmatively or negatively to what we had to say, made it all too clear that he was not repeat not prepared to see Commission take any initiative at present time. He professed to see in what we said a desire for Commission action vis-à-vis Co-Chairmen and questioned what purpose would be served.

3. We stressed that at moment we were talking in terms of internal Commission action to prepare balanced record. Question of what use to make of Legal Committee Report outside Commission was for later consideration.

4. Gundevia in effect refused to accept this statement of purpose and proceeded to elaborate reasons for preferring inaction. He conceded that last Interim Report was two years ago but why not repeat not make it three? While action to reduce tensions was obviously desirable, only unanimous report to Co-Chairmen held any prospect of helping. British Co-Chairman would reject action on Indian-Polish majority report, Russian would reject action on Indian-Canadian majority report. Gundevia played dumb on where work on Legal Committee Report stood, but asked what more could be achieved by Commission action report that had not repeat not already been gained by Special Report. He was completely unmoved by obvious imbalance between overt USA-SVN policies and covert actions of DRVN and Vietcong. His view seemed to be that each side would just have to make best use they could of propaganda openings available under status quo.

5. Finally, Gundevia recalled that SVN were not repeat not lobbying for action on Legal Committee Report and then rather revealingly recited an anecdote that he had told us before. When seeing him off at Saigon airport, Maneli had pointed to team members nearby and said that when USA military planes landed Canadian counted one, Indian two and Pole three. But at Hanoi counting of planes was reversed. To Gundevia he then said, "let us continue such an equitable procedure".

6. Gundevia knows better than this because of course no repeat no planes are counted at Hanoi. He did not repeat not specifically associate himself with Maneli's philosophy, but it was evident from the tenor of his remarks and questions that inaction in the Commission was far more to his liking at the moment than action. His main concern seemed to relate to undesirability of stirring things up (he referred particularly to the extreme DRVN reaction to Special Report). At end he went through motions of denying negative attitude and of suggesting he would be glad if Cox and Goburdhun would get together in Saigon so latter could put up concrete suggestions for consideration. There is little doubt in my mind that proposals for action would get short shrift. Sole ray of light was that Gundevia did not repeat not seem too categorically averse to continuation of editorial work on Legal Committee Report.

[C.A.] Ronning

20.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India and Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde et à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9486, 17-1-1/5.2

No. Y-403
Ottawa, November 7, 1963
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Delhi Tel 1104 Oct 25.
Repeat for Information: longer Indochina list.

VIETNAM COMMISSION PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES

Gundevia's reaction as described in Delhi reference telegram is very disappointing. If his attitude is to prevail, Canadian position on ICSC (would? will?) become very difficult because Commission's activities will in practice probably be confined to those inimical to Western interests.

2. In light of Gundevia's attitude we assume that Saigon will wish to proceed very carefully in testing readiness of Indians in Saigon to continue with editorial revision of Legal Report. In fact it seems worthwhile to us to consider whether in light of Delhi telegram 1007† September 28 and Delhi letter 608† October 10 concerning changes in Indian MEA it would not repeat not be best to leave further probing of Indian position in abeyance until we see whether Jha (Gundevia's replacement as Commonwealth Secretary) will take a more helpful attitude toward the work of the ICSC.

21.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/1

No. 221
Saigon, November 14, 1963
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel Y-403 to Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, Permis New York, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS from CCOS.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

COMMISSION PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES: LEGAL REPORT

By way of bringing up to date our reporting on progress made in connection with Legal Report, following comments may be of interest since it would appear from paragraph 2 of your reference telegram that the present status of this work seems to be somewhat misunderstood.

2. You will recall from the attachment to my despatch number 373 September 17 (paragraphs 12 and 25) that by mid-September the Indians had indicated willingness in principle to resume work on Legal Report and that we did not repeat not anticipate insuperable difficulties in securing an agreed, and not repeat not substantively altered, text even if the review process proved slow. This is in fact the way in which matters have been working out and editorial revision was resumed in desultory way in last week of September. No repeat no real progress was made however until second week October when Rangarajan's attitude of grudging acquiescence suddenly changed to enthusiasm or at least pronounced willingness to "get on with the job". From conversations with him we suspect that Goburdhun may have begun to press for tangible results on the basis of which he can at least make recommendation to his own government before leaving this post, probably early in new year.

3. I am not repeat not sure how closely informed Goburdhun and Gundevia keep each other with respect to anything more than broad outlines of policy and its implementation. According to Rangarajan, Delhi has not repeat not been informed of where detailed work on Legal Report now stands (hence Gundevia's reaction when Ronning and I called on him) and he has often mentioned that Delhi will not repeat not even see editorial changes now being made until second draft, as approved by Goburdhun, has been mimeographed and forwarded.

Fate awaiting second draft in Delhi, however, remains to be seen. Rangarajan has often stated that he expects few changes, arguing that Delhi would hesitate to alter draft approved by Goburdhun. Having seen Gundevia in operation with Goburdhun, the force of this argument is not repeat not altogether irresistible.

4. In any event, if Indians continue in present frame of mind a final and approved draft of the report in mimeographed form may be available by end November.

5. Rangarajan wishes to put section entitled "Complaints of hostile activities in the zone of the South aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the South" before section five entitled "Complaint that PAVN ... have invited, organized and carried out hostile activities in the zone of the South with the object of overthrowing the administration in the South" (the link section). This seems to be a logical suggestion; the link section which indicts the PAVN in general terms would follow three sections where specific allegations are discussed. The real impact of the link section depends on findings in other sections. I believe that we can go along with these changes and I shall be grateful to know whether you approve.

6. Distribution of draft text when it is ready raises question of number of copies to be printed here. (Process of mimeographing approved sections already begun and this work is progressing at gratifying pace). Indians are talking in terms of 40 copies which [we] have indicated we feel is excessive at this stage in view of fact report is still secret and may never be anything else. How many copies will you require in Ottawa, and do you wish us to distribute copies from here to certain other posts such as Delhi, London and Washington?

[Gordon] Cox

22.

Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. 238
Saigon, December 12, 1963
Confidential. Priority from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 221 Nov 14.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS from CCOS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

COMMISSION PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES: LEGAL REPORT

In conversation yesterday on another matter, Head of SVN Liaison Mission, Col. An, raised question of proceeding with new subversion cases. I expressed view that there would be little to be gained by beginning examination of new evidence now without having Legal Report as basis to work from, and that the fate of the Legal Report would now depend on Indian attitude. I asked Col. An whether he had discussed these problems recently with Goburdhun and in particular whether he had informed Indians that South Vietnamese Government was not repeat not in fact opposed to Legal Report. Col. An replied that in discussing Legal Report recently with Goburdhun latter had indicated there would be no repeat no objection to proceeding with the report and signing it but not repeat not presenting it to Co-Chairmen or otherwise making it public. Report would thus have status of document for internal Commission use only and would provide basis for examination [of] new cases.

2. I have deliberately not repeat not reviewed this matter myself with Goburdhun since there seemed little to be gained by such discussion until report itself ready for presentation to Commission. If Col. An's comments accurately reflect Indian attitude I believe we ought to be satisfied since this is probably as far as we can expect Indians be prepared to go.[12]

3. Task of reproducing this copious document is progressing steadily but because of mechanical difficulties and delays in obtaining paper it has not repeat not progressed as swiftly as we would have wished. I am hopeful that it will be completed by end of December.

[Gordon] Cox

23.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. Y-16
Ottawa, January 14, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 238 Dec 12.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, CCOS, CGS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

LEGAL COMMITTEE REPORT

Indians' reluctance to envisage making public Legal Committee Report reflects their present policy of taking minimum action in Indochina Commissions. As stated in paragraph 3 of our telegram Y-386 of October 19/63, we should wish to preserve our freedom to decide later what use we wish to propose should be made of the Legal Committee Report.

2. First priority at this time should therefore be limited to having report revised and put in final form. You should continue to nudge Indians gently in that direction. Although you need not tackle Goburdhun on limited role he foresees for report, you should be very careful not repeat not to indicate that we would necessarily be prepared to agree that it should remain virtually ineffective by never becoming public.

24.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. 30
Saigon, January 25, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel Y-16 Jan 14 and My Tel 25† Jan 24.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS from CCOS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

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[12] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Mr. Pope: No, no, no, no, no is <u>all</u> I can say!!!!! P[amela] A. M[cDougall]

LEGAL REPORT

Goburdhun told me that announcement would soon be made, if this had not repeat not already been done, of appointment of Mohammed Rahman as his successor. I understand Rahman has been in charge MFA Press Liaison in Delhi and is expected to arrive here April 10 and Goburdhun planning to leave April 2.

2. As reported in my reference telegram revised text of Legal Report is now available and should be in your hands in about ten days' time. Goburdhun and his senior political adviser have been referring to Legal Report almost as accomplished fact and I anticipate effort by Chairman to have formal action taken on this document before he leaves Saigon in about two months' time.

3. I will therefore need urgent and explicit instructions with respect to handling of Legal Report in Commission and in this connection I would hope that some preliminary soundings of official opinion might be taken in Delhi. I agree that we should not repeat not commit ourselves in advance and too easily to an arrangement whereby Legal Report would be adopted as Commission document but never made public. We have not repeat not discussed this problem specifically with Indians, preferring to wait until revision and editing of text was completed, but from other conversations we have formed impression that while prepared to proceed cautiously with report, Indians feel the less stir it creates the better. With recent political developments, however, this may have changed and Chairman appears to be even more angry with French than are Americans, speaking sharply of French aid (*sic*) to China but mentioning only the sale of petro-chemical plant. I am thus not repeat not sure whether our role will be to encourage Indians or restrain precipitate action.

4. In view of overall uncertainty of Western intentions in Vietnam I will need specific instructions for action on Legal Report, which would have considerable impact if made public. Please advise (1) whether we should urge that report be signed by Canadian representative higher than de Goumois or Anderson; (2) whether we should agree to sign if Indians so request; (3) whether we should urge Indians to introduce report in Commission as Indel document or as joint Indel/Candel document; (4) whether we should urge that report be merely accepted as Commission report without further action at this time; (5) whether we should urge acceptance by Commission and then suggest report to Co-Chairmen based on Legal Report and appending any or all of it.

5. I would hope that Delhi comments and your instructions might be communicated to me as soon as possible in order that we may be able to move ahead swiftly to take advantage of Goburdhun's evident desire to dispose of this Commission project during his "reign". Such action would enable us to undertake long delayed examination of "new cases" which might well be disposed of in much shorter order than cases forming basis of Legal Report. In this connection we might consider possibility of arranging "compromise" with Indians whereby they support us and cooperate fully in preparation of second report based on new cases in return for our agreeing to leave original Legal Report within the Commission without making it public.

6. I might mention that it looks as if the other delegations are preparing for "action". Poles are now up to full strength with Commissioner, alternate delegate and two advisers. Similarly Indian Delegation increased by arrival [of] Legal Adviser. Present senior political adviser will be replaced about mid-February.

7. Grateful for your comments as soon as possible.

[Gordon] Cox

25.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam and High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam et au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. Y-72
Ottawa, 11 February 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 30 Jan 31.[13]
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, CCOS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

LEGAL REPORT

Part 2 your reference telegram received February 10.

2. After first look at final version of Legal Report our view remains that it meets directly current Western preoccupations in Vietnam because of links it provides between Viet Cong and DRVN. It follows that we would oppose its burial.

3. We agree that first step should be to ascertain from Indians precisely what their intentions are and what arguments they may adduce for treating report as internal Commission document. We should therefore be grateful if you and Delhi would now discuss this problem with Indians in specific terms in order to allow us to see how latter consider issue should be joined. Although our objective is the referral to Co-Chairmen and eventual publication of report, our final position will depend on Indians' own views and way they link Legal Report to further action on new cases and arms imports. In first discussion with Indians you should therefore limit yourselves to saying we had assumed that publication of Legal Report would be matter of course on basis of implied promise in Special Report. If Indian position proves unsatisfactory, we would prefer to examine whole situation before taking position ourselves.

4. On other points [in] your reference telegram, our tentative view is that report should be signed by Canadian representative on Legal Committee as a majority report of Legal Committee. It would then presumably be presented in Commission as a Canadian-Indian document. If Indians agree that it should be signed jointly by Indians and Canadians in Legal Committee, however, actual method of presentation in Commission would seem to be of lesser importance. In any event, it would be preferable to seek Indian views before taking firm position ourselves.

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[13] There may have been a delay in transmitting Saigon telegram 30, sent on 25 January 1964 but dated here 31 January. See previous document.
Il est possible qu'il y ait eu un retard de transmission du télégramme nº 30 de Saïgon, envoyé le 25 janvier 1964 mais daté ici du 31 janvier. Voir le document précédent.

26.
Telegram from High Commission in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. 169
Delhi, February 18, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-72 Feb 11.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (OpImmediate); Washington, London, Paris, CCOS (Priority from Ottawa).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: LEGAL REPORT

On February 18 we approached Alexander, Deputy Secretary for Indochina, MEA, on following lines. We said we understood that particularly in view of Goburdhun's imminent departure some thought was probably being given in Saigon to further Interim Report. If any such report were to be issued we thought that amongst other things it would have to include some indication of Commission action on Legal Committee Report along lines which had been promised in Special Report issued nearly two years ago. In any event, further allegations against the North in respect of new subversion cases had been piling up in Commission and in order to deal with these it would seem logical to get out of way cases dealt with earlier by Legal Committee resulting in Special Report. We pointed out that "action as appropriate in each individual case" referred to in Legal Committee Report had been promised by Commission in paragraph 10 of Special Report.

2. Alexander professed some surprise at approach on question of Legal Committee Report. He said he had just received current draft of it but that he had been under impression that thus far it was to be dealt with simply as internal Indian Government document and thus not repeat not a subject at present for discussion. We said that this might well be so in sense that current action on Legal Committee draft report had been largely question of drafting and editing. We understood that Canadian representative in Legal Committee had been cooperating with Indian representative but that this was no repeat no doubt an informal procedure intended to advance mutually acceptable final draft. On other hand, regarding substance of Legal Committee Report, findings of Legal Committee as set out in the Special Report had been subject of a joint examination of evidence by Indian and Canadian representatives in Legal Committee and therefore Canadian association with findings was established fact. Alexander appeared to accept this position on substance and we did not repeat not press him on more formal aspect of whose particular draft it was at moment.

3. We then went on to ask Alexander for Indian views on procedural aspects of further processing of draft report. Alexander said he had no repeat no views on this and that he would have to examine report before saying anything further.

4. Alexander went on, however, to query our interest in subject, taking line that Special Report had provided SVN with what it wanted, i.e., propaganda base against North and that Indians saw no repeat no reason for providing further detailed base for propaganda activities. We said we thought it would be your view that Commission could not repeat not concern itself unduly with use to which North and South might put Commission activities so long as there was a clear obligation on Commission to follow a particular course of action. In present

case we said we thought it was clear from paragraph 10 of Special Report that Commission was under obligation to take appropriate action and this presumably would involve submission of full report to Commission by Legal Committee and appropriate decisions on individual cases by Commission in light of what report contained. We pointed out that any failure by Commission to take action as forecast in Special Report would amount to burying undertaking thus clearly expressed. Alexander then suggested that this alleged obligation or undertaking on part of the Commission was not repeat not as exact as we had suggested. He thought that at time of report Commission "had planned" to take action along lines we had suggested but that this was not repeat not a binding undertaking. Moreover, he recalled for our benefit that SVN authorities themselves had argued against further Commission action on report.

5. We reminded Alexander that we had never been entirely satisfied that SVN authorities in taking this view at an early stage had understood what it was that Commission proposed to do. In any event, since there had been one if not repeat not two changes in regime since that stage,[14] it would naturally be appropriate to have more regard to present Commission obligations than to views of one of parties at a much earlier stage.

6. Finally, we urged Alexander to provide us with early indication of Indian views, particularly because of Goburdhun departure in March and Rahman's assumption of duties in April. When latter arrives, there might be considerable delay since he might not repeat not be familiar with all implications of Legal Committee Report. Alexander agreed to consider the matter but without giving any promises. Although we have no repeat no real evidence for it, we think Indians in Delhi might not repeat not be too disappointed if nothing were done before Rahman's arrival. Incidentally, we made point to Alexander that present draft of report did not repeat not differ in substance from Mukhi's original draft and that problem of reviewing present draft should not repeat not be too great.

7. As we have reported before, our impression is that Indians would rather not repeat not see Commission taking too much action in Vietnam at present time. This would apply specifically, we think, to Legal Committee Report. We are inclined therefore to view that all possible obstacles to processing report should be removed as soon as possible. In particular we ought to take early action to deprive Indians of argument that SVN authorities would not repeat not like to see Legal Committee Report processed.

8. We did not repeat not deal specifically with question of publication of report as a whole in our discussions with Alexander, although it was clearly implied in both his remarks and ours. As you will have seen above, we took line that at very least Commission ought to take decisions on individual cases dealt with in the report and that such action would inevitably be brought to the Co-Chairmen's attention. We also suggested in the same context that since in some cases this would undoubtedly result in reprimand to DRVN, it would be only reasonable to communicate to them and to Co-Chairmen evidentiary material on which citations were based. We should be grateful for confirmation that this is your view as well.

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[14] On 2 November 1963, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated in a coup d'état. The coup's leader, General Duong Van Minh, was himself ousted from power by General Nguyen Khanh on 30 January 1964.
Le 2 novembre 1963, le président du Sud-Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem est assassiné lors d'un coup d'État. Le 30 janvier 1964, le chef du coup d'État, le général Duong Van Minh, est lui-même chassé du pouvoir par le général Nguyen Khanh.

27.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. Y-205
Ottawa, February 26, 1964
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel 169 Feb 18.
Repeat for Information: Saigon, Washington, London, Paris, CCOS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

LEGAL REPORT

We approve line you took in speaking to Alexander. We agree with argument last paragraph your telegram that Commission is committed to take decisions on individual cases as promised paragraph 10 Special Report. Any such action would then eventually be brought to Co-Chairmen's attention if only as part of Interim Report.

2. *For Saigon*: Indians continue to return to alleged Vietnamese lack of enthusiasm for Legal Report. Perhaps you might urge An to clarify SVN position to Indians once and for all, after having first briefed him on nature of report.

3. We do not think our attitude need be affected by consideration raised in your thoughtful telegram 63† February 15 paragraph 7. Our understanding of U.S. thinking on Vietnam does not lead us to fear that U.S. is likely to adopt a view tending to regard VC rebellion as purely local uprising. Problem in minds of U.S. officials is to decide to what extent local conditions in SVN have been a condition for success of North in promoting subversion in South. This is somewhat different from denying link between North Vietnam and rebellion, and is in fact important question to be answered in seeking political means to meet VC threat.

4. Legal Report will in our view form main piece of documentary evidence affirming connection between North Vietnam and insecurity in the South. This is of immediate usefulness since denial of this connection is one of premises on which support for neutralization is sometimes based.

28.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. 81
Saigon, February 26, 1964
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tels Y-66† Feb 10 and Y-72 Feb 11 and Delhi's 169 Feb 18.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Permis New York, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS, DGPO, DM/DND from CCOS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

COMMISSION PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES; TWELFTH INTERIM REPORT

I have now had opportunity to review with Goburdhun the prospects for constructive Commission action within the foreseeable future in terms of the Legal Report and his own suggestion that an Interim Report be submitted to Co-Chairmen. On the basis of this conversation I would be less than honest if I were to confess to anything other than a sense of futility and discouragement.

2. Goburdhun explained that the suggestion for an Interim Report even if of a routine nature had come from Delhi (which I find curious in view of Gundevia's comments to me last October – see paragraph 4 telegram 1104 October 25 from Delhi).

3. I explained to Goburdhun that as I saw the situation, an Interim Report was certainly due because the Eleventh Report was terminal-dated three years ago (February 28/61).[15] The Special Report, although an extremely important Commission document, did not repeat not relieve us of obligation to submit a more comprehensive report; even the Special Report was more than year and a half old and moreover it had not repeat not been accepted by one of the Co-Chairmen. At the same time, I stated how we would view as misleading and unacceptable any proposed report to the Co-Chairmen which dealt only with routine operational matters (i.e., Commission's frustrations in carrying out controls etc.) or similar futilities such as lack of progress in follow-up efforts in connection with such matters as case of Kaltock alias Cock (paragraph 27 Eleventh Interim Report) or question of RVN allegations of PAVN base on Tiger Island (paragraph 64 Eleventh Interim Report). Both of the foregoing examples were selected by the Chairman as the sort of problem which might be treated substantively in proposed Interim Report; without going into more specific detail to answer the question raised in the concluding sentence paragraph 2 of your telegram Y-66, I can only speculate that, in the absence of action on Legal Report and new cases and, therefore, reference to arms imports, any Interim Report we would draft now would consist of little more than a stringing together of similar "cases". I let Goburdhun know that we could not repeat not associate ourselves with such a presentation even though it mentioned the Special Report as having been presented in period under review, if there were no repeat no substantive discussion of subversion and therefore, presumably, imports of arms and personnel, the latter to include the PAVN Navy. I expressed the belief that the Special Report was a well-balanced document which provided a reasonably accurate picture of what had been going on in Vietnam during the period reviewed. As far as I could see there had been little or no repeat no change in kind since that time; to submit a report to the Co-Chairmen which was not repeat not based on this view would be a procedure so misleading that I could not repeat not recommend such a course of action to my government.

4. Goburdhun appeared to be rather quickly converted by my argument saying that this had been his own point of view originally and that he would inform Delhi that I had demurred at the suggestion of an "innocuous" Interim Report. I am not repeat not sure of his tactics in all this because he has, in fact, only given us the alternatives of presenting a relatively meaningless Interim Report (which in view of terminal date suggested cannot repeat not properly deal with subversion or arms imports because the interested committees have not repeat not yet reported to the Commission) or postponing even further the next Interim Report until the Legal Report has been dealt with and reports have been received on arms and personnel imports; from what I can see from here, the Indians might well be prepared to drag out action on these matters almost indefinitely. The choice is thus between saying

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[15] See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 1551, *Eleventh Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam*, 1 February 1960 to 28 February 1961 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961).

something meaningless and misleading, or saying nothing at all (i.e., until substantive material is ready for presentation). It is just possible that Goburdhun may interpret my intervention as meaning an "invitation" to do the latter.

5. The only real consolation to be derived from our conversation was that Goburdhun seemed to agree on highlights of what next Interim Report might contain (the question of when it is to appear is an altogether different one) in addition to operational matters and discussion of follow-up action from previous report. By way of living up to commitment made in Special Report, he thought that next Interim Report might contain material relating to conclusive findings of Legal Committee; at the same time it would report action taken (and progress made, if any) on Legal Committee's examination of first compendium of "new cases" and perhaps the second compendium and possibly the Commission's referral back to Legal Committee for further study of certain cases treated in Legal Report. On the other side of the ledger, the report would have to incorporate results of studies on USA imports and PAVN Navy which are being carried out by War Materials Section of Secretariat. A report built around this kind of skeleton would, I believe, meet our minimal requirements. Anything less I would consider inaccurate and inadequate. In the context of this brief discussion of substance, I might mention that the suggestion outlined [in] paragraph 1 your telegram Y-66 does not repeat not appear very useful since Article 42 stipulates that Commission decisions on questions relevant to matters treated in Special Report must be unanimous. Special Report was of course only a majority report and according to my reading of the Geneva Agreement, it is not repeat not covered by Article 43 where I would interpret the word "recommendation" as meaning unanimous decision referred to in preceding article.

6. As I see it, our real problem does not repeat not lie in deciding whether Interim Report should contain reference to this or that specific case mentioned [in] earlier reports. Rather it is rooted in Indian reluctance to see the Commission undertake any kind of meaningful activity which might draw attention to the Commission and the situation in Vietnam generally. They have clearly adopted a "do-nothing-and-hold-our-breath" policy and as long as this remains in effect, our position here will remain difficult, frustrating and in a sense degrading because we are acquiescing in a policy with which we do not repeat not agree. Take the Legal Report for example. That document could have been fully dealt with six months ago, but instead it has taken almost ten months to produce only a revised text and we are still very little closer to conclusive action than we were last spring. From the tone and substance of Delhi's reference telegram I would judge that we may be in for a further period of waiting before Indian concurrence is given. Even then, our problems would not repeat not be over since Chairman referred to possibility of presenting report in Legal Committee to avoid charge of being high handed and undemocratic, giving Poles opportunity to express their views on it at that level before submitting it to Commission, where Poles would again have opportunity to criticize and obstruct. This procedure is of course unnecessary since Poles withdrew from work of Legal Committee promising their own minority report on matters under discussion. Thus all that need be done now is for Legal Committee Chairman to write to Polish representative asking for this document so that it may be presented to Commission in conjunction with the majority report. The only debate on the Legal Report that need take place is at the Commission level. I have expressed this point of view to the Chairman but he did not repeat not comment substantively on it. In the second place, I was somewhat dismayed by the echoes in Delhi's reference telegram of long-since abandoned view of the South Vietnamese Government, namely that the Legal Report should be forgotten. I cannot repeat not help but wonder whether Goburdhun has been reporting to Delhi as fully as he might regarding South Vietnamese attitudes. In short, the prospect of continuing with niggling, quibbling approach to Commission problems especially when there are several important matters we could and should be dealing with is very discouraging. Above all we must be clear, I believe, about accepting the fact that we have only two real alternatives open to us at this juncture: the first is to continue as we have been doing, playing an essentially responsive role to the Indians' lead in the interests of not repeat not complicating our broader

political relations with India; the second alternative is begin to argue a "hard line" with them on the grounds that our commitments here are much too exclusive and demanding simply to implement a "do-nothing" policy and if this situation is to continue adjustments may be found to be necessary.

7. In addition to beginning to sort out the detailed nuts and bolts of the contents of the next Interim Report and the tactics for presenting and accepting the Legal Report, I believe that more fundamental questions such as this also require consideration at the moment.

[Gordon] Cox

29.

Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, High Commission in India, and Embassy to United States

Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam, au haut-commissariat en Inde, et à l'ambassade aux États-Unis

RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. Y-240
Ottawa, March 20, 1964
Confidential. From Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel 81 Feb 26.
Repeat for Information: CCOS, London, Paris.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from London; Tokyo from Ottawa.

VIETNAM COMMISSION PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES

Your telegram raises important points which should be further discussed between posts and Ottawa before decision is taken. Two points seem to be at issue.

Interim Report

2. Our order of preferences at this time is as follows. A. We want action on Legal Report and new cases in order to have useful material for inclusion in an Interim Report. B. We do not repeat not want innocuous Interim Report that presents distorted picture of facts, and would prefer none at all to one of that sort. Goburdhun's reaction to your approach seems to lessen urgency of that danger at this time. We should nevertheless continue to be on lookout for useful polemical material for use whenever it is decided Interim Report should be prepared. In addition to possible topics mentioned by you, we should like your reaction to possibility of submitting Canadian statement on inadequacy of controls in North. In our view past Interim Reports have given misleading view of situation. It could be inferred from wording of most Interim Reports that because no repeat no violation of Article 17 by North was recorded, none was perpetrated. (We have in mind second sentence of paragraph 66 of 11th report,[16] and subparagraph of paragraph 50 of 7th report.[17]) Time may have come to put together what we know of opportunities open to North for evasion and looseness of

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16 See/Voir ibid., p. 24.

17 See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 335, *Seventh Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam*, 1 August 1956 to 30 April 1957 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), p. 13.

supervision in attempt to redress balance. In addition, we venture to continue to think that some mileage could be made out of North's reaction to Special Report, along lines of paragraph 81 of 11th report[18] or [paragraph] 46 of 9th report.[19]

General attitudes

3. We are willing to consider whether less "responsive" policy might not repeat not produce better results.

4. Our principal objective in Vietnam Commission at this time lies in having action taken on new cases and Legal Report. Interest of both lies in opportunities they afford for drawing close connection between Hanoi and Vietcong. Since this is often denied by those who propose neutralization of Vietnam, operation is in our view a useful one.

5. It would nevertheless be useful to have State Department's opinion of usefulness of Legal Report and how hard they think we should press for its publication. Americans are ones most closely connected with the war and are in best position to judge whether Commission action could be positively useful from this viewpoint or not repeat not. We should therefore be grateful if Washington would under suitable safeguards show conclusions of Legal Report to State Department on receipt, to obtain State Department's view of probable public effect of its possible publication. Embassy Washington might point out two dangers i.e., general Indian desire for counterbalancing criticism of both sides and fact that it is not repeat not only in North that control of entry of arms is imperfect.

6. If we fail in our best efforts to persuade Indians to have Commission take action on outstanding items, adoption of a hard line would presumably entail abandoning premise that our objectives in Indochina are basically same as Indians. Practical result of this decision would be to lessen our readiness to seek compromises with Indians in Commission and, which is more important, adoption of public Canadian attitude that Commission was not repeat not doing its job and had not repeat not done so for years. Object of adoption of this tougher line would be less to persuade Indians to support our positions than simply to set record straight.

7. At same time we should appreciate Delhi's opinion on suggestion to become less responsive to Indian policy in Commission and bring into open rather than seek to cover over problem of future of Commission. Specifically, are there any tactics that could lead the Indians to abandon their present inactivity? Would a tougher line be likely to produce results, or would it lead on the contrary to an even more unsatisfactory Indian position?

30.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/1.2

No. 345
Delhi, April 1, 1964
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-240 Mar 20.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Priority); Washington, London, Paris, CCOS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

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[18] See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 1551, *Eleventh Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam*, 1 February 1960 to 28 February 1961 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), p. 26.

[19] See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 726, *Ninth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam*, 1 May 1958 to 31 January 1959 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959), pp. 32–33.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

I understand how frustrating it must be to you as well as to our Commissioner in Saigon to continue indefinitely to tolerate inactivity of Indians from whom we expected cooperation that had been promised. You have therefore very properly raised several questions about our policy in Commission: (a) Can Indians be persuaded to agree to action on outstanding items? (b) What tactics or means are open to us to lead Indians to abandon their present inactivity? (c) Would a tougher less responsive Canadian line in Commission produce results or merely induce even more unsatisfactory Indian approach? (d) Implicit in three above questions, are implications of tougher Canadian line acceptable?

2. Taking questions 1(a) and (b) together, I think there is some prospect that we have the means to get Indians to act on outstanding items you mention (your paragraph 2) and therefore to abandon their current inactive approach. You will recall that we have had assurances from Gundevia that Legal Report would be processed in some form or other regardless of consequences. It is true that developments since then have modified and altered Indian attitude. South Vietnamese were apparently satisfied with results of Special Report chiefly because North Vietnamese focussed attention solely on that part of report dealing with their own violations. Also South Vietnamese did convey to Indians that they would prefer Legal Report should not repeat not be given publicity as they feared that publication of Legal Report intended to confirm general report would draw more attention to their own violations of Agreement this time. If attitude of South Vietnamese has changed after coup ending Diem's regime and now favours Legal Report and also if USA take same view, you may wish to consider advisability of instructing me to return to charge to bring pressure on Gundevia and M.J. Desai to live up to Gundevia's previous assurances.

3. In this connection you will remember that at time assurances were given Indians were suffering acutely from their sense of frustration arising out of military debacle in NEFA at hands of Chinese. They were therefore prepared to take action to checkmate activity of China and its satellites or collaborators in Indochina. This gave rise to enthusiasm for more team investigations in Laos and determination to process Legal Report in Vietnam. When they discovered that USSR did not repeat not approve of proposed tactics in International Commissions to checkmate Chinese, Indians suddenly lost their enthusiasm. Indians regard it as essential for India's security to maintain best possible relations with USSR. There is no repeat no evidence as far as I know indicating that Soviet attitude, in spite of relations with Peking, has changed. However, USA and also South Vietnam may now favour Legal Report and it may be possible that Indians who are by no repeat no means desirous of offending USA could be influenced to modify present tendency of procrastination and inaction.

4. I think, however, that if we are to make this effort to persuade Indians to cooperate, we must be prepared to postpone temptation to break with Indians for further indefinite period. USA and SVN must also be warned to accept Indian *quid pro quo* of citation of SVN and USA for material and personnel imports.

5. As to question 1(c) above, I think adoption of a tougher Canadian line in Commission would probably be unproductive of more satisfactory Indian position. Indians dislike pressure at best of times and public pressure even less especially in wake of Chinese occupation of Indian territory. Indian leaders would be under heavy fire in Parliament if it were thought that they were responding to obvious "Western" or Canadian lead. Task of securing Indian cooperation will be difficult enough even if we let it appear that they are taking the initiative. If we put on pressure publicly (i.e., by taking positions for the record in Commission), chances are that Indians with prodding from opposition elements here will simply stand pat and let Poles make running for them.

6. As suggested in 1(d) above, however, taking a tougher line in Commission raises substantial question of what value we see in Commission. I am inclined to think that more is to be gained from working with Indians and on Indians than in being tough to set record

straight. I have always been of opinion that greatest value of Indochina Commissions lies in their very presence. I of course support idea that effective action by Commissions is important to preserve prestige which makes presence effective and that lack of effective action undermines value of Commission presence. I have never, however, been able to see value in activity simply for sake of activity. Activity is valuable only if it produces desirable results. In case of Vietnam Commission it may be that due to impossibility of any effective activity so far tremendous expenses of continuing Commission's presence is unwarranted. If this is [the] case, Commission could be cut down to skeleton size as was done in Cambodia. Even if Indian policy were to continue to make it impossible for Commission to function as we think it ought to function, I would still be reluctant to see Canada accept responsibility for terminating its existence as long as its presence is some deterrent to renewal of North-South hostilities.

7. It is of course for you to decide in light of all factors whether time had arrived to become less responsive to Indian policy in Vietnam Commission and to bring into open problem of future of Commission. I am inclined to recommend otherwise because I still believe that we could possibly induce top Indian officials to join us in tactics that could lead to more satisfactory cooperation and that we should therefore continue to be patient with Indian attitude rather than bring into open our differences chiefly for sake of making position clear for record or exonerating ourselves from blame in inactivity of Commission.

8. If you decide it is no repeat no longer possible to postpone break with Indians, then in my opinion we should not repeat not discuss matter any further with top-level Indian officials in Delhi. Question of Legal Report for example has been thoroughly thrashed out with MEA. If you decide to force issue it should be done in Saigon without further reference to Delhi. It would presumably mean Canadian minority action and top-level Indian officials could not repeat not blame Canada for taking precipitate action because whole question has already been aired and Gundevia's assurances received. We should remember, however, that result would nevertheless have detrimental effect on our relations with India. Damage might not repeat not be irreparable but in my opinion we should think twice before taking action which could terminate Commission. While I do not repeat not think that fact India is undoubtedly most important country in South Asia from military, economic and political standpoint should be determining factor, it may be, however, that it would be more valuable from standpoint of Western interest in this part of world if Canada were careful to retain best possible relations with India even to extent of refraining from action to exonerate Canada from blame for failure of Commission to carry out activities calculated to be in interest of West.

[C.A.] Ronning

31.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10609, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-1/1

No. Y-270
Ottawa, April 6, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 345 Apr 1.
Repeat for Information: Saigon, Washington, London, Paris.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, CCOS.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

We agree with your view that greatest value of Commissions in Indochina lies in their very presence. At same time this as our major motive is difficult to justify in many circumstances both publicly and to those who must serve in our delegations to the Commissions. We must, in addition to merely keeping the Commissions present, try to make them work either as nearly as may be to the way they were meant to work, or at least in some reasonable substitute manner. We have to bear in mind, and this you might like to point out to Indians, that peacekeeping functions of Canadian military establishment are coming under review by a Parliamentary committee[20] and we should not wish to be or to appear to be extravagant in our use of military personnel, especially at such a time.

2. We therefore feel obliged to try to achieve something with Indochina Commissions going beyond their mere presence. This is why we are always ready to examine new ideas or re-examine old ones with open minds. Thus, we do not view Cox's proposals or our reactions to them either merely as action for action's sake, or as merely designed to set record straight, important though we consider latter to be.

3. In context of foregoing, we consider it legitimate to be on lookout for opportunities to initiate action in Commission rather than continue to await Indian convenience. We do not think that use of such opportunities need affect our relations with Indians except possibly in local context of Vietnam Commission. We do not recall that our relations with Indians were affected by our tactics in Laos Commission in 1958 when we forced pace of adjournment *sine die* nor in Cambodia Commission when we withdrew from participation in investigations for period from 1958-61. There is of course no suggestion that we should "break" with Indians, nor have we suggested terminating existence of Commission, although we should always be pleased to discuss any Indian suggestions for reducing its size.

4. We are pleased that you think Indians might be persuaded to modify their present tendency of procrastination and endorse your suggestion to return to charge with Gundevia and Desai. When so doing you might take as a point of departure frustrations inherent in present circumstances, arguing along lines of Cox's telegrams. Perhaps Indians are genuinely convinced that inaction in Commission is best possible policy at this time and that any positive action would exacerbate tensions in the area. We are inclined to regard inaction as dereliction of our responsibilities in light of what is known of increasing support being received from North Vietnam by Viet Cong. Nearly two years have passed since Special Report and nearly a year since first batch of new cases were passed to Legal Committee. Although situation has never been more critical in South Vietnam, Commission has seldom been more inactive. Fact that Commission has deliberately refrained from further action on above two items reflects not only on present Commission and its members but on very principle of international peacekeeping.

5. In keeping with our hope of persuading Indians to adopt more positive line in Commission you should present above arguments without any suggestion of threat of unilateral action if your initiative does not succeed. At same time we hope you will leave Indians in no doubt that we view present situation in Vietnam Commission with seriousness and dissatisfaction.

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[20] In March 1964, the Pearson Government tabled a white paper on defence. See Canada, Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964).
En mars 1964, le gouvernement Pearson a déposé un Livre blanc sur la défense. Voir Canada, ministère de la Défense nationale, *Livre blanc sur la défense* (Ottawa : Imprimeur de la Reine, 1964).

32.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. 390
Delhi, April 13, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-270 Apr 6.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Priority); London, Washington, Paris, CCOS (Priority) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Moscow, Warsaw, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

Since Commonwealth Secretary Jha has now taken over Gundevia's former responsibilities relating to Indo-China, I decided it would be best to broach initially with Jha question of future action in Vietnam Commission. This I did April 13 along lines of your telegram Y-270. Jha confessed that he was unfamiliar with issues but responded initially that our approach seemed reasonable in the circumstances. He may have had second thoughts when we went on to discuss likelihood that Poles and USSR would be opposed to action on Legal Committee Report but if so he did not repeat not communicate them to us. In conclusion he undertook to "look at the papers" in expectation that he would be speaking to us again shortly.

2. I think this first step will be useful in view of Jha's reasonable attitude. We will at least have had advantage of putting our case to a fresh mind. He will hear of the objections soon enough from Gundevia and others.

3. I think that it would be useful now to have confirmation of willingness of USA and SVN to see work on Legal Committee Report proceed. I should also be grateful if you would keep me abreast of your thinking on question of publication of Legal Committee Report. In speaking to Jha today I said that we had no repeat no final view on whether report should be published as a whole, although I did point out that action taken by Commission on individual cases would, of course, have to be reported to Co-Chairmen.

[C.A.] Ronning

33.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. 1385
Washington, April 16, 1964
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-240 Mar 20 and Our Tel 1149† Mar 26.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris; CCOS, Delhi (Priority) from Ottawa; CGS from CCOS; Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Hong Kong from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Tokyo from Ottawa.

VIETNAM COMMISSION – LEGAL REPORT

Mendenhall of State Department Vietnam Working Group informed us today, with renewed apologies for delay, that after extensive consultations here and with USA Embassy Saigon, Department had reached view which was essentially same as his preliminary comment to us (our reference telegram). Department believed, on basis of conclusions shown to them, that publication of report would be useful for political and propaganda purposes. If Indians attempted to offset publication of Legal Report by approving material (e.g., in a new Interim Report) which would put USA in unfavourable light, as we had warned Department they might do, State Department naturally hoped that Canadian representative would try to deflect this; however, even if Indians insisted, Department still felt that publication of Legal Report would on balance be worthwhile.

2. Mendenhall mentioned that USA Embassy Saigon had discussed question of Legal Report with Colonel An. He assured us that State Department telegram seeking Saigon Embassy views had stressed that conclusions of report had been shown to Department on USA Eyes Only basis, but in answer to question he said that Embassy telegram had not repeat not specifically indicated how subject was raised with An or whether fact Canada was consulting USA on disposition of Legal Report had been revealed to him. Colonel An was quoted as saying that last category of cases in report (i.e., those on which evidence permits conclusive findings) provided convincing proof of North Vietnamese interference and that publication of entire report would be very helpful for GRVN. Mendenhall thought this represented change from earlier GRVN position.

3. Colonel An apparently said also that it was his understanding that text of report had been sent to Delhi so that Nehru might authorize its signature in Saigon. An felt it would be useful to obtain approval of report first from Indians so that ICC could use conclusions as basis for taking up additional subversion charges. (We found some of this obscure, although general sense is discernible. Mendenhall could not repeat not elucidate.)

4. Mendenhall suggested that best tactics might be to focus initially on adoption of report by Commission, and try for publication later on. On basis of your telegram Y-290† April 15 we said you had already reached this conclusion.

34.

Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/1.2

No. 183
Saigon, May 4, 1964
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Reference: Tel 345 Apr 1 from Delhi and Your Tel Y-270 Apr 6.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, Geneva, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS, DGPO, DM/DND from CCOS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

We have studied with considerable interest your exchange of views with Delhi as outlined in reference telegrams, and since the direction in which our thoughts have been moving are already well-known to you from earlier reports, I have not repeat not hastened to comment before now in order to allow further time for reflection and assimilation of ideas. In reviewing

the entire field of Commission activities and, indeed, what has already been said about the future of the Commission especially in light of recent indications of thinking in Ottawa and Delhi, I am not repeat not inclined to change the pessimistic conclusions I had come to earlier, although I can see the need for some clarification in certain respects and the presentation of more detailed "evidence" of the reasons for our dissatisfaction, and to this end the following paragraphs may be of interest.

2. Apart from the usefulness in another context to Canada and our friends of a Canadian presence in Vietnam particularly in the North, from a more limited point of view I believe that the continuation of the Commission could serve two main purposes: first, a substantive one in terms of the obligations we have assumed under [the] Geneva Agreement; and second the tranquilizing and stabilizing effect which the very presence of the Commission may have in discouraging a resumption of open warfare. As Mr. Ronning has pointed out in paragraph 6 of his reference telegram, these two factors are inextricably combined in that "effective action by Commissions is important to preserve prestige which makes their presence effective and that lack of effective action undermines value of Commissions' presence". As I see it, this is the very crux of our problem with Indians and their present policy of immobility.

3. Let me deal with the substantive question first, because this ground has been well covered already. It seems to me that the Commission's treatment of Northern subversion is a matter of some significance for several reasons. First, because it represents an infraction of Geneva Agreement; second, if Commission does not repeat not say anything about it these charges as *ex parte* statements will be dismissed or downgraded as USA/SVN propaganda, while press every day publishes evidence, which can scarcely be questioned, of USA/SVN infractions of the Agreement. (British Prime Minister's statement of April 28[21] notwithstanding, Commission in the Special Report of June 2/62 has already cited USA/SVN breaches of Articles 16 and 17.) Finally, to the best of my knowledge, this will be first time that a concept (or phenomenon) such as subversion has been subjected to examination and analysis of this sort and the precedents established by Commission's Legal Committee may well have a relevance elsewhere in future Communist efforts to overthrow non-Communist governments from within. The Special Report made a clear and unequivocal commitment to produce this document and I believe that it must be honoured, and honoured in a way which will not repeat not discredit the report itself. It is now almost two years since "appropriate action" was promised and we seem very little closer to living up to this commitment. If we take very many more months to process the Legal Committee's "full report" I believe that its presentation in any context wider than Commission itself will produce little more than a smile of indulgence. The question I should like to ask Indians figuratively if not repeat not literally is how long do we have to wait and what are we waiting for? If we have Gundevia's assurance that the report will be "processed" regardless the consequences, I am at a loss to understand what is taking so long. In meantime we have allowed ourselves, by insisting on the importance of the Legal Report, to be drawn into the "do-nothing" doldrums of the more important question of evidence of continuing subversion (new cases) and nine months went by without any more current relevance than the material on which the Legal Report is based. The Legal Committee held its first meeting on April 6 to begin the examination requested of it on July 10/63 of new cases referred to it and the prospects for early action are not repeat not very bright. The fact remains that politico-military activities of grave significance in violation of the Geneva Agreement, and (of?) no repeat no small significance to peace and stability in this area, are continuing in Vietnam. Under Article 28 of Geneva Agreement responsibility for execution of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities is assigned to the parties – a point which Goburdhun frequently dwelt on in justifying a "do-nothing"

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[21] See/Voir United Kingdom, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 28 April 1964, vol. 694, col. 200, "South Viet-Nam".

policy. But surely Indians must be aware that Articles 29 and 26 invest Commission with the task of keeping an eye on the way in [which] the parties execute the Agreement; [this] is a responsibility which cannot repeat not be shrugged off glibly by saying that we have no repeat no authority to enforce the Agreement. If the Agreement is being broken and if Commission as a whole, no repeat no less than its Canadian component, is to have any credibility here and now, as well as possibly elsewhere in the future, there is a clear obligation not repeat not to ignore these facts even if both parties must be cited in the process – in this connection it would be obvious that a "balanced" report such as Special Report will bear much more heavily on the North than on the South whose "sins of commission" are front page news everyday around the world. In other words, activity of moment and consequence is taking place in Vietnam and the Commission has said not repeat not one word about it for almost two years. I cannot repeat not emphasize too strongly my conviction that this situation is inconsistent with the concept of the Commission's impartiality; not repeat not to act when action is clearly called for is, I believe, an extremely dangerous precedent to set for an organization such as this – an argument which might make some impression on Indian policy-makers. As far as I could learn from Goburdhun, Indians seem to believe that "the last word" was said in Special Report and that Commission's responsibility has been discharged for all time in presenting that document, since the local situation has not repeat not changed in kind since then. It has of course changed – it has become more serious.

4. With regard to Commission's prestige and our own national self-respect as a participating power, my concern is not repeat not with activity for activity's sake simply to make it look as if we are doing something worthwhile. I am deeply concerned by the implications for Canadian policy and commitments elsewhere of perpetuating the presence of a large group of personnel in Vietnam to do nothing when activity is called for in terms of the obligation we have accepted under Geneva Agreement (see Article 29 in its pristine simplicity) no repeat no less than making contribution to the cause of our friends. To follow a course of inactivity in these circumstances simply through acquiescence in India's assessment of her own self-interests is to my mind to put ourselves in potentially embarrassing situation. To set the record straight simply to derive some small measure of petulant satisfaction from the act is definitely not repeat not what I have in mind. I am interested in undertaking some kind of purposeful activity within the Commission because we have assumed a responsibility to do so in the face of a real and continuing requirement and because continued inactivity in these circumstances could be difficult to justify in Canada no repeat no less than to our friends.

5. In order to get things moving again I do not repeat not anticipate that a break with Indians would be necessary nor would we be forced to admit that our objectives are fundamentally different since I do not repeat not believe that this is true. It seems to me that there is some intermediate position between such extreme action and total passivity. Partly shaken by their treatment at the hands of Chinese I believe that Indians have been trading very heavily on Western sympathies and what they know to be Western susceptibilities. This, however, is another matter, but it is germane to increasing difficulties I have in explaining to myself and to others why ICC in Vietnam has been almost totally stalled for two years.

6. As I have reported earlier it is not repeat not only Indians' "do-nothing" posture on the political plane which has become intolerable; the day-to-day operations of the Secretariat have become almost an absurdity. How much of this is a reflection of "do-nothing" instructions and how much was a function of Goburdhun's own personality and pre-departure attitude, I do not repeat not know. In any event, something must be done to change this as you will appreciate from the following examples.

7. (a) Only after repeated oral requests and on written request from me to the Chairman, have we, just a few days ago, received the draft minutes of the 664th meeting of the Commission which was held six months ago on October 29. (b) More recently we have become involved in the question of the record of decisions of the 665th meeting being altered

at Polish Commissioner's request, one month after the original decisions had been circulated, without any explanation being given as to why this amendment was considered necessary. The Secretariat maintains that the amendment was made on the authority of the Secretary General – a power which I do not repeat not believe he can arrogate to himself and I am still trying to work out a means of setting the record straight without embarrassment. (c) On February 24 the Chairman of the Commission in Cambodia wrote to his counterpart in Vietnam in connection with the Mong incident.[22] We were never informed by Goburdhun that this letter had arrived nor were we consulted about it. When we raised matter on two or three occasions our enquiries were dismissed with a promise to look into the matter and it was not repeat not until April 1, the day of Goburdhun's departure, that the Deputy Secretary General (Administration) replied to the Chairman of Cambodia Commission. Text of this letter has been forwarded to you by telegram and copies of the attachments have been distributed by bag. (d) Then there was the incident of the attack on the Commission courier to Vung Tau on February 10 and the question of expressing official regret and sympathy. A decision to this effect was taken at the Commission's 665th meeting on February 24. The letter to the widow was evidently not repeat not dispatched until March 25 and after repeated prompting on our part, including a written request to this effect, it took another month for copies of these two letters to be referred to us. (e) Recently there have been a number of incidents in North Vietnam which look like harassment of Canadians; this includes a special letter to the Commission concerning the behaviour of one particular team officer. The same officer had been the subject of a PAVN complaint last November, at which time I wrote to the Secretary General asking him to protest to PAVN and reject the unfounded charges they had put forward. When this second complaint was received about the same officer, we looked into the fate of the earlier complaint and found that Goburdhun had ensured that no repeat no action would be taken on it. We were not repeat not informed of this decision. (f) Finally, you (as much as we) will be aware of the totally unsatisfactory nature of our communications arrangements. We had believed, however, that Indian inertia had applied only to some of our longer political telegrams, but a few days ago we were given an example indicating otherwise. A delegation telegram addressed to Qui Nhon on April 7 was signed for by Indian signals centre on that day. The centre now admit that it was never sent and they cannot repeat not even find it in their files.

8. This I think is an adequate sampling of the type of difficulty being forced on us. Frustration is not repeat not a strong enough word. I need hardly point out that in all cases we have attempted at least once and sometimes repeatedly to rectify these problems through our own resources. But I believe we are having no repeat no success whatever because most or all of these episodes are in some way related to a policy laid down in Delhi. My preliminary impressions of the new Chairman are favourable, and it remains to be seen how much of our "present discontents" were due to Goburdhun's particular elaborations on a policy theme established at a higher level. But even if a saintly and martyr-like acceptance of these difficulties were possible, I wonder what this attitude of resignation gains for us. Certainly nothing with Indians who are more likely to be complimenting themselves on being able to get around blue-eyed Canadian innocence. Continued acquiescence in their programme of inactivity in Vietnam in my view does nothing to elevate their estimation of our effectiveness as friends. Similarly, our reputation locally is either surrounded by question marks or else dismissed as insignificant. French pay no repeat no attention whatsoever to the Commission and its operations. British deal with it cursorily and on occasion have felt competent to make recommendations on Commission future without even checking with us.

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[22] See/Voir Seth S. King, "Cambodian Chief Denounces U.S. Over an Air Raid: Accusation Follows Alleged Bombing of a Village by South Vietnam Planes," *New York Times*, 12 February 1964, p. 1; "Bombing of Village in Cambodia Denied," *New York Times*, 15 February 1964, p. 3.

Americans have one officer – a second secretary – who attempts to follow Commission business intelligently but his assessment of the significance of our operations is no repeat no secret. (Fact remains that we are perpetually defending something in which we do not repeat not believe.) This attitude is by no repeat no means limited to diplomats. Throughout the whole Cambodian border crisis when numerous suggestions were made about policing or controlling border area not repeat not one newspaper and not repeat not one politician mentioned Canada as a possible participant and indeed from our reports on the shooting-down of L-19 incident in March[23] you will be aware that Col. An attempted in the first instance to exclude a Canadian representative from the observation party.

9. Finally, the attitude of senior and prominent Vietnamese personalities is revealing. When asked how he views role of Commission in Vietnam, Prime Minister Khanh makes all the right kind of noises about job being done, but while he and his associates show signs of being disturbed or even alarmed by the significance of any suggestion concerning a complete withdrawal which might be put forward as a hypothetical possibility it takes no repeat no great powers of perception to realize that they attach no repeat no significance to Commission's operations and existence in its present form, about which they know little or nothing. Deputy Prime Minister Oanh had obviously never heard of Commission when I was first introduced to him a few weeks ago; although he has been out of the country for several years, this is scarcely an excuse for a senior Minister of the Government. The Commission does not repeat not figure very prominently in their thinking any more than it does with our friends and when they demonstrate reluctance to see the Commission go out of existence, they are saying little more than that they do not repeat not wish to see situation here complicated by politically significant act of withdrawal. Beyond that, Commission and its operations means little or nothing to them – a relatively minor comfort for our friends which is both unduly expensive and frustrating for us. Finally, our over-extended presence here unfortunately but understandably leads frequently to involvements in petty and discreditable activities which are fundamentally a product of frustration and immobility and at the same time detrimental to morale.

10. I am sorry that my contributions to this continuing dialogue are usually of this flavour but the foregoing will illustrate that we are facing extraordinary frustrations. Something must be done to influence Indians towards a more positive view of this undertaking and it seems to me that nothing much can be accomplished here without a change in thinking at the upper levels of Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If such a change proves impossible of achievement, I believe that we have only one course of action open to us and that is a drastic scaling down in numbers and in seniority of our personnel commitment to this Commission. This decision, however, is not repeat not one for immediate future. I believe that the new Chairman should be given a few months to show his hand and moreover I believe that my successor should have an opportunity to assess the situation for himself since if such a decision is made he will be called upon to participate in its implementation.

11. Some very drastic changes should be made in the organization and establishment of a mission such as this based on a ten-year period of experience and we are already making some progress in this. Although it is really another subject, it is mentioned here as relevant and as additional evidence of the timeliness of a review.

[Gordon] Cox

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[23] See/Voir "Cambodians May Have Downed GI," *Washington Post*, 21 March 1964, p. A1.

35.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9486, 17-1-1/6

No. 239
Saigon, June 4, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Permis New York, CCOS, CGS, DGPO, DM/DND.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Jakarta (from London); Vientiane, Phnom Penh (from Saigon).

COMMISSION PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES: NEXT INTERIM REPORT

Rahman has now had about two months to settle into Chairman's job and to indicate his approach to the larger Commission problems, chief of which will be next Interim Report.

2. I would guess that, contrary to the comments made to me by Gundevia when I was in Delhi last October, the Indians are becoming concerned that it is now over three years since Commission has forwarded an Interim Report to Co-Chairman and two years since the Special Report. In any event, Rahman is showing more than the perfunctory interest in this project that was shown by his predecessor and on several occasions he has sounded me out on our views as to what the next Interim Report might contain. In order to speed matters up he has suggested the Commission establish a drafting committee of Senior Political Advisers of each delegation to review what the Commission has done since February 28, 1961 and to urge other committees seized of substantive problems to get on with their work and report to the Commission.

3. On the general problem of what the next Interim Report should contain I went over with Rahman the same ground as I had covered with Goburdhun, emphasizing the requirement for a report with political substance and that by substance I meant action on the Legal Report, at least preliminary action and findings on the "new cases" and a citation of DRVN on the gunboats issue[24]; I presumed that there would also have to be a reference to the War Materials Committee's findings on PAVN charges of arms and military personnel imports into the South. I explained to Rahman that I could see no good reason why all these matters could not be dealt with by the Commission within the space of one week. To take only one example: the two problems before War Materials Committee (i.e., the PAVN gunboats and imports into the South) could be reported on at any time and all further consideration of these matters was simply polishing the point of a pin. I also expressed some surprise at the length of time Delhi was taking to deal with the redrafted Legal Report. Rahman pretended that Indian approval was a foregone conclusion and that he was prepared to press ahead on this basis. I explained that I favoured a more cautious procedure and that I would prefer to wait until he had received clear instructions from Delhi so that the report could be piloted step by step through Commission machinery and decisions made as to how the final use to be made of this material.

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[24] See/Voir doc. 78.

4. I took an even firmer line in reply to Chairman's suggestion about establishing a drafting committee at this time. All the committees now seized of substantive problems have been instructed to report by the Commission and it is difficult to see how a drafting committee could improve on or strengthen these instructions. Moreover, given our insistence on a report of substance, such a drafting committee, if established now, would have no material to work on since neither the Legal Committee nor the War Materials Committee has reported to the Commission. When these various reports are presented to the Commission as required, it will then be time for the Commission to establish a drafting committee and make appropriate referrals to it. In short, I can see no merit whatsoever in Rahman's proposal for a drafting committee at this point since it could result in nothing but undesirable compromises on the contents of next Interim Report.

5. Rahman expressed the view that in future it might be desirable to forward to the Co-Chairmen less comprehensive Interim Reports and at shorter intervals. In other words, there might be two or three reports each year. I expressed the personal view that this idea might have some merit and that it was worthy of serious consideration but that I could not agree to adopting such a policy until the record since February 1961 had been brought up to date and that after the 12th Interim Report had been drafted and forwarded would be suitable occasion to consider future reporting policy.

6. Most recently Rahman tried out on me the possibility of a Special Report to the Co-Chairmen based on a communication from Hanoi protesting USA announcements of intention to send Skyraiders to South Vietnam. He argued that this problem had a special urgency because it represented an intention to break the Geneva Agreement rather than a "*fait accompli*". My astonishment at this suggestion, especially in light of our earlier conversations about reporting to the Co-Chairmen, was in no way reduced by Rahman's suggestion that the Commission's Skyraider Report would be quickly followed within a day or two by a further report based on a projected protest from the South Vietnamese Mission concerning statements emanating from China dealing with Chinese Government support for the insurgency in South Vietnam. (Rahman indicated that he had suggested to Col. An that such a protest be forwarded but as yet I have not seen it.) In arguing against this project I pointed out *inter alia* that this kind of presentation, if made now without the Commission having informed the Co-Chairmen of what had been happening in a wider context since our last report, would result in a badly distorted picture. I also reminded Rahman that another Asian nation – India – was importing U.S. military aircraft and while circumstances were not altogether comparable the responses of two countries to external threats and aggression represented in fact expressions of the same national right of self-defence. I concluded by stating in no circumstances could I support his suggestions and that if the Commission went ahead with them on a majority basis, I would have no alternative but to present a strong dissenting statement of Canadian position. I doubt whether Rahman will follow up on this proposal and I find it hard to believe that he put it forward altogether seriously.

7. It remains to be seen whether developments over the next few months will confirm this but I have the impression that Rahman's policy is to make it appear that the Commission is doing something without in fact taking any significant action which requires a commitment or a judgment by the Commission. It will be noted that even the alarming project mentioned in the preceding paragraph was to consist of forwarding communications from both sides to the Co-Chairmen. Such irresponsible action would doubtless involve a certain amount of political drama and it might focus international limelight on the Commission momentarily but this would be done without the Commission having taken any stand or saying anything of significance.

36.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. Y-466
Ottawa, June 17, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 390 Apr 13 and Saigon Tel 239 Jun 4.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, CCOS; Phnom Penh from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Hanoi, Vientiane from London.

VIETNAM CAMBODIA LEGAL COMMITTEE REPORT AND NEW CASES

Indians have not repeat not shown since your reference telegram that they are in fact disposed to take action on Legal Committee Report or new cases. So far as we are aware, no repeat no progress of any sort has been made on Legal Committee Report, while we have not repeat not been informed by Saigon that any major progress has been made on new cases. We have therefore to assume that Jha's apparent reasonableness in April was an attempt to stall us off once again.

2. Conclusion of Saigon telegram 239 does not repeat not give us any grounds for optimism that Rahman's appointment will be signal for improvement over Goburdhun's performance. At same time, Rahman at least was willing to consider ways in which action by Commission might prove useful and we would not repeat not have rejected out of hand his expressed willingness to press ahead with Legal Report or his suggestion for drafting committee.

[3.] We should be grateful if you would call on Jha again, saying you understood Rahman was considering starting work on the Interim Report. You should say we welcome this intention, but continue to believe that action should first be taken on outstanding issues. We are concerned that Commission's inactivity over the last two years has seriously weakened its prestige, as demonstrated by positions taken by the USA and Vietnam during Security Council debate, the more so as this reflects on whole principle of international peace-keeping.[25]

4. Since Jha may well try to turn your démarche with usual plea of being ill-briefed, you should indicate your desire to be received by him in near future to hear his reaction.

5. You will of course find useful attachment to Saigon's letter 205† June 10 if discussion turns to question of Vietnamese attitude.

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[25] See United Nations, *Security Council Official Records*, Nineteenth Year, 1119th Meeting, 21 May 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1119(OR), pp. 5–15; 1121st Meeting, 25 May 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1121(OR), pp. 2–10; 1122nd Meeting, 26 May 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1122(OR), pp. 1–6; 1124th Meeting, 28 May 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1124(OR), pp. 1–10; 1125th Meeting, 3 June 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1125(OR), p. 11; 1126th Meeting, 4 June 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1126(OR), pp. 9–12, https://docs.un.org.
Voir Nations Unies, *Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité*, dix-neuvième année, 1119e réunion, 21 mai 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1119(OR), p. 5-15; 1121e réunion, 25 mai 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1121(OR), p. 2-10; 1122e réunion, 26 mai 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1122(OR), p. 1-6; 1124e réunion, 28 mai 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1124(OR), p. 1-10; 1125e réunion, 3 juin 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1125(OR), p. 11; 1126e réunion, 4 juin 1964, UN Doc. S/PV.1126(OR), p. 9-12, https://docs.un.org.

37.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10609, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-1/1

No. 295
Saigon, June 26, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel Y-466 Jun 17 to Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Washington, Permis New York, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS, DGPO, DM/DND from CCOS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Hanoi, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: LEGAL REPORT AND NEW CASES

We were pleased to learn from your reference telegram that our dialogue with Indians about the fate of Legal Report is being revived. If, as I suspect, Indians may again attempt to use delaying tactics I would hope that we might be prepared to counter such tactics with persistent and periodic (for example, weekly) enquiries, making it clear that we are not repeat not prepared to be put off any longer with inconclusive answers and that we believe that there is no repeat no further obstacle, large or small, hindering the progress of the Legal Report.

2. You will have noted with the same interest as ourselves the possible implications for the Commission of the recent enquiry in British House of Commons[26] (London telegrams 2116† June 19 and 2163† June 23). The fact that the Commission has not repeat not reported in any way for over two years (and the period is even longer if a formal Interim Report is the criterion) is gradually being realized by interested parties and although Warbey is scarcely the most responsible of observers, his enquiry may touch off interest among more reputable circles. This possibility, together with the positions taken publicly at the UN by USA and Vietnam concerning the Commission, puts us in an increasingly awkward position. Probably never since 1954 has so much public interest been centered on Indochina as over the past year, and never has the Commission been so lethargic and tongue-tied. The possibility that there may be further questions about the Commission's next report and even a formal request for one, might be a useful argument to put to Indians in Delhi.

3. I endorse the view that we must work towards a report of some substance and resist what appears to be Indian desire to think in terms of non-controversial and non-consequential action. It was in this spirit that my predecessor's last formal conversation with Chairman took place (our telegram 239 June 4) from which I did not repeat not conclude that Canadian delegation has "rejected out of hand" any overtures from the new Chairman to make progress in the Commission's work. Least of all was there any rebuff to the idea of pressing ahead with the Legal Report – which would be impossible in any event since power of decision rests in Delhi, not repeat not with Rahman. When asked for some indication that drafting committee proposed by Chairman would be able to deal with some substantive results in connection with Legal Report since Delhi had not repeat not yet made up its mind, Chairman kept repeating that "they will just have to instruct me to go ahead with it". Such an assurance was evidently, and justifiably not repeat not considered adequate grounds for agreeing to establishment now of drafting committee which until material is available from other

[26] See/Voir United Kingdom, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 22 June 1964, vol. 697, col. 21W, "Vietnam (International Control Commission)".

committees would have nothing but trivia to work on. Proposal then for establishment of drafting committee was not repeat not "rejected out of hand" since it is clear that such a committee would be necessary in future; rather, lack of enthusiasm for proposal was essentially tactical and intended to demonstrate opposition to hollow and meaningless activity when real substance of Commission's work was gathering dust in Delhi filing cabinets.

38.
Telegram from Acting High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire par intérim en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. 768
Delhi, July 16, 1964
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-521† Jul 8.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Immediate).

VIETNAM: LEGAL COMMITTEE REPORT AND NEW CASES

I saw Jha July 16 for long discussion, with Alexander present (Jha had asked me to await Alexander's return from tour). Upshot was Jha's statement that he agreed in principle that Commission should do what it had undertaken to do in paragraph 10 of Special Report but that in view of long delay and development of events in Vietnam, he would want to consult Indel Saigon about implications of taking action now on Legal Committee Report. Jha seemed to have in mind that tempo and severity of incidents in South had increased and that action on two-year-old report might seem incongruous. He also said North must have complaints. I pointed out that report would not repeat not be only matter in next Interim Report and that I was sure we would be all in favour of including as much evidence as possible of Commission activity on more current matters.

2. Alexander, apart from stonewalling generally, seemed anxious to extract statement that Canada did not repeat not want Interim Report. I said on contrary we wanted Interim Report, that it should show Commission action on outstanding issues and that of these Legal Committee Report and citation of DRVN regarding gun boats were to all intents and purposes finished business and could rapidly be processed by Commission. Alexander said Poldel would have to be given adequate time to consider draft Legal Committee Report. I challenged this on basis Poles had had opportunity to participate in substantive work of Legal Committee in dealing with cases covered by report and had no repeat no conceivable basis to cavil at purely routine record (i.e., report) of what had long been decided.

3. Jha again needed full explanation from Alexander and me as to whole history of subject and seemed genuinely at sea, commenting at one point that it seemed incredible piece of dilatoriness. Alexander's best contribution was to volunteer that present SVN Government wanted report processed.

4. I urged on Jha need for speed, pointing to adverse public comments on ICSC record. He promised nothing except to seek Indel's views and have Alexander get in touch with me in due course. Apart from qualified agreement in principle, we have not repeat not much to go on but I suggest Saigon may wish to provide counter to or comment on Jha's point about impact of current ICSC action on report and Alexander's about Pole requiring time to consider report. You may also wish to be considering possibility of high-level message to Indians if all else fails.

[E.R.] Rettie

39.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India and Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde et à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

No. Y-553
Ottawa, July 21, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Delhi Tel 768 July 16.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Permis New York (Routine).
By Bag: Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Kuala Lumpur, Moscow, Warsaw.

LEGAL COMMITTEE REPORT AND NEW CASES

Report of your interview with Jha is hardly encouraging. We fully agree with points you made, especially one regarding opportunity to be given Poldel to consider draft report. Opportunity to participate in actual drafting of report was turned down by Poles themselves. Request now for opportunity to consider report would be obvious attempt to waste time.

2. We have noticed your suggestion regarding high-level message to Indians if all else fails. Saigon may wish to comment. Our preliminary view is that we should first see whether encouraging signs noted recently by Seaborn are followed by useful action in Commission. If not, we would be favourably disposed to your suggestion and would welcome now your and Saigon's comments on: a) level of message; b) points it might contain.

40.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2/2.1

No. 394
Saigon, August 5, 1964
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS, DGPO, DM/DND from CCOS.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Wellington, Jakarta, Canberra, Kuala Lumpur from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

DRVN ATTACK ON AMERICAN VESSELS IN GULF OF TONKIN

During formal call on Ambassador Taylor August 4, he said he had received instructions from Washington that morning to request ICC to convey formal protest of USA to DRVN concerning attack on *Maddox*.[27] Embassy had replied that ICC might not repeat not be suitable channel and request could put Indian and Canadian representatives in awkward position. Ambassador asked for my reaction.

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[27] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 270.

2. I told him I did not repeat not offhand know of precedent for ICC acting formally as channel for protest, other than protests and allegations by SVN and DRVN one against the other. USA request might pose awkward technical problem. It might be particularly embarrassing to Indian Chairman. I was afraid that if matter was referred to ICC it could lead to lengthy discussion in Commission and even if agreed to could lead to sharp reaction by DRVN against ICC as having acted improperly. If USA could find other channel it might be preferable. Taylor said that was Embassy's own tentative conclusion.

3. Though I have not repeat not so informed USA Embassy, I broached question confidentially with Rahman this morning and his reaction was same as mine. I therefore phoned Sullivan USA Embassy back to say I had given matter further thought but still did not repeat not see how ICC could serve useful function in this regard. Sullivan said question of formal protest now had probably been overtaken by events of previous night as there had been further attack by PT boats of DRVN on American vessels and President Johnson had given orders that PT boats were to be pursued wherever they might be. Sullivan said he was afraid that this would lead to contravention of Geneva Agreement but situation was of such seriousness that this could not repeat not be allowed to block effective American action.

4. Incidentally, one newspaper here reported August 4 that ICC had already been requested to transmit protest note. This is of course not repeat not true and I think it is unlikely that we shall be so requested.

[J.B.] Seaborn

41.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10617, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4-3

No. 400
Saigon, August 7, 1964
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 392† Aug 5.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, NATO Paris, Permis New York, CCOS from Ottawa; CGS, DGPO, DM/DND from CCOS.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: 95TH INFORMAL MEETING AUGUST 6

Meeting was held immediately following 667th formal meeting. Agenda consisted of discussion of Legal Committee opinions on investigation of western part of DZ South and whether two members of ICC team can undertake a formal investigation. Since it had been agreed at formal meeting earlier in morning that these opinions would be discussed at 668th formal meeting in Hanoi next week, it was decided that it was not repeat not necessary to discuss them further before then.

2. Chairman then referred to reports of developments in Gulf of Tonkin which had led to "emergency situation". Polish Commissioner did not repeat not make propaganda statement which might have been expected but proposed that Commission get in touch with PAVN and pledge immediate cooperation if required. He contended that if Commission did not repeat

not take some action, it might be accused of not repeat not meeting its responsibilities. I stressed that main considerations should be attraction or otherwise of Geneva Agreement and whether Commission could make useful contribution in present situation. After some discussion we agreed that following message should be sent to PAVN Liaison Mission: "ICSC presents its compliments to Liaison Mission of PAVN and has honour to refer to reports of serious events involving armed attacks in Bay of Tonkin and territory of DRVN. In expressing its concern at these developments and in order to contribute to lessening tension, ICSC wishes to communicate its immediate readiness to give all possible assistance within its powers and in light of any info which PAVN Liaison Mission may wish to furnish."

3. I agreed to message since I felt that Commission must react in some way to events of last few days and that most innocuous reaction from our point of view would be to ask for info from PAVN and assert that Commission was prepared to act within limits of its responsibilities. We have informed USA and British Embassies informally of this action taken by ICSC and both agreed that it need cause them no repeat no embarrassment.

4. Quick examination of Geneva Agreements seems to reveal that there is nothing in Agreements concerning attack on one of parties by a third party. Rahman told me informally before August 6 meeting that it might be argued that *de facto* alliance existed between RVN and USA, that USA acted as agents for RVN and that Geneva Agreements were therefore attracted. He admitted that this was pretty shaky ground. Polish Commissioner did not repeat not bring up this point or refer to Commission's responsibilities under Geneva Agreements. As point may arise in future discussion, I would appreciate your views.

5. Rahman asked whether Co-Chairmen and other signatories of Geneva Agreements or alternatively countries represented at 1954 Geneva Conference (which would include USA) should be informed of Commission action. I wondered whether letter similar to that to be sent to PAVN should be sent to USA as other party to dispute. I suggested if Commission decided to inform Co-Chairmen it might recommend to them that they transmit message to USA. After lengthy discussion there was general feeling that Commission was in danger of exceeding its authority and arrogating to itself powers which it did not repeat not have under Geneva Agreements if it assumed good offices role. It was eventually decided that before Commission took further action it should wait for reply from PAVN. In light of discussion, grateful for your views on how Commission could pass message to USA or to any other third power if this was felt necessary and also your views on competence of Commission to offer services in good offices role.

42.

Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam

Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam

RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2/2.2

No. Y-608
Ottawa, August 13, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel 400 Aug 7.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Permis New York, Geneva, CDS.
By Bag: Tokyo from Ottawa; Warsaw, Moscow, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from London.

GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENTS: COMMISSION ACTION

My telegram Y-605† was drafted before receipt of your reference telegram. Object of Y-605 was to react to what we feared might be over-negative Indian position. From your report of Commission action (received in Comcentre August 11), I would judge that this problem no repeat no longer arises.

2. I agree that Commission would have found it difficult to remain silent in face of events and believe actual wording of message to be acceptable. In event that North Vietnamese reply is positive, following are our comments on points you raised:

a) On reflection, we also agree that any argument for Commission action based on *de facto* alliance between USA and South Vietnam is shaky and should not repeat not be used.

b) We think that message to Co-Chairman or to Geneva powers would not repeat not be appropriate until Commission had something specific to report; a report of good intentions would hardly seem necessary.

c) Commission should not repeat not take further action especially to seek to communicate with USA through Co-Chairmen or any other means until North Vietnam's reaction to Commission's offer is received.

d) We would in principle be prepared to see Commission perform good offices role if this was agreeable to both parties and if North Vietnamese reply did not repeat not pose unacceptable conditions. Such action would presumably have to be taken outside Cease-Fire Agreement.

e) If it is ever decided on all sides that good offices role outside CFA is desirable, passing of message to USA should not repeat not present insurmountable technical problem. At first sight, it would seem that note from Commission to USA Embassy in Saigon would be most convenient channel.

3. Above represent our comments directed to specific enquiries of your reference telegram. At present time it is not repeat not clear whether any scope exists for useful good offices role except perhaps in limited way in such matters as negotiation for release of USA pilot.

4. As general guide, we should seek to ensure that any Commission consideration of the matter should not repeat not be limited to bombardment of North Vietnam naval installation but should be as broad as possible and include:

a) Prior North Vietnamese attacks in Gulf of Tonkin (this point would seem to be covered by Commission message to North Vietnamese).

b) Total situation which has led to USA involvement in Vietnam War along lines of Special Report.

[Paul] Martin

43.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/1

Confidential.

[Ottawa,] August 20, 1964

GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENTS – COMMISSION ACTION

Attached is a further telegram of instructions[28] to Mr. Seaborn in Saigon on the handling of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in the Vietnam Commission.[29]

2. You will recall that instructions were sent on two occasions to the Canadian delegation in Saigon on this subject. These instructions were: a) that the Canadian delegation should agree to investigate any North Vietnamese charge on condition that the charges themselves made out a prima facie case for the attraction of the Cease Fire Agreement, and b) that we would be prepared, if certain conditions were first met, to see the Commission undertake some sort of good office role in the crisis if called upon to do so. Copies of the relevant telegrams – Y-605 of August 13 and Y-608 of August 13 – are attached for ease of reference.

3. The matter has in fact been raised in a completely different way by the Polish delegate. (Telegram 438† of August 19 from Saigon attached.) The Pole has neither urged a good offices role for the Commission (which might have indicated a desire to contribute to the lessening of tension) nor has he urged a thorough Commission investigation of the incidents under a specific article of the Cease Fire Agreement. What he has proposed is that the Commission should bring the North Vietnamese complaints to the attention of the member states of the Geneva Conference for their consideration. He has argued that the Commission should take action not under the Cease Fire Agreement, but under the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.[30] This was the declaration of principles made by the members of the Geneva Conference of 1954, with the exception of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam which refused to associate themselves with it.

4. The tactics of the Polish Commissioner are clear. He does not want a thorough Commission investigation for two reasons: a) an investigation would bring out the embarrassing North Vietnamese possession of PT boats and anti-aircraft guns in contravention of the Cease Fire Agreement; b) an investigation under the Cease Fire Agreement would tend to sanction similar investigations of Northern subversion in South Vietnam whose legality the North Vietnamese and the Poles have always attempted to deny. A simple message to the Co-Chairmen and the members of the Geneva Conference transmitting the North Vietnamese claim without thorough investigation would, on the other hand, achieve the purpose of appearing to give Commission support to the charges.

5. The Polish position is irresponsible and politically impossible for us to accept. It is also legally shaky since in our view the Commission derives its authority from the Cease Fire Agreement alone and not from the Final Declaration. Commission action must therefore be based on the Cease Fire Agreement and the Polish Commissioner's attempt to bypass the Cease Fire Agreement is legally inadmissible.

6. The attached telegram to Seaborn instructs him to agree to a Commission investigation of any North Vietnamese allegation which makes out a prima facie case for Commission involvement, but to resist the Polish argument claiming the necessity for Commission action under the Final Declaration alone and to resist moves for messages to the Co-Chairmen unsupported by Commission action. The telegram is drafted in fairly strong terms because the Pole has resorted to the tactic of threatening to "reconsider continued Polish participation

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28 See next document./Voir le document suivant.

29 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Telegram approved and sent 3:30 p.m. Aug. 20/64 J.G. H[adwen] O/SSEA

30 See/Voir Canada, Department of External Affairs, "International Supervisory Commissions for Indochina, Basic Documents, July 20, 1954," Supplementary Paper No. 54/22.

in International Control Commission work if he fails to get satisfaction". This is a form of blackmail which the Poles have already used effectively in the Laos Commission; I think it should be strongly resisted.

7. Seaborn requires instructions before Saturday, Saigon time (tomorrow evening, Ottawa time).

M[arcel] C[adieux]

44.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10617, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4-3

No. Y-619
Ottawa, August 20, 1964
Confidential. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tel 438 Aug 19.
Repeat for Information: Delhi (OpImmediate); London, Washington, Paris, CDS (Routine).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Phnom Penh, Vientiane.

VIETNAM ICC FINAL DECLARATION

Following legal opinion has been prepared: "The Polish present contention is that the Commission is also responsible for the enforcement of provisions of the declarations, substance of which is not repeat not embodied in Agreement itself. For us to agree with this Polish contention would in our view create dangerous precedent for future role of Commission especially as regards its possible involvement in political settlements in Indochina and be inconsistent with position which we have taken in this regard until now. In summary the position has been that the role of ICSC is limited to supervising execution of the Agreements by the parties. This we have consistently interpreted to mean that the Commission will have due regard for the terms of the declarations insofar as these declarations have direct bearing on Agreements themselves. Otherwise Commissions are not repeat not responsible for supervising execution of content of various declarations.

2. Quite apart from fact that USA has expressly disassociated itself from Conference's Declaration at Geneva and made a declaration of its own the Commission is not repeat not responsible for supervising enforcement of paragraph 12 of the Declaration since the undertaking this paragraph expresses is not embodied in the Agreement itself and cannot be interpreted as being an expansion on a provision in the Agreement which the Commission is mandated to supervise. Paragraph 5 of the Declaration on other hand expands on a definite obligation imposed on the parties in the body of the Agreement (Articles 18 and 19) and consequently any allegations that one of the two parties has contravened the provisions to which paragraph 5 of the Declaration refers would attract the Agreement and consequently fall under responsibility of the Commission".

3. You should agree to Commission investigation of any North Vietnamese allegation which makes out *prima facie* case for Commission involvement. You should resist Polish arguments for action under Final Declaration alone and resist any move for messages to Co-Chairmen unsupported by Commission action. You should counter any further threats by Pole to reconsider participation in ICC work with statement that action of sort proposed by Pole outside the CFA and for patently propaganda purposes would finally destroy Commission's authority and would lead me in my turn to reconsider whether continued

Canadian attempts to make Commission workable could be justified. In this connection you should remind him of Canadian (and Indian) willingness to accept a useful good offices role and to investigate thoroughly North Vietnamese charges as required by CFA.

[Paul] Martin

45.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10617, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4-3

No. Y-649
Ottawa, September 2, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tels 460† of Aug 28 and 470† of Aug 29.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Tokyo, Geneva, CDS (OpImmediate).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Phnom Penh, Vientiane.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: FINAL DECLARATION

Your reference telegrams being repeated Tokyo. Presume September 5 formal meeting now postponed until your return Saigon.

2. We are in full agreement with line you have argued in recent Commission meetings on Gulf of Tonkin incidents, on Commission's lack of competence under Final Declaration and on question of Special Report to Co-Chairman dealing with Tonkin incidents alone. Special Report from Commission at this particular time dealing with any given problem out of context, whether the Commission is competent or not (and fact that we believe it is not competent throws this difficulty into sharp relief) would, we agree, tend to focus attention on only one aspect of situation without Commission having provided more complete and balanced background by way of follow up to Eleventh Interim and Special reports. Position you took at 98th meeting (paragraph 2 your telegram 470) is one which we believe deserves reiteration as frequently as possible with emphasis on the fact the Commission's prolonged inactivity with respect to reporting to Co-Chairman now makes it impossible for Commission to act promptly in this regard without presenting a distorted and out of context picture. Indian argument that Commission can scarcely overlook an episode of the significance of Gulf of Tonkin incidents was precisely line argued by Chairman in floating his proposal a few months ago that special notification be sent by Commission to Co-Chairman on introduction of U.S. Sky Raiders into South Vietnam. That allegation seemed to have, from legal point of view, a more direct relevance for Geneva Agreement than Gulf of Tonkin incidents, more serious though the latter may be, and yet Commission took no specific action, evidently because Chairman was convinced by Canadian arguments based on views as outlined above. Moreover, and perhaps a more cogent argument in current discussions, Commission has never reported on PAVN gunboats. Chairman might be reminded that any urgency in present situation demands immediate action in form of fuller report. Commission's credibility suffers not from lack of specific pronouncements on specific developments but from total silence since June 2, 1962, on broad range of problems in Vietnam which are of concern to Commission. Commission's efforts should now be directed as top priority to preparation of next Interim Report which could include paragraph on Gulf of Tonkin incidents and views of delegations on Commission's competence with respect to Final Declaration; but it would also give due weight to subversion.

3. For your own information, we might also note our concern that the course of future developments in Vietnam situation might produce an increasing number of episodes about which Polish Delegation would demand special reports to the Co-Chairman on actions taken by our friends. Thus, quite apart from substantive legal consideration of Commission competence in present circumstances, we are not anxious to set precedent of special report dealing with one episode.

4. We are hopeful therefore that as you report, proposal for Special Message or report to Co-Chairman may now be allowed to fade away, a process which you may be able to encourage further. As you have suggested, Polish Commissioner's objectives may have been served by pushing discussion to the limit and putting his views on record probably for Hanoi's benefit. If this proves to be the case, we wonder whether vote now on Commission's competence under Final Declaration, although it might be useful to dispose of this problem once and for all, might not tend to provoke Polish insistence on minority message to Co-Chairman with which Indian would then feel obliged to co-operate. Even a strong minority Canadian statement in such circumstances would be less desirable than no report at all.

5. If, however, Poles, with Indian support, seem determined to report to Co-Chairman, we believe that it might then be useful to press for vote on legal status of Final Declaration as you have suggested in order to set record straight and perhaps also to dampen their enthusiasm. On other hand, if there is to be no repeat no Special Message and if there is any possibility of convincing the Indians of the need for an early Interim Report which would record recent discussion of Tonkin incidents including positions of delegations, I do not see any serious danger of our position being eroded since Indians clearly share our view of Commission competence. By avoiding "showdown" at present moment, we would not have to put ourselves in a weaker position if and when problem of Final Declaration should arise again in a context which is not related to Special Report to the Co-Chairman.

6. I think decision to press or not to press for vote on Commission competence vis-à-vis Final Declaration should be dependent on tactical considerations of which you are best judge, bearing in mind views outlined above. You may therefore proceed as you see best. If Poles and Indians proceed with plans for Special Message and you call for formal vote on competence, grateful for text of draft for comment as soon as possible.

46.

Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/1.2

No. 491
Saigon, September 9, 1964
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: My Tel 470 Aug 28 and Your Tel Y-649 Sep 2.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Paris, Geneva, Washington, CDS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hanoi from Saigon.

VIETNAM ICC: FINAL DECLARATION AND GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENTS

Thank you for guidance in your reference telegram which will be very helpful in continuing discussion.

2. Poldel has now circulated draft message to Co-Chairmen. It is very brief and says little more than that Commission has spent a number of meetings examining Gulf of Tonkin incidents but that difference of opinion has arisen concerning Commission competence

regarding USA military activity during those events. Space is left for each of three delegations to state its position on Final Declaration. Draft ends with statement that Commission decided to notify Co-Chairmen about situation.

3. On returning from Tokyo,[31] I discussed Polish draft with Rahman September 8. He said draft was so brief and general as to be all but useless. He had in mind message to Co-Chairmen which would (a) report series of PAVN complaints; (b) indicate those which *prima facie* attracted Geneva Agreement and action taken by Commission on them; (c) take note of any additional info on these complaints received from SVN and PAVN; and (d) discuss difference of opinion within Commission as to its competence to supervise Final Declaration and note this as reason for Commission's failure to take official action on remainder of PAVN complaints. Rahman is thinking of including in draft message reference to fact that PAVN had failed to comply with our request for investigation of alleged SVN/USA shelling of islands and that ICC had therefore been unable to confirm that such shelling had taken place. Apparently to balance this statement critical of DRVN, he would also think of making reference to fact that SVN had failed to reply to PAVN allegations about increase in USA military strength in SVN since Gulf of Tonkin incidents. He would propose stating that, although ICC had not repeat not carried out investigation, official declarations by USA and SVN had established beyond reasonable doubt that such increases in military personnel and equipment had taken place in SVN since Gulf of Tonkin incidents.

4. Using arguments in your reference telegram, I told Rahman I could see little value in message to Co-Chairmen and considerable disadvantage to it. We should therefore press on with Interim Report in which adequate space could be given to Gulf of Tonkin incidents and Commission competence. I said I would prefer no repeat no Special Message to Co-Chairman but if he and Polish Commissioner insisted then I would certainly want vote to be taken at next formal meeting on competence question. We agreed to discuss matter further at informal meeting of Commission as soon as Polish Commissioner returns from his trip this week to Hanoi.

5. Contrary to my impression as reported in my telegram 470 August 28, Polish Commissioner and perhaps to even greater extent Indian Commissioner are still hankering after Special Report to Co-Chairmen on Gulf of Tonkin incidents and Final Declaration question. I shall continue to argue that these questions should be included in Interim Report where other important items must also be dealt with; but if there is insistence on preparing Special Message to Co-Chairmen then I shall insist on putting Final Declaration and competence to vote at next formal meeting.

6. Following text of my draft resolution on question of competence: "Resolved that International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam derives its authority only from the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam signed at Geneva on July 12/54, and that the said Commission is neither empowered nor obliged to supervise execution of provisions of Final Declaration of Geneva Conference of 1954".

7. As matter may come up for final discussion and vote on Saturday, September 12, please advise before that date if you object to proposed wording.

[J.B.] Seaborn

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[31] In early September 1964, Seaborn visited Tokyo to brief Martin on the situation in Vietnam. Martin was in Tokyo for the third meeting of the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee.
Début septembre 1964, Seaborn s'est rendu à Tokyo pour informer Martin de la situation au Vietnam. Martin était à Tokyo pour la troisième réunion du comité ministériel Canada-Japon.

47.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/1.2

No. Y-666
Ottawa, September 11, 1964
Confidential. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tel 491 of Sep 9.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: FINAL DECLARATION
AND GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENTS

We still hope that you may be able to persuade Rahman not to proceed with Special Message to Co-Chairmen at this time but if it proves necessary to put question of competence to vote under conditions outlined in our telegram Y-649 of September 2 we approve use of resolution you have drafted.

2. We agree with Rahman that Polish draft is useless. Moreover, if he insists on it and Indians support him, it will have to contain record of Commission vote on competence question, not just views of individual delegations. Concluding statement that Commission has decided to notify Co-Chairmen is unnecessary since message itself is proof of that fact.

3. As it stands, we like Rahman's proposed draft even less since it constitutes in effect a sort of Interim Report but totally out of context. In particular, the balancing act of including unsubstantiated material about increase in USA military aid to South Vietnam is dangerous from our point of view and from Commission's point of view extraneous to problem originally under discussion, namely PAVN charges arising out of Gulf of Tonkin incidents. We fear that Rahman may feel constrained [*sic*] to press ahead with something along lines of his draft and that Pole would quite probably fall in line with Indian. In anticipation of this situation, we would suggest that you approach Colonel An as a matter of urgency asking him to reply to allegations about increase in US military strength by forwarding something along lines of statement of December 9/61 quoted paragraph 13 of Special Report,[32] only in stronger terms. He has stonewalled on this suggestion before in connection with work of Ad Hoc War Materials Committee and it may now be necessary to take it to Foreign Minister Quat if you see fit. For Rahman's draft to be in any way acceptable to us, it would have to contain *inter alia*: (1) record of formal vote on Commission competence under Final Declaration; (2) reply of South Vietnamese Mission referring to subversion; and (3) a precise commitment to forward full Interim Report with suitable terminal date. Ideally, from our point of view, commitment to forward next Interim Report should specify date on which this action will be taken and you might put this forward as "maximum demand" in discussion with Rahman. Similarly, we would hope that you might be able to convince him to rephrase his approach to question of military buildup. You might argue that proposed comments outlined concluding sentence paragraph 3 of reference telegram might more accurately refer to official declarations by USA and South Vietnam that increases had taken place but that Commission had not carried out investigation and had been unable to confirm such information or to form any accurate idea of their scope and nature. You might also wish to

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[32] See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 1755, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), p. 8.

refer to contrast between willingness to report unconfirmed information now on "beyond reasonable doubt" basis, and earlier painstaking efforts of War Materials Committee to establish such facts in more reliable way. It is, however, the contrast in attitude and not the work of the War Materials Committee that deserves emphasis in this context.

4. If Rahman appears determined to proceed with some sort of message to Co-Chairmen and pending indications that you may be able to obtain satisfaction from Colonel An and Rahman on points raised above before meeting September 12, you should reserve position at meeting on everything except vote on Commission's competence and report fully on discussion as well as any tentative draft which shows signs of being acceptable to Indian and Pole.

48.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/1.2

No. 503
Saigon, September 14, 1964
Confidential. Priority from Delhi.
Reference: My Tel 491 Sep 9 and Your Y-666 Sep 11.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon.

VIETNAM ICC: FINAL DECLARATION AND GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENTS

Your telegram arrived Saturday evening after meeting had taken place but no repeat no harm has been done thereby.

2. At informal meeting of Commission September 12 question of Special Report or Special Message to Co-Chairmen was again discussed. Using my previous arguments and suggestions contained in your telegram Y-649 September 2, I expressed in strong terms my distaste for Special Message and desire for early and comprehensive Interim Report. Neither Polish Commissioner nor Indian Commissioner were moved by my arguments and Indian Commissioner now seems determined to convey Special Message to Co-Chairmen if at all possible. He said, however, that he did not repeat not consider Polish draft adequate and undertook to prepare new draft, along lines of paragraph 3 my reference telegram. I said I would have to see new draft before deciding whether I could associate myself with it or indeed with any Special Message to Co-Chairmen and that I would in any event have to refer matter to Ottawa.

3. I told Indian Commissioner and Polish Commissioner frankly that if idea of Special Message were dropped, I might not repeat not push for vote on Commission competence regarding Final Declaration but that if such message were to be sent, I would probably have to insist on vote in formal meeting. It was agreed that pending examination of Indian draft, we had not repeat not even taken decision in principle as to whether Special Message would be sent to Co-Chairmen. Under circumstances I agreed not repeat not to insist on vote on competence at formal meeting September 12.

4. Col. An has already consulted us with draft of his reply to allegations regarding increase in USA military strength which is along lines you favour. ICC should receive reply officially in next day or two. I shall of course draw heavily on it if Special Message to Co-Chairmen becomes inevitable. Given SVN letter and given fact that PAVN have refused either to give ICC further info on incidents or to let ICC investigate, Special Message could shape up not

repeat not too badly from our point of view. I shall make points in paragraph 3 your reference telegram regarding content of possible Special Message to Rahman informally before next meeting with Spasowski. But I shall continue to try to kill the idea and push Interim Report as preferable alternative.

[J.B.] Seaborn

49.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/1.2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] September 21, 1964

COMMISSION CONSIDERATION OF GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENTS

The position that we have taken up is as follows:

(a) If the North Vietnamese will present evidence to establish a prima facie case that the CFA is attracted, we agree that the ICSC should investigate;

(b) The ICSC has offered its good offices (i.e., outside the Geneva Agreement);

(c) The ICSC is not required to act outside the CFA in the sense of being required to act under the Final Declaration.

2. Any proposal that the ICSC should intervene on the basis of the Final Declaration would put Canada (and the West) in a very disadvantageous position. Under the Final Declaration the ICSC would be asked to view American actions as directed against the territorial integrity of North Vietnam. Action under the CFA, on the other hand, brings in the causal relationship which was established in the Special Report of 1962: i.e., North Vietnam is intervening in the affairs of South Vietnam contrary to the CFA, and therefore South Vietnam has had to appeal for American help beyond the quantities allowed in the CFA in order to defend itself. It is probably precisely because of their anticipation of an investigation which would establish this causal relationship that the North Vietnamese have so far been unwilling to make the necessary claim that a prima facie case is established under the CFA; moreover, an investigation under the CFA would be long-drawn-out and not so charismic, whereas if the ICSC once agreed to act under the Final Declaration on a charge of violating the territorial integrity of North Vietnam, the process would probably be much more rapid and more useful to the North from the point of view of propaganda.

3. There is a further drawback to using the Final Declaration. The United States, of course, specifically rejected the Final Declaration. If we agreed to proceed on the basis of that document, we should from the outset be taking an anti-American line, because in doing so the ICSC would appear to be assuming that the United States *ought* to be bound by the terms of the Final Declaration. In this sort of thing, we can only make judgments on the basis of past experience. In relation to the border incidents between South Vietnam and Cambodia, the South Vietnamese have taken the attitude that the ICSC is not empowered to deal with the matter. For years they refused to co-operate with us even when it was obvious that they were suffering one propaganda defeat after another. Only recently have we persuaded them to give us a measure of co-operation in their own interest. This concession was obtained from them over U.S. opposition and as a result of personal appeals in Washington. If the Americans were so starchy over this, would they not be the more so in their own case?

4. If the North Vietnamese change their line and state a prima facie case for the attraction of the CFA, they will get in their charges promptly and with a wealth of propaganda. We shall then have to ask the South Vietnamese to ask the Americans to provide a statement in defence. I think it will require all our persuasive powers to secure this much co-operation from the South Vietnamese and the Americans.

5. It seems to me that if the Minister is faced with charges that the ICSC is not being sufficiently active he can point (a) to the offer of good offices (which requires that both sides be willing to accept such good offices) – which the North Vietnamese have not picked up; and (b) to the willingness of the ICSC to investigate charges which are supported by the minimum evidence to establish the relevance of an agreement which applies only to two parties in Vietnam, and not to any third parties. He could point out that we are willing to have the ICSC carry out a proper judicial investigation, but not act as a sounding-board for North Vietnamese propaganda.

6. I submit that any attempt to change the basis of the Commission's work now will not only launch us into investigations which we cannot control and the ramifications of which we cannot foresee, but investigations which will be generally anti-Western. If we can keep things to their present course, we face the North Vietnamese with a situation in which any investigation will probably lead to a repetition of the 1962 Special Report – linking all the difficulties to their own interference in the affairs of South Vietnam.

7. The relevant telegram is Y-619 of August 20, 1964.[33]

R.L. Rogers

50.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] October 5, 1964

VIETNAM COMMISSION – REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

Attached for your consideration and signature, if you approve, is a telegram† to New Delhi instructing the High Commissioner to make representations at a senior level of the Indian Foreign Ministry, aimed at securing Indian co-operation in abandoning the idea of a Special Message from the Vietnam Commission to the Co-Chairmen at this time and instead to undertake the preparation of a new Interim Report as a matter of priority. Such an undertaking presupposes, from our point of view, final action on the report of the Commission's Legal Committee, a problem which has been "pending" in Delhi since last February, for no good reason other than the Indians' reluctance to take any significant action likely to involve them in criticism from the DRVN.

2. Following the Commission's consideration of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August, the Indian Commissioner suggested that a Special Message be sent to the Co-Chairmen, informing them of the situation and the Commission's treatment of this problem; the Indian Commissioner evidently felt that, even though these incidents did not for the most part directly attract the Geneva Agreement, the situation was of such a serious nature that the Commission would be obliged to take some official cognizance of it if the organization were

[33] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
OK. A.C. S[mith] 22/9

to maintain its credibility. Although our Commissioner in Saigon was at first hopeful that this project would fade away in the face of the difficulty involved in establishing a *prima facie* case that the Agreement has been violated and therefore that the Commission is competent to deal with the problem, the Indian Commissioner, probably with Polish urging, has persisted with his plan for a Special Message, and has gone so far as to prepare an unofficial draft. A copy of this Indian document† is attached. In our view, it is almost totally unacceptable as it stands; there have been some proposed amendments submitted by the Polish Delegation which make it even more so.

3. We believe that a strong effort should be made to avoid a Special Message at this time. Any loss of credibility the Commission may sustain by not making a pronouncement based primarily on the Gulf of Tonkin incidents relates directly to the Commission's long silence since the Special Report of June 1962. This report however was limited in scope to only two main subjects – subversion in South Vietnam encouraged, directed, and supplied by North Vietnam and the introduction into South Vietnam of U.S. military equipment and personnel in response to South Vietnam's appeal for help. Although this was an important report, the fact remains that the last full Interim Report on Commission activities as a whole was presented in September, 1961, covering a period concluding on February 28, 1961. Ever since the Special Report of 1962, and the border conflict with China later that year, the Indians have preferred to let the Commission lie dormant for fear that any significant action might anger the North Vietnamese and the Chinese and complicate India's relations with the U.S.S.R. Rather than disturb our broader political relations with India by pressing for Commission action at a time when such action would not have been particularly significant, we preferred to work quietly and out of the limelight on projects which would ultimately contribute to the substance of the next Interim Report. We have been patient with the Indians in this respect but we have now come to question whether they may not have interpreted our understanding as weakness. Their continued procrastination on the Legal Report for example indicates that they have not been very sympathetic to the idea of giving some measure of satisfaction to Canadian objectives.

4. We thus believe that a full Interim Report is long overdue and it will be particularly useful if a conference on Vietnam should be convened in the near future. Such a report would cover the whole field of Commission activities since February 28, 1961, and would, we hope, present a reasonably well-balanced view of the root causes of continuing instability in Vietnam. Among other things, it should take into account the Special Report referred to above, and more important the Legal Report and the Legal Committee's study of new (i.e., post-Special Report) cases of subversion. It would also cite the DRVN for possession of its now famous gun-boats. At the same time there would have to be reference to U.S.A. military assistance to South Vietnam but since this is already well publicized and since the South Vietnamese justification for it is well presented, we believe that a balanced report would have the effect of highlighting North Vietnamese subversive activities which while known, are not openly admitted, as in the case of U.S.A. military assistance.

5. In these circumstances, we believe that any Special Message at this time would only focus attention on one aspect of the situation; you will note that the attached Indian draft in effect highlights U.S.A.-South Vietnamese breaches of the Agreement, simply by dealing at length with the North Vietnamese complaints with most of which the Commission is not empowered to deal; at the same time, there is inadequate treatment of the South Vietnamese position with respect to subversion as the real underlying cause of the present turmoil in South Vietnam.

6. Our Commissioner in Saigon has argued that Canada would prefer a full Interim Report instead of the Special Message proposed by the Indian Commissioner. He has not however indicated that we would oppose such a message and he believes that if the worst came to the worst we could probably influence the Indians to broaden out their draft into a more balanced form which would include more material in support of the South Vietnamese position.

7. We believe however, that a re-drafted Special Message or a Minority Statement in association with a Special Message ought to be our fall-back position, and our primary objective should be Indian support for an Interim Report in the near future, as a matter of priority. Even as a matter of priority, a full Interim Report could not be prepared and presented before the U.S. elections, and thus any interest it might rekindle in a conference on Vietnam would not come at a time when the U.S. government would not be able to react flexibly. A Special Message now, regardless of its contents, might prove very embarrassing to the Americans for this reason.

8. In more general terms we believe that the time may have come to demonstrate to the Indians that they cannot count on our automatic concurrence in whatever policy they choose to follow for themselves, and for this reason it is hoped that you will be able to find an opportunity to speak in the House about making the Commissions function properly or failing that, setting the record straight about responsibility for any failure the Commission is forced to accept in its tasks. Such a public statement (which was submitted for your consideration with my memorandum of October 2†) would effectively back up the approach outlined in the attached telegram of instructions to Mr. Michener in New Delhi.[34]

9. If the Indians fail to give us the commitments we seek, it may then be necessary to go back at them again to explain that if they insist against our wishes on going ahead with the Special Message project, we might be forced to consider submitting a Minority Statement of which the Legal Report would form an integral part. Such a prospect would be extremely difficult for the Indians and might well prove effective. It is however an extreme position on our part and should be held in reserve as perhaps the strongest card in our hand; to play it would undoubtedly have an effect on our relations with India, but on the other hand we are not encouraged by past experience to believe that the Indians will be prepared to act unless the inducement is strong.[35]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

51.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. 1163
Delhi, October 14, 1964
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-731† Oct 7.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Immediate); London, Washington (Immediate); Paris, Geneva, CDS (Priority) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

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[34] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Let us do this – we could have a question planted. P[aul] M[artin]
Comment drawn to K. Goldschlag's attention for inclusion in speech. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu] 8 Oct. 1964.
Tel[egram] Y-731 signed and sent Oct. 7/64. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]
It was not possible to identify the Martin speech in question.
Il n'a pas été possible de trouver le discours de Martin en question.

[35] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I agree. P[aul] M[artin]

VIETNAM COMMISSION REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

On October 13, accompanied by Rettie, I presented Minister's views in reference telegram to C.S. Jha immediately after his return to Delhi. He admitted having been out of touch and promised to review situation in light of views presented and to renew discussion which we hoped would be soon in view of our concern.

2. In discussion Jha at first feared that delay necessary for completion Interim Report covering long period would be regarded as "drawing a curtain across Tonkin Gulf incidents". He also implied that Interim Report covering variety of complaints might fail to give due emphasis to importance of Tonkin Gulf complaints. As regards our reference to Rahman's having apparently taken initiative on Special Report, Jha disclaimed knowledge of distinction between special or other kinds of reports and did not repeat not give impression that he was aware of specific instructions for Special Report or its contents. However, he said that Indel was under clear instructions not repeat not to neglect Tonkin Gulf incidents. He went on to say that Indel instructions were to effect that report when made should: (a) refer to bulk of complaints as beyond ICSC jurisdiction with explanation that Final Declaration did not repeat not expand ICSC competence; and (b) deal with remainder of complaints involving SVN. Jha anticipated finding on latter would be incomplete because of DRVN refusal of investigation. He thought such report would be balanced and illuminating account.

3. Jha nevertheless undertook to study our suggestions. Apropos of Legal Committee Report he recalled our previous promptings and said that he understood Rahman, who was an energetic officer, would be "re-activating" this question. Also he did not repeat not challenge our references to desirability of a complete Interim Report as a connected account of Commission activities against possibility of reconvening Geneva Conference.

4. In short, Jha clearly expects to achieve report on Gulf incidents before long but he has not repeat not attempted to rule out Interim Report categorically. Our impression is that our proposal for Interim Report in lieu of Special Report would have greater chance of success if we could demonstrate that it could be completed quickly, i.e., earlier than Xmas deadline. Shortly before we saw Jha, desk officer had disclosed familiarity with Special Report concept although we did not repeat not enter into detailed discussion. When desk officer pressed us for our views on Special Report we described briefly our proposal for Interim Report and desk officer immediately argued length of time necessary for consultations to permit its completion. This may well reflect Rahman's advice on tactics to employ to achieve priority for Special Report.

[Roland] Michener

52.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. Y-755
Ottawa, October 14, 1964
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 1163 Oct 14.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (OpImmediate); London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (OpImmediate).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

I am not repeat not satisfied with Jha's preliminary response and although he has promised to take our views into account his remarks indicate that Indian Government appears determined to proceed with some kind of report highlighting Tonkin Gulf incidents. I should be grateful if you could see Jha again at earliest possible opportunity if necessary without waiting for him or other MFA officials to raise question with you after considering our suggestions. Prompt action in this connection will illustrate importance we attach to this problem and emphasize our interest in obtaining Indian cooperation in meeting demands of situation.

2. I believe that these demands can only be met by presentation of balanced full Interim Report which is long overdue. You should emphasize that in our view there is a great difference between this type of report which covers full range of problems of concern to the Commission and Special Message which deals only with specific aspects of total situation. You may inform Jha that we have now studied Rahman's draft and find it totally unacceptable since it highlights only one side of situation in Vietnam and thus presents a distorted picture; for this reason alone, quite apart from fact that main problem under consideration is one which is not repeat not directly related to Geneva Agreements, we could not repeat not associate ourselves with it. We believe that Commission should be cautious in approaching such a situation and we are gratified that Indians share our view of Commission competence. Candel Saigon like Indel (according to Jha) is also under instruction not repeat not to neglect Tonkin Gulf incidents but there is considerable difference between this instruction and the impact of Rahman's draft. Tonkin Gulf incidents can only be seen in total context of what has been happening in Vietnam since last Interim Report in 1961 and we believe that this is the only context in which the problem can be treated without drawing undue attention to Commission's silence since last Interim Report and Special Report of June 1962. (If Jha argues that Special Report of 1962 is precedent you should point out that it was carefully balanced while this proposed Special Report is not repeat not.)

3. In addition to these general observations you should express our serious concern at what appears to be Indian willingness or indeed initiative in reporting to Co-Chairmen essentially on a problem which Commission has decided attracts Geneva Agreement only in very limited and specific respects while at same time they appear reluctant to make any final decision on fate of Legal Report which has full and direct relevance for Agreement. We are at a loss to understand why it is necessary for Rahman to "reactivate" this latter question (paragraph 3 your reference telegram). Revised text of Legal Report was forwarded from Saigon to Delhi in late January or early February and Indians in Saigon have more than once argued that they were waiting instructions from Delhi. You should make it clear that we are fast approaching end of our waiting period and that we believe that further delay will cause serious damage to Commission's credibility as well as unnecessary disruption to work of Legal Committee in Saigon. Without saying so explicitly I hope you can convey clear impression that we attach key importance to Legal Report and to consideration of new cases which because they attract Geneva Agreement directly have greater importance for ICC than Tonkin Gulf incidents.

4. You should also make it clear that we do not repeat not believe that Special Message is preferable in present circumstances simply because it can be prepared faster than full Interim Report. You should assure Jha that while Interim Report may of course take somewhat longer to draft and approve we are prepared to devote high priority to this task which we see as the only way in which Commission can avoid "drawing a curtain across" any and all problems in Vietnam including Tonkin Gulf incidents.

[Paul] Martin

53.
Memorandum from Deputy Head, Far Eastern Division, to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-7/1

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] October 16, 1964

VIETNAM COMMISSION – LEGAL REPORT

In view of your intention to discuss Canadian policy in the Indo-China Commissions with the Indian High Commissioner in the near future, the following detailed comments on the Legal Report, and possible Canadian tactics in attempting to have it dealt with by the Commission, may be of interest.

2. As you know, the conclusions of the Legal Report formed the basis for the Special Report of June 1962 insofar as that Report dealt with the problem of DRVN subversion in South Vietnam. Paragraph 9 of the Special Report quotes the Legal Committee's conclusions verbatim, ending up with the following quotation from the Legal Committee: "We shall submit in due course a full report setting out in detail the complaints made by the South Vietnamese Mission, the evidence forwarded in relation to these complaints, and our specific observations thereon." Paragraph 10 which follows immediately reads: "The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific instances. The Polish Delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case."[36]

3. The text of the Legal Report itself, however, was not completed until after the Special Report was forwarded. Subsequently, the Indian author and the Canadian co-author were posted from Saigon. As we understand the situation, personal rivalries and intra-departmental (Indian) factionalism led to the decision in Saigon by the Indians that the original text required re-drafting and tightening up. The Canadian Delegation agreed to co-operate in this project which turned out to be a line-by-line examination of the report and more extensive textual revisions than we had anticipated. This project was not undertaken in earnest until the end of June 1963 following the return to Saigon of the Indian Senior Political Advisor after extended leave in Delhi. By the end of July, a good deal of progress had been made but the work was interrupted at that time by Indian preoccupation with planning for an inspection visit by former Commonwealth Secretary Gundevia. Gundevia's visit to the three Indo-China Commissions evidently resulted in instructions to the Indian Delegation to do as little as possible and despite repeated reminders from the Canadian Delegation that the project was only half-finished, work on the Legal Report came to a virtual standstill until later in the year. Ultimately an agreed revised text was produced in December and there was a further delay of a month or six weeks while this enormous document (501 pages and 1450 pages of appendices) was reproduced jointly by the two delegations. Copies of the final version were transmitted to Delhi and Ottawa towards the end of January, 1964.

4. The Indian Government has thus had more than eight months to review the revised text. It should be noted however that the revised text differs in no substantive way from the original; it is only a better and shorter version. In our view, Indian policy with respect to the fate of the Legal Report cannot therefore be justified on the basis of not having had an

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[36] See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 1755, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), pp. 6–7.

opportunity to study the material concerned. Clearly, and in spite of Gundevia's earlier commitment to press ahead with the Report, "let the chips fall where they may", a political decision has been made to procrastinate in the handling of this document in the hope that (a) we will lose interest or that (b) the material with which it deals – and it should be noted that some of the complaints go back to the French Liaison Mission – will become so stale and outdated as to make further consideration inappropriate.

5. From Seaborn's telegram No. 541† of September 29, you will note the arguments Rahman is using in an attempt to bury the report. You will also note from the two quotations from the Special Report given above that the Commission is not, strictly speaking, committed to producing the Legal Report publicly, although of course a good argument could be made for presenting a document of this importance to the Co-Chairmen. The Commission is committed however to taking action as appropriate in each individual case (i.e., of proven specific violations of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 by the PAVN) on the basis of the fuller report promised by the Legal Committee. It is this commitment, essentially, which cannot be ignored.

6. The Legal Report constitutes a piece of unfinished business and for that reason alone it should be tidied up; more important however is the fact that we cannot proceed adequately with the new cases of subversion until the Legal Report itself has been dealt with. This latter argument has two "roots":

(a) The Legal Report establishes criteria for further examination of South Vietnamese complaints and while these criteria might have to be modified, at least they constitute a working precedent.

(b) As long as the Legal Report remains in limbo we will remain subject to the charge that it has not been produced because we cannot in fact back up the conclusions of the Special Report – an argument which the former Acting Polish Commissioner in Saigon was in the habit of using.

7. It is therefore in our interests to attempt to convince the Indians that we can no longer accept further procrastination with respect to this problem and that the full text of the report should be published (from Seaborn's telegram you will note that Rahman is reported as saying that his government would never agree to publication.) We might consider agreeing to this but only on condition that the Legal Report be presented to the Commission and accepted by Indian-Canadian majority, and most important, that a deadline be set for a new report from the Legal Committee based on the "new cases". There is some justification in the Indian argument that the Legal Committee's raw materials for the Legal Report were fairly old to begin with and have matured even further in the meantime. It should be very much in our interests to highlight the fact that subversive activities have continued and if we can wring a new Legal Report out of the Legal Committee, this would have a much stronger impact than production of the first Legal Report. I very much doubt however that we could ever hope to get such a new report.

8. The technicalities of handling the Legal Report are not great although the Indians will undoubtedly attempt to present them in this light. Once this document has been approved by Delhi it can be signed by the Indian and Canadian representatives on the Legal Committee, allowing the Polish representative a limited period of time to produce his own dissenting opinion – which the Poles once unwisely promised to do. Thus, the Legal Report together with the Polish statement can go forward to the Commission from the Committee without further debate or delay in the Committee. Commission acceptance of the document can be achieved with a minimum of delay – provided that the Indians wish to do so – sufficient only to allow the Polish Delegation, out of courtesy, a certain time in which to formulate their reactions at the Commission level.

9. Unilateral publication of the Legal Report by Canada would be fully within our prerogative. The Indians may argue, as they have in the past, that this document is an Indian document since it was drafted by the Indian Chairman of the Legal Committee. This argument must be firmly resisted since the Canadian Committee member was constantly with the Chairman during the drafting process and his suggestions were woven into the fabric of the

text. Similarly, the process of revision described above was very much an Indian-Canadian undertaking. The resulting document is therefore as much ours as it is theirs, and in our view we can do with it as we see fit, should the need arise.

P.A. McDougall

54.
Telegram from High Commission in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. 1168
Delhi, October 16, 1964
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-731 Oct 7.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Immediate); London, Washington, Paris, CDS (Immediate); Geneva (Priority) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION – REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

Jha asked Arora to give us reaction to our proposals [in] your reference telegram. Briefly this was that Special Report was thought essential because Gulf incidents were serious and it was important that report be made on incidents and developments of last two months. Indians could, however, see point in Interim Report covering period since last one so that "other important incidents" were not repeat not left out. What would Canadians think of Special Report along lines Jha had mentioned to us but including statement that Commission would send Interim Report within specified period (Arora talked about end November beginning December, or perhaps early new year) covering intervening period?

2. We agreed to transmit this suggestion to you but went over whole issue with Arora to let him know that we expected you would not repeat not find suggestion at all attractive. In particular we stressed that at risk of losing essential perspective there seemed little purpose in having Special Report antedate Interim Report by as little as one month. As purely personal suggestion we said we should have thought Indian suggestion might at least have contained proposal for clear Indo-Canadian understanding about timing, content and tone of Interim Report if there were to be any hope of persuading us about Special Report. Arora said this was not repeat not to be ruled out and said he would speak to Jha. We cautioned him that we had absolutely no repeat no basis for thinking that even such an understanding would be attractive.

3. You may, however, as alternative to minority Canadian report wish to consider possibility of extracting tight bargain from Indians about timetable and contents of Interim Report.

55.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. Y-754
Ottawa, October 19, 1964
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 570† of Oct 10 and Delhi Tel 1163 of Oct 14.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (OpImmediate).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION – SPECIAL MESSAGE TO CO-CHAIRMEN

You will note from Delhi reference telegram that while Jha did not formulate any fixed position, the initial response to High Commissioner's démarche is not encouraging and indicates that perhaps Rahman has been operating more under instructions than we had hoped would prove to be the case. Pending the outcome of further discussions in Delhi, you should adopt firm position based on my earlier instructions to High Commissioner (telegram Y-731 of October 7) when this subject is next raised for discussion in Commission. You should point out that as anticipated our reaction to Rahman's draft is entirely negative and that we could not associate ourselves with it. Using well-known arguments about highlighting a problem which Indel agrees is not essentially within Commission's competence and about presenting an out-of-context account of situation in Vietnam, you should stick firmly to position that full Interim Report is Commission objective best suited to requirements of situation. In so doing, you should avoid giving any indication that any kind of Special Message would be acceptable to us. If Indel and Poldel appear determined to proceed with Special Message at this time in light of Canadian opposition you should indicate that we will regard this as very serious situation indeed and that we reserve position with respect to what we will judge to be greatly changed circumstances.

2. In meantime and in anticipation of possible fallback position, you should undertake preparation of draft Special Message highlighting subversion, DRVN gunboats, etc., (but not ignoring Tonkin Gulf incidents and question of Commission competence) with special emphasis on causal connection between present situation and DRVN subversive activities. Such a draft may ultimately prove useful for negotiating reasons depending on whether we can strike a suitable bargain with the Indians or alternatively it might form basis for Canadian Minority Statement for inclusion in any Special Message Indel and Poldel may decide to send. For both purposes (and particularly the former), we consider that your earlier draft does not allow sufficient room for bargaining.

[Paul] Martin

56.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. 1291
Delhi, November 13, 1964
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-805† Nov 10.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Immediate); London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Immediate) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION – REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

Accompanied by Rettie, I had 75-minute discussion with Swaran Singh who had Arora with him. After long preamble about difficulties, dangers and delicacy in Southeast Asia area and desirability of preserving Commission's presence by not repeat not further inducing non-cooperation by parties to Geneva Accords (which he thought might happen if Vietnam Commission "raked up detailed account" of 900 subversion cases), Minister came up with "pragmatic" proposal that Commission report to Co-Chairmen on Tonkin Gulf incidents and on 15 or 16 "*prima facie*" subversion cases. Long wrangle between the experts on whether this could be done and if so how long it would take was inconclusive. However, I think Swaran Singh was attracted by package deal that would balance Tonkin Gulf incidents

against reasonably brief treatment of Legal Committee cases establishing *prima* evidence and perhaps also other Commission business (we advocated citation on DRVN gunboats case) and would promise Interim Report in due course.

2. Points of agreement that emerged were rather general but still useful:

(a) There should be a report soon by whatever name;

(b) We should get together on what it contains;

(c) Commission should send periodical reports and keep record up to date (we hope Arora took note).

3. I suggest best move now would be to consider specific draft for presentation to Swaran Singh which would convey our view of adequately balanced report, based on condition that full Interim Report be processed as soon as possible. Key point seems to be whether extraction of suitable material from Legal Committee Report can be done quickly. If material could simply be listing and brief description of *prima facie* cases to be accompanied in report by annexed Commission letters to PAVN regarding each case, i.e., avoiding need for conclusive investigation reports, Swaran Singh might buy it and any delay would be Polish responsibility.

[Roland] Michener

57.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. 671
Saigon, November 17, 1964
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Delhi's Tel 1291 Nov 13.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Paris, NATO Paris, Washington, CDS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

I am concerned about a number of suggestions and implications in Delhi reference telegram. Swaran Singh's urging that we not repeat not take any action which would induce non-cooperation by parties and specifically that we not repeat not take up subversion cases looks remarkably like request that Commission not repeat not be beastly to DRVN lest latter get cross with Commission and particularly its Chairman as happened after Special Report of 1962. It is difficult in fact to imagine receiving in any of the substantive work of interest to this Commission less cooperation than we now receive from the parties and particularly from DRVN. If we are to be deterred from carrying out obligations laid upon us by Geneva Agreement out of fear that parties might reduce their cooperation still further, or that DRVN might if sufficiently annoyed throw Commission out of North Vietnam, or out of fear that if pressed too far Poldel might withdraw from Commission (last two possibilities have both been hinted at in mid-63), then we are in effect putting ourselves in position where DRVN and Polish dislike of any Commission activity constitutes virtual veto of our operation. This I think is quite unacceptable.

2. Implication of Swaran Singh's suggestion that we exchange full treatment of Legal Report for mention of 15 or 16 *prima facie* subversion cases is equally serious. Legal Report was finished end of August 6.

3. We were promised momentary publication until May 63 when Indians informed us they wished to make minor amendments and deletions before publication. Minor amendments and deletion cut report down from over 900 pages to 500 pages and took from May 63 to January 64. Unless report is accepted as Commission document as it now stands and preferably published there will be little possibility of publishing any subsequent report based on cases now before Legal Committee. Legal analysis contained in 62 Legal Report is needed to restrain Indian attempts to change standards of proof required to substantiate allegations of subversion. Refusal to publish report in full now because of length of time elapsed merely encourages future delaying tactics in Legal Committee and allows same argument to be used again to prevent publication of future Legal Reports.

[4.] I fear that if we were to enter into bargain whereby we accept report on Gulf of Tonkin incidents (in return for Indian Agreement to permit very brief reference to Legal Committee cases and PAVN boats, either in Special Message or in subsequent Interim Report) we would strike very bad bargain. It would amount to abandoning our stand that no repeat no Special Message should be sent to Co-Chairmen on Gulf of Tonkin incidents and also abandoning our insistence that 62 Legal Committee Report should be given full and prominent treatment.

[5.] Rather than enter into this kind of bargain, we should as recommended in our telegram 664† November 14 strive for Special Message along lines of Candel draft (see our telegram 539† September 28 and modifications) and only if this fails, attach strong Canadian Minority Statement to Indian-Polish Special Message to Co-Chairmen. We should even give serious thought to publishing Legal Committee Report on our own as appendix to our Minority Statement and without Indian concurrence. There is danger that if report is not repeat not published very soon it never will be.

[J.B.] Seaborn

58.

Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. 6[7]8
Saigon, November 20, 1964
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 664 Nov 14.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Paris, Geneva, Washington, CDS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hanoi from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

At 684th meeting November 19, Polish-Indian majority carried vote to send Special Message to Co-Chairmen on Gulf of Tonkin incidents. Drafting committee will start work immediately. Please advise urgently whether we should (a) take part in drafting in attempt to improve on Indian-Polish text; (b) let Poles and Indians prepare own draft and concentrate on Minority Statement; (c) submit Canadian draft message as amended up to and including proposals in our telegram 669† November 17.

2. As indicated in our telegram 671 November 17, I think wisest course would be (c) with (b) as first fall-back position. I do not repeat not favour (a) except as deliberate delaying tactic and this would not repeat not be likely to get us what we wanted in long run anyway. Urgent reply now required if we are to try to control this exercise in any way.

3. Your telegram Y-823† November 17 arrived after meeting to which vote was taken. I have already in our telegram 671 indicated my dislike of Swaran Singh's proposal even assuming that is what Rahman intends to put forward which I doubt. I shall, however, sound out Rahman privately. Now that vote has been taken contents of message will emerge in drafting session, but if we delay decision long we risk not repeat not being able to exert influence at all.

[J.B.] Seaborn

59.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. Y-840
Ottawa, November 23, 1964
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel 1291 Nov 13 and Saigon Tel 6[7]8 Nov 20.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Immediate); Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Moscow, Warsaw from London.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

In view of importance I have attached to full Interim Report, I was disappointed by Swaran Singh's response to your representations. I had, however, interpreted his reply as a proposal for further discussion and was therefore bewildered by Indian action Saigon in supporting Polish view of need for Special Message before we had had opportunity to delineate further possible areas of Indian-Canadian agreement prior to proceeding with this project. I view with concern this situation which appears to me as significant departure from established pattern of Indian-Canadian cooperation in Commission matters. I also find it curious in the circumstances that Indians have been prepared to take such fast action on a Polish suggestion which was formally announced only on November 14 (Saigon telegram 664 November 14 paragraph 2) while for months Chairman has been willing to see control of western end of DZ discussed by Poldel in endless and repetitive detail with no repeat no conclusive action taken. Similarly, there has been no repeat no comparable manifestation of sense of urgency in approach to new cases of subversion, or completing normal processing of Legal Report itself. Minimal action to date in this field of Commission interest suffers greatly in comparison with speed in meeting Polish objectives on special Tonkin Gulf message.

2. Now that Commission decision has been made, however, we are prepared to accept validity of majority vote and to consider with Indians whether there is sufficient agreement between us on content to enable us to accept final action envisaged. This will involve clarification of Indian views as well as exposition of our own position. Swaran Singh's "pragmatic proposal" – if it is still outstanding now that Indians have decided on special Tonkin Gulf message – raises several questions in my mind in terms of general assumptions on which it appears to be based no repeat no less than in terms of procedures it actually involves.

3. I agree fully with Swaran Singh's assertion that situation in area is delicate and dangerous and for this reason I believe that underlying causes merit careful attention. Phenomenon of subversion is in my view direct and obvious manifestation of non-cooperation by one of parties to Geneva Agreement as well as basic cause of instability in Vietnam. It would be difficult to argue that non-recognition of this fact by Commission or Commission's perfunctory treatment of it would contribute in any way to inducing cooperation. Fact

remains that DRVN has persistently if covertly violated Geneva Agreement and shows every sign of continuing to do so. In my view Commission has clear obligation to present facts of situation and to report violations of CFA on basis of info available to it. It is thus in terms of Commission producing balanced and accurate assessment of what has been happening in Vietnam in recent years and not repeat not in terms of inducing cooperation or provoking further non-cooperation that I consider subversion problem important and believe that it requires full and detailed treatment.

4. I should like you to make it clear to Swaran Singh or if necessary to Jha that presenting us with a *fait accompli* in Saigon evidently with no repeat no commitment as to Interim Report, and our willingness to abide by majority decision has in no repeat no way lessened our determination to see Commission take full account of subversion and specifically of Legal Report. I should like you to obtain clarification of whether Swaran Singh's "pragmatic proposal" still stands, but with reference to Special Message, rather than Interim Report. You should explain that we have assumed that 15 or 16 *prima facie* cases to which Swaran Singh referred would be extracted from Legal Report [but] we wonder how Indians propose doing this without destroying conclusions of report itself. Our preliminary view would be that report must be regarded as integral whole and unless Indians have some ingenious proposal for extracting material from it we do not repeat not see how specific number of cases could be convincingly presented. Furthermore, are they thinking in terms of extracting material from report without having it properly presented and adopted within Commission or would they be prepared to have report adopted and then summarized in Special Message?

5. In discussing these points I would like you to make it clear in general that we are not repeat not prepared to sweep subversion problem under carpet and specifically that we are not repeat not prepared to acquiesce in abandoning Commission commitment represented by Legal Report. From procedural point of view we believe that Legal Report must be adopted by Indian-Canadian majority in Legal Committee and forwarded to Commission for consideration together with Poldel's simple statement of dissent or minority opinion (see paragraph 762 Legal Report). Poldel has had since May 28/62 to produce full minority opinion promised by Jasica at that time (see paragraph 761 Legal Report) and further delay to accommodate Polish position is not repeat not necessary. Commission would then have to adopt report officially again by Indian-Canadian majority and at this stage appropriate action could be undertaken on report's conclusions which are summarized in paragraphs 769-781 at end of report. In accordance with these conclusions certain cases would be considered closed, certain others would require follow-up action with parties and still others would be immediately accepted as providing conclusive proof of violation of Agreement. This would amount to Legal Report being treated by Commission according to normal procedures for such material emanating from a committee. If Indians are in fact proposing something less than full treatment it seems an inadequate "bargain" to me since we are being asked to be satisfied with results of something less than full treatment of Legal Report (i.e., abandonment of normal working methods in connection with a problem having direct relevance for the Agreement) to balance treatment of a problem (i.e., Tonkin Gulf incidents) which does not repeat not appear to attract Agreement in any significant way.

6. We have been more than sympathetic and understanding towards Indians in their desire not repeat not to take rapid action on Legal Report, but I would be very concerned indeed if they had impression that they have been successful in undermining our determination to process this document in the normal way and to take action on it as required. I should like you to make this point explicitly with Swaran Singh or Jha. You should explain that while we would be very reluctant to take unilateral action to correct Commission's prolonged neglect of subversion, we are inevitably considering possibilities open to us in event that we are put in minority position in Saigon on question of principle.

[Paul] Martin

60.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. Y-833
Ottawa, November 24, 1964
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel 6[7]8 Nov 20.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Immediate).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from London.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

We regret that our telegram Y-823 November 17 did not repeat not arrive in time to permit you to speak to Rahman prior to meeting at which Poldel and Indel majority carried vote to send Special Message. Chairman's action in bringing Polish item to vote is cause of disappointment and concern to us and does not repeat not square in any way with our understanding of substance of High Commissioner's recent interview with Swaran Singh. We had interpreted Indian Foreign Minister's comments as proposal of which we were seeking clarification and on basis of more precise info on how Indians proposed dealing with Legal Report it might have been possible to continue established pattern of substantial Canadian-Indian agreement on action to be taken.

2. I have examined various courses of action available to us in light of new situation which Polish-Indian vote in favour of Special Message has created. Your tactics for immediate future should be to express regret that it has not repeat not been possible for our Commission partners to meet Canadian wishes but that we accept validity of majority decision and that we are prepared to discuss this approach in various stages of its development. Since we were in minority in making decision, however, I do not repeat not believe that it is incumbent on Candel at this stage to present Canadian draft. Such action would imply abandonment in principle as well as in practice of importance we have attached to full Interim Report. We have opposed Special Message project from beginning and for this reason we believe that it would be inadvisable to present a Canadian draft so soon after vote has been taken to send Special Message. Presentation of Canadian draft at this stage whether put forward formally or shown informally to Rahman would moreover reveal outlines of our thinking before we have had opportunity to see more clearly directions in which Indel (and Delhi) and Poldel are moving and where we might be able if possible to modify their approach. We understand that Rahman's original draft was amended by Delhi and you should seek clarification of whether Rahman proposes to use original draft or amended version as basis for discussion or whether he is contemplating something entirely different. At same time you should emphasize that since we accept majority decision, we expect to be given an early opportunity to study whatever draft Indel and/or Poldel may decide to table, to provide basis for future discussion and negotiation of this project. Until we have text of proposed message in draft, it is impossible to judge whether it would be better to proceed by seeking amendments or by proposing counter draft.

3. I am not repeat not, of course, hopeful that we will be able to find much common ground with Indians and Poles in circumstances, but I believe that your official response to this situation should not repeat not make this assessment manifest. If this process results in some delay, time will be employed to the full in giving consideration with the Indians here and in Delhi to possible consequences in terms of Canadian minority action of total disregard of

Legal Report and new subversion cases in any majority draft submitted to the Commission. We do not repeat not wish to act alone but we may be forced into doing so. We may be able, after we have seen revised Indian draft, to proceed by way of proposing amendments to this revised draft. On other hand, it seems more probable that we shall in the end be forced to submit a counter-draft and later still a minority report, but we would not repeat not, for presentational reasons, want to make this estimate clear in Commission now. By our representations in Delhi and here we hope to make sure Indians understand clearly what consequences may be. Exertion of maximum pressure on Indians may in turn have influence on content of Special Message.

4. In meantime, as outlined in our telegram Y-835† you should continue work on Canadian draft which will probably be presented at later stage of negotiations in Saigon as a counter-draft but which might, with or without further strengthening, also form basis for minority report.

[Paul] Martin

61.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. 1332
Delhi, November 27, 1964
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-840 Nov 23.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Immediate); London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Priority) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

In 40-minute discussion late November 26 Swaran Singh, in response to my opening remarks about hoping to be able to agree on a balanced report in light of his November 13 references to inclusion of 15-16 subversion cases, gave major "clarification" that his references related to their inclusion in eventual Interim Report not repeat not in Special Message. He said he thought he had made it clear November 13 that he wanted us to agree to Special Message now and to include references to subversion in later report. He said he had instructed Rahman to proceed. Arora who was present prompted as necessary.

2. Minister further clarified (with Olympian references to his disdain for detail as something to be considered in Saigon) that he thought it "fruitless" procedure to have Commission calling for further evidence from parties or investigating cases based on "old" report.

3. I sought to crystallize shape of possible balanced report by giving him informally table of contents of such report (copy by bag) which led off with indication of Commission decisions implied in paragraphs 769-81 of Legal Committee Report, followed by section headings on Tonkin Gulf incidents, "other material, e.g., War Material Committee reports" and finally "reference to Commission intention to proceed actively with follow-up action on above items and to prepare full Interim Report by specified date." I invited his consideration of this with view to finding common ground, making clear I would have to refer it to you for approval. Swaran Singh repeated his objection to Commission action on anything but limited number of cases, his aversion to detail and his "initial" reaction that he could not repeat not agree to such proposed contents, although he would have Ministry officials consider it.

4. Minister's main concern seemed to be to understand why we could not repeat not agree to Special Message, especially as Candel Saigon seemed to be in agreement with Indel on contents.[37] He also trotted out Jha's point that Special Report should be acceptable because it denied Commission competence. References to need for balance and avoidance [of] distortion left him unmoved. We made points about subversion as manifestation of DRVN non-cooperation as well as basic cause of SVN instability; about need for normal treatment of Legal Committee Report (as matter of direct concern to Commission); about corresponding need not repeat not to highlight Tonkin Gulf incidents (as matter not repeat not significantly attracting Commission competence) though we were more than willing to report on these in balanced report (since some of DRVN complaints in fact did attract competence); and about reserving our freedom to take independent action in Commission if Legal Report not repeat not properly processed. These points had no repeat no apparent effect, nor repeat nor did our argument that Indo-Canadian agreement on substance of Legal Committee Report had longer existence than agreement on Tonkin Gulf incidents and should be given equal if not repeat not greater weight.

5. Unfortunately discussion had been so much confined to question of contents of report to Co-Chairmen that Minister arose before we could explore his thinking for future course of Commission in light of present Indian stand.

6. Since Swaran Singh leaves for Moscow en route [to] 19th UNGA early November 27 for about one month, I doubt whether promised Ministry consideration of our approach will progress beyond Minister's adverse "initial" reaction. You may wish to plan accordingly either for minority action in Commission or direct discussion with Swaran Singh if opportunity arises.

[Roland] Michener

62.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] November 27, 1964

VIETNAM COMMISSION: REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN

You will recall that on Monday you instructed our High Commissioner in Delhi to make a relatively strong démarche to Swaran Singh or to Jha outlining our reaction to the Indian-Polish majority decision in Saigon to proceed with a Special Message on the Tonkin Gulf incidents; a copy of the text of your instructions† is attached for your ready reference.

2. Mr. Michener saw Swaran Singh on November 26 and a copy of Delhi telegram 1332 of November 27 is attached from which you will note that it would be difficult to describe the interview as anything but a rebuff. On the basis of Mr. Michener's report there are few hopeful signs that the Indians are prepared to offer us any satisfaction whatsoever.

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[37] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Suffering catfish, [Sapphire?]; do Rahman's reports bear <u>any</u> resemblance to reality? [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

3. I plan to call the Indian High Commissioner in early next week (as you agreed earlier) and to present an Aide Mémoire to him outlining at some length the Canadian Government's position, based on your instructions to Mr. Michener. If you agree, I would propose to strengthen this exposition orally, on the basis of our reaction to the unsympathetic hearing we have been given in Delhi.

4. If you agree, I would further suggest that you seek an opportunity in New York to speak to Swaran Singh personally about the consequences of forcing us to go it alone on the subversion problem. If the Indians continue to insist on excluding effective treatment of subversion from the Special Message, you might inform the Indian Foreign Minister that we will have no choice but to present a strong exposition of our views as a Minority Statement to be sent to Co-Chairmen with Special Message. While we would be reluctant to do so we might find it necessary to include material from the Legal Report (i.e., the conclusions) or the Report itself in its entirety.

A.C. S[mith] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

63.
Aide-Mémoire by Department of External Affairs
Aide-mémoire du ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] November 30, 1964

WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

On repeated occasions over the past three months, the Canadian Government has made known here, in Saigon and in New Delhi, its view that the situation in Vietnam, and the responsibilities of the International Commission in relation thereto, have clearly indicated the need for the presentation to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of a long-overdue full Interim Report; in the Canadian view such a report would encompass all Commission activities since February 28, 1961, including such limited involvement as the Commission had in the Tonkin Gulf incidents in August 1964 making unnecessary a Special Message to the Co-Chairmen dealing essentially with these incidents. In the Canadian view a Special Message of this nature would be undesirable since it would present a distorted picture of Commission responsibilities and activities and an unbalanced account of the situation in Vietnam and the root causes of instability in that area.

Earlier this month, the Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi presented Canadian views on this problem to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India, emphasizing the importance which the Canadian Government attached to Commission consideration of the problem of subversion in South Vietnam; this problem directly attracts the Geneva Agreement whereas it is not at all clear whether, and to what extent, the Tonkin Gulf incidents may attract the same Agreement. Although this interview revealed that there were differences in the views held by the Canadian and Indian Governments with regard to the relative importance of various problems which have been and are being considered in the Vietnam Commission, the Foreign Minister of India put forward what the Canadian Government interpreted as a proposal concerning the contents of a future communication – by whatever name such a report might be designated – from the Vietnam Commission to the Co-Chairmen. The Canadian Government was in the process of studying this proposal and was on the point of seeking further clarification in New Delhi of the precise manner in which the Indian Government proposed to deal with the subversion elements in such a

communication to the Co-Chairmen when a report was received from Saigon that the Commission, by Indian-Polish majority, had decided to forward to the Co-Chairmen a Special Message dealing with the Tonkin Gulf incidents.

The Canadian Government has received the news of this vote with disappointment and concern, partly because it appears to represent a significant departure from the established pattern of Canadian-Indian cooperation which Canada has sought to maintain, and partly because of its substantive implications. With regard to the former consideration the Canadian Government finds it difficult to appreciate the urgency in taking a vote on November 19, before adequate time had been allowed for further delineation of possible areas of Canadian-Indian agreement, on a Commission agenda item which the Polish Delegation had formally announced its intention to inscribe only on November 14. The Canadian Government cannot fail but to contrast such haste with the minimal progress which has been made in the Commission's study of the so-called new cases of subversion, or in completing the normal processing of the Legal Report of 1962, or with the delay in making concrete progress in other Commission problems such as the control of the Western end of the Demilitarized Zone (South).

Apart from these essentially procedural considerations, however, the Canadian Government is concerned with the implications, in terms of substance, of the recent majority vote in Saigon to forward a Special Message on the Tonkin Gulf incidents. Although the Canadian Government accepts the validity of majority votes and is prepared to have the Canadian Delegation co-operate in the consideration of the text of such a Message, the Canadian decision to sign such a document, as a unanimous report of the Commission, will obviously have to depend on the Message's contents.

The special importance which the Canadian Government attaches to adequate Commission treatment of the problem of subversion as the underlying cause of instability in Vietnam will be obvious in this connection; in reporting on the full range of problems which it is the Commission's official responsibility to consider, the Canadian Government believes that a measure of attention commensurate with its importance should be given to this matter.

The Canadian Government fully agrees with the assertion made by the Foreign Minister of India in his recent interview with the Canadian High Commissioner that the situation in the area is delicate and dangerous; it is for precisely this reason that the Canadian Government believes that the underlying causes of this situation merit careful attention.

In the Canadian view the phenomenon of subversion is a direct and obvious manifestation of non-cooperation by one of the parties to the Geneva Agreement, as well as a basic cause of instability in Vietnam. The Canadian Government must dissociate itself from any view leading to the conclusion that non-recognition of this fact by the Commission, or the Commission's perfunctory treatment of it, would contribute in any way to inducing cooperation. The Canadian Government believes that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has persistently, if covertly, violated the Geneva Agreement and shows every sign of continuing to do so. The Commission has a clear obligation to present the facts of the situation and to report violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement on the basis of information available to it. It is therefore in terms of the Commission producing comprehensive and accurate assessments of what has been happening in Vietnam in recent years, and not in terms of inducing cooperation or provoking further non-cooperation, that the subversion problem is considered so important as to require full and detailed Commission treatment.

In short, the Canadian Government wishes to make it clear that the majority vote in Saigon recently has in no way lessened Canadian determination that the Commission should take adequate account of subversion generally, and specifically of the Legal Report of 1962. In forwarding the Special Report of June 2, 1962, the Commission made a commitment to the Co-Chairmen, and indirectly to international opinion concerning further action on the Legal Report, and the Canadian Government is not prepared to acquiesce in the abandonment of this commitment any more than it is prepared to overlook the problem of subversion as manifested subsequent to the cases covered by the Legal Report.

The Canadian Government believes that before it can cooperate fully in the preparation of a Special Message to the Co-Chairmen which Canada can sign, the Legal Report which has been under consideration, revision and further re-consideration since mid-1962 must now be fully processed as a Commission document. It has been the Canadian Government's understanding, on the basis of earlier discussions in Delhi, that it was the Indian Government's intention to do so. Specifically, the Canadian Government believes that this Report must be adopted, presumably by Indian-Canadian majority, in the Legal Committee and forwarded to the Commission for consideration together with such material as the Polish Delegation may wish to append as a statement of dissent or as a minority opinion or minority report. The Polish Delegation has had since May 28, 1962 to produce a full minority opinion as promised by the Polish representative on the Legal Committee at that time and for this reason the Canadian Government believes that further delay to accommodate the Polish position is not necessary. The Commission would then have to adopt the Report officially, presumably by Indian-Canadian majority once again, and at this stage appropriate action could be undertaken on the Report's conclusions which are summarized in paragraphs 769-781 at the end of the Report. In accordance with these conclusions certain cases would be considered closed, certain others would require follow-up action with the parties, and still others would be immediately accepted as providing conclusive proof of violations of the Agreement. To this extent, such a procedure would amount only to the Legal Report being treated by the Commission according to normal procedures for comparable material emanating from a Committee. When the requirements of normal procedures have been fulfilled a further decision or decisions could then be taken on whether the report should be published in full, whether it should be summarized and presented in condensed form, or whether specific case material should be extracted for presentation. In connection with this latter possibility, which the Indian Government has apparently been considering, the Canadian Government would be grateful for clarification of how such action could be taken without ignoring or down-grading the conclusions of the Report (as opposed to the evidence represented in specific cases) which are surely the most important part of that document. The foregoing views on the procedure for future work on the Legal Report have been presented in some detail since the Canadian Government believes that anything less than full treatment of the Report in the Commission would constitute an unacceptable abandonment of normal working methods in connection with a problem which has a direct relevance for the Commission's responsibilities under the Agreement.

The Canadian Government believes that it has been more than sympathetic and understanding towards the Indian Government in the latter's desire not to take rapid action on the Legal Report; at the same time it would be unfortunate if this attitude on the part of the Canadian Government were to be misinterpreted as indicating a permanent abandonment of a determination to process the Legal Report in the normal way and to take action on it as required. In view of the importance which the Canadian Government attaches to the desirability of maintaining close cooperative contacts with the Government of India in discharging Commission responsibilities, it would be very reluctant to be forced into taking unilateral action to correct the Commission's prolonged neglect of the problem of subversion in Vietnam. The Canadian Government, however, wishes to make it very clear that it is inevitably considering the possibilities open to it in the event that Canada is put in a minority position in Saigon on this important question of principle. [38]

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[38] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Given by Arnold Smith to Indian High Commissioner, 30/11/64. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

64.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. Y-864
Ottawa, December 1, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate. For delivery to Minister by 9 a.m.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS, Saigon (OpImmediate).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

Following for Minister from Under-Secretary:

Indian responses to date to our representations about contents of forthcoming report to Co-Chairmen have been most unsatisfactory. Indians appear to be adamant in refusal to consider our desire to make report comprehensive and balanced by including adequate subversion content. On other hand, I am convinced that no useful purpose would be served by our departing significantly from policy objectives laid down earlier in face of this show of Indian determination.

2. As recommended in my memorandum to you of November 27 bearing same title as this telegram, I would suggest that you discuss this problem with Swaran Singh at an early opportunity in final attempt to overcome Indian intransigence. From the manner in which Swaran Singh treated Mr. Michener's latest démarche (copy of Delhi telegram 1332 of November 27 was attached to my memo, forwarded to you by bag November 30), it is possible to speculate that Indians do not fully appreciate importance we attach to this matter or that they are attempting by a show of diplomatic firmness to have us back down. I am sure you will agree that it would be desirable to clarify both points with Swaran Singh personally. In your discussion with him you may also wish to challenge his assertion as reported in Delhi reference telegram (paragraph 4) that "Candel Saigon seemed to be in agreement with Indel on contents". There has of course never been any such intimation of agreement since we have from the beginning based our position on need for balanced report. You may also wish to develop implications of Swaran Singh's own argument (same paragraph Delhi reference telegram) that Special Report might be acceptable because it denied Commission competence. The logical and political inconsistency as well as the danger in forwarding a report on a matter which is beyond Commission competence seems to require emphasis.

3. Since Swaran Singh has remained unmoved by any arguments we have put forward explicitly heretofore, I believe that you would be fully justified, as recommended in paragraph 4 of my memorandum under reference, to outline clearly that Indians may be forcing us into unilateral action on the Legal Report.

4. You should know that Arnold Smith spoke at length to Indian High Commissioner here yesterday and handed him aide-mémoire which emphasized importance we attach to subversion problem. Text of aide-mémoire is in our telegram Y-860† of November 30, repeated to Permis New York. You will note, however, that it is based essentially on your instructions to Mr. Michener in New Delhi and that it refers only obliquely in concluding paragraph to possibilities open to us in event we are put in minority position in Saigon on subversion problem. I believe, however, that in final effort to convince Indians, this oblique reference should now be made in most direct terms possible, i.e., that we will have no choice but to present a strong exposition of our views as a Minority Statement to accompany Special Message, and that while we would be reluctant to do so we might find it necessary to include material from Legal Report (i.e., its conclusions) or report itself in its entirety.

65.
Telegram from Permanent Mission to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.1

No. 1840
New York, December 3, 1964
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tels Y-860 Nov 30; Y-862†, Y-863†, Y-864 Dec 1.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva; Delhi, CDS, VCDS from Ottawa; Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London.

VIETNAM COMMISSION REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

In his call on Indian Foreign Minister this morning, Minister left memorandum text as in your first reference telegram edited for New York. Ensuing discussion which followed longer one on financing of UN peacekeeping was discouraging in that Swaran Singh purported to see lack of logical or political inconsistency much less danger in proposal of forwarding Special Report on Tonkin Gulf incidents stating lack of Commission competence. Moreover, he argued against "raking up old irritations" by further action on Legal Committee Report which he referred to as covering cases which went back "so many years". He also purported to be unaware of and unimpressed by lack of action on current complaints of infiltration and subversion. There was nothing in what Minister said to indicate that any new instructions such as those referred to in your second reference telegram have been issued to Indel Saigon. On contrary, his remarks rather echoed Indian position of Rahman's predecessor including even reference to possibility of Commission's being physically ejected from North Vietnam if its reports were such as to disturb situation. While there is some possibility that this discussion and study of memo left with Minister will result in further consideration of Indian position on next Interim Report we sensed no repeat no indication that points put to Swaran Singh had moved him very far and he also seemed to be unaware of any undertaking to arrange further action in Commission on Legal Committee Report.

66.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] December 18, 1964

VIETNAM COMMISSION: REPORT TO CO-CHAIRMEN

Since it is likely that the Vietnam Commission will be forwarding a report to the Co-Chairmen in the near future, I thought that the following brief account of the results of our most recent discussions with the Indians would be of interest to you.

2. Following your discussion with Swaran Singh in New York and our earlier approaches here and in New Delhi, the Indians indicated (but in rather imprecise terms) that they might be willing to proceed with the processing of the long-delayed Legal Report by the

Commission. Since the Indian "proposal" was for the larger part vague, and, where it was more precise, unsatisfactory from our point of view, we decided that it would be worth one final effort to see whether they were in fact prepared to deal now or in the immediate future with the subversion problem in an adequate manner.

3. I therefore approved a proposal, which was put to the High Commissioner here and to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in New Delhi, whereby we would agree to sign a Special Message dealing with the Tonkin Gulf incidents but making explicit reference to the Commission's very limited competence to deal with these problems as presented by North Vietnam, and promising a full Interim Report by a specified date early in 1965. In return the Indians would agree to sign the Legal Report and have it adopted in its entirety by the Commission: as soon as the Commission had adopted the Legal Report we would have been prepared to sign a Special Message such as the one outlined above. I am sure you will agree that in view of the significance of the Commission taking official and full cognizance of the problem of subversion in Vietnam, a bargain along these lines would have clearly been to our advantage because the full Interim Report, to which the Special Message would commit the Commission, would then have to encompass detailed treatment of the Legal Report and its conclusions about the subversive activities conducted by North Vietnam in the South.

4. The Office of our High Commissioner in New Delhi subsequently reported that the Indians found our proposal unacceptable. Consequently the Delegation in Saigon is now proposing amendments to the Indian-Polish draft of the Special Message to have it include material dealing with subversion and other violations of the Agreement by North Vietnam. Although we expect our amendments to be rejected, we believe that there will be advantage in creating a situation whereby the Indians and the Poles will be forced to turn down our proposals to report to the Co-Chairmen on matters having a direct bearing on the Geneva Agreement.

5. Our attempts to widen the scope of the Special Message will probably not be successful and we shall then append a strong Minority Statement to the Indian-Polish majority report. Such a statement has been drafted and a copy of the text is attached for your information. You will note that the penultimate paragraph will include the conclusions of the Legal Report. We have warned the Indians repeatedly that we might be forced to take this action, and we have given them every opportunity to co-operate with us. It is unfortunate, however, that they have not been prepared to give us any satisfaction.

6. This minority action on our part will doubtless affect our relations with India; it will also probably produce a reaction from North Vietnam and its ultimate effect on the operations of the Commission cannot be predicted at this time. I am sure you will agree, however, that inaction and repeated unilateral concessions on our part, when action and compromise on the part of others are clearly required, is a policy which can be justified for only so long. I believe that continued acquiescence in the Indians' desire to procrastinate and to overlook North Vietnamese breaches of the Agreement would, in the long run, create many more serious problems for us than the present measures which, it must be recognized, the Indians themselves have forced us to adopt.

A.E. R[itchie] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

67.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.2

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] January 22, 1965

VIETNAM COMMISSION

You will recall that over the past few months we have attempted, unsuccessfully, to find common ground with the Indians in connection with the question of reporting to the Co-Chairmen on the Tonkin Gulf incidents in August. Our first proposal was that the Special Message dealing with these incidents alone, as proposed by the Indians, should be abandoned in favour of a long overdue full Interim Report which would deal with these incidents in the context of the Commission's full range of responsibilities. The Indians were unwilling to handle the project in this way and our next proposal involved proposing a series of amendments to the text of the Special Message tentatively agreed to by the Indians and the Poles; the purpose and substance of these amendments was to set the Tonkin Gulf incidents in a wider perspective and to present a more balanced and accurate picture of the significant factors in the situation in Vietnam.

2. These amendments proved unacceptable to the Indians and as a last resort, we informed them on December 10 that we would sign a Special Message dealing with the Tonkin Gulf incidents but spelling out clearly the Commission's lack of competence to deal with this problem (except in very limited respects) and promising a full Interim Report by a specified date early in 1965 if the Indians would agree to the immediate processing (i.e., formal adoption of the draft text by the Commission's Legal Committee, presentation to and adoption by the Commission itself) of the long outstanding Legal Report. When the Indians rejected this offer, it was clear that we had no alternative but to submit a Canadian Minority Statement, including the text of the Legal Report's Summary of Conclusions; the draft text of this proposed statement, as well as the possibility that its presentation would undoubtedly give rise to some difficulties in our relations with the Indians, was brought to your attention with my memorandum of December 18, 1964, copy of which is attached for reference.

3. It has now been made clear to the Indians that we have not been bluffing in our earlier references to the possibility of taking minority action along these lines, and they now seem to understand that we intend to publish, unilaterally, extracts from the draft Legal Report. I should point out at this stage that the Legal Report itself, which has caused so much discussion between ourselves and the Indians is essentially a draft document; it has never been formally adopted by the Legal Committee and presented to the Commission for acceptance and action on its recommendations. In our view, however, it is nonetheless an official Commission document. It was prepared on instructions by the Commission, pursuant to Commission decisions; it was drafted by the Legal Advisers of the Indian and Canadian Delegations (the Pole refused to participate) and subsequently it was thoroughly re-edited in the same way. Moreover, the Commission's Special Report of June 2, 1962 was based on the preliminary conclusions of the Legal Committee's study of subversion and refers to the Legal Committee's intention to forward a full report in due course on which the Commission committed itself to take action as appropriate. Thus, although the draft report's status has not been formalized by adoption in the Legal Committee and in the Commission, it is impossible to maintain that the document itself has no status.

4. The Indian High Commissioner called on Arnold Smith on January 20 to make two proposals. His first offer was that a revised version of the Legal Report be prepared, extracting from the existing document only a limited number of specific cases of violation by North Vietnam; the Indians would be prepared to have the Commission, basing itself on such a report, come to the conclusion by Indian-Canadian majority that the PAVN had violated the Agreement in specific instances. This Indian proposal would avoid the use of those passages in the Legal Report's conclusions which rely on specific instances to draw general conclusions about the aggressive policies of North Vietnam which are aimed at the overthrow of the Government in South Vietnam. The Indians claim that in coming to these conclusions the Legal Committee exceeded its terms of reference. In our view, the Legal

Committee's work was well-founded and the evidence before it was sufficient to reach the conclusions outlined in the draft report; Indian reluctance to deal with this problem is clearly based on political rather than juridical considerations.

5. We do not believe that the High Commissioner's first proposal referred to above is attractive. It would amount to burying the existing draft Report, discarding its wider conclusions and abandoning it as an invaluable working precedent. In the final analysis, the Indian proposal would give us no more, in terms of pointing out North Vietnam's violations of the Agreement, than the Special Report of 1962. If we were to accept this offer, which appears to be contingent on obtaining our agreement to sign a Special Message on the Tonkin Gulf incidents, we would be giving in to the Indians' desire to ignore virtually everything that has been done by the Commission in the subversion field in return for nothing more than a fairly weak reiteration of the indictments already made public in the 1962 Special Report. This is a poor bargain.[39]

6. The High Commissioner's second proposal was that if we decided to go ahead with the Minority Statement, we should not include extracts from the draft Legal Report but state the case on Northern subversion as we saw it in our own words only. Acharya claimed that, if we were to use quotations from the draft Legal Report, we would be committing a "procedural transgression and substantial impropriety" and that the Indians would find themselves obliged to say so. He went on to say that if we used these quotations the Indians would not only repudiate our action but also refuse to process the Report further. He claimed that the Report was only a draft, that it had never been approved, that it was not a Commission document and that it had no status.

7. We agree that it would be preferable to have the draft report processed by the Commission in the normal manner, as the Indians have promised to do in the past. Faced with Indian procrastination and their subsequently expressed refusal to process the draft Report in its present form, we believe that we have no alternative but to act on our own and that we would be fully justified in proceeding on a minority basis to do something which the Indians promised to do on a majority basis, i.e., to have the Commission take official cognizance of the subversion problem in Vietnam and report on this problem to the Co-Chairmen.

8. I should be grateful for your authorization to inform the Indian High Commissioner

(a) that after careful consideration we cannot accept his first proposal that a watered-down Legal Report be prepared; that we believe the existing draft Legal Report represents a careful study of the evidence before the Committee and embodies valid conclusions which do not go beyond the Committee's terms of reference; and that we continue to believe that the draft Legal Report should be processed by the Commission in accordance with its normal working methods;

(b) that if the Indians are prepared to proceed immediately on the basis of the existing text up to and including a vote by Indian-Canadian majority in the Commission to accept the draft Report *in toto* with follow-up action on the Report's recommendations to be taken as appropriate, we will agree, at that point, to sign a Special Message reporting on the Tonkin Gulf incidents in appropriate terms and promising a full Interim Report by a specified date in the very near future; this amounts to a reiteration of the proposal we put forward on December 10, 1964;

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[39] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Agreed. P[aul] M[artin]

(c) that if the Indian Government persists in refusing to apply normal processing procedures to the draft Legal Report, we must retain our full freedom of action to deal with this document as we see fit; we cannot agree that a document which has been prepared, and re-edited, within the Commission and on Commission instructions, even if it has never been formally adopted, has no status.

9. The possible consequences, as I see them of this action on our part will be as follows:

(a) The Indians, realizing that we are serious about publishing the Legal Report's conclusions may decide to accept our offer of December 10 referred to in paragraphs 2 and 8(b) above. This seems unlikely but if they did, it would meet our requirements admirably since the Interim Report promised in the bargain could deal extensively with subversion, drawing fully on the Legal Report which would then have full and formal status. If the Indians then refused to deal with contents of the Report, we could still publish it, in whole or in part, in a unilateral statement.

(b) The Indians will probably decide to go ahead with the Special Message project, which will inevitably mean the inclusion of extracts from the Legal Report in our Minority Statement, and append a further statement of their own to the effect that we have made unauthorized and unwarranted use of a document which had no status and to which we had no right. This, in turn, might lead to (i) some public debate with the Indians over Commission policy (though only if they choose to take the initiative), and (ii) a refusal on the Indians' part to do anything further with the Legal Report itself.

10. With regard to (i) above, I believe that our position is much stronger than the Indian one and when they examine their position in detail it is to be hoped that they will see that public recriminations on their part, on legalistic grounds, may lead to embarrassing political questions which they will be hard-pressed to answer, i.e., why the subversion problem in general and the Legal Report specifically, have become stalled in the Commission. I believe that our own position, if pressed to answer similar questions, is much better and that we can demonstrate a willingness and an effort to have the Commission deal fully and adequately with the subversion problem in Vietnam. With regard to (ii) above, the Indians will similarly have difficulty in justifying, on adequate political grounds, a formal decision to jettison the draft Legal Report completely. But even if they are prepared to go this far the resulting situation could not be any worse than it is now whereby deliberate Indian procrastination has effectively muzzled the Commission insofar as North Vietnamese aggressive activities are concerned. Indeed, the proposed Canadian Minority Statement, although less effective than a majority report, will go some distance towards drawing public attention to the fact that it is North Vietnam which is creating the instability in the South and not the American presence *per se*.

11. Although these prospects are not altogether attractive in terms of our relations with India, I believe that at this juncture we have no other alternative than to stick by the firm line we have been following in the Commission. You will recall that in an interview published recently by *Le Devoir*, you indicated that Canadian policy was to attempt to make the Commissions function as effectively as possible and in a manner as close as possible to the original intention of the Geneva Conference; to the extent that we were frustrated in the attempt, we intended to show where responsibility rested for failure.[40] The Indians are doubtless aware of the firmer policy you have authorized and the present situation will provide a demonstration of our intentions. I believe that if we agree to anything less than the terms of our offer of December 10, it will amount to capitulation to Indian procrastination, implied threats and bullying; and this in turn will mean that we have abandoned all claim to credibility and to any influence over the future work of the Vietnam Commission.

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[40] See/Voir Jean Tainturier, « M. Martin expose au *Devoir* les grandes lignes de la diplomatie canadienne », *Le Devoir*, 6 janvier 1965, p. 1, 8-9.

To surrender the field to Indian interests which are clearly quite different from our own, could quite easily lead to a recrudescence of criticism of Canadian policy in the press and this might be more difficult to handle than in the past; having announced an intention to make the Commission function properly, we must be able either to demonstrate some degree of success or to delineate responsibility for the failure or frustration of constructive Canadian efforts.[41]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

68.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/1.2

No. Y-44
Ottawa, January 28, 1965
Secret. OpImmediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-37† Jan 26.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Routine).
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION SPECIAL MESSAGE

Indian High Commissioner received reply from Arnold Smith January 27 along lines approved by Minister as described [in] our reference telegram. Arnold Smith pointed out that Indian offer described in paragraph 2 our telegram Y-30† January 21 amounted merely to repetition of what was already made public in Special Report of 1962 paragraph 10. We had considered carefully suggestion that it would be wrong to quote Legal Committee Report but could not agree with Indian contention especially in light of fact that Indians themselves joined us in 1962 to quote from Legal Committee's Preliminary Report in paragraph 9 of Special Report of 1962. This incidentally answers point raised in paragraph 6 of your telegram 36† January 16.

2. We saw ourselves as merely carrying through promise contained in subparagraph 2 of paragraph 9 of Special Report of 1962 (i.e., to submit "in due course a full report setting out in detail complaints made by SVM, evidence forwarded in relation to these complaints and our specific observations thereon") unilaterally instead of by majority as Gundevia had promised us so often would be done.

3. Arnold Smith repeated that we were still ready to live up to offer we had made December 10, 1964, but could not accept a watering down of Legal Committee Report. At Indian High Commissioner's request this proposal was reviewed with him in some detail making it especially clear that if Indians took us up on this offer, we would want firm and early date for submission of Interim Report and that we would consider Legal Committee Report open for all appropriate use in any new Interim Report.

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[41] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
This is painful but necessary. And in the end, this will be good for the Indians themselves. In the past their role in the Commission has been too often geared to their shifting political objectives rather than to the higher requirements of serving the world community firmly and fairly. M[arcel] C[adieux]
I agree. P[aul] M[artin]

4. Replying to High Commissioner's assertion last week that Legal Committee had exceeded its terms of reference in drawing general conclusions as well as specific ones, Arnold Smith said we had studied these terms of reference with great care and had come to conclusion that Legal Committee had been given very broad mandate to "deal" with SVM letters which covered all aspects of subversion problem. For your own info this opinion has been checked carefully by our Legal Division who are satisfied that propriety of action of Legal Committee can be upheld.

5. Arnold Smith emphasized that we did not see any impropriety in quoting from Legal Committee Report and if it is necessary for us to make conclusions of this report public unilaterally, we shall do so though with regret because action has to be unilateral. He suggested that differing on this matter in Commission while regrettable was not a tragedy which need harm Canadian-Indian bilateral relations or lead to mutual recrimination. Neither did he think it necessarily had to lead to further splits within Commission although just as this was not first such split it would probably not be last. But we always preferred acting together.

6. You should now be prepared for this matter to come to head in Commission. It is our hope that Indians will not make heavy weather of this matter but if they do it is our conviction that it is they who will make themselves look ridiculous for attempting to suppress report of which they are co-authors and which they agreed with us originally fell within proper sphere of Commission. It is not our intention to take propaganda initiative but if Indians make statements which we consider harmful to our position naturally we shall have to be in position to reply adequately. Therefore as unclear parts of Indel/Poldel report become clear and as blanks in Canadian Minority Statement can be filled in we should like to have texts by OpImmediate wire if necessary in order that we may be prepared to make these documents public. In future discussions in Commission please make it absolutely clear that content of Canadian Minority Statement is not proper subject for Commission discussion except *ex post facto*.

69.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/2.1

No. 83
Saigon, February 8, 1965
Confidential. Emergency from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Washington, Permis New York, CDS, DGPO, DM/DND from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hanoi from Saigon.

COMMISSION CONSIDERATION OF EVENTS OF FEBRUARY 7

Commission held emergency informal meeting this morning at request of Deputy Polish Commissioner (Stawicki is in Hanoi) to consider air strike against DRVN.

2. Pole referred to joint USA-SVM communiqué regarding air strike against DRVN[42] and argued Commission should take immediate action. He proposed telegram to Co-Chairmen informing them of "serious situation" as result of violation of Articles 19 and 24 of Geneva

[42] See/Voir Annex A, United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 2609, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965), p. 6.

Agreement and asking them both to undertake immediate steps necessary for prevention of further violations and to give guidance to Commission in present situation. He also proposed letter to SVM asking them to cease violations of Geneva Agreement.

3. I pointed out that Commission had no repeat no firm info regarding events of February 7 in DRVN and that certain facts would have to be verified before Commission could decide whether there had been violation of Geneva Agreement. I then referred to joint communiqué issued on evening of February 7 by Acting Prime Minister Oanh and Ambassador Taylor which read "military action has been taken today against military installations of North Vietnam. These installations had been employed in the direction and support of those engaged in aggression in South Vietnam, such as the attacks early this morning against installations and personnel at Pleiku and Tuy Hoa". I stressed that the Commission consideration of events of February 7 would have to include attacks in both North and South Vietnam rather than just air strike on DRVN proposed by Pole. It would also have to be put in perspective of growing DRVN complicity in subversive war as indicated by recently released figures of infiltrations.

4. Chairman said that, because of conflicting views, he would have to consult his government. His initial reaction was that Commission was obliged to bring serious situation to attention of Co-Chairmen. He stressed that joint communiqué referred to events in both North and South and I imagine he will recommend that Commission should at least bring communiqué to attention of Co-Chairmen.

5. Stawicki returns from Hanoi February 9 and Poles have asked for formal meeting February 10. We would be grateful to have your views urgently on how we should play this matter. At moment, we have no repeat no hard facts and, from point of view of Geneva Agreement, key seems to be whether or not repeat not South Vietnamese participated in attack, whether attack took place from SVN territory, or whether issuance of joint communiqué itself constitutes violation of Geneva Agreement.

[J.B.] Seaborn

70.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/2.1

No. Y-71
Ottawa, February 9, 1965
Confidential. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tel 83 Feb 8.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Immediate).
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

COMMISSION CONSIDERATION OF EVENTS OF FEBRUARY 7

In light of Indian High Commissioner's representations here today (which will form subject of another telegram) based on Government of India statement February 8[43] (Delhi telegram 109† February 9) there would appear to be possibility that Indians will not repeat

[43] See/Voir doc. 224.

not press for immediate reporting action by Commission until results of appeal are known. You should therefore take advantage of any indication that Rahman shows of desire to give full and detailed consideration to project proposed by Pole.

2. In our view current situation differs from that prevailing in August because South Vietnam obviously and directly involved. We believe it would be inappropriate for Candel to appear in a position of questioning this involvement or demanding too legalistic standard of proof. Joint communiqué implies sufficient involvement to make such an approach appear disingenuous and undesirable.

3. When Commission discusses this matter tomorrow you should point out to Indel and Poldel that Canadian Government fully shares their concern with increasingly dangerous situation in Vietnam. Insofar as Commission action is concerned, we believe that Commission is caught in dilemma of having neglected problem of subversion for so long. Having said nothing about this matter for the past two and a half years, Commission is now in position of having to take cognizance of dangerous and dramatic developments of which subversion is basic cause. To ignore or to play down this factor would be to mislead members of the Geneva Conference in dangerous way. These basic ideas will be familiar to you and you will be able to elaborate on them more fully.

4. You should conclude your intervention by reaffirming Canadian willingness to cooperate in exercise of Commission's proper functions and to proceed accordingly on basis of judicious consideration of material before it, including allegations and special investigation reports and all their relevant material. We are quite prepared to report to Co-Chairmen but on the condition that such report presents balanced account of factors giving rise to present problem. It will be up to Indians and Poles to suggest form which they believe report should take. If adequate account is taken of all relevant factors we would be prepared to sign such a document. On other hand, if emphasis of report falls too heavily on any one factor or set of factors, we must reserve freedom of action to correct such imbalance, unilaterally if necessary.

5. We are not repeat not attracted by proposal that Commission forward only text of joint USA-SVN communiqué, partly because Pole may well insist on including North Vietnamese declaration[44] as well (which is highly polemical document) and partly because responding to USA/SVN action alone is in itself one-sided. If it is appropriate to express our reservations on this project, you should explain that we believe that Commission must play something more than postman's role. Text of joint declaration and other statements will be readily available to Co-Chairmen and other interested powers and we believe that no repeat no useful purpose would be served by simply transmitting existing text or texts which might by implication deny that Commission has competence to make substantive comments and interpretation. Our final reaction to report along these lines would obviously depend on what Indians (primarily) intend to put into any covering letter of transmission. If Rahman, contrary to our expectations, shows signs of determination to proceed immediately with some sort of report to Co-Chairmen, involving either referral of joint declaration alone or declaration together with covering letter, you should indicate that you will have to consult us urgently for final instructions.

6. Grateful for text by telegram of USA/SVN declaration.

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[44] See/Voir "Text of North Viet-Nam Statement," *Washington Post*, 8 February 1965, p. A14.

71.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/2.1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] February 11, 1965

VIETNAM COMMISSION: SPECIAL MESSAGE TO CO-CHAIRMEN ON RETALIATORY ATTACKS OF FEBRUARY 7-8 AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Our Commissioner in Saigon has reported that the Indians and Poles appear determined to proceed urgently, possibly by the end of this week, with a Special Message to the Co-Chairmen on the recent USA-South Vietnamese retaliatory raids on North Vietnam.

2. The draft which the Indians have presented is unacceptable for the same reasons as the Tonkin Gulf Special Message was unacceptable: by restricting itself to consideration of activities by the USA and South Vietnam, it implies that the full responsibility for the dangerous situation in Vietnam rests with these two countries alone. The Indian draft makes no mention whatsoever of DRVN subversion, and it seems clear beyond doubt that we will be unsuccessful in our attempts to have this problem covered.

3. In these circumstances, we appear to have no alternative but to think again in terms of submitting a strong Minority Statement, along the lines of the text we had anticipated including with the Tonkin Gulf Special Message and including extracts (i.e., the Summary of Conclusions) from the Legal Report. The availability of these conclusions in the public domain which will come about as a result of a Canadian Minority Statement, will undoubtedly prove useful in the difficult weeks ahead.

4. In earlier instructions to Seaborn this week, I authorized him to proceed with this project on the basis of proposing amendments to the Indian draft Message which will broaden the scope of the Message so that it will include other material but especially material relating to subversion. In doing so, however, I have asked Seaborn to ensure that the tactics he uses do not result in stalemating majority action thus making it impossible for us to bring the Legal Report's conclusions out into the open. Copies of the relevant outgoing telegrams, as well as a copy of Seaborn's telegram No. 107† are attached.

5. The text of a suitable Canadian Minority Statement based on the earlier version but with appropriate changes, is being prepared as a matter of urgency in Saigon. Because of insufficient time, we do not have a text available but I believe that the instructions which Seaborn has received, as well as indications of the outlines of his own thinking, are sufficient to ensure that what he produces will be satisfactory for our purposes.

6. I am attaching for your signature if you approve, a brief *en clair* (in the interests of speed) telegram† to Saigon giving Seaborn your formal authorization to proceed, and to sign a Minority Statement along the lines contemplated.[45]

7. I find it curious that the Indians are pressing ahead with a project of this nature at the same time as they are appealing, on a broader basis and in a much more acceptable way (by deliberately avoiding the open apportionment of blame) for the exercise of restraint and the avoidance of provocative action on the part of all concerned.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[45] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Y-83 signed & sent 4:30 February 11. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

72.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/2.1

No. 116
Saigon, February 13, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-83† Feb 11 and My Tel 110† Feb 12.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hanoi from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: SPECIAL MESSAGE TO CO-CHAIRMEN REGARDING FEBRUARY 7-8 AIR STRIKES

Formal meeting today went according to pre-arranged scenario. Indian Commissioner tabled Indian-Polish draft message to Co-Chairmen (copy to you via our telegram 115† February 13). I spoke along lines indicated in my reference telegram (copy of statement went forward today's unclassified bag). Indel-Poldel draft was approved by majority vote. I then tabled Canadian Minority Statement which will be transmitted to you by subsequent telegram.

2. After short adjournment first Polish Commissioner and then Indian Commissioner spoke [of] impropriety of inclusion in Canadian statement of quotations from document which had no repeat no status within Commission, and both said they would have to append brief remarks to this effect in message to Co-Chairmen. As neither, however, questioned whether or not repeat not Canadian statement should be forwarded to Co-Chairmen in its entirety, I made only brief rebuttal of their charges of impropriety using arguments which you had supplied some time ago regarding report on Gulf of Tonkin incidents. We shall forward text of Indian-Polish comments on Canadian statement as soon as available.

3. It was agreed that text of majority report, Canadian statement and Indel-Poldel comment would be transmitted by telegram to Delhi and there conveyed to British and Soviet representatives for onward transmission to Co-Chairmen. Two original signed copies complete with appendices will be forwarded by first bag to Delhi for transmission to same destinations.

[J.B.] Seaborn

73.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10124, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/2.1

Secret.
[Ottawa,] February 26, 1965

VIETNAM COMMISSION: SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN ON THE RECENT AIR STRIKES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

I am attaching for your perusal a copy of the complete text of the Special Message of February 13 from the Vietnam Commission to the Co-Chairmen reporting on the air strikes in early February against North Vietnam. As you know this document comprises an Indian-Polish

Majority Report with Annexures, and a Canadian Minority Statement with three Appendices; you will note that it also includes separate Indian and Polish statements on the Canadian minority action.[46]

2. I thought that you might wish to have these documents for the weekend to enable you to familiarize yourself with the contents. As soon as we have received a clear indication from London on publication – and we are pressing them for an early decision – we can proceed with tabling this document here and releasing it to the press. A draft statement for your use in the House is under preparation.

3. The Canadian Minority Statement represents an attempt to put recent events in Vietnam (i.e., the air strikes) in proper perspective by drawing attention to the significance of subversion as the basic cause of instability. To highlight the subversion problem, we have quoted extracts in the form of general conclusions, from the draft report of the Legal Committee which as you know the Indians have resolutely refused to process. These conclusions are based on a vast number of allegations of Northern violations of the Agreement as early as 1955 and of violent subversion beginning somewhat later. The time span of the material on which the draft Legal Report is based is thus from 1955 to 1961. Allegations of subversion since 1961 have been repeatedly referred to the Legal Committee, but no further report has been forthcoming, largely because of Indian reluctance to deal with this problem adequately. For this reason, minority action on our part was necessary if we were not prepared to have it appear as if the Commission had downgraded – almost to oblivion – the significance of Northern interference in South Vietnam.

4. I am sure you will agree that this is a useful report, even if we are in minority. The Canadian statement, you will note, is a very strong one and I think that the net impact is in our favour. I do not anticipate any difficulty in meeting the points raised in the comments of the Indian and Polish Delegations; I think we should do so, however, in a non-argumentative way, leaving it to the Indians to take elaborate public issue with us if they so desire. I doubt, however, whether they will wish to do so since they are on relatively weak ground politically, in this context, and more generally because such public recriminations at this juncture would probably not serve their purposes.

5. Attached for your initials and onward transmission if you approve, is a brief memorandum for the Prime Minister covering a copy of the Special Message.[47]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

74.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10125, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/2.2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] March 3, 1965

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[46] See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 2609, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965).

[47] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
[Stamped] Seen by Prime Minister

VIETNAM COMMISSION: FEBRUARY 13 SPECIAL MESSAGE
AND CANADIAN MINORITY STATEMENT

I am attaching for your perusal the text of a statement which I would suggest you make in the House of Commons on Monday, March 8 in tabling the Vietnam Commission's Special Message of February 13 which as you know contains an important Minority Statement by Canada.[48]

2. You will also note that I am recommending that you table the main text of the Special Report of June 2, 1962 which has never been presented officially to the House. I believe this would be desirable because the Canadian Minority Statement in the February 13 Special Message follows through on the 1962 Special Report's observations on subversion and must be seen against the background of this earlier Report. The tabling of this earlier Report, in which we were in majority with the Indians, will serve a useful purpose in drawing attention to the fact that the Commission's examination of subversion goes back a number of years, and that our present Minority Statement represents unilateral fulfilment of an earlier majority commitment.

3. I believe that there are compelling reasons for making a rather extensive statement at the time of tabling:

(a) Canada has taken a strong minority position, and while we are on sound grounds in doing so, I believe that our action merits a full explanation.

(b) Without an explanation on your own initiative, a great many individual questions will probably be raised in the House and elsewhere. Rather than attempt to deal with these piecemeal, I think it would save time and make clarification easier if anticipated questions were answered before they arise. It is particularly important to clarify in the House the history of the Legal Committee Report and our reasons for quoting from this report over the objections of the Indians.

(c) A Statement along the lines suggested is necessary to underline the main conclusions which we wish to have drawn from our Minority Statement; it will provide a suitable basis for press reports of your views as expressed in the House, and a useful guide for press and public review of this document.

(d) The tabling of this Special Message provides an appropriate opportunity to put on the record a comprehensive review of Canadian views on the situation in Vietnam and particularly to bring into sharp focus the role of North Vietnam as the disturbing force; as you know this is an aspect of the situation which is badly misunderstood by the public.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

75.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 204
Saigon, March 5, 1965
Confidential. Priority from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, Geneva, CDS, DGPO, DM/DND from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Wellington, Canberra, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hong Kong, Hanoi from Saigon.

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[48] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 11, pp. 12065–12067.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes,* 26e législature, 2e session, vol. 11, p. 12255-12257.

PAVN VIEWS ON CANDEL, TEAM WITHDRAWAL AND FUTURE OF COMMISSION

During call on Col. Ha Van Lau, which took place ten minutes after he had heard first news of latest air strikes, I was treated to what is probably toughest harangue against Candel and Canadian Government (including reference to Prime Minister Pearson's address to Canadian Club Ottawa February 10)[49] since our signature of Special Report in 1962. Full details, especially those recounting sins of USA, are not repeat not worth reporting by telegram though memo of conversation is going forward by bag.

2. Vigour of Ha Van Lau's remarks stemmed from his knowledge of our minority report to Co-Chairmen on February 7 and 8 air strikes, though it had not repeat not yet been distributed to Geneva Conference members. Gist of complaints was that by reproducing USA-SVN lies regarding Northern involvement in Vietcong insurgence we had slandered DRVN, shown complete lack of objectivity, contributed to rather than helped to deter continued aggression in Vietnam and shown ourselves to be merely mouthpiece of imperialists on whose orders we seemed to be acting.

3. I said I could contest almost every statement Ha Van Lau had made regarding situation in Vietnam and intentions of those involved in struggle but would not repeat not bother to do so as it would lead us nowhere. He knew my views from previous conversations and knew that we could not repeat not agree. As for Minority Statement, we based our statements and conclusions on evidence before us which we found incontrovertible. In so doing, we had acted according to our conscience and our conception of our proper role in ICSC. I rejected allegation we had acted on orders or instigation of others.

4. Regarding Canadian participation in Commission, I said we had taken on task over 10 years ago but on sense of responsibility and on urging of others. It was arduous and thankless burden which we would gladly put down if our continued presence was not repeat not wanted, though we had no repeat no present intention of unilateral withdrawal. Ha Van Lau said decision regarding withdrawal was ours, but "people" would not repeat not understand our anti-DRVN, pro-American stand.

5. Attempt to get info regarding future of Northern team sites was not repeat not very successful. Ha Van Lau said decision rested with my American friends not repeat not with PAVN and it might be one month, it might be five months or longer, but teams could not repeat not return as long as DRVN remained under threat of USA attack.[50] At dinner March 2 in friendlier mood he said mission was "looking into" matter of controls based in Hanoi. For the moment at least there was no repeat no question of altering status of Hanoi office. He hoped ICSC might remain to do useful job in better days which he hoped lay ahead.

6. I shall enquire of Rahman whether he got any clearer idea of DRVN views on future of team sites and Commission as a whole and report further to you.

7. It is of some interest that despite fact new air strikes took place day after arrival of three Commissioners, complaint concerning March 2 raids reached us only late afternoon March 4. No repeat no suggestion was made that Head of PAVN mission address Commission, as was case in mid-August after Gulf of Tonkin raids, and authorities did not repeat not even organize public demonstrations to impress Commissioners. I wonder if this is sign of dwindling interest in Commission as such.

[J.B.] Seaborn

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[49] See/Voir Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/3, 10 February 1965.

[50] See/Voir docs 186–192.

76.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/3.1

No. 235
Saigon, March 15, 1965
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 220† Mar 11.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Paris, Geneva, Washington, CDS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hanoi from Saigon.

DRVN REACTION TO FEBRUARY 13 SPECIAL MESSAGE

On March 10, DRVN press made first mention of February 13 Special Message to Co-Chairmen and gave prominent coverage in all dailies. Three most prominent Hanoi dailies, *Nhan Dan*, *Thoi Moi* and *Thu Do*, all carried text of DRVN Foreign Ministry's statement of March 9[51] on message together with reports and commentaries sternly criticizing Canadian Minority Statement and unilateral British publication of message. Text of Foreign Ministry statement is contained in our reference telegram, while texts of one report and three commentaries are contained in numbered letters 164† and 166† March 13 and 16.

2. Although Foreign Ministry statement is directed mainly at Canadian position, it also expresses dissatisfaction at failure of Special Message "to severely condemn USA and its agents and to lay down positive steps to secure from them immediate end of their criminal acts against DRVN". Canadian Minority Statement is described as reversing right and wrong and slandering DRVN. Canadian representative had "based himself on false materials produced by USA and its agents" and had "echoed USA imperialists' contentions" without "making any positive contribution so far to fulfilment of IC's duties" and "completely at variance with IC's obligations to have Geneva Agreements respected and implemented", he had "distorted facts and attempted to whitewash USA aggressors". Connection is seen between Canadian statement and USA white book.[52] DRVN statement "rejects and strongly protests against" Canadian statement. In press commentaries, Canadian representative is branded as "mouthpiece of USA slander" and inventor of "false evidence" and statement as "slanderous document", justification of "savage acts of aggression of USA imperialists" and "plea on behalf of USA criminal acts and sabotage of Geneva Agreement". British Government is accused of "evil deed... in contradiction of its position as one of Co-Chairmen" and of "sabotage of Geneva Agreements". Alleged Canadian and British opposition to USA actions in Vietnam is cited in order to demonstrate that these governments are out of step with their public opinion.

3. Criticism follows line of DRVN criticism of 1962 Special Report, although Indians are now exempted. In comparison with that of commentaries, tone of Foreign Ministry Statement is reasonably restrained. Commentaries, particularly one in *Thoi Moi*, are vitriolic and [employ] outrageous language. What is noteworthy is that neither statement nor commentaries suggest that ICC or Candel have reached end of road and, in fact, final paragraph of statement implies that their responsibilities remain. This would suggest that authorities wish ICC to linger on in North, at least in present truncated symbolic form. (There has been no sign that

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[51] See/Voir "Reject Report," *Globe and Mail*, 10 March 1965, p. 3.

[52] See/Voir United States, Department of State, *Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1965).

they are considering return of fixed teams to Northern sites and even if there should be improvement in security situation I doubt they will ever permit it.) Interestingly enough, hostile barrage lasted for only one day and no repeat no mention of message was subsequently made by either Government or press. Nor did expected public reaction materialize: to date there have been no repeat no demonstrations or petitioning delegations in Hanoi. While public reaction might have been prevented by civil defence restrictions on public gatherings, short-lived reaction of authorities and their failure to organize mass protest more probably indicates growing DRVN apathy to ICC.

4. PAVN Liaison Mission has been rather unpleasant in several recent letters to ICC and there is possibility they may follow up Foreign Ministry statement with direct complaint to Commission. Without waiting for further comment however, I feel it most important that some official response be made to attack on Canadian delegation. Failure to respond will undoubtedly encourage DRVN authorities to take even greater liberties in future. Most appropriate would be strong letter of protest from Secretary General to Chief of Liaison Mission, which might also make reference to suggestion of inadequate ICC response. If you agree, therefore, I would propose to raise question of letter to Liaison Mission at informal meeting this week. I would probably get some measure of support from Indians, though they will be little disposed to agree to anything of substantive and vigorous nature. Poles would almost certainly be opposed to any comment at all by Commission. I might thus have to take matter up at formal meeting next week. We have, of course, many important items pending on agenda and are doing our best to deal with them. At same time, I do not repeat not see how we can tolerate either tone of communiqué and press comment or substance of criticism of Commission in general and Canadian delegation in particular. Even if I fail to persuade Indians to go along, I shall at least have placed something on record. In subsequent telegram I shall send you outline of proposed letter to PAVN. In event Indians resist, the Minister might wish to consider sending personal letter of protest to General Giap.

[J.B.] Seaborn

77.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/3.2

No. Y-209
Ottawa, March 17, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS.
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

I should be grateful if you could approach Foreign Minister Swaran Singh at earliest opportunity and present following message to him from me. My immediately following telegram outlines series of talking points which you should present orally in support of main arguments in my message.

2. Text begins. The Canadian Government, no less than the Indian Government is deeply concerned by recent developments in Indo-China, and more particularly in Vietnam, where our partnership in the International Commissions gives us a special awareness of the dangers to world peace inherent in the situation there, and a special responsibility to the international community to do what we can to further the peaceful resolution of this unhappy situation.

3. As you will be aware from recent statements by Prime Minister Pearson and myself, it is the firm conviction of the Canadian Government that no real progress can be made towards resolving these difficulties until the basic political facts of the situation have been identified and analyzed, and fully presented.[53] It is my considered view that the International Commission has a particularly important role to play in ensuring that responsible members of the international community and especially the prospective members for future conferences have a full and balanced assessment available to them if there is to be any chance of workable and generally acceptable solutions being put forward.

4. It is in this connection that I am becoming more and more puzzled by the differences which have manifested themselves in the International Commission in Vietnam. In my view, the Special Report of June 1962 was an impartial, balanced and useful appraisal of the factors producing the instability in Vietnam which has now reached very dangerous proportions. More than two and a half years have passed since India and Canada signed that report and in reviewing the record of those years, I am concerned by the increasingly apparent divergence between our Governments on what we think the Commission should say in public.

5. To state the case in its frankest terms, my concern relates to an apparent willingness on the part of Indian representatives to have the Commission react promptly and in certain circumstances, publicly, to complaints from the North, while complaints from the South, which are no less urgent in terms of their seriousness, are generally handled in such a way as to result in delays and inconclusive results. In view of the conclusions of the Special Report of 1962, which were endorsed by both our countries, I find it more and more difficult to justify the different treatment accorded by the Commission recently to the complaints received from the two parties. I refer, of course, not to procedural decisions but to conclusive results. What is required here, I believe, is not so much the elaboration of detailed procedures, as a political decision to proceed expeditiously with the examination of valid evidence with the intention of producing credible conclusions.

6. I see this task as essential in order that the Commission may, through the exercise of impartial procedures and judgment, produce balanced assessments of the nature of the problem in Vietnam. Only if such assessments are forthcoming will the international community be convinced of the potential usefulness of supervisory and control mechanisms – of whatever nature – in performing a valuable service in this situation and in others comparable to it. I am convinced that continued silence from the Commission on South Vietnamese complaints constitutes a dangerous precedent on both counts. Although it is inevitable that our views on some of these questions should differ on matters of detail, I am sure that there is no divergence of view between our two Governments on the fundamental issues at stake in Vietnam. I am, therefore, writing to you to express the hope that we may be able to re-establish the concrete and practical cooperation which resulted in the Special Report of 1962 in identifying these factors in a way which will reassert the necessary impartiality of the Commission's operations.

7. I have felt obliged to bring my concerns to your attention in a spirit of frankness since I believe that developments in the Vietnam Commission have reached a stage where we can no longer afford to sidestep issues on which our priorities, and our assessments of the requirements of the situation, appear to differ. I have sought to explain the Canadian position with all candour, and I hope that you will be able to reply in the same spirit. Paul Martin. Text ends.

[Paul] Martin

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[53] See/Voir Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/4, 18 February 1965; Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/6, 5 March 1965.

78.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/3.2

No. Y-210
Ottawa, March 17, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: My Tel Y-209 Mar 17.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (OpImmediate).
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

In presenting message outlined [in] my reference telegram, I should like you to make the following points orally with Indian Foreign Minister in developing the more generally worded themes in text of message itself.

2. (a) *Examples of different treatment given by Commission to Northern as opposed to Southern complaints*. When Northern authorities have repeatedly charged violations of their zone the Commission has – quite properly – reacted swiftly and proposed special investigations where these appear within its competence. Moreover, it has attached a high priority to reporting on these matters by informing Co-Chairmen. Southern complaints, more often than not, seem to get different treatment, not so much in terms of Commission's initial or procedural response but in relation to Commission's efforts to produce accepted conclusions which clearly delineate extent to which Northern aggression has manifested itself in South Vietnam. For years Commission has been aware of the fact, through South Vietnamese allegations and confirmation by observations of Commission teams in North Vietnam, that North Vietnam was in illegal possession of a considerable number of gunboats. It was not, however, until autumn of 1964 that Commission decision was taken on this problem and then only because it was unavoidable in light of Tonkin Gulf incidents which showed that PAVN had a fleet of gunboats. Furthermore, since that decision was made, no steps have been taken even to notify the party concerned that it has been found in default, much less to inform the members of the Geneva Conference. Similarly, South Vietnamese authorities have been advocating for years that the Commission undertake special controls at western end of demilitarized zone and the stationing of an element of Mobile Team 76 in the DZ North in an effort to verify the South's complaints against the North. Both proposals have been considered from time to time in the past but no concrete action taken. Commencing last summer they were again subjected to active review but as yet neither has been carried out. Such a delay, stretching over a period of years, is unreasonable and contrasts unfavourably with speed with which Commission has always offered to conduct investigations when complaining party is North Vietnam. Finally, there is work of Legal Committee. Ever since July 10/63 that committee has had before it a collection of South Vietnamese complaints which has been augmented by subsequent referrals from the Commission, dealing with North Vietnam's interference in South Vietnam. Task of examining this material and producing findings for Commissioners is surely of utmost urgency. We have had assurances from Indian High Commissioner here that it is not India's intention to suppress evidence of this nature. At same time it must be admitted that Commission's silence on these problems for two and a half years has had practical effect of confining South Vietnamese complaints of Northern subversion and aggression to oblivion. We are now anxious to secure Indian cooperation in having Commission correct its long silence on these complaints by reaching definite conclusions on basis of facts and evidence which are as obvious as facts adduced by Northern authorities in support of their complaints.

3. (b) *Comparison of reaction time as between Vietnam and Laos Commissions.* This same imbalance in priorities is evident when the fast reaction time of the Vietnam Commission in connection with the February 13 Special Message is contrasted with the long drawn-out efforts of the Laos Commission to produce a report on DRVN prisoners, whose presence and activities in Laos are no less serious than the developments on which the Vietnam Commission's February 13 Special Message were based.

4. (c) *Commission should deal with infractions of agreement by all parties.* We are allies of the United States in Europe, and of course we have a good understanding of U.S. motives for many of the things they do. We have, however, tried to keep our alliance with the Americans out of our practices in Vietnam, and have been willing, as the Special Report of 1962 showed, to reach objective decisions whether they were disadvantageous to the United States or not. We are aware of the fact that over the last ten years India and Canada have been together on more than 90 percent of decisions which were not unanimous. We do not think that we have changed our policy. What we objected to in the Special Message of February 13/65, was not the fact of criticism of South Vietnam but its lack of balance in refusing to see developments in context by totally disregarding the other main element in the situation which Canada and India had jointly endorsed in 1962.

5. (d) *Need to recognize and identify aggression is essential prerequisite to attempting to control it.* Having suffered at the hands of an aggressive neighbour, it seems to us that India has a special interest in this connection, and indeed, a special responsibility to the international community and to herself, in ensuring that aggression whether practised by China against India, or by North Vietnam against its neighbours, should be clearly identified as such and if possible, stopped before it appears to pay dividends as a policy. While we may differ in our views on the connection between the various disturbing forces at work in Vietnam, we are confident that the Indian Government would still agree, as we agreed in the Vietnam Commission's Special Report of 1962, that North Vietnamese policies have played a significant part in bringing about the situation which confronts us today.

6. (e) *Canadian assessments of Commission's usefulness.* There is one other important aspect of this problem which must, in all candour, be mentioned. A continuing unwillingness on India's part to have the Commission produce balanced reports, and more important, conclusive judgments reflecting what we all know to be shortcomings on *both* sides of the agreement, will force Canada into a continuing minority position in public presentations of these problems. Such a development will, unquestionably, have a serious effect on the Canadian Government's assessment of the impartiality of the Commission and therefore its usefulness; but more important perhaps, it will not be understood by Canadian public opinion amongst whom there exists a considerable fund of goodwill and understanding towards India.

[Paul] Martin

79.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/1.1

No. Y-217
Ottawa, March 18, 1965
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS.
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

Indian High Commissioner called on Under-Secretary yesterday at former's request. He did not appear to be acting on instructions.

2. Acharya presented USSEA with copy of Swaran Singh's tabling statement March 15[54] and explained that he wished to use this opportunity to make another attempt to explain Indian position and Indian views on Commission responsibilities. He felt justified in doing so because he sensed – and Under-Secretary confirmed that this was true – growing Canadian concern with Indian policy in Vietnam Commission. In Acharya's view, basic differences related to Indian belief that Commission had limited responsibilities to study and report on specific violations of Geneva Agreement, but India could not agree with the general type of political judgments and "commentaries" on which Canadian Minority Statement of February 13 seemed to be based. Political concepts such as "causes" and "nature of the problem in Vietnam" referred to in Canadian Minority Statement were beyond mandate of Commission in Indian view. USSEA pointed out that terminology notwithstanding, Canadian case remained intact. Canada was firmly convinced that there must be basic balance in Commission's work and for this reason we have been registering increasing dissatisfaction with what we perceive as differential treatment of complaints from North and complaints from South. We were therefore making a plea to the Indians that the Commission should discharge its responsibilities towards the two parties with equal determination even if this meant adaptation of working methods in recognition of the fact that the violations alleged by the two parties were of a fundamentally different character (a point to which Acharya had referred earlier in observing that airstrikes had been obvious and admitted while Northern violations required more careful examination and study before reaching conclusions).

3. Acharya also drew attention to phrase in Minister's March 8 statement concerning "unwillingness of our Commission partners" with respect to Legal Report. He claimed that Canada must bear partial responsibility for delay since for past five months we had been "quarreling" with Indians over their offer to proceed with specific cases. Canada had preferred to hold out for the so-called conclusions which are not conclusions at all but general political commentaries. Under-Secretary pointed out that delay in connection with Legal Report had not been of five-month duration but two and a half years, during which time Commission had said nothing about Northern intervention. Acharya commented that in dealing with specific violations of the agreement India had never held back and India's determination to proceed with study of these matters "will be at least as great as Canada's". On the other hand, he said that India could never go along with any policy aimed at Commission enunciation of general political explanations or theories. He acknowledged that India had a great interest in halting aggression, particularly Chinese or Chinese-sponsored aggression. Especially for this reason Acharya said that "we do not want anyone to say that India for its own foreign policy reasons is not impartial on the ICSC".

4. USSEA felt that it was valuable to have these growing differences or apparent growing differences openly acknowledged, since in varying degrees there was virtual unanimity among the high proportion of Canadian Foreign Service personnel who had served in Indo-China that there were some special features of Indian policy in Indo-China Commissions which we found it difficult to understand. Real problem was how to deal with these differences or apparent differences in the interests of maintaining close bilateral relations with India, to which we attached great importance. Under-Secretary hoped to be able to go into these matters in greater detail with High Commissioner in next few days.

5. USSEA's concluding comment above relates of course to Minister's message to Swaran Singh and intention to review these matters here with Acharya. We do not wish to do so before you have made main presentation in Delhi. Grateful if you could inform us when action is to be taken to enable appointment to be made here.

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[54] See/Voir India, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 15 March 1965, 11th sessions, vol. XXXVIII, no. 19, cols 4256–4258.

80.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/3.2

No. 298
Delhi, March 23, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-209 Mar 17.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Priority) from Ottawa; Saigon (Immediate).
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

I delivered your message to Swaran Singh 1815 hours March 22 at end of his long parliamentary day. I was able to make briefly points in paragraphs 2(a), 4(c) and 5(d) of your telegram Y-210.

2. Swaran Singh read your message with apparent care and said he could not repeat not understand why we took view that "impartiality" had to be "re-established". Government of India believed it had always been impartial. He realized we had differed on February 13 message but that this was just one report and impartiality of Commission had to be viewed in longer perspective.

3. I said it was not repeat not my purpose to discuss impartiality in one instance but to point out that on large number of items before Commission it was not repeat not being impartial and that in fact it was not repeat not doing anything at all. I proceeded (on basis your telegrams Y-187† March 10 and Y-200† March 14) to cite seven examples of SVN complaints and requests, some of long standing on which Commission had acted not repeat not at all or imperfectly.

4. Swaran Singh asked for list of these expressing interest in seeing what we had in mind. I have sent him letter (text my following telegram†) including seven points, making it clear they were simply examples.

5. Swaran Singh was cordial throughout but non-committal and offered few comments. He did, however, display possible concern about offending Peking and Hanoi although he phrased it in terms of question as to why anyone could think India had any reason not repeat not to lay bare Communist infractions of Cease-Fire Agreement.

[Roland] Michener

81.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/4.1

No. Y-227
Ottawa, March 23, 1965
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Our Tels Y-209 and Y-210 Mar 17 and Y-217 Mar 18.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Priority); Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

USSEA called in Indian High Commissioner yesterday and handed him copy of SSEA's message to Swaran Singh as well as edited version of talking points. Since Acharya wished to have opportunity to study substance of Minister's message, interview was relatively short. USSEA repeated that we attached considerable importance to re-establishing close cooperation with Indians on Commission problems and that we hoped past differences could be forgotten in new joint attempt to have Commission deal satisfactorily with South's complaints against North as well as with Northern allegations. He made brief specific references to PAVN gunboats, to items relating to DZ and to the general field of subversion.

2. Acharya seems to have taken the point that continued Canadian dissatisfaction with Indian performance in the Commission is becoming serious sour note in otherwise good bilateral relations. We suspect that his recommendations to Delhi may reflect this (accurate) assessment, and we can only hope that his comments will be heeded.

82.
Letter from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Lettre du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/3.3

Personal. Secret.
[Ottawa,] May 14, 1965

Dear Blair [Seaborn],

By the time this letter arrives in Saigon, you will have received a related telegram[55] setting out our desire to accumulate a body of *Canadian-originated* evidence about the nature and the extent of North Vietnamese interference in South Vietnam. We in Ottawa are becoming more and more anxious about the possibility that, basing themselves on remarks such as those contained in London telegram 1681† of May 12, that "these findings are based on ample and detailed evidence gathered over years of investigation," somebody sooner or later may ask us to publish our evidence.

Of course, none of us doubts the fact or the scale of North Vietnamese intervention, and it is, I think, fair to say that over the years we have come to develop confidence in the statistics which the U.S. military provide to your staff in Saigon. Also, I believe that it is true that the application of experienced military judgment has allowed the military side of your staff to come to the conclusion that the scale of Viet Cong operations accords with the approximate figures provided by the U.S. military.

Unfortunately, I think that this problem is about to move out of the classified domain of government officials into a more public forum, where our judgment of U.S. integrity may not carry the necessary weight. I think that we may have to produce some sort of independent Canadian reports which will back up our professional judgment of other people's reports. It is for this reason that we want to start to build up a file of distinctively Canadian reports on incidents of infiltration and the importation of weapons and ammunition, so that we will be able, as necessary, to point to (but not necessarily publish) our own sources of information.

Obviously it would be more satisfactory if there were a unified and conscientious Commission which would send teams to all available sites of capture and produce agreed reports which the Commission would then process promptly. The prospect of this happening appears sufficiently remote to force us to think of the idea of specifically Candel reports, resulting from Commission investigations, or even if necessary, of specifically Candel investigations. Here

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[55] See next document./Voir le document suivant.

again there are dangers: We would not want members of Candel going into areas as part of a U.S. team, nor would we want them to move into a battle zone so promptly that they might become involved or seem to be part of the attacking forces. It is also possible that there would be some lifting of Indian eyebrows, but as we have suggested, it might be possible to explain Candel activities in terms of the brutal truth, i.e., the failure of the Commission to come to grips with these problems realistically and to produce convincing judgments on a problem which everyone knows exists, gives us no alternative but to exploit unilaterally such opportunities as may come our way to satisfy ourselves about what is really happening in Vietnam.

To give an example of the sort of thing we have in mind: We have reviewed the material on the investigation on the arms cache at Vung Ro attached to your letter No. 128† of February 26, and we wonder whether it would be possible for the team officer who investigated it to write an account of what he saw and his conclusions from what he saw as if it were a report to you for the use of the Canadian Government rather than as a report for the International Commission. Perhaps also the Senior Military Adviser and the Assistant Military Adviser who also viewed the cache could write accounts of what they saw and what they concluded from it, again for the use of the Canadian Government rather than the International Commission. In drawing this distinction we mean that we should like to have any opinion they could express as to the origin and possible method of arrival of this equipment in the area for the information of the Canadian Government rather than for use as evidence as if in a court of law. (As a question of curiosity we have noticed more than one reference to distilled water as establishing some connection with North Vietnam. While it may not be a matter of great importance we wonder whether you could clarify the reference in paragraph 17 (b) of Annex B to your letter No. 128.)

Everything would, of course, depend upon U.S. and, I suppose ultimately, South Vietnamese co-operation. Col. An's record is not so impressive that we would expect too much of him, but maybe the Americans could be convinced that an independent but friendly witness would be of use to them, and maybe they in turn would be able to pry a little cooperation out of the South Vietnamese military.

This is an attempt to find a solution to a pressing problem. Maybe you can produce a better one, and if so we would welcome it.

As a further indication of the shape of the problem from our point of view, I might just mention that we are seriously considering producing a White Paper on Vietnam in the next few months. This project has not yet been put up to, or been approved by the powers that be, and our plans need not trouble you directly at least for the moment, although the main substance of this letter and the related telegram, may ultimately prove useful in this context as well as others.

Yours sincerely,
R.L. Rogers

83.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/3.3

No. Y-400
Ottawa, May 20, 1965
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Routine).
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: EVIDENCE OF SUBVERSION

Our experience, as members of the International Commission in Vietnam, has provided extensive opportunities to formulate at first-hand comprehensive assessment of nature of situation in that country and of political and military forces playing on it. Full effectiveness of Commission's role as an independent witness has, however, been restricted to certain extent by limitations imposed by need to reconcile obvious political differences with our Commission partners in interests of reaching conclusions accepted at least by majority. Although abundant evidence is available, Indian reluctance to act, or downright obstructionism, has meant that Commission's confirmation of evidence of Northern interference in South Vietnam (other side of ledger is an open book since it is publicized daily in press and readily admitted by parties involved) has not been as extensive as it ought to be, and this, in turn, tends to downgrade usefulness of role of independent witness.

2. We are therefore interested in seeing whether anything can be done to develop confirmatory function of Commission unilaterally, and to augment scope of proof available to us of Northern interference in South Vietnam. This problem is thus not one of international assessment and analysis, but of independent corroboration through first-hand observations on a purely national basis.

3. Most obvious and easily dealt with manifestations of substantial Northern involvement have taken the form of arms caches and captured infiltrators, both military and political. We see it as matter of some urgency that further efforts be made to develop opportunities to examine this sort of evidence more closely, both as Commission exercise and as Canadian delegation project. If we cannot get adequate number of observations through opportunities provided by investigations conducted on Commission basis, then we think that we should where necessary resort to purely national basis of observation.

4. Although South Vietnamese authorities have made some useful efforts (cf. Vung Ro discovery and more recently Tan Hiep investigation) towards facilitating Commission inspection of captured arms and equipment, we believe that there are probably other opportunities which are not exploited so promptly and so adequately. We have come to conclusion that first-hand examination of such evidence as soon as possible after its discovery or capture is (or will be) of considerably more value to us than, for example, detailed and relatively sophisticated inspection of specially arranged exhibitions of captured arms and equipment. If such on-the-spot investigations could be arranged with greater frequency, we would envisage that two documents might be produced: first, report of Commission's team, assuming that at least the Indians would be prepared to continue cooperation in this field and, second, an independent report from Canadian officer concerned, first to you and through you to us. Basic procedural pattern established by Vung Ro investigation (cf. attachments to your letter 128 of February 26) could readily be adapted to purposes we envisage. First document would presumably be subjected to Commission processing in the usual tedious and inconclusive manner. Second document would, however, be subject to no restrictions with respect to use to which it might be put for Canadian purposes. A similar technique might also be adopted as standard practice with respect to all types of investigations, whether of arms caches or of other manifestations of Viet Cong activity, always of course concentrating on evidence of Northern involvement.

5. Interrogation of prisoners may, however, raise more complicated problems for local authorities. It would obviously be preferable to deal with this category of evidence in same way, that is, within Commission framework, but record of South Vietnamese cooperation and Commission's performance in this field has not been impressive. If this cannot be improved we would hope that it might be possible to arrange for a Candel officer to see, at an early stage, cadres which the SVN authorities might not plan to offer for ICC inspection; his presence on such occasions could be justified to other ICC delegates on the grounds that we have been dissatisfied not only with Commission's failure to produce convincing results but also with its general dilatory approach to matters which we see as urgent; if Commission

cannot or will not establish facts, we intend to do so ourselves as far as possible. In undertaking such interrogations, emphasis would be on relatively simple series of questions, such as, place of birth, place of residence for past five years, location and reason for capture and channel or means of arriving at point where capture took place. Replies to these questions would then form substance of special report to you and then to us by Canadian interrogating officer and this report would not be regarded as privileged Commission document.

6. We are of course aware of problems which implementation of these suggestions might raise. It will obviously be necessary to enlist full cooperation of local American representatives and of South Vietnamese authorities themselves. From their point of view, however, objectives we have in mind would be very much in their own interests, although at same time it would have to be made clear particularly to South Vietnamese that our essential interest is in corroboration of evidence and not in publicity stunts. If results were effectively presented, they might very well go some distance towards correcting misconceptions and misinterpretations, and indeed dispelling suspicions, that the case for Western interest and involvement in South Vietnam rests on flimsy propaganda assertions. Too close a commitment and involvement in the situation on part of Americans and South Vietnamese may make it difficult for them to appreciate impact on international attitudes which has been made by earlier assertions that there is little or no evidence of Northern infiltration of military personnel into South Vietnam. Americans also should appreciate that, if Canadian Government can say it has evidence of its own (i.e., not derived from U.S.A. or SVN intelligence reports), it will be in a much better position to give support, as Prime Minister said in House, to purposes and objectives of U.S.A. policy in Vietnam.[56]

[Paul] Martin

84.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/4.1

No. Y-435
Ottawa, June 3, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Our Tels Y-209 and Y-210 of March 17 and Y-430† of June 2.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, Saigon (OpImmediate).
By Bag: NATO Paris, Permis New York, DGPO, DM/DND, Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

Following is text of Indian Foreign Minister's message to SSEA referred to in our telegram Y-430, in response to SSEA's message of March 17 (our telegram Y-209). Begins: I greatly appreciate your writing to me frankly and in such detail about your own assessment of the situation in Vietnam and about your views on the role of the International Commission. Between countries which are as friendly with each other as Canada and India, it is but appropriate that we should exchange views without reservations.

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[56] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 1, p. 399.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 1, p. 399.

2. We are happy to be in the Commission with Canada and, over the years, we have greatly valued our mutual association and cooperation in the Commission. It has always been the endeavour of our representative on the Commission to work closely with the Canadian representative. I feel that, by and large, the cooperation has been excellent. The number of occasions on which we have agreed have been far in excess of those on which there have been divergence of views between us, and except on one or two occasions, the differences have not been very wide. I am, therefore, not able to agree with the general impression of lack of cooperation and understanding between our delegations in the International Commission in Vietnam which your letter conveys.

3. Your High Commissioner brought to our notice some specific instances in which there have been delays. We have examined them and we do not find that there has been undue delay because of any action or views expressed by our representative on the Commission. In cases in which there have been some delay in investigation of South Vietnamese complaints, these are largely attributable to South Vietnam Government because of their inability to back up their complaints promptly with evidence. If one were to make a surmise, this might naturally be due to the fact that the South Vietnamese Government in recent months have been in a state of crisis. It is, of course, not my intention to blame them for these delays. There is also the fact that some of the complaints made by DRVN were of a striking nature and related to incidents which had drawn worldwide attention, like the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, bombing of DRVN, etc. The complaints by DRVN in these cases were prompt and the evidence was tell-tale since there were statements by the South Vietnam and/or the U.S. authorities themselves. Even in some of these cases, you will recollect, that our delegation, agreeing with the Canadian delegation, took the view that the Commission had no jurisdiction: I have in mind the Gulf of Tonkin incidents. In other cases, again in agreement with the Canadian representative, we insisted on facilities being given by the DRVN for investigation which, as you know, were refused. One has to investigate the totality of circumstances in pronouncing judgement on the attitudes of the Commission and our representative thereon, in respect of complaints from DRVN and SVN. In our view, a judgement that the Commission had deliberately delayed or soft-pedalled complaints from South Vietnam while it had dealt with complaints from DRVN with special speed, would not be a fair one.

4. You will agree that occasionally difference of views between the Canadian and Indian Commissioners in matters of procedure or even of substance, is inevitable. A special responsibility rests with India as Chairman and member of the Commission. Within the limitations which are inherent in the Geneva Agreement of 1954 our representative on the Commission had tried to deal with the complaints efficiently from North and South Vietnam with impartiality and as much expedition as possible.

5. You have rightly stated, if I may say so, that there is no divergence of views between our two Governments on the fundamental issues in Vietnam. As I have stated that there has been on the whole very good cooperation between our two countries in the International Commission, I need not cite here the many instances in which Canada and India have found themselves on the same side in respect of important decisions of the Commission. You have in your message referred to the Special Report of 1962. This report's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence that the DRVN had violated the Geneva Agreement in specific instances was subscribed to by both our countries. We were therefore somewhat surprised that in the Minority Statement of the 13th February 1965, your representative on the Commission went beyond the conclusions reached in March 1962.

6. Our representative was therefore compelled to clarify his stand on this question. I am sure that you will agree that in the exercise of impartial procedures and judgement within its limited terms of reference, the Commission cannot, so to speak, attempt a general political commentary on the complicated situation in Vietnam.

7. I fully reciprocate your sentiments and hope that fullest cooperation and mutual understanding should be established between our representatives on the Commission and we shall endeavour to seek the realisation of this mutual aim.

85.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/4.1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] June 15, 1965

VIETNAM COMMISSION: INDIAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS

As you are aware, we have for some time been experiencing difficulties with the Indians in both the Vietnam and Laos Commissions in our attempts to have these Commissions deal promptly and effectively with evidence of North Vietnamese interference. Since the Special Report of June 2, 1962, the Vietnam Commission has produced only one decision against the North on subversive activities and this was a very minor case. The fate of the Legal Report is well known to you and I need not go into that matter again except to say that our position vis-à-vis public opinion would have been much stronger had the Indians seen fit to process and act upon the report within the Commission.

2. In an attempt to encourage Indian cooperation in these matters, you will recall having sent a message to the Indian Foreign Minister in mid-March (a copy of the text is attached). The reply was not received until June 1; a copy of Swaran Singh's message to you is also attached, from which you will note that the main argument seems to be that the problem does not really exist. In addition to your personal message, we had discussions here, in an attempt to impress on the Indians the sense of urgency which we felt on this matter.

3. Throughout this period of continuing Indian-Canadian dialogue, developments in Saigon have indicated that the Indians had no intention of budging from their policy of procrastination and avoidance of decisions against the North. The Commission has reached a series of decisions against South Vietnam (i.e., on the entry of U.S. military equipment and personnel, South Korean troops, Australian troops as well as on the bombings of the North) and in almost all of these decisions Canada has voted with India and Poland. On the other hand, there have been a number of cases presented to the Commission in which the evidence of North Vietnamese involvement in the war in the South has been clear beyond reasonable doubt; the most dramatic of these cases was the huge arms cache discovered at Vung Ro in mid-February, although there are other similar cases as well as the testimony of captured North Vietnamese soldiers.

4. The Vung Ro case illustrates Indian techniques only too clearly. This matter has been discussed on more than a dozen occasions within the Commission and each time the Indians have sought some delaying device, such as referral to a committee or the need for further information, to postpone a decision. At the Commission's meeting on June 4, the Indian delegation's desire for positive proof (the implication seems to be that the Vung Ro discovery could have been a hoax on the part of the South Vietnamese and U.S. authorities) that the arms and other evidence which have been captured actually came from North Vietnam, reached the absurd point of deciding by Indian-Polish majority to conduct an "experiment" to determine whether documents could be submerged in salt water for a few days and still remain legible. This, together with the Indians' earlier insistence on examining the South Vietnamese frogmen who worked on the sunken arms-carrying vessel, strongly suggests

that the Indians are determined to avoid reaching a decision on this case. Similarly, the procrastination in this case contrasts in an unfavourable way, insofar as Indian impartiality is concerned, with the speed with which the Commission has reacted to cases against South Vietnam. The standard of evidence demanded, moreover, is infinitely higher than the Indians earlier believed necessary in reaching a decision against the South which was based on the testimony of North Vietnamese observers.

5. Equally serious was the Indian Commissioner's performance at the meeting on June 4 in connection with Canadian action in rejecting official North Vietnamese comments on the Canadian Minority Statement of February 13. You will recall that when the North Vietnamese Foreign Office issued their statement some time ago you indicated that you might be prepared to send a protest in your own name to Gen. Giap, Head of the PAVN. We suggested that it might be advisable to attempt to deal with this problem within the Commission in the first instance and Seaborn was instructed to proceed on this basis. When it became clear that the Indians would not support what we considered an adequate protest – they had suggested a draft which was in our view much too mild – it was decided that Seaborn would have to protest unilaterally as Canadian Commissioner. The text of our protest was thus presented in the Commission as a matter of form and was voted down by the Indians and Poles, at which point Seaborn went ahead on his own, giving copies of his letter to the Indian and Polish Delegations.

6. In earlier discussions in Delhi, we had indicated to the Foreign Ministry that if support was not forthcoming for our position, we would probably have to act unilaterally, and in reply we were informed that India would have no objection if we wished to do so. Subsequently, the PAVN returned to the Secretary-General of the Commission the original copy of Seaborn's letter saying that all such correspondence must come from the Secretary-General and not from individual delegations. Seaborn then wrote again to the PAVN Liaison Mission in Hanoi to close off this matter: he said that he could not accept the Mission's contention that he had acted contrary to existing principles since any delegation can correspond unilaterally with the Parties if it does so in its own name and not in the name of the Commission as a whole; at the same time he regretted that the Northern authorities could not meet Canada's request for retraction and apology, and deplored the discourtesy implicit in rejecting the Canadian protest and returning it to the Commission. When Seaborn informed the Commission of the action he had taken in this latter step, the Indian Chairman seems to have reacted violently, not so much against the second letter to Hanoi as against the first which he had been aware of for some time and to which the Indian Foreign Ministry in Delhi had not objected earlier. In the Commission meeting on June 4 the Chairman accused the Canadian delegation of improper conduct, and forced through a procedural resolution, implying censure of Canadian delegation activities, without allowing the Alternate Delegate, Brig. Brown, who was in charge of the delegation at the time, an opportunity to consult us.

7. I am attaching for your information a copy of Saigon telegram No. 468† of June 5, reporting on this Commission meeting. I am sure you will agree that the Indian performance is unacceptable on all counts.

8. We did not believe that Prime Minister Shastri's visit was a suitable occasion on which to raise these detailed difficulties.[57] At the same time, I believe that these problems cannot go unnoticed and indeed that they call for a strong rejoinder to the Indian Foreign Minister. It seems to me that we can go some distance in playing down our differences with the Indians in the Commissions in the interests of maintaining close bilateral relations on broader problems. These differences cannot however be totally ignored. The Indians must be made to realize that we too have our objectives in Indo-China and that they cannot continue, unchallenged, in what appears to be a pretty clear policy of their own even if the pursuit of this policy means perpetual frustration and indeed humiliation for us.

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[57] See/Voir doc. 281.

9. I am accordingly attaching for your signature, if you approve, the text of a message replying to Swaran Singh's message of June 1, bringing our serious discontent to his attention and indicating that a continuation of these problems is bound to have an effect on Indian-Canadian relations. If you agree with this message, I think that it would be suitable to call in the Indian High Commissioner here and present it to him; we will, of course, notify our High Commissioner in Delhi concurrently.[58]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

86.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/4.1

No. Y-483
Ottawa, June 23, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Our Tel 482† of June 23.
Repeat for Information: Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, London, Washington.

MESSAGE FROM SSEA TO SWARAN SINGH

Following is text of message: Begins:
(Comcentre – please transmit attached text.)
Ends.

Enclosure: Message from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of External Affairs of India
Pièce jointe : Message du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre des Affaires extérieures de l'Inde

Confidential.
[Ottawa, n.d.]

MESSAGE FROM THE CANADIAN SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR. PAUL MARTIN,
TO THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MR. SWARAN SINGH

I was pleased to have your message, which I received on June 1, in reply to my message to you in March, concerning problems confronting us in the Vietnam Commission.

Although, as you will be aware, some of these questions were mentioned in the useful and constructive discussions we have had with Prime Minister Shastri here recently, I thought that it would not be suitable to go into these detailed questions with your Prime Minister in our talks, which concentrated more heavily on the Vietnam problem as a whole.

You will be aware that the communiqué issued at the end of Prime Minister Shastri's visit refers to Indian-Canadian co-operation in the Commissions in Indo-China, and that it also notes, as does your message that while it has not always been possible to reach unanimity on

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[58] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Agreed. P[aul] M[artin]

all matters, we have valued this association and we wish our representatives on the Commissions to make every effort to find common ground with a view to encouraging implementation of the agreements which it is the Commissions' task to supervise.[59]

You have also referred to the desirability of countries which are as friendly as ours, exchanging views frankly and in a spirit of mutual accommodation. I share your views on this point, which is why I am now conveying this message to you to make it clear that there are some serious problems before me at the moment which I must bring to your attention but which would not have been appropriate to raise during the recent Indian-Canadian discussions here.

In my earlier message, I expressed concern about the manner in which the Vietnam Commission was handling complaints from the South as opposed to the way in which it has been handling complaints from the North. Generally speaking, the complaints from the two parties are of a different nature, but because they are no less urgent in terms of their significance for peace in the area, it seems clear to me that the Commission has an obligation to attach as high a priority on the one as to the other, even if this means devising special techniques to deal with different types of evidence. It is evident that violations by South Vietnam, with U.S. assistance, are open and admitted and for this reason it takes no special effort or skill on the part of the Commission to record what is already well known. Northern interference in South Vietnam, which India and Canada recognized in the Special Report of June 2, 1962, is no less a matter of urgency and concern even though manifestations of this interference are never acknowledged by the party responsible and are more difficult to pin down. It appears to me that failure to apply the same urgency to dealing with evidence of clandestine North Vietnamese interference as has been apparent in recent Commission treatment of openly acknowledged violations by South Vietnam results in a situation in which the Commission is, in effect, through avoiding decisions on urgent problems, failing in its obligations.

I should like to refer specifically to the case of the Vung Ro arms cache. This matter was investigated by a Commission team on February 20 and was subsequently discussed for the first time by the Commission on March 12 in the light of the team report and a formal communication from the South Vietnamese Liaison Mission. Since that time there have been several decisions against the South Vietnamese, but despite consideration by the Commission on more than a dozen occasions, no decision has been reached about this dramatic demonstration of North Vietnamese interference in the South. I agree fully that Commission decisions must be firmly based on adequate evidence, and that the South Vietnamese have not always given the Commission the precise evidence which it must have on which to base its considerations. In this case, however, I believe that the facts are incontrovertible. Despite the urgings of the Canadian Commissioner to this effect, however, we have had the impression that the Commission is attempting to avoid a clear-cut decision against the North, and at the Commission meeting on June 4, the desire for proof was pushed to the absurd extent of deciding to conduct an experiment to determine whether documents captured in connection with the Vung Ro discovery could really have been submerged in salt water for some days. This, together with the Indian Commissioner's earlier insistence on interviewing the frogmen who worked on the sunken vessel at Vung Ro, creates the impression that the Commission is not only postponing a decision in this urgent matter, but is demanding a higher standard of evidence than would normally be required in such an investigation and,

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[59] See Canada, Department of External Affairs, "Visit to Canada of Prime Minister Shastri," *Joint Communiqué*, 14 June 1965.
Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, « Visite du premier ministre Shastri au Canada », *Communiqué conjoint*, 14 juin 1965.

more important, a higher standard of evidence than has been applied in cases against the South. It also cannot be reconciled with the standards of evidence accepted in the Commission in Cambodia.

As evidence of the tendency to apply different standards, I might mention a recent Commission decision against the South in connection with some incidents of firings in the demilitarized zone. This case was first discussed in the Commission on April 23, and on May 7 a decision, by Indian-Polish majority, was reached in the Commission on the basis of evidence which we considered too flimsy to justify such a decision. The finding was based on a statement that persons had been seen at a distance in the Southern Demilitarized Zone in the type of uniform normally worn by Southern forces; yet it is well known that Viet Cong have frequently worn Southern uniforms.

In any event, both the speed with which the Commission acted and the standard of evidence which it considered sufficient, in this latter case, contrast markedly with the prolonged and indecisive treatment of the Vung Ro case and of the lengths to which the Commission seems to believe it is necessary to go before agreeing to find North Vietnamese involvement.

In all honesty, I must inform you that we have found this tendency deeply disturbing, and if it continues, it is bound to have very serious consequences, not only for the credibility of the Commission's work, but also for our assessment of the extent to which it is possible for Canada and India to co-operate in the Commissions.

Even more disturbing, because it directly affects the position of the Canadian delegation as such, has been the report I have received of the course of action followed by the Chairman at the Commission's June 4 meeting with respect to the Canadian Delegation's action in rejecting the abusive comments of the North Vietnamese authorities on the Canadian Minority Statement of February 13. When it became clear to us some time ago that the Indian Government would not support us in the Commission in rejecting the North Vietnamese comments in terms we considered adequate, we decided that we had no alternative but to act on our own, since no independent power could allow such deprecating suggestions as those made by the Government of North Vietnam to go unchallenged. In fact, in our earlier discussions of this matter in Delhi, we indicated to your Ministry that in the absence of Indian willingness to support us in an adequate protest, there appeared to be no alternative to proceeding unilaterally; in reply, we were informed that India would have no objection to such action if we wished to take it. When the Commission, by formal vote, subsequently refused to adopt our draft protest and forward it in the Commission's name, it was sent by the Canadian Commissioner in his own name, and copies of this letter, dated April 24, were given to the Indian and Polish delegations. We were therefore at a total loss to understand the condemnatory course of action followed by the Chairman almost six weeks later at the meeting on June 4.

I think you will agree that I could not accept the theory (and the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not appear to accept it either in April) that only the Secretary General can correspond with the parties on matters such as this which single out one particular nation. We gave the Commission every opportunity to support us, but they declined. Nor could I accept that on a question of essentially national character such as this, membership in the Commission can prevent actions which a sovereign state deems necessary when support is not forthcoming in a Commission context, or limit the ability of a sovereign power to reply to insults levelled at it. We regard the text of the Canadian Commissioner's speeches in the Commission as Canadian, not Commission, material and the same applies to letters and other texts which have been drafted by the Canadian Delegation or with substantial Canadian Delegation content. Naturally, we would prefer to have such documents remain within the Commission, but only so long as the Commission shows that it is prepared to deal effectively with them. At the point where Commission treatment changes from the category of unsatisfactory (which can be tolerated in certain circumstances in the hope that future

performance will change) to the category of directly counter to Canadian interests, we must retain our freedom of action, and we believe that any sovereign power could scarcely do otherwise.

Most serious of all, the Chairman insisted on putting to a vote a resolution on procedures which amounted to an implied censure of the Canadian delegation without allowing the delegation time to consult Ottawa. The implied censure is serious enough; the forcing of a vote appears inexcusable. In the circumstances, our representative had no alternative but to refuse to participate in the vote. The resulting decision in our view is therefore in a different category from decisions taken when one delegation abstains or votes against a resolution.

This incident is the more extraordinary against the background of the unsatisfactory performance by the Commission as a whole on the problem of Northern aggression and subversion and in the context of the generally close and constructive relations between India and Canada as these have been reaffirmed and strengthened by your Prime Minister's recent visit to Canada.

I have put these thoughts before you in detail and in a spirit of complete honesty and I sincerely hope that you will reply in a similar spirit since it is difficult to continue muting our differences when problems of this magnitude do in fact exist between us over the responsibilities we share in Vietnam.

Paul Martin

87.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/4.1

No. Y-491
Ottawa, June 28, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Our Tels Y-482, Y-483 June 23.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Priority).
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh.

MESSAGE FROM SSEA TO SWARAN SINGH

USSEA this morning gave message to Acharya, who undertook to wire it to Delhi. Acharya did not repeat not read message during meeting but USSEA presented gist of it and of present situation to him in following terms:

2. We are unhappy about the way in which ICSC Vietnam is operating and we do not repeat not think it is effectively supervising 1954 CFA. In the circumstances, we are being forced to weigh seriously results which might accrue from continuation of our association with Commission.

3. We are dissatisfied primarily with way in which violations by North Vietnam are dealt with in the Commission. Violations do take place, and while they are covert and therefore require different techniques of investigation, we would like to be assured in our own mind that our Commission colleagues have same determination to deal with Northern violations as they have in case of those committed by South. We have joined with Indians and Poles in findings against SVN and USA; we should like to see same impartiality shown by our colleagues.

4. USSEA went on to describe specific instances in which approach of Indians varied. In case of firings in DZ, only two weeks were required to reach decision against SVN; significant point was willingness of Indian and Polish Commissioners to act quickly and on

basis of evidence which we considered very questionable. Action, in this case, was very different from that in Vung Ro case. Commission deliberations have been going on since February and Indian-Polish majority has decided not repeat not only to interview frogmen but also to carry out experiment to determine whether documents captured in connection with Vung Ro discovery could really have been submerged in salt water for some days. Implication of these decisions is that SVN authorities are not repeat not above putting something over on the Commission and we have no repeat no evidence to suggest any justification of this.

5. If this sort of thing were to continue, we would find it necessary to examine whole exercise very closely since we cannot stomach this approach indefinitely. We are acutely unhappy about these developments.

6. Acharya was then informed in detail of process leading to Canadian protests to DRVN authorities in connection with their abusive comments on our Minority Statement of February 13. USSEA pointed out that Indians had been warned that we might take unilateral action and had expressed no repeat no objection. On June 4, however, Indian and Pole found it necessary to adopt resolution which by implication condemned our action; Canadian delegation was not repeat not even allowed time to consult with Ottawa. We do not repeat not consider it correct to rule that a sovereign country does not repeat not have the right to reply to insults and we found the Indian-Polish action astonishing. On instructions, USSEA was expressing Canadian Government's very strong feelings on the subject.

7. There had been some hope that problems encountered in Vietnam Commission might disappear. Now, however, it appeared that they would not repeat not and that indeed they might affect Indian-Canadian relations in a wider sphere. We had just had a very friendly and successful visit by Shastri; we had not repeat not wished to mar the visit by discussion of the situation within the Vietnam Commission but now we were obliged to express our views frankly, in a spirit of friendship, and with hope that somehow it would be possible to find a way of improving the situation.

8. Acharya, of course, did not repeat not go into detail but emphasized that friendship between India and Canada, as Swaran Singh's June 1 message had made clear, was very important to them. He then asked if experiment with documents had been proposed by Indian Co-Chairman.

9. USSEA confirmed that it had been and went on to say that he had not repeat not been criticizing experiment itself but the double standard of evidence which it implied – very rigid in cases against the North and less rigid in cases against South.

10. Acharya contended that Indian Government policy was to deal fairly with allegations against both sides and he suggested that perhaps there had been some local misunderstanding. USSEA welcomed statement that India and Canada had the same objectives and expressed the hope that problem was only a local one.

11. Acharya then came back to the question of Indian-Canadian relations in a broader sense and USSEA confirmed that continuation of present pattern in Vietnam Commission could certainly raise some very big issues. Commission would find itself in a dead-end; if India then considered that Commission should continue and Canada decided otherwise, this would be a major difference which would inevitably lead to recriminations. For our part, we had very grave doubts about the propriety of continuing our association with an operation of this kind.

12. Interview concluded with USSEA's remarks that a whole generation of Canadian officials had served in Commissions and that their experience had affected Canadian-Indian relations. Their views on Indian policy had become much more concrete and detailed and this process had had a very sobering effect. Quality of relationship between Indian and Canadian officials had changed as result of experience in Indochina.

13. USSEA closed by expressing hope that it would be possible, by frank exchange of views, to iron out existing differences.

Chapter 2/Chapitre 2

OPERATION BACON: THE SEABORN CHANNEL (APRIL 1964–NOVEMBER 1965)

OPÉRATION BACON : SEABORN, L'INTERMÉDIAIRE (AVRIL 1964-NOVEMBRE 1965)

88.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 9385, 20-22-VIETS-1

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] April 28, 1964

JOINT UNITED STATES – CANADIAN COMMITTEE
ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, APRIL 29-30, 1964
VIETNAM

You will recall that Mr. Rusk has asked for a meeting with you and me on Thursday morning, April 30, to discuss Vietnam.[1] We understand that Mr. Rusk may especially wish to discuss the views he derived as a result of his recent visit to Saigon and that he may raise a number of points, not as a special effort directed at Canada, but as part of continuing U.S. consideration of ways in which to deal with the situation in Vietnam. The following paragraphs indicate points which Mr. Rusk may bring up or which we might wish to raise ourselves:

American policy in Vietnam is to encourage and support with men, money and supplies the government of General Khanh in the war against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, meeting increasing Communist activity with proportionately more American troops and money. In the present circumstances there is no acceptable alternative to this policy. Negotiations with the Communists with a view to the neutralization of South Vietnam cannot be contemplated by the Americans at the present time because of the military weakness of their position. The most probable result of any such negotiations undertaken now would be in effect to hand over South Vietnam (including over 800,000 Roman Catholic refugees from the North) to Communist rule. This could also gravely jeopardize the stability of Thailand, and destroy the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. Especially in an American election year such a development, or indeed any sign of compromising with the Communists, is unthinkable.

2. It would therefore seem best for us to gain what credit we can with the Americans by indicating to Mr. Rusk privately our agreement that there is at present no alternative to the vigorous policy which they are pursuing in South Vietnam. (This formula would enable us, after the American election, if the tactical situation in Vietnam improves, to suggest a

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[1] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 121.

different course of action to the United States Government.) While indicating to the Americans our support for their current Vietnam policy we should make clear that we would consider unwise any extension of the war into North Vietnam either by invasion or aerial bombardment, in the light of the present weakness of the political régime in South Vietnam. Such an initiative would not hold high promise of success, and could involve great dangers of another long-term Korean-type commitment. At best the political price in the uncommitted world would be too high.

3. The Americans have recently had information that a potentially important change may be occurring in the Polish attitude in the Commissions, viz. that the Poles have instructions to be more co-operative with the other Delegations in Commission work. The Americans are inclined to assume that if the Polish Government is in fact seeking to dissociate itself from the DRVN such a development reflects prior discussion between the Polish and Soviet authorities. Mr. Rusk would particularly like to explore the extent to which the suspected change in the Polish attitude may be interpreted as an indirect and cautious Soviet move towards a "coincidence of policy" with the West in the hope of arresting the spread of Chinese influence in South East Asia. We have just received information from Saigon which gives some support to this thesis. We can therefore readily express to Mr. Rusk our willingness to put the theory to the test as the Americans have suggested. We might tell Mr. Rusk that our Commissioner in Vietnam has made specific suggestions as to how tests might be carried out and that we shall keep in close touch with the State Department about our activities in this field.

4. We have had indications that the Americans, in accordance with their policy of attempting to obtain the public support of as many of their allies as possible for the war in South Vietnam, may ask for a Canadian contribution, perhaps a medical unit or medical team. If Mr. Rusk does broach such a possibility we should explain to him that we are already making what we hope is a useful contribution as the representative of the West on the International Commission. If, however, we identified ourselves openly with the South Vietnamese cause by making a material contribution to their war effort, even to the extent of sending a medical team, particularly from our armed forces, we believe that we might damage our relations with our Commission colleagues and with the North Vietnamese and thereby impair our usefulness as a Commission power. We think that Mr. Rusk will agree that the façade of the 1954 Geneva Agreements is worth preserving and that it could be placed in jeopardy if we took a position clearly inconsistent with our Commission rôle. We might, however, agree to see whether our Colombo Plan efforts could be increased, for example by the provision of more French-language teachers, or other technical assistance.[2]

5. We have also had word that there is one other point related to the subject of paragraph 3 above "which Mr. Rusk preferred not to put in official channels but which he would raise privately" with us. It may be that he intends to comment on the adequacy of our representation on the Indochina Commissions. While I do not think we ought to discuss with the Americans the merits or failings of individual members of our Foreign Service,[3] we should listen carefully to Mr. Rusk's views on the level of Canadian representation he

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2 This is a reference to the multilateral Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia of 1950.
Il s'agit du Plan de Colombo pour le développement économique coopératif de l'Asie du Sud et du Sud-Est, une initiative multilatérale lancée en 1950.

3 This was likely a reference to Canada's Commissioner to the ICSC in Vietnam, Gordon Cox, whom US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge disliked. See next document, enclosure, final paragraph.
Allusion probable au commissaire canadien auprès de la CISC au Vietnam, Gordon Cox, qui n'était pas très apprécié par l'ambassadeur des États-Unis au Sud-Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. Voir le dernier paragraphe de la pièce jointe du document suivant.

considers appropriate in the Commissions. If he asks us whether we could appoint more senior and experienced men as Commissioners we shall have to say that we are doing our best to allocate the resources at our disposal among the many conflicting demands upon them, but that, because of the rapid expansion of the Canadian Foreign Service in recent years, we often find it necessary to appoint younger heads of mission than other countries normally do. We might add that the officer recently chosen as our next Commissioner in Vietnam (Mr. James Blair Seaborn), although relatively young (40), has already attained a rank (FSO 6) equivalent to that of several Heads of Division in Ottawa and junior Ambassadors abroad and is one of our most capable officers. We would hope that he and Mr. Lodge would develop a close and productive relationship.

P[aul] M[artin]

89.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 8795, 20-1-2-USA/1

Secret.
[Ottawa,] April 30, 1964

I attach for your comments and/or approval Minutes of the meetings with Mr. Rusk.

I attach a short memorandum† for the Prime Minister requesting his comments.

If you agree, I propose to circulate these Minutes, once they are approved, to the Assistant Under-Secretaries, to our Embassy in Washington and to send sections of these Minutes to the Divisions and/or Missions concerned.[4]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

Enclosure: Draft Minutes of Meeting with Secretary of State of United States
Pièce jointe : Projet de procès-verbal de réunion avec le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis

Secret.
[Ottawa,] April 30, 1964

DRAFT
MEETING WITH MR. RUSK IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

Before meeting the Prime Minister, while the group was waiting in his office, the Secretary of State for External Affairs mentioned the problem which has arisen concerning automobile parts.[5] He stressed the vital character to our economic growth of the steps which

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4 Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Agreed. P[aul] M[artin]
Rapport approuvé par le Ministre et mémoire au P[remier] M[inistre] initialé le 1er mai. [Author unknown/ Auteur inconnu]

5 See Canada, Department of External Affairs, "Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, Ottawa," *Press Release*, 30 April 1964.
Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, « Comité mixte Canada–États-Unis du commerce et des affaires économiques, Ottawa », *Communiqué*, 30 avril 1964.

had been taken by the Government and he appealed to the Secretary of State to consider the matter in the context of our overall relations. The suggestion that a joint study of this problem should be undertaken presented difficulties for us. Such an approach might cause a deterioration in the relationship between the two countries. This would be unfortunate considering the improvement which had taken place over the last year.

The group then went to the Prime Minister's Office. The following were present: the Prime Minister, Mr. Martin, Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie and Mr. Cadieux. On the U.S. side: the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, the U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Mr. Butterworth and Mr. A. Johnson.

[…]

Vietnam

The Secretary of State indicated that his country was trying to provide maximum help to Vietnam within the framework of present policies. A number of steps had been taken recently and it was his feeling that there was now some chance of improving the situation. General Khanh was proving to be pretty able. He had not yet, however, been as effective on the political front as the U.S. had expected. He had been the best Corps Commander in South Vietnam and the U.S. were confident that under his leadership events in South Vietnam would take a turn for the better. The Viet Cong were now being found and fought more than hitherto as a result of better intelligence and greater mobility on the part of the South Vietnamese Army. There was, however, no assurance yet that this course would succeed.

The U.S. could not see any alternative to their present policy. They simply could not get out of South East Asia. They did not want to develop hostilities on a higher scale and to try for the Korean or "the hard way". On the other hand, the U.S. felt that fighting in that part of the world was very unnecessary. The U.S. did not want bases or a military position in South East Asia. The basic agreements in that area were already in position: the '54 Geneva Agreements and the '62 Laos Agreement. What was missing was, essentially, compliance.

In the circumstances, the U.S. were seeking ways to signal to Hanoi that it would be wrong for the Viet Minh to expect that the U.S. were getting discouraged and were thinking of pulling out. It was important for them to realize that if they did not put a stop to their operations they would be in trouble.

In this respect, the Secretary of State wondered whether we could not expedite the movement of Mr. Cox's successor. It would be the hope of the U.S. that Mr. Seaborn might find ways to talk to the leaders in the North and probe what was in their mind. Mr. Seaborn might also help to dispel any misunderstanding as to the future course that the U.S. intended to follow. It would be important to ensure that Hanoi leaders appreciated what an enlargement of hostilities would mean for them. This might result in Chinese intervention which, it was suspected, they did not really want to encourage. The Prime Minister agreed that we would do what we could to arrange for the early arrival of Mr. Seaborn. It was agreed that experts might come from Washington to discuss the situation with him and that they might bring along a number of talking points that he might use in his conversations with Ho-Chi-Minh and other leaders in the North.

The Secretary of State, and this was his second point concerning Vietnam, enquired whether we could assist in probing the attitude of the Poles in the Indo-Chinese Commissions. The Prime Minister thought that they might be a little more cooperative than in the past. Mr. Martin mentioned that we had already considered some steps which might be taken to clarify the attitude of the Polish Delegation. The Prime Minister felt that it might also be possible for our Ambassador in Warsaw to discuss tactics with the Polish authorities. Mr. Rusk said that they had already pressed the Poles pretty hard on this but without much success.

There was some discussion concerning Mr. Cox. Mr. Martin made the point on a couple of occasions that Mr. Cox had been very effective and that he had been right in his forecast of events. Mr. Rusk hoped that Mr. Seaborn might have the required subtlety in manoeuvre and that he might be knowledgeable as to the nuances which had to be maintained in the proposed exploratory talks with the Hanoi authorities. Mr. Martin observed that Mr. Cabot Lodge was "pretty tall" and it was not easy for a young diplomat to establish with him the right relationship. The Prime Minister added that, in some ways, it was difficult for the U.S.A. to have in Vietnam a representative who was so heavily involved in domestic politics. Perhaps the U.S. thought that he might impress people locally because of his potential importance. Mr. Rusk felt that Cabot Lodge would not make a political issue of his mission in Vietnam, *à la* MacArthur.[6] The Prime Minister expressed the hope that there would not yet be another change in leadership in South Vietnam. He thought it was very discouraging for the public to be subjected to a great deal of publicity about a Vietnamese leader only to find that he had been replaced a week or so later.

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90.
Memorandum from Minister, Embassy to United States, to First Secretary, Embassy to United States
Note du ministre, ambassade aux États-Unis, au premier secrétaire, ambassade aux États-Unis
MG31-E83, vol. 12, 12

Secret.
[Washington,] May 28, 1964

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Late on the afternoon of May 27, I had a call from Bill Sullivan, who said that there was a possibility that he and Cooper would be accompanied on their visit to Ottawa today[7] by a third person of more senior rank who would wish to see the Prime Minister. I told Sullivan that the Prime Minister would be in New York today and I thought that, if necessary, an appointment could probably be arranged with him there. Sullivan said he would have to discuss this with his superiors. Later he phoned back to say that the third person in question was McGeorge Bundy, who would in fact like to see the Prime Minister, on the President's instructions, and would be prepared to be in New York in the late afternoon of today, May 28, for this purpose. It could not be done before that time. I informed Louis Rogers and also telephoned Coutts in the Prime Minister's Office and secured an appointment for McGeorge Bundy at the Plaza Hotel at 5:30 p.m.

I thought it wise to telephone the Minister, whom I reached after some difficulty at about 10 p.m. last night. I explained to him that if the Prime Minister had been in Ottawa, McGeorge Bundy would have accompanied Sullivan and Cooper and would have wished to see both the Prime Minister and the Minister. As the Prime Minister was not going to be in Ottawa however, Bundy, on the President's instructions, wished to see him in New York. In the circumstances, I had arranged an appointment. I told Mr. Martin that my understanding

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6 This is a reference to US General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964).
Il s'agit du général américain Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964).

7 See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 168.

was (this on the basis of comments by Sullivan) that Bundy's message to the Prime Minister would be in conjunction with the subject matter to be discussed during the visit of Sullivan and Cooper to Ottawa. I said that I thought it would consist of an account of the present situation in Laos and Vietnam, an assessment of Pathet Lao intentions, and perhaps an account of U.S. contingency planning for various possible eventualities. I thought we might be asked to expedite the departure of Blair Seaborn since it was regarded as important to get a message to the North Vietnamese with as little delay as possible. The North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao were getting "reckless", according to Sullivan, and there was not much time left in which to warn them to call a halt to their military advances.

The Minister said he quite understood that the President had wished the Prime Minister to be informed of his thinking and was glad that Bundy would be going to New York for this purpose. He hoped, however, that any information or requests that Bundy might make to the Prime Minister would be conveyed as fully and informatively in Ottawa by Sullivan and Cooper. He asked me to make certain that this was understood here because he did not like the idea of being less fully or less promptly informed than the Prime Minister, who had many other things on his mind and might not have staff with him who could record and report all that was said. On the question of expediting Blair Seaborn's departure, the Minister said that this might create a real difficulty since Seaborn's wife was still convalescing and it would be very difficult for Seaborn to leave before mid June. (Rogers had told me earlier that another problem was that Gordon Cox would not be leaving Saigon until June 14 and it might not be easy to explain to him the need for accelerating his departure by a further two weeks when in fact he was being pulled out somewhat earlier than had been originally planned.)

I telephoned Sullivan to ensure that he understood the importance of informing the Minister and the Department just as fully as the Prime Minister would be informed by Bundy. Sullivan took the point very quickly and said while Bundy might speak more eloquently and with a more intimate sense of the President's feelings, he could assure us that the information conveyed and any requests made to us would be the same in the two cases.

Arnold Smith telephoned me first thing this morning and I ran over the ground for him in some detail. I also told him about William Bundy's visit to London, which I suspect may be a counterpart to the two approaches to us. I said I did not think that these developments presaged anything really dramatic (Sullivan had said it was not time to put the sandbags in place), but that the U.S. authorities obviously wanted to concert closely with us and the British on the whole range of the current situation, an important element in which was the problem of getting some kind of warning through a reliable channel to the North Vietnamese. Smith said he would try to arrange for Sullivan and Cooper to see the Minister at some stage during their time in Ottawa. On the question of Blair Seaborn's departure, he said it was very difficult because Seaborn was reluctant to leave until his wife was sufficiently well. He recognized however that in the American view time was of the essence and that there might not be any purpose in talking to the North Vietnamese if it could not be done within the next few days. Smith wondered if Cox might not be entrusted with this task. I said it might be worth trying, although I had some feeling that the Americans might not have full confidence in Cox. I agreed however that it would be worth trying on Sullivan and Cooper since in many ways a farewell call to Hanoi by Cox might provide a timely and inconspicuous means of getting a serious message to them.

I asked Smith to be sure that we were as promptly and fully informed here as possible since things might be fairly active and it would be important for us to be up to date on what had happened both in Ottawa and in New York. Smith said he would phone me tomorrow and would see that a written report was sent to us as soon as it could be prepared.

H.B. R[obinson]

91.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

Secret.
[Ottawa,] May 28, 1964

VISIT OF MR. WILLIAM SULLIVAN[8]

You will recall that in his conversation with you and the Prime Minister Mr. Rusk said it was important for the North Vietnamese to "realize that if they did not put a stop to their operations they would be in trouble." He hoped that our new Commissioner in Vietnam "might find ways to talk to the leaders in the North and to dispel any misunderstanding as to the future course that the U.S. intended to follow." In particular "it would be wrong for the Vietminh to expect that the U.S. were getting discouraged and were thinking of pulling out."

2. It was agreed during the meeting with Mr. Rusk that experts would come from Washington to discuss the situation with Mr. Seaborn and that they might bring along a number of talking points that he might use in his conversations with Ho Chi Minh and other leaders in the North.

3. Mr. William Sullivan, who co-ordinates Vietnamese affairs within the State Department, will be in Ottawa May 28 to give an outline of U.S.A. thinking on the way Mr. Seaborn might base his approach to Ho Chi Minh. He is scheduled to call on you at 4 o'clock on Thursday afternoon, May 28.

4. There are no points that especially need to be made to Mr. Sullivan. It would be valuable however to make him aware that we value contact with him. Until recently Sullivan has remained moderately optimistic about future prospects in Vietnam. Following his most recent trip to Vietnam however (when he accompanied Mr. McNamara) Sullivan has made no attempt to paint a rosy picture. He might therefore be asked to comment on which areas of the situation appear most difficult at the present time.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

92.
Memorandum by Minister, Embassy to United States
Note du ministre, ambassade aux États-Unis
MG31-E83, vol. 12, 12

Top Secret.
[Washington,] May 29, 1964

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[8] It is not clear whether this memo, on which someone wrote "not used," was sent to Martin.
Il n'est pas certain que cette note, sur laquelle il est inscrit « non utilisé », ait été envoyée à Martin.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

By an arrangement made yesterday afternoon, the President and the Prime Minister met last night for half an hour at the New Hilton Hotel in New York.[9] Mr. McGeorge Bundy, who was at the meeting and who also had some private conversation with the Prime Minister, gave me an account this morning of what took place.

2. The meeting lasted approximately half an hour and was not exclusively devoted to the situation in Southeast Asia, although this was the main purpose of the President's wish to see the Prime Minister. Other subjects discussed included politics in the United States and in Canada (Mr. Pearson explained how hard it was to change a flag). The Prime Minister mentioned to the President that he would be attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London early in July and invited the President to let him have any views which he might like conveyed to the Conference. Bundy said the President had willingly accepted this offer; I mentioned that the Minister would be here on June 25 and that this might provide an occasion for transmission of United States views. Bundy agreed, and I am sure he will tell the State Department about this arrangement.

3. While I was with Bundy, White House Press Secretary Reedy called to say that the AP was carrying a story to the effect that Canadian sources had described the Prime Minister's meeting with the President as a move by Johnson to get some ideas from Pearson on handling the Southeast Asian crisis.[10] After some discussion, in which I said I thought that as little prominence as possible should be given to the Southeast Asian aspect of the meeting, Bundy told Reedy to say that matters of mutual interest had been discussed, both of a bilateral and international nature. Reedy was to agree that Southeast Asia was among these but was not to volunteer this information.

4. Bundy said the main reason why the President wished to see the Prime Minister was to underline the importance he attached to having Seaborn go as soon as possible to Vietnam. There was a need, in the view of the Administration, to establish a reliable and professional channel of communication with the North Vietnamese in Hanoi. The origin of this need was to ensure that in determining their policy and tactics, especially vis-à-vis Laos, the North Vietnamese should be kept aware of the response which the United States might make to actions of the Communist side as the situation developed. The United States did not wish the North Vietnamese to act on false assumptions or in ignorance of the intentions of the United States. Thus it would be helpful both to the North Vietnamese and the United States to have available a middleman who could explain the real meaning of statements or moves by the United States which might be open to differing interpretations. As the situation was serious, it was of great importance that Seaborn, as the chosen middleman, should arrive in the near future at his new post. It was not impossible (at one stage Bundy described it as a less than 50% chance) that the United States might feel it necessary to take certain measures against the North Vietnamese, but it would be obviously desirable to ensure that before such measures were taken the North Vietnamese should be aware of what was in store and should have a reliable channel for responding if they chose to use it. I had the impression from Bundy's remarks that all this might develop pretty quickly and that the United States

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9 No Canadian record of the Pearson-Johnson conversation was found. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. XII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), document 320.
Aucun compte rendu canadien de la conversation entre Pearson et Johnson n'a été trouvé. Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. XII (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 2001), document 320.

10 See/Voir "LBJ, Pearson Talk in NY," *Austin Statesman*, 29 May 1964, p. 1.

authorities hoped Seaborn could reach Vietnam within the next week or so and perhaps go to Hanoi on his courtesy calls almost immediately thereafter. (Subsequently I learned from Arnold Smith that arrangements have been made for Seaborn to leave Ottawa on Tuesday, June 2, to be in Vietnam by Saturday, June 6, or thereabouts.)

5. In talking about the possibility of measures against the North Vietnamese, Bundy said the President and Prime Minister had had some discussion of the type of action which might be necessary and defensible. The Prime Minister had drawn a clear distinction between measures involving, on the one hand, nuclear and, on the other hand, non-nuclear weapons. He thought that the United States would be totally isolated if it used nuclear weapons. He could not carry Canadian support for nuclear measures, whereas the use of conventional weapons on a discriminating basis against military targets, supply lines, etc., would not create the same problems. According to Bundy, the President entirely agreed with this point and responded enthusiastically to the Prime Minister's warning against measures which would open the United States to charges of attacks of any kind on women and children, etc. (In this connection Bundy said it had been instructive to him to realize that recent statements by Senator Goldwater, who was regarded here as "nut", appeared more dangerous in Canada.)

6. Bundy went on to say that the President had wanted to make it clear to the Prime Minister that the United States was fully aware of the importance of avoiding any measures which might lead to uncontrollable escalation. They were thinking rather in terms of carefully controlled and precise actions designed to deter or, if necessary, react to particular moves by the North Vietnamese or their Pathet Lao clients. As he spoke I was reminded of the doctrine of "graduated response" which the United States used in the October 1962 Cuba crisis. I had the impression from Bundy's remarks that the President had benefited from the Prime Minister's comments involving, as they appear to have done, agreement on Seaborn's role and acceptance of the possible necessity of limited direct action against the Communist side in Laos and North Vietnam. (It will be important to get the Prime Minister's version of this part of the conversation since Bundy was not too precise as to exactly how far the Prime Minister had gone in his response to the idea of direct measures.)

7. It was interesting that Bundy commented that "the professionals" sometimes don't quite get across the political nuances which surround plans made for crisis situations. Thus while the United States was firmly determined "not to be run out of there", the President had an equal determination to avoid precipitating a major conflict. After all, the President was running for election as a man of peace; he was not about to start a war.

8. At another point in the conversation Bundy emphasized that the Administration was "playing this day by day and not engaging in a five act play written either by Walter Lippmann or Joe Alsop."[11] This I took to be an underlining of the fluid state of present United States preparations and to the importance of keeping open a range of options on the pattern of the Cuba crisis. Frequently Bundy emphasized that any action that might be necessary would be minimum action to cope with given moves initiated by Hanoi.

9. I asked about the Honolulu Conference. Bundy put the emphasis on South Vietnam as the main focus of the Conference although he did not, of course, suggest that the situation in Laos and in the area as a whole would not be discussed. (Subsequently Arnold Smith told me that Sullivan and Cooper had said in Ottawa that recommendations on Laos would be drawn up at the Honolulu Conference for discussion on Wednesday next, June 3, with the President.) Bundy said that apart from a general review of the situation in South Vietnam,

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[11] Walter Lippmann (1889–1974) and Joseph Alsop (1910–1989) were prominent American political commentators.
Walter Lippmann (1889-1974) et Joseph Alsop (1910-1989) étaient des commentateurs politiques américains renommés.

they wished to discuss means of countering accusations made by the Communist side that the United States presence in Southeast Asia was nothing but an imperialist venture. It was clear from what Bundy said that the United States is troubled by this line of propaganda and that they wished to devise an information policy which will make more credible the position, which Bundy said reflected the genuine desire of the Administration, that the only purpose of United States involvement was to prevent the countries of the area being taken over by communism and that, for its part, the United States had no ambition to retain military presence in the area so long as this was not necessary to preserve the independence and free choice of the various countries concerned. It may be worth noting here that Bundy mentioned that there were "coup rumours" again this week emanating from South Vietnam. He did not seem unduly worried about this.

10. In subsequent conversation I asked Bundy how the United States authorities felt about maintaining the Geneva framework. He said they had by no means given up and it was especially important to preserve the mechanism in respect of Laos, if only to salvage the position of Souvanna Phouma. He said the Prime Minister and the President had not had much detailed discussion about tactics; he surmised that neither was fully conversant with the most recent exchanges on consultations or a conference. I asked him the United States position on a conference – was it true that they were still four-square behind consultations under Article 4 in Vientiane? His answer was that they were looking "with a not entirely gloomy eye" at the Polish proposal,[12] which had the advantage of excluding certain powers, including especially France, which might not be helpful.

11. On returning to the office, I had a talk with Arnold Smith. He said they would send us a full record of the Sullivan-Cooper discussions in Ottawa, which had been very useful.[13] One point he asked me to check immediately with Bundy. The Canadian Government was impressed with the absolute importance of preserving secrecy regarding Seaborn's mission. Sullivan and Cooper had at first proposed that this mission should be built up in order to impress the North Vietnamese with its importance and thus enhance Seaborn's credibility as a reliable source of interpretation of United States views. I spoke to Bundy and explained that the Canadian authorities thought this was not the right way to go about it. Bundy immediately said that he thought it of great importance to keep the mission entirely secret otherwise its success might be fatally endangered. I told this to Arnold Smith subsequently.

12. One point which I forgot to enquire about when I was seeing Bundy is whether or not any other countries are aware of Seaborn's mission. I suspect that the British may have been brought into the picture, but this is something we should follow up. (Later: Neither U.K. nor any other government is aware of Seaborn's mission, according to Sullivan. But I learned from Ottawa that before we were approached, U.K. was asked if its man in Hanoi might take on the job. U.K. had said their man was "not the right man for the job".)

13. Finally, Arnold Smith told me that he had got it clear with Sullivan and Cooper that any decisions arising out of the Honolulu Conference and any subsequent messages intended for Seaborn should be transmitted to the Canadian Government through this Embassy.[14]

H.B. R[obinson]

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[12] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 185 n. 4.

[13] See/Voir doc. 94.

[14] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Ambassador to see on return. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

93.
Telegram from Minister, Embassy to United States, to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du ministre, ambassade aux États-Unis, au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 1951
Washington, May 30, 1964
Top Secret. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
For personal attention of and distribution by Arnold Smith or R.L. Rogers.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Following is text of paper entitled "Outline of Subjects for Mr. Seaborn" given to me today by Sullivan. First two paragraphs, Sullivan said, represented summary of President Johnson's interpretation of mission being undertaken by Seaborn. Sullivan also said that he realized you would have wished to have for Seaborn a more precise indication of various "carrots and sticks" which might in due course be incorporated in messages to be conveyed by Seaborn to Hanoi. At the meeting this morning, however, officials had concluded they were simply not repeat not in a position to identify types or combinations of carrots and sticks which USA might wish to hold out to North Vietnamese. They therefore considered that Seaborn's first contacts would probably have to be interim and general in nature, to be followed up as appropriate by more precise messages. Text begins:

1. The President wishes Hanoi to understand that he is fundamentally a man of peace. However, he does not repeat not intend to let the North Vietnamese take over all of Southeast Asia. He wishes to have a highly confidential, responsible interlocutor who will deliver this message to the authorities in Hanoi and report back their reaction.

2. The messages which may be transmitted through this channel would involve an indication of the limitations both upon USA ambitions in Southeast Asia and upon USA patience with Communist provocation. The interlocutor or his government need not repeat not agree with nor associate themselves with the messages that are passed. The only requirement is that there be faithful transmittal of the messages in each direction.

3. Mr. Seaborn should arrive in Hanoi as soon as possible [and] establish his credentials as a political personality who can and will deal with senior representatives of the Hanoi regime.

4. Mr. Seaborn should also, by listening to the arguments and observing the attitudes of the North Vietnamese, form an evaluation of their mental outlook. He should be particularly alert to (a) differences with respect to the Sino-Soviet split, (b) frustration or war weariness, (c) indications of North Vietnamese desire for contacts with the West, (d) evidences of cliques or factions in the party or Government, and (e) evidence of differences between the political and the military.

5. Mr. Seaborn should explore the nature and the prevalence of Chinese Communist influence in North Vietnam; and perhaps through direct discussions with the Soviet representatives, evaluate the nature and influence of the Soviet [Union?].

6. Mr. Seaborn should stress to appropriate North Vietnamese officials that USA policy is to see to it that North Vietnam contains itself and its ambitions within the territory allocated to its administration by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. He should stress that USA policy in South Vietnam is to preserve the integrity of that state's territory against guerrilla subversion.

7. He should state that USA does not repeat not seek military bases in the area and that USA is not repeat not seeking to overthrow the Communist regime in Hanoi.

8. He should stipulate that USA is fully aware of the degree to which Hanoi controls and directs the guerrilla action in South Vietnam and that USA holds Hanoi directly responsible for that action. He should similarly indicate USA awareness of North Vietnamese control over the Pathet Lao movement in Laos and the degree of North Vietnamese involvement in that country. He should specifically indicate USA awareness of North Vietnamese violations of Laotian territory along the infiltration route into South Vietnam.

9. Mr. Seaborn should point out that the nature of USA commitment in South Vietnam is not repeat not confined to the territorial issue in question. He should make it clear that USA considers the confrontation with North Vietnamese subversive guerrilla action as part of the general free world confrontation with this type of violent subversion in other lesser developed countries. Therefore, USA stake in resisting a North Vietnamese victory in South Vietnam has a significance of worldwide proportions.

10. Mr. Seaborn can point to the many examples of USA policy in tolerance of peaceful coexistence with Communist regimes, such as Yugoslavia, Poland, etc. He can hint at the economic and other benefits which have accrued to those countries because their policy of Communism has confined itself to the development of their own national territories and has not repeat not sought to expand into other areas.

11. Mr. Seaborn can couple this statement with the frank acknowledgement that USA public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely thin.

12. Insofar as Mr. Seaborn considers it might be educational, he could review the relative military strengths of USA, North Vietnam, and the available resources of Communist China in Southeast Asia.

13. In sum, the purpose of Mr. Seaborn's mission in North Vietnam would be as an interlocutor with both active and passive functions. On the passive side, he should report either observations or direct communications concerning North Vietnamese attitude toward extrication from or escalation of military activities. On the active side, he should establish his credentials with the North Vietnamese as an authoritative channel of communication with USA. In each of these functions it would be hoped that Mr. Seaborn would assume the posture that the decision as to the future course of events in Southeast Asia rests squarely with Hanoi. Text ends.

[H.B.] Robinson

94.

Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

Top Secret. Bacon.[15]
[Ottawa,] June 5, 1964

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[15] "Bacon" was the codename given to Seaborn's assignment to serve as a confidential channel between the United States and North Vietnam.
Le nom de code « Bacon » désignait la mission de Seaborn consistant à servir d'intermédiaire confidentiel entre les États-Unis et le Nord-Vietnam.

VISIT OF MESSRS. SULLIVAN AND COOPER TO THE DEPARTMENT

Attached for your information is a complete record of the conversations with Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Cooper during their visit to Ottawa on May 28 and 29.[16] The separate records of conversation cover the meetings on the afternoon of May 28 and Mr. Sullivan's interview with the Minister the following day.

2. Mr. Kiselyak of the U.S. Embassy has asked for copies of these records. Would you agree we might pass them to him?[17]

R.L. Rogers

Enclosure 1: Record of Conversation
Pièce jointe 1 : Compte rendu d'une conversation

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] June 3, 1964

VISIT OF MESSRS. SULLIVAN AND COOPER TO THE DEPARTMENT

Present

U.S.A. – Mr. William Sullivan ("Vietnamese Co-ordinator", State Department), Mr. Chester Cooper (C.I.A.), Mr. C. Kiselyak (U.S. Embassy).

Canada – Mr. Arnold Smith (chairman), Mr. J. McCardle (DL2), Mr. R.L. Rogers (Far Eastern Division), Mr. H.B. Singleton, Mr. T.M. Pope, Mr. J.B. Seaborn.

The following is a summary of the discussions on May 28 with Mr. William Sullivan of the State Department and Mr. Cooper of the C.I.A. as they affected Vietnam. Separate memoranda† are being prepared on the discussion on Laos and Cambodia.

2. Mr. Sullivan began by emphasizing the gravity of the present situation. It was likely that greater risks would have to be faced in Indochina now than at any other time in the recent past – despite any hopes the North Vietnamese might have of the alleged paralysis of United States policy in an election year.

3. Mr. Sullivan said that the problem at the present time was to come to an accurate estimate of Sino-Vietnamese intentions. The military situation in Laos was now thought to be more significant than it had originally appeared to be and it was not clear how far the Pathet Lao would push at this time. It was likely that decisions would have to be taken in the very near future that would bring us closer to a confrontation than even in the early days of the Laotian crisis. The United States was therefore requesting Canadian good offices to "convey signals" to Hanoi both so that the North Vietnamese leaders would understand the seriousness of the United States determination and also in order to learn something of North Vietnam's intentions.

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[16] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 182 n. 5.

[17] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
1) Mr. Cadieux to see.
2) Mr. Rogers a) Seaborn should be listed as present where he attended. b) See correction on p. 5. Do you agree? c) Send copy to Mr. Basil Robinson. d) I suppose the U.S. Embassy could have a copy. But shouldn't we [then?] have copy of Sullivan's record? e) How about a note on the [Seaborn?] conversations? On 2 Vietnams, 2 Chinas? Etcetera. Or is this feasible? A.C. S[mith] 6/6

4. Mr. Sullivan informed the Canadian side of the forthcoming conference in Honolulu during which Messrs. Rusk and McNamara would confer with high officials to decide on policy for the immediate future. The recently-begun low-level photographic reconnaissance flights into Laos had brought startling evidence of a massive buildup of materiel in the Plain of Jars and, more serious, in southern Laos adjacent to Military Region 5 in South Vietnam. The possibility therefore arose that North Vietnam's intentions were to force a showdown in South Vietnam.

5. Mr. Arnold Smith intervened at this point to confirm that we agreed both with the United States estimate of the situation and that we did not propose any alternative to the present policy of resistance. Mr. Smith recalled General Collins' judgment in 1954-55 that South Vietnam was defendable.[18] The United States was undertaking great burdens in defence of Vietnam and deserved our support and appreciation.

6. In answer to a question by Mr. McCardle, Mr. Cooper confirmed that the evidence now at hand was the result of a new collection effort through low-level photographic flights begun on May 19 but not continuing on a regular daily basis. The buildup in the Plain of Jars was a continuation of a long-standing Vietnamese effort in the area. In southern Laos however there was evidence of a rapid and continuing buildup which had shown significant development even since the beginning of the low-level reconnaissance flights. Moreover, high-level photography showed an acceleration of the logistic buildup in Vietnam since the beginning of the year in the form of new roads and extensions to the railway system. One could only speculate about North Vietnam's ultimate intentions; but one effect of this increased North Vietnamese effort had already been seen in the improvement of the armament available to the Viet Cong. It could not be ruled out that the North Vietnamese might even be contemplating some new Dien Bien Phu in South Vietnam.

7. Passing to what he called the "political dimensions" Mr. Sullivan said that the lines between the Chinese and moderate camps within the Vietnamese Lao Dong party had become clearly drawn following Le Duan's trip to Peking and Moscow in the fall. Mr. Sullivan surmised that this apparent factionalization of the Lao Dong party was something that Ho Chi Minh might have hoped to avoid. At the Lao Dong party Congress in December Le Duan's speech indicated that a choice had been made in favour of the Chinese line. By contrast the special political conference held in February indicated that the moderates – Mr. Sullivan mentioned Ho Chi Minh, Giap and Pham Van Dong – were fighting a rear-guard action against the activists. In speaking of the war in South Vietnam the moderates had been arguing that the period of military decision was not yet at hand and that the rebels should drop back to standard tactics of harassment.

8. In South Vietnam the Viet Cong had a well-developed command apparatus controlled through Hanoi. The military arm of the Viet Cong was however not yet able to inflict decisive defeats on the government forces. The Viet Cong was organized into 44 regular battalions totalling 25,000 men, (Mr. Cooper later qualified this figure as a minimum), to which could be added some 60-80,000 part-time guerilla troops. The Viet Cong was not yet capable of mounting regimental-size operations; at the most it could organize co-ordinated battalion attacks. The targeting of the Viet Cong effort indicated that the Viet Cong was still basing itself on standard tactics of terrorism.

9. The government forces had now swung completely around to an acceptance of Trinquier's theses on the nature of revolutionary war.[19] The fabric however of the Vietnamese government's ability was thin and the Viet Cong had made efficient local administrators a favourite target for assassination. The army was the only well-articulated organization on the

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[18] See/Voir "Gen. Collins Hopeful on Leaving Vietnam: Vietnam Mission Ended by Collins," *New York Times,* 15 May 1955, p. 1.

[19] See/Voir Roger Trinquier, *La guerre moderne* (Paris : La Table ronde, 1961).

government side. It was not yet able however to give protection to the local population and so make the oil spot technique effective. The situation was characterized essentially by the Viet Cong's inability to topple the government militarily while the government was unable to meet the Viet Cong threat by offering protection to the people in the rural areas.

10. In Laos the Communist objective was not to destroy the right wing at the present time but to destroy the neutralists. In this way they could eliminate the remaining symbol of national unity. Mr. Sullivan summed up by saying that two operations directed from Hanoi were concurrently being carried out. One was the erosion of the popular will in South Vietnam. The second was the erosion of neutral strength in Laos.

11. What was alarming in the present situation was the pace at which Hanoi seemed prepared to push. Mr. Sullivan speculated that Hanoi might hope to exploit a supposed election year paralysis in the United States. In fact, there would be a demonstration of bi-partisan support on the issue. There was no illusion in the United States government that war in South East Asia could possibly result in anyone's advantage. What was therefore needed was a clarification of Hanoi's goals; an explanation to Hanoi of United States goals; and a mutual examination whether there would be a confrontation or a standing down.

12. Mr. Smith intervened at this point to note that what was required was a definition of United States goals. Mr. Sullivan replied that the ideal would be for the North to accept the fact that their ambitions must be limited to the territory assigned to them under the 1954 Cease Fire Agreement; that is, to accept the fact that the 1954 settlement was permanent. At a later point in the conversation Mr. Rogers made the point that the 1954 cease-fire and regrouping had not been intended to be permanent but was designed to pave the way for a settlement through elections. Mr. Sullivan nevertheless indicated that in the United States view the 1954 settlement should be regarded as creating a permanent dividing line in Vietnam.

13. Mr. McCardle asked whether the American side had envisaged that any confrontation would eventually involve the Chinese. Mr. Sullivan replied that they had been working on the assumption that the Chinese objective was (a) to isolate their own people from outside influence; and (b) to restore the military and economic situation in their own country. They wished to avoid situations of maximum risk but were quite happy to have the situation on their borders remain tense through North Vietnamese action. Mr. Cooper intervened to say that in his view the Chinese would give strong vocal support to the North Vietnamese, would keep prodding them to maintain their pressures in South Vietnam, but would not take risks themselves. He based his reasoning on three points: (a) North Vietnam would be reluctant to compromise its independence through being forced to call on a Chinese military presence in North Vietnam; (b) the North Vietnamese military establishment was not helpless and was sufficiently well-organized to meet most threats; and (c) the Chinese do not have a great deal to offer in a military way apart from overwhelming land forces.

14. Mr. Smith recalled the Yalu[20] and said that the Chinese response to American action would depend on the choice presented by the U.S. Mr. Sullivan replied that the significance of what was happening in Vietnam was not limited to that particular country alone. It could be seen as a test case for other possible Communist targets in South East Asia, Latin America and Africa. The question that was being posed was whether the West was physically capable of protecting its allies from the technique of revolutionary war. Mr. Smith noted that the problem was partly indigenous and was not merely one of northern fomentation of an outside movement. Mr. Sullivan agreed and said that the political problem was to deal with a situation which made it possible for the Viet Cong to recruit the bulk of its strength from the

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[20] This is a reference to the crossing of the Yalu River, on the border between China and North Korea, by Chinese forces in October 1950 during the Korean War (1950–1953).
Allusion à la traversée du Yalu, le fleuve qui marque la frontière entre la Chine et la Corée du Nord, par les forces chinoises en octobre 1950, pendant la guerre de Corée (1950-1953).

local population. He also envisaged that the integration of the Viet Cong into the national life would be a difficult problem if a settlement was ever reached. Mr. Cooper admitted an indigenous component to the rebellion. At the same time he thought that the Viet Cong rebellion could be brought to an end if instructions to that effect were issued from Hanoi. The rebellion would not come to an end immediately; it would however become a problem that could be handled by the South Vietnamese Government.

15. Mr. Sullivan came to the question of the nature of the message which he hoped Mr. Seaborn might convey to the Vietnamese authorities. He said the United States was prepared to get into a dialogue with North Vietnam and had thought Canada might be a useful intermediary. The French were not at this time considered to be capable of playing the rôle of an honest intermediary. The British said that "their man" was not qualified by temperament to carry out the task the Americans had in mind. A United States attempt to talk directly to Ung Van Khiem, the then Foreign Minister, in the Spring of 1962 had failed.[21] Mr. Sullivan described Mr. Seaborn's mission as being "to see whether there are any grounds for carroting them or whether the threat of sticks produces any movement." During the course of the discussion, which became general about this stage, the following points were made. (a) Mr. Smith raised our concern that the channel of communications to Mr. Seaborn should remain within Canadian hands. Mr. Sullivan confirmed that the channel would be from the State Department to the Embassy in Washington to Ottawa to Mr. Seaborn. (b) Mr. Sullivan said that it was not the American intention to have Mr. Seaborn's mission conflict with our obligations in the Commission. Mr. Smith replied that this was not a limiting problem. (c) Mr. Sullivan said that he hoped that Mr. Seaborn would transmit messages faithfully even if he did not agree with the content. Mr. Smith reassured him on this point. (d) Mr. McCardle raised the question whether the North Vietnamese might not be over-confident because they had not yet met with a military defeat. Mr. Sullivan replied that he hoped that Mr. Seaborn could inform us how great a burden North Vietnamese find the war in the South. Mr. Cooper thought this aspect was not a negligible factor in Hanoi's motivation. He thought the high casualty figures received through U.S. intelligence sources were probably accurate and might even contain a degree of understatement. Mr. Sullivan confirmed that in the American view there was a possibility both of war-weariness in North Vietnam and of war jitters.

16.The basic problem discussed was the manner in which Mr. Seaborn should establish his credentials. The American side put forward the possibility of a discreet leaking of the fact that there had been contacts between President Johnson and Mr. Pearson. The consensus of the meeting, however, was that publicity should be shunned. After some discussion agreement was reached that Mr. Seaborn might be provided with a letter from Prime Minister Pearson setting out his status as an "*interlocuteur*."

17. On the actual nature of the approach to be made to the North Mr. Sullivan read from a paper he had prepared setting out the desirable objectives of Mr. Seaborn's mission. The paper covered the following points: (a) Mr. Seaborn's credentials; (b) Mr. Seaborn's estimate of the North Vietnamese "rationale for action"; (c) Mr. Seaborn's estimate of the effect of the Sino-Soviet split on the formation of factions within the Lao Dong party; (d) evidence of the importance of the Chinese Communist presence in North Vietnam as well as an assessment of the Soviet and Eastern European presence; (e) the degree of interest on the part of North Vietnam in increased contacts with the West.

18. Mr. Sullivan envisaged that Mr. Seaborn should make clear to the North Vietnamese leaders the extent of the United States determination to defend South Vietnam, and at the same time, emphasize the limitations of U.S. ambitions in South Vietnam. In particular it required no bases or other military presence of a permanent nature in that country.

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[21] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), document 247.

Mr. Seaborn was to make clear also to the North Vietnamese authorities that the United States hold Hanoi – and not Peking or Moscow – directly responsible for the tensions in Laos and Vietnam.

19. Mr. Sullivan touched on the inducements that could be offered to the North Vietnamese to put a halt to their efforts in South Vietnam. Mr. Seaborn was to say that the United States accepted peaceful co-existence with the North; he should also hold out the prospect of trade between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, trade which was necessary to the North because of its unviability as an economic unit when cut off from the South. It might even be possible to envisage some sort of help for the North such as Poland and Yugoslavia have enjoyed. As for the "stick", Mr. Seaborn might catalogue United States strength in the area and emphasize the vulnerability of North Vietnam to attack. He should also stress the inability of the Chinese within their present capabilities to counter any American move. The prospect that was facing the North Vietnamese was that of turning North Vietnam into a battlefield. (In answer to a question Mr. Sullivan said that the Americans envisaged air strikes and not the commitment of U.S. troops.) Mr. Seaborn expressed the fear that the above might simply be regarded as empty threats. Mr. Cooper assured the meeting that by the time Mr. Seaborn was in Hanoi there would be available to the North Vietnamese leaders tangible evidence of United States seriousness.

20. At a later point in the conversation Mr. Sullivan said that Mr. Seaborn's first message to the North Vietnamese leaders should emphasize the limited nature of U.S. ambitions in Vietnam but the total nature of its involvement. He should also emphasize the global significance of the war for the United States and say that the United States Government would not be hamstrung by election year politics. The United States accepted co-existence with Communist régimes such as North Vietnam so long as they refrained from interference in other countries. Trade with South Vietnam and assistance from the United States should be held up as inducements. Mr. Sullivan mentioned the examples of Yugoslavia and Poland in this connection. Finally this should be accompanied by a description of United States military power in the area to ensure that the North Vietnamese leaders were labouring under no illusions as to what awaited them.

Far Eastern Division

Enclosure 2: Summary Record of Conversation between Secretary of State for External Affairs and Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to Secretary of State of United States, May 29, 1964

Pièce jointe 2 : Résumé du compte rendu de la conversation entre le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et l'assistant spécial pour les affaires vietnamiennes auprès du secrétaire d'État des États-Unis, 29 mai 1964

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] June 3, 1964

Present

Mr. Martin, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Arnold Smith, Mr. R.L. Rogers.

Mr. Sullivan began by expressing United States concern at the manner in which North Vietnam was forcing the military pace in Laos and South Vietnam. He did not know what were Hanoi's immediate intentions. However, low-level aerial reconnaissance indicated a buildup in Southern Laos which could be preparatory to a move into South Vietnam. It was very important for North Vietnam to know the limits of United States patience. The need was for a channel of communications to the North Vietnamese.

2. Mr. Martin expressed concern over the time it had taken to have Mr. Seaborn ready for his mission. He said that we would undertake to do what the Americans asked of us and do so with dispatch, but wondered how effective Mr. Seaborn's mission would be. North Vietnam must already be in no doubt about the degree of American impatience.

3. Mr. Sullivan replied that Mr. Seaborn would be authorized to present a combination of warnings and inducements to the North Vietnamese. Hanoi might not understand United States motives in South Vietnam. The United States might moreover be able to assist North Vietnam in the resolution of its economic difficulties. Mr. Sullivan was not able to foresee what would be the exact nature of the messages Mr. Seaborn would carry. The important thing was to have Mr. Seaborn first establish his credentials as "a political personage." Mr. Sullivan said it was not essential that Mr. Seaborn endorse all the points he was asked to transmit; the important thing was that he transmit the messages faithfully. Mr. Martin said that it was important that Mr. Seaborn maintain his independence; he undertook however that Mr. Seaborn should pass messages as a friend. Mr. Sullivan added that part of Mr. Seaborn's functions would further be to convey messages from the North Vietnamese. He undertook to provide an outline brief for Mr. Seaborn.

4. The Minister asked what inducements the United States would be able to offer Hanoi. Mr. Sullivan replied that the United States was prepared to accept the independent existence of two Vietnams and hold out the hope of ultimate unity. He conceded that this might not be viewed as a U.S. concession by North Vietnam and indeed that it might create difficulties for both North and South Vietnam. He noted that North Vietnam was experiencing difficulties in the supply of most commodities except coal. They might therefore be looking for a way in which to obtain United States foodstuffs. They could be offered the prospect of trade. Other lines could be explored but the possibility of an arrangement under PL-480[22] was remote. Mr. Sullivan accepted that North Vietnam might prove totally unreceptive: the United States had tried once before to communicate with the North Vietnamese without result. At that time however they were much more confident whereas now Communist China was exercising greater pressures in favour of conformity. Mr. Sullivan said the Americans would be interested in Mr. Seaborn's assessment of the weight this factor played in the thinking of the North Vietnamese leaders. The Americans wanted to have someone in Hanoi in whom they could place confidence. At any rate they did not want to pass up the opportunity to let the North Vietnamese know the United States position.

5. The Minister asked what would result if Mr. Seaborn's approach was not acceptable to the North Vietnamese. Mr. Sullivan indicated that the Americans might nevertheless wish to pass certain specific messages for transmission to Hanoi. He stressed that for the Americans the problem was not limited to Vietnam but was of worldwide significance. The Minister said that Canadians would be concerned about any possible expansion of hostilities. Much would depend on how the messages were presented. Mr. Sullivan replied that he hoped the messages could be framed in such a way that there would be no necessity for an endorsement on our part.

6. Mr. Martin asked for an assessment of Peking's rôle in Indochina. Mr. Sullivan replied that Peking was limiting itself to encouragement of the North Vietnamese. There was no evidence of physical participation. The Chinese had been responsible for some road construction in northern Laos. There were some Chinese truck drivers in a quasi-military capacity. Communist China also supplied weapons to North Vietnam to be passed to South Vietnam. The Communist Chinese viewed it as advantageous to keep peripheral areas in turmoil to distract and exhaust the free world. Mr. Sullivan cited Sarawak and Singapore as examples. The Chinese had not however made a specific commitment to come to North

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[22] See/Voir Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Public Law No. 83-480, 68 Stat. 454 (1954).

Vietnam's aid if attacked. Mr. Martin remarked that it was a disadvantage not to know Communist China's exact thinking. Mr. Sullivan replied that he did not think Peking would intervene directly.

7. Mr. Martin remarked on the Soviet Union's interest in winning support for co-existence. Mr. Sullivan thought that the Soviet Union was rapidly abandoning hope of exerting influence in South East Asia. It wanted to disengage itself from the problem of Laos because the prospect of exerting its influence through lines of communication across Communist China was not attractive. The United States felt that the Soviet Union had "played out" its chances in South East Asia. It may originally have expected that the rôle of Co-Chairman would be sufficient to give it influence. Khrushchev was bored with Laos. The Poles on the other hand were frightened. In their position they could not simply ignore what was happening in the Plaine des Jarres as could the Russians. Mr. Smith noted that the Poles seemed ready to help destroy Souvanna Phouma's position in order to be able to protect their essential interests elsewhere. Mr. Sullivan agreed. He went on to say that Polish-Soviet tactics seem to be to denigrate Souvanna Phouma in order to return to a situation in which three factions face each other. They would therefore join in efforts to get rid of Souvanna Phouma. The French were to a certain extent lending themselves to these efforts.

8. The Minister said that he would be surprised if it proved possible for us to hold Laos. He asked whether the United States was prepared to intervene seriously. Mr. Sullivan replied that the source of the trouble was the same in Laos as in South Vietnam. There would not be much advantage in initiating ground operations from Thailand. The forthcoming meeting in Honolulu would discuss the nature of the military posture to be adopted. The probable recommendation would be to strengthen their general position in the area; Mr. Sullivan did not know whether any recommendation would be made to commit ground forces.

9. On the question of the conference on Laos Mr. Martin said that Canada preferred informal consultations in Vientiane. Mr. Sullivan replied that the United States intended and expected that the Government of Laos should initiate the discussions. The French proposal for consultations on Laos gave them too great an air of formality.

10. The Minister asked for Mr. Sullivan's views on the reasons which led the French to take the position they did. Mr. Sullivan surmised that the French expected that consultations would expand to cover all of Indochina. Why the French wanted this would remain a matter for speculation. De Gaulle however had simple views of power blocs and South East Asia lay within the Communist Chinese sphere of influence. Jealousy as a motive was probably nothing more than an emotional overtone. Mr. Martin intervened to say that he agreed with the article by Lippmann which had appeared in the paper that day.[23] Mr. Sullivan recounted the view of the French Ambassador in Washington that Communist Chinese influence would expand as far as the Anglo-Saxons would allow. To check Chinese influence would however take more force than the Anglo-Saxons had yet committed. Mr. Sullivan surmised that the British would in that case have to withdraw forces from Western Europe, a prospect that was pleasing to de Gaulle. The French expected that South East Asia would be turned over to an Asian Tito [illegible/illisible] in Hanoi if the West withdrew.

11. Mr. Martin said that he did not see how a conference could be avoided unless the United States took a course in favour of direct intervention. Mr. Sullivan thought that these were extreme alternatives and said he would prefer to find a middle course. He conceded however that intervention rather than a conference seemed to be a more likely course at the present time. The Minister said that Canada wanted to give all help but would have to express serious views on such a possibility. Speaking as a politician he said he would find it difficult

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[23] This may be a reference to Walter Lippmann, "Strong India Necessary to Hold Western Position in South Asia," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 June 1964, p. A5.
Il pourrait s'agir de Walter Lippmann, « Strong India Necessary to Hold Western Position in South Asia », *Los Angeles Times*, 3 juin 1964, p. A5.

to condone. Mr. Sullivan replied that any military response would be commensurate with the degree of provocation. Hanoi might be banking on the possibility that the United States would be incapable of action in an election year. He hoped that Mr. Seaborn might open the way to a middle course. Mr. Martin remarked that he hoped that Mr. Seaborn would be able to move as soon as possible.

12. Mr. Sullivan said that Vietnam was becoming an emotional issue in the United States. The letters from men serving in Vietnam about the alleged poor quality of their equipment had caused a stir.[24] It was difficult for the people to understand how military personnel should not engage in direct military action but restrict themselves to the training of military and paramilitary forces to protect the local population. The United States rôle was limited to the provision of equipment and instruction, and support units such as helicopter and transport units. The Americans had 16,000 men in Vietnam of which only 300 were in the field. About 6,000 were in support forces, flying, servicing, maintenance, transport or communications. 700 were in headquarters planning. About 400 were responsible for the bringing in of equipment for the Vietnamese Army. There was no massive influx of Americans and none were in command positions. The military now understood the situation.

13. On Cambodia the Americans had thought of proposing a force along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border made up of 13 battalions from each side. U.N. liaison officers were to be attached to these battalions which would be under U.N. command for purposes of policing the border. Such an operation would require a U.N. force of 700-800 men. The placing of a pure U.N. force along the border would take some 4,000 men. The South Vietnamese had said that 1,500 would be sufficient.

14. Mr. Martin noted the British view that a conference on Cambodia was essential. Mr. Sullivan replied that the question was the attitude of the Thais and the South Vietnamese. Mr. Martin asked whether a conference on Indochina was not becoming inevitable. Mr. Sullivan said that the usual Communist tactic when a conference was in the offing was to bring significant military force to bear to prepare the opposition for negotiation. He mentioned Dien Bien Phu in this connection. A quadripartite conference on Cambodia would be possible if one could bring the South Vietnamese, Thais and Cambodians together. This had very nearly happened (in March). The United States did not object in principle to a conference on Laos provided there was a cease-fire, a return to military positions prior to the most recent outbreak and provided Souvanna Phouma was confirmed as spokesman of the government of national unity. The machinery set up by the Geneva Agreements had been abused and the ICC and the Co-Chairmen were not proving effective. On Vietnam, Mr. Sullivan said that a conference without cessation of Viet Cong activity would lead to a collapse of morale in South Vietnam. A general conference on Indochina as a whole while at the same time reinforcing non-Communist military positions would be very difficult unless military action were taken against North Vietnam.

15. Mr. Martin said that he might be questioned in the House about the meeting between the Prime Minister and President Johnson. He would have to reply vaguely. Mr. Smith suggested that it might be possible to say that Mr. Sullivan had been to Ottawa but Mr. Sullivan preferred to avoid mention of his presence here. Mr. Martin suggested that it would be possible to say that Canada had carried on the fullest consultations with the U.S. on Indochina. Mr. Sullivan hoped that it would in that case prove possible for us to indicate the President's concern at the pace of North Vietnamese recklessness in Laos and South Vietnam. He thought it would be better however not to let it be known that he had been in Ottawa.

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[24] See/Voir Edwin Gerald Shank, Jr., "We Are Losing, Morale is Bad – If They'd Give Us Good Planes–": [Excerpts from] a Captain's Last Letters from Vietnam," *U.S. News & World Report*, 56 (4 May 1964), pp. 46–49.

16. The Minister said that the Opposition tended to be suspicious of United States policy in Indochina. He had defended U.S. position on South Vietnam; there would be trouble however if operations in Vietnam were to expand. Mr. Sullivan said that the press had already carried reports of the fuller aerial reconnaissance which had recently been undertaken. It was known that the United States felt grave concern about the situation. He thought it would be useful for the United States' allies to know how seriously the United States felt on the issue. Mr. Martin asked when the results of the Honolulu conference would be made known to us. Mr. Sullivan said that if decisions and conclusions were reached they would be conveyed to Canada as soon as possible – possibly as early as Wednesday. Mr. Smith said that if the right wing were to again take extreme action in Laos it would be very difficult to defend.

17. Mr. Martin said we would do our best. Mr. Sullivan expressed his thanks and said United States had confidence in Seaborn. In reply to a question from the Minister he said that he hoped Seaborn's mission had not been undertaken too late.

95.

Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 248
Saigon, June 8, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
[Repeat for Information:] Washington (Robinson).
For Far Eastern Division and Arnold Smith only.

INITIAL VISIT TO HANOI

I am making plans to pay first visit to Hanoi today week [of] June 15. I had intended to go this Thursday, June 11 (there are flights up Monday and Thursday and flights back Tuesday and Friday) but have been dissuaded on grounds that there is already a great deal of speculation and curiosity here among diplomats and probably some among South Vietnamese that Canadians are up to something due to suddenness of Cox-Seaborn switch. (Pole is particularly unconvinced by Cox's explanation.) What would be regarded as unseemly haste to get to Hanoi were I to go this Thursday would only lead to further suspicion and gossip and increase risks of aborting our endeavours.

2. Having met Mr. Lodge after church Sunday morning, I called on him informally at residence Sunday afternoon to discuss timing of Hanoi visit and particularly to enquire whether any events of last few days, when I have been out of touch due to travel, or results of discussions in Honolulu, indicated necessity of such haste as to override objections outlined in previous paragraph. He agreed completely on importance of making Hanoi visit seem as normal as possible and felt our preference for June 15 visit was correct. He also suggested that June 11 visit might suggest to North Vietnamese that we were overly anxious to make contact.[25]

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[25] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 206 (Editorial Note).

3. I have so far told Delworth and Kenyon just sufficient of operation to permit them to advise me on timing and will probably leave it that way until my return from Hanoi. I shall send Jackson to Hanoi by Thursday courier flight so that he can inform PAVN Liaison that I am under instructions to seek early meeting with Ho Chi Minh and/or Pham Van Dong.

4. If you have info or advice additional to that contained in Washington telegram 195[1] May 30 please instruct me by end of this week. Senior communicator advised of Bacon codeword.[26]

[J.B.] Seaborn

96.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 273
Saigon, June 20, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: Washington Tel 1951 May 30.
[Repeat for Information:] Washington (H.B.O. Robinson) from Ottawa.
This message to be delivered immediately to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division only.

INITIAL VISIT TO HANOI: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG

Prime Minister received me for hour and a half Thursday morning June 18 with only Lt. Col. Mai Lam, number two man of PAVN Liaison Mission, present. Conversation was entirely in French with no repeat no use of Vietnamese and interpretation which had been practice in earlier lower level calls on Vice Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs.

2. After very brief preliminaries, I told Prime Minister that I had on instructions specially requested interview with him and/or President Ho Chi Minh as I had oral message to convey from Prime Minister Pearson. Perhaps best explanation was to be found in my top secret instructions from my Prime Minister which I was authorized to show him.[27] Pham Van Dong read letter of May 30 from Prime Minister Pearson to myself carefully once and then quickly again. He said he greatly appreciated role Canada had undertaken to play, which he felt was

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[26] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
1) Tell Blair [Seaborn] we have shown 248 to U.S. 2) Use [illegible/illisible] – not Delhi. 3) What is Cox's explanation? [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

[27] In this letter, in French with an English translation, Pearson asked Seaborn to serve as an "unofficial intermediary in order that nothing be overlooked which could prevent a serious confrontation." Seaborn was thus authorized to transmit to North Vietnam's leaders "the views of the American Government of which we have been informed" and to transmit to Pearson "any commentary or proposition which the Government of [North Vietnam] may eventually wish to transmit to the United States." See RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1.
Dans cette lettre, rédigée en français et traduite en anglais, Pearson demande à Seaborn d'être « disponible comme intermédiaire officieux afin que rien ne soit négligé qui puisse éviter une grave confrontation ». Seaborn est ainsi autorisé, dans ses conversations avec les dirigeants du Nord-Vietnam, à « leur transmettre les vues du gouvernement américain dont nous avons été informés » et à transmettre à Pearson « tout commentaire ou proposition que le gouvernement [du Nord-Vietnam] pourrait éventuellement bien vouloir faire parvenir aux États-Unis ». Voir RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1.

important and desirable, and wished me also personal success in task. Tone of conversation thereafter, I believe Pham Van Dong has understood and accepted and perhaps welcomed my role as intermediary.

3. I said that I hoped he would let me elaborate on very general lines of my instructions from Prime Minister and in effect to convey to him first general message from USA Government. I prefaced message by uniting our close and friendly relationship with USA, our good understanding of American intentions, aspirations and our constant detailed and intimate exchange of views and info with USA which gave us excellent insight into American thinking. On this basis, we were convinced that President Johnson was man of peace, that he would take great pains to avoid and avert situations which could lead to confrontation between major powers, but that insofar as Southeast Asia was concerned he was determined that it would not repeat not fall under Communist control as result of subversion and guerrilla warfare. Intentions in Southeast Asia were essentially peaceful and USA ambitions were limited, but USA was also determined and its patience before provocation was not repeat not limitless.

4. This said, I went on to convey USA message, following as closely as I could, though not repeat not necessarily in same order, points made in paragraphs 6 through 11 of Washington telegram 1951 May 30. In course of conversation, I made all these points explicitly and without circumlocution and in some cases with elaboration and repetition. I shall not repeat not therefore repeat them in this telegram. I did not repeat not specifically make point in paragraph 12 other than to say that if conflict in area should escalate, which I did not repeat not think was in anyone's interest, the greatest devastation would of course result for the DRVN itself.

5. I am convinced from later conversation that Pham Van Dong understood importance and context of message I conveyed and seriousness with which USA views situation in Southeast Asia. To that extent, initial purpose of first contact has been successfully accomplished. He gave me careful hearing with no repeat no attempt to interrupt, disagree, contradict or even express displeasure even to assertions which were clearly unpalatable or with which he would not repeat not agree, e.g., Vietminh complicity in Pathet Lao activities and SVN insurgency and DRVN responsibility for future development of situation in area. This is not repeat not of course to say that I convinced him of correctness of USA interpretations (which obviously I did not repeat not) nor that he fully believes even yet firmness and durability of USA determination in area. He could not repeat not however claim that he has not repeat not had USA views and intentions conveyed to him most explicitly.

6. I concluded opening statement by saying I was at Prime Minister's disposal now or at any later stage to convey to USA via Ottawa any message he wished to give me orally or in writing. He said he had no repeat no immediate and specific message to send at this time, but that he would like to expound on DRVN point of view with particular reference to points I had raised in my comment. I shall be sending subsequently detailed report, based on notes made as he talked, of Prime Minister's remarks in his main statement and in course of subsequent discussion. In this initial telegram, however, I shall merely summarize what appear to me to be his main points and give my first impressions.

7. Pham Van Dong opened remarks by saying we must learn to coexist and to find solution to problem which has wracked Indochina for 25 years. But just solution is only way to provide stability. [What] just solution means in DRVN is, as President Ho Chi Minh has explained: a) USA withdrawal; b) peace and neutrality for SVN in Cambodian pattern in accordance with programme of Liberation Front which must participate in determination of Vietnam as result of negotiation when SVN ready for negotiation.

8. Prime Minister said USA must demonstrate what he would consider goodwill but he realized it will not repeat not be easy for USA to do so. USA can increase aid to SVN in all fields, give greater material support to SVN Army and increase its own army personnel also. If so, war will be prolonged and intensified, but "our people" will go on struggling and

resisting. "It is impossible for Westerners to understand strength of people's will to resist, to continue, to struggle. It has astonished us too". Prospect for USA and friends is "*sans issue*". SVN mercenaries and USA soldiers do not repeat not have heart in fighting, whereas support for objective of Liberation Front is growing among Buddhists, students, intellectuals. Lippmann sees no repeat no light at end of tunnel[28] and others speak of new Dien Bien Phu.

9. DRVN Government, said Prime Minister, did not repeat not yet have concrete suggestions to put forward, but this was general line of their thinking.

10. In separate telegram† without Bacon restrictions I shall report in greater detail Prime Minister's comments on Laos situation. Essence of his remarks was (a) only viable solution was return to *status quo ante* April coup d'état and Government of National Coalition as per Geneva Accord of 1962; (b) necessity of convening 14 Nation Conference to achieve this result; and (c) essentiality of no repeat no American interference in Laos. He said DRVN was very worried by step-up of USA military activities in Laos and complained of USA overflights of DRVN territory and of commando raids across border. He denied that PAVN had sent "units" across border to aid Pathet Lao but did not repeat not specifically deny my earlier statement that USA was aware DRVN were helping Pathet Lao and Viet Cong with men, arms and material.

11. Returning to question of SVN, Pham Van Dong said situation could be summed up as choice between "*guerre à outrance*" which USA cannot repeat not win in any event in the long run, or, alternatively, neutrality for SVN.

12. I thanked Prime Minister for detailed exposé of DRVN views, which I said I would transmit faithfully to my Government. At this he said disarmingly that I might not repeat not believe all he had said but he wanted to assure me he had spoken in all sincerity and frankness. I shall not repeat not be so rash as to comment on this other than to say that he took pains throughout interview to give impression of quiet sincerity, of realization of seriousness of what we were discussing and of lack of truculence or belligerency. Certainly in presence and mental stature Prime Minister is head and shoulders above few other North Vietnamese whom I met and undoubtedly an impressive Communist personality by any standards.

13. At this stage I told Prime Minister I had no repeat no further formal message to convey but that I would like to put a few personal comments and questions.

14. I said I was interested to hear from him that as a condition for restoring peace SVN should become neutral as a first step prior to reunification. He stopped me and said he had not repeat not referred to neutrality as a first step only. Whether SVN would continue neutral would depend upon people of SVN. He did not repeat not prejudge. As for Liberation Front, I said I realized it represents a certain force in SVN, though not repeat not in my view all people, as the propaganda asserted, nor even majority. He did not repeat not demur at this downgrading. I said I appreciated that the Front would have to participate should a coalition ever emerge; my fear, however, was that coalition would soon be taken over by Front as had happened in other countries and that other representative elements would suffer or be ousted. Prime Minister merely said there was no repeat no reason to have such fears.

15. I then asked whether Prime Minister appreciated fully that USA's continued acceptance of obligations towards allies in SVN had implications which extended far beyond Southeast Asia and related to USA determination to resist guerrilla subversion in Asia, Africa and Latin-America? Prime Minister laughed and said he did indeed appreciate it. A USA defeat in SVN would in all probability start a chain reaction which would extend much farther. But USA should understand that principles and stakes involved were just as high for Liberation Front in SVN and its supporters and this helped to explain their determination to continue struggle regardless of sacrifice.

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[28] See/Voir Walter Lippmann, "Europe in the Spring: France and America in Asia," *Washington Post*, 21 May 1964, p. A23.

16. Prime Minister said he was glad to hear that USA did not repeat not have aggressive intentions against DRVN and did not repeat not intend to attack it. I corrected him at this point and said USA did not repeat not want to carry war to North but might be obliged to do so if pushed too far by continuation of Vietminh-assisted pressures [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu] SVN; I repeated that USA patience was not repeat not limitless. Prime Minister said if war was pushed to North, "*nous* repeat *nous sommes un pays socialiste, un des pays socialistes, vous savez, et le peuple se dressera*". (This was the closest he came at any time to hinting that DRVN could or would count on outside assistance in event of attack.) But, he said, we shall not repeat not force USA, we shall not repeat not provoke them.

17. Conversation had now continued for almost hour and a half and Prime Minister made move as if to terminate, so I did not repeat not put further questions. He asked me to send greetings to Prime Minister Pearson and to say that if my mission could contribute to this (group missing) solution Canada would have done something very useful. I said I felt it was at minimum essential that no repeat no irrevocable steps be taken due to misunderstanding of intentions and objectives and that USA felt this strongly too. Prime Minister agreed, and said he looked forward to further conversation during my next (group missing) when I would certainly meet Ho Chi Minh. President was on leave at present but had sent greetings. I closed by thanking him for time given me and repeating I was at his disposal anytime he wished to see me.

18. In separate message I shall report first very tentative impressions on questions asked in paragraphs four and five of Washington telegram 1951 May 30.

19. I expect to be seeing Mr. Lodge shortly after my return to Saigon (this telegram is being drafted in plane en route from Hanoi) and will show him copy.[29]

20. I would welcome comments from you and State Department and any suggestions for talking points for further conversations on next visit to Hanoi.

97.

Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 282
Saigon, June 22, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: My Tel 273 June 20.
[Repeat for Information:] Washington (Attn. H.B.O. Robinson) from Ottawa.
To be delivered immediately to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division only.

DRVN: ATTITUDES AND OUTLOOK

To convey specific message and to report DRVN comment is relatively simple. To attempt evaluation suggested in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Washington telegram 1951 May 30 is extremely difficult on the basis of 3-day visit and a few conversations, especially for someone who has never had previous direct experience with Asia, let alone Vietnam. Following comments, to be read in conjunction with my reference telegram, are therefore highly tentative and consist mainly of negative evidence.

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[29] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 222.

Sino-Soviet Split and Prevalence of Chinese Communist Influence

2. No repeat no Vietnamese with whom I spoke made even reference by name to USSR or China. My enquiry of Vice-Foreign Minister Tien as to DRVN views on latest Soviet call for meeting of world CPs drew reply that question concerned Party only and was not repeat not within competence of Foreign Ministry. To direct question he said DRVN had not repeat not commented on latest Moscow call but general views could be found in press. Eastern Europeans were closed-mouthed on this issue. Prime Minister made only most oblique reference to DRVN's membership in group of socialist countries in context of possible results of USA taking war to North.

3. French Delegate General de Buzon asserts DRVN leaders are honestly concerned by bad effect of split on fortunes of world Communist movement and have avoided polemics against USSR even when adopting Peking line. He thinks they fear definitive rupture which would (throw?) them fully under Chinese control, a fate they hope to resist as long as possible. They are not repeat not however strong enough to play dispute for their own purposes as have Romanians.

4. In economic field, probes with Vietnamese and Eastern Europeans were little more rewarding. Strong Vietnamese emphasis at present in official propaganda and in private conversation is on lifting up by own boot-straps and near-autarchy. During lengthy tour of exhibition of ten years of DRVN, guide repeat guide managed to describe economic progress for at least half hour without once mentioning aid received from other socialist countries, (though?) when questioned director admitted it had been great, with lion's share by USSR and China. Representatives of smaller Eastern European powers told me of their relatively modest aid and trade but would not repeat not be drawn on relative weight of Soviet and Chinese aid. Soviet Chargé said that Soviet aid in form of technicians and training of students in USSR had diminished as DRVN capacity for training own cadres had grown. He admitted Chinese were still very active in aid field but would not repeat not be specific.

5. Foreign representatives in Hanoi tell me Chinese technicians, etc., are not repeat not much in evidence but this proves little. Unskilled eye can easily fail to distinguish between North Vietnamese and Southern Chinese.

Cliques in Factions in Party or Government

6. I can add nothing from observation or conversation in Hanoi to analysis of commonly accepted line-up of pro-Chinese extremists and pro-Soviet moderates other than to draw attention to moderateness of Pham Van Dong's tone during interview. Ho Chi Minh appears still to enjoy tremendous prestige and is venerated as demi-god, perhaps above any factional strife. Non-Communist representatives in Hanoi and Nationalist Chinese Ambassador here warn against overemphasis on factionalism as (something?) from which West might derive benefit. National pride is apparent from Pham Van Dong's remarks and from call for economic self-help.

Differences between Political and Military

7. I can adduce no repeat no evidence one way or the other.

Frustration or War Weariness

8. I can bring forward no repeat no evidence that such (exists?) and indeed all Vietnamese emphasized quiet determination to go on struggling as long as necessary to achieve objectives which they said they were bound to achieve in long run. While some discount should perhaps be made for fact they were speaking to me, these assertions carried a good deal of conviction as if really believed. This applies particularly strongly to Pham Van [Dong].

9. Hanoi itself though austere looked much less run down than I expected. Team site officers and others who have been North over course of year say supply of consumer goods while still pitifully small (has?) increased markedly. I saw some queues but no repeat no evidence of malnutrition nor repeat nor did I find people looking markedly sadder or more serious than those in South. Team site officers have seen no repeat no evidence of overt discontent among people.

Desire for Contacts with West

10. Pham Van Dong seemed genuinely grateful for intermediary role Canada was trying to play and also I think for USA desire to get message through. It will take subsequent visits to decide whether this reflects interest in or desire to emerge from isolation, let alone interest in any accommodation or settlement of Laos and SVN problem.

Conclusions

11. Tentative conclusion is that we would be unwise at this stage to count on war weariness or factionalism within leadership or possible material advantages to DRVN or kind of Asian Tito-ism as of such importance to cause DRVN to jump at chance of reaching accommodation with USA in this area. Certainly, on my brief visit I detected no repeat no evidence to suggest (as some columnists have been doing) that starvation, war weariness and political discontent are bringing regime close to collapse and that they would therefore grasp at any straw which might enable them to save something before country falls apart.

12. Prospect of war being carried to North may give greater pause for thought. But I would hesitate to say that DRVN are yet convinced, despite USA public statements and moves and private message I have conveyed, that USA really would be prepared to take this step, ultimate consequences of which could be start of World War III. I am also inclined to think that DRVN leaders are completely convinced that military action at any level is not repeat not going to bring success for USA and government forces in SVN. They are almost as completely convinced that Khanh Government is losing ground on local political front and are confident that in fullness of time success is assured for Liberation Front supported by DRVN.

13. I would however caution on the extreme difficulty of forming meaningful judgements on basis of brief or even longer period spent in North Vietnam, which is a singularly closed society even by Communist standards. Press is very uninformative and I suspect that most foreign representatives including those of Eastern Europe know little of what is going on. Soviet and Chinese Ambassadors are probably only ones taken at all into DRVN confidence and councils and I am not repeat not sanguine about former, who was unfortunately absent during my visit, opening up to me at least on first meeting. I shall persevere of course with foreign representatives and North Vietnamese but the limitations should be fully understood.

[J.B.] Seaborn

98.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 2250
Washington, June 22, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: Saigon Tel 273 Jun 20.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (OpImmediate) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

SEABORN'S CALL ON NORTH VIETNAMESE PRIME MINISTER

Comment of William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, when I gave him reference telegram today, was that it was a superb report, all the more useful because of its clarity and thoroughness, and the promptness with which it had been prepared.

2. Understandably neither Bundy nor Sullivan (State Department Coordinator for Vietnam, who was present when reference telegram was handed over) were prepared to comment at length on substance of reference telegram without having opportunity to study it at length,

but they were both obviously pleased at apparent initial success of operation and they seemed distinctly hopeful that a worthwhile dialogue might be possible. Bundy said however that he had at present no repeat no particular feeling about timing of another visit to Hanoi; he wished to know what Seaborn's own personal plans might be, as well as his assessment of desirability of an early visit to North. Sullivan made point that it might be preferable not repeat not to show too much eagerness, and that suspicions should not repeat not be created in SVN, where Col. An had already guessed something might be afoot. We were left with impression that while Americans will undoubtedly want to make suggestions for use on Seaborn's next visit, they may want to delay formulating these until not repeat not long before his date of departure on trip. Implication of this, although Bundy did not repeat not say so, is that they have as yet nothing new and urgent to say to DRVN.

3. Sullivan remarked on Pham Van Dong's repeated references to SVN Liberation Front and commented that this might be most tricky problem for USA to handle in forthcoming dialogue, as Pham was clearly trying to have Front dealt with as separate entity (as Pathet Lao in Laos) whereas USA felt Front was purely a NVN creation and would want to talk directly to NVN regime and Lao Dong (i.e., NVN Communist Party). Bundy remarked that Pham's emphasis on coalition with Liberation Front as basis for SVN neutrality was almost exactly what Couve de Murville had proposed at April SEATO meeting in Manila; DRVN had evidently been putting its ideas to French.

4. Interest was expressed in hearing from North Vietnamese of a supposedly harder line type (e.g., Le Duan and Trinh) on Seaborn's next trip, as well as Ho Chi Minh himself and General Giap. It was appreciated, however, that these others might not repeat not be willing to receive Seaborn without some official reason.

5. Could Seaborn indicate to us as soon as convenient his present thinking on a further visit?

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

99.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 2278
Washington, June 24, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Priority.
Reference: Saigon Tel 282 and Our Tel 2250 Jun 22.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (Priority) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

We had a very brief opportunity June 23 to speak to Sullivan about Saigon reference telegram. His comments, which are summarized below, should not repeat not be regarded as a fully considered reaction although they may be helpful for the indications they give of problems uppermost in State Department thinking.

2. Sullivan said that Seaborn's assessment provided a sobering picture which was in line with the least optimistic among various assessments prevalent in Washington. This did not repeat not surprise him personally; it illustrated the size of the job there was to do for SVN and USA.

3. Owing to developments surrounding Lodge's resignation,[30] Sullivan said it had not repeat not yet been possible to give much further thought to next steps to be taken in dialogue

[30] See/Voir Max Frankel, "Lodge Resigning:...Ambassador to Saigon Since Last Autumn Asks to be Relieved in 30 Days," *New York Times*, 15 June 1964, p. 1.

with Hanoi. On the assumption, however, that Seaborn was not repeat not planning imminent return trip to North there was time to give question additional study. It was possible that some further comments might be forthcoming as result of lunchtime meeting yesterday between President, Rusk and McNamara at which Seaborn's first report (telegram 273) was on agenda. We shall follow this up.

4. Sullivan reiterated and amplified comment reported in our reference telegram that Pham Van Dong's references to Liberation Front were significant and would require careful handling. Implication of his remarks on this point was that emphasis by Hanoi on Liberation Front as a potential party to SVN political settlement might mislead some less sophisticated countries into regarding Liberation Front as independent entity deserving of political status.

5. Sullivan also wondered whether there was not repeat not danger that Hanoi might get false impression from USA action in initiating dialogue, that this was being done from feeling of weakness on part of USA. Propaganda steps could, however, be taken to correct such a danger if it existed; appointment of Taylor-Johnson team in Saigon would itself be an illustration of continuing USA firmness.

100.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] June 24, 1964

MR. SEABORN'S MISSION TO NORTH VIETNAM

Attached for your information are two telegrams from Seaborn following his first visit to North Vietnam and his introductory call on Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese Prime Minister.

2. The importance of the first telegram lies more in the fact that Mr. Seaborn's credentials were apparently accepted by Pham Van Dong than in anything the latter said, the first meeting being no more than a *prise de contact*. Pham Van Dong did not indicate whether there was any room for negotiation between the North Vietnamese and U.S. positions on the rebellion in South Vietnam.

3. The second telegram (282, June 22) gives Mr. Seaborn's views on the various points in which the Americans expressed interest. The interest of this telegram lies in the assessment that "It would be unwise at this stage to count on war weariness or factionalism within the leadership (of North Vietnam) or the possible material advantages to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of a kind of Asian Titoism as of such importance to cause the DRVN to jump at the chance to reach an accommodation with the United States in this area." In other words, Mr. Seaborn's first and very tentative conclusion is that there may be fewer pressures on the North Vietnamese to reach an accommodation with the United States than the Americans may themselves believe.

4. Also attached is a telegram from Washington giving the first American reaction to Seaborn's telegram 273.

5. We are consulting Seaborn regarding the timing of his next visit to North Vietnam.

A.C. S[mith] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

101.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 314
Saigon, July 5, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-476† Jun 25.
[Repeat for Information:] Washington from Ottawa.
To be delivered immediately to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

It now seems likely that Commission will hold formal meeting in Hanoi approximately July 14. If this changes in next few days, I shall let you know immediately. Trip will give me chance to make additional calls. I shall try [to] see Ho and Giap, either of whom I would ask whether they have any comment on or reply to message I conveyed to Pham Van Dong. I shall also ask to see representative of harder line (e.g., Le Duan, Foreign Minister, etc.) but would not repeat not propose to ask them explicitly for comment unless they indicate awareness of details of my conversation with Prime Minister.

2. I would appreciate receiving from you and USA friends any specific further points you wish me to convey to DRVN. According to present timing these should reach me July 11 latest to be useful. Sullivan expected here Tuesday with Gen. Taylor and I can also discuss personally with him.

3. If for any reason Commission plans for meeting in Hanoi at this time fall through, I would propose to make next individual trip mid-August after family arrival. Unless USA have further points they feel must be conveyed earlier or unless DRVN indicate desire to see me earlier (Prime Minister gave me no repeat no indication when or even if they would react), I think July trip on my own might look over-eager to DRVN and quite odd to SVN.

4. Regarding paragraph 3 Washington telegram 2250 June 22, question of Liberation Front status and role is undoubtedly tricky but it should be no repeat no surprise. I believe stand taken by Pham Van Dong has figured in DRVN public statements for some time and certainly well before April SEATO meeting. Irrespective of rigid control by Hanoi and because of Hanoi's public support of Front's programme, I do not repeat not see how DRVN could take any other position in dialogue with USA. I would welcome USA comment on this point particularly.

5. DRVN are almost sure to ask me about Lodge-Taylor shift.[31] If you agree, I shall emphasize Lodge's deep conviction he must try to stop Goldwater and discount heavily policy differences as reason for change. I shall also emphasize appointment of Taylor-Johnson team as evidence of USA seriousness of purpose but not repeat not of bellicosity, i.e., no repeat no change in basic USA approach which I have already given to Pham Van Dong. Any further guidance here would be useful.

[J.B.] Seaborn

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[31] See/Voir "President Names New Ambassador to Saigon, Reiterates U.S. Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 51, No. 1307 (13 July 1964), pp. 46–47.

102.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam and Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam et à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. Y-517
Ottawa, July 7, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. OpImmediate.
Reference: Saigon Tel 314 and Washington Tel 2413.†
For Seaborn (direct routing).

NORTH VIETNAM

We will leave it to Embassy [in] Washington to glean points from the Americans which they may wish to have you make in Hanoi.

2. We have been struck by recent public statements such as that issued by Third National Assembly of DRV. They have impressed us as showing determination to put maximum DRV position on record and to give at this stage no indication that a fruitful dialogue was possible. Too great an eagerness to reopen dialogue might in these circumstances be misinterpreted and lead to danger raised by Sullivan in paragraph 5 of Washington telegram 2278. State Department might inform Embassy whether it shares this concern.

3. We would judge, subject to State Department views, that explanation of Lodge-Taylor shift outlined in your paragraph 5 is appropriate.

103.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 2453
Washington, July 8, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-517 July 7.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (OpImmediate) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

Mendenhall of State Department Vietnam Working Group, who is in charge of Vietnamese affairs pending appointment of replacement for Sullivan, gave us today following reply to Seaborn's request for comments on his next visit to Hanoi (Saigon telegram 314 July 5).[32]

2. Mendenhall said State Department was in full agreement with point in your reference telegram that too great an eagerness to reopen dialogue might be misinterpreted. State Department therefore agreed with Seaborn that if the ICC did not repeat not meet in July in Hanoi, it would not repeat not be desirable for him to make next individual trip to North

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[32] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 230.

Vietnam before mid-August. Mendenhall said State Department also thought that if Seaborn's request to see Ho and Giap met with no repeat no response from DRVN he should not repeat not show over-eagerness by pushing his request unduly.

3. If there were any specific further points which USA wished to have Seaborn convey to DRVN these would be mentioned by Sullivan direct to Seaborn in Saigon. Personally, Mendenhall doubted that there would in fact be any further specific points at this time. Although Mendenhall did not repeat not say so, increased role being played by USA Embassy Saigon in deciding on points to be conveyed to Hanoi presumably reflects effort by Washington to give new Taylor-Johnson team in Saigon more authority to make on-the-spot decisions, at least on short-run tactics.

4. On National Liberation Front Mendenhall said that there was really nothing new in Pham Van Dong's position, which was generally consistent with public stand of DRVN. However, Mendenhall wanted to make sure that we understood that Pham was not repeat not being very candid when he said to Seaborn that neutrality was not repeat not necessarily a first step towards reunification (paragraph 14 Saigon telegram 273 June 20). It had been repeatedly made clear (e.g., in resolution of Congress of Lao Dong Party on September 10/60) that united front to be established in South Vietnam had among its aims "peaceful national reunification". There were other public texts which confirmed that reunification was an aim of Front.

5. Mendenhall stressed that USA wanted DRVN to be in no repeat no doubt that USA regarded National Liberation Front as a puppet and agent of Hanoi; State Department hoped that Seaborn would keep this point firmly before DRVN leaders.

6. Mendenhall said that State Department concurred in line Seaborn proposed to take about Lodge-Taylor shift (paragraph 5 Saigon telegram 314).

104.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States and Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis et à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. Y-524
Ottawa, July 9, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. OpImmediate.
Reference: Washington unnumbered Tel Jul 8.
For Seaborn.

NORTH VIETNAM

Paragraph 2 Washington reference telegram[33] notes that US Embassy Saigon is playing increased role in deciding on points to be conveyed to Hanoi and that Sullivan would mention these points directly to Seaborn.

2. Such procedure would run counter to undertaking given by Sullivan in Ottawa that channel of communications would be via Ottawa. Americans are aware that we may have to defend or explain our role in exchange with North Vietnamese if it became public.

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[33] This may have been a reference to paragraph 3 of Washington telegram 2453. See previous document.
Il pourrait s'agir du 3e paragraphe du télégramme no 2453 de Washington. Voir le document précédent.

Consequently, it is important that we always be in position to take responsibility for instructing Seaborn to pass messages which the Americans may wish to have put to North Vietnamese. We and Americans should also understand frankly that situations could arise in which we would want to discuss certain points with them before asking Seaborn to put them to North Vietnamese. We committed ourselves to the Americans to pass messages faithfully to the North Vietnamese and we abide by this commitment. At the same time our acquiescence in Seaborn's mission has implications for Canada which could make it necessary for us to wish to discuss once again the whole operation if its direction were to give us cause for concern.

3. Please make this point gently yet firmly with State Department. We have no repeat no objection to Sullivan briefing Seaborn directly in Saigon so long as it is understood that Seaborn would then report back to Ottawa and await our formal instructions which would constitute his authority to speak to North Vietnamese along lines indicated.

4. For Seaborn. Please make above points to Sullivan.

105.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 330
Saigon, July 13, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Washington Tel 2453 Jul 8.
[Repeat for Information:] Washington from Ottawa.
To be delivered immediately to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division only.

NORTH VIETNAM

Reference telegram reached here July 11 via Delhi where it had been broken and re-encyphered and without proper identification at beginning of message; similar error reported my telegram 256† June 1. Please ensure there are no repeat no such errors in future.

2. ICC will not repeat not meet in Hanoi in July due to Pole's indisposition. Present plans are to meet there mid-August but if not repeat not I shall make individual visit to complete remaining calls. Have noted State Department comments regarding eagerness and National Liberation Front.

3. Reference your telegram Y-524 July 9, I have spoken to Sullivan regarding channel of communication on which I personally would of course insist and which he fully understands. I shall keep him, Alexis Johnson or General Taylor fully informed but will convey no repeat no message to DRVN which has not repeat not had your express clearance. Sullivan had no repeat no specific points which he thought should be conveyed other than one regarding National Liberation Front and saw no repeat no necessity for trip to Hanoi before mid-August.[34]

[J.B.] Seaborn

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[34] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 232.

106.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 2518
Washington, July 14, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-524 Jul 9.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Seaborn) (Priority) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

I made points in your reference telegram yesterday to William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, who said at once that he quite understood that "Ottawa would want to have the whole script"; your position would therefore be clarified immediately to Saigon. From Bundy's reaction I am sure that USA authorities had no repeat no intention of infringing their undertakings and that incident was caused by oversight. I do not repeat not think we will have further difficulties on this score.

2. When I asked whether there had been any change in State Department's initial assessment that Seaborn operation could be a useful exchange (my telegram 2250 June 22), Bundy replied that operation was at least as vital as when it had first been suggested; in fact it was sole reliable channel available to USA.

3. Bundy did not repeat not display any concern that Seaborn's next visit to Hanoi might have to be postponed till mid-August. In another context he commented on "current pause as far as USA decision making is concerned". This is doubtless partial explanation for USA lack of haste in pursuing exchange with Hanoi. Another reason, as you know, is desire not repeat not to seem overeager.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

107.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] July 31, 1964

SEABORN'S MISSION TO HANOI

Following Mr. Seaborn's first visit to Hanoi, the effort to open up lines of communication between the DRVN and the United States seems to be in the doldrums with the failure so far of the DRVN authorities to respond. At the same time, the United States itself has preferred to moderate the expression of its concern at the degree of North Vietnamese involvement in the Viet Cong rebellion.

2. The attached memorandum for your information reviews this latter aspect of the situation and estimates what might be the present North Vietnamese assessment of United States' intentions.[35]

R.L. Rogers

Enclosure: Memorandum
Pièce jointe : Note

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] July 31, 1964

VIET NAM – U.S. INTENTIONS

When William Sullivan was in Ottawa at the end of May, he went to great lengths to impress upon us the extreme gravity of the situation in Indochina. The burden of his message was that decisions would have to be taken in the immediate future that would decide the issue of peace or war in Indochina. At one point in the conversations, Chester Cooper, the C.I.A. representative accompanying Sullivan, said flatly that tangible evidence of United States determination in Viet Nam would soon be given [to] Hanoi. It was because matters were, by their own account, so pressing and critical that the U.S. authorities wished Seaborn to proceed urgently to Viet Nam to convey this message to the North Vietnamese authorities.

2. Since that time, the United States position seems to have moderated considerably. At the high-level meetings in Honolulu (which took place immediately after Sullivan's trip),[36] U.S. officials seem to have decided that the threat was less than had been feared, and the suspicion arises that they may simply have panicked at the sudden Pathet Lao thrust in Laos in April and May. Seaborn delivered his message in mid-June as had been agreed. In virtual contradiction of the import of his message, however, United States officials have seemed since early June to prefer to play down speculation about the consequences should Hanoi continue or increase its support of the Viet Cong rebellion, and to emphasize local measures to deal with the local military threat.

3. This has led in recent weeks to a situation in which the Americans have disagreed publicly with the South Vietnamese authorities on the alleged presence of North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam. (The South Vietnamese authorities have claimed that regular units of the People's Army of Viet Nam are present in South Viet Nam. United States authorities in Viet Nam have denied this claim. The facts of the matter would appear to be that elements of regular North Vietnamese units have recently been infiltrated into South Viet Nam and assigned as cadres to Viet Cong units.) The irony of the situation in which the United States finds itself is that, having launched the idea of retaliation against North Viet Nam, United States officials are now embarrassed and disquieted at the success their propaganda has had on the South Vietnamese authorities themselves.

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[35] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Should we not seek a clarification of US views: Seaborn's task will be hopeless and may even be needlessly dangerous if the US [have?] changed their mind. [T.M. Pope?]
Mr. Pope – I spoke to the Minister about our doubts on Aug. 3. He would like to seek clarification from the Americans. L[ouis] R[ogers]

[36] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), documents 187–189.

4. One can doubt, as we do, the advisability of carrying the war to North Viet Nam, while admitting that the United States might at some point reach a conclusion that it had no alternative other than to commit the whole might of the United States army to the war in South Viet Nam. What is disturbing in the U.S. decision since early June to put less emphasis on warnings to Hanoi is that it compromises the credibility of the United States position. We ourselves are confused now about the likely direction of United States policy. We think a move north is more likely than withdrawal, but cannot be entirely certain that the United States' determination might not flinch before embarking on a course that could lead to war with China. If we are confused, it would seem likely that the North Vietnamese are even more uncertain of United States intentions. The principal effect of United States vacillation in its statements about extending the war to North Viet Nam seems to us to have been to undermine the object the United States primitively hoped to achieve when it sought to make use of Seaborn as a means of communication to North Viet Nam: to ensure that North Viet Nam remain absolutely certain of United States intentions and therefore be under no illusions as to the consequences of its acts in South Viet Nam.

108.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 385
Saigon, August 3, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: Washington Tel 2699† Jul 28.
To be delivered immediately to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

As I am leaving for Hanoi morning of August 10, last practical date for receipt of suggestions here is August 8. I support point made in paragraph two of your telegram Y-565† July 28 to Washington. Sullivan's rather casual reaction July 25 to my telling him of my August 10 trip to Hanoi makes me wonder whether USA has, after initial enthusiasm and excitement, now lost interest in Operation Bacon. If so, I should know it before going to Hanoi.

[J.B.] Seaborn

109.
Memorandum by Prime Minister
Note du premier ministre
MG26-N6, vol. 36, Johnson, President Lyndon B.

[Ottawa, n.d.]

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY RUSK

Secretary Rusk phoned me tonight, August 4th, 1964 on instructions from the President – to tell me that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had again attacked U.S. destroyers 65 miles off the Vietnam Coast. The U.S. had decided to retaliate against this unprovoked attack but would ensure that the retaliation was "relevant" to the provocation and to the attack.

I thanked Mr. Rusk for letting me know. I understood that they must feel strongly about the attack but I expressed the hope that the retaliatory action taken would not be in excess of that which the circumstances required; would be limited in scope.

Mr. Rusk assured me that they would not go beyond what was required; that action would be "relevant" to the aggression. I then telephoned an account of this conversation to Mr. Martin.

L.B. Pearson

cc. to Hon. Paul Martin

110.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 397
Saigon, August 6, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: My Tel 385 Aug 3.
Repeat for Information: Washington from Ottawa.
To be delivered immediately to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM: HANOI MEETING OF ICC

Provided DRVN authorities give permission for ICC aircraft to fly to Hanoi August 10, intention of Commission is to proceed with meeting in Hanoi as originally planned regardless of latest crisis.

2. If I am in Hanoi from August 10 through August 14, I shall be effectively out of communication with Ottawa for that period as we have only army OTP cypher facilities in Hanoi and rather unreliable Indel signals. I think nevertheless I should attempt to get to Hanoi to gather whatever info I can on DRVN motivations and intentions in attacking American warships, and also in case Northern leaders have any messages which they wish to convey to USA. I shall therefore proceed on this basis unless I have orders from you to the contrary. Depending on how situation looks, however, I may leave Brig. Kenyon here in charge of mission rather than take him with me to Hanoi.

[J.B.] Seaborn

111.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 2848
Washington, August 7, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Emergency.
Reference: Saigon Tel 397 Aug 6.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (Emergency) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, told me this morning that USA welcomed ICC decision to continue with proposed trip to Hanoi; the more contact with Hanoi, the better. Forrestal yesterday had indicated continued interest in Seaborn's mission as "our only channel".

2. Bundy expressed regret at delay in providing suggestions for Seaborn's guidance. Such suggestions had already been drafted but were being held because USA destroyer was completing its patrol and there were highly sensitive indications that North Vietnamese might still be wanting to launch another attack on it. USA presumed that such an attack would again be by sea although it was uncertain how much capacity remained to North Vietnamese to move. Ship was staying reasonable distance out from coast and there were no repeat no activities in progress by SVN in area. USA would be taking stock late tonight or early tomorrow morning. (You will recall previous info through other highly confidential channels that exercise in which *Maddox* was engaged was scheduled to end August 7).

3. Bundy said type of message which USA have in mind for Seaborn to convey would consist, in Bundy's colloquial language, of such sentiments as "what do you think you are doing? Do not repeat not say that you did not repeat not attack us because we know you did. We do not repeat not intend to escalate. Our basic position remains unchanged from time of Seaborn's last visit." Bundy thought other points might be added.

4. Bundy said USA was fascinated by reports from SVN that Ho Chi Minh had been removed, but that there was absolutely no repeat no confirmation. USA will obviously be interested in Seaborn's comments.

5. Above remarks were made in strictest confidence.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

112.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 2872
Washington, August 8, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (Emergency) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

Following document was given to us by State Department at 2:45 p.m. EDT with apologies for delay. We understand it has been cleared by White House and Secretaries of State and Defense. USA ambassadors in Saigon and Ottawa are receiving copies.[37] Begins:

The Canadians are urgently asked to have Seaborn during August 10 visit make following points (as having been conveyed to him by US Government since August 6):

A. *Regarding Tonkin Gulf actions, which almost certainly will come up*:

1. The DRV has stated that Hon Ngu and Hon Me islands were attacked July 30. It should be noted that *USS Maddox* was, all of that day and into the afternoon of the next day, over

[37] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 304.

100 miles south of those islands, in international waters near the 17th parallel, and that DRV attack on *Maddox* took place on August 2, more than two days later. Neither *Maddox* or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on DRV islands.

2. Regarding August 4 attack by DRV on the two USA destroyers, Americans were and are at a complete loss to understand DRV motive. They had decided to absorb the August 2 attack on the grounds that it very well might have been result of some DRV mistake or miscalculation. August 4 attack, however – from the determined nature of attack as indicated by the radar, sonar, and eyewitness evidence both from the ships and from their protecting aircraft – was, in the American eyes, obviously deliberate and planned and ordered in advance. In addition, premeditation was shown by the evidence that DRV craft were waiting in ambush for the destroyers. The attack did not repeat not seem to be in response to any action by South Vietnamese, nor did it make sense as a tactic to further any diplomatic objective. Since the attack took place at least 60 miles from nearest land, there could have been no repeat no question about territorial waters. About the only reasonable hypothesis was that North Vietnam was intent either upon making it appear that USA was a "paper tiger" or upon provoking USA.

3. American response was directed solely to patrol craft and installations acting in direct support of them. As President Johnson stated: "Our response for the present will be limited and fitting."

4. In view of uncertainty aroused by the deliberate and unprovoked DRV attacks of this character, USA has necessarily carried out precautionary deployments of additional air power to SVN and Thailand.

B. *Regarding basic American position*:

5. Mr. Seaborn should again stress that USA policy is simply that North Vietnam should contain itself and its ambitions within the territory allocated to its administration by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. He should stress that USA policy in South Vietnam is to preserve the integrity of that state's territory against guerrilla subversion.

6. He should reiterate that USA does not repeat not seek military bases in the area and that USA is not repeat not seeking to overthrow the Communist regime in Hanoi.

7. He should repeat that USA is fully aware of the degree to which Hanoi controls and directs the guerrilla action in South Vietnam and that USA holds Hanoi directly responsible for that action. He should similarly indicate USA awareness of North Vietnamese control over the Pathet Lao movement in Laos and the degree of North Vietnamese involvement in that country. He should specifically indicate USA awareness of North Vietnamese violations of Laotian territory along the infiltration route into South Vietnam.

8. Mr. Seaborn can again refer to the many examples of USA policy in tolerance of peaceful coexistence with Communist regimes, such as Yugoslavia, Poland, etc. He can hint at the economic and other benefits which have accrued to those countries because their policy of Communism has confined itself to the development of their own national territories and has not repeat not sought to expand into other areas.

9. Mr. Seaborn should conclude with the following new points:

a. That the events of the past few days should add credibility to the statement made last time, that "USA public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely thin."

b. That USA Congressional resolution[38] was passed with near unanimity, strongly re-affirming the unity and determination of USA Government and people not repeat not only with respect to any further attacks on USA military forces but more broadly to continue to oppose firmly, by all necessary means, DRV efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and Laos.

c. That USA has come to the view that DRV role in South Vietnam and Laos is critical. If DRV persists in its present course, it can expect to suffer the consequences.

d. That DRV knows what it must do if the peace is to be restored.

e. That USA has ways and means of measuring DRV's participation in, and direction and control of, the war on South Vietnam and in Laos and will be carefully watching DRV's response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them.

113.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. Y-598
Ottawa, August 8, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. Emergency.
Reference: Washington Tel 2872 of Aug. 8/64.
Repeat for Information: Washington (OpImmediate).
For Seaborn.

YOUR VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

You are authorized to proceed as requested by USA in reference telegram down to and including point C in paragraph 9. Points D and E should in our view be used only if in your judgment North Vietnamese are completely unresponsive as means of bringing home to them fact that preservation of peace appears to depend upon their willingness to restrain their ambitions.

114.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 2893
Washington, August 11, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-598 Aug 8.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn only on return) (Priority) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

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[38] See/Voir "Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia" [Gulf of Tonkin Resolution], Public Law No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).

NORTH VIETNAM

Could you let us know whether you wish us to inform State Department of your decision not repeat not to authorize Seaborn to convey to the North Vietnamese, except under defined circumstances, two of the points which USA wished to transmit to them?

2. Because of regrettable American delay in furnishing suggestions for Seaborn, there was of course no repeat no time left for Canadians to discuss proposed changes with USA in accordance with your telegram Y-524 July 9; nevertheless, in light of Canadian undertaking to pass USA messages faithfully to North Vietnamese, re-affirmed in above-mentioned telegram Y-524, it seems to me that we should let USA know that we are proposing to omit part of their message – especially as they may attribute some importance to points D and E, particularly to the statement that USA "will be carefully watching the DRV's response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them". Also, should we not repeat not explain to USA the reasons for our decision?

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

115.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. Y-606
Ottawa, August 12, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 2893.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn only) (Priority).

NORTH VIETNAM

Problem raised by your reference telegram arises out of emergency nature of drafting last Bacon message. There was, as you say, no time to discuss our doubts with State Department and we thought it best to give Seaborn limited green light rather than none at all.

2. Our doubts regarding points D and E were basically that it was not very clear what they meant. Point D sounds vaguely ominous but beyond that does not convey a great deal. We did not see how Seaborn could put point to DRVN without knowing himself its exact significance. (It may be that Sullivan was able to give Seaborn fuller briefing in Saigon. This would, of course, not meet point of our Y-524 that, as Bundy put it, we want the whole script.) If point D is meant to refer only to U.S. assessment that DRVN support is determinant of Viet Cong insurgency, it seems to be superfluous. Very objective of Seaborn's mission is to persuade Hanoi to cease its support of Viet Cong. Our qualms with point E had similarly to do with vagueness of threat.

3. We agree there is a problem here that must be discussed frankly with Americans. Our commitment to pass messages faithfully does not mean we can be expected to play the role of unthinking mouthpieces. We estimated that passing points D and E to North Vietnamese without amplification would have reflected on Seaborn and affected his position not only in regard to Bacon but as Canadian representative in Vietnam. We would have preferred to thrash out question first with State Department but were prevented from so doing by lack of time. We hope this will not be repeated in future.

4. Please discuss with Americans.

116.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] August 12, 1964

SEABORN'S MISSION TO NORTH VIETNAM

The Americans transmitted to us late on Saturday the list of points they wished Seaborn to make to the North Vietnamese during his current trip to North Vietnam. Attached is a copy of Washington telegram 2872 of August 8th which transmitted the text of the State Department paper.

2. This paper was largely a repetition of points that had already been made. It showed evidence of hasty drafting and we were particularly concerned with the imprecision of points D and E on the last page. We estimated that they were too unclear to permit Mr. Seaborn to make them effectively. We feared that the effect of making them might be to compromise Seaborn's position both for purposes of Bacon and as Canadian representative. We accordingly instructed Seaborn (telegram Y-598, attached) to omit these points in his approach to the North Vietnamese, while leaving him discretion to make them if he thought necessary.

3. We would, of course, have preferred to thrash out these points with the Americans but were prevented from doing so by the fact that the Americans sent us their paper only at the very last minute. We have since instructed the Embassy in Washington to discuss the question with the State Department.[39]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

117.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 419
Saigon, August 15, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-598 Aug 8 and Washington Tel 2872 Aug 8.
[Repeat for Information:] Washington from Ottawa.
To be delivered immediately to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

Washington reference telegram reached me Sunday evening August 9. On arrival Hanoi August 10, I requested PAVN Liaison Mission to arrange interview with Prime Minister or someone thoroughly conversant with my conversation with Prime Minister mid-June.

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[39] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
He [SSEA] commented that the U.S. points did not amount to much. J.G. H[adwen]

On evening of August 12, I was told I could have appointment on afternoon of August 14 which would have meant missing ICC aircraft and catching next flight down August 18, with delay probably encouraging unfortunate speculation here. On my urging, Prime Minister managed to give me appointment afternoon August 13.

2. After brief preliminaries and thanks for receiving me on short notice (this time Colonel Mai Lam of Liaison Mission and a note-taker were present), I conveyed to Prime Minister virtually verbatim translation in French of contents of USA message down to and including point C in paragraph 9. I had message before me to be sure no repeat no points were omitted or incorrectly conveyed.

3. As translation proceeded, I could see that Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, who usually maintains equable and even affable exterior (he did so during conveyance of first message), was becoming very angry indeed. As I finished, I said I regretted that what I had just said was not repeat not very pleasant for him to hear but I hoped he would understand that I was carrying out faithfully my instructions to convey a specific message. Apparently controlling himself with difficulty, he said that even to deliver such a message to a Prime Minister was not repeat not very polite, that the message did not repeat not merit being listened to and that he would not repeat not think to reply to "these lies". For a moment, I feared he would end the meeting then and there and show me the door. I intervened quickly to say that job of intermediary was often a thankless one but that I hoped despite his displeasure he would give me some response, some reaction which I would promise to convey faithfully to USA Government.

4. Calming down a little, Prime Minister then proceeded to make statement which I shall send separately in close to verbatim form. Chief points are as follows: (a) [Group corrupt/ Groupe corrompu] of crisis are as given in DRVN official statements. (b) Basic abuse of USA act of aggression is necessity to seek way out of impasse in South by carrying war to North. This (fact?) and requirements of electoral campaign are continuing factors and therefore USA will quite possibly be led to new acts of aggression. (c) Situation remains very dangerous. DRVN have tried for peace in area but USA do not repeat not wish it and it becomes more difficult because act of war has been made on DRVN. (d) If war comes, DRVN (and?) Vietnamese people will fight defensive and patriotic war in legitimate defence. We are not repeat not alone. Other socialist countries will come to our aid as Khrushchev's statement and Chinese Government's statement show. (e) If USA is thinking of new Korea War, it should know conditions are not repeat not the same. Korea is peninsula and furthermore "times have changed". If war comes to DRVN it will come to whole of Southeast Asia with unforeseeable consequences. More USA spreads war, greater will be its ultimate defeat. (f) Situation was already serious before August 5, it is worse now and it is important that it not repeat not get worse still. ICC should make effort to stabilize situation and seek solution based on Geneva Agreement. ICC must play more important role.

5. Prime Minister closed by saying he was sorry for harsh words he had spoken but he was obliged to say them. I asked if he would permit me to repeat a few personal words and he agreed.

6. I repeated first that intermediary's role was often thankless one. Before coming to Indochina, I had realized, as had Canadian Government, that acceptance of special mission on behalf of USA could lead to at least apparent conflict with my official mission as head of Canadian delegation to ICC. But we thought importance of having channel of communication between USA and DRVN so great that this risk should be taken. I personally regretted having to convey unpalatable messages back and forth and hoped one day to be able to convey more palatable ones. But that day was not repeat not yet and I would like to know whether he, Pham Van Dong, found existence of this link useful despite tenor of messages. He replied without hesitation and with apparent sincerity that he did indeed find it useful and he wanted channel to be kept open. I thanked him and said that if that were not repeat not the case then there would be no repeat no point in my trying to continue the special mission.

7. Secondly, I said that I was profoundly convinced that USA did not repeat not want and did not repeat not seek wider war. Causes of tension might continue for some time, dangerous situations could arise again, but this central fact should be kept in mind. I could see no repeat no point at this interview in disputing precise points in DRVN and USA versions of recent crisis, but I hoped he would be able to believe me on USA intentions. Prime Minister merely replied that he hoped I was right.

8. Meeting closed with mutual expression of hope that next meeting would take place in calmer atmosphere.

9. I did not repeat not convey points D and E of paragraph 9 in USA message, in part because of reasons in your telegram Y-606 of August 12, which I saw upon return from Hanoi, but even more so because I feared these final two points, if put to Pham Van Dong in his present mood, could have jeopardized any chance I had of keeping dialogue open and any chance of conveying virtually same points during mid-June conversation.

10. In subsequent telegram I shall comment tentatively on meeting with Prime Minister and atmosphere in Hanoi.

[J.B.] Seaborn

118.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 426
Saigon, August 17, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 419 Aug 15.
Repeat for Information: Washington from Ottawa.
For immediate delivery to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

Pham Van Dong's angry reaction to latest USA message is not repeat not surprising. Its wording was blunt, as befits incidents in question; but no repeat no Prime Minister could be expected to be given to his face the lie direct to his Government's recent official declaration and not repeat not react strongly. Also to be kept in mind is shock, or at least chagrin, which DRVN leaders must have felt over aerial attack, loss of face over failure to inflict any damage on USA naval vessels and tension under which they have been living not repeat not knowing whether August 5 attack was precursor to further and more serious aerial attacks.

2. After visit to Hanoi and interview with Prime Minister I am still little wiser as to DRVN motivations in launching August 2 and August 4 attacks on USA vessels. Because they have had to tell own people and world that they were object of USA aggression, leaders have either begun to believe it themselves or at least are going to speak and act as if they believed it. They may also believe, despite President Johnson's reassurances, that there is chance of new USA attack even if they do not repeat not provoke it. Again, they are at least acting as if this were their estimate and are taking various precautionary measures (air raid drills, slit trenches, brick bunkers, etc., and reportedly, at least, preparation for evacuation of women and children).

3. It can be argued that hue and (cry?) regarding continued threat and USA overflights is no repeat no more than attempt to squeeze last bit of propaganda value out of attacks at home and abroad and last bit of extra work out of already hard-pressed population. Certainly, slogans surrounding daily demonstrations and marches in streets of Hanoi emphasized need

to work harder for fatherland in present situation, in addition to condemnation of USA imperialists and defence of country. My Permrep in Hanoi thinks August 5 attacks alone without further incidents are sufficient to keep present rate of trench digging and marching in streets going for a good three weeks.

4. Pham Van Dong gave no repeat no indication of being worried by firmness of USA message I delivered and in fact its immediate effect was to produce anger rather than desire to discuss way out. But I find it mildly encouraging that he did calm down as he talked further and significant that (he?) should state unequivocally that he wanted to keep open DRVN-USA channel of communication. I do not repeat not, however, as result of this interview see likelihood of his using it for some time, at least to put forward to USA side proposal or requests for discussion. I think he is genuinely convinced that things are bound to go his way in Indochina and that there is therefore no repeat no need to seek compromises.

5. I have now put Jackson completely in picture regarding my special mission and have so informed Col. Mai Lam. I have full confidence in Jackson's discretion and good judgment and I think it important that someone on spot in Hanoi should be able to act for me in case of urgent need or my inability to get to Hanoi for any reason.

[J.B.] Seaborn

119.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 2974
Washington, August 17, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: Saigon Tel 419 Aug 15.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn only) (Priority) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

I gave copy of reference telegram this afternoon to Forrestal who after confirming that message had arrived (he seemed to have had prior word of its transmission) came immediately to my office. After he had read text, I took opportunity to explain reasons why points D and E in paragraph 9 of original USA message were not repeat not communicated to DRVN. Basing my remarks on your telegram Y-606, I emphasized in particular the extent to which it was felt that Seaborn, because of his position as member of ICC, should have degree of discretion regarding use of last two points. I also explained that timing of operation had precluded opportunity to discuss this matter with State Department prior to transmission of message to Seaborn.

2. Commenting on my explanatory remarks, Forrestal said he personally would have rated as "somewhat small" the possibility that the inclusion of points D and E in the message might have resulted in DRVN closing the channel. He appreciated, however, the delicacy of Seaborn's role and indicated he understood why we considered it advisable to give him discretionary authority in this respect. In any event, he felt the tenor of DRVN reaction was pretty much as they had anticipated. On the basis of this report Forrestal thought that the one interesting "chink in the door" was reference to idea that ICC must play a more important role. He said USA officials concerned would await with interest Seaborn's fuller report to see more precisely how this point was put by Pham Van Dong.

3. When USA officials have had opportunity to study this and subsequent messages, Forrestal undertook to provide you and Seaborn with outline of their views.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

120.
Letter from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Head, Far Eastern Division
Lettre du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

Personal. Top Secret. Bacon.
Saigon, August 31, 1964

Dear Louis [Rogers],

By the same bag as brings you this letter, you will be receiving an excessively lengthy despatch[40] and one shorter letter[41] on the future of the Vietnam ICC, or rather Canadian participation in it. The gist of them is, what good are we doing by our presence and why *should* we stay in? I don't pretend I've said the last word or taken everything into account, but I hope to have put the ball into play for others to kick it around.

One important consideration to be kept in mind, which I have not of course mentioned in the other correspondence, is the Bacon operation. For this one we shall obviously have to consult the Americans before taking any drastic decisions about withdrawing from the ICC, for withdrawal would cut off our access to Hanoi. How important do the Americans consider my messenger role, either now or for possible future use? Can we persuade them to give an honest, not just a polite answer? I sense that USA interest is far less than it was during the heady days of late May when everyone was all hepped up about it. Having taken two Hanoi runs with messages in my hot little hand, and having seen Pham Van Dong's reaction, I am not surprised if interest in Washington has waned despite the expressed North Vietnamese desire to keep the circuit open. I suspect one reason the North may want it kept open is the hope they may well entertain that, if things get more muddled and hopeless in the South and after the American elections, the USA might want to put forward a feeler for a negotiated way out of Indochina. Even if that situation should arise, would the USA want to use this circuit for the purpose? These are questions which I cannot answer, but they'll have to be fed into the decision-making machine at some stage. Over to you.

All best regards,
Blair Seaborn

121.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 11781, 38-1-CCP-VIET/2

Restricted.
[Ottawa,] September 10, 1964

As you will be aware, Mr. Cabot Lodge, former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, has recently concluded a series of visits to capitals of certain friendly countries in Western Europe.[42] Before his departure, he expressed an interest in visiting Ottawa on his return. It was

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[40] See/Voir doc. 173.

[41] See/Voir doc. 174.

[42] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 301 (Editorial Note).

envisaged earlier that he might come to Ottawa next week but in view of other commitments it seemed desirable that this be postponed until the week of September 21. Mr. Lodge has now suggested that, if convenient, he might visit Ottawa on Tuesday, September 22, arriving about noon and departing the following day.

2. I believe that this visit would provide a useful and timely opportunity for a full review of the situation in Vietnam, and that you might wish to take advantage of this visit to receive Mr. Lodge. If you agree, in principle, I shall have appropriate arrangements made.

P[aul] M[artin]

122.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 8795, 20-1-2-USA/1

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Windsor,] September 14, 1964

MY MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 14 WITH DEAN RUSK

Dean Rusk spent an hour and a half at my home in Windsor this morning. We covered many subjects in our informal chat together.[43]

2. His visit arose because he was fulfilling a speaking engagement later in the day at the Economic Club of Detroit. I told him that his decision to come and visit me in my home was deeply appreciated by Canadians.

Indochina

3. It had been arranged that he would come on Sunday but events in Vietnam over the weekend made this impossible. The failure of the recent attempted coup in Vietnam provided a different background for our discussion than might otherwise have been the case.

4. Rusk did not minimize the U.S.A. problem in Indochina and, without actually saying so, he left the impression that the situation is every bit as difficult as Seaborn had reported to me when we met in Tokyo.[44]

5. In urban centres, Rusk said there was admittedly restlessness but evidence of the will to resist the Viet Cong did exist in other parts of the country. I formed the judgement that the situation in Vietnam is deeply worrying to the U.S.A. authorities.

6. Rusk believes that there is evidence of less North Vietnamese action in Laos than there was. It seemed to him that a more orderly procedure for settling disputes over Laos than that followed in the past could evolve from the tripartite talks now taking place in France. This could have benefits for the procedures now observed for discussion of problems affecting Vietnam.

7. I noted that this view was inconsistent with his forebodings about Vietnam. He mildly objected to my use of the word "forebodings" to describe his analysis of the situation in Vietnam, but his replies did not alter my original assessment of his discouragement at the deterioration of the situation in Vietnam. It was clear that he believes a settlement of some

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[43] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. XII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), document 322.

[44] In early September 1964, Seaborn visited Tokyo to brief Martin on the situation in Vietnam. Martin was in Tokyo for the third meeting of the Canada-Japan Ministerial Committee.
Début septembre 1964, Seaborn s'est rendu à Tokyo pour informer Martin de la situation au Vietnam. Martin était à Tokyo pour la troisième réunion du comité ministériel Canada-Japon.

kind in Laos would provide a kind of precedent for discussion of other Indochinese problems. I think he is reconciled, to judge from his comments during our discussion, to a general conference on Laos but a decision to agree to such a move would clearly not be taken until after November 3 and possibly until sometime later in the winter. I mentioned that I thought Canada should eventually consider withdrawing from the commissions, assuming this could be done without prejudice to friendly interests. I observed that I thought there was a role for Japan to play in situations similar to that which made the Vietnam Commissions necessary.

8. He agreed that Japanese should gradually assume greater political responsibility in Asian affairs. Their sensitivity was understandable but their power was undoubtedly there to be exercised. He did not think there was a constitutional block to the participation by Japan in a peace-keeping effort such as that represented by the Control Commissions.

9. He observed that the action taken in the Gulf of Tonkin had been effective. He doubted that there would be any immediate re-occurrence of North Vietnamese military aggressiveness at least so far as the United States was concerned.

10. Rusk was well briefed on our discussions in Japan. He thought that what the Japanese Government should do is to make up its mind on the kind of Asia it wished to see created and act accordingly. (He digressed to say that the United States and Japan had a number of disagreements but he did not spell these out.)

[…]

27. Rusk spoke very highly of Seaborn in Saigon. He said that he hoped Seaborn would feel free to talk with absolute frankness, particularly to Alexis Johnson but also, of course, to General Taylor.

28. I told him how much I appreciated his visit to Windsor and thanked him for the friendliness he had shown whenever we had met. I ventured the hope that there would be increased opportunities for us to meet over a long period of time. I was trying to draw him out on the question of his future after the election. I met with no success. He said the President was looking forward to seeing Mr. Pearson, whom he regarded as one of the most important Heads of Government in the world today.

Paul Martin

123.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11781, 38-1-CCP-VIET/2

No. 3325
Washington, September 16, 1964
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-672† Sep 15.
Repeat for Information: ExtAid Ottawa from Ottawa.
By Bag: Saigon from London.

VISIT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE

Roberts of State Department, who will accompany Ambassador Lodge to Ottawa, told us today that Lodge's discussion of Vietnam would probably be in broad-brush terms and (if pattern followed on European trip were repeated) would consist chiefly of an exposition of reasons for USA presence in South Vietnam and explanation of what USA was trying to accomplish. During European trip, Lodge had not repeat not made a direct pitch for increased assistance from countries visited but Roberts admitted that this had been an unspoken purpose of Lodge's visits. In case of Canada, USA authorities were aware and appreciative

of fact that increase in assistance to SVN had already been decided on in principle (your telegram E-1539† August 13), but State Department was under impression that public announcement had not repeat not yet been made. Roberts intimated that if Canadian authorities found it possible during Lodge's visit to give some public indication of their intention to increase aid to SVN, this would be highly gratifying as a further demonstration of international support for SVN. British announcement during Lodge's London visit (London telegram 3187† September 4) was mentioned to us to illustrate point.

2. Roberts (a comparatively junior official) will be only person accompanying Ambassador Lodge to Ottawa according to present plans, although we were reminded that Lodge is wont to make last minute changes.

124.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States and Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis et à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 11781, 38-1-CCP-VIET/2

No. Y-698
Ottawa, September 24, 1964
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Permis New York, CDS, DGPO, DM/DND (OpImmediate).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

LODGE VISIT TO OTTAWA SEPTEMBER 22-24

Although copies of notes taken on Lodge's meeting with Prime Minister and Minister and subsequently with officials will be distributed in due course, we thought that following outline of salient features of discussion might be useful.

2. Lodge asked for no commitments either political or in terms of aid although you will have noted from PG telegram 51† of September 22 that Canadian decision in aid field was announced by Minister September 22 prior to Lodge's arrival.[45] Lodge did say, however, that participation of Canadian volunteers "with sense of adventure" would be welcomed in civic action programs in Vietnam. Main purpose of visit was, he said, simply to take close ally into confidence and to discuss USA purposes and concerns in Vietnam, in hope of consolidating "intellectual partnership."

3. Lodge reiterated USA support and admiration for Khanh who was moving in right directions. USA role was limited to advising and assisting South Vietnamese in struggle for self-determination and in building modern, viable nation state, a task which was doubly difficult because Vietnamese had no sense of nationhood. While he could not absolutely rule out possibility of more active USA involvement, he suggested that it was not actively under consideration. It had been unfortunate that problem in Vietnam in the beginning had been seen in exclusively military terms, but USA had now come to conclusion that while there was obviously a strategic content in what they were doing, there could be no military solution as such. Rather, primary effort now being made in political and civic action terms, i.e., spreading oil spot pacification technique involving co-ordinated and successive measures

[45] See/Voir "Aid to Vietnam," *Province* (Vancouver, B.C.), 23 September 1964, p. 6.

to ensure security precinct by precinct, and therefore, win loyalty of local population and to deny to Viet Cong use of local base on which they stage terrorist activities. Current USA approach could best be likened to effective police action rather than ordinary military operation. Lodge was hopeful of long-term results but this would take time (cf. Malaya and Philippines, in both of which cases authorities had advantages which they did not have in Vietnam). USA could afford to play present role indefinitely. Objective was to ensure that government exercised control over territory under its jurisdiction. After that had been achieved, Lodge anticipated that there would probably be a relatively long period before any wider goal such as reunification could be attained. Solution to present problem definitely not to be found in international conference. South Vietnam not strong enough to be neutral in hostile environment.

4. Although ICC a failure in terms of intended function, Lodge said he would be very reluctant to see Canada abandon present position because it was useful to maintain one of few channels of communication with North Vietnam and he felt it could only be good to have someone of Seaborn's intelligence and ability moving in and out of Hanoi.

5. On Canadian side, Lodge was informed that we agree with American assessment of importance of Vietnam and their policy, which we supported, but in an unobtrusive way. He was also informed that Canadian Government believes that some sort of conference will be necessary at some stage. Lodge had rejected idea of conference solution now as undesirable, and by implication, at a later stage as unnecessary.

125.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] October 6, 1964

SEABORN'S SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT IN VIETNAM

You will recall that Mr. Seaborn has on two occasions presented special messages to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, once in June shortly after he had taken up his duties in Saigon as Commissioner and once in mid-August, just after the first incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin.

2. You will also recall that while Pham Van Dong indicated an awareness of the potential value of an intermediary (even in the context of the second interview which was, for the most part, a stormy expression of indignation over the Gulf of Tonkin incidents by the North Vietnamese Premier), the Hanoi authorities have not been very forthcoming in a substantive way and, indeed, have shown no inclination to transmit any messages of their own through Seaborn's good offices.

3. We have formed the impression that the U.S. authorities are less actively and immediately interested in Seaborn's special assignment than they were last Spring. We recently asked our Embassy in Washington to review this matter with the interested State Department officials in a general way and without suggesting that we were encouraging – or otherwise – any new initiatives. The Embassy has now replied and the relevant section of their telegram† reads as follows:

> We were left with distinct impression that Bacon exercise does not repeat not currently have same importance in U.S.A. thinking as it did earlier this year, perhaps because now that both sides have had two occasions on

which to state their positions via this channel, there is little more that U.S.A. can say for time being, barring a change in circumstances or in U.S.A. policy. However U.S.A. interest in channel is probably only dormant; it could quickly revive in a new situation.

Mr. Seaborn has received a similar impression in Saigon.

4. On the basis of Commission commitments in Saigon, it now seems unlikely that Seaborn will be able to make a visit to North Vietnam before early November or mid-month. By then, with the American Presidential elections over, it is possible that the U.S.A. may wish a further message to be transmitted; it is also possible that the Hanoi authorities may feel that substantive comment of their own might usefully be made. In any event, I am sure you will agree that the channel is a potentially useful one and that we should take no action which might jeopardize its effective functioning in future.[46]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

126.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 653
Saigon, November 10, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-791† Oct 30.
Repeat for Information: Washington from Ottawa.
For immediate delivery to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

At [a] reception recently I mentioned to Ambassador Taylor I expected to visit Hanoi again later this month. Yesterday afternoon Alexis Johnson asked me to drop in to see him and in response to his enquiry I said I was planning departure from here November 23. He asked whether it would be feasible to delay departure one week. I said yes provided I knew within one week maximum that trip would be delayed. Last-minute change might attract too much attention and would also interfere with Commission business.

2. Johnson said he did not repeat not yet know whether there would be any message to carry this time. Ambassador Taylor was going back for consultations around November 19 and depending on decisions which might be reached then there could be new message. If I could delay trip against this possibility it might be helpful. But now that he knew what leeway I had he would try to find out (real?) likelihood of new message.

3. I reminded Johnson that there would have to be sufficient time for any message to be studied and approved in Ottawa and preferably time also for me to study it here before delivery. Speaking personally, I hoped USA would not repeat not think of third message merely along same lines as first one, main burden of which I had repeated at second meeting with Pham Van Dong. Repetition of same theme would have very little impact. I therefore hoped that if there was to be new message it would be much more specific, whether it be in form of offer or warning. Johnson took my point and said he would repeat it to Washington.

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[46] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Agreed. P[aul] M[artin]

4. Please let me know if you have any objection to my delaying trip till November 30 provided this might be helpful to USA. Also, if you agree with points in previous paragraph, I would appreciate it if you could emphasize them in Washington. I hope this time to receive instructions regarding message earlier than Sunday evening before Monday morning departure for Hanoi.

[J.B.] Seaborn

127.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 4021
Washington, November 17, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Priority.
Reference: Saigon Tel 665† Nov 14.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Seaborn only) (Priority) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

In conversation today William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, asked whether it would be possible for Seaborn to postpone Hanoi trip beyond his proposed November 30 date. Bundy said that it was likely that within approximately fortnight of Ambassador Taylor's visit to Washington late next week, decisions would have been reached regarding future USA policies in Vietnam. While Bundy avoided definite commitment as to whether USA authorities would want to send message to Hanoi, he seemed to think that they might well wish to do so. He said he was taking careful note of Canadian need to receive any future message in ample time to permit consideration in Ottawa as well as Saigon, and Canadian view that next message would have little impact unless USA had something new and preferably more specific to say. It was clear from Bundy's general attitude that USA authorities have by no repeat no means lost interest in Canadian channel to DRVN. Incidentally, Bundy once again expressed high praise for Seaborn's abilities.

2. Bundy was reluctant to suggest a firm date for Seaborn's trip. I should think however that insofar as a possible new USA message is concerned, it might be preferable if Seaborn could postpone departure till perhaps December 15.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

128.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 4189
Washington, December 3, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (Immediate) from Ottawa.

SEABORN'S VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, gave me today USA suggestions for Seaborn, cast in form of following draft telegram to USA missions in Saigon and Ottawa. Comments contained in our telegram 4190 December 3. USA telegram begins:

"The following message has been handed directly to Canadian Embassy here for transmittal to Seaborn through fastest channel. This is for your info only.

Canadians are asked to have Seaborn take following position during his next visit to Hanoi which, we understand, is currently scheduled for December 7th or 10th.

USA has nothing to add to the points made by Seaborn on his last visit to Hanoi in August. All the recent indications from Washington, however, point to a continued and increasing determination on the part of USA to assist the South Vietnamese in their struggle. Although he has no repeat no specific message on this trip, Seaborn has noted from its public statements increased USA concern at DRV role in direct support of Viet Cong, and this together with reported high-level meetings Washington makes him feel that time is ripe for any new message Hanoi may wish to convey.

Seaborn should convey attitude of real personal concern over the growing possibility of direct confrontation between GVN and DRV.

For your info: purpose of this approach is to probe for any new DRV reactions." USA telegram ends.[47]

129.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 4190
Washington, December 3, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 4189 Dec 3.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (Immediate) from Ottawa.

SEABORN'S VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

In handing me USA text transmitted in our reference telegram, Bundy commented that USA suggestions were essentially passive. He indicated that he would not repeat not be surprised if DRVN response were much the same as during Seaborn's last talks with Hanoi in August, but thought there was a possibility that DRVN authorities might have something further to add. He referred in another context to fact that North Vietnamese had recently been putting out hints in all sorts of quarters that they would be interested in a settlement but strictly on their own previously stated terms; USA would naturally be keeping ear cocked for any fresh indications of North Vietnamese thinking. When Bundy and Forrestal were asked whether they thought, in view of this fact, that Seaborn should take line implying that USA would be interested in eliciting propositions from DRVN, they answered in emphatic negative. Forrestal stressed that USA draft had been specifically designed to avoid creating any such impression.

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[47] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 436.

3.[48] I shall be reporting separately on Bundy's cautious outline of future short-term USA intentions in Vietnam. In summary, these amount for the present to: no repeat no radical change of course; no repeat no large-scale escalation; some limited USA bombing activities in Laos along infiltration routes, if Souvanna agrees, with operations to begin possibly some days after December 10; and a possible but carefully measured and limited aerial reprisal, perhaps via SVN aircraft, against targets in southern part of NVN if there is some dramatic VC action in South, such as attack on a provincial capital, mortaring of Saigon, or repetition of Bien Hoa style operation. Further prospects are left cloudy, and many questions remain unanswered but general atmosphere conveyed by Bundy was one of considerable caution.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

130.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. Y-883
Ottawa, December 4, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. OpImmediate.
Reference: Washington Tels 4189 and 4190 Dec 3.
Repeat for Information: Washington (OpImmediate).
For Seaborn only.

VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

In light of your last interview with Pham Van Dong, we are concerned about lack of substance in position you are being asked to adopt in forthcoming visit to Hanoi. Since there is no specific message to convey, USA suggestion amounts to recommendation that you express personal views. In particular, it will be difficult to suggest personally that "time is ripe for any new message Hanoi may wish to convey" without appearing to represent USA interest in eliciting propositions from DRVN.

2. In agreeing to carry out this exercise, we believe you should make it clear to Johnson or Taylor that since USA suggestions are essentially passive, your role will have to be likewise. You could point out to them that you will not be in a position to press for an interview with Pham Van Dong simply to discuss your personal views and reactions. Your own discretion of course will be ultimate guide in deciding course of action to be followed in Hanoi but we believe that you might consider possibility of attempting to continue calls on DRVN Ministers in routine and normal way and make yourself available to meet the Prime Minister. You should ensure, however, that line suggested by Americans is taken, at one stage or another during visit, with Mai Lam if you are unable to see Pham Van Dong, unless there is some other Minister who knows of this operation.

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[48] The original document skipped from paragraph 1 to paragraph 3.
Le document original passait du paragraphe 1 au paragraphe 3.

131.
Memorandum from Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] December 14, 1964

U.S.A. POLICY IN VIETNAM

I thought that you would be interested in the following outline of current U.S.A. intentions with respect to the military problem in Indochina, and particularly in Vietnam.

2. The State Department has confirmed that General Taylor's recent visit to Washington has resulted in no decisions involving a major change of direction in U.S.A. policy in Vietnam; although long-term plans – if any – are still obscure, for the moment the Americans do not appear to be thinking in terms either of large-scale escalation and confrontation or of disengagement.

3. As you will be aware, Washington is concerned by evidence of increasing North Vietnamese participation in the war in the South; at the same time evidence of this activity is being handled cautiously lest giving full play to it in public might lead to pressure for more stringent countermeasures, and this is evidently something which the U.S.A. wishes to avoid at least for the immediate future.

4. The State Department has informed our Embassy that additional military measures are being planned for the next 30 to 60 days. These plans have been described to us as follows:

A. *Extended U.S.A. air operations in Laos*:

Souvanna Phouma has agreed to U.S.A. plans which will involve limited air strikes, conducted by U.S. pilots, on ground installations along the Ho Chi Minh trail. In the past, the public justification of U.S.A. reconnaissance flights has been that escort aircraft were required because of flak and that these aircraft were authorised to suppress ground fire. The measures now being contemplated would still be within this general context, in order to avoid the impression that dramatic new policy departures are involved. Thus U.S.A. plans in this connection seem to involve a deliberate attempt to avoid arousing public opinion and the impression that military measures directed against North Vietnam are being undertaken.

B. *Retaliation against North Vietnam*:

In the event that there is some dramatic new demonstration of Viet Cong capability comparable to the recent attack on Bien Hoa airfield, the U.S.A. would discuss with the Saigon authorities a careful and measured reprisal carried out *primarily* by South Vietnamese against a specific target in the southern part of North Vietnam. This reprisal would be immediate, specific and related in dimension to the event which had triggered it and except in unusual circumstances it would not be on the same scale as the Tonkin Gulf action.

5. We have also learned from sources who asked that this information be handled on a "need-to-know" basis that President Johnson would shortly be asking the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers for a considerable increase in those countries' contributions in Vietnam. In addition, the Americans are reported to be considering sending a force to be stationed in the northern part of South Vietnam. This would, of course, constitute a new policy departure by the U.S.A. and is probably being contemplated as a result of deteriorating security and the Government's decreasing control in that part of the country, partially as a result of disruptions caused by the recent floods and partially, perhaps, by the prospects of a full-scale Buddhist-student rebellion centering on Hue. If the Government's control collapses totally in the provinces just south of the Demilitarized Zone, the Viet Cong might proclaim an independent area which could then "seek reunification" with North Vietnam.

6. Seaborn is at present in North Vietnam (as are the Indian Chairman and the Acting Polish Commissioner). Seaborn has no special message to convey from Washington to Hanoi although the Americans are obviously interested in seeing whether Hanoi may wish to take advantage of this visit to pass substantive comments to Washington.

7. The Americans told us originally that the action contemplated in Laos would begin shortly after December 10. Since this coincided with the visit of the three Commissioners to Hanoi, we asked whether it might be possible to postpone this new phase in air operations until December 19 when the Commission would be back in Saigon. The Americans have told us that unfortunately it would not be possible to defer their plans. They thought, however, that the initial impact of expanded air strikes in Laos would probably be minimal and that little risk would be involved.

8. I shall of course keep you informed of new developments in this situation.

A.E. R[itchie]

132.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 773
Saigon, December 18, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Washington Tel 4189 and 4190 Dec 3 and Your Tel Y-883 Dec 4.
Repeat for Information: Washington from Ottawa.
For immediate delivery to Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

In absence on holiday of Col. Mai Lam, I told Col. Ha Van Lau on my arrival in Hanoi that I had this time no repeat no special message to convey but that I hoped to continue my round of visits with DRVN government personalities and was of course available if any of those whom I had seen before wanted to see me again. Ha Van Lau knows at least something of Bacon exercise and I am sure he understood what I meant. Jackson had given PAVN list of those new ones I would like to meet but one excuse or another was given for leading ones (Ho Chi Minh, Gen. Giap and Foreign Minister absent and Truong Chinh, Assembly Chairman, busy) and in the evening I called on no repeat no new ones. I saw Prime Minister Pham Van Dong at theatre December 16 and told him I was in town for another day. He was amiable and with a little laugh wished "success to me and Commission in our work" but said no repeat no more.

2. In meeting with Ha Van Lau: only Vietnamese personality with whom I talked, I developed theme in Washington telegram 4189 regarding USA tenacity of purpose in SVN, USA concern about growing DRVN support for insurgent forces and real possibility that counteraction might be taken. He did not repeat not pick up directly any of these ideas. Notes were taken throughout meeting and I assume higher authorities will be informed. I made same points to Soviet and other Bloc ambassadors. In separate telegram† I am reporting impressions of other conversations in Hanoi.

3. I shall be telling Taylor and Johnson of my trip within next day or two.

[J.B.] Seaborn

133.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10113, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/1

No. 4396
Washington, December 23, 1964
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Priority.
Reference: Saigon Tel 773 Dec 18.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (Priority) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM

When we communicated results of Seaborn's Hanoi visit to Forrestal, Rusk's Special Assistant on Vietnam, he commented that even the fact that the North Vietnamese had had nothing to say to Seaborn was something which was useful for USA authorities to know.[49] We said that as far as Commission business was concerned, we thought it unlikely that Seaborn would plan to visit Hanoi again before two or three months had passed, although if there were some special need for a trip this could undoubtedly be considered. Forrestal was personally inclined to doubt whether USA authorities would have anything to communicate to North Vietnamese in near future.

134.
Memorandum by Head, Far Eastern Division, to Vietnam Desk Officer, Far Eastern Division
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au chargé de dossier du Vietnam de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] January 14, 1965

OPERATION "BACON"

Chuck Kiselyak of the U.S. Embassy invited me to lunch today probably to talk about Vietnam since that was the principal subject of conversation. He was somewhat depressed possibly because of worry over his further prospects. The only prospects he mentioned were two jobs in the State Department which would keep him there for four years and which he did not find attractive but he may really have been worried as to the possibility of his being selected to go to South Vietnam under an arrangement of which I was not aware whereby FSO's (25 so far) are sent to Indo-China and dispersed among the villages of Vietnam. He was very critical of this arrangement saying that he could not imagine what these FSO's could be expected to do in small Vietnamese cities or towns (neither can I).

2. He spoke at some length about the prospects for South Vietnam and it was clear that his personal views were no more optimistic than ours but what interested me most was his attitude towards Operation "Bacon". On the way to lunch mention had been made of

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[49] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
! [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

Bill Sullivan and Kiselyak's comment was that he had been sent to Laos to mess something else up. During lunch he expressed considerable skepticism about the operation as a whole and said that he had never believed in it. He seemed to write it off as a fancy idea of Sullivan's and clearly implied that he at least did not expect anything to come of it. I told him that as far as we were concerned the Americans need not feel embarrassed at bringing the operation to an end if they at any time reached the conclusion that there was nothing in it and added that I did not think that Blair Seaborn could go to North Vietnam again just to ask whether the North Vietnamese had any messages to convey. Kiselyak's response was to ask why anybody would think that they did or would have a message to convey.

3. I do not know whether Kiselyak's attitude was just temporary or not; it may be related to his general state of depression which is why I have given the preliminary details in this memorandum. It does, however, suggest that we should do nothing whatsoever to try to keep Operation "Bacon" alive.

R.L. Rogers

135.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 132
Washington, January 14, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Seaborn) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

NORTH VIETNAM

Unger, newly appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far East in charge of Vietnam affairs, indicated today, in response to indirect query, that USA was most unlikely to have anything to communicate to DRVN in near future.

2. We said that it was our impression that in normal course of events Seaborn would probably not repeat not plan to visit Hanoi until say mid-March.

136.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. Y-157
Ottawa, February 25, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Commissioner only) (OpImmediate).

VIETNAM: USA POLICY

In his message to Secretary Rusk, SSEA has indicated Canadian Government's concern with Vietnam situation, understanding of problems with which USA is dealing and willingness to make constructive contribution if possible.[50] It might therefore be useful by way of

[50] See/Voir doc. 233.

amplifying latter point to ask Mr. Rusk (or Bundy if more appropriate) whether there are any further ideas which might usefully be conveyed to Hanoi authorities by Bacon channel in addition to the matters which Seaborn has already discussed with North Vietnamese Prime Minister, and in light of current developments.

2. In his telegram No. 169† of February 25 (paragraph 5) Seaborn has reported that a convenient opportunity might present itself for a visit to Hanoi next week which could be undertaken without attracting special attention. We would be quite prepared to have Seaborn undertake such an assignment if it were considered that it would be useful at this time.

3. *For Saigon*: We believe that you should indicate to Rahman that you might be prepared to go to Hanoi if he decides to go north at the same time as Stawicki. Quite apart from possibility of having special message to convey, trip north would not be inappropriate at this time in order to allow PAVN opportunity to express any grievances they may have about Canada to you rather than to Jackson, and also to avoid appearance of being reluctant to confront them and to attempt to justify our position to them.[51]

137.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 636
Washington, February 26, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-157 Feb 25.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Commissioner only) (Immediate) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

VIETNAM: USA POLICY

In conversation this afternoon which I am reporting separately, Secretary Rusk said how interested USA authorities had been in what Seaborn had been able to find out concerning DRVN attitude on previous visits to Hanoi. When I mentioned that Seaborn might pay inconspicuous visit to Hanoi next week with other Commissioners, Rusk said at once that his observations there would be of considerable value and that he would consider urgently whether USA authorities might ask him to make some comments to DRVN on their behalf either now or a little later, even though it was unlikely that USA would have much that was new to convey.

2. Even though Rusk avoided committing himself about sending message at this time, perhaps it would be useful for Seaborn to make tentative travel plans as suggested in your paragraph 3. We shall keep in close touch on this subject with William Bundy, who was present at interview and who is aware of importance of time factor. If any last-minute word is received from Americans use could presumably be made of rapid USA communications facilities to Saigon to convey USA suggestions and your comments thereon.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

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[51] See/Voir doc. 73.

138.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 642
Washington, February 27, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Commissioner only) (direct from Ottawa) (Emergency) from Ottawa.

VIETNAM

Following is text of self-explanatory draft telegram from State Department to USA Embassy Ottawa, Info USA Embassy Saigon, already approved by Secretary of State. Begins:

We have passed to Canadian Embassy here text of that portion of Ambassador Cabot's presentation at latest Warsaw talks dealing with Vietnam situation.[52] Text as follows:

> I have been instructed to restate USA policy in South Vietnam. Our constant policy has been to assist South Vietnam in its efforts to maintain its freedom and independence in the face of Communist aggression directed and supported by Hanoi. So long as Viet Cong, directed and supported by North Vietnam and encouraged by your side, continues its attacks in South Vietnam, USA will find it necessary to afford Government of Vietnam such help as it desires and needs to restore peace. The pressures being mounted by North Vietnamese across the frontiers of South Vietnam are intolerable. We must and will take action to stop them.
>
> President Johnson, on February 17, repeated that we have no repeat no ambitions in Indochina for ourselves. We seek no repeat no dominion and we seek no repeat no conquest. We seek no repeat no wider war, but we will persist in the defense of freedom and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those made necessary by the continuing aggression of others.[53]
>
> Mr. Ambassador, I wish to stress that we have made it very clear that we have no repeat no designs on DRV territory, nor have we any intentions of unseating the authorities in Hanoi. It was our hope that the 1954 Geneva arrangements would allow governments in Indochina to exist in peace.
>
> Geneva Agreement of 1954 has been torn up by North Vietnamese in their effort to subvert South Vietnam. Hanoi has supplied Vietcong with orders, direction, training, personnel and key material. To give you more specific examples, we have proof that majority of hard-core Viet Cong officers and bulk of specialized personnel such as communications and heavy weapons specialists have been provided by North Vietnamese army through infiltration to South. We know principal training centers in North Vietnam and principal routes of infiltration. South Vietnam Government has captured North Vietnamese army and public security officers who have been sent to South Vietnam under orders.

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[52] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 199 n. 7.

[53] See/Voir "Remarks to the National Industrial Conference Board, February 17, 1965," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 202–205.

We would be satisfied if the Geneva Agreements of 1954 were observed by all parties. Observance of these agreements by all sides would provide a satisfactory resolution of Vietnam problem. Any evidence of willingness on the part of the DRV to return to these Accords would be noted and welcomed by our side.

I presume that you feel obliged to go on record here with your public position. Please do so if you wish, but I hope that you will pass substance of my comments to your authorities for their serious consideration. If there is any doubt in Hanoi as to this USA position, I hope that you will convey it to them.

We have asked Canadian Embassy here to seek Ottawa's approval for having Blair Seaborn convey above quoted passage to appropriate Hanoi authorities in course of next visit [to] Hanoi. (According to Embassy, this could be as early as March 1, when Seaborn might accompany other ICC Commissioners on trip to Hanoi). We are not repeat not asking that Seaborn do more than convey this passage from Cabot's presentation, pointing out that this is being done for purposes of making clear American position as taken at Warsaw and that Warsaw conversations are of course confidential. We believe that there are differences in Peiping's and Hanoi's general outlook (e.g., over Soviet-DRV relationship) and there may accordingly emerge certain variations in their prospective views on negotiations issues that makes it important to have Hanoi as fully and correctly apprised of our position as is possible. Moreover, we consider it desirable not repeat not to allow Seaborn channel to become clogged through disuse and to make clear that we are dealing with Hanoi as a separate element, not repeat not one entirely controllable by Peiping.

USA draft telegram ends.

139.

Telegram from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. Y-108
Ottawa, February 27, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Emergency.
Reference: Washington Tel 642 Feb 27.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Emergency).
For Commissioner only.

VIETNAM

On receipt of reference telegram, we went back to Americans to say we did not repeat not consider message as they envisaged it warranted your going to Hanoi and indeed might serve to clog, rather than keep open, the channel. After discussion, USA suggested following form of approach to DRVN Government to which Prime Minister has agreed.

2. You should seek interview with Pham Van Dong on basis of having a message to discuss with him. Your introductory comment should be that you have been asked by USA to convey substance of an important statement of USA policy and objectives which you understand has been made available to North Vietnamese Government through other channels. In the interests of clarity however, you have been asked to review this statement with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in the hope that he may have substantive comments to offer on the main elements, or some of them, in USA position. You should then undertake oral

presentation of main points included in Ambassador Cabot's exposition in Warsaw. Without distorting or destroying essential argument and without departing from essential framework of presentation, you might usefully delete at your discretion such detail as might provoke unnecessary hostile reaction. It will be necessary to bear in mind, however, that any material departure from the Cabot text may widen gap between your presentation and possibly harsher version conveyed by Chinese and cause misunderstanding or uncertainty which could impair usefulness of your interview.

3. In the event that there are any developments (paragraph 7 your telegram 172† February 26) prior to your interview which you believe might vitiate its usefulness in the changed atmosphere which might then prevail, we would accept your judgment of whether or not repeat not you should go through with this assignment.

[Marcel] Cadieux

140.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 203
Saigon, March 5, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-108 Feb 27.
Repeat for Information: Washington from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

VIETNAM

Upon arrival March 1 in Hanoi, I told Lt. Col. Mai Lam that I would like to see Prime Minister to convey USA message. Next morning Liaison Mission said request had been sent to Prime Minister's Office. That afternoon during call on Col. Ha Van Lau, he said he would pass to Prime Minister any message I had to convey. I said I hoped for interview but if this proved impossible, I could pass message through him on March 4 before departure. At dinner March 2 Ha Van Lau was out of town that day and might because of latest air strikes that day be too busy to receive me [*sic*]. I told Ha Van Lau what message was and why Americans wanted it conveyed so he could let Prime Minister know.

2. On afternoon March 4, I paid second call on Ha Van Lau in lieu of call on Prime Minister. Incidentally, Stawicki managed without difficulty to see Prime Minister for farewell call. I explained nature of message and then read him slowly French translation of full text of Cabot's statement in Warsaw as given in Washington telegram 642 February 27.

3. Interpreter took full notes. Ha Van Lau said he would pass message on to Prime Minister, though his personal opinion was that it contained nothing new. They had already had report of latest Warsaw meeting from Chinese.

4. Ha Van Lau then made personal comment on message and general situation. It contained no repeat no new elements and is of so little interest that I am sending close to verbatim account only by bag.

5. I told Ha Van Lau that if after Prime Minister had had report of message he had any comment or reply, it could be passed to me at any time via Jackson or with a bit of notice I could always come to Hanoi to hear it myself.

6. My personal opinion is that in present circumstances DRVN have very little interest in Canadian channel of communication with USA. They have never taken initiative to use it and this time were not repeat not even sufficiently interested to arrange for me to see Prime Minister.

7. I shall show copy of this telegram to Alexis Johnson tomorrow.[54]

[J.B.] Seaborn

141.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 731
Washington, March 9, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Saigon Tel 203 Mar 5.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Commissioner only) (Priority) (direct from Ottawa).
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

VIETNAM

The contents of reference telegram were passed on to Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary Far East, on March 6. He commented that DRVN reaction to message was not repeat not unexpected. North Vietnamese probably would need to consult among themselves and with their allies before attempting response. However, two main purposes of trip had been achieved inasmuch as USA position as defined in Warsaw had been made clear to DRVN and Bacon channel was kept open for any eventual communication.

142.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 1739
Washington, May 28, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (Emergency) from Ottawa.
Attention Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

USA MESSAGE TO DRVN

Following is text of self-explanatory aide-mémoire given to me early this afternoon by William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East. Copies have been sent to USA Embassies in Ottawa and Saigon. Bundy's comments and account of USA attempts to pass message to DRVN during recent pause follows in separate message.†

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[54] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), documents 187, 199.

2. USA aide-mémoire begins:

We would be most grateful if the Canadian Government would instruct Mr. Seaborn, on his visit to Hanoi commencing May 31, to bear the message below. We do not repeat not believe that this message should be delivered if Mr. Seaborn's contacts are confined to his normal liaison contact; if this is the case we would ask only that he state that USA Government believes it has made its position clear and continues to await Hanoi's response. In the normal course, however, we assume that Mr. Seaborn will inquire of his liaison contact whether senior officials are available, and that this inquiry will be understood, as it was in March, as indicating that he has a message if Hanoi wishes to receive it. Thus, we would consider that the arranging of an appointment at any senior level of the DRV Government – which we would be prepared to leave to Mr. Seaborn's judgment – would indicate DRV interest in the message and would justify its delivery. In making his usual inquiry, we would not repeat not wish Mr. Seaborn to appear to be pressing for a senior appointment, but we would convey his inquiry in a sense which we believe Hanoi would find meaningful.

The proposed message is as follows:

Begin text:

1. In my last visit, I conveyed a statement of USA views concerning South Vietnam, which followed the lines of what the USA Government had stated to Peiping representatives at Warsaw. That statement, of course, remains valid. Its essential points have been repeated subsequently in public, and it would perhaps be wise to underscore particularly the manifest USA determination to persist in the defense of freedom in South Vietnam and to take those continuing actions which are, in the view of the USA Government, justified and made necessary by the continuing aggression of others.

2. Since my last visit, the USG has of course further publicly stated its position in President Johnson's speech of April 7[55] and in the USA reply to the note of the 17 non-aligned nations,[56] in which the USG further defined its readiness for unconditional discussions, its objectives, and the sequence of actions that might lead to a peaceful solution of the problem.

3. The USG has been disappointed to note that actions in the South supported and directed by Hanoi appear to continue without change, and even to be currently intensified. The USG notes that Hanoi expressed no repeat no readiness for discussions in its reply to the 17 non-aligned nations, that it responded negatively to the proposal for a conference concerning Cambodia, and that it has been negative toward the recent Indian proposal even as a basis for discussions.

4. In addition, the USG informed Hanoi on May 12 that it was undertaking a temporary suspension of bombing attacks for a period of several days. The USG regrets that this action met with no repeat no response from Hanoi in any way. Accordingly, the USG, in coordination with the Republic of Vietnam, was obliged to resume bombing attacks.[57] Nonetheless, the USG continues to consider the possibility of working toward a solution by reciprocal actions on each side.

5. In making these points, the USG again must make it clear that in the absence of action or discussions leading to a political solution it must and will take whatever actions may be necessary to meet and to counter the offensive actions being carried out by North Vietnam against South Vietnam and against American forces acting to assist the Republic of Vietnam.

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[55] See/Voir "Address at Johns Hopkins University: 'Peace Without Conquest,' April 7, 1965," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 394–399.

[56] See/Voir "U.S. Replies to 17-Nation Appeal on Viet-Nam," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 52, No. 1348 (26 April 1965), pp. 610–611.

[57] See/Voir doc. 271.

6. (Begin underline) If but only if the senior DRV representative gets on to Pham Van Dong's Four Points of April 8 (end underline),[58] Mr. Seaborn would reply that he has no repeat no message from the USG on this subject. However, his study of the Four Points would indicate that some might be acceptable to the USG but that others would clearly be unacceptable. It has also not repeat not been clear whether DRV statements should be taken to mean that the recognition of these points was required as, in effect, a condition for any discussions. He would say that the USG appears to have made its position clear, that it would accept unconditional discussions in the full sense, with either side free to bring up any matter, and that he would be personally interested in whether the DRV representative wished to clarify the question of whether their recognition is regarded by the DRV as a condition to any discussions. End text.

By way of explanation, paragraph 1 reiterates points stated in March. Paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 are self-explanatory. Paragraph 4 reviews the pause matter in which, for the info of the senior officials of the Canadian Government, our message to Hanoi suggested the possibility in particular of a significant reduction of armed actions in South Vietnam by forces whose actions, in the view of the USG, can be decisively affected from North Vietnam. The message to Hanoi further suggested that there might be further suspensions of the same type in the future, in the expectation of more forthcoming actions by Hanoi.

Paragraph 5 is self-explanatory. Paragraph 6 is an attempt to clarify the point which we believe Hanoi has deliberately left obscure in their April 8 and other re-statements of the Four Points. We do not repeat not wish to seem to be probing beyond the point indicated, and you will note that we are asking that Mr. Seaborn state his own view that the Four Points, as they stand, would clearly be unacceptable. The main point we wish to clarify is, as stated, whether recognition of the Four Points is regarded by Hanoi as a precondition to any discussions. Our frank expectation is that Hanoi would not repeat not wish to clarify the point at this time, but we wish to give it the chance to take what might be a significant move if it did so.[59]

USA aide-mémoire ends.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

143.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. G-154
Ottawa, May 28, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Emergency.
Reference: Washington Tel 1739 May 28
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador only) (Emergency).
For Seaborn only.

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[58] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 852–853.

[59] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), documents 316, 317.

VISIT TO HANOI

On arrival in Hanoi, you should inform Liaison Mission that on instructions from your Government you would be grateful if appointment could be arranged with Prime Minister, or if he is not available with new Foreign Minister. It is important that there should be clear emphasis on Canadian aspect of request.

2. If you are given interview with either of these two you should begin by expressing Canadian Government's concern with situation in Vietnam, our interest in seeing whether negotiations can be usefully stimulated and undertaken, and willingness to play helpful role. As a manifestation of our willingness to be helpful you have conveyed messages in the past and U.S. Government now has asked that further comments be conveyed. You would then present points made in paragraphs 1-5 of proposed message outlined in Washington reference telegram.

3. Your presentation would conclude with request for clarification of status [of] Pham Van Dong's Four Points of April 8, expressing comment that on basis of its close contacts and continuing discussions with U.S. Government, Canadian Government believes that some aspects of Pham Van Dong's thinking might be acceptable to U.S. Government but that other features would clearly be unacceptable. The remainder of your presentation of this matter would then follow outline given in paragraph 6 but as Canadian Government interpretation rather than your own.

[Paul] Martin

144.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. G-155
Ottawa, May 28, 1965
Confidential. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Emergency); London, Paris, New Delhi, Moscow, Warsaw, NATO Paris, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hong Kong (OpImmediate).

VISIT TO HANOI

Recent curiosity about channel through which USA communicated with other side concerning the pause[60] may well stimulate press and diplomatic interest in your forthcoming visit to Hanoi. Line you should take, and which we shall take here, is that it is part of your regular functions to make periodic visits to Hanoi, that in view of dangers inherent in Vietnam situation we are interested in having you keep up this practice, and that both for this reason and because of government interest in having first-hand reports on attitudes in Hanoi at time like this, and putting forward to DRVN authorities Canadian views, your Government has instructed you to make brief trip. If pressed for more specific answer we shall go on to say that it would not be appropriate to go into details about what you might be doing on this or any other particular trip.

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[60] See/Voir Jack Brooks, "Peace Bid to Hanoi Flowed Through Canadian Pipeline," *Vancouver Sun*, 19 May 1965, p. 3; George Bain, "The Pause that Failed," *Globe and Mail*, 21 May 1965, p. 7.

145.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 444
Saigon, May 30, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tel G-154 May 28.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Emergency) from Ottawa.
Attention Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

VISIT TO HANOI

Your reference telegram reached Saigon afternoon May 29 and I discussed it with Johnson this morning. His reaction was exactly as I had expected, namely that for me to press for appointment with Prime Minister or new Foreign Minister even emphasizing Canadian aspect of request would, because main content of what I have to say in USA message, convey considerably more eagerness to have message passed than is in fact USA desire. Also, paragraph 2 your reference telegram instructs me to make only points made in paragraphs 1 and 2 of USA message. Johnson said it would not repeat not be acceptable to USA that I convey only paragraphs 1 and 2. They would want all message, paragraphs 1 to 5, passed or none at all.

2. Instructions in your paragraph 3 concerning request for clarification of status of Pham Van Dong's Four Points of April 8 also goes well beyond USA request on this subject as described in paragraph 6 of their message. It would indeed appear to be "probing beyond point indicated" to use phrase in final paragraph of Washington telegram 1739 May 28. I appreciate that you want me to request clarification as Canadian initiative but if this comes at end of presentation of USA message it is almost inevitable that DRVN authorities would consider it at minimum a USA inspired initiative or probe despite any protestations to contrary which I might make.

3. Johnson is sending immediate wire to Washington at same time as I send this one. I have agreed with him that I shall not repeat not carry out instructions contained in your reference telegram until matters are straightened out between Ottawa and Washington. I am leaving tomorrow morning for Hanoi where only communication is OTLP, but Saigon could send brief message advising me to carry out instructions in such and such paragraph of such and such telegram. I shall have all recent telegrams in this series with me.

[J.B.] Seaborn

146.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. Y-118
Ottawa, May 30, 1965
Secret. Bacon. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tel 444 May 30.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador only) (Emergency).

VISIT TO HANOI

We consider that in using Bacon channel so ultra-cautiously there is danger that its usefulness will be completely destroyed, if it has not repeat not been destroyed already. After series of approaches which were in effect merely enquiries whether other side had anything to say, you were authorized to convey message which simply repeated message already passed to DRVN through other channels. It seemed to us that if any credibility was to remain, something more active would have to be done this time. This we sought to achieve by using Canadian aspect of approach more openly, as befitted our own more active approach toward negotiations.

2. In light of your advice and agreed view between Johnson and Washington, however, we are reluctantly prepared to acquiesce in the more timid approach Americans appear to wish on this occasion. You may accordingly proceed as in Washington telegram 1739 May 28.

3. There must have been corruption in original transmission. You were meant to convey all five repeat five of first five paragraphs of USA proposed message.

147.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 1757
Washington, May 30, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-118 May 30.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn on return from Hanoi).
This message to be sent direct to Saigon from Ottawa. To be on officer desk in Ottawa for 9 a.m. Monday.
Attention Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

VISIT TO HANOI

We conveyed gist of your instructions to Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far East, and warned him of your view that in all likelihood strict adherence to tactics suggested by USA would result in no repeat no USA message being passed, apart from brief statement in paragraph 1 of USA aide-mémoire. Unger indicated that he appreciated this point but added that USA officials had devoted a great deal of reflection to tactics which they had suggested for Seaborn.

2. William Bundy, in handing over aide-mémoire May 28, mentioned to Ambassador that before preparing this document, he had carefully reread Seaborn's account of his last visit (Saigon telegram 203 March 5) in which Seaborn had reported unwillingness of senior DRVN personalities to see him and had expressed personal view that DRVN had very little interest at present in Canadian channel of communication with USA.

148.
Memorandum from Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] May 31, 1965

SEABORN'S SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT IN VIETNAM

You will recall that on Friday afternoon we discussed the latest U.S. request for Seaborn to pass a message to the North Vietnamese authorities on his current visit to Hanoi; as a result of our discussion, you agreed that Seaborn's approach should be rather more active – with a Canadian emphasis – than the Americans had requested, but without distorting the substance of the message which the Americans asked us to pass along.

2. These amendments in tactics were suggested, after careful consideration, for two main reasons:

(a) Because of Seaborn's previous experiences in Hanoi, we thought it doubtful whether the more or less passive approach suggested by the Americans would result in any meaningful contacts being arranged during Seaborn's visit, and this in turn could result in discrediting the Bacon channel even further to the point where it would be seen as having no significance and no potential usefulness.

(b) We felt that a slightly more active and interested posture on Seaborn's part, acting on the responsibility of the Canadian Government explicitly, would be more in keeping with our own views on the desirability of getting negotiations started.

3. Our approach did not commend itself to the Americans either in Saigon or in Washington, where our instructions to Seaborn were interpreted as conveying considerably more eagerness to have a message passed than was desired by the U.S.A., and as appearing to be probing more deeply than the U.S. wished to do. On the basis of these reactions, we reluctantly instructed Seaborn to proceed on the basis of the original U.S. request.

4. I thought that you would be interested to see the actual texts, if you have not already seen them, of this last exchange and I am accordingly attaching copies of Saigon telegram 444 of May 30, Washington telegram 1757 of May 30 and our telegram Y-118 of May 30.[61]

5. In view of the Prime Minister's close interest in this project, you may wish to have a member of your staff bring these documents to his attention.[62]

A.C. S[mith] for A.E. R[itchie]

149.

Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 462
Saigon, June 4, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-118 May 30 and Washington Tel 1739 May 28.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only) (Immediate).
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division only.

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[61] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 317 n. 9.

[62] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I'll wager 1 piastre that no one in Hanoi will talk to him. L.B. P[earson]

VISIT TO HANOI

During call on Col. Ha Van Lau June 1, I enquired about calling on Prime Minister, new Foreign Minister or Defence Minister. Col. Lau did not repeat not ask whether there was special purpose for request but I am reasonably sure he understood its significance. He said meeting might be difficult because of current Solidarity Conference and beginning of summer holiday season but he would enquire and let me know.

2. On morning June 3 I was told I could make half hour call on Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh at end of afternoon. After opening civilities, I expressed Canadian concern over Vietnam situation, our desire to ascertain whether there were prospects for talks, and our willingness to play helpful role including that of intermediary (your telegram G-154 May 28). New Foreign Minister seemed genuinely unaware that I had passed previous messages to Prime Minister. He implied USA position as too well known for me to have to reiterate it and said DRVN reply to USA proposals had been given in Pham Van Dong's Four Points of April 8. With this lead I sought clarification along lines suggested in paragraph 6 of USA message. I could elicit no repeat no clearer reply than have others who have made same attempt. Foreign Minister said Four Points were "basis for solution of Vietnam questions" but that there had to be "favourable conditions in order to negotiate". President Johnson speaks of unconditional discussions but his conditions are that USA will not repeat not give up aggression against SVN, will not repeat not recognize unified Vietnam and will not repeat not recognize Liberation Front.

3. Making further attempt I asked whether withdrawal of USA troops as stated in point one was pre-condition to negotiations or whether it was seen as terminal point in final settlement of Vietnam problem. Reply was that "we must consider USA attitude to all Four Points" and in any event number of USA troops is still growing not repeat not diminishing and USA is intensifying war.

4. I then asked Foreign Minister if he was nevertheless interested in hearing USA message. He indicated indifference but said go ahead. Message was then put into Vietnamese by interpreter while Foreign Minister attempted not repeat not to show growing displeasure. At end he said he hoped I appreciated his patience in listening to the end. Vietnamese people he said have given reply and will continue to do so. They will strike back at aggressors. SVN problems should be solved by Liberation Front. DRVN will strike back at its attackers who will be defeated. As sovereign and independent country, we cannot repeat not accept conditions of aggressors. Rather than act as such an intermediary, Canada should strive for fulfillment of Geneva Agreements and oppose aggressors.

5. Throughout interview Foreign Minister showed little inclination to enter into substantive dialogue and even less interest in hearing USA message. He moved to close conversation after hearing message.

6. Interview with Foreign Minister confirms my own opinion which is that of all foreign observers with whom I spoke in Hanoi, namely, that DRVN is not repeat not interested in talking to USA at present time. Nor is it prepared to clarify Four Points which it probably feels are best left with some vagueness. I can find no repeat no indication of any desire to pick up several opportunities given by President Johnson and others to talk rather than go on fighting. Leadership gives every sign of being confident in its stand, perhaps even more confident than during my last visit just after air strikes began, and determined not repeat not to be dissuaded from its present course almost regardless of duration of war or of damages and hardship to which they may be subjected.

7. In other telegrams or letters I shall give fuller reports of this and other conversations in Hanoi.

8. I shall show copy of this telegram to Ambassador Johnson in Saigon.[63]

[J.B.] Seaborn

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[63] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 336.

150.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 472
Saigon, June 7, 1965
Confidential. Priority from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Permis New York, DGPO, DM/DND, CDS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM TALKS AND SETTLEMENT: VIEWS OF HANOI OBSERVERS

Gist of conversations with Communist and non-Communist personalities during trip to Hanoi June 1-3 is discouragingly consistent picture of lack of DRVN interest in seeking ways to end war by talking rather than fighting. They are not repeat not disposed to clarify ambiguities in Pham Van Dong's Four Points of April 8 setting out "basis for settlement" of Vietnam problem. North Vietnamese remain to all appearances totally uninterested and mistrustful of various American gestures. They seem equally determined not repeat not to be intimidated by American armed might and genuinely convinced that USA will be forced for various reasons to give way before Communist side does.

2. Col. Ha Van Lau, Head of RVN Liaison Mission, noted that since our last conversation early March, President Johnson had made more than one speech referring to unconditional discussions. DRVN considered all such speeches deceitful as they were contra[di]cted by continuing attacks on DRVN and rapid buildup of American forces and equipment in SVN. But the greater the USA military intervention, the greater its ultimate defeat. War is already very costly to USA in terms of both money and prestige but "even if USA increases its forces to 100 or 200,000 soldiers, it will face defeat at hands of RVN people". One amusing aside to Col. Lau's comparatively brief and calm remarks on general situation was that "you probably do not repeat not believe figure of over 300 aircraft shot down over DRVN" said in way which indicated he knew quite well figure was exaggeration.

3. I asked Czech Ambassador Mucha whether he thought Pham Van Dong's Four Points were preconditions even to initiation of discussions or whether they were intended to form subject matter of discussion as DRVN goals. He said cessation of aerial attacks on DRVN was precondition to discussion. Another precondition was that USA accept Liberation Front as negotiating partner although he thought it was not repeat not clear whether Front was to be sole negotiating partner or only one of several. I said that cessation of aerial attacks should not repeat not pose insurmountable difficulty though USA had been disappointed that DRVN had not repeat not responded more encouragingly to brief cessation of attacks in mid-May. Recognition of Liberation Front was, however, very different matter and, if DRVN stuck to this point as absolute precondition to any talks, I feared talks might not repeat not be held for long time at least.

4. On mid-May cessation of air strikes, Czech Ambassador said it was not repeat not real one since overflights continued during period. He understood that Americans had tried to deliver note to DRVN Embassy in Moscow stating that USA would continue to refrain from air strikes against the DRVN if DRVN would tell Vietcong to stop its attacks against USA and SVN forces in South Vietnam.[64] This, he said, was completely unacceptable proposition as Hanoi "does not repeat not control activities of Vietcong".

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[64] See/Voir ibid., documents 293, 298.

5. The new Indonesian Ambassador Sukrisno, who is intelligent and probably closer to DRVN leaders than some Bloc Ambassadors, emphasized determination of DRVN leaders not repeat not to yield before USA military or political pressures. He is convinced that, if Haiphong and Hanoi were bombed, they would withdraw to hills and continue fight from there. He did not repeat not think DRVN was looking for means of initiating talks with USA at present time. He did not repeat not put great emphasis on Pham Van Dong's Four Points though he admitted that there was some vagueness in them and that this was probably encouraging sign. He was strongly convinced, however, that DRVN leaders would not repeat not enter into talks, however informal, until they had firm assurances, either public or through diplomatic channels, that there would be full withdrawal of USA troops from South Vietnam, since to start talking without this prior assurance would be considered as betrayal of Liberation Front. He did not repeat not mean that American troops would have to be withdrawn before beginning of negotiations proper, as he admitted this was obviously unreasonable demand, but he seemed to mean that there must be prior assurances that total withdrawal would be terminal point of settlement. He put less emphasis on question of status of Liberation Front during and after negotiations than did Czech Ambassador. He also threw in well-known Indonesian thesis that we should give encouragement to Vietnam's nationalism even to point of letting SVN go Communist, since reunified Vietnam would strike independent stance and refuse to be satellite of either China nor Soviet Union. He said, however, that DRVN was in no repeat no hurry about reunification which it knew would be slow process. He emphasized Geneva Agreements as basis for settlement especially with respect to withdrawal of foreign troops and bases but had to admit that it lacked similar precision regarding infiltration of arms and weapons which I pointed out was of major importance to other side.

6. British Consul General (Ponsonby?) and French Delegate General de Buzon, while holding markedly different views as to nature of insurgency in SVN, nevertheless both analyzed present DRVN attitude along lines of paragraph 1 of this telegram. De Buzon had recently asked Pham Van Dong whether Four Points were preconditions or subjects for negotiation to which Prime Minister had laughingly said "both". De Buzon is convinced situation is not repeat not ripe for negotiation and that fighting will go on for long time yet.

7. I did not repeat not call on Soviet Ambassador (who knew I was in town) since one conversation with him last December (our telegram 774† December 19/64) had been totally unrewarding. Elsewhere, however, I heard he was taking very tough line around Hanoi regarding Soviet determination to give substantial support to DRVN if USA persisted in intensification of war. Observers in Hanoi do not repeat not seem to be preoccupied with prospect of large-scale Chinese or Soviet intervention, and most tend to play it down. Details of royal Observer [*sic*] article in *People's Daily* regarding Vietnam and disregard for 17th parallel[65] reached Hanoi too late for me to discuss them with people there.

8. I am sending by bag close to verbatim account of three-quarter hour conversation June 3 with new Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. Attempts to obtain clarification from him regarding Four Points were unavailing. At one point he said these were basis for solution of Vietnam problem and at another that they must be fulfilled in order to have favourable conditions to negotiate. On timing of departure of USA troops, he was equally evasive.

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[65] See "China Warns America: 'We Have the Right to Aid Counter-Attacks,'" *South China Morning Post*, 2 June 1965, p. 1. According to this source, the article in the *People's Daily*, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, was signed by "Observer."
Voir « China Warns America: 'We Have the Right to Aid Counter-Attacks' », *South China Morning Post*, 2 juin 1965, p. 1. Selon cette source, l'article paru dans *People's Daily*, le journal officiel du Parti communiste chinois, était signé par « observateur ».

9. Throughout conversation Foreign Minister took very hard line towards USA. He said DRVN had given reply to USA stick and carrot policy. He claimed USA was setting preconditions by refusing to stop aggression against SVN or to recognize Liberation Front. DRVN could not repeat not accept conditions of aggressors. DRVN and Vietnamese people would strike back at USA which would be defeated. Neither force nor deceitful manoeuvre would change this nor deprive Vietnamese people of their fundamental rights as laid down in Geneva Agreements.

10. All in all, prospects for negotiations or even preliminary talks seem very bleak indeed.

[J.B.] Seaborn

151.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 1863
Washington, June 7, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Immediate.
Reference: Saigon Tel 462 Jun 4.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) Direct (Priority) from Ottawa.
Attention Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

MESSAGES TO AND FROM DRVN

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, to whom I gave copy of reference telegram this morning, expressed great appreciation for Seaborn's report. He then went on to discuss tactical difficulties for USA administration which might arise from fact that French were now spreading a rather different and, he felt, misleading account of DRVN thinking based on remarks allegedly made by DRVN representative in Paris May 18.

2. As indicated in paragraph 5 my telegram 1744† May 28, I had raised with Bundy last week report in *CI* [*Central Intelligence*] *Bulletin* for May 24 about approach by NVN representative in Paris to French on May 18.[66] Bundy was obviously taken aback to learn that CIA had briefed us on this conversation,[67] but he rallied quickly and gave me confirmatory account conveyed in my telegram 1744.

3. This morning Bundy, in obvious embarrassment, reverted to above-mentioned incident and expressed regret that USA authorities, in their prepared brief for Seaborn, had not repeat not felt able to provide a completely frank account of their dealings with DRVN, until I raised subject in manner described in previous paragraph. He said USA had of course made no repeat no mention of Canadian channel to French. Reason for initial USA reserve with us had been that they wished to see whether a new channel was in fact about to open up at initiative of DRVN.

[4.] Bundy then recapitulated DRVN approach to French as follows. On May 20 (two days after bombing had resumed following pause) French (Lucet) informed USA[68] that on morning of May 18 Bo, DRVN representative in Paris, sought interview with them, obviously on instructions. (Although bombing had started again on night of May 17-18, Bo may not

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66 See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 308.

67 See/Voir ibid., document 335.

68 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Why did Quai wait 2 days? [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

repeat not have known this, and his instructions were undoubtedly sent during pause.) First part of Bo's communication was to convey in familiar terms DRVN objections to Indian proposal for Afro-Asian force. Second part consisted of reiteration of Pham Van Dong's Four Points, but whereas most DRVN public statements had indicated that these points were the essential or the only basis for settlement, Bo was quoted by French as saying merely that these points were the "best" basis for settlement. (Bundy termed this a "shading of wording".) Bo then reportedly went on to say that if there were agreement on these bases of negotiation, ways and means could be found in peaceful manner. When French asked whether USA withdrawal could be dependent on conclusion of a negotiation (i.e., whether USA withdrawal under Hanoi's Point 1 could come last instead of first), Bo answered affirmatively, and in response to further question said that his answer was based on instructions. Bundy pointed out that it could be argued that this represented a step forward on part of DRVN, so that it was of particular interest that DRVN Foreign Minister had waffled on the same point in talking to Seaborn (paragraph 3 reference telegram).[69]

5. French did not repeat not attempt to draw out Bo further on question [as] to whether acceptance or recognition of 4 Points by USA was a firm DRVN condition for negotiations. Here again evasive reply received by Seaborn was of interest.[70]

6. Bundy said USA did not repeat not return any reply through French, in part because USA officials were not repeat not confident that French could be counted on to present American viewpoint with precision or impartiality.

7. Bundy said that French had given account of Bo's remarks to British and Australians knew through them; French might also diffuse their account more widely on diplomatic circuit, so USA had told SVN Government. Highly awkward aspect was that French were accompanying their account with a gloss to the effect that this demonstrated that during pause DRVN had been ready for negotiations without preconditions. USA authorities (and privately some French officials) did not repeat not consider that Bo's remarks warranted this interpretation, particularly when DRVN had denounced pause in public so strongly. More serious was fact that a French official (Manach) had given similar account to some USA Senators, adding untruth that DRVN message was delivered prior to resumption of bombing; in fact, as already indicated, bombing had started by time French were approached, and they only told USA two days later.[71] I remarked that Bo's more conciliatory statement was made when he supposed the pause still to be in effect, whereas the more unsatisfactory statement made to Seaborn was made after resumption of the bombing.

8. [As] one Senator had already referred to Bo-French exchange in a closed Senate hearing, Bundy was concerned that whole matter might become public very soon.

9. Bundy's purpose in telling me all this was to sound me out on possible Canadian reaction if State Department were to counter a future leak on Bo message by making public reference to fact that Canadian representative had recently had conversation with DRVN on same points and that he had received evasive reply.

10. In reply I said that speaking personally I thought proposal might present delicate problems in two respects; (a) circulation of competing French and Canadian versions of DRVN thinking could be awkward, especially since French version would give more favourable interpretation of DRVN thinking whereas Canadian version would be more negative; (b) Canadian channel might be spoilt for future use.

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[69] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Would Seaborn have known about Bo? [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]
Yes. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

[70] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 335.

[71] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
! [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

11. Bundy took the hint and said that perhaps his query had been settled by our conversation. He then showed me a proposed USA press guidance telegram making no repeat no reference to any Canadian role, but saying that USA, which had learnt of Bo's approach only two days later, had studied his communication very carefully and saw no repeat no reason to alter its conclusion that Hanoi's reaction to pause had been negative.

12. Bundy however wondered aloud whether it might be necessary to brief one or two Senators confidentially on what had really transpired. Our conversation on this point concluded with his confirmation that USA would say nothing publicly about Canadian role, and that if there were any change in this position, he would let me know. I think however that we cannot repeat not exclude possibility that if further French-inspired leaks develop, USA administration may tell us of a desire to talk quietly to one or two key Senators about general tenor of Seaborn's finding in Hanoi. Indeed, if pressure developed on administration as a result of leaks this might take place. In the circumstances I should be grateful if you could (provided of course that you agree with the personal position I took in paragraph 10 above) instruct me to reaffirm it as official view and ask State Department to confirm that no repeat no statement public or private as to Canadian role will be made without full prior consultation with us.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

152.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. Y-442
Ottawa, June 8, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 1863 June 7.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Commissioner only).
For Ambassador only.

MESSAGES TO AND FROM DRVN

We agree with reasons you advanced (paragraph 10 reference telegram) for not making public, either openly or through quiet conversations, any reference to Canadian Commissioner's special messenger role in Vietnam, or any detailed and interpretive account of Seaborn's recent conversation with North Vietnamese Foreign Minister beyond SSEA's statement in House yesterday, which should however prove helpful.[72]

2. You may reaffirm this as official view and ask State Department to confirm their willingness to consult us before making public comment on these matters.

3. You have doubtless drawn attention of State Department to SSEA's comments in House yesterday (our PST-100† of June 7) in which Minister acknowledged that Seaborn had had conversation with Foreign Minister but emphasized Canadian character of initiative. We hope it will be possible to maintain this position publicly for a variety of reasons, including the protection of Seaborn's position and maintenance of channel for possible future use.

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[72] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 2, pp. 2038–2039.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 2, p. 2038-2039.

153.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
MG26-N3, vol. 322, 845/I41V666 Crisis 1965 – Secret

Secret.
[Ottawa,] June 8, 1965

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE

In view of the interest which has been shown in Mr. Martin's comments in the House yesterday about Seaborn's recent visit to Hanoi and his interview with the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister (Nguyen Duy Trinh), it is possible that a question may be asked today about the "Four Point programme" which the North Vietnamese Government has advanced in connection with the Vietnam problem.

2. These four points were first outlined, as such, in Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's statement to the North Vietnamese National Assembly on April 6. I am attaching a copy† of the official text of this section of Pham Van Dong's speech as published by the official North Vietnamese News Agency on April 12.

3. It will be noted that there is considerable overlapping and repetition between these four points, which makes it difficult to keep them clearly and distinctly in mind without an exact text at hand.

4. The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister indicated to Seaborn that these four points, taken as a whole, should form the basis of a settlement in Vietnam; as Mr. Martin commented in the House yesterday, however, there was not much flexibility evident in the Foreign Minister's remarks.

5. If further questions are asked about this matter, I would recommend that emphasis be placed on the Canadian character of Seaborn's instructions: that he went to Hanoi on special instructions from Ottawa to express Canada's concern with the situation, to indicate our willingness to play a helpful role and to obtain clarification of the North Vietnamese position including their reaction to the recent pause in the bombing.

6. I am sure you will agree that it would be desirable to avoid any reference to any special assignment for Seaborn in Vietnam. If questions arise on this point, it might be advisable to make reference to the following:

(a) Seaborn visits Hanoi from time to time as part of his programme of activities as head of the Canadian Delegation. While the Commission's headquarters are in Saigon, it is important that our representative on the Commission keep in touch at first hand with the authorities in the other half of Vietnam.

(b) When in Hanoi on one of his regular visits, he tries to call on as many government representatives and members of the diplomatic corps as possible.

(c) In the past he has had several conversations with members of the government and Senior Officials, and in these discussions views have been exchanged and positions examined. This is the legitimate activity of a Canadian diplomatic representative. As is true of all Canadian diplomatic representatives abroad, Seaborn's instructions originate in Ottawa.

A.E. Ritchie for Paul Martin

P.S. If you are asked specifically what the rest of the four points were which Mr. Martin could not recall when he was speaking in the House yesterday, you might wish to reply along the following lines:

The four points referred to yesterday by the Secretary of State for External Affairs were stated some time ago, in fact as long ago as April 8. In view of the interval which has elapsed since then and in view of the complicated way in which the points were phrased by the Hanoi

authorities, it is perhaps not surprising that they should not spring readily to mind without a text before you. In order to refresh the Hon. Gentleman's memory, I would be happy to read the text of the four points in the form in which they were originally published.

A.E. Ritchie

154.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 480
Saigon, June 10, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-118 May 30.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador) (Immediate) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division only.

VISIT TO HANOI

DRVN Foreign Minister's obvious lack of interest in receiving USA message and his extreme annoyance after hearing it (my telegram 462 June 4) is quite consistent with DRVN attitudes encountered during previous visits, except first one last June. Unless and until DRVN give tangible sign that they are interested in dialogue with USA or USA have more substantial message to pass, I believe we should for the present discourage USA from using Canadian channel again. It is not repeat not (despite kind remarks by Bundy as reported in Washington telegram 1863 June 7) producing significant results and seems only to be exacerbating DRVN antagonism to USA and annoyance with Canada. Also, repeated attempts to pass messages (quite apart from unacceptability of contents) may give DRVN wrong idea that USA is desperately looking for way out. I believe Alexis Johnson shares these views.

2. In any event, publicity given to my recent trip to Hanoi both in Ottawa and Washington, even though it does not repeat not specifically refer to role of intermediary, may well have "blown" or at least seriously compromised this channel. DRVN authorities also have some reason based on Western press reports to consider channel unreliable. My telegrams 462 June 4 and 472 June 7 emphasized that Foreign Minister had not repeat not removed ambiguities in Four Points of April 8 whereas press reports have interpreted Ottawa and Washington statements to mean that Four Points and particularly one regarding withdrawal of USA troops are definitely pre-conditions to any discussions.[73] These reports have caused me some embarrassment with friendly local diplomats to whom I gave full report of my conversations (my telegram 472 June 7) and will certainly have lowered my stock with DRVN.

[J.B.] Seaborn

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[73] See/Voir "Hanoi Rebuffed Canada's Peace Bid, Martin Says," *Toronto Daily Star*, 8 June 1965, p. 2; "Hanoi Bars Peace Talk Suggested by Canadian," *New York Times*, 8 June 1965, p. 9; Ted Sell, "Combat Order: GIs on Vietnam May Take Offensive," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 June 1965, p. 1.

155.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] June 11, 1965

SEABORN'S RECENT VISIT TO HANOI

I am attaching a copy of Saigon telegram No. 480 of June 10 in which Seaborn comments on North Vietnamese reactions to U.S. approaches, on his own rôle as an intermediary, and on the extent to which press reports of his activities may prove to be counter-productive by resulting in a hardening of North Vietnamese "antagonism to U.S.A. and annoyance with Canada", thus compromising the future usefulness of the Canadian channel.

2. Although Seaborn has not, himself, referred to it, there is one other factor which suggests the desirability of allowing public interest in Seaborn's special assignment to lapse for a while.[74] It is not inconceivable that certain elements in South Vietnam, and in particular the military, might react very strongly against any attempt to make effective negotiating contact with North Vietnam behind their backs. It was for this reason that information regarding Seaborn's special assignment has been handled on a very restricted basis; if the full details of these arrangements were to become public, Seaborn's position and, indeed, his own personal safety, might be jeopardized.

3. You may wish to draw the attached telegram and these comments to the Prime Minister's attention.

4. You will note that Seaborn in the attached message, refers to two earlier telegrams reporting on his interview with the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister. You have already seen telegram No. 462 of June 4, which was Seaborn's first report on his discussion; a copy is attached of telegram No. 472 of June 7.[75]

A.E. R[itchie] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

156.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] June 11, 1965

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[74] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I entirely agree with this. L.B. P[earson]

[75] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Seen by P[rime] M[inister] and by SSEA. June 14/65 J.G. H[adwen] O/SSEA

MESSAGES TO AND FROM NORTH VIETNAM

In view of your comments yesterday on a memorandum and related papers dealing with exchanges of messages with North Vietnam, I thought that I should bring to your attention the following facts which are relevant to your comments:

(1) "The U.S.A. should have told us of the French exchange *before* we sent Seaborn to Hanoi". The Americans did in fact provide us with a certain amount of information about the conversation in Paris between the French Foreign Office and the North Vietnamese representative there. This was given to us on May 28, but as Charles Ritchie subsequently reported, these comments were not volunteered but given in response to Ritchie's specific enquiry which, in turn, was based on C.I.A. rather than State Department sources. It was not until June 7 that the fuller account, which you saw yesterday, was given to us in Washington. I agree that this is not a very satisfactory state of affairs, although Bundy's explanation ("reason for initial U.S.A. reserve with us had been that they wished to see whether a new channel was in fact about to open up at initiative of DRVN") may seem, from the U.S. point of view, to have a certain element of validity. I have, however, written to Charles Ritchie on a personal basis indicating that we were not altogether happy with this display of reserve, whatever the reasons for it, which seems especially inappropriate in the light of our willingness to be helpful in this connection.

(2) "The French told us nothing, yet they expected us to give them an account of Seaborn's visit. If there is to be an exchange with Paris on these matters, it is to be reciprocal …". Although most of our detailed knowledge of what transpired in Paris between the Quai d'Orsay and the North Vietnamese representative has come from Washington, the French were not entirely silent on the subject and on May 28 our Embassy in Paris reported on an earlier conversation with the Quai d'Orsay in which some mention is made of these discussions. I am attaching for your information a copy of telegram 1038† of May 28 from Paris in which the first paragraph is relevant. Although the North Vietnamese approach was mentioned, I would agree that it was not presented in a very forthcoming manner, nor in a way which would indicate the French assessment of its significance.

2. It is, of course, possible to suggest that the price we have to pay for an independent policy and a considerable degree of freedom of manoeuvre will be the reluctance of the U.S.A. (and indeed France, but for different reasons) to tell us everything. The Australians (and the New Zealanders) have committed themselves unequivocally to U.S. policies in Vietnam, and it seems clear from the attached copy of telegram No. 1923† of June 10 from Washington, reporting on Sir Robert Menzies' visit to Washington, that in the passing of information, the Australians are getting "most favoured nation" treatment. We can obviously not go as far as the Australians have, even if we wanted to, and this I suspect is a problem with which we will simply have to live. In fact, we may be able to turn it to advantage when conditions appear more propitious than at present for a further initiative aimed at bringing these problems under negotiation.

3. On this last point, you will be particularly interested in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the attached Washington telegram. This and other information indicates beyond much doubt that we cannot really hope for any "opening" on the Communist side, with respect to negotiating prospects, until the end of the rainy season, i.e., until about October.

P[aul] M[artin]

157.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 1940
Washington, June 11, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-442 Jun 8.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Commissioner) from Ottawa.
Attention Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

MESSAGES TO AND FROM DRVN

Your views have been conveyed to Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far East. Unger said that according to info received subsequent to conversation between William Bundy and Ambassador (our telegram 1863 June 7) there were now considerably less grounds for believing that French were deliberately spreading tendentious accounts of Bo's remarks to them on May 18. This meant that it was much less likely that USA administration would feel itself under any pressure to refute French arguments in manner suggested by Bundy to Ambassador.

2. Our telegram 1877† June 8 contains text of State Department's public comment on Minister's statement of June 7.[76]

158.
Letter from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador to United States
Lettre du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] June 11, 1965

Dear Charles [Ritchie],

I thought that I should let you know that both the Prime Minister and I were somewhat disturbed by the indication of U.S. reluctance to give us a full account of the necessary background, as reported in Paragraph 2 of your telegram 1863 of June 7. While Bundy's explanation for this reluctance may seem to have some validity from their point of view, it is not altogether satisfactory insofar as we are concerned. Had you not been aware of the North Vietnamese-French conversations in Paris through the C.I.A. we would not have known very much about this side of the exercise before Seaborn went to Hanoi. If we are to play any useful rôle in this exercise, it seems to me that we must be given the confidence which the rôle implies.

I realize that this is a matter of some considerable delicacy in your relations with the interested parties in Washington. Without making a special démarche about it, however, I hope you may be able to find an opportunity in the near future to suggest again the need for frankness and confidence in our discussions on these matters.

With best personal regards,

Yours sincerely,
Paul Martin

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[76] See/Voir Bruce Phillips, "U.S. Units in Vietnam Alert for Combat Role," *Calgary Herald*, 9 June 1965, pp. 1, 2.

159.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 2023
Washington, June 18, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Immediate.
Reference: Saigon Tel 480 Jun 10.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Seaborn) (Immediate) from Ottawa.
Attention Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

MESSAGES TO HANOI

You will have noted President Johnson's thinly veiled paraphrase of portions of Saigon telegram 462 June 4 in his news conference yesterday (our telegram 2020† June 18).[77]

2. We understand that in special off-record briefing of British and Canadian correspondents here June 16 Secretary Rusk said that Mr. Seaborn's efforts to sound out North Vietnamese on various occasions had been deeply appreciated. He apparently added that now that Seaborn's activities in Hanoi had been made public, usefulness of this means of ascertaining DRVN views seemed to have been seriously impaired. He did not repeat not expressly state that Seaborn had been acting on behalf of USA but Canadian correspondents rapidly put two and two together, particularly after the President's comments yesterday.[78]

160.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 513
Saigon, June 21, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Washington Tel 2023 Jun 18.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador) from Ottawa.
For Arnold Smith and Far Eastern Division.

MESSAGE TO HANOI

In view of briefing to press by Rusk, please advise what if anything I should say about messenger role if questioned (a) by press (b) by fellow diplomats.

[J.B.] Seaborn

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[77] See/Voir "Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs," *New York Times*, 18 June 1965, p. 14.

[78] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
J. Hadwen's attention drawn to this message. [Author unknown/ Auteur inconnu]

161.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. Y-481
Ottawa, June 22, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 513 June 21.
Repeat for Information: Washington.

Following for Commissioner: If questioned, you should reply along following lines: In accordance with the instructions of the Canadian Government, I visit Hanoi from time to time as my other responsibilities permit. The conversations I have with the authorities there represent part of the Canadian Government's continuing exploration of all avenues open to it in its attempts to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question. I, of course, pass on to my Government the information I obtain in the course of these visits and I assume that the Canadian Government conveys to other interested governments the views which it considers would contribute to their assessment of the situation and which may not be available to them from other sources. I cannot comment in detail about this process since I am not directly involved; I am sure, however, that interested governments are provided with whatever information the Canadian Government considers useful, in the sense of contributing to an understanding of the situation and thus ultimately to the cause of a peaceful settlement.

2. This explanation should get you by with the press. Although we realize it does not provide much substance for friendly diplomats, we do not think you should go beyond this, even with them.

162.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States and Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade des États-Unis et à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA

No. Y-690
Ottawa, September 22, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Immediate.
Reference: Saigon Tel 780† Sep 14 and Our Tel Y-690 Sep 17 [*sic*].
For Ambassador only. For Commissioner only.

SEABORN'S NEXT VISIT TO HANOI

You will have noted from reference telegrams that Seaborn will be visiting Hanoi for Commission meeting from September 30 to October 5. I should be grateful if you could bring these plans to attention of State Department, and if you will not repeat not be seeing Rusk in person, please ask that this info be brought to his attention on my instructions.

2. In your conversation you should explain that we have serious doubts about usefulness of attempting to give Seaborn for this trip special instructions of type he has had for previous visits. Although this channel always remains available if it is needed, we have not repeat not

been encouraged by substantive results achieved thus far. Moreover, we have no repeat no reason to believe that Northern authorities this time would be any more receptive than in the past to exploratory discussions with Seaborn. In addition, public attention and speculation to which Seaborn's possible role as intermediary has been subjected, as well as signs of skepticism in Saigon about USA's repeatedly expressed willingness to negotiate, indicates quite clearly desirability of a cautious approach at least for present. I have therefore decided that unless Americans have anything of a significantly new and substantive nature to convey to Hanoi, it would be better for Seaborn to play this visit in a low key looking to general discussions with any political leaders who might be available and able to see him. If, however, the Americans have reason to believe that a more specific and substantive approach might be appropriate, in terms of likelihood of it eliciting a useful response, we would of course be prepared to consider their suggestions sympathetically.

[Paul] Martin

163.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 3063
Washington, September 24, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-690 Sep 22.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (for Commissioner) (Immediate) from Ottawa.
For R.E. Collins and Far Eastern Division.

SEABORN'S NEXT VISIT TO HANOI

Ambassador spoke today to William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, in accordance with reference telegram. Bundy indicated general agreement with your approach and said that he would be very surprised if those in authority here developed any contrary thoughts. Matter would, however, be brought immediately to attention of senior personalities.

164.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 832
Saigon, October 7, 1965
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: My Tel 472 Jun 7.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Permis New York, Hague, CANFORCEHED, Rome from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Hong Kong, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIEWS OF HANOI OBSERVERS ON VIETNAM SITUATION

Despite request put in week before my arrival, I was not repeat not given interview during visit to Hanoi September 30-October 4 with any senior government or party leader. In fact, only Vietnamese on whom I called was Col. Mai Lam, Deputy Head PAVN Liaison Mission (Col. Ha Van Lau is reportedly ill). I explained to him this might or might not repeat not be my last visit to Hanoi depending on work load in Saigon until departure. To my enquiry about calls, Col. Lam said DRVN views were well known to me and unless I had anything new to say there was "no repeat no need" for me to meet with leaders.

2. From Col. Lam I got nothing but usual pro forma propaganda diatribe against USA and all its works in North and South Vietnam, plus re-affirmation of strong DRVN and SVN Liberation Front determination to battle on to eventual victory no repeat no matter how long it took. He stressed "rising tide of support" from USA and world public opinion. His proposal for peaceful solution to problem was of course reference to Pham Van Dong's Four Points as "basis for settlement" and SVN Liberation Front five points, with heaviest emphasis on departure of all American troops.

3. Indian Chairman Rahman called on Foreign Minister Trinh. He told me little of interest emerged except that he found remarkable Trinh's theory that the more USA troops came the greater would be final disaster for USA. I told Rahman that in June before massive American build-up Trinh had voiced same theory to me perhaps best described as "the bigger they come the harder they fall". I do not repeat not yet have any details of Wendrowski's calls as he stopped off in Phnom Penh on return from Hanoi.

4. Of foreign observers in Hanoi my calls this time were limited to French, British, Czech, Indonesian and new Hungarian. Chief question I put to them was whether they thought DRVN leaders had begun to comprehend significance in political and military terms of total USA commitment to defence of South Vietnam as exemplified particularly by massive build-up of USA direct combat forces as opposed to advisory and support forces. Verse of answers, which were not repeat not precise ones but which also did not repeat not vary greatly, was that leaders recognized important new factor had entered in but this had not repeat not yet at least led them to any fundamental change in policy. It probably meant in their analysis that war would last a lot longer but eventually Americans would get tired of it whereas Vietnamese Communists would not repeat not.

5. No repeat no foreign observer with whom I spoke harboured any illusion that USA could be "forced" to leave SVN in ignominious manner apparently desired by DRVN and Communist China. I tried to probe Czech Ambassador on differing interests of DRVN which is being hurt by war and China which is not repeat not. He evaded question by implying DRVN was too dependent on China to do other than follow same policy. Indonesian Ambassador Sukrisno talked of Chinese and other Communist "volunteers" (see our telegram 821† October 2) but when pinned down agreed that, apart from Chinese and Soviet caution regarding direct involvement, DRVN was unlikely to ask for large numbers of Chinese volunteers unless DRVN was invaded or under imminent and certain threat of invasion.

6. I could detect no repeat no sign of interest in discussions or negotiations, even less so than in June when meaning of Four Points of Pham Van Dong was still lively subject. Czech Ambassador in fact told me that at end of August "political bureau" of Parliament had let socialist representatives know that DRVN wanted to play down talk of negotiations as it was having harmful effect on morale and conditions were not repeat not favourable to negotiations. He said socialist countries had been asked to resort [*sic*] from making soundings regarding negotiations or offering to act as intermediaries in any way. If true, this sounds like Chinese-inspired move. Czech Ambassador also said that DRVN had "stopped" recent UAR initiative for solution to Vietnam problem (see our telegram 820† October 2) but this info may be obtained from same source as gave it to Turner. French representative de Buzon is

now convinced from conversation with Pham Van Dong mid-August that his Four Points are goals rather than preconditions but says situation is not repeat not ripe for negotiation in DRVN view.

7. Czech and to lesser extent Hungarian are quite concerned about their and other socialist countries having to shoulder heavier burden by replacing damage caused by USA air strikes against DRVN (see our telegram 821 October 2). Since tour of two DRVN delegations through Eastern Europe this summer, moral support from socialist countries is no repeat no longer considered enough. Czech was distressed by unfortunate effects of war on East-West relations but what really seemed to hurt was that Czechs were having to help pay for costs of war. Hungarian said sadly that raids had destroyed "their" hydro-electric plant at Thanh Hoa.

8. I could pick up no repeat no reliable info locally on extent of material and human losses as result of bombings of North except that they were "extensive". Hungarian said that Hungarian team which had been making film on war reported Vinh was "flattened, completely destroyed".

9. Apart from continuing construction of bomb shelters, which adds to general Communist neglect in spoiling appearance of once-lovely city, Hanoi to outward appearances remains much same as in June. Admittedly quick and superficial look indicates goods in shops and market are by local standard in reasonable supply, lots of children still to be seen, life and work apparently going on with comparative normalcy.

10. As you can see visit North was not repeat not very productive. There are no repeat no outward signs at least that anything is moving or about to move politically. On contrary there is general depression stemming from feeling that things are likely to go on in same pattern for long time. It may be significant that I was asked less this time than on previous visits about political instability and morale in SVN and no repeat no one challenged my assertion that situation in that respect had improved.

11. Given meagreness of this "take" and unless there should be within next six weeks some indication of movement towards or interest in political settlement, I am not repeat not inclined to make further visit to Hanoi before my departure from Vietnam.

[J.B.] Seaborn

165.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 3662
Washington, November 18, 1965
Immediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Permis New York; Delhi, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi; Geneva from Paris.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London.
Airmail: Phnom Penh, Vientiane.

VIETNAM

At daily briefing November 17, State Department press spokesman was asked to comment on statement by reporter Schoenbrun that he was informed by French official that during bombing pause last May North Vietnamese offered to begin unconditional peace talks with USA.[79] Spokesman replied, "I can say that a few days after termination of pause, French

[79] See/Voir "Hanoi Rebuffed, Schoenbrun Says," *Sun* (Baltimore, Md.), 17 November 1965, p. A2.

Government told us that Foreign Office had had a talk with a Hanoi representative in Paris. However, it was made clear that Hanoi was still insisting on prior conditions that were clearly unacceptable, including program of so-called National Liberation Front. As to Hanoi's attitude in general period April through June, public record contains much evidence, and I refer particularly to a statement by Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin in House on July [*sic*] 10, 1965, which I should like to read into the record. This is the Canadian foreign minister speaking." Spokesman then read long extract from text of Minister's statement June 10 to External [Affairs] Committee beginning with words "I informed House on Monday" down to "some of points involved in these four conditions" (pp. 9-10 of Committee proceedings or pp. 261-262 of *External* [*Affairs*] for July 1965).[80]

2. In response to further question State Department spokesman said, "Since North Vietnam on April 8 enunciated its conditions for discussion there have been no repeat no approaches that suggested modifications of these basic conditions".

3. When asked when French Government was supposed to have [had] said talk with Hanoi representative, spokesman said "I wouldn't wish to give precise dates, but it can be said that approach did not repeat not take place during pause and as I have stated it was not repeat not reported to us until a few days after pause and did not repeat not contain any proposal for discussion without prior conditions."[81]

166.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 971
Saigon, November 20, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. No Distribution. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador) from Ottawa.
For Far Eastern Division only.

I was distressed to read in local press and to have confirmed [by] reference telegram that State Department spokesman had once again quoted from Minister's statement in House on June 7 concerning my trip to Hanoi early June.

2. As pointed out in my telegram 480 June 10, I felt that statement had not repeat not accurately reflected remarks made to me by DRVN foreign minister and reported in my telegram 462 June 4. Though not repeat not of vital importance, it is unfortunate that State Department continues to make use of slightly inaccurate public version of conversation.

[J.B.] Seaborn

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[80] See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 9–10; "The Facts About Vietnam," *External Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 7 (July 1965), pp. 261–262.
Voir Canada, Chambre des communes, Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures, *Procès-verbaux et témoignages*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 1, no 1, p. 9-10 ; « A propos du Vietnam », *Affaires extérieures*, vol. 17, no 7 (juillet 1965), p. 275-276.

[81] See/Voir Max Frankel, "U.S. Confirms Bid by Paris on Hanoi," *New York Times*, 18 November 1965, p. 1.

167.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 3707
Washington, November 22, 1965
Top Secret. Bacon. Priority.
Reference: Saigon Tel 971 Nov 20.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Seaborn only) (Priority) from Ottawa.
For Collins and Far Eastern Division only.

As indicated in our telegram 3662 November 18, Minister's remarks quoted by State Department press spokesman November 17 were not repeat not his brief remarks in House of Commons June 7, but his more detailed description of North Vietnamese attitude contained in statement to External Affairs Committee June 10.

2. After State Department press spokesman had given statement, William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, contacted us in order to draw statement to our attention and express hope that it would cause no repeat no difficulties in Ottawa. When we spoke to Bundy again on following day, he told us in reply to question that he did not repeat not think that USA authorities would feel under any pressure to make further reference to Canadian statements in near future, and that he would want to consult us in such an eventuality.

3. Circumstance which impelled State Department to refer to SSEA's June 10 statement was, as you will have noted, the sudden revelation of conversation between French and North Vietnamese representative in Paris at end of pause in air strikes last May. See our telegrams 1744 May 28 and 1863 June 7.

168.
Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Secret.
[Ottawa,] November 24, 1965

SEABORN VISITS TO HANOI: SUGGESTED STATEMENTS

Mr. Scott of the U.S. Embassy came in this morning to leave us copies of the texts which Mr. Butterworth had given to the Minister on Monday, and to let us know that a new element of urgency had developed since Mr. Rusk would like to make use of the U.S. statement (if agreed) in a speech on Monday, November 29.

2. In this connection, Mr. Scott read us his telegram of instructions from Washington. It asked that he enquire whether we would be prepared to let other interested governments know something of the background in advance of any statement by the Secretary. If Mr. Martin were agreeable to public statements by "either of us", there would presumably be no problem. "But we might like to inform such key (and discreet) governments as the U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Japan, and go into greater detail than we would use for agreed public announcement." Alternatively, Canada might wish to do this.

3. I told Mr. Scott that we were reviewing the file as a matter of urgency to see how the proposed statements squared with the record, and hoped to obtain the Minister's views as soon as possible after his return from Toronto. I also pointed out that although we would like to be as helpful as possible, there were some obvious difficulties involved in the proposal, including the references to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. From one remark that was made during the interview I gathered that this project may have originated in the White House.

R.E. Collins

169.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] November 25, 1965

POSSIBLE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
ABOUT SEABORN'S SPECIAL ROLE IN VIETNAM

As you know, the Americans have approached us for our agreement to disclose publicly some of the features of Seaborn's special assignment in Vietnam. They have suggested that you might wish to consider issuing a special statement on this matter here over the weekend, to be followed by the inclusion of related comments in a speech Dean Rusk is to give on Monday, November 29. The Americans have also indicated that it would be helpful if advance notification could be given to the Governments of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

I am submitting herewith a detailed memorandum giving some background to this request, and outlining the reasons why we are not enthusiastic about the American proposal, especially in view of its potential embarrassment for the Canadian Government if it is carried out as envisaged in Washington.

In view of the Americans' special interest in this matter, we would like to be helpful to them, and we believe we can do so, provided that such disclosures as are to be made are kept within the confines of Canadian policy, that no reference to Seaborn's message-carrying function is made, and that an implicit or explicit confrontation between the views of Seaborn and U Thant is avoided.

To avoid calling too much public attention to this matter and making the manner of its disclosure appear too contrived, we believe that it would be preferable to let Mr. Rusk deliver his speech on Monday (but with relevant passages cast in terms acceptable to us) without this having been preceded by a special statement in Ottawa. If Mr. Rusk's speech stirs up a sufficiently active public interest, it could be responded to by special comment here by you personally, or issued in your name.

Because we hesitate to disseminate too widely detailed knowledge of Seaborn's activities (this has been very closely held information so far) we would suggest that we ask the Americans not to give advance notification to other governments. If however it is decided subsequently that public interest is sufficient to warrant issuing a brief statement here, we might agree to call in British, Australian, New Zealand and Japanese representatives in Ottawa to give them a slightly fuller account of this Canadian activity, but omitting of course any reference to the passing of messages from Washington to Hanoi.

You will find attached to the fuller, explanatory memorandum submitted herewith, the following draft texts† for your approval, if you agree with the revised procedure we are suggesting:

(a) An account of Seaborn's activities which Mr. Rusk might use in his speech: this is our re-draft of the text suggested by the Americans and retains a good deal of their original phraseology;

(b) A brief statement which you might issue or give to the press here next week, if this seems called for;

(c) A fuller background briefing on Seaborn's activities which might be given to the four governments of special interest to the Americans, and to the Secretary-General in our own interests.[82]

A.E. R[itchie] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

Enclosure: Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Pièce jointe : Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] November 25, 1965

POSSIBLE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
ABOUT SEABORN'S SPECIAL ROLE IN VIETNAM

Over the past ten days there has been considerable press discussion of and speculation about attempts to bring the Vietnam problem under negotiation. While references have been made to alleged initiatives by Roumania and the United Arab Republic, the most important recent "revelations" have been the U Thant initiative in late 1964[83] and the North Vietnamese conversation at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris on May l8 at the end of the bombing pause.

2. It seems clear that of these, the U Thant initiative and the negative hearing the Secretary-General's efforts were given in Washington, is the more embarrassing and difficult one for the Americans to explain internationally and to their own public opinion. The reason given by Washington at the time for their negative response to the Secretary-General's efforts – according to the account of this initiative given to the Prime Minister in New York in March by U Thant – was that "if such talks were being held, the news would inevitably leak out with predictable impact in the U.S.A. and in South Vietnam, putting into jeopardy the whole American policy."[84] It should be recalled that at the time, the U.S. Government had not committed itself to entering into "unconditional discussions" of the Vietnam problem and the military position on the ground in Vietnam was not strong. Moreover, the newly installed civilian government of South Vietnam was shaky at best and could very easily have collapsed totally, resulting in chaotic problems for the Americans, if it had become known that the U.S.A. had undertaken negotiations with North Vietnam behind the backs of the Saigon Government. Finally, it is likely that public disclosure during the Presidential election

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[82] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Mr. Martin, statements revised as requested this morning. [J.G. Hadwen]

[83] See Eric Sevareid, "The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson," *Look*, 30 November 1965, pp. 81–86. This issue of the magazine was published in mid-November.
Voir Eric Sevareid, « The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson », *Look*, 30 novembre 1965, p. 81-86. Ce numéro du magazine a été publié à la mi-novembre.

[84] See/Voir doc. 240.

campaign of an active interest in undertaking negotiations on the part of the Administration might have strengthened the less moderate forces backing Senator Goldwater. The negotiating hand held by the U.S.A. was thus not a very strong one in the autumn of 1964. It is difficult, however, for the Americans at this time to put their public case in any or all of these terms.

3. The Minister of the U.S. Embassy here, Mr. Scott, called on the Department yesterday to inform us that it would be helpful to the Americans if a fuller account of Seaborn's responsibilities in Vietnam could be released publicly through related announcements in Ottawa and in Washington, and to this end draft statements had been prepared to show to the Canadian Government. Scott left with us copies of these draft texts which, I understand, Mr. Butterworth had shown to you earlier. The purpose of these two statements would be to indicate that the U.S. Government had received information through special Canadian channels indicating that the North Vietnamese were not seriously interested in finding a solution to the Vietnam problem at the time and that their positive response to U Thant's initiative was not therefore to be taken seriously.

4. The Americans are also, evidently, concerned to strengthen the position of friendly governments which have supported the American position in Vietnam and may well find themselves under pressure from their own public opinion in the light of what may appear as American rigidity, if not bad faith, in rejecting U Thant's initiative. No doubt for the purpose of mitigating such pressure, the Americans have now asked for our agreement to have them bring the governments concerned (i.e., Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Japan) more fully into the picture or to have us take the initiative in doing so.

5. We understand from our conversation with Scott that Washington wishes to reach agreement with us on these matters by this weekend since they are apparently thinking in terms of putting the proposed American "statement" into the text of a speech to be delivered by Dean Rusk on Monday, November 29.

6. In terms of the totality of our relations with the United States, Canadian cooperation in meeting this request for making public a fuller account of Seaborn's activities would, of course, be desirable; it is evident that Washington attaches considerable importance to this problem and, if at all possible, we would clearly wish to be helpful to them. Second, we have publicly stated that we support the purposes and objectives of American policy in Vietnam and we have also made it clear in public statements that we had detected no disposition on the part of the North Vietnamese to bring the Vietnam conflict into a negotiating framework. Finally, the release of this information would demonstrate that Canada has not been diplomatically passive in relation to the Vietnam problem, as is sometimes charged in criticism of the Canadian Government, but, on the contrary, has been exploiting to the full the special channels available to it.

7. These general considerations must however be carefully weighed in the light of the specific disadvantages we can see for the Canadian Government in revealing, at this time, anything more about Seaborn's special role in Vietnam than has already been made public by your statements in the House of Commons and in the External Affairs Committee. These disadvantages are as follows:

(a) The Canadian Government is on record as being in favour of a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict. The net effect of a public disclosure of Seaborn's special role will be to justify the rejection of what public opinion is bound to regard as a serious negotiating initiative on the basis of an assessment of information derived through Canadian channels. Domestically this could lead to criticism that the Government had allowed itself to be used to reinforce American determination to rely primarily on military power to influence the outcome of the issue.

(b) In Canadian terms, it might also be argued that Seaborn, the Canadian Government's representative, had been used as a "messenger boy" for the United States rather than as an agent for a more active and independent Canadian policy.

(c) The course the Americans are urging upon us would have the effect of pitting Seaborn's judgment against that of U Thant, to the latter's disadvantage. Thus the United States Government would be seen to be relying on Seaborn's analysis (which tended to confirm what they wanted it to confirm) rather than U Thant's, which tended in another direction.

(d) The disclosure of this information now might have a serious effect on our role in the Commission in Vietnam and on our possible future usefulness in this capacity. The North Vietnamese might well react by saying that Canadian efforts were not seriously motivated and were intended only as part of an American propaganda exercise. Equally serious is the possible reaction in the South where the Prime Minister, Air Vice-Marshal Ky, has been stating recently that he will *never* negotiate with the Communists. The full publicity which would no doubt be given to any disclosure now of Seaborn's past activities in Hanoi could have serious implications for the relations of confidence and trust between the South Vietnamese Government and the Canadian Delegation in Saigon, more specifically in the person of Victor Moore, who will be replacing Seaborn very soon.

(e) Finally, we have reservations about meeting the present U.S. request on grounds of historical fact. It should be kept in mind that Seaborn's special responsibilities were never intended to provide negotiating contacts, nor, so far as we were aware, even to lay the groundwork for negotiations. Rather he was to act as a channel for the transmission of messages, or statements of position between Hanoi and Washington and beyond that to establish himself as a significant political personality and to report his assessments of attitudes and events in the North. When this exercise was first set up in May and June of 1964 the Americans were not prepared for negotiations; what they were interested in was a channel which would make clear to Hanoi their long-term peaceful intentions in Vietnam coupled with their determination to resist further Northern aggression with all possible means. They were thus interested in eliciting a response from Hanoi in terms of the latter's agreement to a stabilization of the Vietnam situation, in return for which there might have been economic advantages for North Vietnam such as trade with South Vietnam and even economic assistance. To disclose Seaborn's activities now, in the context of the rejection of U Thant's initiative and particularly in the terms suggested by Washington might make it appear as if his assignment had been in a fundamental way different from what it was in fact.

(f) Canada knew nothing about the U Thant initiative until March and April when, on two different occasions, the Prime Minister and you visited New York and received from the Secretary-General (but at no time from the United States) an account of his efforts to arrange contacts in Rangoon. A review of the record of Seaborn's activities in North Vietnam indicates that after Seaborn's first two discussions in Hanoi in June and early August, we became progressively more concerned about the lack of substance in what the Americans were asking us to do. It was this factor among others which led us to put the exercise in early June 1965 in a special Canadian context. Had we known about the U Thant initiative earlier, our own approach at the time (December, 1964) would almost certainly have been cast in somewhat different terms. In short, there is evidence to indicate that the Americans, although they had asked us to undertake a very sensitive diplomatic operation on their behalf, were not prepared to take us into their confidence to the fullest possible extent. They are now asking us to help them justify a position in terms of information from Canadian sources, relating to an initiative of which at the time we had no knowledge whatever.

(g) The issuance of related statements in Washington and Ottawa, far from closing off discussion of this matter, will almost certainly stimulate further questions by the press and probably in Parliament when the new House meets. There will be increasing pressure to disclose more and more of the background on Seaborn's activities with all the attendant risks of embarrassment to the government suggested above.

8. In view of the foregoing considerations we would recommend that we inform the Americans that we still feel it necessary to keep any public discussion of Seaborn's activities within a Canadian framework. This position could be justified on the grounds of:

(a) Domestic political implications in Canada;

(b) The unfortunate juxtaposition of Seaborn's judgment with that of U Thant which might have serious implications for us in the United Nations;

(c) Our present and possible future role in the Commission and our relations with both the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese authorities;

(d) Our reluctance to have a Canadian diplomatic exercise, which was designed to meet a specific set of circumstances, drawn into a domestic and international discussion of U.S. policy which is related to an essentially different set of circumstances from those in which Seaborn's mission was first conceived.

9. Although it would be preferable from our point of view to have no further public discussion of Seaborn's special activities in Vietnam, it seems reasonably clear that the Americans hope to refer to these matters in one way or another in the near future. Moreover, as indicated above, we would presumably wish in terms of our relations with Washington to give what assistance we can. In these circumstances our efforts might be concentrated on ensuring that the substance of a disclosure is acceptable to the Canadian Government. From our point of view there are three considerations of over-riding importance which should be taken into account:

(a) There should be no disclosure of the fact that Seaborn was acting on behalf of the U.S.A. at any time;

(b) An explicit confrontation between the views of U Thant and the views of Seaborn should be avoided;

(c) Reference to Seaborn's activities as "a major third party" approach should be eliminated.

If you agree, I would propose informing the U.S. Embassy here that while we are not enthusiastic about this exercise, we appreciate their problem and would be prepared to go along provided that the three criteria mentioned above are met. At the same time we could make available to the Embassy a re-draft of their proposed statement (as left with you by the Ambassador) which meets these requirements, explaining that this would be the sort of formulation we would wish the U.S. statement to take. A copy of the text of our re-draft is attached for your consideration.

10. The plan as proposed by the Americans would envisage the issuance in Ottawa of a statement by you or in your name and this would be followed by a statement (or speech) in Washington covering much the same ground, but from a different point of view. We believe that this procedure would appear too artificial and contrived and would stimulate criticism in Canada that we were acting as stooges of the Americans. Unless you feel, therefore, that there are compelling reasons for your issuing a special statement here in advance of Mr. Rusk's speech on Monday, we believe that it would be more satisfactory if the Secretary of State were to make his speech as planned and to await the public response to it. If circumstances are such as to indicate that this would be useful from our point of view, Mr. Rusk's speech could be followed up here by a brief confirmatory statement in response to press enquiries or requests for official comment. Attached for your consideration is a text designed to meet this situation.

11. The problem remains of advance notification to the governments of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, as suggested by the Americans (see paragraph 4 above). We do not believe, in all the circumstances, that this would be desirable, especially in advance. In the event however that Mr. Rusk's speech is followed by a statement here, we might consider, if you agree, giving the four countries concerned a somewhat fuller range of background information about Seaborn's activities but omitting any reference to his message-carrying

functions on Washington's behalf. Attached for your consideration is the text of an outline of these activities which might be used for these briefings. The text of this briefing might also, if you agree, be transmitted to the Secretary-General in New York.

A.E. R[itchie] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

170.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

[Ottawa,] November 26, 1965

SEABORN VISITS

Herewith a redraft of the U.S. statement.†

2. Mr. Scott has just reported that Bundy telephoned from Washington to say that a reference to this subject was in Rusk's brief for today's press conference,[85] but in purely factual terms related to your own public statements and going no further than what had been said to the press last week.

A.E. R[itchie] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

171.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Top Secret. Bacon.
[Ottawa,] November 29, 1965

U.S. STATEMENT ON SEABORN VISITS TO HANOI

After you had cleared the text of the proposed draft U.S. statement with the Prime Minister on Friday, it was given to Mr. Scott of the U.S. Embassy. Mr. Scott was informed that you did not propose to make a statement yourself, either before or after any use of this material by Mr. Rusk, although we had material ready for use by the departmental Press Officer in the event of subsequent enquiries. So far as other governments were concerned, we did not think it appropriate to make a special effort to brief them in advance about Seaborn's visits, especially the BACON aspect, but we would of course be prepared to provide more details than were envisaged for the press if representatives here of the U.K., Australia or New Zealand approached us for additional background. Finally, Mr. Scott was informed that if the proposed statement were to be made, you would wish the Secretary General of the United Nations to be informed in advance; since no official Canadian statement was involved, such notification would probably best come from the Americans themselves.

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[85] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 906–910.

2. Mr. Scott indicated that he fully appreciated our problems in this regard. He brought with him a copy of Secretary Rusk's statement on Friday at his press conference, which he had just received (text contained in Washington telegram 3766† of November 26, attached). This seems to have covered a good deal of the ground contemplated for inclusion in Mr. Rusk's speech (now scheduled for Wednesday) without raising the problem of U Thant's initiative in an unduly embarrassing way from our point of view and relieving pressure on us somewhat by citing other sources of information on which the U.S.A. had relied at the time. It was suggested to Mr. Scott that in the circumstances there might not appear to be the same urgency as before the Secretary's press conference to make use of the text which you had approved. On a personal basis, Mr. Scott said he thought it might well be best to leave things as they stand, especially in view of the North Vietnamese statement, reported on the radio that morning, denying that any offer had ever been made to the Secretary-General.[86]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

172.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 3774
Washington, November 29, 1965
Confidential. Priority.

VIETNAM: DRAFT USA STATEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, expressed view to me November 28 that Canadian role in ascertaining DRVN position had been adequately covered in Secretary Rusk's press conference statement November 26 (our telegram 3766 November 26) and that further reference to subject might be superfluous. He would therefore recommend to Rusk that no repeat no mention of Canadian role be made in Secretary's forthcoming speech (now scheduled for December 1 in St. Louis). He could not repeat not say what Rusk's decision would be but would let me know.[87]

2. Grateful if you could send us for our records text of original draft USA statement† on Vietnam negotiations, as proposed to you by Americans last week. I have copy of final draft incorporating suggested Canadian amendments.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

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86 See/Voir "Hanoi Scorns Feeler 'Legend,'" *New York Times*, 9 December 1965, p. 22.

87 Such a reference does not seem to have been included in Rusk's speech in St. Louis, which was delivered on 2 December 1965.
Il ne semble pas qu'une telle mention ait figuré dans le discours prononcé par Rusk à Saint-Louis, le 2 décembre 1965.

Chapter 3/Chapitre 3

REVIEWING PARTICIPATION ON THE ICSC (SEPTEMBER 1964–SEPTEMBER 1965)

LA PARTICIPATION À LA CISC RÉEXAMINÉE (SEPTEMBRE 1964-SEPTEMBRE 1965)

173.
Despatch from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Dépêche du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 332
Saigon, September 1, 1964
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Air Mail.
Reference: My Telegram No. 460† of Aug. 28/64.

THE FUTURE OF THE VIETNAM COMMISSION

In my telegram under reference, I said I was becoming increasingly convinced that the ICC was ill equipped by its mandate under the cease fire agreement and by its whole organization to play a useful role in Vietnam. In this despatch I should like to elaborate on these ideas.

2. Put in its simplest terms, we agreed in 1954 to assume a role in the Vietnam ICC in order to supervise: (a) the withdrawal of combatant forces to the north and to the south; (b) the regrouping of populations which chose to go north or south; and (c) the entry of military personnel and material with a view to ensuring that neither party should have the resources to renew hostilities against the other.[1] The task, expected to be of two- or three-years duration at most, was that of supervising the execution of the cease fire agreement, the immediate consequences of the end of the Indochina war, and the prohibitions which would help to ensure that there would be no immediate recrudescence of hostilities in Vietnam. We did not, I think, envisage a task which included the maintenance more or less in perpetuity of peace and security in Vietnam and the territorial integrity of the two parts of the country against anyone or anything which might threaten it. We did not envisage having to cope with a new and subtler type of aggression by the north against the south in the form of subversion and infiltration, nor the resultant necessity for our major ally, the U.S.A., to come to the moral and material assistance of South Vietnam in a way which was undoubtedly a violation of the cease fire agreement, whatever the justification for that violation. Had we envisaged such complex developments, we might not have taken on the ICC role. And if the

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1 See/Voir vol. 20, doc. 743.

member powers of the Geneva Conference of 1954 had envisaged such developments they would have called into being an ICC with greatly different terms of reference, powers and responsibilities.

3. For the first years of the agreement's life, we were able to play a reasonably useful role and one which was closely related to the task originally envisaged for the ICC. Since that time, the problems of the area have become not only increasingly complex but also increasingly remote from those envisaged by the Geneva powers in 1954. The result has been that we have made a valiant but frustrating effort to apply old terms of reference to a new situation. It is no wonder that the ICC has appeared to be increasingly ineffectual.

4. After something like two years of labour, we managed to give birth, by majority vote only, to a Special Report to the Co-Chairmen stating that there was subversion in the south directed by the north.[2] Yet we have still been unable, two years later, to produce the detailed documentary proof (i.e., the Legal Report) which gives chapter and verse for our statements in the Special Report.[3] In the two years since the Special Report was prepared, moreover, we have not been able to produce even one interim report to draw attention to the fact that subversion and infiltration is an ever-mounting threat to South Vietnam.

5. It is sometimes argued that, in spite of the frustrations of our work in the ICC and in spite of the inadequacies of our terms of reference vis-à-vis present problems of the area, we still have a useful function to perform. The useful functions are alleged to be (a) that a reputable international body like the ICC is able by dint of hard work to draw the world's attention in a particularly striking and telling way to the fact of infiltration and subversion by North Vietnam against South Vietnam; and (b) that the mere existence of the ICC acts as a restraint on both parties and keeps them from taking more overt action one against the other. I consider both these propositions very questionable.

6. As I mentioned in a previous paragraph, it took practically two years before we could prepare a Special Report drawing attention to the fact of subversion and infiltration by the north. Its impact, because it was signed only by the Indian-Canadian majority and was objected to by the Pole, was considerably reduced except within those countries where there was no need for an ICC opinion to convince anyone that infiltration and subversion existed. Two years later we have been unable to produce the detailed documentary proof of what was contained in summary form in the Special Report and even if it were produced now, I doubt whether it would have much political impact. My point is not just that the dilatoriness of Commission proceedings, Polish blocking tactics and Indian lethargy have kept the Commission from performing a highly useful function. The point is rather that those who are not yet convinced of the existence of North Vietnam's control and manipulation of the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam are not likely to be so convinced by anything which the ICC might have to say on the subject even if the Commission were to act more efficiently and more speedily.

7. The second alleged advantage of having the ICC in existence is that it restrains the two parties from doing things which they ought not to do under the Geneva Agreement. This I consider an even more dubious proposition. The systematic frustration by both north and south of the so-called mandatory controls by our fixed teams in both parts of the country is such that it is quite impossible for those teams to maintain any sort of supervision over the entry of military personnel and material into either North or South Vietnam. We know from official announcements that USA troops and equipment are coming into SVN and we have some idea of what Chinese and Soviet equipment has come into North Vietnam through intelligence sources and high-level American photography. The additional information which ICC teams can produce on these matters is virtually nil. And even where ICC teams have

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2 See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 1755, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962).

3 See Chapter 1./Voir Chapitre 1.

been able to make some eye-witness reports (e.g., on the PAVN gun-boats), the citations against the guilty party by the ICC have been either blocked by Polish obstruction or so watered down by the Indians as to be useless.

8. The real cause of the current troubles in Vietnam is the control, direction and supply, in both arms and men, of a rebellion in South Vietnam by North Vietnam. What can the ICC do about this? If its southern teams were not located at seaports but at strategic points along the Vietnamese border with Laos and Cambodia, it might conceivably be able to verify or at least make more difficult the VC supply routes from the north – though even this is a dubious possibility given the nature of the terrain along the frontiers. As it is, none of our teams, with the possible exception of that for the Demilitarized Zone, is of any effectiveness whatsoever with respect to limiting DRVN control of the southern insurgency. Nothing in this field which the ICC does has any restraining effect upon the DRVN, nor does it add anything to common knowledge of the facts of the situation. Nor is there any point in suggesting a radical relocation of team-sites to meet the current situation. Even if the SVN authorities could guarantee their security in the border areas (which they could not), the Polish Delegation would automatically veto any suggestion for such re-location.

9. I would maintain therefore that we are deluding ourselves if we think that by our participation in the ICC we are making any contribution worth mentioning to peace and stability in this part of Southeast Asia, to a truer knowledge of what is happening, or to restraint upon the parties. If we are not doing anything really useful, why do we not pull out, if need be unilaterally?

10. One consideration which might keep us from pulling out of the ICC is that, whenever they are asked, both the DRVN and the SVN authorities insist fervently that they love us dearly and that they want us to stay in existence. If pressed to say why they want us to remain, the northern reply, stripped of its verbiage and communist jargon would amount to this: (a) somehow the ICC may be able to bring about elections in both North and South Vietnam which the Communists would be able to manipulate in such a way as to ensure Communist control over the whole country; and (b) the ICC is a useful sounding board for northern propaganda directed against the SVN and the USA, and the Geneva Agreement a useful stick with which to beat the USA for its "interference" in the area. The SVN reply to the question would probably boil down to this: (a) we keep hoping that somehow or other the ICC will be able to come out unequivocally with an assertion that the SVN is the subject of subversive aggression from the north and that all the assistance we have accepted from the Americans is therefore completely justified; and (b) we find the ICC a useful sounding board for our propaganda directed against North Vietnam. I think you will agree that none of these reasons is in itself such as to warrant our continued participation in the ICC.

11. I am sure that there is also a reluctance in certain quarters that Canada, which has such a good record of readiness to take part in peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world, and in a remarkably disinterested way, should take the initiative to withdraw from and thereby break up one of those peacekeeping operations. That sort of action smacks of the walk-out which is practiced only by Communists who are unable to get their own way. If Canada were to withdraw from this international commitment, would it not put in question our word and good faith insofar as other similar commitments are concerned?

12. I look at this part of the problem in a somewhat different way. I cannot see that we are doing our own reputation in international circles, or peacekeeping operations in general, a good turn by continuing to take part in one such operation when it has outlived its usefulness and when it has become in many ways a laughing stock. The reputation of peacekeeping operations can only be maintained if they can demonstrably be shown to have a useful function. One or two useless ones are likely to cast doubt on the usefulness of peacekeeping operations in general. Surely our reputation would be improved if we made a clean break with the ICC – provided we gave a clear and convincing explanation of why we found the break essential. It is possible of course that, deep in their hearts, both Indians and Poles are

harbouring the same ideas, that they would need very little encouragement to speak up on the subject, and that therefore all three of us might agree to pack up and go home. (Soviet talk of withdrawal from their co-chairmanship of the Laos Conference cannot be entirely lost on the Poles.) This might avoid the possible opprobrium of unilateral Canadian withdrawal; but it would require very delicate soundings to ascertain what were the real sentiments of the Indians and the Poles, and the main difficulty would probably be that all three of us would want to give different and often contradictory versions of why we found it necessary to cease our Commission activities. Also, if they got wind of our intentions far enough in advance, the Indians or the Poles might beat us to the gun so that they could get in the first word as to why they found it necessary to withdraw. In short, I think we should be prepared to get out even if we could not persuade Poles and Indians to come along with us and there might even be some advantage in not trying to get their assent, though presumably we would have to warn them and others of our intentions at least a short while in advance.

13. I shall make no more than passing reference to the domestic advantages or disadvantages in Canada of such a unilateral Canadian action. From what we have seen here of an increasingly critical Canadian press attitude towards continuing Canadian participation in the ICC, I should think that the balance of advantage would definitely lie on the side of early withdrawal.

14. This may sound like a drastic recommendation and I am sure the reader will be asking whether there is not some less dramatic step, one which avoids the disadvantages which unilateral withdrawal may carry. One might be to try to make the Commission at least work more effectively within its admittedly inadequate terms of reference: force the Indians to process the Legal Report; insist on formal meetings which put positions on record and record votes even if they are split ones; press on with the production of a long overdue twelfth interim report. Thanks to a more dynamic Indian Chairman here and apparently an attitude in Delhi a little closer to our own, there now seems some chance of breathing life into the Commission machinery. I have been pushing for decisions at formal meetings and a number have been taken, mostly on Indian-Canadian majority. We are thereby creating the necessary raw material out of which to prepare an interim report, for which I am also pressing.[4] But at best this will be many months in the making, and when it does appear it is unlikely to be exactly earth-shattering or headline-catching in its revelations. In fact it will solemnly set forth, in carefully qualified language, a number of obvious facts and comments which are unlikely to cause a ripple in the chanceries of the world. We come down again to the fact that the Commission is just not equipped according to its composition, terms of reference and machinery, to do anything about the present situation in Vietnam and I do not see that any amount of hard work or ingenuity are likely to change the situation greatly.

15. If we cannot adapt the Commission to present requirements, could we not at least cut out its most useless component, the team-sites, thereby saving a good deal of money and manpower without destroying the whole Commission? Yes, we could. I am convinced, as is Brigadier Kenyon, that most of the teams serve no useful Commission function now and will serve none. They do not "control", let alone prevent, the importation of military personnel and material into either north or south because the authorities in both parts of the country ensure by administrative measures that the teams are rendered totally ineffectual. We can and do complain about this officially, but to no avail. If we kept perhaps one mobile team in Hanoi, two in Saigon and the present two for the demilitarized zone, we could handle any investigations which we are now called upon to make just as effectively as at present, detract in no way from the Commission's usefulness (little enough in any event) and effect a very considerable saving. We would also spare a number of Canadian officers from spending an

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4 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This has been the policy we have been trying to follow during the past ten months. A.C. S[mith]

all but useless year doing a daily modicum (an hour or two) of work which they know to be of no value at all. Regardless of the decision on the Commission's future, I think a major surgical operation should be taken on the outposts of the ICC.[5]

16. To return to the main question, one argument against Canadian withdrawal from the ICC has been that we should keep ourselves in readiness to play a more useful role in case the situation should change and we be called upon to undertake tasks more nearly related to the current problems of the area. What this general consideration boils down to is, I think, the following. As long as the SVN government and people have the will and capacity to continue to resist the Viet Cong, and as long as the USA supports them in this regard, it is unlikely that anyone will think of assigning new tasks to the ICC and therefore there is little we can usefully do. If, however, there should be a general collapse in South Vietnam or if there should be a slow erosion of the will to resist because of war-weariness and Viet Cong persistence, then we might well move towards a situation in which the SVN would be seeking for ways to find an accommodation with the north. This accommodation would probably be some sort of neutralism which perhaps made provision for the inclusion of the Liberation Front in a coalition government. Developments along this line could well be accompanied by new pressures for a Geneva Conference on Vietnam (especially if a conference in Laos had gotten under way) designed to confirm and ratify the new arrangements being worked out in the area. If this occurred, there might well be a proposal that an international body should supervise the arrangements and it would seem natural for the conference to turn to the three powers whom they had turned to in 1954.[6]

17. If this is what is meant by holding ourselves in readiness for more important tasks later on, I think we should tread extremely warily. I fear that the international supervisory body called into existence under the circumstances which I have described in the previous paragraph would be more than likely to find itself supervising the slow erosion of a truly neutralist position for South Vietnam and its gradual absorption by the DRVN (via the Liberation Front) and thence into a position of mere vassalage to China.[7] Some would argue that this is an inevitable development in the area. I would question the inevitability of it, but I do not deny it as a possibility. The only thing that matters for our purposes in the present context, however, is whether Canada would want to be a member of the international body which was possibly destined to watch over the slow (or not so slow) slide of South Vietnam into the communist camp or at least the Chinese sphere of influence. If there is a serious chance of that happening, I think we would not want to be a member. And I think we should be under no illusions that, if the situation which gave rise to a new supervisory body were as I described it, there would be anything Canada could do within that body to keep this development from happening. I am tempted to say, therefore, that we should get out of the present international commission now lest we find ourselves inevitably drawn into participation into a new international commission where we would be in an even more uncomfortable position than in the present one.

18. This despatch does not constitute my last and definitive word on the subject. It does not, for instance, take into account the possible advantages of a Canadian presence in North Vietnam, a matter on which I am commenting separately. It does, however, reflect my preliminary observations and thinking as a result of three months in this job. I hope it will spark some discussion in Ottawa and as a result lead to a further dialogue with this post on the subject.

Blair Seaborn

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5 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This is likely to be recommended by our inspection team. [A.C. Smith]

6 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This is the best argument against unilateral action. P[aul] M[artin]

7 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
A good point. [Paul Martin]

174.
Letter from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 333
Saigon, September 1, 1964
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Air Mail.
Reference: My Despatch No. 332 of Sept. 1/64.

THE FUTURE OF THE VIETNAM COMMISSION:
THE CANADIAN PRESENCE IN NORTH VIETNAM

In my despatch under reference I have gone at length into the question of whether Canada should withdraw from the ICC for Vietnam. One of the considerations which would have to be taken into account in arriving at a decision is the value of having through the ICC a Canadian presence in Hanoi and five other centres in North Vietnam. As this is largely an intelligence matter, I thought I should deal with it in a separate letter with a higher classification than confidential.

2. Through the Canadian presence in North Vietnam, we are able to make a Canadian contribution to the total western intelligence gathering on the communist world by means of on-the-spot observations. No other Western Power has representatives outside Hanoi and the British and French representation in Hanoi is very small and circumscribed. It is sad to think of the possible cessation of one of the few (perhaps the only) unique Canadian contributions to the Western intelligence machine, but we must ask ourselves and others what that contribution really adds to knowledge. I have my own doubts on that score first because our team-site officers are very heavily circumscribed in their movements and are denied access to most interesting observation points; and secondly because we have made almost no effort to send to Indochina officers trained in or particularly suited for intelligence work. I would like to know exactly wherein our Canadian observations have provided information not already available through other sources either overt or clandestine.

3. The second consideration with respect to North Vietnam is that, via the ICC, there is a Canadian access from time to time to North Vietnamese leaders. I would be reluctant to suggest that we cut off this Western access, however limited and formalistic it may be; or, looked at from the other direction, to suggest that we cut off this one small additional contact which the North Vietnamese have with what must be largely an unknown non-communist world. I think we must nevertheless admit in all honesty that such contacts as we have had with North Vietnamese leaders have not been particularly fruitful, have done little to add to our knowledge of North Vietnamese thinking, and have done even less to change the attitudes and policies of the North Vietnamese themselves.

4. You will be in a much better position than I to assess this aspect of the problem, possibly after making some quiet soundings with London and Washington. If however the advantages of a Canadian presence in and an access to North Vietnam and its leaders are as limited as I fear they have been, then the prospect of cutting off that contact through our withdrawal from the ICC is not such a serious one to contemplate.

Blair Seaborn

175.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. Y-682
Ottawa, September 28, 1964
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Despatch No. 332 of Sep 1 and Letter No. 333 of Sep 1.

FUTURE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN ICSC IN VIETNAM

I have considered carefully all the arguments you have advanced in favour of a radical re-examination of continued Canadian participation in Vietnam Commission leading to the conclusion that withdrawal would be in our best interests. A general aspect of the problem which must be borne in mind is the role Canada has built for itself in the field of peace-keeping. This is a role which appeals to the Canadian public, which would not understand action which might well appear as abandonment of a peace-keeping task freely entered into and not yet complete. Until the case for withdrawal can be well documented, it is probable that unilateral Canadian withdrawal would be less acceptable than an attempt to arrive at improved terms of reference, through a new conference, for example. In many respects your arguments are well founded, especially as they relate to the Commission's relative ineffectiveness in the light of outmoded terms of reference, the dangerous precedents which this sets for the future of peacekeeping operations and the expensive and extensive commitment we maintain to produce so little which can be seen to be of use. In a different configuration of international circumstances and if situation in Vietnam were static, arguments you have presented would of course be overwhelming.

2. I believe, however, that the international political forces focussed on Indochina and on Vietnam in particular are changing more rapidly and more significantly than they have for some years. I also believe that the problems of that area are not going to be resolved by a simple perseverance by all concerned in pursuit of present policies and that we are heading into a conference situation, the precise nature and timing of which however cannot be determined. This is a factor which in my calculations has an overriding and compelling political importance and I am prepared to subordinate other considerations to the role we may be able to play in the situation I can foresee. If such a conference takes place it will be essential that Commission render an account of its activities and that this account should provide an adequate picture of true nature of problem in Vietnam and difficulties which Commission has encountered in discharging its responsibilities because of this problem. We may have to compromise on certain points in order to get this picture but I believe that final result can be of some help in strengthening hands of everyone opposed to a Communist take-over in Southeast Asia.

3. I believe therefore that your first priority, and I see it as having some urgency, should be to attempt to make Commission function as effectively as possible and, as closely as circumstances permit, in manner originally intended. You should seize every available opportunity, and create new ones wherever possible, for Commission to take account of communist infringements of Geneva Agreement and build up a record of meaningful findings. You will encounter pressures in opposite direction in process and you should attempt to mute but not disregard these since in final analysis Commission can say nothing new by way of criticising our friends whereas factors on other side of ledger are neither admitted nor so well publicized in detail let alone officially recognized by an international body.

4. At same time your secondary policy guideline should be, in event that, and to extent that, you are unable to make Commission function properly, to build up precise and accurate record of reasons for this failure, whatever its extent may be. Although you will wish to continue to seek guidance on specific issues and in certain circumstances tactical considerations may indicate otherwise you should think in terms of bringing issues to final conclusion even at risk of being outvoted. While our primary objective as above would most effectively be met by unanimity or majority, our secondary objective leads to conclusion that we should not worry unduly about going into minority since that situation too may have its advantages.

5. As far as public opinion in Canada is concerned, I am naturally disturbed by criticism of our position in Indochina. I am however prepared to live with this problem for immediate future until developments confirm that a conference will take place.

6. If international negotiations are undertaken, I consider it important that Canada should have a voice. A decision on future Canadian participation could then be made in light of our experience of what is workable and what is not, depending on (a) nature of settlement reached; and (b) degree to which we believe proposed future Canadian membership in any supervisory body could strengthen existence of an independent reunited Vietnam or more probably an independent South Vietnam, rather than helping South Vietnam to slide downhill into communism. I would be reluctant to jeopardize a claim to a voice in these deliberations (or to bring them about prematurely) by precipitating action now to break up Commission. I am also anxious to keep open one of the few Western channels of communication with Hanoi. Past results in terms of information obtained or influence exerted have not been impressive but this does not mean that important future opportunities for usefulness will not present themselves.

7. Although these main objectives for the Canadian Delegation obviously preclude for time being the sort of action you have made as your main recommendation, I would be prepared to consider any suggestions you may be able to make (in consultation with Liaison Mission which is to visit you next month) in direction of scaling down our financial and personnel commitments which would still leave the political organs of Commission intact and which would not tempt others to blame us for a subsequent and total withdrawal themselves.

[Paul] Martin

176.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 3563
Washington, October 8, 1964
Confidential.
Reference: Your Tel Y-682 Sep 28.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva; Delhi, CDS from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

In recent conversation both Forrestal (Special Assistant to Rusk on Vietnam) and Green (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far East) expressed firm hope that Vietnam Commission would remain in being. Main reason given by Forrestal was that despite Commission's current handicaps and relative lack of effectiveness, it was a body which, in unpredictable future circumstances, might come to assume great importance as link or bridge between contending sides. As such, Commission was well worth retaining in "our arsenal".

2. Officials did not repeat not utter criticism of inaction of Commission in recent past, or display hope that much could be achieved by it in near future. However, they indicated continued appreciation of role being played by Canadians on Commission under frustrating conditions, and were glad to hear of recent Canadian efforts to prod Commission into increased activity.

177.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 4126
Washington, November 25, 1964
Confidential.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris; Delhi from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

Corcoran of State Department Vietnam Working Group contacted us recently to convey Department's comments on recent conversation between USA Embassy official and Rogers in Delhi, during which latter was said to have mentioned possible consideration of reduction in Canadian participation in Vietnam Commission (presumably reference was to personnel on fixed teams).

2. Corcoran said that State Department hoped that any such move by Canada could be discussed with them before implementation. Concern was that in present awkward political situation in SVN, a Canadian strength reduction on Commission might start speculation among Vietnamese that support for Geneva Accords was diminishing; serious embarrassment could be caused for new government, whose Prime Minister was already in difficult situation.

3. Corcoran added that in this same context of possible strength reduction, "some officials" had also asked that our attention be drawn to importance of info available to Canadian military officers in North Vietnam. Corcoran said, however, that he himself was personally aware, from having served in Hanoi, that opportunities for useful observation were severely limited by North Vietnamese restrictions. (Separate message will reach you on this subject.)

4. Corcoran also said that if Canadian Commission personnel in SVN were reduced, it was to be hoped that we would find it possible to increase aid by equivalent amount. He did not repeat not stress this point.

5. On political effect of possible Canadian personnel reduction, we said that problem seemed mostly one of presentation, and that we were sure that you would see to it that any Canadian decision was not repeat not made known or implemented in such a way that Vietnamese public would misinterpret general Canadian attitude to SVN.

178.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. Y-856
Ottawa, December 1, 1964
Confidential.
Reference: Your Tel 4126 Nov 25.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Paris, Geneva, CDS; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from London.

VIETNAM COMMISSION

You may wish to follow up your interview with Corcoran on future of Canadian participation in Vietnam Commission by explaining that after more than ten years of attempting with diminishing success to make the Commission function as intended under the Geneva Agreement, we are inevitably reviewing our commitments to this undertaking not repeat not only on the basis of the political considerations involved, but also in the light of the increasingly serious administrative difficulties we face, particularly in making adequate arrangements for staffing. In this connection, you might point out to Corcoran that for a foreign service the size of Canada's, our Indochina commitments are substantial. We have to consider comparative utility of having our limited staff tied up in Indochina instead of being better employed elsewhere.

2. In examining these commitments, we have, of course, paid special attention to differentiating between those organs of the Commission which have atrophied wholly or partially as a result of the political realities of the situation, and those which still offer potential or actual opportunities for a constructive role. Conversation in Delhi which Corcoran mentioned was in fact based on possibility of reduction of fixed teams. When Geneva Agreement was drafted, it was assumed that possible violations of settlement would be directed inwards through seaports and along Chinese border. Location of team sites was decided accordingly. Subsequent experience has shown that pattern of real threat and actual violation is quite different. Thus, quite apart from lack of cooperation from both parties, situation of fixed team sites renders them incapable of exercising any meaningful "supervision and control".

3. We find it curious that Corcoran should argue that a reduction in Canadian Commission strength might have unsettling effect among South Vietnamese on grounds that it might be interpreted as indicating support for Geneva Agreement was diminishing. He will be aware that South Vietnam rejected the Geneva settlement before it was signed and although it accepts *de facto* the cease-fire arrangements and accepts the Commission on this basis, it still does not repeat not consider itself bound by the terms of the agreement. Moreover, the South Vietnamese record of cooperation with the Commission has not repeat not been such as to give us any real encouragement in carrying out tasks (in South Vietnam) which at best are detrimental to Western interests and at a worst, a meaningless charade. North Vietnamese record of cooperation is no repeat no better. In both cases, living and working conditions are below sub-standard and this is particularly true of one of the few meaningful – in a symbolic rather than operational sense – team sites; this is the ad hoc team at the demilitarized zone where conditions, for which South Vietnam is responsible, are so primitive and badly maintained that one can question South Vietnamese willingness to make an adequate effort to see Commission structure remain intact.

4. We naturally do not repeat not wish to embarrass our friends or the Western position in Vietnam, and whatever action may be decided upon will be carried out with a minimum of disturbance. We are convinced, however, that the "don't rock the boat" argument has less and less force and we believe that we are fast approaching the point where practical considerations, in terms of Canadian resources and political results achieved by these resources in relation to the problem itself, may make necessary a readjustment of our commitment. Moreover, we question the wisdom of leaving Canadian military officers at team sites not repeat not only without serving useful purpose but also in circumstances which are undignified. To continue under such circumstances risks bringing the whole idea of peace-keeping into disrepute.

5. In the first instance, any readjustment would of course be limited to meaningless activities, leaving a reduced operation to prove itself.[8]

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[8] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This advice makes sense to me. L.B. P[earson]

179.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 1896
New York, December 7, 1964
Confidential.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Bonn.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Phnom Penh, Saigon from London; Vientiane from Saigon.

CONVERSATION WITH POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER RAPACKI

Polish Foreign Minister saw me at his request this morning. He was his usual urbane self. Our conversation dealt mainly with Southeast Asia and MLF.

2. On Commissions in Southeast Asia, I told him that we were extremely frustrated, wondered about their value, and were even wondering whether they could continue to exist. Rapacki said he could not repeat not deny that they had no repeat no day-to-day value. In Vietnam for example their official task was limited to supervising demarcation line. However, he considered Commissions had potential political role to play. Poland considered that alternative to negotiation was ever spreading conflict which could assume international proportions. He therefore thought it important to stay as long as there was any hope for negotiations taking place. He admitted that while recognizing need for political solution Poland had no repeat no formula on which such a solution could be worked out. He noted in passing that UK position appeared to be evolving towards a harder line. UK was no repeat no longer advocating conference on Laos as they had done earlier in summer.

3. Rapacki repeated usual Communist objections to MLF and advocated as alternative nuclear freeze along lines suggested by Poland.

[Paul] Martin

180.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 763
Saigon, December 15, 1964
Confidential. Priority from Delhi.

POSSIBLE SUPPRESSION OF ICC TEAM SITES

During conversation with Col. Ha Van Lau December 12, I referred to visit of Liaison Team and asked whether he had any comments to make on ideas put forward by Mr. Rogers to Col. Mai Lam on possible suppression of team sites. Ha Van Lau said question was for Commission to decide. There was precedent for it in suppression of two team sites North and two team sites South in 1960. This had taken place after discussion with Northern and Southern authorities.

2. Ha Van Lau asked whether we had raised in Commission possibility of elimination of remaining sites. I said that while question had been mentioned to Indel and Poldel as tentative Canadian thinking during visit of Liaison Team, just as it had been put to PAVN and SVM, we had not repeat not yet put it forward for formal discussion within Commission as idea had not repeat not yet been presented and received approval of Canadian Government. We were anxious to know reactions of parties before proceeding.

3. Ha Van Lau said job of Commission was one of supervision and control and team sites had been established to enable it to fulfill this function. However, if teams could not repeat not fulfill the function, it was understandable that we might want to re-examine their role. While he would not repeat not say so in so many words, very clear inference to be drawn from Ha Van Lau's remarks was that it was not repeat not likely to cause any particular anguish to DRVN authorities if Northern team sites were suppressed, probably on basis that similar number of Southern team sites would be suppressed. Although DRVN authorities usually express themselves as reasonably satisfied with the Geneva structure and dislike thought of tampering with it, Ha Van Lau made no repeat no allusion to idea that wholesale suppression of team sites would put whole Geneva settlement in question.

[J.B.] Seaborn

181.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Chef d'état-major de la défense, ministère de la Défense nationale
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] December 21, 1964

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

For some time now, the scope of the Canadian commitment, in terms of personnel, to the Vietnam Commission has been under review both here and in Saigon; as a result of assessments which have been made of the various aspects of the Commission's operations, it has been concluded that the effective usefulness of the Commission's teams has been so eroded in recent years that it is now time to recognize the ineffectiveness of the work of the Commission's teams in terms of what these teams were originally intended to do, and to readjust the Commission's commitments in the light of current political realities.

As you will be aware a special liaison team consisting of representatives of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence recently visited the three Commissions in Indochina. As a result of its study of the Vietnam Commission the team recommended that "all of the teamsites be closed with the exception of MT 76 in the Demilitarized Zone and that a nucleus of officers be maintained in Hanoi and Saigon available to carry out emergency investigations at the request of either party. A number of officers could also be available in Canada to be sent out to Vietnam by air if and when the parties agree to permit the teams to function according to the Agreement."[9]

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[9] See/Voir "Report of the Liaison Team on its visit to the Canadian Delegations to the Commissions for International Supervision and Control in Indochina October 22-November 10, 1964," RG25, vol. 3069, 6, p. 58.

I am attaching for your consideration copies of the documents relating to this recommendation. The main memorandum entitled "Vietnam" and dated November 9†, from which the quotation given above has been taken, was prepared by Brigadier Leech, the military member of the liaison team. This memorandum is accompanied by three annexes; you will note that the two attachments to Annex A (letter No. 383† of September 30 from Saigon) which are a chart and a map respectively, outlining the extent to which authorized controls are being carried out, are not included with the appended material since we understand that copies are already available to you.

Since the proposal to reduce the number of Commission teams in Vietnam will require prior approval by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on behalf of the Canadian Government, and subsequently, consultation and coordination with our other Commission partners, we should be grateful for any observations you may wish to make on this matter at your earliest convenience in order that we may begin making plans to implement this recommendation. It would be our hope that these reductions could take place during the first half of 1965.

A.E. Ritchie
for Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs

182.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] January 13, 1965
Reference: D.L.(2) Memorandum of Dec. 18.†[10]

VIETNAM COMMISSION: INTELLIGENCE REPORTING
AND REDUCTION OF TEAM SITES

You will recall that the special liaison team which visited the Indo-China Commissions in October and early November came to the conclusion that the team sites maintained by the Vietnam Commission (except for the team at the Demilitarized Zone) should be closed down as soon as it was possible to take such action; the intention behind this recommendation is not to eliminate the Commission entirely, but to reduce those Commission activities which have become, in our view, useless from a substantive point of view and which because of their meaninglessness, constitute an unwise precedent for international peacekeeping and supervisory undertakings elsewhere. The main features of our thinking in this connection were outlined in our telegram Y-856 of December 1 to Washington (copy attached as Appendix "A" for your ready reference) and you will recall that when this message was brought to the Prime Minister's attention, he commented "this advice makes sense to me".

2. Reports of recent conversations (see attachment Appendix "B"†) which Seaborn and his Permanent Representative in Hanoi have had with the interested North Vietnamese authorities indicate that firm opposition is not likely to be encountered from that quarter to

[10] Not found./Non retrouvé.

any proposal for the elimination of team sites, although it has been specified that such a project would have to be a Commission undertaking and that the southern authorities would have to agree to do likewise. The attitude of the Saigon authorities is not so clear-cut although we would guess that they too might agree to a reduction provided that parallel action was taken in the North or provided they were told that allowing the teams to carry out their duties was the only alternative.

3. The most specific reservations about the proposal that the Commission's team sites be abolished has come from the USA intelligence authorities, who have argued that the reports based on Canadian observation in North Vietnam have been one of their main sources of information on that otherwise almost totally inaccessible country; consequently the Americans would be reluctant to see us take any action to reduce the scope of our information-gathering network in North Vietnam.

4. We are inclined to take a skeptical view of the usefulness for intelligence purposes of the five team sites in North Vietnam which are manned on a rotational basis by military officers. In the vast proportion of cases, these officers have had no specialized training in this type of work. Moreover, their tours of duty on each team site are relatively short (up to a month) which means that there is no long-term continuity in observation and therefore a great deal of duplication of detail which is already well known. The fact that this operation is conducted by amateurs has led to embarrassment in the past including a relatively serious case last August in which there was extensive confusion among the British, American and Canadian intelligence communities; this could be potentially dangerous. This risk might be worth taking if the material gathered were of sufficient importance, but given the physical limitations imposed on the Commission's teams in North Vietnam, we doubt whether we should continue to expose ourselves in this way. The fact that our observational activities are well known to the North Vietnamese authorities is borne out by the attached report from Hanoi (Appendix "C"†).

5. The North Vietnamese authorities of course take every precaution to ensure that members of the Canadian delegation will see as little as possible which might be of interest in the outside world. Control activities in North Vietnam are, stated baldly, a farce, and there is no such thing as freedom of movement for the officers concerned when they are not conducting authorized controls. In most cases, housing is arranged in such a way as to reduce or eliminate the possibility of acquiring incidental knowledge such as frequency of trains (we are told that the team site at Lao Kay was recently moved so as to prevent team members from hearing trains crossing switches) and other forms of transport, and Canadian officers are accompanied by PAVN liaison officers when on recreational walks. The attached (Appendix "D"†) recent letter from Seaborn reporting on his own visit to Dong Dang on the Chinese border gives some insight into these problems; also relevant is the attached memorandum (Appendix "E"†) describing the visit to another Northern team site (Vinh) by the special liaison team. It is true that a posting to two Northern team sites (Lao Kay and Dong Dang, which are both on the Chinese border) provides officers with an opportunity to travel to and fro by train; a third, the port of Haiphong, is serviced by road transport, while the other two (Vinh and Dong Hoi) are reached by specially chartered aircraft. The intelligence potential of travelling by these carefully delimited means of transport – and from an intelligence point of view, only the first two have any meaning – have pretty well been exhausted over the course of years. In view of these stringent limitations we cannot help but believe that even a trained intelligence observer would find that his time on North Vietnam team sites would produce very lean pickings indeed. This is not to say that Canadian team site representatives never pick up specific items which are of interest; it does mean, however, that such items are few and far between, and as nearly as we can judge, of fairly peripheral relevance.

6. You will recall that we recently received from the CIA a memorandum† commenting on Canadian reporting from North Vietnam, and in view of the factors outlined above, we find it curious that the CIA can contend for example that "reporting on...rail transport activities between Communist China and North Vietnam over the Lao Kay-Hanoi and Hanoi-Dong Dang rail lines has been essential in estimating North Vietnam's relative dependency on each of these facilities for engaging in foreign trade". We must confess to finding it hard to believe that the observational opportunities available to team site officers at these two team sites, and while proceeding to and from them, could yield anything of substance in terms of understanding North Vietnam's foreign trade pattern. Similarly, it is argued that reports of the composition of cargo entering the port of Haiphong have been "extremely useful" but here again, since the DRVN authorities normally refuse permission to see cargo manifests it makes any observation very spotty and largely a matter of guesswork. In the same memorandum, it was stated that the CIA had been grateful to receive a 1962 land-use map of North Vietnam through Canadian channels. We would be very surprised if this map had been obtained anywhere else than in Hanoi. The CIA memorandum states that Canadian sources were first to report the existence of oil storage facilities at Vinh. We find this assertion hard to accept at face value in view of the possibilities open to the Americans through high altitude photography.

7. We have no doubt that the USA has found a Canadian presence in North Vietnam useful from their point of view, and as you may know, our office in Hanoi purchases, on a regular basis, a selection of North Vietnamese newspapers and publications which are transmitted to Saigon and distributed to the CIA representative there as well as to the South Vietnamese. In addition, members of the Canadian delegation in Hanoi forward factual and interpretative reports on a fairly regular basis on a wide range of subjects including impressions of living and working conditions, such evidence of economic trends as may be available, information about availability of foodstuffs and the implementation of civil defence precautions. We would judge that a heavy proportion of the information on which the CIA memorandum was based, came from reports from Hanoi, and it is not proposed to reduce this operation in any way; in fact, if anything, it could be enlarged.

8. Since we are not, however, the ultimate consumers of the reports submitted by team site officers, we cannot be dogmatic in any assertions about the usefulness of this material. We remain nevertheless skeptical and we would wish to see specific instances of team site reports providing new and important information before we could agree that a continuation of these activities is worth the effort[11] and constitutes a valid justification for continuing in activities which are at best meaningless, casting doubt on the validity of peacekeeping operations, and at worst are potentially very dangerous.

9. At the best of times we lay ourselves open to the political awkwardness and embarrassment of being caught red-handed. The DRVN has not chosen to play up such knowledge as they have of our activities, but the fact remains that we are involved in a situation where the initiative in our relations which are never very cordial, rests with the North Vietnamese. The desire to retaliate, however, may become greater in the immediate future as a result of the forthcoming Canadian Minority Statement[12] or even conceivably as a result of any military action the USA might undertake and in this context, real or trumped-up charges of espionage might well be levelled at a Canadian; it is even possible to envisage loss of life in these circumstances. We strongly doubt that the benefits derived from our

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[11] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I agree. M[arcel] C[adieux]

[12] See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 2609, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965), pp. 12–14.

presence on team sites in North Vietnam is worth the risk of any of these possibilities. In my view we should not enter upon offensive intelligence operations unless we are prepared to accept the normal losses more philosophically than I think we now are.[13]

R.L. Rogers

P.S. I know that other intelligence services use a diplomatic cover for their activities but I believe that none of our friends use their regular personnel as agents. L[ouis] R[ogers]

183.
Memorandum from Head, Defence Liaison (2) Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la 2e Direction de liaison avec la Défense au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] January 14, 1965
Reference: Far Eastern Division's memorandum of January 13.

VIETNAM COMMISSION – INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND REDUCTION OF TEAM SITES

Far Eastern Division's memorandum of January 13 to you on this important subject deserves short comment. It was encouraging to find the admission towards the end of the memorandum that Far Eastern Division could not be dogmatic in assertions about the usefulness of the material; a reader of the earlier paragraphs might justifiably have been confused on this point.

2. The only point of D.L.(2)'s memorandum of December 18 was to draw to your attention the real interest and considered judgment of a United States Government agency which has a considerable stature in Washington with respect to the information provided by Canadian observers in Vietnam, and to urge that this expression of view be given due weight in our thinking about the reduction of team site activity. Far Eastern Division is sceptical, cannot help but believe that the pickings are lean, find it hard to believe that observations yield anything of substance, etc., to use a few of the words in their memorandum. A professional U.S. agency with immense resources, both human and technical, (whose product we are given in large measure) has indicated in writing that Canadian observations are of great value. I cannot "prove" the U.S. case. I doubt equally that Far Eastern's case is provable. However, based on this Division's responsibilities and contacts, I can only urge that because of what we get out of the CIA, if for no other reason, we should not lightly dismiss the case that they have put to us.

3. I am not unimpressed by Far Eastern Division's arguments on other than this aspect of the case for reduction. It may well be that impelling Canadian reasons exist that we should reduce our total commitments in Vietnam. So long as this particular aspect of our relations with the United States Government is taken into account I would not in carrying out this Division's responsibility take issue. In the circumstances perhaps one useful next step would be, in consultation with Far Eastern Division, to put a request for comment to the U.S. authorities concerned as to which team sites seem to provide the most useful information.

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[13] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
I agree. [Marcel Cadieux]
In short, unless the USA make a more impressive case, we should certainly not develop what we are now doing and even pursue the course we had tentatively adopted. M[arcel] C[adieux]

Our own initial Canadian survey would suggest that Hanoi and the team sites at Haiphong and Haiphong Port represent, statistically at least, the most productive source of reporting. This course of action would not only serve the purpose of providing us with better factual grounds for decision, but would as a minimum indicate that we were at least willing to give as serious consideration to their representations as Canadian circumstances might allow. Even a minimum show of interest would be valuable in reducing the impact on our relations with the CIA of any reduction of Canadian efforts in Vietnam that may be required.

J.J. McCardle

184.
Letter from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Lettre du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9486, 17-1-1/6

Personal and Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] January 19, 1965

Dear Blair [Seaborn],

From the pieces of paper which have been referred to you over the past few weeks, you will be aware that we have been taking the first steps here towards a formal decision in favour of an effort to eliminate the Commission team sites, except MT 76.

As anticipated, the main reservations about this project have been voiced by the Intelligence community, and I believe that we are going to have a tough argument on our hands. I am attaching a copy of a recent memorandum to the Under-Secretary which will bring you up to date – on a personal basis – with respect to the direction in which we are moving. On the original copy of this memorandum, the Under-Secretary has indicated his agreement with the second sentence of paragraph 8 and the concluding two sentences in paragraph 9. He has also commented as follows: "In short, unless the USA make a more impressive case, we should certainly not develop what we are now doing and even pursue the course we had tentatively adopted."

As you might imagine, we have had a fairly sharp response from those who do not want a change, and our next step will be to ask for specific demonstrations of usefulness.

The most serious weakness in our case at the moment is the total absence for a period of a year of regular and systematic political and economic reporting from Hanoi. I have a very strong suspicion that a great deal of the material which the CIA finds of value has come from observation in Hanoi, and in this connection, as I have said before, the spot reporting has been very good. I am convinced, however, that our position would be greatly strengthened if we were able to demonstrate that we are taking full advantage of our position there to make the unique contribution which our presence makes possible. I well realize that the preparation of monthly or quarterly reviews is not the most inspiring task for a foreign service officer and that the contents of these documents tends to be fairly low-grade material. Especially now that the British have discontinued their periodic reporting from Hanoi, however, this task has a double importance in terms of providing political background and continuity (and an opportunity to comment on general trends) and in terms of generating material which we can use as a limited *quid* for our friend's very extensive *quo*. I wonder, therefore, whether you could make a special effort to impress on David Jackson that tedious though the task may be it is assuming a rather greater importance than it has in the past and that we look forward to receiving some sort of review from him on a regular basis in future; it would be helpful if he could begin by preparing something for the last months of 1964. I would be prepared to leave

to your discretion whether this should be monthly or quarterly. From a "presentational" point of view a monthly document would be most useful but tentative agreement had been reached earlier – without bearing fruit – that it would be quarterly.

I do not wish to sound unduly critical of Jackson's work which, I would repeat, has been in our view absolutely first class as far as it goes; in the present circumstances, however, I do feel that he is not doing as much as he could to help us in the elimination of fixed teams.

I think you might also wish to consider whether it would be possible for you (or the Brigadier) to provide us with an analysis of the relative importance of the various collection-points in terms of the material which is being sent to the intelligence people; if this analysis confirmed the importance of Hanoi and the relative insignificance – the red plums available at the local market are very tasty, to quote a recent report – of other team-site sources, so much the better. It seems to me that it is more in the interest of the military than anybody else that this operation be brought to an end, and they may have to provide us with some of the data on which to base our arguments.

I would welcome your comments on this specific problem, as well as the more general one.

With best personal regards.

Yours sincerely,
Louis [Rogers]

185.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] February 8, 1965

COMMISSION TEAMS IN VIETNAM

As you will recall from the introductory chapter of the report of the Liaison Team which visited Indo-China in October and November, 1964, I strongly favour the elimination of all team sites except Saigon, Hanoi, and MT 76 in the Demilitarized Zone. I have refrained from pressing ahead with this project (in favour of which, you may remember, the Prime Minister commented at one stage) for two main reasons:

(a) there was certain other work before the Commission in Vietnam which I thought could suitably be straightened away first (e.g., the difference of opinion with the Indians over the Tonkin Gulf report and the Legal Committee report);

(b) a feeling that the present was not the best time to ask Ministers to agree to a project which, however justifiable in itself, has met with some opposition from the United States C.I.A.

2. The second was frankly the determining consideration. I do not myself accept the U.S. arguments in favour of retaining the teams, but see immediate advantage in getting our people out of the teamsites. But it seemed to me that, in their recent mood, there was a risk that Ministers might argue that we could go on for another year or so as we have already gone for ten years, rather than take any marginal chance of irritating the U.S. Administration: the Prime Minister would not want to get a phone call from President Johnson asking him to leave our people where they are. If the case was put forward while Ministers were in this sort of mood, there was a risk that the project of withdrawal from the teamsites might be put off indefinitely.

3. The events of this weekend in Vietnam,[14] in my view, now make it urgent that we start, at the first opportunity, to seek the agreement of the Indians and the Poles to close down all save the three teamsites mentioned in paragraph 1 above. Intelligence reports suggested that the teamsite in Dong Hoi might have been hit. If it had been, and if there had been loss of life the results would be politically unfortunate. If a Canadian had been killed, one likely result would be an upsurge of opposition to the present U.S. policy in Indo-China. As you will know from newspaper editorials and from seeing the Minister's correspondence on this subject, the Canadian public, in so far as it is aware of what is going on in Indo-China, is almost uniformly hostile. I would fear that reports of Canadian casualties in Vietnam, especially if they were the direct result of U.S. counter-action, would provoke a more actively hostile attitude. This would obviously be much harder for the Government to deal with than some short-term U.S. irritation over the reduction of team activity in the North.

4. You have seen the arguments previously put forward on both sides by D.L.(2) Division and Far Eastern Division. In my view the considerations which D.L.(2) held to militate in favour of retaining Canadian team officers in the North have been over-ridden by this new danger. We cannot, of course, be sure that there will be a repetition of U.S. air raids in the North, but I suggest that the risk is not worth taking. The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to ask for your decision as to which set of arguments is to prevail.

5. If you agree, as I hope you will, that we should set about getting the Canadian team officers out of all save Hanoi in the North, I would envisage a memorandum to the Minister, setting forth the possibility of some higher-level U.S. approach directed towards maintaining the operation in the Northern team-sites, but arguing in favour of early withdrawal.[15] Assuming the Minister agrees that we should begin to move, we should have, I think, to be prepared to see what attitude the Indians take as a result of the U.S. air raids to choose (a) the best time to raise the question in the Commission, and (b) the way in which to raise it. At a later stage still, but before we make our first move in the Commission, we shall have to decide whether to proceed unilaterally if we cannot carry the Indians and the Poles with us, and the fact that this might be necessary should also be mentioned to the Minister.

R.L. Rogers

186.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 117
Saigon, February 13, 1965
Secret. Emergency.
Reference: Our Tel 87† Feb 9.
[Repeat for Information:] Washington, London, Delhi, Paris, NATO Paris, CFHQ (Attention DG Plans) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

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[14] On 7 February 1965, the United States launched air strikes against selected targets in North Vietnam in retaliation for Viet Cong attacks the same day on certain US military installations in South Vietnam.
Le 7 février 1965, les États-Unis ont bombardé des cibles précises au Nord-Vietnam en représailles aux attaques menées le même jour par le Viêt-cong contre certaines installations militaires américaines au Sud-Vietnam.

[15] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes. [Marcel Cadieux]

WITHDRAWAL OF OFFICERS FROM NORTHERN TEAM SITES

We reconsidered yesterday possible necessity of withdrawing team site officers from North should anti- repeat anti-Canadian activities be mounted against them following despatch of our strong minority statement on subject of February 7-8 air strikes. In Operations Committee question was also raised of possible withdrawal of teams from Dong Hoi and Vinh on grounds of lack of security against aerial attacks though on this point neither Indel nor Poldel were prepared to take any immediate action and we did not repeat not feel we could push it too hard.

2. Last night Secretary-General received flash telegram from Hanoi reporting that Col. Ha Van Lau called in Chairman IC Bureau at 1750 hours and requested Commission to take steps urgently to withdraw all fixed teams in DRVN because of tension and gravity of situation and "only taking into consideration security of teams". Jackson who was called in subsequently to receive DRVN Government statement on February 11 air strikes was told by Col. Mai Lam that DRVN regarded situation with utmost repeat utmost gravity and that population was highly indignant. In subsequent telegram Jackson has speculated on possibility that general movement of DRVN or Chinese military personnel and equipment may be imminent and that PAVN want to get teams out of way. USA Embassy has informed us that rumour of movements which is admittedly hardy perennial at all moments of crisis in this area has just cropped up again.

3. PAVN request was discussed at informal meeting today. I said physical safety of officers was important responsibility but that we should also consider serious implications for whole Geneva structure of withdrawal of all Northern teams. Rahman felt that physical danger from aerial attack was not repeat not excessive and certainly not repeat not equal at all team sites: that we should therefore seek clarification of PAVN's views on security of teams; that in any event we could not repeat not take such fundamental steps as withdrawal of all team site officers on m[e]re oral request from Ha Van Lau. Pole clearly would have gone along with "temporary" withdrawal particularly if he could manoeuvre Canadian into proposing. After considerable haggling we agreed that Chairman IC Bureau Hanoi be instructed to tell PAVN that teams were prepared to take reasonable risks in discharge of Geneva Agreement obligations but that if PAVN maintains decision regarding withdrawal, demand should be presented in writing.

4. In agreeing [on] this course of action I am taking calculated risk regarding physical safety of Canadian officers either from aerial attack or from hostile demonstrations. Would appreciate your authorization to stick with this position at least for few days assuming there is no repeat no serious increased threat to physical security from either source. If PAVN are sufficiently anxious to get rid of ICC teams for whatever reason, we may in this way throw onus of responsibility clearly on them for crucial action tantamount to scrapping Geneva structure.

5. Col. An with whom we are in close consultation says it would be unthinkable for Southern team sites to remain in existence for long, if Northern ones were suppressed. In latter eventuality would you want me to propose withdrawal of officers from Southern team sites or would you prefer that SVN make request as direct consequence of PAVN action? I believe latter would be preferable though chances of its acceptability within Commission would depend upon whether suppression of Northern team sites was described as temporary only.

6. Though PAVN demand for withdrawal fits splendidly with our own desire on other grounds to suppress all team sites, I think we must resist temptation to agree too willingly when show of reluctance and slight delay may serve our larger purposes.

[J.B.] Seaborn

187.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. Y-103
Ottawa, February 13, 1965
Secret. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tel 117 Feb 13/65.
Repeat for Information: CDS, Washington, London, Delhi, Paris, NATO Paris (Priority).
By Bag: Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM: WITHDRAWAL OF NORTHERN TEAM OFFICERS

We share your concern for security of Candel personnel in North Vietnam in light of military situation and probable reaction to Canadian Minority Statement. We assume you will be able to find way to urge all Canadian personnel in North Vietnam to exercise utmost caution and to avoid reaction to hostile provocation.

2. We agree with course of action Commission has followed in preliminary response to PAVN oral request as reported at conclusion your paragraph 3. We are also in full agreement with your position that Candel should not appear to adopt too forward an attitude in advocating or facilitating withdrawal. This attitude should not however be too inflexible and when formal request received from PAVN in writing you should express reluctant acquiescence in a situation to which there appears no alternative since request emanates from a party to agreement. We believe that no useful purpose served by suggesting that only some teams (i.e., Vinh and Dong Hoi) be withdrawn since even if major military movements from China or within North Vietnam are being contemplated, it is doubtful whether teams would be allowed to observe even as little as they now do. Moreover, to withdraw some now would allow North Vietnamese to make a second incident out of withdrawal of remainder.

3. In further examination of PAVN request, either before written request received or when such request being considered, there are other questions which will obviously require clarification. First: Terms under which withdrawal to be undertaken should indicate clearly whether PAVN regards this action as temporary or permanent. If this is not clear from written request, you should press for Commission action to clarify. Second: Especially if withdrawal is not described as temporary measure, Commission should press for explanation from PAVN on North Vietnamese attitude as it relates to CFA, Agreements' machinery and Geneva structure as a whole. Third: What will be position of Hanoi Bureau? Does PAVN envisage it remaining and if so, will it continue to have adequate facilities such as twice-weekly courier service and unhampered telegraphic communications?

4. Our first reaction is that Col. An might profitably wait for a time before asking for suppression of Southern teams. If, however, he takes immediate action he should be encouraged to request withdrawal in same terms (especially with reference to whether action is to be temporary or permanent) as North Vietnam.

5. In general, we believe that this Northern initiative may be played to our advantage and overall consideration in tactics should clearly be to attach as much responsibility as possible to PAVN for initiative to which follow-up action appears as logical and inevitable response.

188.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 119
Saigon, February 14, 1965
Secret. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Delhi, Paris, NATO Paris, CFHQ (Attention DGP) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

WITHDRAWAL OF OFFICERS FROM NORTHERN TEAM SITES

Colonel Ha Van Lau has now sent telegram reiterating request regarding withdrawal without delay of all fixed teams in DRVN on grounds that their security cannot repeat not be guaranteed in face of American attacks. (See Saigon telegram 151† February 20 for text.)

2. From Rahman I have learned that Delhi have already contacted Co-Chairmen to bring DRVN request to their attention. Indians will try to persuade Russians to speak to North Vietnamese and get them to withdraw request on grounds that it is tantamount to scrapping Geneva Agreements.

3. Rahman feels we should continue to resist DRVN demand on grounds that danger from aerial attack is not repeat not at moment grave. Alternatives are: (a) To hold out for a few days and to tell teams to withdraw only if forced to do so and then under protest. Danger is that if any casualties should occur, we would have no repeat no possible comeback on PAVN. (b) Urge on Rahman temporary withdrawal to Hanoi in compliance with PAVN request after stating readiness to return to sites at any time. Of alternatives, I have slight preference for (b) out of concern for physical security of officers though it (has?) political disadvantages. Please instruct urgently.

[J.B.] Seaborn

189.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. Y-104
Ottawa, February 14, 1965
Secret. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tels 117 of Feb 13 and 119 of Feb 14 and Our Tel Y-103† of Feb 14.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, CDS (Attention DG Plans), Delhi, Paris, NATO Paris (OpImmediate).
By Bag: Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Hanoi from Saigon.

WITHDRAWAL OF NORTHERN TEAMS

Although it may be possible to delay final action on PAVN request for a limited period pending results, if any, of Indian initiative in appealing to Co-Chairmen, we do not repeat not believe that in the final analysis we can refuse to comply with such a request from one of the

parties. Quite apart from propriety of Commission itself attempting to maintain part of a structure which the party concerned seems to wish to eliminate for whatever reason, we agree entirely with your assessment of the dangers involved in alternative (a) outlined paragraph 3 your telegram 119. We believe that at least partial and prompt compliance is desirable. You should therefore urge Rahman to accept withdrawal of teams at least as far as Hanoi in the first instance, after expressing reluctant acquiescence and readiness to consider request to return if PAVN expresses its willingness to have teams return. Once this phase has been completed, situation can be reviewed again on an urgent basis to see whether final withdrawal action is then unavoidable in the light of absence of any change in attitudes of Northern authorities.

2. From Candel point of view we assume that sufficient accommodation will be available in Hanoi at villas and at hotel and equally important that PAVN authorities will not repeat not object to providing meals etc. while officers are in Hanoi pending final decision. In this connection you will no repeat no doubt wish to ensure that no repeat no more than the minimum necessary personnel complement will be kept in Hanoi.

3. You should find an opportunity in Commission discussion of this matter to indicate for the record that teams have not repeat not been serving the purpose for which they were intended and that their continued presence in North Vietnam is really only symbolic of DRVN's formal acceptance of Cease Fire Agreement. This is the real issue at stake and PAVN should be urged to clarify its position.

190.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. Y-132
Ottawa, February 18, 1965
Secret. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tel 132 Feb 17 and Our Tels Y-103 and Y-104 Feb 14.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, CDS (Attention DG Plans), Delhi, Paris, NATO Paris (Routine).
By Bag: Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Hanoi.

WITHDRAWAL OF NORTHERN TEAMS

Indian High Commissioner Acharya called at own request today to explore degree of Canadian support for Indian position on PAVN demand for withdrawal of teams. Indian position was (a) to try to get demand withdrawn; (b) failing this to delay withdrawal as long as possible; (c) as last resort to withdraw under protest. Arguments he advanced against withdrawal related mostly to fear of facilitating PAVN/Chinese movements of troops and/or materials but of course this argument may have been used because it looked like one most likely to appeal to us. Also, he suggested that PAVN would be breaking CFA if it enforced demand for withdrawal.

2. Arnold Smith told Acharya that in Canadian view teams had been of dubious value for many years but that we did not repeat not necessarily therefore feel any need to facilitate PAVN demand. Acharya said that as Poles would not repeat not resist demand India would be isolated on vote in Commission (he did not repeat not make clear what vote: he could not repeat not have meant Indians would present resolution refusing to comply) if Canada would not repeat not support India.

3. Arnold Smith pointed out that in the past we had wanted to withdraw teams because restrictions placed on work of teams by DRVN had destroyed their utility but of course DRVN request for withdrawal represented even greater restriction placed on work of teams and one which consequently ought to be protested. Summing up interview Acharya said there were four points which to him seemed to need clarification assuming as both he and Arnold Smith did that Indian démarche seeking withdrawal by DRVN of its request to ICSC to remove teams would fail: (a) ICC should withdraw teams under protest; (b) in Indian view withdrawal should be temporary only; (c) in Indian view withdrawal should be to Hanoi only; (d) hope expressed by Arnold Smith that if withdrawal was temporary and there was question of teams returning later to North that India would join Canada in ensuring that they return only under proper conditions.

4. There was also some discussion of probable SVN reaction. Acharya had info to effect that Rahman had been told by somebody in SVN Government that SVN might consider withdrawal of teams from North to relieve SVN of any obligations under CFA. We said we had no repeat no such info and questioned whether it was time to think in terms of collapse of whole Commission system. At very end also there was discussion of possibility that delaying too long in complying with PAVN request for withdrawal of teams might cause PAVN in exasperation to request withdrawal of Hanoi office too. Grateful for any observations you have on this last possibility. We would not want to leave Hanoi office.

5. In light of this discussion and because we may need to carry Indians with us in preparation of some sort of report to Co-Chairmen condemning PAVN request afterwards, we think you should be as cooperative with Indian representative as possible, i.e., not repeat not crowd him too fast but quietly let him do most of objecting.

191.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 164
Saigon, February 23, 1965
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 157† Feb 22.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, CDS (Attention DG Plans) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Hanoi from Saigon.

WITHDRAWAL OF NORTHERN TEAMS

All team site officers have now been withdrawn as far as Hanoi.

2. I have agreed with Rahman's understanding that teams remain "duly constituted" but are temporarily withdrawn from their sites. I do not repeat not intend to keep all five team site officers waiting in Hanoi as we can employ them to better advantage in Saigon. They would, however, be readily available to retain their sites in unlikely event that this should be requested by PAVN.

3. I have suggested to Rahman that we might insist on more satisfactory living and working conditions as pre-condition for return of teams to Northern sites should PAVN request it. He said Indel would be prepared to send team officers back under exactly same conditions as existed prior to withdrawal. Would appreciate your comments on this point.

[J.B.] Seaborn

192.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 179
Saigon, February 26, 1965
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel Y-159† CSF.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Hanoi from Saigon.

SPECIAL MESSAGE TO CO-CHAIRMEN REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF TEAMS: 696TH FORMAL MEETING, FEBRUARY 26

Following is text of Indian-Canadian majority report on Northern team withdrawal approved at today's meeting: Text begins: The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam presents its compliments to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina 1954, and has the honour to state that on the 12th of February, 1965 at 1715 hours, the Chief of the PAVN Liaison Mission asked the Chairman of the IC Bureau at Hanoi "to convey to the Commission the request of the PAVN High Command to take steps urgently to withdraw all the fixed teams in the DRVN. This is because of the tension and the gravity of the situation and only taking into consideration the security of the teams".

2. The International Commission immediately on 13/2/65 sent instructions to the Chairman, IC Bureau, Hanoi, to request that "if PAVN Liaison Mission maintain decision" they should "present it in writing", and to point out to the PAVN Liaison Mission the "far-reaching implications".

3. On the 13th of February 1965 a telegram from Col. Ha Van Lau, Chief of the PAVN Liaison Mission, was received which is at Appendix A.† After drawing attention to recent air attacks against the territory of the DRVN, this telegram formally requested the withdrawal of the ICSC fixed teams in North Vietnam on security grounds.

4. The request was considered by the Commission and on 19th February 1965 a telegram was sent (which is at Appendix B†) outlining the far-reaching implications of the request affecting the work of the ICSC under the Geneva Agreement, the fact that all controls by these fixed teams had been stopped, that the Commission was prepared to take reasonable risks, but that if the PAVN felt obliged to maintain their decision, the Commission would have no repeat no alternative but to withdraw its fixed teams with great reluctance. The Polish statement on this letter is at Appendix C.†

5. A reply to Commission's telegram was received on 20/2/65 from the PAVN (which is at Appendix D†) which reiterated their demand. This was further corroborated orally at 1500 hours on February 20, 1965 by a representative of the PAVN Liaison Mission to the Chairman of the ICSC Bureau, Hanoi.

6. The fixed teams were withdrawn from Dong Dang, Haiphong and Vinh on the nights of 20/21 February, after being informed by the local authorities that immediate evacuation must take place for security reasons; and from Lao Kay and Dong Hoi on the following day. Thus, by the 22nd all the five fixed teams of the ICSC had been withdrawn to Hanoi from their locations in the DRVN.

7. [As] the attached exchange of correspondence will indicate, the Commission had no repeat no alternative but to order with great reluctance the withdrawal of its fixed teams from their sites on the DRVN territory. The Commission has informed the PAVN Liaison Mission

that it was willing to take reasonable risks in discharging its duties and has indicated to the mission that it considers the withdrawal to be a temporary measure. The Commission intends to discuss with the PAVN authorities the functioning of mobile teams and the possibility of controls by the teams temporarily withdrawal from team sites [*sic*]. It will keep the question of the status and functions of its teams in North Vietnam under continuing review in the light of subsequent developments.

8. The Commission takes this opportunity to request the Co-Chairmen to use their good offices with the members of the Geneva Conference so as to ensure that the implementation of the Geneva Agreement is not repeat not impeded, that mobile controls and other operations of the ICSC in North Vietnam may continue without interruption, and in particular that appropriate conditions for the return of the fixed teams are rapidly created.

9. The ICSC in Vietnam takes this opportunity to renew to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina the assurances of its highest consideration. Text ends. Comments in subsequent telegram.†

[J.B.] Seaborn

193.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. Y-196
Ottawa, March 12, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Routine).
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

SPECIAL MESSAGE ON NORTHERN TEAMS

Before formulating recommendations to Minister concerning most suitable method of presenting Commission's February 27 report[16] we should be grateful for your comments by return telegram on manner in which we could most profitably proceed with this project. Our reaction to report itself is that text is milder than we had hoped would be possible and that double statement of Polish position without corresponding comments in rebuttal by Indel or Candel or both, further weakens presentational impact in terms of our objectives. We think that in future cases of this sort such tendentious Polish statements ought to be fully rebutted.

2. It has not yet been decided whether Minister will make full tabling statement or whether main substantive comments will be outlined in press release. In either case, we would hope to make following points: (a) Canadian Government regards this report as having been submitted under Article 43 of the Geneva Agreement as illustration of work of Commission being further hindered by North Vietnam. For years, Northern teams have not been allowed

[16] See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Press Release*, no. 19, 5 April 1965. The press release included the ICSC's 27 February report and its appendices.
Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Communiqué*, nº 19, 5 avril 1965. Le communiqué comprenait le rapport de la CISC du 27 février et ses annexes.

to conduct meaningful controls but their presence was symbolic of Geneva Settlement and DRVN acceptance of it. Demand for withdrawal of teams and implementation of this demand in certain instances before Commission's instructions to teams had been received indicates clear departure from procedure envisaged under Article 35. (b) Canadian Government regards reasons adduced by North Vietnam for withdrawal of teams as insufficient. Only two out of five fixed teams located in area of recent air strikes. Moreover, in all cases because North Vietnamese authorities had been anxious to ensure that teams would be as ineffective as possible, team headquarters had been located in such a way as to ensure that teams would be as remote as possible from any potential targets. Finally, Commission had clearly indicated to North Vietnam that its officers were prepared to take reasonable risks in discharging responsibilities. (c) Faced, however, with North Vietnamese insistence on removal of fixed teams, which are Commission's "eyes and ears", Commission had no choice but reluctant compliance. (d) Canadian Government believes that Commission cannot discharge responsibilities assigned to it under Geneva Agreement in North Vietnam in present circumstances. Commission is pressing North Vietnamese authorities for indication of intentions with respect to both full restoration of teams with freedom of movement originally intended, and failing that with respect to possibility of mobile controls based on Hanoi being carried out. North Vietnam has to the present given no satisfaction on these points, although Hanoi sub-office of Commission headquarters remains intact.

3. We should be grateful for your comments and suggestions with particular reference to clarifying present situation. We believe that it might be useful to have formal Commission consideration of these problems on record and unless you have strong objections, we believe you should seek early opportunity to do so. Since present report is relatively easy on DRVN obstruction we wonder whether it might not be useful to begin pressing in Commission for formal follow-up action with respect to mobile controls, and possibly for report to Co-Chairmen with more clear-cut judgment on issues involved.

4. Have there been any recent indications of form South Vietnamese reaction is likely to take?

194.
Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-3/1

No. 1027
London, March 26, 1965
Confidential.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS, Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Hanoi, Warsaw, Moscow from London.

VIETNAM COMMISSION FINANCES

During recent conversation on Vietnam, Murray of Southeast Asia Department Foreign Office mentioned that Brits were under pressure from Indians to do something about financing of Vietnam Commission for operation of which funds apparently were nearly exhausted. Indians had formally asked Brits to approach Russians about having Moscow exert pressure on Chinese to pay up. Murray said Chinese were three years in arrears while Russians were about one year behind. Brits are fully paid up, as are French.

2. Murray said Foreign Office was labouring over how Indian approach might be handled since they saw little future at this stage[17] in tackling Russians about pressing Chinese to pay for support of Vietnam Commission.[18]

195.
Memorandum from Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-3/1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] June 2, 1965

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION IN VIETNAM

The Chairman of the ICSC in Vietnam recently wrote to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo China to draw to their attention the acute financial crisis of the ICSC which has deteriorated to the point that the Commission is unable to meet its daily expenditures.[19] Personnel on the Commission have received only half their normal food allowance for June and the Chairman pointed out that "unless the International Commission immediately receives its dues from the Contributory Powers concerned payment for daily logistic support will not be possible and the Parties will be obliged to discontinue these services resulting in the virtual termination of the Commission."

2. The contributions due from the four Contributory Powers are as follows:

	Due as of Dec. 31/64	First quarter of 1965	Total
U.S.S.R.	£ 27,430	£ 75,000	£ 102,430
Britain	£ 74,226	£ 75,000	£ 149,226
France	£ 111,019	£ 135,000	£ 246,019
China	£ 762,452	£ 75,000	£ 837,452

3. Canada's recoverable accounts with the International Commissions in Vietnam and Laos amounted to slightly over $1.2 million as of December 31, 1964 and there is very little possibility of Canada receiving any payments against this indebtedness unless contributions are received from all Contributory Powers.

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17 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Understatement of the year! [W.E. Bauer]

18 Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Mr. Rogers, This strikes me as potentially a very troublesome problem – and an expensive one for us, since we're normally a large creditor of Commission. If we're in same boat as Indians, there might be some political, as well as financial, advantage in kicking up a big stink publicly. Do you want this examined? I'll pass copy to A. M[atheson?]. [W.E.] B[auer]
Mr. Bauer, Yes, we spoke. L[ouis] R[ogers]
This overtaken by events, i.e., Indian initiative. W.E. B[auer]

19 See/Voir John Maffre, "Viet Control Unit Going Broke," *Washington Post*, 5 June 1965, p. A8.

4. Our Commissioners in Vietnam and Laos have repeatedly warned us that they will have to rely increasingly on Canadian rather than Commission resources if the present financial crisis continues. In a recent telegram from the Commissioner in Cambodia, the Department has been requested to pay costs of approximately $400 a month in order to provide four Canadian members of the administrative staff with suitable accommodation. Normally, these expenses should be borne by the Commission but, because of its acute financial difficulties, it is unable to assume the additional costs. The alternatives, therefore, would appear to be (a) to incur increased expenditures on behalf of Canadian personnel in order to maintain reasonable living and working conditions which the Commission is unable to assume; (b) to reduce our participation to token proportions; or (c) to withdraw completely if the Co-Chairmen are unable to resolve the present financial crisis. At this stage, this memorandum is merely for your information in order that you may be aware of a situation which may have to be dealt with very shortly.[20]

A.E. R[itchie]

196.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-3/1

No. 465
Saigon, June 5, 1965
Confidential. From Delhi.
Reference: Our Tels 450† May 31 and 459† Jun 3.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Hong Kong, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon.

NORTHERN TEAMSITES AND COMMISSION FINANCES

During call June 1 on Col. Ha Van Lau, I enquired whether there was any change since my March visit regarding Northern team sites and possibility of carrying out limited controls from Hanoi.[21] He said situation remained unchanged. It was impossible for Commission to carry out control functions at present, but it must "patiently wait" for better days.

2. Col. Lau said he had heard from Secretary-General that Commission was facing financial difficulties. PAVN was concerned about this and was at moment studying question to see effect of financial shortages on "operations and very existence of Commission". He enquired what Commission was doing about situation. I told him we had brought it to attention of Co-Chairmen but that solution was in hands of four donor countries who were anywhere from six months to several years overdue in payments.

3. I shall inform Secretary-General of this conversation with Col. Lau.

[J.B.] Seaborn

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[20] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
We must not let this build up. What results have we had from our "demands"? P[aul] M[artin]

[21] See/Voir doc. 75.

197.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-3/1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] June 8, 1965

VIETNAM COMMISSION FINANCES

In view of the serious financial crisis confronting the Vietnam Commission at the moment, you might consider it appropriate for the Canadian Government to take some action to register its concern.

2. As you know, the Commission in Saigon, with Canadian support, has already forwarded a unanimous appeal to the Co-Chairmen to take remedial action, and we have also informed Seaborn that we would be prepared to support a further appeal along these same lines if a suitable opportunity presented itself.

3. The question arises as to whether Canada might express its concern by taking unilateral action to reinforce this appeal from the Commission, for example, by presenting identical notes to the Co-Chairmen. On balance, however, we believe that such an approach on Canada's part might not be suitable for the following reasons:

(a) It might be taken to imply a greater eagerness than is the case to stay on in the Commission, and this in turn might not be advantageous at a later stage if developments point to the desirability of withdrawal.

(b) The Indians have assumed full responsibility for the administration of the Commission's finances. The text of the final communiqué issued in Delhi on August 6, 1954, at the conclusion of preliminary talks between India, Canada and Poland on the work of the Commissions, contains the following statement:

"India, as Chairman of the three Commissions, will communicate with the Chairmen of the Geneva Conference in regard to the financial arrangements".[22] This is a prerogative which the Indians have always guarded jealously and as a result we have never been kept well-informed of administrative matters – hence we find ourselves in the midst of the present crisis with little advance warning. From the attached telegram No. 2055† from London, you will note that the British have not been satisfied with the manner in which the Indians have handled the Commission's accounts and have even hinted at irregularities. In view of these circumstances I believe we should avoid too close an association with a problem which may turn out to have unpleasant implications, especially when we have never exercised any control or influence over practices in this sphere.

(c) The Indians might resent any unilateral attempt on our part to usurp their rôle, by virtue of their Chairmanship of the Commissions, as the established channel of communication with the Co-Chairmen.

4. I would therefore recommend that our immediate action, in recognition of this crisis, take the form of an official approach to the Indian Government acknowledging India's special responsibilities in this sphere but offering further cooperation outside of the Commission if the Government of India so wishes; I also believe that our message to the Indians should indicate where responsibility lies for the present crisis (i.e., China's failure to contribute for

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[22] See/Voir Canada, Department of External Affairs, "International Supervisory Commissions for Indochina, Basic Documents, July 20, 1954," Supplementary Paper No. 54/22.

years), suggest possible means of reducing expenditure and give a preliminary and discouraging reaction to the suggestion that the three Commission powers assume responsibility for the general costs of the Commission.

5. I am attaching for your signature if you approve a telegram to our High Commissioner in New Delhi outlining the text of an aide-mémoire for presentation to the Indian Foreign Minister or senior official of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.[23]

6. The text of this aide-mémoire could be tabled subsequently if such action seemed necessary or desirable in the light of developments in this matter.[24]

A.E. [Ritchie] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

198.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-3/1

No. Y-443
Ottawa, June 9, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Saigon, Paris, Warsaw, Moscow.

VIETNAM COMMISSION FINANCES

I should be grateful if you would present an aide-mémoire along the following lines at earliest opportunity to Foreign Minister, or if this would involve undue delay to senior official MFA. Begins: The Canadian Government is seriously concerned by the implications for the future of the International Commission in Vietnam of the financial crisis now confronting the Commission. The Canadian Government is of course aware of the administrative responsibilities assumed by the Government of India in 1954 when the Indochina Commissions were established; without wishing to intrude on arrangements which have worked in the past, the Canadian Government, in view of the present financial circumstances, the outstanding debt owed to Canada by virtue of recoverable expenses, and the prospect of further increases in recoverable expenditures resulting from emergency financing of Canadian personnel in Vietnam because of the immediate lack of funds, is sure that Government of India shares with it the belief that a special and urgent effort should be made to encourage the payment of outstanding contributions by the four powers concerned, especially the People's Republic of China.

2. The Canadian Government would be prepared to cooperate further with the Indian Government in an effort outside the Commission, if the Indian Government so desires.

3. The serious financial crisis in the Commission, and its implications, will be evident to the four contributing powers, especially since some contributions have not been paid for a number of years. Continued failure to meet these obligations can lead only to the conclusion that some contributing powers consider that the Commission's operations should be either suspended altogether or reduced to such proportions as can be financed by the contributions of those powers which have been and are prepared to contribute. It might for example be

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[23] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
(Y-443) [A.E. Ritchie]
Tel[egram] signed and sent out June 9. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

[24] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Agreed. P[aul] M[artin]

possible to effect considerable savings by closing down the Cambodia Commission, the present activities of which in Canada's view do not fall within its mandate under the Cease Fire Agreement for Cambodia and it might also be possible to close down the Vietnam Commission's Southern team sites, in line with the action taken recently in North Vietnam at the insistence of that Government.

4. Although Canada is not yet advocating that such steps be taken, the continuing failure of the financing powers to live up to their obligations may make necessary some such adjustments, or indeed, the cessation of all Commission activities.

5. In view of the reasons for the present crisis, the Canadian Government believes that it would be unreasonable to expect the three Commission powers henceforth or even for an interim period to assume responsibility for the general costs of the Commission on a tripartite basis.

6. The Canadian Government would welcome the views of the Indian Government on this situation, and any information the Indian Government may be able to provide about the steps to be taken to alleviate this crisis. Ends.

[Paul] Martin

199.
Letter from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/4.2

No. 376
Saigon, June 9, 1965
Confidential.

FUTURE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

I am sure you are as discouraged as I am by the results of the 713th meeting of the Commission on June 4 (our telegram #468† of June 5). After giving us repeated assurances that they were going to vote with us to find a violation of the Geneva Agreement in Vung Ro case, the Indians have now backed off once again and have insisted upon further detailed examination of the evidence in a way which leads me to suspect that the Vung Ro case may never be brought to a vote. Furthermore, the Indian reaction to the interrogation of the prisoners who were first brought to our attention last November and their preliminary remarks to us concerning more recent PAVN prisoners interrogated by our team at Qui Nhon suggest that they are not prepared to find any violation of the Geneva Agreement based on prisoner interrogation alone unless it is backed up by substantial documentary evidence.

2. I have now been in Vietnam for just over a year. It has been a busy one. We have held during that time 46 formal meetings and 44 informal meetings, more than had been held in several previous years of the Commission's existence. I need hardly tell you how hard we have worked, both in Saigon and in Ottawa, to try to make the Commission an effective instrument and to bring our two colleagues to useful and meaningful decisions related to central problem of this area. The results can scarcely be said to justify the effort expended. We have in all that time found only two violations by the PAVN, one on the old problem of the PAVN gun-boats (687th meeting) and one concerning a single infiltrator across the Ben Hai River (705th meeting). Even on such a well-documented case as that of Vung Ro we have not, almost four months after the event, been able to bring the matter to a vote. If the Indian Delegation persists in setting the unreasonable standards of proof which it seems to

be setting whenever cases against the PAVN are concerned, it is unlikely that the remaining months of my tour of duty here will bring a higher proportion of findings of violation by the DRVN.

3. The Indians have been willing to move with considerably greater haste to accommodate the Polish demands for prompt handling of various cases against the SVN. With much less delay, the Commission has been able to find violations against the SVN with respect to a number of air strikes, one case of shooting in the DZ, the admission of ROK, Australian and American troops and the introduction of certain war material into the South. It may be argued that many of these are more open-and-shut cases than the complaints against the North, in that they are public knowledge openly admitted by the South. But the fact remains that the Commission seems able without difficulty to find a significant total of violations against the Southern party without, apparently, being willing or able to come to grips with the admittedly more difficult but none the less important cases against the Northern party.[25]

4. If the Commission's operations in North Vietnam were already ineffective enough when I arrived at this post, they are even more so now that DRVN has insisted upon the closure of all northern team sites and gives no indication of allowing them to open again. The southern teams have become more active in the last few months as the SVN has begun to appreciate the usefulness of having the teams undertake emergency investigations involving cases of infiltration of arms and war material by the North into South Vietnam. Yet, having seen the fate within the Commission of even its best-documented cases such as Vung Ro, the SVN is beginning to question seriously whether the Commission serves any useful function at all. Col. An, for instance, is now coming increasingly to the view that India's imperative requirement for good relations with and tangible assistance from the USSR will keep it from taking any action not acceptable to the USSR; and that, for reasons related to the Sino-Soviet dispute, any condemnation of the DRVN by the ICSC is not acceptable to Moscow. I consider that there is a good deal of truth in this reasoning. I would therefore be hard put to it to make any convincing case for the Commission's usefulness on the basis of the record since I arrived, nor to hold out any great hope for its greater usefulness in the future.

5. When the Liaison Team visited Indochina in November of 1964, we discussed a programme of work, subsequently set out in the Report of the Liaison Team, whereby this Delegation would try to establish by about mid-1965 whether or not it was possible, given the attitude of our Indian colleague in particular, to turn this body into a more effective one than it has been in the past. Despite all our energies and best efforts – both in Saigon and in Ottawa – and indeed in Delhi as well, it seems to me that there is little chance of achieving our goal since it requires that we carry the Indians with us. The recent exchange of correspondence between the Minister and Swaran Singh is, I think, significant in this regard.[26] We have by now, I believe a reasonably well documented case on the record to show that the Canadian Delegation has tried to push the Commission to the acceptance of its responsibilities and that by one means or another the other two delegations have blocked and frustrated our efforts at every turn. In my despatch #332 of September 1, 1964, a few months after my arrival I proposed a drastic reappraisal of our participation in this Indochina Commission and even recommended our total withdrawal from it, if need be unilaterally. Certain objections were raised to the proposal at the time, one of them being that unilateral action on our part might precipitate an unwanted Geneva Conference. It was therefore considered that what we should aim for by approximately September, 1965 was that, if we decided the Commission was unworkable, we should reduce the Canadian Delegation to mere token size.

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[25] See/Voir doc. 85.

[26] See/Voir docs 77, 84.

6. In my opinion it is now established beyond all reasonable doubt that this Commission is very close to unworkable in the sense of being able to do anything useful to document the case of DRVN aggression against the South. Given the intransigent opposition of the DRVN and Communist China to any talks or negotiations at the present time, I do not see that the fear about precipitating a new Geneva Conference need deter us. I therefore submit that the time has now come to reach a decision as to whether we are going to maintain the Canadian Delegation at its present level (thus taking out of more useful employment some 60 military and civilian personnel) or whether we are going to reduce it to token proportions or whether in fact we should not withdraw unilaterally.

7. This letter is meant to renew the dialogue on the future of the Commission which, it was agreed, should be held in abeyance for a number of months following the visit of the Liaison Team. I look forward to having your early contribution to this resumed dialogue.[27]

J. Blair Seaborn

200.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Finance Division
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient à la Direction des finances
RG25, vol. 10247, 1-4-INDO/1

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] June 15, 1965
Reference: Saigon Letter 349† of May 26.

LIAISON TEAM REPORT

I think I have a particular responsibility to comment on paragraph 15 of the above-referenced letter which concerns the idea of drawing up a balance sheet in September and (hopefully) deciding to reduce our participation in the Commissions to a nominal level.

2. Last October and November we had gone through the incidents in the Tonkin Gulf during the summer and it looked as though the North Vietnamese would be careful not to initiate action which would precipitate further U.S. bombing attacks. The institution of regular and continuous bombing since February 7, 1965 has, as the letter suggests, changed the situation. The Minister has spoken publicly both in the House and in the External Affairs Committee of the usefulness of the Commission. He had in mind particularly the ability it gives to us to communicate with the North Vietnamese. You will recall that he was specific in his praise of Mr. Seaborn and in outlining his qualifications for the delicate tasks which have been entrusted to him.[28] In the light of these remarks I think we must, for the present at least, abandon the idea of being able to reduce our Commissioner to an acting Commissioner and also replacing Mr. Seaborn by a junior officer.

3. It might still be possible to contemplate removing the teams from the South. This problem has, of course, already been settled for us in the North. There are signs of discontent and disillusionment on the part of the authorities in the South as a result of the failure of the

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27 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I discussed this with Cadieux July 23rd. We must let nations know privately how we feel. But we would be unwise to take a public unilateral position now. P[aul] M[artin]

28 See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 2, pp. 2038–2039; Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 8–43.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 2, p. 2038-2039 ; Canada, Chambre des communes, Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures, *Procès-verbaux et témoignages*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 1, no 1, p. 8-43.

Commission to act reasonably over the Vung Ro case and this could lead to a Southern request for the removal of the teams but I suspect that when he looks at the matter carefully, Colonel An will decide that his personal interests are best served by persuading his government to retain the teams. He may, of course, be overridden by the more impatient military establishment but we have no way of calculating the outcome of problem.

4. There remains the possibility that we could institute steps to close down the southern teams or to withdraw from them. At the moment I think all the probabilities are against this course of action. I base this judgement on the reaction of the Indians to the withdrawal of teams from the North and on my belief that the Minister would not want to take unilateral action of this sort at this time, especially since we are under fire from people like Squadron Leader Campbell who say that the Commission has always been useless: withdrawal would seem to confirm their contention.[29] The second main contrary argument is that we are also under fire from academic and related circles who contend that we have no evidence for what we say about Vietnam and that if we have any evidence it is all based on U.S. sources and therefore in their eyes not reliable. We are currently engaged in an operation with the Canadian Delegation which involves the use of team officers to make more investigations of arms caches and to examine more defectors and prisoners either within the Commission context or outside it so as to provide a series of purely Canadian reports which can be used to confirm or deny evidence received via American channels.[30]

5. Taking all these factors together I question whether there is likely to be any Canadian initiative to reduce the Canadian Delegation further during the present year. There has, of course, already been a substantial reduction in the number of military officers, the total of whom now stands at twenty-six. The essential phenomenon about Indo-China however, is the rapidity with which situations change and the question of reducing the size of the Canadian Delegation will be kept under constant review.

R.L. Rogers

201.
Letter from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10129, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/1

No. 417
Saigon, June 29, 1965
Confidential.
Reference: Our Letter #376 of June 9, 1965.

FUTURE OF THE COMMISSION

Col. An asked to see me last week to give me the substance of his recent talk with Mr. Vaz, the Senior Political Adviser of the Indian Delegation, in which he had expressed disappointment and dissatisfaction with work of Commission. (He spoke with Vaz rather than Rahman because the former's French is fluent.) Straw threatening to break the SVM camel's back is the continuing delay on the Vung Ro case. Col. An claims to have told Vaz in very direct terms that he does not understand why the Commission is demanding such high

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[29] See/Voir Hugh Campbell, "RCAF Officer Charges: 'Canada's to Blame for Much of the Unholy Mess in Viet Nam,'" *Vancouver Sun*, 18 July 1964, p. 6.

[30] See/Voir docs 82, 83.

standards of proof in this and other SVN complaints against the North while it is able on the quite flimsy testimony of witnesses to find quick violations against the South for alleged violations in the DZ. He said he could produce more prisoners for interrogation and documents for examination by Commission arising out of the recent battles in Quang Ngai and in Dong Xoai; but he did not intend to do so since the Commission seemed unable to reach decisions even when presented with PAVN prisoners for interrogation or when provided with elaborate documentation proving North Vietnamese complicity in the war in the South.

2. Col. An told me, though he has not said this to the Indians, that if the Commission now wrote to SVM asking either to interrogate the frogmen involved in the Vung Ro case or to have access to the original documents in order to put them to a salinity test, he intended to reply in no uncertain terms rejecting the request and stating bluntly that we seemed to be applying double standards in the examination of cases and the evidentiary requirement depending upon whether the cases were against the North or against the South. Furthermore, he intended to publish the reply so that it would become widely known what was going on within the Commission.

3. Col. An wanted me to know that, if it came to this point, I should appreciate that his criticism would not in any way be directed at the Canadian Delegation which he realized had worked long and hard to try to get rapid and sensible Commission decisions. But he said he did not think he could keep silent much longer. All the Commission was doing these days was to find a series of violations on obvious but undeniable breaches of the cease fire agreement by SVN in connection with the entry of the growing number of American and other friendly troops and their equipment. The Teams in South Vietnam were perforce assisting in this task as they could scarcely help seeing the buildup. He had hoped that the use made of our teams in the earlier months of this year to carry out emergency investigations of the infiltration of arms and men from the North would serve a useful purpose from the point of view of the Republic of Vietnam. Since the Commission seemed unable, however, to process the results of its investigations sensibly, he did not intend to ask the teams to carry out any more such investigations at present.

4. I told Col. An that I could fully share his exasperation with the Commission and his sense of frustration. I could scarcely in honesty urge him not to send the letter which he is threatening to send and which will expose our inactivity. I asked him, however, to keep me closely informed so that the Canadian Delegation could work with him on the preparation of such a letter to the end that it be turned to best advantage within the Commission itself. He assured me that he would do so.

5. From Col. An's latest remarks, it seems to me it would take very little to persuade him to request the Commission to withdraw its teams in South Vietnam, perhaps on the ostensible grounds that there seems no hope of our teams returning to their sites in North Vietnam and that the South cannot allow the imbalance to continue. He might even ask that the Commission reduce its operations to token proportions. Please advise by telegram whether you would wish me to encourage Col. An in this direction and also whether, as opportunity arises, I might give similar encouragement to the Foreign Minister and other Government leaders.

6. In an initial call on Col. An on June 25, Mr. Roberts asked him what he thought of the work of the Commission and what good he thought it was doing in and for South Vietnam. The answer without hesitation was that he was fed up with the Commission and that it was not only not doing South Vietnam any good, but in fact it was working positively against South Vietnamese interests.

7. To the long-standing non-cooperation by the PAVN Liaison Mission with the Commission, there is now being added, for reasons which I can fully appreciate, the threat of almost total non-cooperation by the South Vietnamese Liaison Mission. I have been convinced almost since arriving at this post that the amount of manpower, energy and money expended upon the Vietnam Commission is totally out of proportion to its present usefulness now and indeed

to its probable usefulness in the foreseeable future under any circumstances which can now be envisaged. I therefore think we would be well advised to take advantage of the current dire financial straits of the Commission and of the disenchantment of our friends the South Vietnamese with its operations to make a bold move to have the Commission cut down to token size or better still eliminated altogether.

Blair Seaborn

P.S. Please excuse the rather staccato style, which comes from converting a draft telegram into a final letter.

202.
Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-3/1

No. 2811
London, July 16, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, CANFORCEHED, Geneva (Immediate); Delhi (Immediate) from Ottawa; Saigon (Immediate) from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Hong Kong, Warsaw from London.

VIETNAM COMMISSION FINANCES AND OPERATIONS[31]

Brown of Southeast Asia Department Foreign Office told us that latest set of accounts received from Indians was under cover of an aide-mémoire which stated that accounts from Canada for period 1/10/64 to 31/3/65 in respect of Vietnam Commission and for period 1/7/64 to 31/3/65 in respect of Cambodian Commission were not repeat not incorporated since they have not repeat not been received. It stated also that accounts from Government of India for March 64/65 had not repeat not been incorporated either for similar reasons. Next paragraph of aide-mémoire went on to say that as result of accounts submitted USSR, UK and China owed pounds 75,000 and France pounds 135,000 (including common pool expenses) for period ending June 30. Brown remarked that this aide-mémoire was an example of mess which Indian accounting of Commission is. These accounts contain figures which British consider to be largely inflated and do not repeat not even take into consideration latest payment made by British. Indian claim for such nicely round figures after they had stated their accounts were incomplete was typical. We told Brown we doubted correctness of Indian assertion concerning our failure to submit accounts but that in any case we would ascertain situation and inform Foreign Office as soon as possible. Brown cautioned us that aide-mémoire had been addressed to British only and that we were not repeat not therefore expected to be aware of its contents. He added Foreign Office would not repeat not want this aide-mémoire to be circulated to Geneva powers.

2. As regards present financial situation of Commission, Brown said that pounds 641,000 have now been paid in addition to British payment of 102,000 and France has paid approximately pounds 390,000. He had no repeat no idea as to how long these sums would keep Commission going. He commented that France's record of payment was particularly

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[31] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Copy has been referred to Finance Div[ision] to query separation of acc[oun]ts into V[iet]N[am] [and] Cambodia components. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

good considering its views on Vietnam problem and considering also fact that it has been paying for common pool (local) expenses, i.e., expenses which should in fact be defrayed by South Vietnam. French, however, have been grumbling for a long time about their payments of common pool (local) expenses and it seems probable in view of break of diplomatic relations with South Vietnam[32] (which occurred shortly after their last payment) that they will no repeat no longer do so in future.

3. Brown told us that not repeat not much progress has been made towards setting up of a working group to deal with problem of Commission finances. After much deliberation Indian MEA informed British they agreed it would be useful if a working group could be set up in Delhi but they made following suggestion: (a) representation should be at Ambassador or Minister level not repeat not First Secretary or Counsellor as British had inferred. (b) Terms of reference [for] working group should be spelled out more clearly. (c) Canadians and Poles should participate in discussions.

4. British reaction to all three Indian suggestions was unfavourable. They felt that ambassadors would not repeat not be sufficiently aware of technical intricacies of Commission finances to be able to hold useful talks. There was no repeat no point in attempting to define too precisely terms of reference since this would only generate controversy which would delay setting up of working group. While British had of course no repeat no objection in principle to us and Poles participating they felt that proposal we should participate from beginning was modelled too closely on Polish proposals of last year [and] would trigger suspicions on part of USSR that talks would be used also for a political purpose and thus invite a flat refusal on their part. For this reason it would be better if proposal concerned only USSR, British and India. Canada and Poland could be invited to later join discussions on specific questions as they arose.

5. British reaction was also conditioned by suspicion that Indian suggestions were merely a device on their part to keep stalling until next financial crisis of Commission when they can again press to get contributions quickly. Indians told British that an informal sounding they had made in Moscow indicated USSR reaction to idea of working group was "not repeat not very discouraging". Soundings which British made on their own revealed that Soviet attitude was "very discouraging". British thought that Indians must have in fact assessed Soviet mood as they have and were making their suggestions merely to generate discussions and make it easier for Soviets to turn whole proposal down. Brown remarked capital concern of Indian foreign policy was to avoid doing anything which might displease Soviets.

6. Brown said British had informed Indians of preliminary reaction to their suggestions. They felt, however, that Indian attitude does not repeat not augur well for setting up of working group. They had been hoping that Indians would accept to make running in Moscow but their attitude indicated they were not repeat not in mood to do so. As British felt there is not repeat not a chance that such a proposal would be accepted by Soviet if it came from them, they were already giving thought to possible next step. Brown said Southeast Asia Department was toying with idea of proposing to Soviets a message to Commission urging reduction in expenses and if necessary to curtail some of its activities in order to achieve this result. Brown wanted to know how much message would fit in with our present ideas on Commission operations. He had heard that we were currently in mood of disenchantment with Commission. He emphasized that British considered it important in present situation for Commission to remain in being but he wondered whether it would not repeat not be sufficient for Commission to have an office in Hanoi, another in Saigon, with a courier link in between. It thus emerged that what he had in mind was elimination of all team sites in South Vietnam and withdrawal of as much staff as possible.

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[32] See/Voir Jack Langguth, "South Vietnam Ends Ties With Paris, Charging Aid to Enemies," *New York Times*, 25 June 1965, p. 1.

7. While Brown made clear that these ideas were still very tentative, we should be grateful for views which we could pass to Foreign Office on this matter in case, as seems likely, proposal for setting up working group does not repeat not get off ground. Present financial situation of Commission added to its longstanding ineffectiveness may be a good opportunity for us to enlist support of our allies as well as all concerned for reductions we may be contemplating. As preliminary comment we pointed out to Brown that even if Commission's expenditures were reduced this would not repeat not solve problem of Chinese default for quarter of cost. Brown replied that reductions would make it easier both for Commission to manage its debts and for money to be obtained from other three contributors. We remarked also that if working group envisaged by British were set up and question of reduction of Commission activities ever came up this was matter in which we had direct interest and concerning which we would naturally want to have a say.

203.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] July 16, 1965

FUTURE WORK OF THE VIETNAM COMMISSION

I am attaching for your information copies of two recent letters – Nos. 376 of June 9 and 417 of June 29 – from our Commissioner in Saigon in which he recommends that we undertake a re-examination of our position in the Commission in the light of the frustrations we have encountered over the past eight months or so in attempting to have the Commission function in an acceptably objective manner.

2. This suggestion from Seaborn parallels our own thinking and in fact flows from the main policy lines laid down last autumn when it was decided that rather than withdrawing from the Commission at that time (as Seaborn had suggested), a determined effort should be exerted for a reasonable time to see whether the Commissions could be made to function in a manner as close as possible to the one intended, and to the extent that this objective proved impossible of achievement, to establish a record of responsibility for that failure. We are in the process of preparing an analysis of our experience under this policy[33] and I hope to be able to have this available for presentation to you in the near future.

3. In the meantime, you will note from Seaborn's letter No. 417 that the growing disenchantment of the South Vietnamese authorities has led them to question seriously the usefulness of the Commission from their point of view. Seaborn believes that it would not take very much effort to persuade Col. An to request the Commission at least to withdraw its teams from South Vietnam to match the situation which has prevailed in the North since February; and he has asked whether we would wish him to encourage such an approach on the part of the South Vietnamese.

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[33] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Good. P[aul] M[artin]

4. Clearly, it would be inappropriate (and possibly embarrassing) for us to appear to be actively promoting such a reduction. But while we would thus not wish to encourage the South Vietnamese to take action, neither should we discourage them from taking such a decision on their own responsibility; if such a decision were taken and carried out, it would probably work to our advantage in the final analysis because it would help to justify any withdrawal or reduction we may decide to make. I am therefore attaching for your signature, if you agree, a telegram[34] to Seaborn informing him that we would not wish to appear to be either encouraging or discouraging this line of thought with the South Vietnamese; if however, Col. An raises the matter with him, we have indicated the nature of the response Seaborn might make.[35]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

204.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

Secret.
[Ottawa,] July 16, 1965

FUTURE OF THE VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA COMMISSIONS

You will recall that in our memorandum of July 14† (subsequently sent back to us to be prepared as a memorandum for the Minister's consideration) we mentioned that we were in the course of preparing an analysis of our position in the Vietnam Commission, and of the prospects for anything useful emerging from that organization as a result of our efforts to make it function in a satisfactory manner.

2. We have concluded that if the Vietnam Commission (and indeed the Cambodia Commission) continue to function as they have over the past eight months, we have very little to gain by continuing to participate in their work. From both a political and administrative point of view we believe that the net impact of these two bodies on Canadian interests is negative, and that it would therefore be wise to re-examine our commitments to them.

3. I am attaching for your consideration a draft paper† reviewing this situation, and concluding that we should, at the earliest opportunity, suspend participation in these two Commissions, without formally withdrawing from them; in theory, we would continue as a member of the Commissions, but in fact, all Canadian personnel would be withdrawn from Vietnam and Cambodia.

4. I should be grateful to have your reaction to the line of argument, and the conclusions, presented in the attached paper.

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[34] See/Voir doc. 205.

[35] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Agreed. P[aul] M[artin]

5. If you agree with the course of action proposed, I would suggest that the attached paper (incorporating any changes you may wish to make) be prepared in final form and submitted to the Minister under cover of a brief memorandum summarizing our assessment of the prospects for anything useful emerging from either Commission, and setting forth the recommendations for suspending participation for his concurrence, or otherwise.[36]

R.L. Rogers

205.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

No. Y-527
Ottawa, July 19, 1965
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Lets 376 of June 9 and 417 of June 29.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Routine).
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

FUTURE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

As a result of experience in the Commission over the past eight months we had come to much the same conclusion as you, namely, that the time had come to re-examine full implications of continued participation in the light of demonstrated frustration of our attempts to have Commission function in effective and objective fashion. For your own information a review of these problems is now in progress in connection with which we will seek Minister's instructions. You will appreciate that this is complicated project requiring careful consideration at all levels and it may therefore be some time before any final decision can be conveyed to you.

2. In meantime, we have noted (in addition to our own frustrations and yours) the growing sense of exasperation shown by South Vietnamese authorities and in the circumstances their attitude is understandable. Obviously, we could not repeat not appear in position of actively encouraging the South Vietnamese to take action against the Commission. On the other hand, we would certainly understand the reasons for any South Vietnamese Government decision to request suspension (i.e., withdrawal) of Southern team sites. We could not repeat not therefore in conscience object to or actively resist implementation of such a request.

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[36] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Mr. Cadieux, the Minister approved the previous memo sent to him in Windsor and agreed we should now proceed with this study. There are a number of other points not touched on in this paper such as future Canadian representation in Vietnam if we should withdraw from the Commission, and so on. If you agree we might have a talk, together with Messrs. Rogers and Delworth to discuss this draft. R.A.D. F[ord] 19 July 1965.
Yes. M[arcel] C[adieux]
Mr. Ford, A two- or three-page summary of this paper is needed. No Minister should be expected to read 19 pages. (Even such good ones as this.) M[arcel] C[adieux]
This is worth pursuing. Can we process this as a policy paper, e.g., discussion at a prayer meeting, discussion with the Minister [including all assistants?] concerned present. M[arcel] C[adieux]

3. If Col. An raises this question with you, you should let him know that, should the South Vietnamese Government take such a decision, we would hope that he might work closely with you in drafting terms in which notification to the Commission is presented. For our part, we would prefer to see South Vietnamese rest their case essentially on imbalance between situation in the South and the situation now prevailing in the North rather than on desire to see Commission itself reduced to token proportions because of political dissatisfaction. Finally in any such conversation we would like you to emphasize to Col. An our hope that any reduction of team sites which South Vietnamese Government might request, would not repeat not jeopardize possibilities for special investigations and interrogations which we assume could be carried out by fixed team Saigon or indeed by Candel representatives alone.

206.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in United Kingdom
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-3/1

No. Y-533
Ottawa, July 20, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 2811 of July 16.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS.
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM COMMISSION: FINANCES AND OPERATIONS

Accounts submitted in recent Indian aide-mémoire were probably prepared some time ago and would not therefore incorporate most recent Canadian statements of recoverable expenditure. Claims for the period October 1 to December 31, 1964 in respect of Vietnam (and Cambodia) Commissions were forwarded to Saigon June 1 for presentation to comptroller of accounts. Since preparation of these claims here involves coordination between two government departments and careful auditing before presentation, the time lag is often greater than would normally be the case. We do not understand the division Indians have made in Canadian accounts for Vietnam and Cambodia Commissions since our practice has been to group these expenditures together and to present claims as single statement.

2. While suggestion outlined paragraph 6 reflecting tentative thinking in Foreign Office might appear attractive in certain respects, we are not convinced that it would fully meet political requirements of the situation, on which our dissatisfaction with the Commission rests. Reduction of Commission to token proportions would not solve political problems as long as Polish Delegation kept up pressure for continuing series of decisions against SVN and U.S.A., with Indian acquiescence, but with Indians refusing at the same time to give adequate treatment to evidence of Northern involvement. Such a situation could continue even if all delegations were reduced to a few members. Only if Commission remained quiescent would the suggested reduction be acceptable, and to remain quiescent in present circumstances would be difficult to justify for a body whose mandate is to examine and report on breaches of Cease-Fire Agreement. We, for our part, are approaching the point where we believe that some more radical solution may have to be applied.

3. You may wish to bring foregoing thoughts to attention of appropriate members of the Foreign Office as indicative of tentative and preliminary reaction on our part to current problems in the Commission, and to suggestion Foreign Office has advanced to you.

207.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-3/1

No. 583
Saigon, July 20, 1965
Confidential. From Delhi.
Reference: London Tel 2811 Jul 16.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, Geneva, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Hanoi, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION FINANCES AND OPERATIONS

At 136th informal meeting July 15 Commission agreed to proposal of Polish Commissioner that letter be sent to Co-Chairmen from Chairman ICSC Vietnam drawing attention to fact that Chinese People's Republic is in arrears of payment of Commission dues in amount of pounds 912,452 since 1962. (Polish Commissioner said he would also be willing to write to USSR reminding them they were behind in payments; he thought it was unnecessary as he understood they would pay soon; we have in fact recently received pounds 101,000 from USSR.) Letter (copy by bag) asks Co-Chairmen to ascertain intentions of Chinese People's Republic concerning past dues and future payments. Both Indel and Candel were amused that Poldel should have made proposal but we could see no repeat no objection to going along with this particular Polish ploy in Sino-Soviet dispute. Polish Commissioner made it abundantly clear that in his view there was no repeat no hope of getting money out of Chinese but he hoped to get soon record [of] our complaint and with luck their refusal also. He said that if Chinese made it clear that they had no repeat no intention of paying, then we would be obliged to reduce Commission activities.

2. Do-nothing Commission in Vietnam would suit Polish book very well. It would not repeat not suit Canadian book but it should be possible to carry out what we consider to be useful or potentially useful aspects of Commission work, i.e., investigation of Northern subversive activity, even with some reductions.

3. We were interested that Brown of Foreign Office is toying with possible reduction of Commission activities because of financial limitations. For financial reasons or to demand of SVN authorities some curtailment of Commission personnel and activity may become necessary. Even if other teams along the coast of SVN are eliminated we would recommend retaining MT 76 at Gio Linh in order to maintain Commission presence at 17th parallel and to carry out special investigations in DZ. We should also maintain at least two officers for mobile element of fixed team Saigon which would be available to carry out special investigations anywhere in SVN at request of Southern party. Investigations outside zone of action of FT Saigon would require sanction of Commission vote. This would be nuisance but not repeat not insurmountable problem as Indel is likely to vote in favour of special investigation outside zone of action provided Southern complaint indicates clear *prima facie* attraction.

4. Elimination of fixed teams at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Vung Tau would have advantage from our point of view that there would be less opportunity for Commission personnel to record violations of Articles 16 and 17 of Geneva Agreement by SVN as is now done in WTRS [*sic*]. If our Southern team sites were withdrawn, we could also effect some reduction in HQ staff of delegations and presumably of Secretariat.

5. From private conversations it is apparent Rahman is thinking of possible elimination of Southern team sites. Please let me know if I should give his thinking any encouragement.

[J.B.] Seaborn

208.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

No. 584
Saigon, July 21, 1965
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 583 Jul 20 and Your Y-527 Jul 19.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon.

FUTURE WORK OF COMMISSION

Thank you for reference telegram. I am encouraged that re-examination is taking place.

2. I had asked to see Col. An today before receipt of reference telegram to ask him how literally we should take remark by General Thieu speaking to mass rally July 20 to effect that RVN "no repeat no longer recognizes Geneva Agreements".[37] Col. An said remarks were impromptu and he did not repeat not have definitive text but he felt sure statement should not repeat not be taken literally at least in so far as ICSC is concerned. He thinks that what General Thieu meant to say is that Northern party, which is signatory of agreements, had violated them so often that SVN which was not repeat not signatory but only inheritor should not repeat not feel bound by restrictions contained therein.

3. Col. An said he had just received approval from Generals Thieu and Ky for his proposals regarding future of Vietnam Commission. In recent memo to government he had drawn attention to disadvantages of having Commission teams throughout country and also to unsatisfactory working of Commission because of Indel attitude. He had nevertheless recommended that no repeat no action be taken at present to request departure of ICSC nor even closure of Southern team sites lest this should "pour oil on the fire" at a time when one did not repeat not want to take any actions which would render more difficult efforts of those who are seeking a peaceful solution to Vietnam problem, or which would give bad press to RVN abroad. This recommendation constitutes distinct shift in attitude which Col. An has displayed toward Commission in several recent talks with me and one can only speculate on reasons personal or political for change.

4. Bearing in mind paragraphs 2 and 3 your reference telegram, I told Col. An that I could indeed envisage possible unfortunate repercussion if SVN should ask ICSC to leave bag and baggage, but that I thought Commission could perform work which was useful to SVN (special investigations, interrogation of prisoners, etc.) without maintaining anything more than MT 76 and FT Saigon (see my reference telegram). Col. An said he would keep this in mind if question of withdrawal of Southern team sites should become active again. He also agreed to consult closely with Candel in that event and to take our suggestion carefully into account.

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[37] See/Voir "War Slipping, McNamara Tour Finds," *Pittsburgh Press*, 20 July 1965, pp. 1, 7.

5. It appears that for the moment at least we can anticipate no repeat no move from SVN to ask for withdrawal of our Southern team sites. This is not repeat not to say that the question may not repeat not arise again from the SVN side, nor that it may not repeat not arise because of financial stringencies. We may also of course want to take some initiative ourselves after your current re-examination has been completed and submitted to Minister.

[J.B.] Seaborn

209.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

No. Y-539
Ottawa, July 22, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.

FUTURE OF COMMISSION

One of principal difficulties about ceasing participation in work of ICC and therefore withdrawing all personnel from Commission (one possibility now under study) is that we should then be left with no first-hand source of info about what is happening in Vietnam, although this is principal world trouble-spot at this moment. Government might be open to criticism if it followed such course. (We might explain parenthetically here that reduction of participation in Commission while still maintaining our presence in it does not seem to meet our principal preoccupation, which is that Commission is behaving in unbalanced manner; mere reduction of our participation therefore would seem to give us worst of both worlds since we should be unable to prevent Indo-Polish one-sided condemnations of South, yet remain responsible for Commission decisions.)

2. We should be interested in your observations in time for use at meeting of officials Wednesday morning on idea of following Indian lead, i.e., opening Consulates-General in both Saigon and Hanoi. This course would have additional advantage of giving us permanent contacts in Hanoi. Staffing problems would be at least as difficult as those for Candel on civil side. But one major problem is whether such action is possible (i.e., acceptable to two Governments concerned) and whether it would be likely to be useful.

3. Grateful also for your observations on idea of opening embassy in Saigon with nothing in Hanoi. We take it that embassies in both would not be acceptable to either government.

210.
Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures par intérim au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures par intérim
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] July 22, 1965

FAR EASTERN DIVISION'S MEMORANDUM OF JULY 21
REGARDING FUTURE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

As I mentioned to you this morning, after reading Far Eastern's memorandum I do not think we should withdraw, or even threaten to withdraw, from the Vietnamese Commission.

From a broad political point of view, it seems to me that withdrawal, even temporarily, would delight the Poles and other like-minded countries. Moreover, such a retreat by the Canadian element, despite the provocations and frustrations that might be given as justification, would be taken very badly in Canada. It would really look as though we were abdicating if we were to pull back from the area which probably presents the greatest danger at the moment for world (including Canadian) security. I would also be concerned that our withdrawal, regardless of the explanation we might give, might be taken as confirming the allegations made by the other side (especially if it occurred at a time when there was a difference between us and the other participants regarding the tests to which evidence produced by the SVN should be subjected).

The memorandum from Far Eastern Division speaks of the savings in Canadian resources, including FSO personnel, which would result from our withdrawal. Although I can understand the impatience of those directly involved in these frustrating operations, I believe that our participation in the Vietnamese Commission has in fact saved us money and personnel compared with the amounts that we might have been pressed to put up if we had not been taking our part in the Vietnamese situation through our relatively small contribution to the Commission. Put very crudely, our contribution to the Commission probably represents the cheapest possible way of doing at least something in Vietnam and keeping some standing for Canada in discussions with the United States and others about the Vietnamese situation. If we were to terminate or suspend our participation in the Commission, I think there is no doubt that either –

(a) we would lose whatever status we now have in discussions regarding the Vietnamese situation, or

(b) we would keep some standing for ourselves only if we were willing to undertake an active role in Vietnam in some form which would doubtless cost much more than our activities in the Commission.

A.E. R[itchie]

211.
Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

No. 2901
London, July 23, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-533 Jul 20.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, Geneva, CANFORCEHED (Immediate); Delhi (Immediate) from Ottawa; Saigon (Immediate) from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from London.

FUTURE OF COMMISSION

Brown expressed his thanks for info contained in reference telegram. In reply to query as to whether radical solution envisaged by us included withdrawal from Commission, we said that this was one possibility among others. Brown reiterated Foreign Office's views on necessity of Commission presence and expressed hope that when time came Foreign Office would be consulted.

2. Even though Foreign Office is perfectly aware of present Commission's ineffectiveness and sympathises with our frustrations on this score, it is clear that they would consider it a mistake for us to withdraw from Commission. It is more than likely that a Commission composed only of India and Poland would be unacceptable to South Vietnamese authorities and would entail complete withdrawal of the Commission from Vietnam. Such an action might hold some attraction to Foreign Office if it produced the result we considered possible last September, i.e., a new conference on Vietnam. However, in view of the stubborn attitude of the DRVN there seems to be little chance now that this would happen. Communist reaction to unilateral withdrawal on our part might well be that this is just another ploy incited by USA to force them into negotiations.

3. We gathered from a remark by Brown that main argument Foreign Office would see for continued Commission presence at this time would be its availability to verify a ceasefire if and when the Communist side decides to negotiate. It would be much easier to get this done quickly if the Commission is already there than if it has to be convened again. We feel quite certain Foreign Office would resent any moves on our part which would lead to the removal of the international peace machinery in Vietnam however ineffective it may be at present.

4. Quite apart from these considerations it seems to us that there is an intangible advantage which accrues to Canada from its participation in the Commission which bears an analogy to the presence of Canadian brigade in Europe. However small our role can be considered in regard to the whole picture it allows us to make our voice heard with perhaps more authority than otherwise with our allies. Even if latter have not repeat not always consulted us as fully as they could have on this problem, fact remains that our participation in Commission gives us ready access to them to discuss these problems in a manner which may in long run exercise some influence on their approach to them.

5. It seems to us also that such a move would hardly be in tune with Canada's international image as peace-maker. However justified we may in fact be, there is a danger that outright withdrawal would be misunderstood, and it would certainly be in India's as well as Poland's interest to disseminate impression that this is a spurious move taken for purely partisan political reasons.

6. Such considerations persuade us that the answer to our present predicament lies rather in the way of drastic action within the Commission, such as reduction in its numbers and non-cooperation on our part, even though this would not repeat not prevent Poles and Indians from going on as before. The present guerilla war may continue for some time in Vietnam and it is not repeat not to be excluded that prevailing political thought in Indian MEA may change later on or that other circumstances yet unknown may make possible a more effective use of Commission.

212.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

No. 602
Saigon, July 26, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
Reference: Your Tel Y-539.

FUTURE OF COMMISSION

I consider it so unlikely as to be almost impossible that DRVN would agree to opening of Canadian ConGen in Hanoi, least of all if ConGen were to be alternative to Canadian participation in ICSC. (British and I believe Indian ConGens have been in Hanoi since 1954.) Our stock in Hanoi is very low due to 1962 and 1965 Special Reports and our clear alignment with USA over Vietnam problem. I can think of no repeat no good reason why North Vietnamese would want Canadian ConGen and many why they would not repeat not. I can think of no repeat no incentive which would be enticing to DRVN and acceptable to Canada. They would probably be glad to have us out of Hanoi if this could be done without destroying what is left of ICSC structure in North, to retention of which they still however seem to attach considerable importance. Presumably only reason they tolerate British so-called ConGen is because of DRVN presence to which this entitles them in Hong Kong and London. It is doubtful they have strong interest in similar presence in Canada even if we were prepared to accept it.

2. Even if DRVN were prepared to accept Canadian ConGen, practical problems of establishing and maintaining it would be enormous. To take but one example, assuming Canadian pullout led to collapse of Commission structure, Hanoi's only physical link with outside world once ICSC courier plane disappeared would be rail or air through China, i.e., via country we do not repeat not recognize. Problems of accommodation, staffing, food supply, bag service, communications, etc. would be formidable and not repeat not worth listing here in detail.

3. In short if we consider it essential to maintain Canadian presence in DRVN I see no repeat no practical alternative to doing so other than via continued participation in ICSC. Moreover, this is probably better than ConGen presence as it allows automatically (and at no repeat no cost to us) for signals and courier services, and for presence of Permrep, plus visits as deemed useful by any other member of Candel including more senior personnel than would likely be at ConGen.

4. My [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu] practical value of our presence in DRVN given in my letter 333 September 1/64 and in other subsequent correspondence are the greater now that all team sites are gone and we remain only in Hanoi. Perhaps it is deemed worthwhile despite meagre political intelligence info obtained and there is so very little firsthand info available to West and since it is pleasing and marginally useful to USA and ABC intelligence community. But we must weigh this against many disadvantages of continuing presence in Commission.

5. If you are prepared to withdraw from Commission and to do without firsthand reporting from DRVN, I would recommend you simultaneously open embassy in Saigon as most important place in Southeast Asia for additional Canadian Mission. (Embassies in both Saigon and Hanoi would be impossible.) This would indicate support for SVN and USA despite withdrawal from Commission and would permit continued and indeed augmented political reporting. It would make very bad impression to withdraw from Commission and establish no repeat no other presence in RVN. Change in nature of Canadian presence would, however, be bound to lead to pressures to increase economic aid and possibly even to provide military or quasi-military assistance. This should be taken carefully into account.

6. Establishment of Canadian embassy here would pose problems of accommodation for office, official residence and staff in city which is already bursting at seams. It would also be expensive and there would be admin problems, though naturally not repeat not of same nature and order as in Hanoi.

7. One final point. You say that reduction of participation in Commission would not repeat not meet main objection of Commission's current one-sided condemnations of South. This is true provided ICSC remains an active body. But it is conceivable that if Candel took off pressures for frequent meetings and examinations of infiltration cases, Indian Delegation particularly and perhaps Polish Delegation would be happy to sink back into somnolence which characterized Commission from mid-62 to mid-64. Rahman has hinted that best policy would be to drift quietly at least for few months in hopes that general situation might then have developed in way which might give ICSC more useful role to play. He may be thinking of international conference and new mandate for Commission.

8. I am not repeat not recommending that we condone or encourage a do-nothing Commission. I feel now as I have [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu] usual that we ought in all conscience to withdraw from useless body which does no repeat no credit to Canada and little good to our friends (see my despatch 332 September 1/64 and my letter 376 June 4). But if for any reason you want or have to avoid taking unpleasant decision at this time, you might be able to maintain Canadian presence in both Vietnams by means of continued membership in reduced Commission which provides reason for presence but which does nothing either good or bad. Personally, having prodded my colleagues consistently for active Commission, dealing vigorously with infiltration and subversion problems, I would find switch in direction distasteful and embarrassing. I felt obliged, however, to put it to you as one possibility since agonizing reappraisal is in process.

[J.B.] Seaborn

213.
Note from Far Eastern Division to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10123, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-4/4.2

Confidential. Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] July 28, 1965

VIETNAM: FUTURE OF COMMISSION

I attach, for your information, two telegrams and a letter on this subject, on which the Minister has made some marginal notations.[38]

2. I had an opportunity of discussing the future of the Commission with the Minister yesterday. From my discussion, I would take it that the Minister does not favour Canadian withdrawal from the Commission at this time for the following reasons among others:

(a) Unilateral Canadian withdrawal in present circumstances could be held to add a further complicating element to the situation in Vietnam;

(b) Membership in the Commission does give us a *locus standi* in international discussions of the Vietnam problem;

(c) Membership in the Commission also enables us to resist pressure for direct Canadian involvement in the Vietnam situation;

[38] See/Voir docs 199, 211, 212.

(d) The possibility of the Commission being able to play some part in moving toward a solution of the Vietnam problem cannot be altogether excluded, however remote the prospects may appear at the moment.[39]

K[laus] G[oldschlag]

214.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] July 29, 1965

FUTURE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM COMMISSION

I am attaching for your consideration the text of a paper[40] reviewing the prospects for the work of the Vietnam Commission, suggesting possible courses of action open to us in the immediate future and commenting on the advantages and disadvantages of each. In analysing the main possibilities open to us, you will note that we have assumed that both a simple withdrawal from the Commission and a refusal to participate in its work (while retaining the delegation in Vietnam) would not be acceptable policies, and that the practicable alternatives come down to three main choices.

2. You will also note that the attached paper, although intended to form the basis for a memorandum to the Minister, does not make any recommendations. After you have had an opportunity to review these matters, you may wish to have a meeting with interested officials to discuss the nature of the specific recommendation, if any, which you wish to put up to the Minister.[41] Alternatively you may wish to present something along the lines of the attached study, without concrete recommendation, and ask the Minister for his views on the most desirable alternative.

3. It occurs to us that it might be desirable to postpone, for the moment, action on your suggestion that we should let the British and the Americans know that we have become increasingly and seriously dissatisfied with the position in which we find ourselves in the Commission; further ideas might emerge from your consideration of the attached draft, from

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[39] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
I discussed this with the Minister last week: he made the above points but he did not disagree with the suggestion that we should convey our doubts to the UK and to the USA as to continued participation. I propose therefore that we discuss the paper prepared by your Division as previously agreed. M[arcel] C[adieux]
New paper prepared and forwarded to USSEA July 29 with suggestion that we postpone discussions with US and UK until we decide what recommendations (if any) to go up to SSEA. [Author unknown/ Auteur inconnu]

[40] This paper went through various iterations; for the final version, see doc. 219.
Il y a eu plusieurs versions de ce document. Pour consulter la version définitive, voir doc. 219.

[41] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
I suggest this be arranged as soon as possible. R.A.D. F[ord]
Can we discuss at the 10 o'clock meeting on Thursday? M[arcel] C[adieux]

any subsequent discussion of it you may wish and it might be necessary to modify our approaches in London and Washington in the light of such action as may be decided upon to bring these problems to the Minister's attention. Unless, therefore, you specifically authorize us to proceed as intended earlier, we will delay the drafting of instructions to Washington and London.

R.L. Rogers

215.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-3/1

No. 617
Saigon, July 31, 1965
Confidential. Priority from Delhi.
Reference: Our Let 431† Jul 7 and Your Tel Y-542† Jul 2.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris from Ottawa.

COMMISSION FINANCES

At 138th informal meeting July 30 Rahman tabled draft of further letter to Co-Chairmen calling their attention to basically unsatisfactory financial situation in ICSC despite payments made by UK and USSR to end of first quarter 65 and by France to end of second quarter 65. Letter asks Co-Chairmen to bring to attention of contributing powers view of Commission that for its effective functioning and fulfilment of obligations under Geneva Agreements funds at any stage should not repeat not fall below those required for its functioning for at least subsequent six weeks. It contains no repeat no threat of what might happen should this requirement not repeat not be met and is generally couched in moderate language. Text to which I made several changes at meeting follows by separate telegram.†

2. Please advise soonest whether you approve. I would prefer not repeat not to ask for minor drafting changes but to object if at all only on matter of substance.

[J.B.] Seaborn

216.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

No. 619
Saigon, July 31, 1965
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-541† Jul 23.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hanoi from Saigon.

FUTURE OF COMMISSION: POSSIBLE ELIMINATION OF SOUTHERN TEAMS

I have raised with Rahman in informal conversation question of possible elimination of Southern teamsites in context of move which might be forced upon us by financial stringencies. He agreed that for practical Commission purposes we needed nothing more than MT 76 and mobile element of FT Saigon. He suggested that should such reorganization become necessary we could say that mobile elements of FTs at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Vung Tau were now based in Saigon on grounds of poor security or financial stringency and that this would allow us to carry out controls by Saigon-based teams. He agreed that elimination of Southern teamsites could also lead to substantial reduction in size of Secretariat and three delegations. In fact, he had asked Indel to make study of reduction in personnel which could be effected. All this sounded rather encouraging until I tried to nudge Rahman in direction of raising question at informal meeting of Commission when next discussing finances. This, it seems, he is not repeat not prepared to do, at least at present time when current funds available should see us through to end September at least and when he seems hopeful of further contributions from UK and USSR.

2. Looking ahead very generally at future of Commission, Rahman said that, barring financial *force majeure*, we should wait approximate end of year to see whether developments in international situation give any indication of negotiations and therefore possibility of new mandate for ICSC. If such a prospect seemed unlikely, we could start discussion of future of Commission with view to getting it (cut?) down to size of token Commission in Cambodia. If there was general agreement with this idea, he could foresee Vietnam Commission reaching token size about mid-1966.

3. I do not repeat not know whether these very general views of Rahman's are shared by Delhi but, if so, I suspect they are only in embryonic stage. As you can see, Rahman is facing up slowly to fact that there is little which Vietnam Commission can usefully do but he is doing so at pace well short of that desired by impatient Canadians. No repeat no doubt leisurely approach can be explained by hope that something will turn up to make this unpleasant decision unnecessary. You will want to consider whether Indian pact is good enough for our requirements.

[J.B.] Seaborn

217.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] August 4, 1965

FUTURE WORK OF THE VIETNAM COMMISSION:
EVIDENCE OF NORTHERN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I am attaching for your information a copy of letter No. 460† of July 19 from our Commissioner in Saigon, in which he reports on a lengthy conversation with the Chief of the South Vietnamese Liaison Mission charged with relations with the International Commission; the immediate reason for this interview was a reminder by us of our continuing interest in building up an independent body of evidence of North Vietnamese involvement in the war in South Vietnam.

2. You will note that the response, as reported by Seaborn, is not very encouraging; not only are the South Vietnamese authorities so thoroughly disenchanted with the Commission's ineffectual treatment of their side of the story, but they say there are also serious technical problems involving Intelligence security considerations which prevent the South Vietnamese from presenting a full and detailed range of evidence to the Commission for examination.

3. As a result of earlier efforts by the Delegation in Saigon, we have accumulated a limited amount of evidence based on independent Canadian observations and conclusions. I thought, however, that you would be interested in the attached report which indicates that it is going to be difficult to augment presently available materials to any significant extent. In more general terms, Seaborn's report will be of interest for the light it throws on the likelihood of the Vietnam Commission producing useful, substantive conclusions for the immediate future.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

218.
Letter from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Lettre du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
Trinity College Archives, F2368, J. Blair Seaborn fonds, 1-2

Secret and Personal. Canadian Eyes Only. Addressee Only.
[Ottawa,] August 10, 1965

Dear Blair [Seaborn],

By the time this reaches you, you may have received a more formal indication of the results of the extensive review of the implications for the future of continued Canadian participation in the work of the Vietnam Commission. We began this project towards the end of June; six weeks, several drafts and thousands of words later we have come up with – precisely nothing new.

The attached papers† speak for themselves. There is a great deal more that has not been put on paper, but no matter, it all comes down to the same in the end: more of the same for you and more of the same for us.

I am sure you are as uncertain as we are about how it will all end, but perhaps when the awful day comes, some of us at least can take comfort at having effectively discharged the role of Bagehot's constitutional monarch – to advise, to be consulted and to warn.

I had hoped that my parting act – I leave Far Eastern Division at the end of this week – might have been a grander (and sounder) gesture, but I'm afraid that "over and out" sums up the reaction pretty well. No one can say we didn't try.

With all good wishes for the immediate – as well as for the more distant – future.

Sincerely yours,
Louis [Rogers]

P.S. All of this is more or less in a bootleg category, so I would ask you to destroy it when you have read it.

219.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] August 25, 1965

FUTURE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM COMMISSION

You will recall that in my memorandum of July 16 on this subject I mentioned that as a result of recommendations by Seaborn which paralleled our own thinking here, we were preparing an analysis of our recent experience in the Vietnam Commission with a view to determining whether it might be possible to make some readjustments in our commitments and/or our policy approach to the Commission. This review has now been completed and I am attaching a copy of the detailed analysis of the main difficulties facing us and the possible courses of action open to us, together with the advantages and disadvantages of each.

2. This analysis has been carefully studied by senior members of the Department to determine whether we might formulate recommendations to you which would take into account on the one hand the record of the Commission's disappointing performance in political terms and on the other, our desire to maintain a non-military presence in Vietnam which gives us a *locus standi* in international discussions of this matter. On the basis of our discussions, however, I have concluded that there is no feasible readjustment in our activity in the Vietnam Commission that we can make at this time which would not create serious disadvantages in terms of broader Canadian policy objectives. In this connection, it is clear that if we do not maintain active participation in the work of the Commission, we would be under considerably greater pressure to make a direct military contribution; we would also have difficulty in justifying, as we can now, our claim that our assessment of the problem in Vietnam derives from our independent observer position there.

3. I have therefore concluded that, all things considered, we can only reaffirm the objectives set last autumn for the work of the Canadian delegation, namely, to attempt to make the Commission function as objectively and as impartially as possible, and to the extent that this proves incapable of achievement, to establish as clear a record as possible of the Canadian point of view and of responsibility for the Commission's ineffective or non-objective functioning.

4. The main difficulty with this course of action however is that Canada alone, as only one member out of three in the Commission, cannot set the Commission's pace, and that unless the Indians are prepared to support us in some measure, we can easily become involved in an operation which runs counter to our broader political interests. Thus over the past year, the Commission has taken decision after decision against the South Vietnamese and the Americans, while it has been disturbingly slow to take comparable action with respect to North Vietnamese interference in South Vietnam. If, despite all our efforts to convince the Indians to support us and to make the Commission function in an impartial manner, the Commission continues as it has the past year, we are in a paradoxical position; on the one hand the government in Ottawa states that Canada supports the purposes and objectives of U.S. policies in Vietnam, while on the other, we are participating in the work of a body in Saigon which is reaching decisions indicating that the South Vietnamese and Americans are repeatedly violating the Geneva Agreement – and this is the more awkward for us because in most instances the facts of the matter are clear and indisputed and in all honesty we must support such decisions by the Commission. Concurrently, we have, as you know, obtained

almost no satisfaction in our attempts to have comparable Commission treatment given to evidence of Northern interference.[42] While there have been some hopeful indications recently that Delhi may be in the process of becoming slightly more flexible in its approach, the future of Indian policy remains very much a matter of uncertainty at the moment, and in this connection it is worth noting that the Indian Foreign Minister has not yet, after two months, responded to your most recent personal appeal to him for increased cooperation.[43] The prospects for success in our operations in the Vietnam Commission for the future are not, therefore, very bright.

5. These potential difficulties must, I believe, be recognized but I assume that you would not judge them to be sufficiently dangerous as to warrant withdrawal from the Commission, or some other radical readjustment of our commitment or policies there since the latter might run the risk of creating even greater difficulties for Canada and jeopardize our claim to participation in international discussions of the Vietnam crisis.

6. If you agree with the considerations outlined above, you may wish to sign the attached telegram of instructions to Seaborn in Saigon[44] which is based on the analysis prepared earlier, a copy of which is attached, and our interpretation of your assessment of priorities in this situation.

M[arcel] Cadieux

Enclosure: Memorandum
Pièce jointe : Note

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa, n.d.]

FUTURE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM COMMISSION

The Vietnam Commission has not functioned effectively for a number of years, and from time to time this situation has been examined with a view to determining whether anything could be done to improve the Commission's performance. Last September, our Commissioner in Saigon submitted a series of recommendations pointing to Canadian withdrawal. After a careful examination of all the implications of such a course of action, it was decided that withdrawal from the Commission could not be justified; instead the instructions which were subsequently sent to Seaborn envisaged two main policy objectives – first, an attempt to make the Commission function as effectively as possible in a manner as close as possible to the one originally intended and, second, to the extent that this primary objective proved impossible of achievement, to establish a precise and accurate record of responsibility for failure. At about the same time, a special liaison mission comprising officials of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence visited Indochina to see whether some revisions in our commitments there might prove possible at a later date. The liaison mission concluded that while no immediate change was possible, a further review of the situation would be desirable after a period of some months in the light of the record of success or failure of the major policy objectives referred to above. It now appears desirable that this anticipated review of Canadian participation in the Vietnam Commission should be undertaken.

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[42] See Chapter 1./Voir Chapitre 1.

[43] See/Voir doc. 86.

[44] See next document./Voir le document suivant.

2. Before reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of various alternative courses of action, it is necessary to mention three general factors which are relevant to any comprehensive review of Canadian participation in the Vietnam Commission.

3. The first and perhaps most significant element of the situation is Indian policy in the Commission and its implications for Canadian policy. The Canadian sense of frustration and dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Vietnam Commission stems essentially from the nature of Indian policy, and it must be admitted that, whether this situation is ideal or not, the troika structure of the Commission assigns to the Indians a role of decisive importance. It is apparent that Indian policy is based on a desire to avoid condemnation of North Vietnamese policies, and this is undoubtedly rooted in India's relations with the Soviet Union. For whatever reason, Indian policy in the Vietnam Commission has manifested itself in such a way as to prevent the Commission from making any significant substantive judgments against the North since the Special Report of June, 1962 which, viewed in perspective, now emerges as an aberration from normal Indian behaviour. The Indians have been prepared to see the Commission repeatedly reach decisions against South Vietnam and the U.S.A. for violations of the Geneva Agreement but they have procrastinated and been obstructive on matters which would lead to a comparable series of citations against North Vietnam. Moreover, they have demanded a higher standard of evidence in connection with the latter type of problem than when the question at issue reflected unfavourably on the South.

4. In short, because of Indian policy, concerted efforts by Canada to make the Commission function impartially and effectively have been frustrated and it has been impossible to impart the sense of balance (i.e., judgments against the North as well as judgments against the South) which it has been the primary Canadian objective to promote. It will be recalled that protracted difficulties were encountered with the Indians in New Delhi and in Saigon over the fate of the Legal Committee's draft report which, if it had been properly dealt with by the Commission, would have brought to light some significant information about the extent of North Vietnamese interference in the affairs of the South; the Indians were however not prepared to see this report handled in the normal way and as a result, Canada was forced to take unilateral action by including quotations from it in the Minority Statement of February 13. Furthermore, since last autumn the Commission has reached the grand total of three decisions (only two of which are based on evidence of interference in South Vietnam) against North Vietnam as a result of the strenuous efforts which the Canadian Delegation has been making, which contrasts sharply with the series of about a dozen substantive citations in the same period against South Vietnam (and, by implication, the U.S.A. or some other country rendering military assistance such as Australia). The net result of this situation, from the Canadian point of view, is that we find ourselves voting for citations of South Vietnam (and the U.S.A. or Australia) where the facts are open, admitted and not in dispute, and at the same time we find that our efforts to balance these decisions off against citations of the North for their violations of the Geneva Agreement are blocked or dissipated in procedural niceties by Indian unwillingness to take this essential other half of the picture adequately into account. There have also been some decisions by Indo-Polish majority where the evidence is very questionable.

5. Despite repeated Canadian appeals (the Minister has sent two special messages to his Indian counterpart in this connection) the Indians have shown no inclination in the past to take the Canadian point of view seriously and there is little evidence to suggest that in future they will be more amenable to appeals for greater cooperation in restoring a sense of balance to the Commission's operations. In short, in assessing Canadian success and/or failure in the Commission, and the prospects for future Canadian participation yielding useful results, it is essential to recognize the importance of Indian policy objectives (which appear to be quite different from Canadian objectives) and the extent to which these objectives may allow the achievement of some measure of satisfaction for Canadian policy goals. Experience over the past year indicates that regardless of the effort the Canadian Delegation puts into the

Commission, it is never (short of total change of direction on India's part) going to produce the tangible results Canada considers necessary or desirable. It seems clear that whatever Canada does in the Commission, the best that can be hoped for is a holding operation, and in all probability the maximum Canadian achievement will be the occasional softening of negative results.

6. The second general consideration concerns the extent to which the Commission serves, or appears to serve, the purposes for which it was established. The essential question which must be asked here is whether the credibility of international peacekeeping operations – and the Commission may be considered a special type of peacekeeping operation – is enhanced by maintaining such a body in existence while its mandate is being ignored or disregarded by others and hostilities are going on at an increasing tempo all around it. Although the Commission is not invested with executive authority to attempt to restrain such hostilities, this is not generally understood; this ends up with the paradoxical picture of a peacekeeping organization in the midst of what amounts to a full-scale war. The Commission's real mandate, of course, is to establish and to report systematically and accurately on violations of the Agreement which it is supposed to be supervising, but as discussed above it has not discharged this obligation adequately. It is legitimate, therefore, to ask whether the credibility and usefulness of international presences of this sort are enhanced by an indefinite life span which goes beyond the manifest willingness of the parties involved to observe the terms to which they agreed earlier. In more theoretical terms, the question relates to the conditions and techniques for terminating a commitment such as this when it becomes evident that

(a) the parties do not consider themselves bound by the terms which the peacekeeping organization is intended to supervise; and

(b) the presence itself has demonstrated its inability to take concerted action in establishing and reporting violations in a manner which would adequately reflect the full range of responsibility for the creation of tensions and danger.

7. Thirdly, Canadian public opinion is significant in this context, and here there would appear to be two main streams of thought. The first stream tends to be critical of Canadian policy in the Commission and such words as "charade" and "failure" are frequently used in the press and letters from the public. In other words, the apparent failure of the Commission to guarantee peace in Vietnam leads some to question the efficacy of Canada's role in the Commission, and since the Commission has failed to ensure peace, they ask why Canada continues to participate in a body which is so obviously "useless". On the other hand, there would appear to be a second school of thought which attaches considerable importance to the role which Canada can play and has played in international peacekeeping operations. Rather than criticising the Canadian Government for the shortcomings of the Commission, these elements of public opinion urge a special role for Canada simply by virtue of our membership in the Commission. Thus any attempt to divest ourselves of Commission responsibilities – whatever these may be in reality – might be widely interpreted amongst the Canadian public as a surrender of special responsibilities for maintaining peace.

8. These general considerations form a background against which should be seen the various alternative courses of action which appear to be practical possibilities for Canada in the Vietnam Commission for the immediate future; each of these alternatives of course involves both advantages and disadvantages.

9. There are two possible courses of action which, it is assumed, can be ruled out from the beginning. The first of these is formal withdrawal from the Commission, thereby breaking up that organization. Although such a policy would undoubtedly have great advantages, it has the major drawbacks of implying a renunciation of any claim to exert influence over the situation (and especially to participate in any future Conference on Vietnam), and it would render Canada much more susceptible to pressure to make a military contribution in support of U.S. policy. The second unacceptable alternative would be, while still remaining in Vietnam, to refuse to participate in the work of the Commission. This would constitute a

direct and abrupt reversal of Canadian policy over the years in Indochina; it is a tactic which the Poles have used repeatedly in the Laos Commission, when the going gets too difficult for them, and for which they have been censured by the Commission by Indian-Canadian majority. Equally significant is the likelihood that, in addition to opening up possibilities for formal public criticism by the Indians and the Poles on the grounds that Canada was avoiding its responsibilities, the Poles would use the Canadian Delegation's absence from Commission meetings to force through an even greater number of anti-Western decisions than would be possible if the Canadian Delegation were present. It other words, continuing membership without participation would yield the worst of both worlds; Canada would be charged with irresponsibility and at the same time we would have lost whatever limited ability now enjoyed by virtue of full participation to influence Commission decisions. Since these two courses of action have overwhelming disadvantages, there would appear to be only three main policy choices, as follows:

10. *Course A*. The simplest and most obvious policy would be *to continue as at present*. This has the advantage of maintaining an independent Canadian presence on the ground in Vietnam, including a channel to Hanoi, although it must be frankly recognized that any real usefulness which this channel may have had has probably been exhausted at least during the remaining months of Mr. Seaborn's tour of duty.[45] Moreover a continuing presence and indeed deliberate effort to make the Commission function adequately would serve as a demonstration both real and apparent of Canadian willingness to continue discharging our obligations under the 1954 Agreement to the best of our ability and to the limits imposed by prevailing circumstances. Canada could thus not be accused of "losing interest" in a critical situation or of doing anything to disturb what remains of the Geneva machinery.

11. The disadvantages of this course of action are however as numerous as the advantages. As discussed in the introductory paragraphs of this analysis, it is unlikely that the Indians will agree to co-operate fully in the Commissions in the absence of some unpredictable aberration like that of 1961 and 1962; the Canadian Delegation's continuing tasks will thus be time-consuming and unproductive in the extreme, and in all likelihood embarrassing since Commission decisions in future are likely to be predominantly of an anti-South Vietnamese and anti-U.S.A. nature. With the Commission reaching this sort of decision in Vietnam it will become progressively more difficult for the Government in Ottawa to indicate support for the purposes and objectives of American policy. In short, while it may be possible occasionally to modify the nature of Commission judgments, Canada will be privy to a general approach which is consistent neither with Canadian policy nor what we know independently to be the facts of the matter on the ground in Vietnam. In other words, we will be subjecting Canadian foreign policy objectives to those of India, and to a lesser extent Poland. There are some indications already that the South Vietnamese authorities have become seriously exasperated with the Commission's failure to take cognizance of its complaints of Northern interference in the South and if this attitude continues it will be difficult or impossible for us even to attempt to balance anti-South Vietnam decisions with Commission discussions (if not decisions) of the other side of the story; if the South Vietnamese do not provide the basic raw material, the Canadian Delegation will be unable to develop a convincing position in the Commission. Finally, if we are to carry on as we have for the past year, it is imperative that more staff be assigned to these problems. As a minimum, the Delegation in Saigon will require one more middle-ranking officer in order to maintain the arduous and unrewarding pace of activity, and Far Eastern Division in Ottawa will also require a comparable strengthening. Moreover the choice of a Commissioner will have to be given a high priority in order to select a man of great skill, endurance, and drive in the face of continuous frustration. The limits of human endurance and practical possibility indicate that we cannot continue for another year on the basis of existing personnel resources alone and if we are to

[45] See Chapter 2./Voir Chapitre 2.

continue with unchanged objectives, we are convinced that an even greater effort will be required in the preparation and analysis of cases. Even if we put our present level of effort into this project, with increased staff, there can be little doubt that it will not contribute significantly to a balanced and useful international assessment of the situation in Vietnam; in other words, there can be no guarantee of success and the outlook is for failure in our national objectives.

12. *Course B*. Canada could work towards a *quiescent Commission* either in its present form or in a reduced form. Under such a scheme the Commission would remain intact but inactive or it might be reduced to bare essentials by eliminating team sites and supporting operations; in either case, it would undertake no significant activities. This course of action offers the advantage of maintaining an independent Canadian presence on the ground in Vietnam which would be symbolic of our continuing interest in the Geneva machinery and in peacekeeping operations generally; it would also maintain a Canadian channel to Hanoi. It has however serious disadvantages, the greatest of which is that a dormant Commission would suit Communist interests very well because Western violations of the Agreement are publicized daily in the newspapers while North Vietnamese infractions are seldom treated in the same way. While the Commission's performance in this latter context is far from adequate, at least the record shows that Canada has been making a deliberate effort. To pursue a "do nothing" policy would be difficult to justify publicly now and at any future time when a balance sheet of Canadian participation in this operation might become politically necessary or desirable. In any event, the success of this course of action rests clearly on the agreement, formal or tacit, of the Indians and Poles to put the Commission to sleep, and it would be diplomatically impossible for Canada to appear in the position of approaching the Indians and the Poles with such a proposal at a time when the situation in Vietnam is more serious than it has ever been. In any event, there is the serious danger that even if the Indians and Poles agreed to let Commission activities dwindle off, either of them might decide suddenly to reactivate the Commission, possibly on some such issue as the arrival of a significant number of American troops or some other "dramatic" infraction of the Agreement. Canada would be powerless to prevent such a sudden reactivation, or indeed to block decisions flowing inevitably from it. The end result could be a whole series of anti-South Vietnamese/anti-U.S.A. decisions at the conclusion of a period of quiescence during which the Commission had not even been considering South Vietnamese allegations of Northern interference. Another disadvantage of this course of action is that it would be directly counter to everything Canada has been attempting to do in the Commission over the past year and such a sudden reversal of policy would appear curious and difficult to justify. Finally, if there has been criticism in Canada of the apparent impotence of the Commission while we have been exerting a deliberate effort to make it function properly, it might be expected that this criticism would be even greater if we were to continue to participate in a Commission which was not even going through the motions of activity.

13. *Course C*. The third main alternative would be to *suspend participation in the work of the Commission (while retaining membership*) and announce that Canada was not prepared to take further part in its work until given adequate assurances that our Commission colleagues were prepared to have the Commission function adequately and impartially; we would regard decisions taken without our participation as having no effect. This course of action would involve the departure of all Canadian personnel from Vietnam, but would not amount to a permanent withdrawal from the Commission which we would regard as continuing to exist, if not to function; at the same time we would make clear our willingness to return at any time when we were assured that the Commission would serve the purposes for which it was intended. This policy would offer the advantage of freeing us from obligations which for the immediate future offer nothing but difficulties and embarrassment and unrewarding effort. It would mean that Canadian policy would not be subject to the internal contradictions which are likely to arise from Commission operations in the future. It would also be an honest recognition of the difficulties we have encountered in attempting to

make this peacekeeping operation function properly and in so doing it would clear the record of a great deal of obscurity and suspicion to which Canadian policy, in supporting American objectives, has been subjected. Finally, it would relieve the strain on personnel resources by making unnecessary any increased deployment of officers and by freeing the four officers now in Vietnam.

14. There are however some disadvantages which must be recognized. The first of these is that unless we were prepared to establish an embassy in Saigon, we would be without first-hand, independent Canadian sources of information about and assessments of the situation in Vietnam; it would also mean that we would be without a representative on the ground in Hanoi but the net loss of this would not be too great since his contacts are such as to make his reporting of marginal interest and as mentioned above, the practical usefulness of the "Hanoi channel" may be regarded as having been exhausted (with negative results) at least for the moment. At the same time, since we would not have formally withdrawn from the Commission, we would have a theoretical right to resume contacts with Hanoi at any time so long as the Commission retained an officer there. By the same token, suspension of participation, rather than formal withdrawal, would not mean that Canada had foregone all claim to participate, as a Commission member, in any future conference on Vietnam. Another problem raised by suspension of participation would be the nature of the public justification for this action; since so much of this results from dissatisfaction with Indian policy, we would be forced to reveal the full scope and nature of our differences with the Indians and this would undoubtedly have a serious impact on Indian-Canadian relations; at the same time, it would offer the advantage of showing to those elements of public opinion, both Canadian and international, the reasons for the Commission's apparent failure and dispelling at least some of the skepticism which has been shown with regard to Canadian policy in the past.

220.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 11089, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/3

No. Y-621
Ottawa, September 8, 1965
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Let 376 of June 9.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Geneva, Permis New York, CANFORCEHED.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

FUTURE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM COMMISSION

Taking into account the political objectives and time-table recommended by the Special Liaison Team last autumn, your most recent consideration of these problems and our own experience here, we have recently completed a comprehensive review of the work of the Vietnam Commission over the past year, and an assessment of the prospects for success in meeting the objectives outlined in my telegram No. Y-682 of September 28, 1964.

2. The results have not been very gratifying, and I think it must be admitted that despite our efforts, the Commission's record in discharging its obligation to deal adequately and in a balanced manner with evidence of all violations of the Agreement and more particularly,

evidence of violations by the North, is a sorry one. The frustration and disappointment we have experienced is the greater because of the Canadian effort which has gone into this attempt. The work which you and all members of the delegation have done in the most difficult circumstances has been remarkable in both quantity and quality and deserves the highest commendation; if we have been unable to convince our partners in the Commission of the need for balance in the Commission's work, it is clearly not for want of trying or indeed for want of adequate evidence of the basic cause of the present turmoil in Vietnam. Your efforts have, with considerable success, ensured that these factors have been made abundantly clear in the record of Commission deliberations if not in its decisions, and this will have an important, if secondary, usefulness.

3. We had anticipated earlier that, if we could not make the Commission function adequately, we would at least have a convincing record of deliberate efforts to do so on which it would be possible to base a far-reaching decision about future Canadian participation and justify whatever course of action seemed most desirable in the light of this well-documented effort and prevailing circumstances. Although the record which you have established might of itself indicate the desirability of some readjustment of our commitment, it is the broader perspective of prevailing circumstances in Vietnam, of international policy factors now that Vietnam has become perhaps the most pressing single world problem, and public opinion here which have acquired a more compelling significance over the past year.

4. The alternative courses of action which might be open to us could be listed as follows (a) Formal withdrawal, thereby breaking up the Commission; (b) Suspension of participation and withdrawal of all Canadian personnel from Vietnam but without renouncing our claim to Commission membership, on the understanding that we would be prepared to resume participation when adequate assurances had been received that the Commission would function more objectively; (c) Refusal to participate further in the work of the Commission but with the Canadian delegation remaining on in Vietnam; (d) To work towards a quiescent "do-nothing" Commission.

5. All of these alternatives would have advantages judged solely from the point of view of our dissatisfaction with the Commission's failure to render adequate account of the North's basic responsibility for Vietnam's instability. At the same time, they all have serious disadvantages, some of them local (for example course (c) above) but more particularly in terms of wider Canadian objectives and interests in relation to the Vietnam crisis. Without attempting a detailed analysis of the various pros and cons (of which you will be fully aware) of each alternative course of action above, I think you should know that I have concluded that any radical readjustment at this time of our presence, our objectives and our efforts in the Vietnam Commission would only create new and perhaps more awkward problems than those which I recognize are implicit in continuing to participate as at present. The main factors which are relevant to this decision are as follows:

(a) Unilateral Canadian withdrawal, or other major revision of commitment carried out on Canadian initiative, could be held to add a further complicating factor to a tense situation; it might also be misunderstood by public opinion in Canada and by international opinion, as well as opening the way for deliberate misrepresentation by countries such as China and North Vietnam.

(b) Active Canadian membership in the Commission does give us a *locus standi* in international discussions of the Vietnam problem and a potential claim to participate in any forthcoming conference where I believe we would have a positive and perhaps unique contribution to make.

(c) Similarly, continuing our active membership enables us to resist pressure for direct Canadian involvement in the situation in military terms. I would judge that any revision of our policy in this regard (short of a radical change in the nature of the situation) would be unacceptable to Canadian opinion.

(d) However remote the prospects may appear at the moment, there is always the possibility that the Commission may be able to play some part in helping to resolve the crisis.

(e) Finally, our presence in Vietnam gives us a source of information and independent assessment which must be retained, especially because no other conceivable presence would provide simultaneous access to both North and South.

6. For these reasons, I have concluded that the only possible course of action open to us is to continue our activities in the Commission in accordance with the two major objectives set forth in my instructions last September, and as these have been developed by subsequent practice. I realize that this is likely to be an unsatisfying and probably unrewarding task, and that it involves hazards as long as the Indians perform the way they have. But I can see no alternative for us except to continue to press the South Vietnamese for cooperation and the Indians for support, and in this latter connection, there have been some hopeful signs recently that Delhi may be taking a closer look at its policies in Indochina. Regardless of whether the Indians may be thinking in terms of "specific instances" or a more general policy reappraisal, the full and indeed expanded cooperation of the South Vietnamese is obviously vital if we are to achieve at least minimal Canadian objectives (i.e., a convincing record of effort and an accumulation of independent Canadian evidence) even if the Commission as such is not prepared to reach the decisions we believe are justified. I realize that you are doing your best to convince Col. An of this requirement and if you believe that it would be useful to appeal to the Foreign Minister, I would be prepared to consider your recommendation to that effect. Beyond that, I can only assure you that your efforts will be viewed with sympathy and understanding here and that we will do everything possible to facilitate what may be an increasingly difficult and unrewarding assignment.

[Paul] Martin

PART 2/PARTIE 2

ESCALATION AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE (1965–1968)

L'ESCALADE ET LA RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX (1965-1968)

CHAPTER 4/CHAPITRE 4

RESPONDING TO US BOMBING (FEBRUARY 1965–JANUARY 1966)

LA RÉPONSE AUX BOMBARDEMENTS AMÉRICAINS (FÉVRIER 1965-JANVIER 1966)

221.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/4

No. 89
Saigon, February 9, 1965
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi; London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Washington, Permis New York, CDS, DGPO, DM/DND, Hong Kong from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

USA-SVN AIR STRIKES ON NORTH VIETNAM: FIRST COMMENT

Air strikes February 7 and February 8 against military installations in DRVN supporting infiltration of men and equipment into SVN constitute first openly admitted proof of seriousness of USA warnings voiced off and on since late last spring that continued DRVN support for insurgency in South could lead to retaliation on Northern territory. (USA air strikes August 5 are in different category of retaliation for DRVN attacks on USA warships in Gulf of Tonkin.)

2. Although I have not repeat not yet had analysis from Jackson in Hanoi, I suspect North Vietnamese were surprised by fact and scale of air strikes which were publicly linked with Vietcong attacks at Pleiku and Tuy Hoa February 7. There had been no repeat no retaliation for earlier and comparable attack on Bien Hoa Air Base and after end of November consultations in Washington White House seemed to have played down possibility of extension of war to North Vietnam. There had been openly admitted raids along Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and other alleged raids of coastal points and in and near DZ to which neither USA nor SVN admitted. But suddenly on February 7 and February 8 North Vietnamese were submitted to major raids announced and explained jointly by USA and SVN within hours of their taking place, and raids which were carried out almost with impunity.

3. I assume that as USA has said strikes are retaliatory for Pleiku and Tuy Hoa attacks and not repeat not precursor to all-out attack on DRVN. Latter would run greater risk of American-Chinese confrontation than USA would wish to take and would be inconsistent with stated USA aims in SVN. Limited retaliatory raids demonstrate USA determination and ability to dole out punishment which it considers fits the crime of DRVN support for

Vietcong. But once this fact has been demonstrated we may well be almost back where we were before particularly since there is limit to staging bases which can be hit in retaliation. Though suitable DRVN reaction would be aerial attack on Da Nang and Nha Trang air bases, Hanoi does not repeat not to our knowledge have wherewithal to retaliate in kind. Damage to staging installations for infiltration may cause limited disruption, but it is not repeat not going to be determinant of Vietcong ability to pursue war in South, though Vietcong may sit relatively quietly for a short period till excitement dies down. Least of all is Hanoi likely to instruct Vietcong to stop its activities in order to remove possibility of further air strikes against Northern territory.

4. Here in South elation caused by giving North a blow may, as after Gulf of Tonkin, temporarily divert attention from internal political dissension and make people forget war-weariness. Press is already excitedly suggesting this may prove turning point. But effect is realized strikes have no repeat no essential change in war situation in South any more than did August 5 raids. It is possible that Khanh may again try to improve his political position and power as he did with such disastrous results for himself in euphoric period following August 5 air strikes.

5. More interesting speculation, however, relates to next steps to be taken by three major powers most directly concerned: USA, China and USSR. Here I trespass on others' territory.

6. I see no repeat no reason to revise our admittedly pessimistic analyses to date regarding likely political developments in SVN and their unfortunate effects on pursuit of war and position of USA here. I would therefore hope as set forth in my telegram 657† November 12 that, having vividly demonstrated its determination and its might, USA might move swiftly, and before opposite side has time to prepare its full verbal or physical response, to propose ceasefire and negotiated settlement as generous gesture of major power which could mete out far more unpleasant treatment if it so wished. I fear however that, despite rumours of soundings on negotiation such as those President Johnson recently saw fit to dismiss, USA do not repeat not have plans ready to take political initiative in this way. Therefore, insofar as they can control events, we shall revert almost to *status quo ante* recent air strikes to accompaniment of rising torrent of abuse from Communists and perhaps neutrals.

7. China, once it is assured strikes are not repeat not prelude to immediate escalation, will utter usual tirades and remarks about not repeat not standing idly by in case of repetition. This could help to cover up loss of face over its manifest inability to provide significant material assistance to DRVN against USA air power. I cannot repeat not see it undertaking attacks on USA bases in SVN lest this lead to retaliatory strikes against Chinese mainland and full-scale confrontation. It may offer more material aid to DRVN but latter is likely to resist any sizeable influx of Chinese personnel. China will probably welcome opportunity offered to castigate USA aggressive imperialism, confident that this will turn more Asian people away from the West and hasten extension of Communism and Chinese influence.

8. USSR is in awkward position that raids took place while Kosygin was actually in Hanoi attempting presumably to gain North Vietnamese support for Moscow's more cautious line as opposed to belligerent Chinese one and to offer in return an increase in Soviet economic and even military support for DRVN.[1] USSR may feel obliged to strike more strident anti-American note than it would otherwise have wished. But as Moscow clearly does not repeat not want escalation and has limited control over events in the area, it will be careful not repeat not to overcommit itself publicly to defence of DRVN and may well in private counsel caution. One possibility that occurs to me is that Kosygin might put out ringing cry for conference not repeat not just on Laos but on whole of Indochina. Its stated purpose would be not repeat not just to condemn but to hold back rash imperialist warmongers who

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[1] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 89.

are bidding fair to carry us all into World War III, fate which statesmanship of USSR in calling for conference may help to avert. This could strike responsive chord among many Afro-Asians. If there is likelihood that Russians may try this gambit, there is all the more reason for USA to get in there first with its call for negotiations rather than merely reacting to Soviet one.

[J.B.] Seaborn

222.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6271

Secret.
[Ottawa,] February 9, 1965

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Gordon),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Sharp),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. MacEachen),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),
The Solicitor General (Mr. MacNaught),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Teillet),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Miss LaMarsh),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Favreau),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Nicholson),
The Minister of Forestry (Mr. Sauvé),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner), (Mr. Hardy), (Mr. Wall).

[…]

VIETNAM

(Previous reference January 20†)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs reported on current developments in Vietnam. *Mr. Martin* said that recent reports from Mr. Seaborn, the Canadian Secretary of the International Truce Commission, had been to the effect that the United States was now embarked on a hopeless course since the Vietnamese people had no will to fight and there were no prospects for strong civilian leadership. The U.S. government, with Canadian support, had opposed the idea of holding a joint conference regarding Vietnam until such time as a strong civilian government had been formed.[2] The visit last week of McGeorge Bundy, the President's Aide, to Vietnam had resulted from a division of opinion in the State Department as to future policy the U.S. should pursue. The U.S. Secretary of State had earlier

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2 See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 11, pp. 11708–11709.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 2e session, vol. 11, p. 11898-11899.

told him that this would be a crucial year in relations with China and recent statements from the Chinese tended to confirm this. He was worried about the position which the United States faced if it intended to remain indefinitely in Vietnam.

The Cabinet noted the report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the situation in Vietnam.

[…]

223.
Memorandum by Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10827, 20-1-1-17/1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] February 10, 1965

VIET NAM

At noon on February 10 the Minister telephoned the Prime Minister concerning the text which the Prime Minister proposed to use in his speech that day on Viet Nam.[3] The Minister said that the latest telegrams he had seen suggested that it was very necessary for us to be extremely careful in commenting on the idea of a Geneva-type conference. Mr. Martin thought that we should not go any further than to make the point we had made earlier that if the other governments concerned agreed, Canada would be willing to attend such a conference.[4]

Mr. Martin noted that the U.K. authorities had been very careful in their comments on the possibility of a new Geneva conference and referred to the telegrams he had been receiving from the Canadian Communists urging that such a meeting be held as arguments for being extremely careful in our public statements on the conference idea.

Mr. Martin was aware of the latest French statements favouring a conference.

J.G. Hadwen

cc. USSEA, Mr. Smith, Mr. Rogers (Far Eastern)

224.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10827, 20-1-1-17/1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] February 10, 1965

VIETNAM: INDIAN INITIATIVE

On February 8, the Indian Government issued a statement on the Vietnam situation which, after expressing grave concern at the recent turn of events, calls on the interested parties to suspend all provocative actions immediately and to refrain from any measures which would aggravate the situation; if carried out, this would create the necessary atmosphere for

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3 See/Voir Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/3, 10 February 1965.

4 See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 6, pp. 6456–6457.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 2e session, vol. 6, p. 6644-6645.

negotiations in a Geneva-type conference.[5] I am attaching a copy of Delhi telegram No. 109† of February 9 setting forth the text of this statement. I think that this statement, in tone and content, is more balanced than might have been expected from the Indians six months ago, and in this connection I would direct your attention in particular to the phrase "one thing has led to another and there has been interference from many quarters". This together with the balanced references to "developments in South Vietnam and North Vietnam" (i.e., the Viet Cong raids as well as the USA-South Vietnamese air strikes) makes it possible to be associated with at least the basis on which the appeal has been launched.

2. Yesterday the Indian High Commissioner called on Arnold Smith to enlist the Canadian Government's support for the two objectives encompassed by the Indian statement. I am attaching a copy of our telegram No. Y-72† of February 10 summarizing the High Commissioner's presentation and our preliminary response.

3. You will note that the Indians have evidently made a similar démarche in Washington, London, Moscow and Warsaw, and that similar action may have been taken in certain Southeast Asian capitals as well.

4. This Indian démarche comprises two distinct elements – an appeal for restraint on the part of those involved who would presumably declare themselves willing to exercise such restraint, and a renewed call for an international conference. I believe that these two elements must be assessed separately.

5. It seems to me that there might be advantage in associating ourselves more formally with and following up the Indian suggestion for an appeal for restraint, provided that it takes Peking into account (forcing them to respond publicly) and that it also takes the Viet Cong into account but preferably without according them a status independent of Hanoi. The Prime Minister's statement today might provide the basis for diplomatic representations to, say, the governments involved in the 1954 Geneva Conference. This aspect of the problem remains to be worked out in detail, either unilaterally or in conjunction with the Indians.

6. I am not so favourably disposed towards the second aspect of the Indian initiative, namely, endorsing the call for a Geneva-type conference, at least at the moment; until there is some sign that such an initiative would not run directly counter to U.S. policy and equally important, until there is reason to believe that the Chinese desire to negotiate seriously and in good faith, rather than just make propaganda in a larger forum, I do not believe that we should adopt too forward a position in advocating such a conference. I believe that the most we should do would be to indicate, as the Prime Minister has done, that, provided certain conditions related to the cessation of military activity in both North and South Vietnam are or seem likely to be met, we would be prepared to consider the idea of a new conference sympathetically.

7. I believe that our first move, before considering any further action, should be to take immediate soundings of reactions in Washington and London to the approaches I understand have already been made there by the Indians. I am therefore attaching for your signature, if you approve, a telegram† to London and Washington asking for British and American reactions to the feasibility and acceptability of the Indian initiative as a whole, and authorizing our representatives in those capitals to inform the Governments to which they are accredited that the Canadian reaction to the first element in the initiative taken by India is favourable but that we have some reservations about a call for a new Conference at this time. Depending on these reactions it may be possible to judge more accurately whether further consultations would be desirable, or whether we could proceed immediately on our own or in concert with the Indians.

8. Although they have not yet mentioned this idea, the Indians may propose that the Vietnam Commission should become involved in this project. At the moment, I am inclined to steer away from any such suggestion since Commission action would not necessarily carry more weight than unilateral action by member Governments and at the same time might tend

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[5] See/Voir "India," *Washington Post*, 9 February 1965, p. A11.

to tie our hands in continuing to press for action by the Commission on the subversion problem, and ultimately, if need be, in making unilateral use of existing documentation on subversion. To join in Commission endorsement of the Indian emphasis (which is apparent in the text of their statement and which the High Commissioner underlined strongly) on avoiding apportionment of blame might imply to them a willingness which does not exist on our part to close the Commission's books on matters which have been before it for some time but which have never received adequate treatment.

9. I should be grateful for your comments.[6]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

225.
Talking Points for Secretary of State for External Affairs
Points de discussion à l'intention du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/4

Secret.
[Ottawa,] February 11, 1965

TALKING POINTS FOR CABINET: VIETNAM[7]

1. The latest reports suggest that the possibility of greater trouble look larger. If there had been only one exchange, the Viet Cong attack on Pleiku and the USA/SVN riposte against Dong Hoi, there would have been room to hope that, like the Tonkin Gulf incident, this exchange would have convinced the North Vietnamese that they could not challenge the United States directly.

2. There is very secret information to the effect that the Viet Cong command has told sub-units to intensify attacks on Americans and American installations. This instruction was issued on February 8, the day after the U.S. attack on Dong Hoi.

3. We were informed in advance of the U.S. intention to launch another counter-raid in retaliation for the Viet Cong attack on the U.S. barracks at Qui Nhon.

4. This process of attack and counter-attack increases the danger either of enlargement of the war or of growing anti-Americanism in the non-aligned world (and possibly elsewhere).

5. It is questionable whether Communist China would be willing to risk its stock of modern fighter-planes (and they are not of the most modern sort) in an attack on the United States forces; neither does land action or naval action by China seem very likely. Equally the USSR is too far away to be able to use its much more modern aircraft to attack U.S. aircraft or installations;[8] nor is there any sign that they yet feel compelled to go beyond words in supporting North Vietnam. Indeed, reports from Moscow suggest that the Russians may feel they have been framed by the North Vietnamese, which if true, would probably make them reluctant to act. While we think it is most improbable that they would do so, one cannot

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6 Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
I agree. P[aul] M[artin]
Tel[egram] Y-73† signed and sent Feb. 11, 4.30. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

7 Vietnam was briefly discussed at the Cabinet meeting on 12 February 1965. Although that record indicates that the subject had also been discussed by Cabinet on 11 February, no such reference was found.
Le Vietnam a fait l'objet d'une brève discussion lors de la réunion du Cabinet du 12 février 1965. Bien que ce document indique que le sujet a aussi été discuté lors de la réunion du Cabinet du 11 février, aucune mention n'a été trouvée à cet égard.

8 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Submarines. [Paul Martin]

completely rule out the possibility that either Communist China or the USSR will feel unable to confine itself to words if the present rate of exchange of blows continues. It is difficult to see what sort of direct Chinese military action there could be – possibly renewed public supply of arms or some other supply operation designed to intensify the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese attack on the ground in South Vietnam.

6. There is not much prospect of being able to persuade the Americans to abandon their present policy of counter-attack, nor is it at all clear that it would be either wise or justifiable to try to do so. There does not appear to be any action possible on our part except to continue to urge a cessation of all provocative acts in both north and south.

226.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/1.1

Secret.
[Ottawa,] February 11, 1965

VIETNAM: REPRESENTATIONS IN MOSCOW AND WARSAW

I think that you would probably want to be in a position to assure the Americans, in the light of the Prime Minister's speech yesterday, that our concern had been expressed not only to them but also to people on the other side. In addition I think it would be useful to express concern to the Russians and the Poles and to give our Ambassadors a reason for seeking to engage Soviet and Polish representatives in a direct conversation on the present crisis in Vietnam.

2. With this in mind I have had prepared the attached telegram No. Y-82, to Moscow and Warsaw, for your signature if you approve.[9]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

227.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Soviet Union and Embassy to Poland
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Union soviétique et à l'ambassade en Pologne
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/1.1

No. Y-82
Ottawa, February 12, 1965
Secret. Immediate. Immediate from London.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Priority).
By Bag: Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh from London.

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[9] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Telegram signed by SSEA. Feb. 12/65. J.G. H[adwen]
Y-82 signed and sent. Feb. 12. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

VIETNAM

At earliest opportunity you should approach Soviet Foreign Ministry at senior level, possibly Deputy Foreign Minister, to present text of Prime Minister's remarks on Vietnam yesterday (our telegram Y-74† February 10).

2. In discussing Prime Minister's comments we should like you to state that while our views of basic nature of Vietnam situation probably differ from those of USSR we are firmly convinced that essential difficulty for which there is adequate corroboratory evidence relates to Hanoi's policy towards South Vietnam and this fact must be fully recognized if broad policy outlines on part of other governments is to conform to reality and therefore stand some chance of making progress towards solution. We believe that now more than ever before there is need for exercise of restraint and caution on part of all concerned as Indians have pointed out in their statement February 8. We hope that USSR will exercise its responsible influence in this direction.

3. With regard to possibility of new Geneva Conference you should underline our conviction that it would be impossible for USA to agree to such a meeting as long as military pressure is being exerted on South Vietnam and USA forces there. Before progress can be made towards consideration of possibility of negotiations it is our view that there would have to be demonstrable lessening of military pressure and provocation from every direction. It is to this end that we hope USSR would be prepared to exert its influence.

4. Your recent reports on indications of Soviet thinking have been most useful and we hope that formal approach to MFA will provide opportunity to elicit as much firsthand substantive info on Soviet thinking as possible.

5. *For Warsaw*: Grateful if you could take similar action in Polish Foreign Ministry.

[Paul] Martin

228.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/4

No. 439
Washington, February 12, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-73† Feb 10 (received Feb 12).
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Permis New York (Priority); Delhi, CDS, DGPO, DM/DND (Priority) from Ottawa; Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: INDIAN DÉMARCHE

On being informed of your thinking concerning possible Canadian action on Indian statement, William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, expressed view to me this morning that your proposals merited very considered response on part of USA Government and said that he wished to consult urgently with other senior USA State Department officials before providing substantive reply.

2. Bundy commented that a great deal depended on precisely what Indian phrasing meant or could be taken to mean. He said USA, as Canada knew, was already attempting to exercise restraint on escalation by its choice of targets (this was presumably reference to fact that bombing attacks have all been in southern part of DRVN and aimed at military barracks and staging points for infiltration). Suspension of provocative actions as called for in Indian statement obviously signified, as far as application to USA was concerned, cessation of

attacks on North but could also mean no repeat no further introduction of men or material into SVN and could even mean some USA withdrawal from South, although Indians had not repeat not mentioned withdrawal in outlining their proposal to USA. USA had weighed this general problem very hard, as one part of pattern of whole picture.

3. Bundy added that USA shared your doubts about call for Geneva type conference at this time. USA had grave reservations about an early convening of a conference to be held "naked", so to speak, with nothing more. He did not repeat not elaborate on what more might be required. He added that USA had tried to pitch its actions in such a way as not repeat not to create uncontrollable public feelings in that direction (i.e., towards immediate conference) in friendly countries such as Canada and Britain. He agreed that there was possibility that Russians might seek to obtain diplomatic initiative by calling for conference as French had done and he implied that USA had been taking this into account.

4. Bundy promised that State Department would contact us as soon as considered views were available.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

229.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/1.1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] February 13, 1965

VIETNAM: STATEMENT BY U THANT

You might find it useful to have some quick comments on the statement on Vietnam issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations yesterday.[10] Our Delegation in New York has suggested to us that this statement is rather more concrete than most statements issuing from the Secretary-General's office and therefore suggests that there may be some concrete plan behind it.

(a) The statement seems to be consistent with the positions taken publicly both by the Prime Minister and by the Government of India.

(b) It accepts that there is little possibility of a rôle for the U.N., relating this to the absence of certain of the parties from the organization, whereas in comparable circumstances we should probably have taken note of the rejection of U.N. authority in a way which may relate to other factors, such as present Communist Chinese criticism of the U.N. as an organization.

(c) It calls for "the utmost restraint in both deeds and words" on the part of *all* the parties; so, in effect, have we.

(d) It lays perhaps greater emphasis on a conference than did the Prime Minister's statement, because it does not state with quite the same clarity the need to cease provocations in order to bring about discussions.[11]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[10] See/Voir Kathleen Teltsch, "Thant Asks Talks on Vietnam Crisis: Urges Restraint," *New York Times*, 13 February 1965, p. 1.

[11] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Pl[ease] note that word received from our missions is that both London and Washington are <u>not</u> in favour of an immediate conference. – see attached messages.† M[arcel] C[adieux]

230.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/4

No. 175
Moscow, February 16, 1965
Secret. Immediate from London.
Reference: Your Tel Y-82 Feb 12.
Repeat for Information: London (Immediate); Warsaw, Washington, Paris, Delhi, Geneva, CDS (Immediate) from London.
By Bag: Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh from London.

VIETNAM

In accordance with your instructions, I sought an interview with MFA and was received last night by Deputy Minister Zorin. Conversation lasted over hour, was extremely stormy and demonstrated a marked hardening in Soviet position, which I attributed to third American strike on North Vietnamese bases and forthcoming Sino-Soviet ideological showdown on March 1.[12] He was very angry, particularly over the third strike, and I think this reflects the mood of Soviet Government.

2. I gave Zorin copy of Prime Minister's statement and explained orally that we did not repeat not think a solution could seriously be sought of Vietnam problem which did not repeat not proceed from premise that Hanoi Government's policy towards South was major difficulty. In present situation we felt caution and restraint were needed and we agreed in this context with Prime Minister Shastri's appeal. We hoped USSR would also recognize need for exercise of these virtues. I then explained that we were convinced it was out of question for Americans to consider a conference unless there was some demonstrable cessation of attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces. We hoped USSR would use its influence in Hanoi so that atmosphere could be improved.

3. Zorin said what Prime Minister had to say and my remarks came as a distinct disappointment. They could not repeat not agree with my accusations against DRVN, nor would majority of states agree with us. For past ten years USA had violated Geneva Accord by stationing troops in South Vietnam and in every way hampering holding of free elections and peaceful unifications. I had talked of facts, but the real facts were that USA had been carrying on war against peaceful population of South Vietnam for ten years, propping up puppet regime after puppet regime against wishes of eighty percent of population. And now USA continuously bombed DRVN for which there was no repeat no basis or excuse, certainly not repeat not policy of DRVN.

4. I said I thought it useless to get into an argument over this since we obviously had two completely differing versions of what had happened in Indo-China. But I said we had ample evidence in ICC of interference of Hanoi in affairs of South Vietnam from very beginning. Nevertheless, I had not repeat not come to argue this but to see if there was not repeat not some way out of impasse.

5. Zorin said there was a very simple way, let Americans leave South Vietnam. I said this was tantamount to saying there was no repeat no compromise possible. He said Americans had regularly rejected any hint of a conference in past. I said there was no repeat no sign they wanted one now but it seemed to me it was necessary to recommence Soviet-USA dialogue and this would be hard if Vietcong attacks on USA installations continued.

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[12] See/Voir Henry Tanner, "19 Parties Begin Moscow Meeting," *New York Times*, 2 March 1965, p. 1.

6. Zorin said I had mentioned exercise of Soviet influence on DRVN – well, they would only help DRVN to defend itself. "There is no repeat no other policy to be expected from us. We cannot repeat not close our eyes to violations by USA of all norms of international law and Geneva Agreements. We shall unveil the attitude of USA and its policies".

7. And, he said, don't be angry if we criticize Canada too. If your Government supports Americans on this, then you are no repeat no better. I said it seemed to me he had misunderstood or misinterpreted both the facts as I had explained them and spirit of my call. I was not repeat not there to defend American policy, which Americans were perfectly capable of doing, but to explain interest of Canada, as a responsible country, in serious situation in Vietnam, and to try to see if there was not repeat not some place where we could make a start on easing dangerous tension. He then backed down a little.

8. The Americans, Zorin went on, working himself into a state of considerable passion, "will end as French did and create for themselves hatred in all Asia. We have declared we will help DRVN and we will not repeat not retreat from threats of USA". He said they knew there was widespread opinion in USA opposed to USA policy. In fact, he said strikes against DRVN could hardly be called a policy.

9. Only course of action Zorin said is: (a) immediate cessation of aggressive action by USA against DRVN; (b) complete fulfilment of Geneva Agreements; (c) removal of all USA troops and techs from South Vietnam; (d) commencement of peaceful negotiations.

10. I said again that to insist on such conditions meant that they were ignoring real state of affairs and that in fact they were not repeat not interested in seeking to improve situation. Further USA attacks on North Vietnamese installations would not repeat not take place unless there were serious provocations by Viet Cong.

11. Zorin said first [of] these so-called serious provocations had been going on for years so why now should Americans decide to retaliate. And what exactly was a serious provocation? I said point I was trying to make was that North Vietnamese had it in their power to settle this question peacefully and calling off of attacks was a prerequisite. In any case I thought it clear that there were limits beyond which Vietcong could not repeat not go without risking American retaliation.

12. Zorin repeated that DRVN had nothing to do with Vietcong and that only solution was for Americans to leave South Vietnam etc., which I decided was time I had come in, and therefore left.

13. Zorin of course is toughest and least flexible of senior officials but yesterday morning British Ambassador accompanied British Minister of State Thomson, in Moscow to sign cultural accord, in courtesy call on Gromyko. Thomson raised Vietnam question to which Gromyko replied that Soviet position had been made clear in statement of February 9[13] and remained same. He seemed reluctant to discuss it and Thomson did not repeat not push.

14. On Laos, however, Gromyko said prospects were better since Phoumi Nosavan was chased out. Parties might now perhaps begin to move clos[er] together although it would take a long time.

15. Kosygin returned to Moscow yesterday and it may take some little time for any flexibility in Soviet position to emerge, if it does. At moment there seems little that can be done and I suspect this will continue until after the March 1 meeting of Communist Parties.

[R.A.D.] Ford

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[13] See/Voir "Warnings by the Soviet and Chinese Governments: Statement by Moscow," *New York Times*, 9 February 1965, p. 12.

231.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/4

No. 485[14]
Washington, February 17, 1965
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 459† Feb 15 and Moscow Tel 175 Feb 16.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva; Delhi, CDS from Ottawa; Moscow from London; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Warsaw from London.

VIETNAM: USA POLICY

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, told me yesterday, in response to request for comment on USA view of various current calls for negotiation, that in 3-4 days there would probably be clearer idea of USA attitude to various aspects of Vietnam problem. He appreciated that reply was still owing to us on request for views on Indian statement of February 9 and on Canadian proposals to follow up Mr. Pearson's statement February 10 (your telegram Y-73 February 10). Secretary Rusk (just returned to Washington after period of illness) would want to participate in formulation of USA position on this and related issues. For the moment Bundy would limit himself to saying that such calls for restraint provided useful tests of atmosphere and elicited sense of the other side's reaction; they were helpful in that respect. However, at this point USA was not repeat not anxious to be rushed into anything that would smack of negotiation.

2. I showed Bundy Moscow reference telegram reporting on Zorin's uncompromising reception of Canadian démarche. Bundy expressed great interest and remarked that Soviet attitude in reference telegram was somewhat stiffer than had been indicated to USA by Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador here. Personality differences between Zorin and Dobrynin might be relevant, but in any case, Ford-Zorin interview had taken place during in-between period when Russians were most likely to be adamant. This period was likely to continue for some time despite Kosygin's return. Flexibility was not repeat not to be expected of USSR at this point. Bundy remarked on fact that Zorin re-echoed entire Hanoi line on internal nature of VC insurrection and lack of VC-DRVN connection.

3. On possible military developments Bundy said that if NVN simply laid off USA installations in SVN, he doubted that USA would find this much to go on; cessation of all activities in South, or at least all infiltration, was what USA had in mind for DRVN – but he did not repeat not think that Hanoi was about to desist to this extent. However, he did not repeat not want to go on record on USA intentions at this point, as USA was now trying to formulate its position rather more precisely; nevertheless, cessation of infiltration was likely to remain a key element.

4. It would seem from comments made by Bundy and others (cf. our reference telegram) that in next few days certain decisions are likely to be made here on some of military and political aspects of Vietnam problem, and that there will be some kind of public statement. I do not repeat not think however that we should count on such a statement revealing the full implications of whatever decisions are reached; in particular a decision to begin exploring prospects of compromise settlement would be most carefully masked because of need to preserve bargaining position and concern for SVN morale. Nevertheless, even if outside

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[14] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Corrections copied from Washington SVC-47† Feb. 17. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

world does not repeat not immediately realise what USA decisions are, the mere fact that some decisions will have been taken will – I hope – make it easier than it has been lately for Americans to carry on a meaningful dialogue with their friends on the Vietnam problem.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

232.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/1.1

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] February 17, 1965

CONVERSATION ON VIETNAM BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR INDIA

The Prime Minister received the High Commissioner for India at 10.00 a.m. February 17, at the latter's request. Mr. Arnold Smith was also present.

2. The High Commissioner gave the Prime Minister a message from Mr. Shastri, a copy† of which is attached to this memorandum. Mr. Shastri welcomed the reference in the Prime Minister's Canadian Club speech on February 8[15] to the Indian statement about Vietnam, suggested that it was desirable to create an atmosphere in which the powers concerned could get together, and reiterated that it was difficult to contemplate a conference while intense and large-scale fighting was going on in Vietnam as at present. Mr. Shastri hoped that the Prime Minister would continue to use his influence for the creation of conditions in which a conference could take place.

3. The Prime Minister told Mr. Acharya that he certainly agreed that a conference was hardly possible while serious fighting was taking place. He said that he thought the Americans should for their part welcome appeals for restraint addressed impartially to both sides. He said that he had discussed the question by telephone with Washington over the weekend and might do so again. He asked Mr. Smith whether Mr. Ritchie had been in touch with the State Department on this question in the last few days, and Mr. Smith said that Ambassador Ritchie had had several discussions with Bill Bundy and that Bundy had promised to give us a considered reply soon to the suggestion for restraint on all sides. The Prime Minister told Acharya that he might possibly speak again to the White House about Vietnam. He stressed, however, that it was far more effective discussing matters like this quietly and confidentially with the Americans than making public statements. Acharya said his Government fully appreciated this.

4. The High Commissioner mentioned that Mr. Shastri had some days ago suggested to President Johnson and Mr. Kosygin that they should meet to work out an agreement on Vietnam.

5. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Acharya said that he did not think that any Indian diplomatic representations had been made to Peking since their contacts with Peking were not friendly or likely to be effective. The Prime Minister thought it might be useful if the French were encouraged to sound out Peking and suggest the desirability of restraint on all sides and a cessation of military pressure.

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[15] Pearson's speech to the Canadian Club of Ottawa was on 10 February 1965, not 8 February.
Pearson a prononcé son discours au Cercle canadien d'Ottawa le 10 février 1965, et non le 8 février.

6. The Prime Minister told Mr. Acharya about the recent conversation between our Ambassador in Moscow and Mr. Zorin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. He observed that though Zorin had taken a very hard line this was typical of his personal tendency in diplomatic conversations and need not necessarily be too significant.

7. The Prime Minister wondered whether there might not be some value in getting the United Nations seized of the Vietnam situation. Mr. Acharya said that the fact that neither China nor North Vietnam were members of the United Nations made this course seem not very promising in the Indian view. There was some discussion about the possibility of having the International Commission issue an appeal for a cease fire. The Prime Minister, while not ruling this out entirely, thought that the international prestige of the Commission was not such as to make this course seem particularly promising unless the Russians indicated that they wanted such a call from the Commission and thought that Hanoi would respond to it. Mr. Acharya thought that appeals through high-level diplomatic channels were more likely to be effective at present.

8. In conclusion the Prime Minister told the High Commissioner that the Canadian and Indian Governments would continue to keep in touch on this question and that he welcomed the opportunity for cooperation with Mr. Shastri in this. He was concerned that unless restraint was in fact exercised by all concerned, the danger of escalation could be very real.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

233.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 8673, 20-1-2-USA/2

No. Y-156
Ottawa, February 25, 1965
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tel 576† Feb 24.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Paris, Geneva, CDS (Priority).
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh from Delhi.

VIETNAM: USA POLICY

I have noted with interest your useful summary of current variations in USA public opinion on Vietnam and continued administration silence over future Vietnam policy. I am particularly concerned that we continue not repeat not to be receiving American views on a confidential basis despite William Bundy's previous assurances. I would be grateful if you would pass following message to Secretary Rusk on my behalf at earliest opportunity.

2. Begins: Dear Mr. Secretary, our officials have been keeping in touch regarding developments in Vietnam. At stage we appear to have reached now I should like to convey to you personally some of my own thoughts on matters of immediate concern to both USA and Canada.

3. I should like to emphasize in first instance that I appreciate fully difficulties confronting USA policy-makers at present time and that you may count on sympathetic understanding of Canadian Government in search for a satisfactory resolution of dangerous problem in Vietnam. For our part, we have I think been doing everything possible to strengthen support for Western position and I am hopeful that early publication of Canadian Minority Statement to recent International Commission report on air strikes against North Vietnam will contribute in some measure to a focussing of international attention on scale and significance

of North Vietnamese subversive policies as real basis for instability in Vietnam.[16] I am also hopeful that Commission's report on withdrawal of Northern teams will serve purpose of drawing attention to Hanoi's bad faith.[17]

4. Satisfactory formulation of these Commission messages has been an intricate and difficult diplomatic project but we hope that they will have some useful and significant effect on international opinion. In terms of public opinion in Canada, publication of these messages should help to counteract growing doubts about USA position which I find disturbing and which I feel bound to mention to you.

5. As you know we agree that we should not repeat not be stampeded into a conference in present overheated circumstances and both Prime Minister and I have attempted to point this out in recent public statements.[18] However, I think time has come when we must ask ourselves how long we can avoid one. It goes without saying that we are deeply concerned with Vietnam situation. If there is anything we can do which would contribute to achieving a satisfactory resolution of this problem, we would be happy to do it. For all these reasons it is my hope that you will be able to keep us informed of your thinking on Vietnam problem and of any new policy departures which may be forthcoming. Yours sincerely, Paul Martin. Ends.

[Paul] Martin

234.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, 20-1-1-17/2

Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] February 25, 1965

VIETNAM: BRITISH INITIATIVE

The First Secretary of the British High Commission, Mr. Fair, called on Far Eastern Division this morning to inform us of a diplomatic initiative which the British are undertaking in Moscow. Mr. Fair emphasized that this information was of the utmost sensitivity and that, at the moment, the only countries apart from Canada which would be aware of this British initiative were the Soviet Union, the U.S.A., Australia and New Zealand. Fair was under instructions to urge us not to reveal to anyone, for the moment, that this information had been given to us.

2. The British Ambassador in Moscow has been instructed to approach the Soviet Foreign Ministry to suggest joint action by the British and Soviet Governments. He was to preface his approach with the observation that although Her Majesty's Government agreed that the 1954 Geneva Conference conferred no continuing rights or obligations on the Co-Chairmen, they were prepared to co-operate in measures of a constructive and practical character. The

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16 See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 2609, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965).

17 See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Press Release*, no. 19, 5 April 1965. The press release included the ICSC's 27 February report and its appendices.
Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Communiqué*, nº 19, 5 avril 1965. Le communiqué comprenait le rapport de la CISC du 27 février et ses annexes.

18 See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 11, pp. 11372–11374; Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/4, 18 February 1965.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 2e session, vol. 11, p. 11560-11562 ; Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/4, 18 February 1965.

specific measures proposed would be a joint approach by the British and Soviet Governments ("having noted with grave concern the dangerous state of international tension now existing in connection with Vietnam"), to the Governments which had participated in the 1954 Geneva Conference and the Governments of the three countries represented on the International Commission, requesting them to furnish the Co-Chairmen "without delay with a statement of their views on the situation in Vietnam and in particular on the circumstances in which they considered that a peaceful conclusion would be reached".

3. The Governments involved would thus be: the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Communist China, France, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, together with Canada, India and Poland.

4. There has not yet been any indication of the Soviet reaction to this initiative.

5. We were informed that British intentions had been discussed fully in advance with the U.S. Government and that Washington had indicated that they would find it possible to provide a statement of their objectives in Vietnam and of the conditions in which air strikes against the North would cease, if this were in reply to such a request from the Co-Chairmen.[19] It is undoubtedly against this background that the British, in informing us of their approach in Moscow, have urged the utmost secrecy to avoid possible embarrassment.

6. My initial reaction to this information is that the initiative envisaged appears constructive and if the Soviet Government agrees, it may represent a step forward. For the immediate future, and until we know what the Soviet response has been, I am sure you will agree that no action is called for at the moment and that this information should be treated with the utmost caution.

7. We are, of course, considering what our reply might be if the Soviet Union agrees to the action envisaged by the British and we are approached along the lines indicated above.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

235.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/4

No. 635
Washington, February 26, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-156 Feb 25.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Immediate) from Delhi; London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva; Delhi, CDS from Ottawa; Moscow from London.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: USA POLICY

Secretary Rusk, whom I saw this afternoon, asked me to tell you that he very much appreciated receiving your message and that he would be responding. Meanwhile he offered preliminary comments as follows:

a) He thought that perusal of full transcript of his February 25 news conference would be of interest as illustration of USA position (comprehensive summary of transcript in our telegram 624† February 26; full text to be sent by mail on Monday).[20]

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[19] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), documents 135–137, 138 (Editorial Note), 150.

[20] See/Voir "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 25: The Situation in Southeast Asia," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 52, No. 1342 (15 March 1965), pp. 362–371.

b) USA was about to publish a large body of factual material which would make clear extent of infiltration and Hanoi's responsibility for it.[21] This would help public and press to understand facts and would remove any idea that this was basically indigenous problem. Russians for example knew it was not repeat not but could not repeat not say so; USA had pointed out to them that if West Germans were doing in East Germany what North Vietnamese were doing in South, Moscow would hardly regard this as indigenous problem.

c) USA had been reviewing in great detail and with microscopic care all signs via all channels concerning DRVN attitude but had failed to find slightest indication that Hanoi was interested in pulling back. Before other major settlements of recent years such as Berlin Blockade, Korea, 1962 Laos Conference and Test Ban [Treaty], there had been preliminary private contacts indicating that settlement was possible. This element was totally missing at present. Thus, if we all were to jump ahead into some sort of conference, such a conference might well break up after a very short interval leaving situation worse than it had been because of failure in this court of last resort.

2. Rusk pointed out that they had been following with great interest observations that other friendly countries were able to make concerning intentions of opposing side but that nothing had been revealed. Perhaps Hanoi thought they were on winning streak because of confused situation in recent months in Saigon. British had had some contacts in their role as Co-Chairmen and in December and January French had put some questions to North Vietnamese without productive result. North Vietnamese representative (apparently in Paris) had been completely evasive when asked if Hanoi would desist from its campaign in South although French had impression that he had been somewhat more forthcoming on two other questions put to him, i.e., whether Hanoi would agree to strengthen international machinery and whether it would accept independent neutral SVN.[22] Rusk commented that Hanoi's understanding of independence and neutralism might well be very different in any case.

3. Rusk indicated that USA had been watching Soviet position very closely. He read with great interest Moscow telegrams 205† and 210† which I gave him. He said USA had recognized all along that Moscow would face serious dilemma if situation in Southeast Asia heated up to point of conflict. Russians would find it very difficult not repeat not to support Hanoi although USA did not repeat not believe they desired major confrontation. Rusk said that more than one Eastern European representative had told him that Moscow would not repeat not agree with Peiping on Peiping's terms, if only because Eastern Europeans would be opposed because of their desire for better contacts with Western Europe. However, USA had feeling that committee now governing USSR was somewhat more conservative than its predecessor.

4. In response to my query as to whether Russians might have been surprised at strong USA reaction against North Vietnam, Rusk said that USA had tried to be simple and straightforward with Russians but one never knew what interpretation they would put on one's remarks. Americans had said many times that they would come home promptly from South Vietnam if aggression ceased; perhaps Russians thought this meant USA did not repeat not have its heart in its effort. However, Dobrynin (Soviet Ambassador here) was more sophisticated judge of USA than many other Russians.

5. Rusk said that one reason that USA had not repeat not taken problem to Security Council was that they did not repeat not wish to force USSR to speak out as advocate for Hanoi if for example they were willing to play different role in Co-Chairmen context. USA had some reason to think that new government in Moscow did not repeat not wish to pull away from its Co-Chairmen role. There would be various opportunities for them as Co-Chairmen,

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[21] See/Voir United States, Department of State, *Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1965).

[22] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 48.

e.g., in relation to July deadline for renewal of Laos Commission or in context of messages of denunciation of USA recently received from Hanoi. However, nothing had been received from Moscow in the last twenty-four hours.

6. Rusk remarked that USA was considerably interested in Souvanna's recent invitation to Souphanouvong to sit down to talk over factional difficulties. He pointed out that a door into some sort of political meeting could conceivably be somewhat easier via Laos than directly via South Vietnam. At any rate Laos could provide temperature reading of North Vietnam's intentions and quite possibly provide way in which motion could be achieved without other side losing face. Nevertheless, there was no repeat no present indication that this was likely.

7. When I asked whether, as indicated in Secretary's press conference, USA judged it undesirable to spell out criteria for determining cessation of North Vietnamese aggression, or to specify USA preconditions for subsequent negotiation, Rusk confirmed that this was indeed the case. He said that he had felt inclined to tell press conference that one could not repeat not attend Ph.D. seminar before passing kindergarten.

[8]. In conclusion Secretary emphasized two points:

a) Issue now being faced was one we had been through before in Greece, Malaya and elsewhere, i.e., the persistent issue of what other side termed wars of liberation and which to him was central issue of organizing a peace. In Europe we had come to position where NATO and Warsaw groups seemed to be able to work out problems without conflict; conditions appeared otherwise in Pacific.

b) USA was by no repeat no means indifferent to political channels as it had big stake in problem; but even with these channels Americans had so far heard nothing despite their earnest attention.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

236.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/1.1

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] March 1, 1965

VIETNAM – DISCUSSIONS IN CABINET[23]

I attach in accordance with your request a series of talking points on Vietnam for your use in Cabinet.[24] You will note that these talking points cover the current military situation, the initiatives for a conference, current American attitudes and policies, and the Canadian position.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[23] It is not clear whether Martin saw this document or whether the version printed here was subsequently revised before it was sent to him.
On ne sait pas si Martin a vu ce document ou si la version imprimée ici a été révisée par la suite avant de lui être envoyée.

[24] According to its records, Cabinet next discussed Vietnam on 22 April 1965. The subject was also raised on 5 April following Pearson's speech at Temple University in Philadelphia and meeting the next day with President Johnson at Camp David.
Selon ses archives, le Cabinet a discuté ensuite du Vietnam le 22 avril 1965. Le sujet a également été abordé le 5 avril, à la suite du discours de Pearson à l'Université Temple de Philadelphie et de sa rencontre le lendemain avec le président Johnson à Camp David.

Enclosure: Talking Points
Pièce jointe : Points de discussion

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] March 1, 1965

VIETNAM

1. *Military Situation*

In South Vietnam, the military situation is dominated by United States active air support of South Vietnamese forces in order to help prevent the further deterioration of the military position of the government forces in the face of new and important Viet Cong successes threatening to cut the country in two. There is a very strong possibility that retaliatory air strikes will not, as in the past, be mounted only in response to specific and easily identifiable attacks on American personnel. There is no evidence of American intentions to escalate beyond this stage at the present time. In South Vietnam the military situation is causing the Americans such concern that the continuing political instability goes almost unnoticed.

2. *Negotiating Initiatives and Possibilities*

Despite various pleas for restraint on both sides and for subsequent negotiations, little has come from the initiatives thus far. The British attempt (at the instigation of the Americans) to persuade the Russians to join in a request to members of the Geneva Conference and of the International Commission to state their views on the current Vietnam situation and particularly as regard ways of reaching a "conclusion" has produced no results. Secretary-General U Thant's call for negotiations appears to have little significance in practical terms and the joint Franco-Soviet efforts have apparently produced no agreement as to what might be the preconditions for negotiation demanded by both sides.[25] While public pressures for some form of negotiation are mounting, the facts still are that negotiation at this stage is most apt to result either in the surrender of the American position in Vietnam or the very early breakdown of these negotiations with consequent greater dangers of escalation on the military side.

3. *American Attitude*

Our Ambassador in Washington in his conversations with Secretary Rusk on Friday was told that the Americans had failed to find the slightest indication that the North Vietnamese were prepared to reduce their pressures on South Vietnam or had any inclination to undertake meaningful negotiations. The conditions under which the problem could be solved without further conflict did not exist at the present time because North Vietnamese have not dropped their prerequisite of complete American withdrawal. It is apparent that for the time being the Americans, while prepared to keep diplomatic channels open, plan to move ahead on the military front both in South Vietnam and in retaliation on the North Vietnamese. A controversy is undoubtedly going on in the American administration about the way out of this dilemma. The proponents of a wider Korea-type war have some support and the dangers of miscalculation undoubtedly exist. The Americans appear however acutely aware of difficulties of guessing at Soviet reactions and of complications introduced by Soviet desire to re-establish Communist unity in the face of the Chinese provocative position. On balance, it would appear that the present trend in American policy is to hit hard at the DRVN with the specific goal of bringing the North Vietnamese to the point where they will agree to negotiations on a suitable basis as a *quid pro quo* for the cessation of American military pressure.

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[25] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 173.

4. *Canadian Position*

Current American policy holds dangers of escalation, particularly if it is not successful in producing a more amenable North Vietnamese attitude. It would not be in our interests however if a hasty move to the negotiating table resulted either in the destruction of the American presence in Vietnam or, and this is more likely, in an early breakdown of negotiations and the creation of an even more serious situation. The Chinese and North Vietnamese allegations of dwindling Western power and influence in Southeast Asia must be parried by some show of the United States' superiority in combat strength or the way may well be open to early American withdrawal and Chinese domination of the whole Southeast Asian area. It would seem to be in the Canadian interests not to undercut the American position by going all out for negotiation without proper preparation but at the same time to urge restraint in the display of US military power in Vietnam and to encourage every possible channel of communication which may help to produce eventually the prerequisites for a conference. Continued implicit support for the American position is difficult in the face of Canadian public opinion, the articulate section of which seems uniformly against the United States. It seems important therefore to get on the record as soon as possible the recent Special Message on air strikes in Vietnam to which is appended the Canadian Minority Statement which attempts to put into perspective the air strikes and the whole history of North Vietnamese subversion and infiltration into South Vietnam in support of the Viet Cong. We had considered tabling the Minority Statement unilaterally but decided that on balance it would be preferable to wait until the British have tabled the whole Special Message, provided they do not delay beyond their present deadline of Monday, March 8. We hope that this Minority Statement will help to set the record straight regarding Canadian efforts in the Commission over the past few years and at the same time provide evidence to correct the impression that the war in South Vietnam is a spontaneous, indigenous phenomenon in which the Americans have wilfully interfered. There is now a new report from the Commission (by Canadian-Indian majority) on the withdrawal of Commission teams from North Vietnam which, when published, will be a useful indication of Hanoi's bad faith.

237.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

No. 649
Washington, March 1, 1965
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Para 7 Saigon Tel 172† Feb 26.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, Geneva; Delhi, CDS, DM/DND, DGPO from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: USA POLICY

Main lines of USA policy are gradually becoming clearer, through words as well as deeds. Deeds include: last month's air strikes against North, an announced increase in USA military presence in SVN; and openly admitted use of USA aircraft in strikes against Vietcong. Words include: President's brief and calm reaffirmation of USA determination in his February 17 address[26] (our telegram 505† February 17); Secretary Rusk's emphasis in his February 25 press

[26] See/Voir "U.S. Objective in Viet-Nam," Remarks by President Johnson on February 17, 1965, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 52, No. 1341 (8 March 1965), pp. 332–333.

conference (our telegram 624 February 26) on point that missing piece in any consideration of negotiation was an indication that Hanoi was prepared to desist from what it was doing against neighbours; and State Department white paper entitled "Aggression from the North" issued yesterday which "establishes beyond question that NVN is carrying out carefully conceived plan of aggression against South", says "clearly the restraint of the past was not repeat not providing adequately for defense of SVN against Hanoi's open aggression", adds that "these (air) strikes constitute a limited response fitted to the aggression that produced them", promises that "if peace can be restored in SVN, USA [will] be ready at once to reduce its military involvement" and concludes "choice now between peace and continued and increasingly destructive conflict is one for authorities in Hanoi to make" (full text being airmailed).

2. You will have noted front-page story in today's *New York Times* reporting that President Johnson has decided to open a continuing limited air war against North, unrelated to specific provocations, to bring about negotiated settlement on honorable terms.[27] If this is what has been decided, it is our impression that, as suggested in same *Times* story, the basic aim would be not repeat not to bomb North Vietnam into submission but (in words attributed to a high official) "to do something we could stop doing to them, in return for equivalent concessions".

3. At any rate it seems that coming weeks and months will be a period during which patience of all concerned – including that of friends of USA – will be sorely tried. How much the Americans appreciate this, it is difficult to say.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

238.
Memorandum from Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

Restricted.
[Ottawa,] March 2, 1965

PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH TO THE CANADIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26

The Prime Minister's speech on this occasion was not a prepared one.[28] Indeed, he made a point of emphasizing that he had only seen the detailed subject of his address, "The Elements Favouring International Cooperation", when he received a memorandum on leaving his office with his programme for the night.

2. There were two sections in his speech and in his replies to questions which it might be useful to record for the Department.

Viet Nam: Mr. Pearson shared with his audience deep concern at the Viet Nam situation and went a long way towards stating Canada's preference for early negotiation. He described some of the problems which made immediate negotiation hard to envisage (aggression and hostilities from the North) but left no doubt in the minds of the audience that Canada was urging other nations, including United States, to move towards the early opening of negotiations.

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27 See/Voir Robert Kleiman, "U.S. Said to Plan Limited Air War as Lever on Hanoi," *New York Times*, 1 March 1965, p. 1.

28 The event was closed to the press. The text of Pearson's speech, "What Are the Real Forces in International Cooperation" was not found.
La presse n'a pas eu accès à cet événement. Le texte du discours de Pearson, intitulé « What Are the Real Forces in International Cooperation », n'a pas été retrouvé.

He referred to the fact that the United Nations was not in a position to play an important substantive role in Viet Nam. He said that he thought there could be a good case made for the U.N. assuming a major role in the Viet Nam settlement but that this would not appear possible because of the current financial difficulties.

[…]

J.G. Hadwen

239.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

No. 730
Washington, March 6, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.

PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS IN NEW YORK:
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO VIETNAM

We spoke today to Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary Far East, about proposals outlined last night by Prime Minister for effective control, supervision and policing in Southeast Asia.[29] After discussing matter with Under Secretary Ball he asked us to convey to you appreciation for helpful and constructive suggestion, particularly because of emphasis on international community interest and responsibility, which fits in with President's hope of bringing in more flags.

2. Main difficulty would be to determine under what auspices and authority such international force could act. Present climate in UN did not repeat not seem favorable to new peacekeeping venture. Closing up operation by combination of elements friendly to USA might entail violation of Laos Agreements. Moreover, it is doubtful that frontiers can be effectively policed against guerrilla infiltration. VC is receiving from DRVN not repeat not only physical support but orders and directives. Even if communications between VC and DRVN could be broken, VC would remain for some time force to take into account. In circumstances, sealing off borders might not repeat not be in itself completely sound basis for negotiations.

3. State Department would be glad to examine further with us ways of bringing about international cooperation envisaged in Prime Minister's address.

240.
Telegram from Permanent Mission to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

No. 349
New York, March 8, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Limited Distribution.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only).

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[29] See/Voir Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/6, 5 March 1965.

VIETNAM: HIGHLIGHTS OF PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL

One of the most interesting parts of conversation on Vietnam was info given by Secretary-General regarding his personal efforts to bring about some talks between Ho Chi Minh and Americans. U Thant said that in August of last year he had approached Ho Chi Minh, whom he knows very well from his Burma days, to find out whether he would be prepared to enter into discussions with Americans on Vietnam problem. It was understood that these talks would take place without commitment from either side and would only be exploratory in nature. Within a couple of weeks Ho Chi Minh responded affirmatively to U Thant's approach. U Thant conveyed this info to Adlai Stevenson and for a long period there was no repeat no response from Washington. In meanwhile, however, Stevenson explored further with U Thant modalities under which talks could take place. As these talks were intended to be secret it was agreed with Burmese Government that they would take place in Rangoon, reason being that South Vietnam, North Vietnam and USA are represented in that capital. In this way Americans would not repeat not have to send any representative and talks could take place without drawing attention. Towards end of September Washington made it clear through Adlai Stevenson that they were not repeat not interested in having such exploratory talks. Reason given by Washington was that if such talks were being held news would inevitably leak out with predictable impact in USA and in South Vietnam, putting into jeopardy whole American policy. U Thant said that he recognized risks involved and suggested (with knowledge that idea might be appealing to USSR) that talks be broadened under what U Thant called five plus two formula, e.g., USA, USSR, UK, France, China, plus the two Vietnams. In U Thant's mind these talks would be pursued on same basis as those initially envisaged by Ho Chi Minh, e.g., exploratory in nature and without commitment. At this stage Burmese Government withdrew its offer to have talks held in Rangoon and U Thant suggested that they might be held in Geneva at UN headquarters. U Thant realized of course that none of great powers involved would want to take initiative in proposing these informal talks but he was prepared as Secretary-General of UN to make at appropriate time suggestion himself. For a long period of time there was no repeat no reaction from Washington to these suggestions and Secretary-General due to his illness in December was unable to pursue matter further. Meanwhile, however, he was informed that Ho Chi Minh had withdrawn his offer to enter into discussion with Washington.[30]

2. Through various statements he has made Secretary-General has conveyed impression that Vietcong successes in South Vietnam are not repeat not related to interference and infiltration from North Vietnam but rather that present instability in South Vietnam results from indigenous Communist activities. The Prime Minister questioned him on this point. U Thant claimed that for several years after 1954 no repeat no evidence has been found of North Vietnamese military interference in South Vietnam. In his opinion there was a useful parallel to establish between situation in Burma and in Vietnam. During worst period of Communist influence in Burma, Burmese Government had to decide whether it would accept military assistance offered by USA. Government at time refused to receive USA assistance because it knew that while Chinese would not repeat not help local Burmese Communists as long as they remained an indigenous movement, they would intervene if Burma were to accept military assistance from West. U Thant's belief therefore was that if Vietnamese had followed similar policy, intervention by North Vietnam could have been avoided. Secretary-General, however, did not repeat not dispute fact that there now exists strong North Vietnamese interference in South Vietnam. He would estimate at some 20 percent the North Vietnamese elements now engaged in Vietcong operations in South Vietnam.

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30 See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 427 (Editorial Note).

3. Secretary-General said that he had already been asked to comment on Mr. Pearson's reference to Vietnam and was wondering whether Mr. Pearson wished to elaborate on his views.

4. Prime Minister said that Canadians understand and have considerable sympathy for USA position. On other hand he wished to express concern over possibility of escalation of conflict. When peace is endangered, it is responsibility of international community to prevent aggression. It may not repeat not be easy to achieve this through UN, not repeat not only because main parties are not repeat not members of organization, but also because of practical difficulties involved in establishing effective UN presence in Vietnam. In his mind, however, there was a certain similarity of objectives in present situation and that which existed at time of Suez. Nobody knew for sure whether proposed emergency force would prove to be successful but proposal had had merit of providing through internationalization an acceptable way out for British and French. As to nature and form of possible UN intervention in Vietnam, Mr. Pearson said that this would have to await developments and would become clearer when process of negotiations has been initiated. Although U Thant's public statements so far have discouraged UN discussion of problem, he made it clear that he foresees possibility of useful UN role at some stage of negotiations. Secretary-General did not repeat not exclude for instance some UN supervisory role with regard to withdrawal of forces.

5. Turning his mind to possible composition of a UN presence in Vietnam, U Thant said that it would have to be primarily Asian and mentioned specifically Pakistan as ideal contributing country. It was possible also that some African country would prove to be acceptable.

6. When the Prime Minister asked U Thant what useful role Canada might play at this juncture, U Thant said that Canada was in best possible position to convince Americans that no repeat no lasting settlement in Vietnam could be achieved by use of force alone. He thought that Mr. Pearson and Ayub Khan of Pakistan were two statesmen who could most effectively use their influence in Washington at moment.

241.
Telegram from Permanent Mission to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

No. 358
New York, March 8, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: McDougall-Freifeld telecon.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador only).
USSEA and Far Eastern Division only.

VIETNAM: PRIME MINISTER'S MARCH 6 PRESS CONFERENCE

Prime Minister met with Canadian correspondents (plus Hamilton of *New York Times*, Pick of *Guardian* and Otis of AP) following his luncheon with Secretary-General. On record he referred very briefly only to his meeting with Secretary-General saying that they had a useful discussion on Vietnam and financing of peacekeeping. Remainder of his remarks which lasted some 45 minutes were allegedly off record with some parts useable for background without attribution but there was doubtless some confusion about this. While a ConGen New York stenographer was present she was unable to make proper record and following is based on incomplete notes of a Permis New York officer present.

2. Prime Minister began by stating that if we find basis for negotiation, we must also find a basis for making it stick. In Geneva in 1954 we set up a truce commission with small staffs. From that experience we feel something more is needed. We would not repeat not want to go into a negotiation unless machinery for ensuring settlement was an essential element.

3. Questioned about his own role, Prime Minister said while he has been putting out some ideas we are involved only as a nation concerned with maintenance of peace. Others would have to take lead.

4. Regarding UN role, Prime Minister noted that UN has not repeat not been involved in Vietnam and two of parties in situation are not repeat not UN members. He did not repeat not know whether there would be a conference, but we must have some idea of supervisory arrangements that would come out of it. We do not repeat not want to repeat 1954 experience.

5. In event that powers concerned did come to some acceptable arrangement then they might presumably also be able to reach agreement on some kind of policing and might then ask Secretary-General to implement this.

6. Agreement on policing machinery is not repeat not a precondition to entering a negotiation. That would enable any country to stop conference. It would be quite impossible to work out policing arrangements in detail at this stage.

7. Asked whether USA has indicated any interest in negotiating, Prime Minister said he thought USA is just as interested in a negotiation as any other nation. Remember situation at time of Suez. UN intervention there was coupled with adequate policing force. This made it easy for UK to take action that it took. I [Prime Minister] realize that Indochina area is different and difficult to supervise. It is not repeat not like Gaza Strip. I realize Chinese do not repeat not want to have anything to do with UN. On falling domino theory, I [Prime Minister] hope USA would not repeat not be put in that situation. We must bring Laos and Cambodia into a general settlement.

8. If this could all be linked with economic development by putting in say two or three hundred million dollars then political differences might be submerged in economic development of whole region.

9. Questioned regarding wars of liberation, Prime Minister said we cannot repeat not leave it simply to USSR or China or USA to decide whether they wish to intervene in some situation.

10. Asked whether Secretary-General gave his views on Vietnam, Prime Minister said that what Secretary-General said about internal situation does not repeat not jibe with what we have learned through years.

11. Asked whether he thought VC would collapse if Hanoi withdrew its support, Prime Minister said he did not repeat not think so and it was more likely that SVN would collapse. This has been a basic weakness of USA position. USA gave impression of being an army of occupation, with helicopters blasting away, with USA guards frisking local populace, with moving 7,000 Vietnamese to provide a security zone for USA base. That is no repeat no way to do job. Maybe that is unfair, but it is one of most dangerous aspects of USA position.

12. Present division of Vietnam is not repeat not necessarily permanent though it is not repeat not easy to see how division could be removed. If SVN wanted to go with VC it should be allowed to and even to go Communist in its own way. We should give South freedom to go to hell in their own way. If they want to go Communist let them go Communist. Look at Yugoslavia – they now serve with Canada on UN peacekeeping missions. Eastern European states now have dominion status and have more freedom than mother country. Going Communist does not repeat not mean that a country need become part of Communist conspiracy.

13. USA intervened in Vietnam in good faith to make it possible for SVN to work out its own destiny. USA is now having to use force in a way that it did not repeat not contemplate.

14. Questioned regarding feasibility of retaliatory strikes Prime Minister said that Washington holds theory that if they hammer North hard enough it will want to negotiate. My [Prime Minister's] own instinct is that this will not repeat not work. USA has painted itself into a corner. Let's try to help USA get out of corner without starting world war. Neutralization of Southeast Asia under UN coupled with spending of 200-300 million on economic development would be best; if USSR and China would contribute, so much the better.

15. French are proposing a conference without conditions. USA and UK feel they must have some assurance that a conference would lead to success. We have no repeat no basis for believing that Peking and Hanoi would come to conference table. Hanoi would be more likely to do so to seek a way out.

16. On morality of retaliatory air strikes, Prime Minister said that if there is an attack on a USA base or installation from a particular spot Mr. Rusk could make a strong moral case for destroying that spot.

17. Asked whether UN could cope as effectively in Vietnam as USA, Prime Minister emphasized that UN has never been involved from beginning. We would be far better off if UN could be invited in.

242.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

Secret.
[Ottawa,] March 12, 1965

VIETNAM – USA POLICIES

I am disturbed, as I am sure you are, by the continued failure of the Americans to come clean with us on their intentions in Vietnam or even new departures such as the landing of the Marine battalions.[31] I think perhaps it is time to go back to the Americans on this subject and that it would be particularly opportune to do so immediately after taking what can be interpreted as a position in support of the Americans during the tabling of the Special Message in the House of Commons.[32] I have, therefore, prepared for your signature, if you concur, the attached telegram[33] to Charles Ritchie in Washington.[34]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[31] See/Voir Jack Langguth, "Force 'Strictly Defensive' – Arrival Is Protested by Hanoi and Peking: U.S. Marine Units Arrive in Danang," *New York Times*, 8 March 1965, p. 1.

[32] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 11, pp. 12065–12067.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 2e session, vol. 11, p. 12255-12257.

[33] See/Voir doc. 244.

[34] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Final para[graph] amended by SSEA. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]
Tel[egram] signed and sent, March 15/65. J.G. H[adwen]

243.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

No. 807
Washington, March 13, 1965
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Permis New York, London, Paris, NATO Paris; Delhi, CDS from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi; DM/DND, DGPO from CDS.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: USA THINKING

In conversation yesterday Leonard Unger (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far East with main operational responsibility for Vietnam) made a number of thoughtful and interesting comments on current USA policy and recent Canadian statements.

2. Unger began by saying that USA authorities were most appreciative of Canadian Minority Statement in ICC report; USA Embassy Ottawa had been asked to inform you of this. Canadian statement had been very helpful as it had done what Commission as a whole should have done, namely put incidents in proper perspective.

3. Unger expressed earnest apologies for delay in answering your message to Secretary Rusk (your telegram Y-156 February 25). Pending despatch of reply, he wished you to know that your thinking had been carefully noted by USA authorities.

4. Passing on to general trend of USA policy, Unger emphasized that USA had never had feeling that there would be immediate and direct effect from air strikes alone; a whole complex of various types of action was obviously required. Americans were very much aware of criticisms being encountered by governments of friendly countries endeavouring to be helpful in Vietnam problem and there was similarly a good deal of criticism from respected and responsible quarters in USA. To these critics USA officials had emphasized that they too were fully alive to the various preoccupations and doubts which were being expressed. USA acknowledged it was engaged in very tricky operation but one which it felt obliged to see through because of its wider implications.

5. When I explained the tentative and exploratory purpose of Prime Minister's and your recent statements of March 5 and 8 and invited comments on them, Unger replied that these statements had been studied with close attention in Washington and that officials had been particularly struck by passages in these statements which identified what kind of situation was being faced today in SVN (Northern aggression etcetera) and made references to necessity of working out problem with these considerations in mind. References to assumption of responsibility by elements of international community were also helpful in that USA likewise regarded international assumption of responsibility as indispensable if there were to be a formal working out of problem which would inevitably require association of other countries.

6. Unger thought there was remote possibility that there could eventually be a tacit resolution of conflict if NVN were quietly to damp down and gradually call off its effort in SVN, in such a case there would be no repeat no need for enforcement machinery.

7. It was, however, more likely that in due course there would be some form of international gathering where parties would sit down directly. There were various possibilities such as: 1954 Geneva powers plus ICC countries; seven powers suggested by U Thant; some UN forum; or a NVN-SVN meeting with others looking over their shoulders.

8. Unger emphasized that for USA whole question was one of timing. In USA view it would be mistake to move into negotiations on broad international scale before it was apparent that right time had come. That would be only when there was some kind of indication that it was really worth sitting down to talk – at least a beginning of a readiness on part of Hanoi to bring aggression to end. End of aggression was all USA was after. I stressed that recent Canadian statements had not repeat not been intended to advocate any kind of premature conference.

9. On question of supervisory machinery as discussed in Prime Minister's statement and possibility of either improving Commission formula or adopting some other approach, Unger said he thought the problem would be whether same difficulties which Canada saw in ICC as presently constituted would have to be faced in any alternative supervisory body to which Communists might agree. Question was not repeat not so much one of facilities and infrastructure of an ICC-type body as one of the will of those involved to see the job done. What Unger seemed to be implying was that if a genuine desire for settlement were ultimately to manifest itself one might not repeat not necessarily have to reject possibility of working through and adapting present ICC structure.

10. When asked whether USA would expect a statement from Hanoi or deeds on the ground as indication that negotiation had become possible, Unger thought both elements might be needed, although he did not repeat not put this as an official position. It would not repeat not be difficult for Hanoi to let some word slip out through one of various channels available to it, but problem of discerning NVN acts was more difficult. There was question as to whether Communists would reach assessment that they could get away with mere words.

11. A preliminary which would seem obvious to many would be a cease-fire, although USA felt that this could pose danger of becoming involved in something unilateral (i.e., end of strikes on North which would relieve pressure on Hanoi), perhaps without assurance that other side had taken steps to stop their aggression. He agreed that it would take time to set up a supervisory body to check this. There would be problems such as whether ICC or another body could proceed up to infiltration routes in mountain passes, visit infiltration bases in North, and be free to visit VC-held areas in South. In answer to question Unger said USA did not repeat not think that in the strained circumstances which would prevail one could necessarily count on 100 percent obedience by VC of a command from North to desist, but this was not repeat not too important; SVN forces could handle residual problem.

12. Unger agreed that USA withdrawal in event of settlement would probably be staged so as to ensure that situation remained under control but he re-emphasized principle that if USA saw real daylight in tunnel it was prepared to move forces out.

13. I asked about reports from UN sources that in September Ho Chi Minh had allegedly been willing to talk. Unger replied that this was a troubling matter for USA; there had been an indication then that people were interested in talking although apparently only in order to receive full endorsement of their own position on paper. He commented on apparent difference between Peiping and Hanoi on talks at present; Peiping was very strong against them, but Hanoi's opposition was not repeat not in such categorical terms, although it of course had not repeat not gone as far as Russians in saying conference might now be in order. Till time of Kosygin visit and February air strikes NVN probably on balance thought, on basis of events of preceding months, that USA was pretty much ready to find way out in Vietnam; North Vietnamese had therefore perhaps been more receptive at that time to idea of talking, on theory that things were going and would go their way. During Kosygin visit they had thrown out a challenge to USA which was perhaps not repeat not expected to be picked up, although they had probably been prepared to play matter either way.

14. In answer to question Unger expressed tentative view that a settlement would probably be restricted to SVN. There was already a settlement in Laos which NVN might respect somewhat more if they were not repeat not so interested in preserving infiltration routes to

SVN. Cambodia was neutral by 1954 settlement and its own declarations. NVN by its own declaration was not repeat not neutral; at time when de Gaulle was pushing his neutralisation theme DRVN had made it clear it was and would remain socialist state, i.e., full member of Bloc.

15. As for neutralisation of SVN, if this meant what it did in Laos, i.e., that all factions would be in Government with each having a veto, this would be obvious invitation to instability and disaster and would give Communists whip hand. But if neutralism were understood in sense of non-alignment and removal of SVN from East-West conflict, this was entirely up to South Vietnamese.

16. I asked if a proposed settlement might conceivably be linked with economic development proposals. Unger said that all USA was after was that SVN should be left alone. Americans took dim view of NVN but were not repeat not bent on forcing change in their regime. If there were peace USA would like to think about ways of furthering constructive development of area. Although Mekong River did not repeat not flow through NVN there were ideas to link it to overall schemes. SVN might raise questions about recognition of NVN if latter participated in such a scheme but in such an eventuality an answer would have to be found. Whole subject was one about which USA officials had thought a great deal although it appeared inappropriate to talk about it at present as any dangling of a carrot would only be regarded with suspicion.

17. Although Unger's remarks were fully in accord with previously stated USA policy, I was encouraged by relative openness with which he was prepared to discuss with us problems of an eventual settlement.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

244.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

No. Y-189
Ottawa, March 15, 1965
Secret. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Saigon, Delhi, CDS (Priority).
Following for Ritchie.

VIETNAM: USA POLICY

I am anxious to maintain the position we have worked so hard to establish in which the Canadian Government has taken as balanced and objective an approach to Vietnam situation as is possible. Americans will be aware that our efforts in preparation of Minority Statement to the IC's Special Message of February 13 were at least in part designed to explain American public position and to point to justification of what is so often referred to as unwarranted USA interference in internal affairs of South Vietnam. The Americans through their Embassy here have indeed already thanked us for this Minority Statement and for my explanatory statement in the House March 8.

2. Secretary Rusk will, however, be perfectly aware (I have already alluded to this problem in my message of February 25) that public pressures in Canada are against maintenance of this position. Indeed, there are strong voices clamouring for a stop to hostilities in Vietnam and claiming that real escalation has begun. These pressures are greatly increased when incidents occur which tend to undercut Canadian Government's position. While it is certainly

not repeat not politic for us or for Americans for us to appear to be so much in their confidence that by implication we condone their actions, on the other hand, our willingness to support USA position to best of our ability is made difficult if we are faced with new departures without being satisfied that we know real reason for them.

3. For example, just as I was preparing to table Special Message in House and make clarifying statement Americans commenced landing 3,500 Marines without any previous indication to us. We must presume from press reports that these Marines do not repeat not represent a combat force but are there to guard installations. How much easier it would be to respond satisfactorily to public demands for clarification in Parliament (and Americans must be aware that under our system of government we have to be prepared to answer questions about intentions of our allies if we are to support them) if we had some advance info of American intentions and even more important had some picture of direction and motivation of current American policy. Now there are public references to the use of 7th Fleet which are bound to raise questions in Parliament.[35]

4. I should be grateful if you would draw my concern at this situation to personal attention of Secretary Rusk. This message was prepared before receipt of your telegram 807 of March 13 but I think it still stands. Under what conditions would the USA agree to a conference? Since the USA agreed to the British soundings with the USSR and others we have heard little as to the conditions to be achieved before a conference could be held. We feel we must go a long way publicly in indicating support for USA positions in Vietnam but we cannot be expected to do so relatively ill-informed of US intentions.

[Paul] Martin

245.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Multiple Posts
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à plusieurs missions
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/1.1

No. Y-197[36]
Ottawa, March 15, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Permis New York, NATO Paris, Geneva, Brussels, Hague, Bonn, Rome, CDS (Routine).
By Bag: Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Canberra, Wellington, Hanoi from Saigon.

VIETNAM: CANADIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT

Action addressees will by now have received text of Prime Minister's March 5 speech in New York, my statement in House of Commons March 8 and Prime Minister's comments in House of same day replying to questions about his New York speech.[37]

2. As Prime Minister has indicated his New York speech was not intended to constitute concrete and specific plan. Rather it was designed to suggest one possible type of solution which might in certain circumstances be feasible provided that the parties in conflict were willing to recognize dangers of major confrontation and were prepared to see entry of international insulating mechanism between them. These suggestions were advanced publicly

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35 See/Voir John W. Finney, "U.S. May Expand Fleet," *New York Times*, 9 March 1965, p. 1.

36 To/À : London, Washington, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Delhi, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Saigon, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Belgrade, Rio de Janeiro, Colombo, Cairo, Lagos, Tokyo, Karachi.

37 See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 11, pp. 12082–12083. Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 2e session, vol. 11, p. 12272-12273.

rather than diplomatically in deliberate attempt to attract attention and to create atmosphere in which these ideas might germinate or might stimulate the appearance of alternative proposals which might achieve the same ends.

3. Sufficient time has now gone by to have made possible consideration of these suggestions by interested governments; we would be interested in preliminary reactions. You should therefore approach the government to which you are accredited with explanation along foregoing lines and making available text of Prime Minister's and my own remarks referred to above. In doing so you should make it clear that we are not attempting to promote any specific plan but rather that we are interested in other governments' reactions to the general analysis of the problem and suggestions as outlined by the Canadian Government. In your discussions you should indicate that we are fully aware that entry of any new and more effective international presence into situation is contingent upon goodwill of parties in conflict and in the first instance, this means North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong movement which they control. (On this latter point you may wish to develop theme that one of main purposes of Candel Minority Statement in recent Special Message was to set political facts and realities in Vietnam straight so that any proposed solution could be based on accurate international assessment of nature of problem.) We are not of course encouraged by public reaction to Prime Minister's remarks on part of Viet Cong spokesman in Peking who, in recent press conference, specifically rejected Prime Minister's suggestion and reiterated traditional Communist thesis that solution to Vietnam problem lies in simple withdrawal of Americans from South Vietnam allowing Vietnamese people to settle differences among themselves.[38] If local authorities have any suggestions to make about possible means of applying persuasion or pressure on Viet Cong, North Vietnamese and Chinese to alter their rigid and doctrinaire approach, we should be most interested in having them.

For Saigon:

Grateful if you could make approach to SVN Foreign Minister on this matter. It is also our intention that similar approach should be made in Hanoi soon as possible preferably by you, but otherwise by Jackson. Approach to North Vietnamese will obviously require modification of presentation above which we leave to your discretion but we wish to register disappointment at negative attitude shown by Front spokesman in Peking recently.

[Paul] Martin

246.
Memorandum from Minister, Embassy to United States, to Ambassador to United States
Note du ministre, ambassade aux États-Unis, à l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 3175, Indochina

Secret.
[Washington,] March 16, 1965

VIETNAM

I telephoned Mr. Cadieux on your behalf and raised the question whether it was desired that you should call on Mr. Rusk, as instructed in telegram Y-189 of March 15, to express to him the Minister's concern at the lack of advance notice on projected operations in Vietnam and to ask him under what conditions would the United States agree to negotiations. I pointed out that it was very unlikely that the United States authorities could or would keep us informed in advance of the details of military developments. I said that we had asked under

[38] See/Voir Charles Taylor, "Viet Cong Rejects Plan of Pearson," *Globe and Mail*, 9 March 1965, p. 29.

what conditions the United States would agree to a conference at every level on many occasions and had received the same reply: the United States will not consider negotiation unless the authorities in North Vietnam "stop doing what they are now doing to their neighbours". I felt very dubious that a démarche of the kind suggested would elicit more information than what had been communicated to us repeatedly until now.

The Under-Secretary replied that the telegram under reference had been drafted at Mr. Martin's request after two days of discussion and consideration with officials of the Department and that Mr. Martin had written the last part of it himself. Mr. Cadieux could testify to the mounting pressures from all sides on the Government. Criticism was growing against the bombings in North Vietnam and the uncertainties of United States policy. The Minister had been doing his utmost to support the United States position but felt that he could not go on much longer without receiving timely and frank explanations of the political and military motives and purposes of United States initiatives. Mr. Cadieux therefore thought that it was important for you to see Mr. Rusk and draw to his attention Mr. Martin's difficulties in maintaining his present course. I said that in the circumstances I would make arrangements for you to call on Mr. Rusk on your return from New York.[39]

Y[von] B[eaulne]

P.S. I tried four times yesterday and to-day to communicate with Mr. Unger. I left messages with his secretary, but he did not call back.

247.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

No. 876
Washington, March 19, 1965
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-189 Mar 15.
Repeat for Information: London (Priority); Delhi, CDS (Priority) from Ottawa; Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
Following for Minister.

VIETNAM: USA POLICY

I saw the Secretary of State March 18 and spoke to him in the terms of your reference telegram. I emphasized your personal concern about the present situation in which public pressures in Canada are against the maintenance of the position the Canadian Government has taken with regard to Vietnam. I pointed out to Mr. Rusk the critical questions in Parliament and the doubts about the American action as reflected in the press. I also expressed our desire to receive fuller indication of their thinking and of the direction of current American policy.

2. The Secretary of State expressed his warm appreciation of the public stand which you had taken on this subject and seemed familiar with discussions in the House of Commons and your replies to critics. He said that he was aware of the difficulties which the Government faced, and added that the UK Government also had difficulties.

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[39] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Ambassador saw Secretary Rusk March 18 [indecipherable/illisible]. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

3. Mr. Rusk said that, as we were aware, there were at present no repeat no signs of a willingness on the part of Hanoi or Peking to discontinue aggression or to negotiate. He had hoped that action by the British and Soviet Co-Chairmen might lay the groundwork for discussions. So far Gromyko's reaction in London had been entirely negative, but he understood that the British were returning to this question with him. The Secretary said that he had thought that the Co-Chairmen might address messages to the Geneva Conference powers which would elicit constructive suggestions. USA was insisting on the cessation of infiltration and aggression from North Vietnam, while the North Vietnamese were calling for the cessation of USA raids on North Vietnamese territory. It might be that other participating Geneva powers could offer suggestions for a means of balancing off these positions and reaching a basis for negotiation. USA had repeatedly stated that if North Vietnamese aggression ceased they would withdraw their forces from South Vietnam.

4. Mr. Rusk said that he had also thought of the possibility of utilizing the services of the Co-Chairmen in the context of Laos. If a conference on Laos were to take place in July to deal with the renewal of the Laos Commission's mandate (Article 19), such a conference would of course have no repeat no legal competence to deal with Vietnam but that question would certainly be discussed "in the corridors" and other interested powers could be brought into the discussion. You will recall that last month the Secretary of State made a similar reference to Laos as a possible door into a political meeting on Vietnam and that for some time he has had a cautiously receptive attitude to talks in the Article 19 context (paragraph 6 of our telegram 635 February 26 and paragraph 2 of our telegram 659† March 2).

5. The Secretary said that he had also given some consideration to the possibility of utilizing the meetings of Vietnam Commission [itself]. (He emphasized that this was a personal idea and did not repeat not form part of USA "official" policy.) Perhaps other interested powers could in some way be brought into relationship with the discussions in the Commission on Vietnam. He wondered whether in the context of Laos or of the Vietnam Commission the Poles might have a role to play. He had had a lengthy discussion on Vietnam with Rapacki at the UN in New York in December. While there had been no repeat no meeting of minds, he was left with the impression that the Poles were anxious to avoid any confrontation over Vietnam. He wondered also whether it might be easier for the Poles than for the Russians themselves (although obviously they would be under Soviet direction in this matter) to participate in the early stages of such a discussion.

6. I then referred to the Prime Minister's speech of March 5 in New York and your statement in tabling the Commission report in the House of Commons on March 8 and asked whether the Secretary envisaged that any eventual settlement would have to come under some form of international supervisory machinery which involved other members of the international community. Mr. Rusk replied that no repeat no doubt this might eventually be necessary. As to the settlement itself, he restricted himself to saying that it would have to be the kind of settlement which did not repeat not permit the subversion of South Vietnam by the Communists. He said that this was important not repeat not because of any mechanical "domino theory" but because it was now evident that the case of South Vietnam could not repeat not be isolated. We were faced with a technique of infiltration and subversion which, if it succeeded in South Vietnam, would be pursued by the Communists not repeat not only in other Asian countries but also in Africa. It was essential that this should be met and stopped. The stakes were very high and the repercussions would be worldwide. He thought, for instance, of the effect in West Berlin of any capitulation of USA over South Vietnam. Mr. Rusk said that one could be sure that if USA abandoned South Vietnam today, tomorrow General de Gaulle would claim that USA would not repeat not fulfil its obligations for the defence of Europe. Also, it was possible that by firmness now, the Communist Chinese would be convinced that it would be unprofitable to stimulate further aggressions of this kind and might, over a period of time, become more and more reconciled to the idea of peaceful co-existence.

7. The Secretary said that it was most important that the international community should be more aware of the nature of the danger with which they were faced by tactics like those being used by the Communists in South Vietnam. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, the full support for USA position and the quick response to the threat of Communist aggression on the part of the countries of the OAS and of NATO had undoubtedly been a most important element in discouraging USSR. The situation in Vietnam was different. The war and the process of infiltration had been dragging on since 1959 without any actual climax and in many Western countries there was a lack of interest and a lack of understanding of the gravity of the issues at stake. Mr. Rusk asked me to tell you that he intended to raise this whole problem at the forthcoming NATO ministerial meeting.

8. I asked Mr. Rusk whether he thought there was any likelihood that North Vietnamese aggression might eventually be terminated, not repeat not by the action of a conference or by an explicit renunciation of aggression by North Vietnam, but rather by a tacit and gradual diminution of aggression to a vanishing point. I added that this process would not repeat not of course replace the necessity for a settlement and for international action to enforce it. The Secretary said that such a development was always a possibility, and USA would be watching closely for any signs of it, but there were none at the present time.

9. In the meantime, Mr. Rusk said we should all have to hold steady and he thought that things would get considerably worse before they got better. I asked whether he thought that increased USA pressures on North Vietnam might result in an invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese forces or by the presence of Chinese troops in North Vietnam, or both. The Secretary did not repeat not reply directly but said that so far, from any evidence they possessed, there was no repeat no sign of substantial troop movements, regrouping, etc., which would indicate anything of the kind. Indeed, he commented that the reaction to the latest USA air strike on March 15 on the part of Peking and Hanoi was milder than their reaction to earlier strikes notwithstanding that the last strike was the most damaging and serious so far in the series. This might simply be a lull while Peking and Hanoi considered countermeasures which they should take or it might mean that they were considering the consequences for themselves of such USA punitive action.

10. I found the Secretary of State in a relaxed and forthcoming mood and anxious to convey to you his appreciation of the helpful attitude of the Canadian Government over Vietnam. His willingness to discuss various procedures for bringing about eventual negotiation was encouraging and interesting. Particularly interesting was the evidence that USA, while maintaining pressures on North Vietnam, were exploring the possibility of bringing about informal contacts with the other side, contacts which might result in private meetings where the North Vietnamese might make concessions without public loss of face. It was quite clear, however, that in Mr. Rusk's mind such negotiations could only be contemplated on the basis of North Vietnamese cessation of aggression and that he contemplated the possibility of a considerable time span before such a point might be arrived at (e.g., his reference to the possible utilization of the Laos International Supervisory Commission as an occasion for a July conference). Meanwhile there is every indication that USA pressures on North Vietnam will continue and increase in severity if this is considered necessary to obtain the desired results and that this is seen here as a response to continued North Vietnamese aggression. Indeed, the Secretary of State said that it would have been much easier to make this point if the aggression had taken the form of an orthodox military invasion but that North Vietnamese infiltration and subversion were just as much an aggression as an invasion would have been.[40]

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

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[40] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Seen by SSEA and P[rime] M[inister]. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]
Copies sent to members of Cabinet E[xternal] A[ffairs] C[ommitt]ee, March 23. W. B[auer]

248.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 10102, 20-CDA-9-PEARSON/5.2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] March 29, 1965

A draft of a speech for delivery at Temple University April 2nd is attached.†

2. The introductory paragraphs of this speech have been left for drafting in your office. The rest of the speech falls into three parts – Peace-keeping under the United Nations, Peace-keeping in Indochina (with emphasis on Vietnam), and concluding remarks. The section on Indochina consists of an explanation of the peace-keeping role of International Commissions and the reasons why the Vietnam Commission's present difficulties do not reflect adversely on peace-keeping as a concept, along with some concrete proposals concerning the crisis in Vietnam.

3. The treatment of the Vietnam problem incorporates the following ideas you outlined to Mr. Cadieux March 27:

a) The broad objectives of the draft appeal prepared in Belgrade by some non-aligned and other countries: The presentation of this appeal now seems to have been postponed indefinitely because certain participants, including Ceylon, disagree with some of its language. It has also lost much of its value to truly non-aligned countries following a Yugoslav government statement of March 26th, which, after condemning "the aggressive actions of the U.S.A. against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam" and "the policy of force and brinkmanship", goes on to appeal, in the general terms of the draft, for a solution by negotiation. Despite this, we have incorporated in the draft speech a number of the ideas contained in the draft appeal; these are sidelined on page 11.

b) The possibility of combining international economic efforts with the supervisory function following any settlement: Until the terms of a final settlement can be envisaged more clearly, it is difficult to formulate specific arrangements. On page 14, however, the possibility is hinted at.

c) A suggestion that the United States might suspend retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam for a certain period of time, in order to give the Hanoi authorities an opportunity to soften their line without appearing to do so as the direct result of military pressure: This suggestion (pp. 11-13) attempts to meet your desire for a more positive and independent approach. You may consider, however, that a proposal of this kind would be more effective if it were put forward, in the first instance, privately to President Johnson.[41]

P[aul] M[artin]

249.
Memorandum by Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/5

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] March 31, 1965

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[41] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes. [L.B. Pearson]

UNITED STATES VIETNAM POLICY

Marquis Childs, the United States columnist and commentator, called on the Prime Minister on March 30. Mr. Childs has known the Prime Minister since Mr. Pearson's Washington days. Mr. Pearson was interested in his views and asked that he see Mr. Martin, and that a record be kept of the latter conversation for the use of the Department.

2. Mr. Childs' main theme was that President Johnson was embarked on a course which, in the next three or four weeks, would bring the United States perilously close to war with Communist China and the USSR. Speaking, as he emphasized, personally and confidentially, Mr. Childs said that President Johnson was relying almost entirely on Mr. McNamara for his advice on Vietnam. Dean Rusk was supporting Mr. McNamara's stand. He was not bringing forward any alternative policies. President Johnson had failed, in Mr. Childs' opinion, to assess accurately the consequences of his present policy for the direct involvement in Indo-China of the USSR and Communist China.

3. Mr. Childs reported a conversation which President Johnson had had recently with a friend, (whom he later identified as Walter Lippmann), in the course of which President Johnson had said that he did not want a war with 700 million Communist Chinese, but that a war with the North Vietnamese might be a different matter. Mr. Childs' fear was that, to judge from such statements, President Johnson did not appreciate that continued war with North Vietnam would certainly involve both the other major Communist powers.

4. Prime Minister Pearson, Mr. Martin and the Canadian Government, Mr. Childs felt, had an important role to play in influencing United States policy at this crucial period. He referred to Senator Cooper's speech last week, on the floor of the Senate, in the course of which the Senator had read into the record most of Mr. Pearson's recent speech in New York. (Mr. Martin has asked for a copy of the Senate record.)[42]

5. It was Mr. Childs' view that the war on the ground in South Vietnam was, in the present framework, lost. The only major troop movements in South Vietnam were made possible by United States air support. The Viet Cong forces were steadily increasing their control of the countryside.

6. Mr. Childs seemed to be concerned especially at the extent to which United States policy at the present time was being determined by the Pentagon. Mr. Childs said he had information to the effect that General Taylor would ask for at least a division of United States forces to be sent, as were the Marines, to guard strategic installations. He said that he understood the Pentagon was fully prepared to anticipate that as many as 250,000 to 300,000 United States soldiers might eventually be committed to South Vietnam.

7. In this situation, Mr. Childs said Dean Rusk seemed incapable of taking a conciliatory position. McGeorge Bundy was also committed to the "hard line" and he, Dean Rusk and Mr. McNamara seemed resentful of any suggestion that there were respectable alternatives. He referred repeatedly to the hypersensitivity of the United States administration to comments that alternatives to present United States policies were feasible.

8. Mr. Childs noted that Mr. Humphrey's position was extremely difficult, although he was as concerned as others at the rigidity of the United States position. He could not be a party to an internal dispute in opposition to the President. Mr. Childs also said that the President was wrong if he felt that he could count indefinitely on Republican support. The Republicans had supported President Truman on Korea, but in time they withdrew that support for what was then described as "Truman's war". President Johnson was enjoying bipartisan support for his Vietnam policy for the moment, but in Mr. Childs' opinion, before too long the war in Vietnam would be known as "Johnson's war".

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[42] See/Voir Senator Cooper, speaking on Situation in Vietnam, on 25 March 1965, 89th Congress, 1st Session, *Congressional Record* (Senate), Volume 111, Part 5, pp. 5934–5935.

9. In the absence of a real dialogue within the United States administration, Canada could play a vital role by making practical suggestions. Mr. Childs said that in addition to the possibilities which the Prime Minister's speech had opened up, he felt that there was an opportunity which the Secretary-General of the United Nations should seize. The USSR has apparently been prodding U Thant "indirectly" to visit Hanoi. U Thant might well be inclined to go. However, Mr. Childs had learned that the United States State Department was refusing to take a position on such a visit.

10. One question which Mr. Childs had apparently discussed recently with Dean Rusk was whether Hanoi would be *able* to call off the war in the south. Dean Rusk had said that he thought Hanoi might *not* be able to call off the war entirely, but that if Viet Cong operations were "largely stopped", the United States would be willing to take part in negotiations for a settlement.

11. When Mr. Martin asked Mr. Childs what he would recommend if he were in a position to do so, Mr. Childs said that assuming the war on the ground in Vietnam under present circumstances was lost, more United States ground troops would have to be committed. However, he said that when such a commitment was made, the United States should at the same time, in its own interest and as a concession to world opinion, propose an international conference on Vietnam. However, Mr. Childs was concerned that the bombing of the United States Embassy[43] would harden the United States position, and perhaps result in bombing of Hanoi. There were strong Pentagon forces in favour of carrying present bombings farther into Vietnam and, ultimately, to the destruction of the nuclear installations in China. It was Mr. Childs' view that this kind of thinking represented a serious miscalculation of the facts and the politics governing the Vietnam war.

12. Mr. Martin reviewed the Canadian position and commented that nothing he had seen suggested that a crisis involving USSR and Chinese commitment to the war in Vietnam was as near as Mr. Childs thought. He noted that there was no indication from the Communist Chinese or the North Vietnamese of a willingness to negotiate and referred to Dean Rusk's comment that if "we agreed to negotiate, who would we negotiate with?"

13. Mr. Martin also referred to the difficulties of the Canadian position and stressed that privately we had brought a lot of pressure to bear on the United States and other countries for the purpose of getting negotiations started. He made it clear however that under present circumstances our public position should not be expected to run strongly and obviously counter to the United States position. When the United States was carrying the responsibilities of the West in Vietnam, Canada could not add to its problems.

14. Mr. Martin initiated a discussion of the representation of China at the United Nations. Mr. Childs said it was widely known that when Kennedy came into power, there were influential members in the State Department who were prepared to support a two China policy. However, in this field again, Dean Rusk had not been prepared to take any initiative. Mr. Martin said that his consultations with United States authorities had led him to conclude that the United States would have to do something about Communist Chinese recognition by the end of 1965. Dean Rusk had said to him that some change of attitude might be possible "if there were no war before then". Mr. Martin had found it hard to see exactly what Dean Rusk meant by this, unless he was thinking of the escalation of the conflict in Indochina. The absence of Communist China from the United Nations clearly prevented it, when taken together with its financial problems, from taking action although the Secretary-General could and should move.

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[43] See/Voir "Heavy Bomb Wrecks U.S. Saigon Embassy," *Washington Post*, 30 March 1965, p. A1.

15. At several points in his comments, Mr. Childs referred to personality clashes between United States public figures, e.g., between Acheson and Lippmann. Mr. Childs himself (it might be useful to determine exactly where he stood) appeared to be deeply involved in, and concerned with, the clash of personalities surrounding President Johnson and most anxious that the President receive advice which would include alternatives to the present United States Vietnam policies. This advice, if it could not come from within United States official circles, might have to come from outside. Mr. Childs seemed to think that Canada had a special responsibility in this connection and he re-emphasized the urgency ("in the next few weeks") for Canadian intervention in Washington on Vietnam.

16. Mr. Martin asked Mr. Childs to call on Mr. Ritchie when Mr. Childs returned to Washington and to discuss these issues.

J.G. H[adwen]

250.
Memorandum by Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
MG32-B12, vol. 227, 25

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] April 1st, 1965

UNITED STATES VIEWS ON VIETNAM

Mr. Marquis Childs called again late on Thursday, April 1st, to report some recent developments of interest to the Prime Minister prior to his Temple University speech.

2. Mr. Harlan Cleveland's speech of yesterday had been interpreted in the *New York Times* as supporting an active role for the Secretary-General in respect to Vietnam.[44] Mr. Childs said that there were a number of signs which he had seen on return to Washington of an increased desire for diplomatic discussions on Vietnam.

3. When Mr. Harlan Cleveland returned to Washington Mr. Childs interviewed him and in the course of their discussion Mr. Cleveland said that his speech had been misinterpreted by the *New York Times*. Mr. Harlan Cleveland had meant to say that if there were opportunities for negotiations, the United States would welcome them but that in the case of Vietnam and Berlin, the situation appeared for the moment to be without opportunities for negotiations.

4. Mr. Childs asked Mr. Cleveland if the United States would favour Mr. U Thant going to Hanoi, and Mr. Cleveland replied "yes, if on invitation".

5. Once again Mr. Childs said that from the press conference the President had given just a few minutes before Mr. Childs' call, it appeared that there was a somewhat greater disposition in Washington to receive suggestions than had been the case.[45] Mr. Childs said he was sure that the general lines of Mr. Pearson's speech would "not be resented in Washington".

6. He had spoken to McGeorge Bundy and others of the White House, and the President was still hoping to go to Texas but the decision would not be taken until the last minute.

J.G. Hadwen

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[44] See/Voir Irving Spiegel, "U.S. Official Sees U.N. Vietnam Role," *New York Times*, 1 April 1965, p. 1.

[45] See/Voir Tad Szulc, "President Asserts Strategy on Vietnam Is Unchanged," *New York Times*, 2 April 1965, p. 1.

251.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Multiple Posts
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à plusieurs missions
RG25, vol. 9311, 20-10-VIETS/2

No. Y-270[46]
Ottawa, April 1, 1965
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Our Tel PST-19.†
By Bag: Hong Kong, Hanoi, Canberra, Wellington, Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, CDS.

VIETNAM: APPEAL BY NON-ALIGNED AND OTHER COUNTRIES

SSEA received Yugoslav Ambassador and UAR Chargé yesterday morning to accept text of Belgrade appeal.[47]

2. Yugoslav Ambassador gave brief exposition of background and went on to explain that objective was to suggest and press for political solution to Vietnam crisis which necessitated undertaking negotiations immediately without preconditions (SSEA interjected that Canada would strongly support this). Ambassador noted that appeal did not analyze causes of conflict nor attempt to establish guilt. Moreover, it did not suggest any specific procedure for negotiations. Appeal was being directed to parties directly concerned as follows: U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., France, Communist China, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Liberation Front, Canada, Poland and U.N. Secretary-General.

3. U.A.R. Chargé said that his Government wished to avoid apportioning blame in interests of solving problem. Appeal was seen as first step in process which would establish contacts between the non-aligned nations and major powers involved.

4. SSEA replied that Canada would not quarrel with spirit of the appeal and could give it general support since it appeared to be in keeping with what had been repeatedly stated by Prime Minister and himself in and out of Parliament. Canadian Government did not believe that military solution was possible and did not condone use of force in Vietnam. If there had been strict adherence to terms of 1954 Geneva Agreement present situation would never have come about and, in this connection, attention should be paid to comments of Canadian delegation to International Commission in Vietnam. Canada had noted President Johnson's statements that cease-fire could be arranged if there were some evident disposition to stop aggression. Unfortunately, Canada could see no disposition on part of Hanoi or Vietcong to undertake talks of any kind, although SSEA referred obliquely to report in morning's press that Hanoi might be changing its position in this respect;[48] this remained subject to confirmation (see our telegram Y-264† to Moscow). SSEA concluded by saying that our objective was "a neutral or an independent Vietnam". There would have to be some sanction to guarantee that status and this idea was behind Prime Minister's suggestion for international peace-keeping force.

5. SSEA expressed Canadian Government's view that any appeal such as this must be directed to both sides involved in the conflict, and in appealing for cease-fire on several occasions in the past Canadian Government had made this position clear.

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[46] To/À : London, Washington, Saigon, Belgrade, Colombo, Delhi, Nicosia, Accra, Beirut, Dar-es-Salaam, Cairo, Warsaw, Moscow, Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Permis New York, Tokyo.

[47] See/Voir "Text of Appeal by Nonaligned States," *New York Times*, 2 April 1965, p. 2.

[48] This may have been a reference to the following article: Henry Tanner, "Neutralists Say Hanoi Indicates Interest in Talks," *New York Times*, 1 April 1965, p. 1.
Il pourrait s'agir de l'article suivant : Henry Tanner, « Neutralists Say Hanoi Indicates Interest in Talks », *New York Times*, 1 avril 1965, p. 1.

6. Yugoslav Ambassador, referring back to SSEA's comments about unwillingness of Hanoi and Vietcong to undertake talks, said that it would be a distortion to view Belgrade appeal as directed primarily to North Vietnam and Liberation Front. Appeal had been drafted March 15 before air strikes against North Vietnam had become virtually daily occurrence and before use of gas in South Vietnam had been publicized. These circumstances indicated that it would be totally unrealistic to ask for considerations from one side alone. This had been made clear to President Johnson. American and SVN bombings of North Vietnam should stop and should not be seen as a concession.

7. When asked whether Canada would support Belgrade appeal, SSEA said that he anticipated question in House that afternoon and he would reply in much the same terms as above.[49] Subsequently text of appeal would be given careful consideration, particularly in light of Canadian membership on International Commission. This led Minister to ask whether, by avoiding attribution of responsibility, appeal was not – and perhaps this was wise – ignoring real political situation in Indochina. Facts of situation were as Canada had reported them in Commission context. U.S. position did not deserve wholesale condemnation since U.S. presence in SVN had come about at request of SVN Government under Article 52 of U.N. Charter. Although unable to speak for U.S. Government, SSEA informed Ambassador and Chargé in strong terms that it would be grave mistake to believe that U.S.A. was prepared to tolerate subversion in South Vietnam or elsewhere in Asia. His comments did not imply Canadian endorsement of means U.S.A. was applying in resisting subversion, but recognition of U.S.A. determination on this score was fundamental to understanding U.S. policy and therefore situation. On other hand if North would stop its aggression and if China would stop encouraging it, there was little doubt in SSEA's mind that settlement could be found. (Yugoslav Ambassador went so far as to indicate agreement that there had been Northern intervention.)

8. SSEA concluded interview by asking whether conference on Laos would be useful since same parties would be involved and conference would open up new contacts and channels of communication. Yugoslav Ambassador asked whether this was formal initiative to which SSEA replied that it was idea worth speculating about.

[Paul] Martin

252.
Letter from Counsellor, High Commission of United Kingdom, to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre du conseiller au haut-commissariat du Royaume-Uni, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/6

Ottawa, April 2, 1965

Dear Secretary of State,

In the High Commissioner's absence from Ottawa today I enclose a message for you from the Foreign Secretary, acting in his capacity as Geneva Co-Chairman, which we have received this morning by telegram from London.

Mr. Stewart's message is being released to the press in London today.

Yours sincerely,
Eleanor J. Emery

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[49] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 12, p. 13028.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 2e session, vol. 12, p. 13218.

Enclosure: Message from Co-Chairman, Geneva Conference, to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Pièce jointe : Message du coprésident, Conférence de Genève, au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

London, April 2, 1965

MESSAGE FROM THE RT. HON. MICHAEL STEWART M.P.
AS GENEVA CO-CHAIRMAN TO THE HON. PAUL MARTIN M.P.

The British Co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China has noted with grave concern the dangerous state of international tension now existing in connection with Vietnam. Accordingly he invites the Governments members of the 1954 Conference and the Governments represented on the International Control Commission to furnish him with a statement of their views of the situation in Vietnam and, in particular, on the circumstances in which they consider that a peaceful settlement could be reached.

The British Co-Chairman also hopes that the forthcoming visit of his special representative, Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker, to South East Asia will afford the Governments of the countries he will visit an opportunity for further discussion of their views on this problem.

Foreign Office, London

253.
Diary of Prime Minister
Journal du premier ministre
MG26-N6, vol. 36, Johnson, President Lyndon B.

[Ottawa, n.d.]

VISIT TO CAMP DAVID SATURDAY, APRIL 3, 1965

A helicopter took us from Philadelphia; Charles Ritchie, John Hadwen, Jim Coutts and myself.

After a flight of an hour and a half in sunny weather, we landed at Camp David in the Catoctin Mountains at 12.30 p.m. The President and Mac Bundy met us and took us straight to the Camp. We were greeted by "Lady Bird". We had an aperitif – all except the President, who had milk! and then went in to lunch.

The talk at lunch was limited by the fact that the President was on the telephone practically all of the time – even while eating. He appeared to be talking to McNamara about the latest developments in Vietnam. It was not easy to exchange even polite pleasantness with "Lady Bird" while this was going on; let alone talk business. We did get in a few words before lunch, however, about a new idea of joint action on pollution of the Great Lakes, an agreement for which had been drawn up and handed to me by the President, to my surprise, as this was the first I had heard of it. I also proposed that Galbraith should act as a kind of mediator in an effort to resolve the deadlock in the air agreement, reporting back directly to the President and myself.[50]

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[50] The Air Transport Agreement between Canada and the United States was signed on 17 January 1966. See *Canada Treaty Series*, 1966, no. 2.
L'Accord relatif au transport aérien entre le Canada et les États-Unis a été signé le 17 janvier 1966. Voir *Recueil des traités du Canada*, 1966, nº 2.

It was only after lunch when we went out on the terrace (cool, sunny and a wonderful view) that we got down to real talk about Vietnam – just the two of us.

I began it by asking what he thought of my speech of last night.[51] He replied quickly and decisively: "It was bad", and then for an hour (before and after the press conference) he told me why it was bad, allowing me to get in only a word or two of explanation and justification. If there had not been a kind of "*et tu, Brute*" feeling about the assault, without any personal unpleasantness of any kind, I would have felt almost like Schuschnigg before Hitler at Berchtesgaden!

The burden of his complaint was that I had joined the ranks of the domestic opponents of his Vietnam policy: [Senator Wayne] Morse, [Walter] Lippmann, the *New York Times*, A.D.A. [Americans for Democratic Action], the ignorant Liberals, the "know nothings", "do gooders", etc. By doing so, I had made it more difficult for him. He didn't expect that of me, etc.; that I would come into the United States and make a speech of this kind without consulting him or Mac Bundy or Dean Rusk or somebody. That he was getting tired of receiving advice (and nothing else) from foreign visitors: Wilson, Stewart (whom he particularly resented) Couve de Murville, etc. None of these people really knew anything about the situation; they had no policy or solution of their own but that didn't prevent them criticizing his. When he asked them for positive proposals – alternative policies, etc. – they never had any reply.

Eventually I tried to explain to him what I really did say in Philadelphia, not what he thought I had said; and why I said it; how I was trying to make the kind of suggestion – carefully guarded – that might be of help to him in circumstances where the stepped-up bombing of North Vietnam had not achieved the desired result. I also pointed out that public opinion in my country was profoundly disturbed by the implications of certain aspects of U.S. policy and that some of us were having difficulty with public opinion in our complete support of that policy.

He couldn't understand why. Nor could he understand why we seemed to be critical of, or fearful of, the results of every warlike action by the U.S., when we ignored the horrible atrocities of the Communists. The President seemed to feel a little forlorn at not being understood better by friends. "O.K., if you don't want us there, we can clear out; really clear out and then see what happens."

He then expounded his Vietnam policy at some length, emphasizing a dozen times that all he wanted was peace. How dare "they" consider him a war-monger, etc. For peace, there had to be negotiation. Of course, he knew this but who were you going to negotiate with? Did the Communists want negotiation? No, they wanted surrender, which they thought would soon come, especially when the friends of the U.S.A. began to criticize her.

The Americans would, however, not surrender or stop the fight against aggression.

I got in a word or two here to point out that I agreed – and had said so last night and earlier – that a cease-fire must come before negotiation and that meanwhile resistance to aggression must go on. But what if air bombing of the North, as part of that resistance, didn't succeed in bringing about a situation where the North would agree to a cease-fire and negotiation? What then? Extension of the air warfare, or what?

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[51] A published version of the full speech was not found. For excerpts, see Canadian Consulate Philadelphia, "Address by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, on Accepting the 2nd Temple University World Peace Award at the Founder's Dinner of the University's General Alumni Association," Philadelphia, 2 April 1965 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Canadian Consulate, 1965).
Aucune publication du discours complet n'a été trouvée. Pour en consulter des extraits, voir Consulat du Canada à Philadelphie, « Address by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, on Accepting the 2nd Temple University World Peace Award at the Founder's Dinner of the University's General Alumni Association », Philadelphie, 2 avril 1965 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania : Canadian Consulate, 1965).

The President then gave me a frank and revealing exposition of U.S. plans, told with great vehemence, many short and vigorous vulgarities at the expense of his opponents, and a few Texas illustrations.

There were three possible policies:

(1) That advocated by General Lemay, certain Chiefs of State, Dean Acheson (I gathered) and the real "hawks"; namely wipe out Hanoi, Haiphong, even Peking, and other Asian Communist centres by using the strategic Air Force; in short, all-out war. The President had been resisting this policy for 18 months and would continue to do so, come what may. "Not bad, for a war-monger."

(2) The other extreme – get out – lock, stock and barrel; back to the continental U.S.A. and to hell with Vietnam and Asia. A kind of escalation in reverse. Then watch, said the President, the reaction of India, Pakistan, Great Britain, Australia and the others, when we leave them to their fate.

(3) The policy that was being followed, what was that?

Helping South Vietnam in spite of its political confusion and military unreliability; step up American military aid, which would mean more troops; kill more Viet Cong, really go after them; follow through on the planned bombing of the North.

On the last point, I pressed him on what their "plans" were. What did Maxwell Taylor mean by "unlimited bombing"?[52] This was the possibility causing most anxiety for the friends of the U.S.A.

The President said their plans were *not* for unlimited bombing but for the progressive destruction – if necessary – of military installations, communications and industrial facilities important in the assistance North Vietnam was giving the South. They would not bomb within a 50-mile radius of Hanoi – the distance beyond which Hanoi MiGs cannot operate and return. They would also do everything possible to avoid killing civilians, for which restraint, the President repeated with the bitterness he had previously shown on this matter, they would get no thanks even from their friends.

The President is sincere about this limitation of air action in the North and he has removed certain military targets from the list because they are too near the Chinese border or in crowded towns.

I told the President I was relieved, as I thought everybody would be relieved, to hear of the careful character of this planned retaliation. I wished we had known of it before. He replied that he had told us and the world in numerous speeches and statements. But certainly he has not – at least in the detail he gave me.

There is no doubt that the President is tired, under great and continuous pressure, and that he is beginning to show it. He is more worried about U.S. policy in Vietnam than he is willing to show. His irritation at any indication of lack of full support for his policy; his impatience of criticism and his insistence that everything is working out in accord with a well-conceived plan; all these really indicate a feeling of insecurity about the situation, rather than the reverse. As the President said: "It's hard to sleep these days". "I'm beginning to feel like a martyr"; "misunderstood", "misjudged by friends at home and abroad".

This crisis over Vietnam is going to be a great test for L.B.J. I'm not now certain that he is going to be successful in meeting it.

L.B. P[earson]

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[52] This may have been a reference to an AP report from Saigon that Taylor had said in a speech that no limit existed on the potential escalation of the war. See "All-Out Red Drive Seen by Taylor," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 March 1965, p. 22.
Il pourrait s'agir d'une dépêche de l'AP provenant de Saïgon, selon laquelle Taylor aurait déclaré, dans un discours, ne voir aucune limite à l'escalade potentielle du conflit. Voir « All-Out Red Drive Seen by Taylor », *Los Angeles Times*, 23 mars 1965, p. 22.

254.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6271

Secret.
[Ottawa,] April 5, 1965

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Gordon),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Sharp),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Benidickson),
The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Laing),
The Secretary of State (Mr. Lamontagne),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),
The Solicitor General (Mr. MacNaught),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Miss LaMarsh),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Nicholson),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Hays),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Loughead), (Mr. Wall).

[…]

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

The Minister of Finance expressed warm agreement with the speech by the Prime Minister on the occasion of the presentation to him of the Temple University World Peace Award. He felt there had been general agreement with it in Canada.

The Prime Minister said that he had met with a good reception at Philadelphia and, upon arrival there, had received an invitation to visit the President of the United States at Camp David. He learned that copies of his speech had been distributed in the Pentagon and that the reaction there was not too favourable. The President considered that U.S. intentions in Viet Nam were misunderstood. The Air Force missions were carefully planned. They were proceeding according to very strict limitations and were directed at purely military objectives. The U.S. does not intend to start an all-out war.

[…][53]

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Prime Minister on his meeting with President Johnson at Camp David.

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[53] In the material excised from this document for length, Pearson described some of the other, non-Vietnam-related issues he and Johnson discussed at Camp David.
Dans un passage extrait du document en raison de sa longueur, Pearson décrit certains autres dossiers, non liés au Vietnam, dont il a discuté avec le président Johnson à Camp David.

255.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10102, 20-CDA-9-PEARSON/6

Secret.
[Ottawa,] April 7, 1965

VIETNAM: PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

This morning Mr. Johnson, the Counsellor of the United States Embassy, called on me by appointment and bearing in hand this morning's article in the *Globe & Mail* by George Bain.[54]

2. After a great deal of circumlocution it became clear that his purpose was to observe that there had been a contrast in a very short space of time in the way in which speeches on Vietnam had been treated on the one hand by the Prime Minister and on the other by Mr. George Ball, in the sense that Mr. Ball had accepted Canadian advice not to speak on Vietnam after showing a prepared text to Mr. Ritchie[55] whereas the Prime Minister's text had been made available only at an hour too late to allow any American observations to be made.

3. While not apologizing for this difference in treatment I explained to Mr. Johnson that the Prime Minister's speeches were normally put in final form only at the very last minute. For example, the speech to the Canadian Club on February 10 was put in final form only ten minutes before the Prime Minister left his office to deliver it. I explained that I understood that this was not unusual and had probably also been the case for the Temple University speech.

4. I asked Mr. Johnson whether he was calling as a result of a desire from within the Embassy for clarification or on instructions. He said that he had been "authorized" to draw the difference in practice to my attention. He did not go on to say that the hope was that this observation would be conveyed higher up but this obviously is the U.S. hope.

R.L. Rogers

256.
Letter from Prime Minister to President of United States
Lettre du premier ministre au président des États-Unis
MG26-N3, vol. 134, 313.4 Camp David Pers. and Conf.

Personal and Confidential.
[Ottawa,] April 8, 1965

Dear Mr. President:

May I first thank you for our short, but most pleasant, visit last Saturday to a very delightful place, Camp David. Mrs. Johnson and you have a wonderful gift for making people feel at home and for making possible the discussion of even the most difficult and sensitive subjects in the friendliest of atmospheres.

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[54] See/Voir George Bain, "A Significant Difference," *Globe and Mail*, 7 April 1965, p. 7.

[55] See/Voir "Ball Says Canadians Have Right to Protest U.S. Racial Problems," *Globe and Mail*, 23 March 1965, p. 31.

We certainly discussed one such subject, Vietnam, last Saturday. I came away feeling that, though I understand much better the plans and the purposes of your policy in Southeast Asia, I really had not made my own position clear enough, especially in the light of the "peace" speech I gave in Philadelphia the night before.

I want to assure you that my Government, and I particularly as its leader, want to give you all possible support in the policy, difficult and thankless, you are following in Vietnam in aiding South Vietnam to resist aggression. I believe that the great majority of the Canadian people feel the same way.

There is also, however, a feeling of deep anxiety about developments which could lead to wider hostilities. This is understandable enough, especially when it is not possible to know all the facts at the disposal of the government of another country. We are very much aware in Canada that we are inevitably involved in every big decision made in Washington, so we are concerned about the decisions themselves – at times, I think, quite as much as the American people themselves are. We also talk about them.

To this anxiety is added criticism of United States' Vietnam policy from certain quarters in Canada. A part of this is left-wing exploitation of fear; a part of it is merely a reflection of that irrational anti-Americanism which a few Canadians have as their primary prejudice. A part of it is based on a quite genuine feeling that current United States policy in Vietnam is wrong and heading for trouble. This vocal, if limited, critical reaction has resulted in a good deal of questioning, much of it unfriendly to the government, in our Parliament. The burden of the criticism is that we are giving the United States automatic and unquestioning support; tagging along as a satellite, rather than acting as a self-respecting friend. A government, especially a minority government, cannot merely brush off these criticisms as unimportant. This is the political background in Ottawa, though it is not expressed adequately in a few words.

At Philadelphia, I took this background into account in making a plea for peace in Vietnam, along with two or three suggestions which I thought might be helpful for this purpose in the right circumstances. In doing so, however, I also emphasized (I venture to attach a few excerpts from my speech to show this) the honourable and unselfish motives behind United States intervention in the first place; the necessity of defeating aggression even if it meant stepping up military power in South Vietnam; the necessity of a cease-fire and a cessation of aggression from the north before there could be meaningful negotiations. In my proposal for a "suspension" or "pause" in the series of "increasingly powerful retaliatory strikes", I did not argue it should be done now but might be considered "at the right time"; that it would be "for a limited time" and that, even if it took place, it would not apply to other action against aggression in the south.

My point is that, once the destructive effects of air strikes are really being felt by the Hanoi Government, they might wish to "cry quits" but without being accused of doing so in the face of continued air action. In other words, this "pause" would give them an opportunity to stop the fighting in the south if they wished to use it for that purpose. If they didn't, then their aggressive intransigence would have been exposed and it would be made very clear who was preventing a negotiated solution. I should have thought that this would have strengthened your position diplomatically, without weakening it militarily, because the suspension would only be for a short time; long enough for northern Communist intentions to be made clear. Surely, if and when the right time comes and if there has been no other break in the deadlock, this suspension would be worth trying. I feel certain that it would strengthen your support in friendly and even non-committed countries. It would also make full support easier after the suspension had been lifted, if that had to be done.

I assure you that my proposal, carefully guarded, was meant to be helpful; neither critical nor obstructive. I believe that in certain circumstances it may turn out to be useful though I realize that only you can judge those circumstances. I want you to know that I appreciate, as much as any person could, the crushing nature of the problems, domestic and international, that you are facing with such courage and wisdom; that Vietnam is only one of these, though

the one, I suppose, of most immediate danger and stress. I am anxious to help you in this and other matters as the leader of the Government of your closest neighbour and friend. But Canada is a political democracy too, with an active and often divided public opinion; sensitive that its leaders do not appear to be merely echoes of the United States but anxious, I believe, to back up their neighbour when required to do so, as an independent friend should.

I had these considerations very much in mind when I spoke the other night. May I add that your exposition of the American case for planned and limited air retaliation, designed to do the job intended, with a minimum of loss of life and without provocation to China or Russia was reassuring and impressive. I am grateful to you for it, as I am for your kindness, and for your consideration in speaking to me so frankly last Saturday.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,
L.B. Pearson

P.S. I have just listened to your Baltimore speech on our national television network. It was magnificent and deserves, and will receive, I am sure, wholehearted Canadian support; particularly for your declaration of willingness to engage in unconditional discussions looking towards a peaceful settlement and for the imaginative and far-reaching proposal you made for a great development program in the Southeast Asia region.[56]

257.
Letter from President of United States to Prime Minister
Lettre du président des États-Unis au premier ministre
MG26-N3, vol. 134, 313.4 Camp David Pers. and Conf.

Washington, April 11, 1965

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of April 8.

I was glad to have this full account of your thinking. I am pleased you liked the speech at Johns Hopkins and your government's immediate support of it was a great help.[57]

Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson

258.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/6

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] April 14, 1965

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[56] See/Voir "Address at Johns Hopkins University: 'Peace Without Conquest,' April 7, 1965," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 394–399.

[57] See/Voir Stanley Westall, "Pearson Informs House: Canada Vows Help in Asia Aid Project," *Globe and Mail*, 9 April 1965, p. 1.

VIETNAM: APPEAL BY THE "BELGRADE GROUP"

I am attaching for your consideration the text of a reply we might give to the seventeen-power Belgrade group's appeal. You will recall that this appeal was formally presented to you on April 1 by the Yugoslav Ambassador and the U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires, and that you outlined the Canadian Government's initial and favourable reaction to the appeal in the House on the same day; reports from Belgrade indicate that the Canadian Government's sympathetic reaction received favourable attention in Yugoslavia.

2. The Yugoslav Ambassador has asked that our formal reply be made available in the same manner as the appeal was presented and, if at all possible, before the end of this week. If you agree, you may therefore wish to call in the Yugoslav Ambassador and the U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires in the near future to present the attached text to them; you will note that two "original" copies have been prepared for this purpose.

3. In your discussions with them I believe it would be advisable to avoid any commitment on the question – which they may well raise – of whether we are formally associating ourselves with the appeal. You will note that our reply has been drafted in positive and forthcoming terms, but that it avoids any expression of endorsement of the text of the appeal in its entirety; instead, we have indicated specific support for continuing efforts to encourage a more favourable reply from all quarters to the call for talks without preconditions, which the United States has already expressed its willingness to undertake. Thus general acceptance by all – and not just by one side – of the appeal's main purpose must be the next objective and we are prepared to support efforts in this direction. If and when such general acceptance comes about, the purposes of the appeal will have been served and we will then find ourselves in a new situation where too precise a commitment to the terms of this appeal (i.e., by formally associating ourselves with it) might not be helpful or to our advantage, especially in the light of the strong differences which became evident during the negotiations in Belgrade and the equivocal position of some of the participants which those negotiations revealed.

4. You may wish to mention the possibility of releasing the text of this document to the press, explaining that if the substance or full text is to be made public in Belgrade (and Cairo) we would expect to be so informed in advance, to permit simultaneous release to the press here.[58]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

259.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in United Kingdom
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 9311, 20-10-VIETS/2

No. Y-321
Ottawa, April 14, 1965
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Our Tel Y-314† Apr 14.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Colombo, Delhi, Nicosia, Beirut, Cairo, Moscow, Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Permis New York, Tokyo, CDS, Saigon, Belgrade (Priority).
By Bag: Accra, Dar-es-Salaam, Warsaw, Hong Kong, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Hanoi.

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[58] See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Press Release*, no. 23, 20 April 1965.
Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Communiqué*, nº 23, 20 avril 1965.

VIETNAM: APPEAL BY BELGRADE GROUP

Discussion between SSEA, Yugoslav Ambassador and UAR Chargé in connection with presentation April 14 of Canadian reply to Belgrade group's appeal revealed no repeat no new initiatives or new policy departures.

2. Yugoslav Ambassador expressed satisfaction with President Johnson's April 7 speech as representing "significant change". Peking's response had been discouraging but Ambassador repeatedly expressed view that "this is not repeat not the end" and indicated that Yugoslav Government at least would continue to consider possibility of further follow-up action. SSEA suggested that in first instance this might take form of attempt to persuade Soviet Union to which Ambassador replied that while Soviet Union might align its responses with those of such countries as Canada and France or could play useful role in connection with possible Cambodian conference there was not repeat not much Moscow could do vis-à-vis China or North Vietnam. Ambassador indicated that "other side" was at the moment not repeat not in favour of negotiations of any kind but he hoped that this could be overcome. SSEA observed that there was no repeat no evidence that Communist side's position contained any flexibility at all although Hanoi authorities must be registering painful effects of USA-SVN military activities. Ambassador observed that it would be difficult for any country to accept idea of negotiations while being subjected to daily bombings. Ambassador had referred to Prime Minister's "measured pause" proposal as one possible follow-up suggestion. SSEA noted that USA had not repeat not been interested in this idea but that it might prove useful at some later stage. Ambassador subsequently returned to this idea as one possible way in which USA could give further indications of readiness to negotiate.

3. There was considerable discussion of possible role of UN Secretary-General. Ambassador expressed belief Secretary-General might be "ready to move" and would not repeat not be surprised if something was forthcoming near future. When SSEA commented that present info suggested that Peking unlikely to agree to discussions with Secretary-General, Yugoslav Ambassador, although refusing to be drawn out, said he had reason to believe that this situation might change.

4. Ambassador repeatedly expressed interest in potential usefulness of Cambodian conference or Laos conference as providing indirect contacts.

5. SSEA noted continuing and renewed Canadian interest in economic development scheme for region and asked Ambassador how he assessed chances of wider international participation. Ambassador expressed view that proposals were interesting and far reaching but that usefulness would depend on local situation and that real progress could probably not repeat not be made until negotiations got started. He agreed that China was probably not repeat not very interested. Ambassador concurred in SSEA's expression of confidence in Black's judgment on basis of which decisions could be taken as to whether wider development scheme could be undertaken now or whether it would have to await more settled local conditions.

260.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 10622, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-6/3

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] April 20, 1965

VIETNAM – REPLY TO BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY'S MESSAGE OF APRIL 2

You will recall that on April 2, the British Foreign Secretary, in his capacity as Co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference, invited the Member Governments of the Conference and the three powers represented on the International Commission, to furnish him with a statement of their views on the situation in Vietnam, and in particular, on the circumstances in which they consider that a peaceful settlement could be reached. Mr. Stewart's message is attached.

2. Also attached for your consideration and approval is a proposed reply to Mr. Stewart.†[59]

3. The terms of Mr. Stewart's message seem to call for a more far-reaching statement of Canadian views, and a more comprehensive treatment of possible approaches to a solution, than were required in responding to the appeal of the Belgrade group. Because it covers more ground, the present reply will probably have a longer "life-span" as an expression of the Canadian position than the reply to the Belgrade group; it has therefore been cast in fairly general terms to allow maximum flexibility in the light of subsequent developments.

4. You will note that the following ideas, advanced earlier by the Prime Minister and yourself, have been taken into account:

(a) our role in the International Commission and the independent conclusions we have formed; the need to make an accurate assessment of the nature of the problem before attempting to apply remedies.

(b) the international community's need to recognize and deal with aggression, whether direct or indirect and in the form of outside support for so-called "wars of liberation".

(c) recognition, at the same time, of the dangers of escalation, and the appeal for restraint on the part of all concerned.

(d) the need for negotiations looking to a fair, just and workable solution, in which some form of international control mechanism would probably be desirable to guarantee the terms as agreed by negotiation; reference is also made to Canada's favourable response to the Belgrade group's appeal in an attempt to secure an agreement to negotiate from both sides.

(e) the possible usefulness of indirect contacts, and the U.N. Secretary-General providing initial exploratory channels for discussion.

(f) endorsement of proposals for regional economic development schemes.

5. In addition to the foregoing points, the attached draft reply incorporates two ideas which have not previously been highlighted or included in Canadian statements on Vietnam; I should like to draw your special attention to the following:

(a) *page 5* – a paragraph in general terms has been included dealing with the position of Communist China in relation to the Vietnam problem, and the desirability of a beginning being made towards mutual acceptance and greater contact between that power and the rest of the world community. It is suggested that an improvement of existing differences in this broader area might facilitate a durable settlement in Vietnam, or that conversely, a settlement in Vietnam could be a significant contribution to solving the broader problem. You will note that this paragraph has been cautiously phrased to avoid the impression that we may be contemplating any specific initiatives with respect to China at the moment. I would suggest that in any elaboration or comment on this idea, we might avoid detailed discussion by explaining that the reference is to nothing more than the facts of the situation which must be recognized, as indeed President Johnson recognized them – if in a somewhat different way –

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[59] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Minister agreed to this proposed text, to tabling on Thursday, and to a press release. [J.G. Hadwen?]
See/Voir Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/14, 30 April 1965.

when he said in his April 7 speech: "Over this war – and all Asia – is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China… The contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes". Moreover, from our own point of view, the references in the attached draft reply are, I believe, fully in keeping with your long-term thinking on these problems and with your comments in the House of Commons indicating an awareness of the desirability of a Chinese commitment to a new settlement.

(b) *page 7* – a brief reference is made to the benefits which might accrue not only from a regional development scheme as such, but also from "the gradual development of *economic and other exchanges* between the component units of the region as arranged bilaterally or within the scope of a wider development scheme". This idea is being advanced for the first time, and therefore it is couched in very general terms and the treatment is brief. I believe this is desirable until we see what sort of reaction it elicits. While the formulation it has been given could be applied to the Indo-China region as a whole, its most specific relevance is of course for the two halves of Vietnam. Ultimately, as part of any settlement, it seems desirable that this mutual isolation should be broken down. It also seems clear that a simple return to the 1954 settlement's *de facto* two Vietnams, without any compensating substantive benefits, will offer North Vietnam no positive attractive reason to desist from its present activities.

6. These ideas could of course be developed in detail much further, but they verge onto the very emotional and politically sensitive area of the reunification of Vietnam. In view of the U.S. reaffirmation of its policy goal of an independent South Vietnam, and Hanoi's demand for international recognition of the integrity of Vietnam, I think it would be highly dangerous at this time to take a specific stand on this contentious issue or to indicate that we may be proposing any scheme for the reunification of Vietnam. At the same time, it is possible to suggest, without offending Washington and without giving political comfort to Hanoi in furthering its propaganda objectives, that gradually expanding economic and other exchanges might be mutually advantageous for the component units of the region; clearly, this would be as possible between two totally independent Vietnamese states as it would as part of a cautiously controlled programme of contacts leading to a confederal or other political solution in Vietnam.[60]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

261.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 10122, 21-13-VIET-ICSC/2

No. Y-329
Ottawa, April 21, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
From Minister for Commissioner only.

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[60] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
1. Why not mention Cambodia and the proposal for a conference as we do re: Laos? (see p. 5). [Paul Martin]
Agreed subject to [above]. This is a good reply. P[aul] M[artin]

VIETNAM: NEGOTIATIONS

During conversation with me in New York on April 20 Stevenson asked on personal basis whether we would have any views or suggestions based on your direct experience and our own assessment here of how beginning might be made on bringing Vietnam problem under negotiation. I should therefore be grateful for your reactions and comments on following three main problem headings around which conversation with Stevenson turned.

2. *Possible arrangements for cease-fire or scaling down military activities.* What would be likely reaction to an appeal for a cease-fire by the Secretary-General as he has been contemplating to the three main parties i.e., North Vietnam, South Vietnam and USA? Would the appeal be any more effective in terms of response if Viet Cong were ignored or if it were referred to but in context of North Vietnam or if it were specifically singled out? The second alternative (or it might be undertaken in addition to appeal by Secretary-General) would be unilateral statement by USA as suggested by Prime Minister to effect that airstrikes would be suspended for a certain period. If such action were taken is there any possibility that Hanoi would be prepared to stop its direct infiltration and "use its influence" with Liberation Front to reduce military activities in perceptible way in South Vietnam? There is also third alternative which though less obvious might prove possible. USA could no repeat no doubt find suitable way to let it be known without making formal statement that if nature and scope of Viet Cong military activity in South Vietnam decreased USA might be prepared to scale down airstrikes against North Vietnam to corresponding extent. Does this alternative offer any practical advantages over either or both of two foregoing possibilities? Would it for example have any attraction for Viet Cong, North Vietnamese and/or South Vietnamese?

3. *Political terms advanced by North Vietnamese as conditions for negotiations.* First problem under this heading is status of Liberation Front. Stevenson thought that a way around this difficulty might possibly be found if there was half way house in Hanoi position which would not repeat not necessitate USA dealing solely and exclusively with Liberation Front as only *interlocuteur valable*. Thus is there any compromise arrangement which would involve recognition by USA of Liberation Front as significant part of situation but which at same time would involve acceptance of full share of responsibility by Hanoi? Second main problem relates to demand for USA withdrawal from Vietnam. Since USA has expressed willingness in principle to withdraw, difficulty is one of timing and conditions. Since immediate USA military withdrawal would leave little or nothing to negotiate is there any ground for believing that Communists have advanced this demand as maximum terms and would they be prepared to accept a gradual fade-out probably related to progressive implementation of other elements in the bargain such as preparations for elections, increasing economic contacts, etc.? Thirdly is there any element of flexibility in any other terms for settlement which have been advanced by North Vietnam? As indicated above it is conceivable that common ground could be found with respect to status of Liberation Front and military withdrawal. Are there in your opinion any other areas in which common ground either actual or potential [exists] between positions enunciated by Pham Van Dong and President Johnson? What would be maximum flexibility you would estimate on North Vietnamese side and what limitations if any would South Vietnam impose on USA?

4. *Relative importance of military and political elements.* In general, is there any new balance which might be imparted to broad outlines of USA policy as a whole in order to further enhance possibilities of success? Do you think that concessions in the military field will be sufficient and, if so, which? Or alternatively do you think that basically the approach must be political and, if so, what do you think will be Hanoi's minimum price? Or do you think that a combination of some military moves (such as outlined in paragraph 2 above) and political concessions (paragraph 3 above) will be required and, if so, which combination would be most likely to succeed in your view?

5. You will of course appreciate the extreme sensitivity of this message as well as fact that the views and opinions sought are yours alone. Although you may wish to consult senior staff members on substance in general way, I should be grateful if the background and purpose of this enquiry were not repeat not made known to anyone else within or, above all, outside the delegation. I appreciate that workload you are facing is very heavy one but I am sure you will understand if I ask you to give me your views and comments in reply to above questions as a matter of priority.

[Paul] Martin

262.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6271

Secret.
[Ottawa,] April 22, 1965

Meetings of the Cabinet were held in the Privy Council Chamber, on Thursday, April 22nd, 1965, at 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson), in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Gordon),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Sharp),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Benidickson),
The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Laing),
The Secretary of State (Mr. Lamontagne),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Cardin),
*The Solicitor General (Mr. MacNaught),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Miss LaMarsh),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Favreau),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Nicholson),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson).
* 10:00 a.m. Meeting only.

The Acting Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Loughead) (a.m. Meeting only), (Mr. Hardy) (p.m. Meeting only).

[...]

VIETNAM

(Previous reference February 12th†)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs gave a progress report on recent developments in Vietnam. During his exposé he made the following points:

(a) The Prime Minister had not discussed in advance with the United States authorities the statement which he had made in Philadelphia the previous week suggesting a pause in bombings in North Vietnam. The Leader of the Opposition had criticised the Prime Minister

on that account,[61] but there was no doubt that the Prime Minister's proposal had been a factor in the subsequent decision of the President to propose negotiations without pre-conditions, as had been advocated by a group of seventeen non-aligned countries.

(b) In advancing his proposal for negotiations, the President had also put forward his project for the economic development of the Mekong River area. However, the amount of $1 billion which the United States was prepared to devote was not as impressive as it might appear, when due account was taken of the proposed length of the program of existing U.S. commitments, and the sums which it had already spent in connection with this project.

(c) The Secretary-General of the United Nations had been criticised for not using his Office to bring about negotiations. Mr. Martin said that he had just returned from New York and that he was satisfied that this criticism was neither true nor fair. The Secretary-General had been doing his best both to promote negotiations and to ensure that the United States' position was fairly represented. He had prepared an appeal, which he proposed to send to all parties at the appropriate time and which he had submitted to the President in advance. He had also arranged for the Algerian Ambassador to the United Nations to make representations to Chou En Lai on the occasion of his visit in Algiers. U. Thant could not have direct contacts with the Chinese Government since the United Nations was *persona non grata* in China.

(d) The situation in Vietnam was growing more serious with the passage of time. A pause in the bombing of North Vietnam at this time would undoubtedly have the effect of weakening the U.S.A. position. However, the Canadian proposal might become useful at a later stage. Senator Fulbright, after discussing the matter with President Johnson himself, had the previous weekend made a statement in which he endorsed the Prime Minister's suggestion.[62] There was some reason to believe that the President was not perhaps altogether opposed to Senator Fulbright's declaration.

(e) One of the effects of the Vietnam crisis was to bring the Soviet Union and China closer together. They were speaking with increasingly stronger voices and the situation could easily get out of control. However, the United States was not being deterred by this possibility. The United States did not believe, on the whole, that China would intervene directly in the conflict. The President and his advisers in the White House were of one mind in their determination to pursue the struggle.

(f) While the United States' attitude to negotiations was based on two implicit conditions, namely the continued independence of Vietnam and the right of the United States to remain in the country, China and North Vietnam insisted that the United States must first leave Vietnam before negotiations could be undertaken. This was obviously unacceptable. The United States was supported in its position by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

(g) Nevertheless, the United Kingdom was very anxious to bring about negotiations. It had endorsed a previous Canadian suggestion for a resumption of the Laos Conference which could be used behind the scenes for discussions on Vietnam.[63] The previous day, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia had proposed a Conference on the border disputes between Cambodia, Thailand and South Vietnam which could have served the same purpose. The Soviet Union, China and the United States were about to accept this proposal when Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia declared that he could not agree if the unavowed purpose of the Conference was to discuss Vietnam and not to deal with the Cambodian problems.

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61 See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 1, p. 11.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 1, p. 11.

62 See/Voir George Bain, "Support for Pearson," *Globe and Mail*, 20 April 1965, p. 7.

63 See/Voir Stanley Westall, "Martin Suggests Laos Parley as Door-Opener for Vietnam," *Globe and Mail*, 3 April 1965, p. 4.

(h) No one could see a way out of the present situation. The United States bombing, despite appearances, had not succeeded in arresting the infiltration of South Vietnam by Viet Cong forces. The information which Canada was receiving from the Canadian delegation to the International Commission was not encouraging.

(i) Under Secretary of State Ball had recently brought the NATO Council up-to-date on developments in Vietnam. Most members had expressed concern and doubt about United States action but had given assurances that they would refrain from any pronouncement that could cause the United States public embarrassment. President Johnson did not take kindly to criticism of United States policy towards Vietnam. This was presumably the reason why the proposed visits of the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan to the United States had been postponed. But, in spite of occasional criticism in the United States press, the American people were generally behind the United States government.

(j) Eugene Black would soon be going to Asia in connection with the Mekong River project. However, it was unlikely that much could be done in implementing it until the cessation of hostilities. Only the United Kingdom and Canada had declared their intention to participate in the Mekong River development with the United States.

(k) The Vietnam crisis was delaying a prospective settlement of the United Nations constitutional and financial problem. It was over-shadowing every other question now before the United Nations.

The Cabinet noted the report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs concerning recent developments in the Vietnam situation.

R.G. Robertson

263.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/7

No. 634
New York, April 23, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ritchie only), London (for High Commissioner and Deputy only) (Priority).
For Minister and USSEA.

VIETNAM: SSEA'S INTERVIEW WITH STEVENSON

Mr. Martin opened conversation by referring to his talks with Secretary-General on Vietnam.† He said that Canadian basic objectives were same as those of USA but that we hope that stage will soon be reached where we will be able to move towards fruitful negotiations. Minister told Stevenson that U Thant alluded briefly to Senator Fulbright's statement on Vietnam. U Thant indicated that personally he was in full accord with Fulbright's approach. At same time he did not repeat not wish to take any stand that may prove embarrassing to USA. Coming back to Canada's views on Vietnam, Minister said that the recent statements emanating from Moscow and Peking underlined necessity of seeking negotiated settlement. Present situation was fraught with danger, had far reaching implications for East-West relations and also made it more difficult to reach agreement on problems now confronting UN. With regard to President Johnson's proposals for economic

development of Southeast Asia, Minister mentioned his statement in Parliament and Canada's willingness to make appropriate contribution.[64] Minister reported Secretary-General's feeling that prospects of going ahead with programme while actual fighting is going on are rather dim. U Thant also felt that sum of one billion dollars when viewed in context of requirements of Mekong Basin River scheme and those of other areas was perhaps not repeat not as spectacular as it sounded. U Thant believes that the sensible approach is to build on the work being carried on under the aegis of Coordination Committee for Lower Mekong and he also expressed interest in strengthening activities of Asian Development Bank.

2. Minister asked Stevenson about possibility that a conference on Cambodia might be called. Stevenson said that the British had already been told that USA missions in Saigon and Bangkok had reacted negatively to proposal. General view held in State Department is that considerable spade work has to be done before it could see its way clear to agreeing to proposed conference. It has been indicated to Walker that he should not repeat not in any way give impression that he was speaking on behalf of USA although State Department would be interested in reactions elicited during his talks.

3. Stevenson expressed hope that Canada would avoid representing conference on Cambodia as a means of initiating dialogue on Vietnam. To extent that such public statements are made idea of a conference becomes less appealing to other side. Minister said he had just been queried by press on Canada's stand on this proposal but had stated only that it was under study and no repeat no conclusion reached. Nevertheless it was his feeling that we should lose no repeat no opportunity to bring about discussion of Vietnam between parties directly concerned.

4. Stevenson said that USA position was not repeat not wholly negative but they were very much aware of Thailand's misgivings and of the fact that when Sihanouk proposed this conference he did so in terms hostile to USA and Thailand. Stevenson was also aware of British view that Soviet support for conference might be withdrawn if USA hesitated too long but State Department disagreed with this assessment. Problem was complex one and USA wished, before reaching decision, to study carefully nature of treaties that will have to be drafted to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality. Stevenson ended his remarks on this point by repeating that public talk about this proposal at this time would do more harm than good.

5. Stevenson said that he understood and to certain extent shared Canadian anxiety over Vietnam and particularly our fear over possible escalation of conflict. Uppermost in the President's mind is whether cessation of bombing done unilaterally or as response to international appeal would result in cessation of infiltration and active NVN support to Vietcong. Likelihood was rather that cessation of bombing would be welcomed by Ho Chi Minh as lull enabling him to consolidate his position and renew activities at later date with greater vigour.

6. Stevenson made no repeat no comment when Minister told him of U Thant's personal diplomacy over Vietnam; (he?) said that like the Secretary-General we were anxious not repeat not to add to USA difficulties. At the same time our USA friends could not repeat not expect self-respecting countries to remain silent over an issue which threatens international peace. Stevenson asked whether Minister had any specific suggestions to bring about fruitful negotiations. There were several questions in Stevenson's mind. Was it not repeat not wiser to await more meaningful reaction from Hanoi to President Johnson's Baltimore speech before (strengthening?) military pressure? To what extent were Vietcong activities indigenous and was it possible for Ho Chi Minh to call them off? What contingency planning should be made with regard to direct negotiations with Vietcong?

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[64] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 1, pp. 95–97.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 1, p. 95-97.

7. Minister did not repeat not wish to address himself directly to these questions at this stage but said he fully appreciated difficulties confronting President. Precisely because the difficulties were great, it was important that there should be frank and close consultations between USA and its allies in order that they be fully aware of USA position, intentions and objectives.

8. Conversation ended up by Stevenson's suggestion that perhaps it would be possible to make further use of Canada's representative in Saigon to probe Hanoi's thinking regarding conditions under which it might consider cessation of military operations.

[Paul] Tremblay

264.
Letter from Ambassador to United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/7

Secret and Personal.
Washington, D.C., April 26, 1965

Dear Paul [Martin],

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, I had a talk with McGeorge Bundy at his request on the subject of United States policy in Vietnam. Bundy said that the President had asked him to tell me, for your own and the Prime Minister's personal information, that he had in the last few days been giving most careful consideration to the possibility of a "pause" in the bombing of North Vietnam. He had wished to satisfy himself and the members of his own administration whether such a pause at this time would be productive. He had come to the conclusion after close study of all the circumstances that this would not be the right course to pursue at this time.

Bundy went on to say that he could envisage three types of situation in which a pause of the bombing might be possible:

(1) if the North Vietnamese showed a serious interest in negotiation without unacceptable pre-conditions then the bombing could be stopped;

(2) if there was real evidence of a substantial reduction in Hanoi-controlled Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam this could lead to stopping the bombing; and

(3) a stage might arise when it was judged that a pause in bombing operations, even in the absence of the conditions mentioned under (1) and (2) above, might be judged to be likely to lead to positive results. This third was the kind of pause to which, Bundy said, he understood the Prime Minister had been referring in his speech in Philadelphia. As to whether this would be desirable "at the right time", Bundy said that this would remain for consideration but that it was the President's considered judgment that the "right time" was not the present moment.

Bundy said that the President particularly wished the Prime Minister to share in his thinking on this matter because it had been the subject of their talk together at Camp David and he wanted to keep in touch with Mr. Pearson on these developments.

Yours sincerely,
C.S.A. Ritchie

265.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/7

No. 349
Saigon, April 27, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-329 Apr 22.
For Minister, O/USSEA and Far East Division only.

VIETNAM: NEGOTIATIONS

Possible arrangements for ceasefire or scaling down military activities.

Cool reaction from USA and SVN at time of Prime Minister's suggestion regarding suspension of air strikes and remarks made to me since then concerning that and similar suggestions make me think that appeal by UN Secretary-General at present time would not repeat not be welcomed here. Both USA and SVN fear too ready acceptance would look as if they wanted to find way of getting off road of escalating air strikes which admittedly have not repeat not yet produced desired political results. Both fear that agreement to full ceasefire now would look as if they had no repeat no confidence in military prospects, would lead to sag in ARVN and civilian morale and perhaps lead to sharp reaction from armed forces. Before it can face with any confidence negotiations which would follow upon ceasefire Government feels it needs few more months of stability during which it can put some social reforms in train and perhaps demonstrate some representativeness through at least partial elections. It would also like significant military success against Vietcong in South to match effect of air strikes in North or at least defeat of Vietcong initiative which is expected shortly. Situation is not repeat not yet ripe for ceasefire and negotiation from GVN point of view.

2. Public appeal by UN Secretary-General would be likely to have cool reception in Hanoi also, first because it came from UN which DRVN regards as creature of imperialists and secondly because to endorse it would be tantamount to admitting that not repeat not all fault lay on side of USA for prolongation of war. Whether Vietcong were singled out for special attention or ignored would not repeat not make much difference. Former would tend to please Hanoi and latter to please Saigon, but substantive reaction by Vietcong would be unlikely to differ from that of Hanoi.

3. Unilateral statement now by USA regarding suspension of air strikes would have most disadvantages in South of acceptance of Secretary-General's ceasefire appeal. Given level of damage done so far in North by air strikes (mounting but still quite bearable) it would probably still be taken by Hanoi as sign that Americans were losing will and nerve rather than as welcome way to permit DRVN to get out of increasingly dangerous and damaging situation. I doubt whether such suspension would induce DRVN to cease infiltration or to tell Liberation Front to cease military activities. To do so in response to public USA statement would involve loss of face. It would also be tactical error in eyes of Communists who still feel that they have good chance of ultimate victory if they stick with present policies.

4. Discreet and indirect words passed by Americans to Hanoi regarding willingness for mutual scaling down of military activity could at right moment have advantage over public appeal or unilateral declaration in that it could minimize loss of face; the least possible could be said publicly about scaling down. But if proposed too soon it could again be taken by Communists as indicating lack of USA determination. Unless Vietcong defeats were greater and Vietcong morale lower than I consider them to be now, scaling down offer could appear to them almost like suing for peace.

Political terms advanced by DRVN as conditions for negotiations.

5. I regard Hanoi's insistence that FNL is only *interlocuteur valable* as public pre-negotiating stand consistent with its contention that it gives insurgents no repeat no more than moral support. But if things seemed to be moving towards real negotiation at conference table, I do not repeat not think it would cause Hanoi any real difficulty that it and Peking should be seated alongside FNL representatives as part of Communist negotiating team. Real difficulty would, however, arise for USA and GVN. Acceptance of FNL as even one of *interlocuteurs valables* rather than mere agent of DRVN would be tantamount to admitting it had genuine indigenous status and support. Once that was admitted for negotiating purposes, pressures would be great to grant FNL representatives position of importance in post-settlement coalition Government. I appreciate and have pointed out to Foreign Minister Tran Van Do how difficult it will be to avoid giving status to FNL at negotiations and afterwards. But if our analysis of great degree of Hanoi's control over FNL is even partially correct, this will render very hazardous chances of maintaining genuine neutral SVN for any length of time after fighting has stopped.

6. If Communists came to believe that negotiations were really leading toward settlement creating neutral SVN, I think they could live with gradual fade out rather than immediate withdrawal of USA forces. Period could be longer if USA-SVN forces had scored greater successes prior to ceasefire and negotiations, shorter if military situation inconclusive or obviously unfavourable to our side. I do not repeat not think Communists could readily and publicly accept enshrinement in any document of retention of USA bases in SVN even for interim period (Tran Van Do idea my telegram 251† March 19) and even less right of reentry in event of violation of provisions of settlement by Communist side (my telegram 688† November 23/64). But it could be and indeed should be made clear to Communists that closing of two or three USA bases would be final step in slow phase-out and that any violations by Communists would indeed lead to reentry. Also, idea of tripartite force suggested in my telegram 688 might be worth further exploration.[65] Unless and until DRVN and Vietcong have suffered more than they have (suffered?) to date, I would expect that maximum flexibility in Hanoi's position would be neutralized SVN from which USA troops would be withdrawn over fairly short period, probably not repeat not more than year, and in which FNL representatives would be given significant role in SVN Government. As for South Vietnamese, who at moment are feeling more self-confidence than at least since I arrived here, I cannot repeat not see them conceding anything like this much unless in meantime they have suffered important and unexpected defeat at hands of Vietcong and/or collapse of civil power, both of which now look less likely than even three or four months ago. As things stand now, they would probably insist on retention of significant American military presence as safeguard for several years, repatriation of Vietcong military and political cadres to DRVN, non-admission of known FNL members into administration and amnesty only for Vietcong who had fought more or less against their will.

Relative importance of military and political elements.

8.[66] Approach to settlement should be basically political one designed to demonstrate that only sensible solution for area is one in which non-Communist South coexists and even to growing degree trades and cooperates with Communist North pending distant day in which reunification can be envisaged. To help North it will be necessary to pay lip service to idea of

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[65] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
F[ar] E[astern Division] comments please. A.C. S[mith]

[66] The original document skipped from paragraph 6 to paragraph 8.
Le document original passait du paragraphe 6 au paragraphe 8.

reunification at date far earlier than anyone thinks it can take place. It will also be necessary to allow North to make much of departure of USA armed forces. These two "triumphs" could help to blur fact that Communist takeover is not repeat not to take place.

9. To repeat what I have said earlier, however, chances of pulling off this essentially political success will be slim unless DRVN have been made to suffer more damage (not repeat not major cities) than so far and unless some important even though not repeat not decisive success has been scored over Vietcong in South. I think therefore that in order not repeat not to suffer defeat at conference table we may have to see fighting go on and even intensify to a degree for at minimum few more months. If Vietnam discussions do take place in corridors of proposed Cambodia conference or in some other discreet way, I assume that, as happened in Algeria, fighting and talking will go on at same time and that fighting will stop only just before a final settlement is ready.

10. If and when reasonable settlement is reached, competitive coexistence will start on social and economic plane. That is when extensive foreign aid will be necessary (see my telegram 688 November 23) and when regional economic development could become operative. Despite predictable first DRVN reaction (peace cannot repeat not be bought with capitalist dollars) to President Johnson's Baltimore proposal, I suspect they would not repeat not hold indefinitely aloof from benefits of scheme once they realized participation need not repeat not threaten Communist regime. But this is looking farther ahead than is warranted in this telegram.

11. I regret I cannot repeat not be more optimistic regarding timeliness and elements of negotiation and settlement. I would like to be proven wrong.

[J.B.] Seaborn

266.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/7

No. 1361
Washington, April 29, 1965
Secret.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva, NATO Paris, Permis New York; Delhi, CDS, DGPO, DM/DND from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

Following are some points covered in conversation yesterday between Ambassador and William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East.

2. When asked for comment on Hanoi's Four-Point proposals Bundy pointed out that these Four Points had been presented in 3 separate documents and that there were variations in context in which points were presented – e.g., key sentence "if this basis is recognized favourable conditions will be created for peaceful settlement" did not repeat not appear in all three. In general Bundy thought that Hanoi's intention had been to present proposals in such a manner that sympathetic commentators could argue that DRVN was not repeat not exactly stipulating preconditions (such as USA withdrawal) for holding talks; but statements as whole did not repeat not suggest genuine DRVN willingness for unconditional discussions at present.[67]

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[67] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 852–853.

3. On Four Points themselves Bundy said that USA found two major difficulties, one of timing and one of substance. Timing difficulty was requirement of USA withdrawal as point one. In USA thinking American withdrawal was in effect fourth point, i.e., it would come after other problems had been resolved.

4. Major difficulty of substance was point three stipulating that affairs of SVN must be settled in accordance with Liberation Front's programme. This programme called for admission of Front representatives to a new SVN coalition government followed by elections at some subsequent time. Bundy termed this the "*loi polonaise*", i.e., process by which Communists acquired power in postwar Poland, and said that USA and DRVN certainly parted company on this question. Nevertheless, if Northern interference were removed one might conceivably put gloss on this point at some later date as implying free political activity in South.

5. Point two (no repeat no foreign alliances, bases or troops) presented no repeat no particular difficulty although USA would like to see no repeat no foreign interference added to list.

6. Point four (reunification) was not repeat not insuperable obstacle. It was significant (and Bundy implied helpful) that Hanoi had carefully omitted reference to free elections. Reunification was subject which ought eventually to be discussed even though it had a certain amount of sensitivity in SVN.

7. In general, Bundy's opinion was that Hanoi had done good job in presenting plausible exposition of its case. He said that underlying feeling of USA was that these points were Hanoi's fallback position but that DRVN did not repeat not really mean to negotiate at present. He agreed that Chinese line was distinctly harder; Chinese support for Four Points had been expressed with no repeat no more than mechanical enthusiasm.

8. Ambassador mentioned that officials in Ottawa had been doing some preliminary thinking concerning possible control mechanism for an eventual settlement and that in any new or revised machinery retention of troika principle seemed undesirable. In addition, it might conceivably be useful to obtain further Afro-Asian participation. Greater freedom of movement was also needed. Bundy reacted favourably but vaguely, and remarked that question of control mechanism was a virtual blank in most USA planning papers so far, in part because of difficulty envisaging what would be feasible at time of a settlement.

9. Concerning likely developments over next two to three months Bundy said that punitive action without change in present ground rules would be likely to continue and that there would be increased measures against infiltration by sea. It was not repeat not unlikely that there would be modest increase in operations by USA Marines who were already starting to patrol outside their perimeter. However, no repeat no drastic decisions had been taken at recent Honolulu meeting[68] and USA was not repeat not thinking of increasing USA forces to the extent rumoured in some recent press stories (figures of up to 60 thousand have been mentioned).

10. On Cambodia Bundy emphasized that USA was genuinely desirous of conference although USA did not repeat not have in mind signature of a formal guarantee of Cambodia with treaty status, if only because of difficulty of senatorial ratification. Conference might be of some use in Vietnam context; it would put mailbox on corner instead of round the block. However, there was now less than 50 percent chance that it would be held. USA had heard that Sihanouk's change of attitude had been due to arm twisting by Chinese during recent Bandung meeting and Prince might throw further spanner in works.

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[68] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), documents 187–189.

267.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/8

No. Y-381
Ottawa, May 7, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel 337† Apr 21.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, London, Geneva, CDS (Priority).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT

You will be receiving by bag from London copies of our telegrams Y-375† and Y-376† May 5 to Paris, second of which gives text of first draft of background paper analyzing implications of approach to Vietnam settlement based on terms worked out at Geneva in 1954. Tentative conclusion to which we have come is that a simple "return to Geneva terms" is not repeat not likely to be adequate basis for policy because distinction between two main elements of 1954 settlement (i.e., CFA and Final Declaration) has become blurred and Communists on one hand and Americans on other appear to mean different things and to envisage totally different end result when they suggest that problem can be solved (as opposed to restoration of peace) by strict adherence to or reaffirmation of Geneva "Agreement", "settlement" or "Accords".

2. Simple truth of matter is that it was clearly not repeat not intention of Geneva Conference to establish two Vietnams in perpetuity or even over relatively extended period whereas USA insistence on observance of CFA seems predicated on permanence of independent South Vietnam. Quite apart from not repeat not wanting to see our friends caught up in likely difficulties and embarrassment of attempting to elevate CFA from military to political status while attempting to disregard Final Declaration totally, we are very skeptical about ultimate workability of such a settlement simply because we believe it would be unacceptable to North and ultimately to China. There may be some common ground in between but it is difficult to find it in terms of precise stipulations agreed to at Geneva.

3. We are inclined to wonder too whether whole approach indicated by Johnson (your reference telegram) would not repeat not be disappointing to international opinion. Even if the two sides could agree upon what they mean by a return to Geneva we doubt that mere adhesion by USA or SVN or mere re-affirmation of 1954 documents would satisfy world opinion, which in our opinion would want proper conference followed by formal agreement embodying a settlement which would hopefully be permanent.

4. We would welcome your comments. In meantime we would suggest that for the moment you continue any discussions you may be having with Johnson on this subject on personal basis. Views expressed in this telegram represent official level thinking only.

268.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10853, 20-USSR-1-3-VIETN/1

No. 510
Moscow, May 8, 1965
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Repeat for Information: London; NATO Paris, Paris, Geneva, Washington, Permis New York from London.
By Bag: Hong Kong, Delhi, Saigon, Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade from London.

VIETNAM

Last night when calling on new Deputy Foreign Minister Zimyanin, I left copy of Canadian reply to British Co-Chairman on Vietnam. I gave a brief resumé of argumentation drawing his attention especially to paragraph 7 concerning our views on a negotiated settlement.

2. We then had a spirited discussion, conducted however in a very friendly way, that lasted almost an hour. It was punctuated regularly by Zimyanin with declarations about their understanding of Canadian position and our genuine desire for a peaceful solution. The bulk of his argument was a highly emotional outpouring about Americans and the dangerous position in which they had placed everyone.

3. I argued that it was pointless to reiterate as he did that North Vietnamese Four Points were only basis on which negotiations could begin. There had to be a clear recognition that USA could not repeat not and would not repeat not accept a humiliating defeat in Vietnam. No repeat no matter what they thought of the right or wrong of the situation there had to be acceptance of this before any progress could be made.

4. And how to do that? Zimyanin asked. It would be easier if we knew what Americans wanted. What is the reason for this large effort in Vietnam? What can it mean to the USA? I tried to explain what American aims were but he brushed them aside in disbelief; he referred to President Johnson's Baltimore speech, offering talks without any pre-conditions. But, he said, this was meaningless unless it were followed up by some practical gesture such as cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. We simply don't know what the Americans want, he said.

5. Zimyanin said he wanted me to ask Canadian Government to exercise its influence on American Government to stop bombing of North. "Your Prime Minister already tried. He should try again. This is absolutely essential."

6. Zimyanin then added that he hoped we realised that only North Vietnamese Government was qualified to discuss this question. Soviet Government could not repeat not. Canadian Government could not repeat not, and we should not repeat not think our discussions constituted anything more than a discussion of problems by interested Governments. North Vietnamese Government, he repeated, was only valid spokesman on this issue, and talks had to be between them and Americans. But when I tried to pin him down on how such talks could begin, he was evasive.

[R.A.D.] Ford

269.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/8

No. 1666
London, May 12, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 1638† May 11.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, CDS, Geneva (Priority); Delhi (Priority) from Ottawa; Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Hong Kong, Warsaw, Moscow from London.

SSEA'S BILATERAL TALKS WITH MR. STEWART MAY 10: VIETNAM

I began by noting the strong support which British had been giving to USA as regards its policy in Vietnam. I pointed out that Canada's position on the ICSC tempered to some extent the support which Canada could express. Stewart remarked that British position as Co-Chairman had to be kept in mind.

2. In response to my question Stewart said that he saw little chance of conference on Cambodia. I remarked that Couve de Murville seemed to share that view; he had told me in Paris that the fighting would continue for some time. Stewart's retort was that whether the fighting continued or not repeat not would depend on a number of factors not repeat not the least of which was USA determination not repeat not to show weakness. He referred to the curious attitude of some left-wing opponents in Britain who, while avowing that they did not repeat not wish to give way to Communist pressure, objected strenuously when vigorous counteraction like aerial bombing was taken. He had tried to make clear to these opponents that British policy in Vietnam could not repeat not be based on wishful thinking.

3. I referred to Prime Minister Pearson's proposal that the bombing be suspended at the right time. USA attitude seemed to be that there should be no repeat no interrupting of fighting even if international discussions could be arranged. I remarked that there seemed to be a uniformity of advice on the part of President Johnson's advisers which I found a little disconcerting. This made it very desirable that friends of USA should express their own views in a forthright manner in Washington. Stewart said that President Johnson had a tendency to take up positions which his allies might find difficult to support. Developments in Dominican Republic served as an illustration. USA action seemed very justifiable in the event but USA position had been placed in a very poor light by the blanket statement of President Johnson about not repeat not allowing Communist governments within the so-called USA sphere of influence.

4. Toward the end of this interview Stewart and I compared notes in appraisal of President Johnson. We were agreed that the strain of office was bound to show on a man wielding such tremendous power. Our impression was however that President Johnson was bearing this strain remarkably well with no repeat no apparent impairment of his judgement and political adroitness.

[Paul] Martin

270.
Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/8

No. 1681
London, May 12, 1965
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 1680† May 12.
Repeat for Information: Washington, NATO Paris, Paris, Brussels, Hague, Bonn, Rome, Permis New York (Immediate); Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane (Immediate) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Oslo, Copenhagen, Athens, Ankara from Paris; Lisbon from London.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING: VIETNAM

Following is text of SSEA's intervention in restricted discussion on Vietnam on May 12:

In my first statement yesterday, I gave the Council an indication as to our general agreement with the broad policy objectives which USA are pursuing in Vietnam and the special factors related to Canada's participation in the Control Commissions in Indochina.

Today, in the light of Mr. Rusk's exposé, I propose to make four additional points.

My first point is that, basically, we agree with USA that North Vietnam is involved in an aggression against South Vietnam. It may well be that in the Liberation Front in South there are indigenous elements and that these elements would have revolted against the authorities in South without any encouragement or assistance from North. But, because we are one of the three members of the International Commission in Vietnam and have been such a member for ten years now, since 1954, we have been in a position to observe what is happening there and to reach certain conclusions.

As a result of our years of experience on the spot, if there is anything we can state with any assurance, bearing in mind the complexity of the situation and the limitations surrounding Commission activities, it is that Vietcong movement was launched by North Vietnamese Government, that the movement has been directed, encouraged and supported ever since with men and equipment by the same North Vietnamese authority. And, may I add, that these findings are based on ample and detailed evidence gathered over years of investigation.

This finding of aggression against South Vietnam by North Vietnam was officially reported to British and Soviet Co-Chairmen in 1962 by Indian and Canadian delegations. More recently, a few months ago, Canadian delegation had occasion to reiterate formally this finding and to adduce evidence in support.

As a member of the International Commission in Vietnam, we and Indians have found North Vietnam guilty of aggression. In this respect, our verdict coincides with the conclusions of the white paper which was published recently by USA Government.

My second point is equally simple. As a result of our membership in Vietnam Commission we have been in a position to observe closely and to be in touch with North Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi. So far, in spite of our best efforts, we have been unable to find any indication that North Vietnamese are prepared to accept President Johnson's proposal to discuss a settlement without pre-conditions. On the contrary there is every indication that North Vietnam will envisage talks only on the assumption that there is willingness on the other side to concede that the purposes of the aggressive course they have pursued will be achieved, e.g., that their creature, Vietcong, will be recognized in effect as the Government of South Vietnam, that outside assistance to South will be withdrawn and that the country will be unified under the aegis of Hanoi.

The third point is that while, so far, the response from North and from Peking has been negative, we cannot assume that this will be their final reply. We must follow the very sound advice which Mr. Stewart, British Foreign Secretary, gave us yesterday. We must repeat that our objective in Vietnam is a negotiated and peaceful settlement. The objective is not repeat not the military defeat or the political collapse of North Vietnam. Consequently, military operations against North must remain a limited undertaking and one which must be related to political aims and to equally vigorous diplomatic operations.

It is not repeat not sufficient, I submit, to proclaim that our purposes are peaceful. Public opinion in our respective countries and consequently the Governments of this alliance will, of necessity, be concerned with the risks of escalation connected with military operations directed against North, with the risk of a larger war being triggered by accident. We will all be concerned equally with the very grave consequences of the political escalation which is taking place now, at Soviet initiative, as a result of military operations in North Vietnam. These risks will be accepted so long as we can be persuaded that they will be limited, that they are justified, that there is no repeat no less expensive alternative available.

It will be necessary also in order to maintain support of USA policies in Vietnam, to be able to demonstrate not repeat not only that our proclaimed objectives are peaceful but, more importantly perhaps, that the steps that are taken to achieve these objectives are and can be shown to be related to or consonant with these objectives.

My last point is that, while we are in general agreement with the course which is being followed by USA in resisting aggression in Vietnam because, honestly, we are unable to see a practical alternative, like USA, I am sure, we are worried as to the limitations, the risks, that attend such a course. If we are to be in a position to provide continued support for such a course, it will be important that we should be kept closely informed of situation in the field and of new developments that may be intended.

For those of us in particular who have to answer daily before our parliaments for support of USA actions in Vietnam, such support may even be made difficult, if we are faced with *faits accomplis* and if we learn of important policy decisions with implications for all of us here only when the stage of implementation has been reached.

I realize that action or reaction may have to be effected quickly on occasions in the type of operations which are now being conducted in Vietnam. As a reasonable man I am not repeat not requesting the impossible. If USA would ask us to give understanding and support for what they are attempting to do in Vietnam, my plea is that a corresponding effort be made to keep us informed in advance, whenever possible or feasible, so that we will not repeat not be taken by surprise and we will have the best opportunity of determining how we can prepare and influence our public opinion along the desired lines.

271.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9394, 20-22-VIETS-2/8

No. Y-402
Ottawa, May 20, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Permis New York, Delhi, Moscow, CDS (Priority).
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hanoi.

VIETNAM: PAUSE IN BOMBING

When he was in London for NATO meeting, Minister was told by Rusk that President Johnson wished him and Prime Minister to know that as of noon May 12 there would be no repeat no further bombings by USA or SVN aircraft in North Vietnam for period of three days. No repeat no press announcement was made beforehand and, at request of Rusk, Minister did not record this projected pause in writing. Associated with this pause was message from USA to USSR, exact nature of which we do not repeat not know, but it must have indicated that there would be temporary cessation of bombing and that USA was looking for response from other side.[69]

2. On May 17, USA Ambassador called on Minister in Ottawa to say that as of May 18 Saigon time bombing of North Vietnam would be resumed. He also said that Rusk had received message from Gromyko to effect that USA message to USSR was "insulting".[70] It was matter of regret to Rusk that other side's reception of pause in bombing was not repeat not merely negative but hostile. Rusk assured Minister that he did not exclude possibility of trying out expedient of pause again in future.

3. As you know from press reports there have been many stories to effect that Canada was intermediary by which message was conveyed to other side.[71] These stories have been denied here when questions have been asked about them. Addressees may also say that Canada did not repeat not act as intermediary. They should not repeat not however discuss or speculate on role of Canada as intermediary on past or future occasions nor above all reveal means by which message was conveyed to other side.

4. Grateful for account of reactions (especially from Saigon and Hanoi) to experiment with pause and also to resumption of bombing. For example, does it appear to have been recognized as such by other side and what are prospects for any future pause.

272.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6271

Secret.
[Ottawa,] May 27, 1965

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Gordon),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. McIlraith),
The Secretary of State (Mr. Lamontagne),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Cardin),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. MacEachen),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),

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69 See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), documents 294, 298, 299.

70 See/Voir ibid., document 303.

71 See/Voir Tom Wicker, "U.S. Raids North Vietnam After 6-Day Lull...Canada Said to Have Given Reds News of Suspension Plan," *New York Times*, 19 May 1965, p. 1; George Bain, "Martin Denies Canada Intermediary in Vietnam," *Globe and Mail*, 20 May 1965, p. 45; "Report Pearson Role in U.S. Bomb Pause," *Globe and Mail*, 20 May 1965, p. 45.

The Solicitor General (Mr. MacNaught),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Teillet),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Miss LaMarsh),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Favreau),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Nicholson),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Hays),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Tremblay),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Loughead), (Mr. Hardy), (Mr. Wall).

[…]

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

(Previous reference April 22)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that the situation in Vietnam was becoming more serious. New Zealand had moved troops into that country, the Soviet action concerning missile sites there was a matter of considerable concern in Washington,[72] and there were now the first indications that China was re-assessing its position in relation to Vietnam and coming to the view that there would be some advantage in direct United States action against them.

The United States, in some degree as a result of the proposal made by the Prime Minister in Philadelphia, had initiated a five-day pause in the bombing in Vietnam. There had been no positive response from Hanoi, the Chinese or the Soviet Union. There had been some suggestion that Canada had not taken the opportunity to act more positively as a conciliator in the situation, and there was some question whether the Canadian representative on the International Control Commission had been sufficiently informed of the pause to take this opportunity.[73] While the United States intention to initiate a pause could not for a variety of reasons be indicated to more than a very few people, there was good reason to believe that members of the Control Commission, including Mr. Seaborn, were aware of the intention. Because of political difficulties in his own country, President Johnson had been unable to announce the pause in advance or to indicate that its inception was at least in part a result of Mr. Pearson's proposal.

Mr. Martin said it was essential that Canada continue to support the position of the United States in Vietnam, and to emphasize that Canada would continue to work for a cease fire and for negotiations without conditions. Canada had been the first nation to accept the proposal of the seventeen non-aligned nations. While there was a good deal of soul-searching in both Canada and the United States about the United States position in Vietnam, Mr. Martin was convinced that the position he had outlined was correct and would command majority support. Any alternative would be extremely difficult. The matter was of the utmost importance to such countries as Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia, whose security was directly affected. While Canada had no intention of participating directly in Vietnam, she could not adopt the position of being the only close ally of the United States to withdraw her support.

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[72] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 318 (Editorial Note).

[73] See/Voir George Bain, "The Pause That Failed," *Globe and Mail*, 21 May 1965, p. 7.

During the discussion the following points were made:

(a) The Minister of Finance expressed the view that Canada was going too far in support of the United States position in South Vietnam, and felt it was incumbent upon the government to express the doubts felt by some of its members.

(b) Others considered that, while there was honest disagreement with some aspects of United States policy in relation to Vietnam, it would not be helpful to express disagreement at the present time.

(c) It was important to bear in mind the obvious fact that the United States was Canada's closest ally and that the Chinese Communists represented a real threat to the Western world. On this basis there should be no present indication that Canada was opposed to some aspects of United States policy.

(d) It has to be acknowledged that the United States presence in Vietnam was at the invitation of the government of South Vietnam, and that troops from Australia and New Zealand were now also present in that country.

In summarizing the discussion, the *Prime Minister* noted that U.S. bombing in North Vietnam had been limited to military and transportation targets, and that the U.S. government had indicated its preparedness to enter into unconditional negotiations. An offer of significant aid for economic development had been made, and there had in fact been a five-day pause in bombing. The Communists were fully aware of these facts, and had reacted only with contempt and a harder line. It was clear that they were not prepared to negotiate unless the United States removed its influence from South Vietnam.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and other Ministers concerning the current situation in Vietnam, and agreed that a further discussion of the matter should be held the following morning prior to the debate on External Affairs.[74]

[…]

273.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6271

Secret.
[Ottawa,] May 28, 1965

Present

The Secretary of State for External Affairs and Acting Prime Minister (Mr. Martin) in the Chair,
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Gordon),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),
The Solicitor General (Mr. MacNaught),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Teillet),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Favreau),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux).

The Acting Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Hardy),
The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Loughead).

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74 See next document./Voir le document suivant.

STATEMENT ON CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said he proposed to make a statement in the House that day on various aspects of Canadian foreign policy in relation to current developments.[75] He would refer to the United Nations, NATO, and the situations in Cyprus, the Dominican Republic and Viet Nam, stating that the setting up of a Committee on External Affairs in the near future would permit these matters to be discussed in more detail.

Mr. Martin said the Canadian position in support of U.S. policy had been stated by the Prime Minister in the House on April 26th.[76] He reviewed his proposed statement on Viet Nam, which referred to the situation in that area being the worst the world had faced since the Second World War. The Canadian position has been that a solution by military means alone is not practicable and negotiations with no preconditions were necessary. Our efforts had been toward a cease fire, a conference in Laos to establish the channels of negotiations, and a conference in Cambodia for the same purpose. The President of the United States accepted the suggestion that there should be negotiations, without preconditions. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was doing all he could to prepare the ground for contacts between the conflicting parties, but was being frustrated by the attitudes of the Chinese and North Vietnamese.

Canada had first hand experience of the methods employed by the Viet Cong and knew that they had been infiltrating into the South since 1956, to the point where there were now over 35,000 guerillas in South Vietnam, and that aggressive acts had taken place. Communist efforts would not stop in Vietnam, and unless checked they would try the same tactics with Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia. The governments of Australia and New Zealand realized they could be next in line for the Chinese expansionist designs, and had recently stated their strong support of the U.S. position and actions and they were supporting the U.S. by sending some forces.

The Canadian position had to be that aggression would not be allowed to succeed and the international community must sustain its responsibilities in this region. Our objective is negotiation for peace, leading toward the establishment of an independent or neutral Viet Nam, with guarantees to ensure that this status was maintained.

To date the North Vietnamese and their supporters had shown no sign of readiness to drop their policy of subversion and indirect aggression in favour of negotiation. They hope to divide the free world on this point.

There was no Western desire: (a) to overthrow the regimes in China or North Vietnam; (b) to establish permanent military bases in Vietnam; (c) to thrust any particular form of government on South Vietnam.

During the discussion the following points emerged:

(a) The proposed statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs was a firm yet conciliatory review of Canada's position.

(b) The basic reason the U.S. was fighting in South Vietnam was to prevent the process of infiltration and the possibility of fighting at a later date in Thailand, Malaysia, etc.

(c) It was desirable to avoid extreme statements which might be interpreted as meaningless unless we were prepared to back them up with military support.

(d) In view of the widening gulf between the USSR and China, care should be taken to refrain from the unqualified condemnation of communism in public statements.

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[75] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 2, pp. 1774–1784.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 2, p. 1774-1784.

[76] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 1, p. 399.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 1, p. 399.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and other Ministers concerning Canadian foreign policy and noted with approval the proposed statement to be made in the House by the Secretary of State for External Affairs later that day.

[…]

274.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/1

No. 1890
Washington, June 8, 1965
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Saigon, London, Delhi, CDS, Paris, Permis New York, Rome, NATO Paris (Routine); Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington (Air Mail).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw.

VIETNAM: CANADIAN STATEMENT MAY 28

During conversation yesterday on other matters, William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, made a point of saying how helpful USA authorities considered Minister's remarks on Vietnam during May 28 Foreign Affairs debate.[77] Bundy understood that Secretary Rusk would be sending personal message to SSEA to express his appreciation for this constructive statement.

2. Bundy said that there was only one small passage in statement on which he would like to offer an observation. This was Minister's reference to point that Vietnam "should enjoy…a neutral position such as that suggested by General de Gaulle…" Bundy said that all USA enquiries to French, including a fairly direct question during a recent conversation between Rusk and Couve, indicated that in French view neutral status for SVN meant that it would have no repeat no right to call on outside assistance if subjected to aggression; even less would it be entitled to any minimal military assistance, advisers, etc. from abroad. Bundy thought this French view was unrealistic. He also referred to explosive connotations of word neutrality in Saigon.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

275.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Multiple Posts
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à plusieurs missions
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

No. Y-440[78]
Ottawa, June 8, 1965
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority.
By Bag: Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

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[77] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 2, pp. 1778–1781.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 2, p. 1778-1781.

[78] To/À : Saigon, Moscow, London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, Geneva, CDS, Delhi.

VIETNAM

On Sunday, May 30 and again on Friday, June 4, SSEA and Soviet Ambassador had conversations, substantial part of which devoted to Vietnam.

2. SSEA indicated that since UN Secretary-General was not in position to act in this crisis, it was up to countries such as Canada and Soviet Union which shared deep concern over crisis, to do what they could in quarters where they might be able to exert special influence. Minister's interest was to see whether some formula might be found to get negotiations started. In light of US determination not to withdraw (which he emphasized) and willingness to deal with Hanoi but not Liberation Front as *interlocuteur valable*, SSEA wondered whether Hanoi might be prepared to undertake negotiations if no restrictions were placed on composition of NVN delegation. In other words, Liberation Front would be represented at negotiations but as part of NVN delegation.

3. Ambassador's reaction at first interview was noncommittal but in second more detailed discussion, he revealed no sign of flexibility. He made following points: (a) Soviet influence limited in situation where main participants are USA and Vietnamese parties; (b) It was up to Hanoi to decide on its policy about negotiations and representation at negotiations. Soviet Union had been given no green light to explore this or exchange opinions on Hanoi's behalf; (c) Problem is very serious and measures looking to relaxation would be welcome but since situation results from USA intervention, up to Washington to take initiative; (d) Hanoi and Liberation Front have said USA troops must be withdrawn before talks can begin.

4. SSEA said he had hoped Ambassador would not find it necessary to follow this line of argument. SSEA's exposition had been based on the facts as they exist and one of these facts was that USA was not going to be forced out. Problem was to determine whether anything could be done on basis of these inescapable facts. SSEA indicated his interest in pursuing this matter further at any time in near future if Ambassador wished to do so.

276.
Memorandum from African and Middle Eastern Division to Commonwealth Division
Note de la Direction de l'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient à la Direction du Commonwealth
RG25, vol. 10080, 20-INDIA-9/2.2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] June 15, 1965

RECORD OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN MR. SHASTRI AND MR. MARTIN ON JUNE 14

Mr. Martin called on Mr. Shastri in his suite in the Windsor Hotel at 7:30 p.m. on June 14. Mr. L.K. Jha and I were present. Mr. Martin emphasized how important the visit had been to Canada and said Mr. Shastri had made a wonderful impression.

Viet Nam

2. In addition to the suggestion outlined in my memorandum† to Far Eastern division of today's date, there was some additional discussion on Viet Nam. Mr. Martin mentioned the United States' appreciation that the USA bombing of North Viet Nam was having some effect. The USA military authorities were urging the view that this bombing was the only way to force negotiations. Mr. Shastri said a pause in the bombing should be tried for a month and that, if this proved unsuccessful in promoting a settlement, some alternative could be considered. He seemed to be implying that it would do no harm to stop the bombing for a month since it could always be resumed if the gesture was unsuccessful.

3. Mr. Martin thought that at the [Commonwealth] Prime Ministers' Conference Britain would strongly defend USA policy with Canada going less far in this direction and the Indian position slightly further removed. Apart from Australia and New Zealand, the other members of the Conference would probably be very critical of USA policy. Ceylon, however, would probably be less critical than the others. Mr. Shastri agreed that Ceylon would be less inclined to raise its voice against the USA on Viet Nam than would the previous government there have been. Mr. Martin remarked on how strongly British leaders had been defending USA Viet Nam policy despite trouble in their own ranks.[79] This was an indication of how concerned Mr. Wilson was about Britain's own interests, e.g., the position of Malaysia.

4. Mr. Martin said that before the USA five-day pause in the bombing of North Viet Nam we had received 6 hours' advance notice. In general Canada had to dig for information from the USA on Viet Nam. McGeorge Bundy was our best source as he was close to our Ambassador in Washington. Mr. Martin had known President Johnson since before he was Vice-President. Mr. Johnson had good judgement and was a great politician but he did not like to discuss policy matters. He listened to others' views but you were left not knowing what he thought himself. He relied on the advice of a few people he particularly liked; McGeorge Bundy, whom he liked very much, Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk. Mr. Rusk was a very able man but his influence was somewhat smaller than that of the two others.

5. In connection with Canadian policy on Viet Nam, Mr. Martin said that perhaps we should say more publicly [that we were concerned about the course of events?] but we had to bear in mind our own long-term bi-lateral problems with the USA.

[…]

D.C. Reece

277.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in United Kingdom
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

No. Y-457
Ottawa, June 15, 1965
Secret. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Delhi.

Following for Prime Minister from SSEA:

When I saw Shastri and Jha again in Montreal yesterday we had further talks about Vietnam.

2. I said I have been thinking that it might be worthwhile if U.S.A. could be persuaded to stop bombings of North Vietnam before, during and after Algiers Conference,[80] since the meeting will probably take a strong anti-U.S.A. position on the Vietnam problem. Jha agreed this was important and went on to suggest that if U.S.A. could be persuaded to undertake such a pause, they might also ask Ben Bella, as host, to seek to have conference take pause

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[79] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 330.

[80] This is a reference to the Second Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled for Algiers in June-July 1965. Il s'agit de la deuxième conférence afro-asiatique, prévue à Alger en juin-juillet 1965.

in bombing into account by going on record as urging Geneva Co-Chairmen to convene immediate conference on Vietnam with U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Communist China and the two Vietnams participating. (Although we had some discussion of conference participation with special reference to Communist delegations, this question is probably of secondary importance for the moment. The main question as I see it is to attempt to arrange a pause and a suitable reaction from the Algiers Conference.) Jha thought that Ben Bella's natural inclination might be to side with the Chinese, but since he enjoyed the limelight, a U.S. approach to him might encourage a more constructive line.

3. Prime Minister Shastri thought this proposal might be worthwhile but felt that any approach to Washington should be tentative sounding rather than specific request and that it was important for U.S.A. to let Russians know in advance of their intention to pause as further attempt to promote settlement.

4. We then discussed channels through which these ideas might be advanced, insofar as the approach to the Russians was concerned. (The Indians took for granted that we would make the original suggestion to Washington.) Mr. Shastri suggested that the U.S. approach to the Russians might be made through the British, or alternatively through U Thant, while Jha thought that our approach to the U.S.A. might be matched by the Indians talking to the Russians. We did not, however, reach any decisions on these procedural matters.

5. If you agree, I believe that we might usefully undertake an initiative based on this discussion. My immediately following telegram provides suggested instructions for Charles Ritchie for your consideration and approval. You will note that the approach envisaged is to Dean Rusk rather than to the President. I believe this channel would be preferable since I agree with Mr. Shastri that this should appear as a suggestion rather than as a specific and formal request and an approach to the President might imply the latter. You will also note that while this idea is directly attributed to our discussions with Mr. Shastri here, we have not attempted to indicate to the Americans how they might wish to communicate with the Russians, if they react favourably to these ideas. More specifically, I believe that the question of India's role as an intermediary is one which will have to be decided by the Indians either on their own initiative (in the light of what we are doing) or in response to any invitation for consultations and joint action which may be forthcoming from Washington.

6. If you agree with this approach, I shall authorize Charles Ritchie to proceed accordingly. At the same time you may wish to keep Mr. Shastri informed of what we are doing.

[Paul] Martin

278.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in United Kingdom
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

No. Y-458
Ottawa, June 15, 1965
Secret. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Delhi.

VIETNAM (FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM SSEA)

Following is text of proposed instruction to Washington. Begins: I should be grateful if you could arrange an interview with Dean Rusk as soon as possible, and give him the following oral message from me.

2. During Prime Minister Shastri's visit we devoted a good deal of attention to the problem of Vietnam in an endeavour to find common ground with respect to devising an approach to this problem which would offer some hope for bringing it under negotiation by establishing an acceptable basis for a beginning to be made.

3. I have been concerned, as I am sure you have too, about the prospects for the discussions on Vietnam at the forthcoming Algiers Conference. In discussing this with our Indian visitors, we agreed that the pressures for condemnatory decisions might be considerably lessened if there were to be a further pause in air strikes against North Vietnam before, during and immediately following the conference. We also agreed, that if this could be arranged, its impact might be heightened by U.S.A approach to Ben Bella, informing him of the decision as a further step in the direction of promoting a settlement, and suggesting that he might wish to use his position as host to urge the conference to call on the Geneva Co-Chairmen to reconvene an international conference on Vietnam. Given Ben Bella's wish to play an active role, such an approach to him might encourage a more positive and constructive contribution from him and act as a counter gravitational pull away from the Chinese position.

4. We and the Indians agreed that if you found merit in these ideas, it would be important to involve the Soviet Union, if possible, by informing Moscow of any decisions you may be making in this connection, and this could be done through a number of available channels. Although past experience has not been very encouraging, it seemed to us that the active exertion of Soviet influence in Hanoi, whatever it may amount to, is an essential precondition to progress being made along the lines we all desire.

5. I am sure you will understand that these suggestions are being advanced in a spirit of sympathetic understanding and out of concern for a serious situation which has attracted the grave attention of all the world. Although these suggestions emerged from our talks with Prime Minister Shastri, these comments to you are being made on the sole responsibility of the Canadian Government. The Prime Minister of India will however be informed in general terms of what we have done.

[Paul] Martin

279.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

No. Y-462
Ottawa, June 16, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-461† June 15.

VIETNAM

At conclusion of discussion reported our reference telegram, SSEA said to U.S. Ambassador that he would welcome an opportunity to talk to Rusk in near future if this could be arranged without having to go to Washington. Minister asked Ambassador to inform Rusk of this wish but at the same time to explain that he was aware of how busy Rusk was and that he would not wish to see him cancel other more pressing commitments. Nevertheless, SSEA felt that he would like to have a talk if this could be arranged while his impressions of Indian visit were still fresh. SSEA said that he had found Indians cooperative and that Shastri could not have been more understanding of U.S. position. Shastri wanted to be good friend of U.S.A. and it was therefore regrettable that Washington visit had been cancelled.[81]

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[81] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. XXV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), document 123.

2. In reply to Ambassador's question Minister said he would be in Windsor over weekend, but reiterated that he did not wish Rusk to come just to hear impressions left by Shastri. Nevertheless, such impressions were important and doubtless had been conveyed to us by Indians in expectation that they would be passed on.

3. Ambassador promised to inform Rusk of SSEA's wish for informal discussion.

4. SSEA said he hoped to have something more specific about discussions with Indians to tell Ambassador in immediate future.

280.
Note by Clerk of the Privy Council
Note du greffier du Conseil privé
RG25, vol. 10662, 23-3-1965/2

Secret.
[London,] June 16, 1965

MEETING IN ADVANCE OF THE CONFERENCE OF PRIME MINISTERS

A meeting was held at No. 10 Downing Street at 11:30 this morning in response to an invitation by the British Prime Minister which was attended by the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. No other Commonwealth countries were represented.

Also present were:

Sir Burke Trend,
Sir Saville Garner,
Sir Hilton Poynton, and three or four British officials;
The Hon. Paul Hasluck, Minister of External Affairs for Australia, and
Sir John Bunting, Secretary of the Australian Cabinet;
Mr. Alistair McIntosh, Secretary of External Affairs of New Zealand; and
myself.

The stated purpose of the meeting had been to discuss some concern that our Prime Minister and Mr. Menzies had expressed over the rapid expansion of the membership of the Commonwealth and the change in its nature pursuant to the admission of a large number of very small countries. In fact, the meeting principally discussed other questions. These were the following:

[…]

(b) *Viet-Nam*

Mr. Wilson said that the British Government was extremely concerned at the way in which the Viet-Nam situation appeared to have settled into a "flat" calm in which there was no movement or initiative designed to bring about some solution. He mentioned that the British had decided (as they had intimated to the various governments) to suggest that the 17 countries that had taken an initiative toward discussions some months ago should now move toward a positive invitation to discuss.

Because of the seriousness of the situation, the British Government felt that a more positive initiative still was justified. Mr. Wilson referred to the fact that the Chinese Government had declined to receive Mr. Gordon Walker when he had been sent to visit the Eastern countries on behalf of the British Government. It was possible that a delegation under the auspices, not of the British Government, but of the Commonwealth as a whole, including as it does a large number of Afro-Asian countries, might have a much better chance of being received and of achieving some success. They were, accordingly, considering suggesting to the Commonwealth meeting on June 17th that the conference should decide

that a delegation, consisting of three Commonwealth Prime Ministers, should visit the various countries involved in the Viet-Nam war to determine on what basis it might be possible for negotiations or discussions to be undertaken.

Mr. Wilson said that it was not thought that they should be given any more specific or detailed terms of reference. It was also felt that, to a large extent, the success of the mission in gaining any hearing would depend on its composition. In the British view, the best course would be for the Prime Minister of Britain to be Chairman of the delegation and the other two members to be the President of Pakistan, Mr. Ayub Khan, and the President of Tanzania, Mr. Nyerere. The two latter members would be people whom it would be very difficult for the Chinese to refuse to see. Obviously, the acceptability of such an initiative to the United States was of vital importance. The British had been in touch with Washington and had received clear intimation that the United States would not object to the plan.[82]

Mr. Wilson also indicated, in referring to the inclusion of himself as a member of the delegation, that he thought the inclusion of the British Prime Minister would be a "condition" of United States approval.

In discussing the considerations relating to the proposal Mr. Wilson said that it was the feeling of the British Government that the initiative would have value whether the mission was successful or not. For the reasons he had outlined, he thought its chance of being received in Hanoi and Peking was substantial. If it brought about discussions, that would be a great accomplishment. If it did not, there would be at least some prospect of identifying the Chinese as the ones who were unwilling to sit down for consultation. He said the British were also under the impression that an initiative of this kind might do something to strengthen the position of Moscow in its contest with Peking, especially for influence in Hanoi.

Mr. Menzies said that Mr. Wilson had discussed the proposal with him privately a day or two previously. He gave it his full and complete support. Mr. Holyoake also expressed himself unreservedly in favour of it.

Mr. Pearson said it was of the greatest possible importance to be sure that the initiative was acceptable to the United States. He was glad to know that it had been discussed with them. He agreed entirely with the assessment that a great deal would depend on the composition of the group. Mr. Ayub Khan would be ideal, both because of his personal qualities and also because of the interest Peking had in developing close relations with Pakistan. He was, however, very doubtful, after his discussions with Mr. Shastri in Ottawa, whether Mr. Shastri would agree to having Ayub Khan chosen. He had been quite astonished at the bitterness with which Mr. Shastri had discussed relations with Pakistan during the Ottawa visit.

There was some discussion of the action that would be taken if Mr. Shastri would not agree. The Prime Ministers were of the view that Tunku Abdul Rahman was not a possibility and that Mr. Senanayake could not leave Ceylon for the purpose. Mr. Shastri obviously would not be a substitute, and in any case, he would not be acceptable to Ayub Khan if he had first vetoed Ayub Khan's inclusion. It was, accordingly, the consensus that everything possible should be done to get Mr. Shastri's consent.

Mr. Pearson also expressed agreement with the proposition that the other member of the group had to be from Africa. He felt that Nyerere was a good choice, especially because of the relations China was trying to develop with Tanzania.

Mr. Pearson enquired about the handling that was contemplated in the conference. It might be best to begin with discussion of the Viet-Nam situation generally. It would almost certainly be gloomy. Out of that gloom it might be possible to get a greater degree of agreement on the necessity for some initiative such as the one proposed.

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[82] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 4.

While the logic of the Prime Minister's argument was recognized, Mr. Wilson, and especially Mr. Menzies, felt there was great risk that a discussion of Viet-Nam might reveal such wide differences and lead to so much controversy that agreement on the initiative would be extremely difficult. The discussion might also lead to a profusion of suggestions, many of which would be of doubtful value, but it would make it difficult to get agreement on the initiative now proposed. It was, accordingly, felt that the best course would be for Mr. Wilson to make his suggestion at a restricted meeting (that is of Prime Ministers and principal representatives of countries whose Prime Ministers are not present) on Thursday afternoon, June 17th.

The general view was that the best course would be to try to get agreement on the initiative in principle, as a first stage. Once agreement had been secured in principle (if it was to be forthcoming at all) the meeting might then adjourn to give Prime Ministers an opportunity for informal and private discussion with one another concerning the composition of the delegation. During such discussion, Mr. Pearson would speak to Mr. Shastri to try to convince him of the desirability of accepting Ayub Khan. There would then be a resumed meeting to see if agreement could be reached on the Prime Ministers to compose the group.

It was agreed that nothing whatever should be said to any other Prime Ministers in advance of the meeting on Thursday afternoon.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at about 12:45.

R.G. Robertson

281.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in United Kingdom
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

No. Y-466
Ottawa, June 16, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, NATO Paris.
By Bag: Delhi, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Moscow, Warsaw, Karachi from London; Geneva from Paris.

VIETNAM: PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI'S VISIT

Following is text of verbatim (but uncorrected) notes on discussions about Vietnam between two Prime Ministers and SSEA and Jha during recent Indian visit. Grateful if London could indicate to addressees whether there are any corrections to be made in this text. Begins:

A. *Conversations in Prime Minister's office, morning June 11.*

Mr. Pearson said Vietnam was the main preoccupation in the USA. He had spoken twice to Johnson about it: at the LBJ Ranch[83] with Mr. Martin and later at Camp David. The latter had been a frank confrontation and argument, but friendly. Johnson appeared anxious to

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[83] While the meetings at the LBJ Ranch in Texas in January 1965 are best known for the signing of the Canada-United States Automotive Products Agreement, Canadian aid policy to South Vietnam was also one of the subjects discussed.
Bien que les réunions qui se sont tenues au ranch de Lyndon B. Johnson, au Texas, en janvier 1965 soient surtout connues pour la signature de l'Accord canado-américain sur les produits de l'industrie automobile, les discussions ont également porté sur la politique d'aide du Canada au Sud-Vietnam.

liquidate the Vietnam War and get the troops home. Americans were bad imperialists: they never really lived abroad, with their compounds and PXs. However, Johnson no repeat no more knew how to get out of Vietnam than Kennedy did. Now they were in deeper than ever. But the President sincerely wanted negotiations. Though his tactics of stepping up the warfare had aroused resentment among intellectuals, they had not repeat not disturbed the public or Congress very much. There had been reaction to the casualties following the new policy, which might help to force negotiations. For our part, when talking to the USA we tried not repeat not to criticize the basis of their intervention, but we were very worried as to where it might lead. The fact that we were not repeat not publicly critical enabled us to have more effect in private. We tried to understand them and to help them out of the mess they were in.

Mr. Martin recalled his private talk with Mr. Jha in which they had agreed that the positions of India and Canada were basically the same. The USA could not be asked to get out unconditionally. That would lead to chaos. There had to be a satisfactory agreement. Mr. Shastri said the USA would have to accept in principle getting out ultimately. That was a necessary part of any political settlement.

Mr. Arnold Smith asked whether Mr. Shastri could give an assessment of the threat of the extension of the "war of liberation" technique to Thailand.

Mr. Shastri said there was no repeat no definite info but some report of subversive activities. This made a Vietnam settlement all the more important. He had said that the bombing should be stopped: temporary suspension did not repeat not produce any special effect.

Mr. Pearson observed that the "pause" had not repeat not been well done.

Mr. Shastri continued that it was necessary to consider whether military operations in Vietnam could be effective. North Vietnam seemed confident of its ability to meet the situation. Accordingly, the Soviet Union had no repeat no wish to intervene and persuade the North to stop. There should be moves on both sides but it was not repeat not easy to judge what would draw a satisfactory response. It was therefore the more important to stop bombing for some time to enable the North to make a favourable response. Then the Soviet Union might be interested in taking some part.

Mr. Martin said the USA thought the bombing was getting results and was the only way to get Hanoi to negotiate. Our Commissioner had sought Hanoi's reaction to the pause. The North Vietnam Foreign Minister had repeated the four conditions for negotiations: the pause seemed to have had no repeat no effect.[84] However, a French source had given the view that the North was not repeat not rigid based on remarks of the North Vietnam Ambassador to France.[85] It would be interesting to hear impressions of the Russian attitude gathered during the Moscow visit. All overtures towards negotiations had come from the West: there were no repeat no signs of give from Peking or Hanoi.

In reply to Mr. Acharya's questions to the effect of a longer pause, Mr. Pearson said, if the President were to invite his opinion, he would advise him to stop but not repeat not as had been done before. Rather the USA should say they were discontinuing the bombing in the hope of an indication that negotiations were in prospect. Johnson might agree, though Maxwell Taylor was in Washington and he would argue that such action would lower South Vietnam morale. The Communists did not repeat not have a similar problem and although Hanoi was shaky it did not repeat not show it like Saigon. Mr. Shastri said Moscow had a good influence in Hanoi. The Chinese latterly had been taking an interest, but the USSR had been giving positive help – arms, equipment and economic assistance. There were reports that essentially Hanoi was not repeat not happy with Chou. The Vietnamese were afraid of Peking and found it easier to get on with Moscow. Kosygin had indicated to him that Russia

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[84] See/Voir doc. 149.

[85] See/Voir doc. 151.

was not repeat not prepared to consider a settlement unless the USA agreed to withdraw. Mr. Shastri had suggested that if the bombing were stopped, the USSR might intervene and seek a settlement. Kosygin had replied that North Vietnam and the USA had to settle the matter. As to the effect of the bombing, earlier there had been reports that the Vietcong were on the run, but that had proven incorrect. The validity of the latest reports was unknown.

Mr. Martin said the USA had wished us to inform the Indians that they had not repeat not been informed in advance of the pause to avoid embarrassing the Indians.

Mr. Shastri remarked that Kosygin had not repeat not taken the pause seriously. Mr. Pearson commented that it had been done badly as the Americans were so concerned about public opinion in the South. Mr. Shastri said that even if the bombing stopped the USA forces would remain. If that would not repeat not give South Vietnam reassurance, the position of the Government was very weak.

Mr. Michener pointed out that the bombing was directed not repeat not against North Vietnam but against the Vietcong supply routes.

Mr. Pearson agreed that the bombing was directed against installations rather than people. It was not repeat not clear whether it was helpful. Mr. Pearson raised the question whether the Commission was still useful or should be wound up after eleven years. Mr. Martin pointed to the serious financial situation: the Commission had been refused an overdraft and we had had to pay our own people's hotel bills. Mr. Smith observed that China had not repeat not paid its contribution for three years, while the USSR, Britain and France were some months in arrears.[86] Britain was ready to pay but did not repeat not wish to be the only one to do so. The real problems were China's policy of no repeat no payments and Hanoi's policy of forcing the teams out of the North and perhaps the bureau out of Hanoi. Eviction of the bureau could be serious. Mr. Martin said it would be a blow to peacekeeping in general if the Commission ended by being thrown out of a hotel for not repeat not paying its bills.

Mr. Jha understood the Russians would consider making a payment: they had not repeat not refused.

Mr. Pearson said we sometimes became impatient with the Commissions: they were a nuisance and the problems were far away. However, they might be useful for the future.

B. *Conversations at Prime Minister's residence, afternoon June 11.*

Mr. Martin asked whether Mr. Shastri had views as to how India and Canada together or perhaps with others might help to bring about a cease-fire and talks in Vietnam. Mr. Shastri seemed satisfied that the USSR had considerable influence in the North.

Mr. Shastri said that to secure a cease-fire the USA had to change somewhat its attitude to the problems discussed at the morning session so that the Russians could get closer to the USA. The Indian authorities considered that the USA and the USSR had been coming closer in the Kennedy era but since his death their impression was that the two had been moving further apart. In the matter of peacekeeping forces and other problems, if the USA could be more accommodating the USSR might take a tougher line with China and be more outspoken. However, the USSR wanted to outwit China and on Vietnam USA was not repeat not being helpful or constructive. Perhaps Canada was in a better position to advise the USA that they should try to accommodate the USSR. If the USSR adopted a rigid attitude to the settlement of South Vietnam there hardly could be any solution. The question was how to tackle the problem. Mr. Pearson asked whether an appeal for a cease-fire from the UN Secretary-General would be useful if he were willing to make it. Mr. Shastri said the ground would have to be prepared through indirect approaches before an appeal could produce any effect. Mr. Martin said the Secretary-General did not repeat not feel that an appeal addressed to all

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[86] See/Voir doc. 195.

parties would be welcome to China. The USA had no repeat no objection to such an appeal but would like to know about any such move in advance so as to be able to express views. The problem was how to reach the Chinese. The device of a conference on Cambodia was acceptable to the USA on Sihanouk's terms, i.e., that it should be confined to Cambodia's border problems. The USA doubtless expected that other matters in fact would be discussed. Mr. Shastri said his understanding was that China would not repeat not welcome any kind of conference.

Mr. Martin agreed that was the greatest cause for concern. Mr. Shastri would be with Chou in Algiers; in view of the importance of the Afro-Asian Conference it could be the occasion to try to do something. Mr. Pearson referred to Mr. Shastri's remark about the need to prepare the ground with the Russians. India might find a way to discuss the matter with them and Canada could easily and gladly pass the results to the USA. But in the matter of accommodation, both sides wanted it. We could talk to Washington but this was no repeat no time for them to expect much accommodation from the North: the rains had begun and the Vietcong were busy. The USA was reconciled to a tough two or three months in Vietnam, so they too would be tough and unyielding. However, Indians might pick up info they thought the USA should have but would not repeat not want to pass it direct. Similarly, we might convey info from Washington through India to the Russians.

Mr. Martin said we had recently spoken to the Russians and had raised for speculation [how] to deal with Vietcong representation in a delegation. The USA was toying with the idea and it might open things up. The Chinese were said to have spiked the idea but, though Ambassador Shpedko had not repeat not reacted to the concept, he had passed it on. And it was understood that at Algiers Chou would make overtures to India.

Mr. Shastri said he did not repeat not know whether he would meet Chou, but if they did have a talk he would try to be helpful and make Chou reasonable. It was an old story about Chou's wish to have direct talks with him in Cairo. Nasser had advised him to meet Chou but he did not repeat not see much point in a meeting. However, they faced a stalemate situation and the ice had to be broken. There were the alternatives of war and talks and negotiations. War with China was not repeat not advisable for India: it would bring prolonged suffering and consequences were unknown. But in Nehru's time the Lok Sabha had unanimously taken the pledge not repeat not to rest until every inch of Indian soil had been recovered. To get out of the pledge or even to deviate from it would not repeat not be easy. Perhaps he could have a first general talk to find out what Chou wanted. If they met, other issues such as Vietnam could be discussed.

Mr. Pearson said he could see no repeat no useful initiative emerging from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting. Mr. Martin added there were some indications that the British and Australian positions might come in for some criticism. He understood that the USA was interested in the meeting from that point of view. There might be an opportunity for an initiative by India and Canada that might have some impression on the USA. Mr. Pearson observed that it would be difficult to get a conference opinion of any value since it would have to reconcile Menzies and Nkrumah. But there might be some limited exchanges.

(The two Prime Ministers withdrew to talk in private.)

Mr. Martin said he was really worried about Vietnam.

Mr. Jha said that if the Russians had a suitable package to sell to North Vietnam, Hanoi would buy it without Chinese concurrence. However, communications on Vietnam between the USSR and the USA had been cut. The Russians had not repeat not wanted the break and had had different public and private lines. However, if now the Russians supported any proposal for peace, China would accuse them of betraying Hanoi.

In answer to a question, Mr. Jha said India's communications with the USA were very poor, although they had had a very frank communication from Rusk on North Vietnam. Mr. Martin said he was familiar with the message, about which we had been informed

because of the present visit. Canada attached great importance to the public and private relations between India and the USA and the invitation incident had been upsetting. It was important that communications be restored. Mr. Jha said the Rusk message had improved the situation. Mr. Martin said the USA needed to recognize the importance of India as a channel to the USSR. […]

In reply to questions about a Vietnam "package" Mr. Jha said if a set of proposals reasonably attractive to Hanoi could be put together, Moscow could agree that it was not repeat not a bad deal. However, Moscow was in competition with Peking. They had lost contact in the West and if the Chinese outwitted them in the East they would be in difficulties.

Mr. Arnold Smith agreed that a change in USA-Soviet relations would be good. However, under Kennedy relations had long been bad: Khrushchev had changed them and his hurry to improve relations with the West was why he had been removed. The present state of relations was due more to Russian leadership than to Johnson. The Russians had to be moved.

Mr. Jha said, up to about three months ago there had been a dialogue which had suddenly been broken. The USA policy had gone beyond the point where the USSR could live with it – after Kosygin's visit to Hanoi.

Mr. Arnold Smith observed that a senior Russian official had said that the Hanoi incident had been a Chinese trap laid for the USA. However, perhaps the Russian leaders still hoped for the unity of the Communist world, a possibility which Khrushchev had written off. Mr. Jha remarked that the Russians believed peace was better than war and promoted coexistence, while such attitudes were lacking in China. Mr. Smith said Russian history was not repeat not a cause for pessimism: once again there could be an important change and the leadership might adopt Khrushchev's policies. Mr. Martin said the USA had been concerned over the strength of the Soviet-Indian communiqué in respect of Vietnam.[87] Mr. Jha agreed. The emphasis on stopping the bombing came at the wrong time, but the text had been agreed before the pause although made public after it. Mr. Martin said the USA bore great responsibilities and it was easy to find bases for public criticism. We tried to speak to them privately but, e.g., on Vietnam it was necessary to have a suitable public posture. This was an important consideration in our attitude. And the USA considered bombing to be the way to promote negotiations.

Mr. Jha asked how viable South Vietnam was without the USA. Mr. Martin said that last year it had looked difficult for the USA to continue or even find anyone to govern, there was such lethargy and war-weariness. The situation had, however, changed and though the South Vietnam Government had its problems it was not repeat not in danger of disintegration. But if the USA ceased to have an energetic policy the rot could set in. It would be dangerous for India if the USA and South Vietnam were to lose out. It had been hard to understand Nehru's attitude to Indo-China in 1956 or why India could wish for anything better than an independent Vietnam. Mr. Acharya said there were two considerations. India's struggle for independence had ingrained the [basic?] idea that a country should have its own Government – including South Vietnam. However, any policy that underscored Chinese prestige was bad for India, and the bombing appeared to do that.

Mr. Jha said that the desire to see Vietnam ultimately independent of China was shared, but the present phase of great USA activity there was awkward. It was easy to brand USA policy as imperialist among the Afro-Asians and the Chinese could pose as the bulwark against neo-colonialism.

Mr. Arnold Smith pointed out that North Vietnam was in South Vietnam and there were implications for the future of Thailand, etc. Mr. Acharya said the 17th parallel was just a line: there were not repeat not two countries and it could not be argued that there was

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[87] See/Voir Henry Bradsher, "Shastri, Russians Denounce Bombing of North Viet-Nam," *Washington Post*, 20 May 1965, p. E28.

a "foreign" attack. Many refugees had gone from South to North as well as the other way, and when they came to join the Vietcong they were returning. Mr. Smith agreed that such had been the case up to about five years ago but now most of the arrivals were North Vietnamese. The USA, moreover, offered North Vietnam the carrot of trade and aid as well as the stick of bombing. Unfortunately there was no repeat no such dual approach to China.

Mr. Martin said the possibility of a move on Vietnam at the Algiers Conference was very disturbing to the USA. Mr. Jha agreed but was of the opinion that Vietnam might be made the focal point of Afro-Asian solidarity.

282.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in United Kingdom
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

No. Y-123
Ottawa, June 16, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel 2265† Jun 16.

VIETNAM

Although there may be differences in emphasis (and means), our interpretation of USA objectives, based on announced policy statement of USA Government and especially April 7 speech of President Johnson, is that in essential elements we can support what USA is attempting to achieve. First objective we share is to bring Vietnam problem under negotiation. Second objective is to ensure that result of those negotiations will be creation of conditions in which people of South Vietnam will have opportunity to decide upon the path they themselves wish to follow in their future political and economic development, free from outside interference and coercion. Third objective is that this decision must be result of meaningful free choice which can only be exercised if the necessary conditions are guaranteed internationally.

2. Following is relevant extract from President Johnson's April 7 speech: "Such peace demands an independent South Vietnam, securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others, free from outside interference, tied to no alliance, a military base for no repeat no other country. These are the essentials of any final settlement. We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. There are many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones. We have stated this position over and over again fifty times and more, to friend and foe alike, and we remain ready, with this purpose, for unconditional discussions."

3. (An independent South Vietnam able to shape its own relationships to all others, means, in our view, that the division of Vietnam would continue to exist only as long as those concerned, i.e., the people of South Vietnam, wished it to. This same element is of course evident in Indian thinking as shown in President Radhakrishnan's recent proposals.)[88]

4. We accept the assurances which the USA has repeatedly given that it seeks neither territorial aggrandizement nor material gain nor permanent bases in Vietnam. We also accept the assurances offered by the USA and South Vietnam that the USA military presence in

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[88] See/Voir Sharokh Sabavala, "India Pushes Proposal for Peace in Vietnam," *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 May 1965, p. 6.

South Vietnam has come about at the request of South Vietnam appealing for assistance to deal with the problems created by the special form of aggression North Vietnam has been practising, and that these measures of military assistance can come to an end when North Vietnam demonstrates that it [is] prepared to desist from these policies (see ICSC Special Report June 2, 1962).[89]

283.
Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

No. 2322
London, June 18, 1965
Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, CANFORCEHED, Geneva, Permis New York (Priority); Delhi (Priority) from Ottawa; Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hong Kong, Warsaw, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra, Wellington, Accra, Lagos, Salisbury, Dar-es-Salaam, Colombo, Karachi from London; Nicosia from Paris; Port of Spain, Georgetown, Kingston from Ottawa.

COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING – VIETNAM

Following is summary of proceedings afternoon session June 17.

2. Prime Minister Wilson opened meeting with statement that gravity of Vietnamese conflict was such that Commonwealth should take advantage of fact that it assembled members with different viewpoints on situation in order to take collective action and press participants to negotiate and end the fighting. He proposed that three prime ministers representing all shades of opinion in Commonwealth should go, not repeat not as individuals or as representatives of their own countries, but as delegates of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting and visit all capitals of nations concerned: Saigon, Hanoi, Washington, Peking and any other capital necessary. The three prime ministers should discuss the basis on which conference could be convened and a peaceful, honourable and lasting settlement achieved.

3. In presenting his proposal Prime Minister Wilson developed two arguments: a) it would be fruitless to analyse past and attempt to attribute responsibility of conflict, Commonwealth should look to future in an attempt to end grave situation; and b) in view of the fact that UN was presently incapacitated and that Co-Chairmen of Geneva Conference had not repeat not been able to agree to convene new conference, Commonwealth was only world organization remaining capable of taking initiative. Proposal was welcomed by most prime ministers. Main reservations were made by Tunku and President Nyerere. Tunku asked whether it might not repeat not be more appropriate to seek in advance whether governments concerned would welcome Commonwealth delegation. There were risks for prestige of Commonwealth if mission was turned down. Commonwealth should perhaps seek to speak with one voice at Algiers Conference and influence it to send a delegation. President Nyerere's main reservations were to the effect that Commonwealth should consider carefully the possible reactions of the two protagonists, i.e., USA and China and should not repeat not take action

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[89] See/Voir United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 1755, *Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962).

which would have the result of putting China in the dock since of the two it was only government likely to refuse. He proposed instead that those prime ministers who were close to China and USA should separately and without publicity investigate from these two countries possibilities of finding a solution.

4. Argument however to which prime ministers rallied was that statement produced on the first day of meeting which indicated that Commonwealth was taking collective action in attempt to resolve Vietnam crisis, would carry much greater impact and was most likely to have a useful effect. Mr. Pearson particularly emphasized this view and made point that once announcement that mission was being set up had been made it would be very difficult for any government to refuse to receive it without losing prestige. The conference endorsed Mr. Wilson's suggestion that conference should agree on the principle of sending a mission, that an announcement should be made in the same evening and that full consideration be given later to briefing the mission and laying down guidelines either by conference itself or by a working group of Foreign Secretaries and other Ministers. It was eventually agreed that mission should consist of five members, Prime Minister of UK as Chairman, President of Ghana, Prime Ministers of Nigeria and of Trinidad and Tobago, and Prime Minister of Ceylon, providing he were willing to serve.[90] (Prime Minister of Ceylon being absent, a telegram was sent to him.) The conference agreed to issuance of communiqué which is reproduced in immediately following telegram.†

5. Other points of interest which arose during discussions concerned a) the relationship of this Commonwealth initiative with the Co-Chairmen of Geneva Conference, b) its link with UN, and c) terms of reference. Prime Minister Shastri suggested that delegation should first call in Moscow to discover if Russian Co-Chairman would agree to join in summoning a conference. President Ayub pointed out that such an approach was bound to fail since Co-Chairmen had already stated their positions. Mr. Pearson suggested that it would be possible, once mission had reported, for Commonwealth Prime Ministers to pass the report to Geneva Co-Chairmen. As regards UN, suggestion was made by Mr. Pearson that it should be informed of developments once decision was reached by conference. Mr. Wilson said he would ask Lord Caradon to approach U Thant immediately afterwards. President Nkrumah suggested that mission should have detailed terms of reference but the prevailing view was that these should be general enough not repeat not to create any difficulty from either side.

284.
Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

No. PM-2303
London, June 18, 1965
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tels Y-457 and Y-458 Jun 16 to Prime Minister regarding Vietnam.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador).
SSEA from R.G. Robertson.

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90 See/Voir Patrick Keatley and Brian Lapping, "Mr. Wilson to Lead Commonwealth Vietnam Mission," *Guardian*, 18 June 1965, p. 1.

Following our telecon yesterday, I have now spoken to the Prime Minister and he agrees that it would be satisfactory to have instructions sent to Ritchie as contained in your Y-458.

2. You may want to consider whether there would be advantage in withholding action until Monday to see whether there has, in the interim, been any reaction from Peking to British initiative. It could be of obvious relevance to the approach and to the desirability of action as suggested.[91]

285.
Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
MG26-N3, vol. 320, 812.3 1965 Minutes – Secret

No. PM-2325
London, June 18, 1965
Top Secret. Limited Distribution. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Immediate).

VIETNAM

Following for Minister and USSEA.

Nyerere lunched with the Prime Minister today. Afterwards the Prime Minister dictated the following account of their private conversation. Begins: At lunch today with the Prime Minister [*sic*] of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, I reproached him for his unfriendly attitude, both at the meeting yesterday and in his public statement afterwards toward the Commonwealth Vietnam Peace Commission. He said that he had been quite disturbed by the way it was rushed through and by the refusal of the Chairman to agree that a basis of operations and terms of reference should be worked out before a Commission was established, rather than afterwards. I said that I shared his worry, as others did, at the speed with which it had been put through but that Mr. Wilson thought this was absolutely necessary to achieve maximum impact and to prevent everything being watered down by long and divisive discussion. I agreed also that he might have had a political motive in mind to create the maximum impact for himself at the very beginning of the conference. However, I did not repeat not mind this as long as the venture was a success.

2. Therefore I pleaded with Nyerere to review and revise his position. I told him that we could now go to work on the terms of reference and establish a satisfactory foundation for the work of the Commission. If that could be done then he should give the Commission his blessing; indeed he should offer to serve on it, as he was one of the members who had been thought of originally. He promised to do this and, I think, took my advice seriously. He even seemed receptive to the idea that, at the end of next week the Commission personnel might

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[91] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
To the Under-Secretary: Charles Ritchie is not acting on this at the moment. He understands from the Minister that action is to be deferred until further notice. You may wish to confirm with the Minister. A.E. R[itchie] June 21.
I assume that this scheme is now moribund as it was based on Ben Bella's relations with the Chinese. M[arcel] C[adieux]
Mr. Baker – Maybe we should confirm this to Washington D.C. L[ouis] R[ogers]
Algerian President Ben Bella was deposed in a coup on 19 June 1965.
Le président algérien Ben Bella a été renversé lors d'un coup d'État le 19 juin 1965.

be changed and improved. If he served he hoped that I would reconsider and also join the Commission, if there was a possibility of that happening. I agreed to consider this if the situation made it possible.[92]

3. I also begged him to get in touch at once, this afternoon, with the Chinese Communist representation in London and have him send a message to Chou En-Lai, from him, to the effect that the latter should not repeat not reject the Commission initiative out of hand; that he should await developments and that these developments might make it wise for the Chinese Government to co-operate. An immediate rejection would certainly make the Commission's work impossible but it would also put the Chinese Government in a very bad light. Nyerere should impress this on his Chinese friends, as forcefully as he could without any delay. He promised to do this at once.

4. He then passed on to me a message from Chou En-Lai, given to him in Tanzania a few weeks ago. It was meant for transmission to Washington and Nyerere hoped that perhaps I could do this. Chou En-Lai asked Nyerere to tell USA through some suitable channel that: "1. The Chinese Communists do not repeat not want war; they really mean this. 2. They were concerned only with the reconstruction and redevelopment of their own country and war would make this impossible. 3. So far as the Vietnam War was concerned, they did not repeat not have nearly as much influence with Hanoi as was thought by many to be the case."

5. I told Nyerere I would see that this message got to Washington.

Lester B. Pearson

Ends.

6. The Chinese message should be passed at once to White House and Secretary of State.

286.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

No. 2031
Washington, June 19, 1965
Top Secret. Limited Distribution. Immediate.
For Minister and USSEA.

VIETNAM: NYERERE MESSAGE

I gave the Nyerere message to McGeorge Bundy at White House and William Bundy at State Department today. They expressed warm appreciation of Prime Minister's action in transmitting his "important" message and considerable interest in its contents. McGeorge Bundy commented that points (1) and (2) of message were familiar as they had been transmitted to them by another channel on May 31[93] but point (3) in its present formulation was new and of considerable interest. McGeorge Bundy said that it might be read in a number of ways. For instance that the Chinese felt some disapproval of Hanoi's policies in continuing the war and refusing to negotiate. This would surprise USA as they have assumed that Chinese had a greater influence in Hanoi than the Russians and that Hanoi's policies

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92 This document incorporates revisions made by Pearson, as outlined in London unnumbered telegram of 21 June 1965. See MG26-N3, vol. 320, 812.3 1965 Minutes – Secret.
Ce document comporte des modifications apportées par Pearson, comme l'indique le télégramme non numéroté de Londres du 21 juin 1965. Voir MG26-N3, vol. 320, 812.3 1965 Minutes – Secret.

93 See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 321 (Editorial Note).

were in accordance with this Chinese influence.[94] Another interpretation might be that Chinese wished for some reason to place the overt responsibility for the continuance of the war and the refusal to negotiate on Hanoi while presumably really approving these policies. There might be other interpretations. USA authorities would be much interested in obtaining any clarification of point (3) and in knowing whether Nyerere could provide any amplification and as full an account of Chinese point (3) as possible. They wondered whether the Prime Minister would be willing to talk to Nyerere further on this point and said that if he was agreeable to doing so he might say that he knew his American friends and that he was certain they would be much interested to have any further clarification of point (3) which Nyerere could give. USA authorities would also welcome Prime Minister's personal assessment of Nyerere's reliability as transmitter of this message.

2. I am sending this telegram simultaneously to Prime Minister.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

287.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/1

No. 2071
Washington, June 23, 1965
Top Secret. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-480† June 22 and London Tel PM-2334.†
Repeat for Information: London (Priority).

VIETNAM: NYERERE MESSAGE

Prime Minister's assessment that Nyerere might not repeat not be entirely reliable as channel in present instance was passed on to senior USA officials earlier this week; they were most grateful. We might add that in a separate conversation a member of State Department Office of Asian Communist Affairs, when invited to comment on point 3 (Chinese claim that in Vietnamese war they do not repeat not have nearly as much influence with Hanoi as many believe), remarked that this was not a completely implausible comment for Chou to make to Nyerere. Chinese disliked assertions that China was ultimate source and instigator of North Vietnamese activity. Of course they had been strongly emphasizing their support for DRVN as fellow Communist state under imperialist attack, and for liberation struggle of Vietnamese people, but at same time they seemed to want to leave impression that struggle in Vietnam was first and foremost a Vietnamese affair. This theme was occasionally to be detected in their statements, for example during recent visit to China of Kartawinata, Speaker of Indonesian Assembly. Perhaps Chinese took this line because they did not repeat not wish to be too deeply and automatically associated with evolution of a conflict over which they could not repeat not exercise complete control.

2. State Department officials are reluctant to commit selves to firm assessment of relative influence of USSR and China in Hanoi at present, but their general view seems much the same as that expressed in paragraph 2 your reference telegram.

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[94] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Mr. Rogers, F[ar] E[astern Division].
We spoke. J.G. H[adwen]
We should let Washington know that Shastri said U.S.S.R. was [more?] influential with North Vietnam than China. P[aul] M[artin]

288.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/9

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] June 30, 1965

CONCORDANCE BETWEEN CANADIAN POLICY AND THE GUIDE-LINES FOR THE COMMONWEALTH MISSION ON VIETNAM

As promised in a memorandum† this morning, I attach a commentary on the various sections of the Statement of Guidance for the Commonwealth Mission on Vietnam in which the comments are numbered in the same way as they appear in the Statement of Guidance, a copy of which is also attached.† There would be no objection in the use of any of this material in answering questions in the House.[95]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

Enclosure: Memorandum
Pièce jointe : Note

[Ottawa, n.d.]

CONCORDANCE BETWEEN CANADIAN POLICY AND THE GUIDE-LINES FOR THE COMMONWEALTH MISSION ON VIETNAM

2. (a) "There is an inherent risk of the conflict in Vietnam escalating into a wider war." We have always accepted this possibility while not seeing signs that it is imminent.

(b) "...there are grave doubts as to an early or final solution by military means." Our policy has often been stated: We do not consider that a purely military solution is either possible or desirable.

(c) "A comprehensive cease-fire and a conference of all the parties directly involved in the situation seem to provide the essential precondition to the solution of the problem." We have agreed with this throughout with one possible exception: we would not want a cease-fire to be a precondition for negotiation. In 1954 and earlier in Korea, negotiations took place before there was a cease-fire. We took the lead in proposing a means whereby one party which is not a government could be accommodated at the conference.

3. (a) and (b): "(a) A suspension of all United States air attacks on North Vietnam. (b) A North Vietnamese undertaking to prevent the movement of any military forces or assistance or material to South Vietnam." As has already been explained, these two clauses were considered together, and the obligation was meant to be reciprocal. We would expect that the North Vietnamese undertaking would not only be given, but this time carried out.

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[95] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
John Hadwen: Speak to me the next time we are together. P[aul] M[artin]
Press & Liaison [Division] has copy, with Minister's comment for possible future use, if questions arise. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]
Now that the House has risen, the Minister agrees that a briefing on the lines of the attached concordance be given by P[ress] & L[iaison] Div[ision] to a group of responsible press representatives. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu] 6 July 1965.

(c) "A total cease-fire on all sides to enable a conference to be convened to seek a peaceful solution." Our only difference from this has been that we have been prepared to see a conference meet before there is a cease-fire in order to get negotiations started.

(d) "The objectives of such a conference might be to:

(i) end the war in Vietnam." There would be no doubt of this in our minds, and there never has been.

(ii) "Secure the withdrawal of all foreign military presence from Vietnam and the neutralization of the area." We have long supported the aim of withdrawal of *all* external military forces – and that includes those infiltrated into South Vietnam by North Vietnam, under whatever guise. The question of neutralization is more complex, but we certainly do not envisage South Vietnam belonging to any military bloc nor having any military bases in it, after peace has returned – and neither does the United States. What is not clear about this is what is meant by "the area". Those who advocate neutrality for South Vietnam are rarely clear about their intentions for North Vietnam.

(iii) "establish, for a period, an international peace force, under the auspices of the Geneva Agreement, to safeguard peace in Vietnam." It was our own Prime Minister who first put this idea forward last March, but we would hope that the possibility of such a force being brought under the United Nations would not be excluded.

(iv) "establish principles for the eventual unification of the country through free and internationally supervised elections." This also has long been part of Canadian policy, with the understanding that the elections must be genuinely free, and that the right of the people in both halves of Vietnam to come to their own decisions would be recognized, i.e., that there would be no swamping of the South by the larger population of the North, organized to produce one of those results 98% in favour of what the government wants.

289.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/10

Secret.
[Ottawa,] July 9, 1965

VIETNAM: EXPLORATORY MISSION
BY THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL

Before we first heard of the "Davies Mission" to Hanoi – through the press on July 8[96] – we had meant to suggest to you that Arnold Smith, in his capacity as Commonwealth Secretary-General be asked to go on a mission to Hanoi to explore the possibility of a visit by the Commonwealth Mission. He would not have been charged with responsibility for negotiating the terms of their entry, since the possibility of success in such an undertaking would not have been sufficient to justify risking permanent damage to the office of Secretary-General.

2. The Davies Mission, however, probably puts an end to this project for the time being. If Davies succeeds, which seems most unlikely in view of the doubt being cast on his status by the communist press and radio, then a second mission would of course not be required. If his

[96] See/Voir "Wilson Sends Aide on Hanoi Mission," *New York Times*, 8 July 1965, p. 1.

mission is a failure, then it seems to me that the possibility of Arnold Smith being accepted is too small to justify putting him in a position where he will have been rejected personally (as a Canadian) or by association with the Commonwealth Conference which created the Commonwealth Mission.

3. There were in any case a number of factors which, even before the launching of the Davies Mission, made this a doubtful project:

(a) Arnold Smith was himself opposed to it: partly because the Commonwealth Mission was a political move inspired largely by domestic British considerations which might well make Mr. Wilson resent interference, especially by a Canadian; and partly because the present Chinese and North Vietnamese attitudes towards any form of conference would suggest an almost certain rebuff.

(b) It would be difficult to launch such a mission over the opposition of the Secretary-General himself.

(c) We agree with Mr. Smith in his estimate of the risk to the prestige of his office and the reluctance of the other side to consider entering into negotiations of any sort.

4. In the circumstances, therefore, I suggest that this project be left in abeyance and be brought out for re-examination later, possibly toward the beginning of October, when it may be possible to look forward to a greater prospect of success for such a venture. If other peace-making projects have by that time come to nothing, it might be very useful indeed to have this scheme available to be put forward. Do you agree?[97]

H.B. R[obinson] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

290.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/10

Secret.
[Ottawa,] July 12, 1965

PEACE PLAN FOR VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Having considered the best way to take action on the Minister's instruction to devise some sort of peace plan for Vietnam (and presumably for Southeast Asia as a whole) I thought that it might be desirable to have your reaction to the procedure we would envisage in putting forward suggestions.

2. If you agree, I would suggest that this project might be carried out in two stages. In the first stage I would envisage drafting an analysis of the positions adopted by the various interested parties with regard to the terms they could accept for a peaceful settlement; the principal parties I have in mind are, of course, the North and South Vietnamese, the USA, Communist China and the USSR, although it may be desirable to include some reference to the Liberation Front as well. The purpose of this analysis would be to determine, and rule out, those factors which appear to be absolutely incompatible and conversely to establish the nature and extent of any common ground which may appear to exist or which might be "created".

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[97] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes, I agree. P[aul] M[artin]

3. Subsequently to the Minister's concurrence with this analysis, fixing the limits within which diplomatic action might be possible, we could then attempt to devise specific proposals in the form of a "peace plan".

4. I should be grateful to know whether this suggested approach meets with your approval and whether you have any specific ideas which might be incorporated at this stage.[98]

R.L. Rogers

291.
Letter from Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre du représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, 20-1-1-17/2

No. N-960
Paris, July 13, 1965
Secret. Air Bag.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL SPECIAL MEETING – JULY 13 – VIETNAM

Attached for your information are two copies of the remarks which I made based on your telegram M-118† July 11, M-124† July 11 and M-120† July 11.

G. Ignatieff

Enclosure: Talking Points
Pièce jointe : Points de discussion

Secret.
[Paris,] July 13, 1965

COUNCIL MEETING, JULY 13

Vietnam

On Vietnam, Mr. Chairman, developments since the NATO Ministerial Meeting in May have been very discouraging. I can confirm what Mr. Ball has said about the messages recently passed through our member of the International Commission from Hanoi. There appears to be no desire on the part of the authorities in Hanoi or Peking to enter into discussions or negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem. Certainly there is no indication of any willingness to negotiate on terms other than their own. The position of the USSR appears to be somewhat less rigid, but nevertheless, Moscow so far has been unwilling or unable to soften North Vietnam's attitude and seems to have decided to take no initiatives. We had hoped that the Commonwealth Mission, because of its representative character and the sincerity of its intentions, might lead to a more forthcoming attitude on the Communist side. Unfortunately these hopes have not so far been realized.

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[98] It is not clear what the response was to this memo, nor whether Martin's requested peace plan was ever produced.
On ne sait pas exactement quelle a été la réponse à cette note, ni si le plan de paix demandé par Martin a jamais été produit.

It seems safe to assume that one reason for North Vietnamese refusal to enter into discussions is their hope that they can, in the foreseeable future, achieve their objectives by force. They are probably banking on the success of their stepped-up military campaign in South Vietnam during the remaining months of 1965, and on a weakening of the resolve of South Vietnam, the USA and their allies.

I should like to repeat our general agreement with the broad policy objectives of the USA in Vietnam which, as re-stated by Mr. Ball today, are directed at finding a political solution. We know, on the basis of our own experience in Vietnam during 11 years, that North Vietnam is involved in aggression against South Vietnam. We know, too, that since 1954 the Hanoi authorities have never deviated from their objective of a unified Vietnam under Communist control. The bloodshed and suffering now taking place in Vietnam are a direct result of North Vietnam's determination to pursue this objective at all costs and, given the clear determination of South Vietnam and its allies to resist this aggression, there is little hope for an improvement in the situation unless Hanoi authorities can be persuaded to abandon their attempts to achieve control by force.

We are all aware of the repeated statements by the USA Government of its willingness to enter into discussions. We also know that every initiative taken during the past months has been flatly rejected by the Communist countries, often in insulting terms. It is natural to assume that no initiative will shake North Vietnam in its determination to conquer the South, and to wonder whether any purpose is served by further efforts to find a solution. I think it is important, however, that we maintain our efforts to reach a political solution – or at least to get discussions started.

At the same time it is our duty to be candid with one another in these consultations, if the consultations are to be, as Mr. Ball has rightly asked that they be, really serious. We must therefore admit that in so far as public opinion in Canada is concerned, it is troubled by the developments in Vietnam and by no means solidly behind USA policy in Vietnam – I gather from Mr. Thomson's remarks that this is not a problem peculiar to Canada.

Much of the more extreme criticism of that policy stems from a failure to recognize the facts and to be guided by them; on the other hand, some of the reservations expressed by responsible segments of the public result from a fear of the ultimate consequences of the war in Vietnam and a reluctance to accept the risks inherent in the situation.

This fear is understandable and the factors contributing to it are worth examining:

First of all, there exists a widespread uneasiness about the process of escalation which is taking place. There is, of course, a tendency to overlook the contribution to escalation which is being made by North Vietnam, and a failure to recognize increased USA participation as a direct response to stepped-up military operations by North Vietnam and Viet Cong. Nevertheless, we think it is important, if we are to retain broad public support of USA policy in Vietnam, that the response to North Vietnamese provocation be no greater than is necessary to counter it. It is just as important that the reason for such a restrained response be kept before the public.

Air Vice Marshal Ky appears to be inexperienced in political matters and, as Mr. Ball put it, a flamboyant character who has a reputation for being prone to impetuous and ill-considered actions and statements. We have seen little to suggest that his new responsibilities as Prime Minister are acting as a restraint.

Third, in the broader field of international relations the position of the USSR and the state of USA-USSR relations give rise to concern. Early last month my Minister had two long discussions with the Soviet Ambassador to Canada. The Ambassador made it clear that the USSR was very concerned about the situation in Vietnam; on the other hand my Minister was left in no doubt that the Soviet Government was either unable or unwilling to play a very constructive role in bringing about some accommodation. The Ambassador's reaction in general reflected the hardening of the Soviet attitude which has been becoming more

noticeable. The deterioration of relations between the USA and the USSR is disturbing, but even more disturbing is the possibility that, with the establishment of Soviet missile sites in North Vietnam and increased Soviet military assistance in general, there seems to be a greater risk of direct military confrontation in Vietnam between the USA and the USSR.

However strong our support for USA policy in Vietnam, it would be unrealistic to ignore the concerns and the problems I have just outlined. We consider it essential that every effort be made to allay the kind of misgivings which may arise from these considerations. The basic long-term issues at stake in Vietnam are political as well as military, and military operations against North Vietnam must be related to political aims and to equally vigorous diplomatic operations.

The continuing search for a political settlement, which we must pursue, we all realize also contains dangers. As long as the Communist powers remain immobile, and as long as political pressures for a political settlement build up in our own countries and elsewhere in the world there will be an inevitable tendency always to go one step further in making concessions to the unyielding demands of Hanoi. If this process goes too far, there is a real danger that North Vietnam may achieve most of its political objectives before a conference begins. To avoid this erosion, it is, of course, necessary to maintain the hard core of an honourable position.

Finally, I think it important to recognize that behind the problem in Vietnam lies the question of China. We should not let the immediate problem obscure the necessity of finding ways of averting a continuing expansion of what is assuming the proportions of a deepening world crisis. Vietnam represents only one aspect of the Chinese offensive in the "third world" and, whatever the outcome in Vietnam, we must face the probability of a long period of wrestling with Chinese Communist ambitions throughout the world. It may be indeed that a reasonable approach to the present deepening crisis would include a direct and continuing dialogue with Communist China designed to draw the authorities in Peking out of their present irrational and hostile mood, so vividly described by Mr. Thomson in their rejection of a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' offer as "a plot for peace" and to persuade them to assume the responsibilities which flow from membership in the world community.

292.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/10

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] July 26, 1965

VIETNAM: DAVIES VISIT TO HANOI

Attached is a copy of the report† submitted to Prime Minister Wilson by Mr. Harold Davies, giving an account of his recent visit to Hanoi; this document was made available to Canada House in London by the Foreign Office. Only Canada, Australia, New Zealand (in addition to the U.S.A.) have been given the full text of this report; other Commonwealth countries are apparently being given a shorter version of it.

2. The details of Mr. Davies' account fill in the picture but do not alter the main conclusions formed earlier as a result of preliminary reports: Hanoi is not prepared to consider negotiations at this time. The reaction of the North Vietnamese to the publicity given in London to the Davies Mission is interesting; it suggests that when the time comes for preliminary contacts and discussions – assuming that circumstances do not change radically – the success of such contacts may depend on their not being made public.

A.E. R[itchie] for P[aul] M[artin]

293.
Letter from Ambassador of United States to Prime Minister
Lettre de l'ambassadeur des États-Unis au premier ministre
MG26-N6, vol. 10, Vietnam – Correspondence and Memoranda with U.S.

Secret.
Ottawa, July 26, 1965

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver to you a personal letter from the President of the United States which is transcribed below:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have asked my Ambassador to bring to you my frank assessment of the situation in South Vietnam.

In recent months open aggression against the people and Government of Vietnam has increased and very heavy strains have been placed upon the South Vietnamese armed forces and the South Vietnamese people.

In this same period, as you know, repeated and imaginative efforts by many governments, including your own, have been unsuccessful in moving this problem to the conference table because of the determined and rigid opposition from Hanoi and Peiping.

I have been reviewing this situation during the last few days in the light of up-to-date reports from my most trusted associates. While final decisions have not been made here, I can tell you that it now appears certain that it will be necessary to increase United States Armed Forces in South Vietnam by a number which may equal or exceed the 80,000 already there.

In making this additional commitment, I shall be considering additional decisions, and my Ambassador will be in touch with you on these as soon as they are developed. I want to emphasize that in any event there will be no degradation in our commitment to NATO.

I want you to know that as we make this major additional effort we will also continue to make every political and diplomatic effort that we can to open way to a peaceful settlement. In this connection, I want to reiterate my appreciation of the efforts of your Government and of yourself personally. We shall continue to welcome constructive initiatives.

We will also continue to use every care and restraint to ensure that the fires of war do not spread on the mainland of Asia. Our objective remains the end of external interference in South Vietnam so that the people of that country can determine their own future.

In this situation I must express to you my own deep personal conviction that prospect of peace in Vietnam will be greatly increased in the measure that the necessary efforts of the United States are supported and shared by other nations which share our purposes and our concerns. I know that your Government has already signalled its interest and concern by giving assistance. I now ask that you give most earnest consideration to increasing that assistance in ways which will give a clear signal to the world – and perhaps especially to Hanoi – of the solidarity of international support for resistance to aggression in Vietnam and for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

I have asked my Ambassador to make himself available to you for any consultation which you may wish on this matter.

Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson"

I shall, of course, be at your disposal to do whatever I can to be helpful.
With all good wishes.

Sincerely yours,
W. Walton Butterworth

294.
Memorandum from Acting Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures par intérim au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures par intérim
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/10

Secret.
[Ottawa,] July 27, 1965

I took the opportunity of my lunch with the Prime Minister today to discuss the projected reply to President Johnson's message on Vietnam. The Prime Minister's first remark was that we should not rush an answer and he saw indeed some advantage in waiting perhaps as much as two weeks. This runs contrary to your feeling on the subject, as well as that of Charles Ritchie in Washington. Perhaps a compromise in timing can be worked out.

The Prime Minister did not want to look at a draft but was interested in discussing the general trend of the answer. He thought it important that we should try to find out first to whom this message had been sent, as this would condition his reply. In the second place, he said that from his experience of dealing with President Johnson he was sure the latter had something definite in mind, i.e., he wanted to bargain something against concrete Canadian support for the U.S. position in Vietnam. Perhaps this would be purely negative, in the sense that he would do something to hurt us if our reply was completely unsatisfactory.

The Prime Minister was not sure that it was a good idea to promise anything specific in the way of aid to Vietnam or to the area of Southeast Asia in the future, although this could be mentioned in general terms.

Finally, Mr. Pearson said he thought it important that we should examine carefully the question of medical aid. We discussed the two real possibilities, i.e., a medical unit along the lines suggested by Mr. Drury, and a Red Cross unit financed by the Canadian Government. The Prime Minister agreed, after discussion, that neither unit would have any real possibility of working with both sets of combatants. He also agreed that the army unit was to all intents and purposes a non-starter because of our role in the I.C.C. However, he thinks that a case could be made for a Red Cross unit and we ought to look into it very carefully.[99]

I attach herewith a draft memorandum† on this subject prepared by Far Eastern Division.[100]

I also attach a memorandum† concerning the number of Canadians in Vietnam.

R.A.D. Ford

295.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures par intérim
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/10

Secret.
[Ottawa,] July 28, 1965

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[99] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Mr. Ford: The Minister also does not think we should rush a reply although he agrees that a draft (or drafts) should be prepared. He would like to see some concern expressed about the size of the proposed increase in U.S. forces which could be regarded as changing the nature of the operation. He thought there had been no warning of this kind of increase in the NATO discussions. A.E. R[itchie]

[100] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Passed to Mr. Drury. A.E. R[itchie]

VIETNAM: AMERICAN TROOP STRENGTHS

We received a telephone call from the U.S. Embassy at 7:15 this morning to inform the Canadian Government that President Johnson, in his news conference at noon today, will announce the proposed increase in U.S. troop strength in Vietnam. The figure he will announce, however, will be different from that which was contained in his letter to the Prime Minister. He will announce an increase of fifty thousand now with a possibility of more to follow later. Probably he is announcing the increase in this way in order to make the figure look less alarming and less provocative.

2. We have also ascertained from the U.S. Embassy that the letter which was sent to the Prime Minister was addressed to a number of other Heads of State or Government (possibly as many as thirty) and that it was basically a form letter in which minor variations were made to suit individual cases. There was no accompanying background information indicating the sort of help the United States might hope to get from other countries.[101]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

296.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6271

Secret.
[Ottawa,] July 28, 1965

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Gordon),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Sharp),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Cardin),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. MacEachen),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. MacNaught),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Teillet),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Miss LaMarsh),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. Favreau),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Hays),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Tremblay),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Minister of Forestry (Mr. Sauvé),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson),
The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Pennell).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner), (Mr. Loughead).

[…]

[101] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Mr. Martin has been informed. M[arcel] C[adieux]
[Stamped] Seen by the Prime Minister

U.S. REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Previous reference January 20†)

The Prime Minister said he had received a letter dated July 26th, 1965, from the President of the United States, through the U.S. Ambassador, concerning the increased strain placed on South Vietnam and the lack of success in bringing the Vietnam problem to the conference table because of the opposition from Hanoi and Peiping. The letter said a recent review had indicated U.S. military forces would need to be substantially increased over the 80,000 already in South Vietnam. At the same time the United States would continue to make every political and diplomatic effort to open the way for a peaceful settlement.

The President said the United States were appreciative of support which had been received and would continue to welcome constructive initiatives. They would make every effort to ensure that the war did not spread to the mainland of China and their objective remained to end external interference in South Vietnam, so that the people of that country could determine their own future. The United States were seeking increased assistance in Vietnam which would indicate the solidarity of international support for resistance to aggression and for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

The Prime Minister said the U.S. President had sent letters, similar to the one he had received, to the leaders of all NATO countries (except France) and to some other friendly countries. Canada appreciated the U.S. position and no action would be taken now which might create further difficulties for the United States. He had spoken to the U.S. Ambassador and had reminded him of the several commitments Canada had had for some time regarding United Nations operations in Cyprus and the Middle East, which, for the present at least, showed few signs of diminishing.

Mr. Pearson said that, if questioned by the press on the statement of the U.S. President, he intended to indicate that any decision to increase their forces was for the United States to decide. He would also state that, while the United States had agreed to negotiate and accepted the principle behind the Commonwealth Peace Mission, the Communists had turned down every effort to reach a solution, including the Commonwealth Peace Mission. Canada was assisting in the area as a member of the Indo-China Truce Commission, and by taking a part in the Mekong River project.

Mr. Pearson said it had occurred to him that Canada might make a contribution in Vietnam by sending out a civilian mobile hospital unit to serve under the International Red Cross. The idea had been examined by officials of the Department of External Affairs who thought there were difficulties in the plan.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Prime Minister concerning the letter from the President of the United States, dated July 26th, 1965, which stated the intention of the United States to increase the size of their forces in Vietnam and requested further assistance in that area from friendly countries, and agreed that comments concerning the letter be along the lines indicated by the Prime Minister.

[…]

297.
Telegram from Ambassador to Yugoslavia to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Yougoslavie au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 447
Belgrade, July 28, 1965
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Repeat for Information: London; Washington, NATO Paris, Paris, Permis New York, Rome, Moscow from London; Delhi, Colombo from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Prague, Hong Kong from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM

At small "working" dinner last night to which USA Ambassador invited only British Ambassador and myself, Harriman made following points in brief about his trip to Moscow.[102] Despite material being given on rising scale by USSR to NVN, Moscow leaders disclaim ability to influence Hanoi; in any event they have no repeat no desire to try as long as USA is bombing North. On positive side, there is now clearcut recognition in Moscow that 17th parallel exists and that any settlement will have to take into account existence of two sovereign states. Also encouraging was definite interest of USSR in what Harriman described as six-point programme of improved relations with USA, with non-proliferation agreement at top of list and improved bilateral trade at bottom. Again, however, it was made clear on Soviet side that progress towards this happier relationship could begin only when Vietnam was out of way. Harriman said that Soviet respect for USA military strength remained undiminished, fact which accounted in large part for cautious attitude of USSR towards widening of Vietnam War.

2. Essence of Harriman's mission to Moscow had been to ensure that there was no repeat no misunderstanding in USSR concerning determination of USA to uphold integrity of SVN. He had also warned USSR of dangers of deeper Soviet involvement in defence of NVN. Harriman said he regretted that he had not repeat not been authorized by Washington to forewarn USSR that USA might have to take out SAM sites if they were successfully used to destroy USA aircraft. News of USA bombing of two SAM sites had just come through and Harriman said he regretted that this had not repeat not happened while he was in Moscow in order to bolster his warnings to Kosygin. He had told latter of intended USA build-up in SVN and mentioned to us figure of 160,000 without making clear whether he had used this figure with Kosygin.

3. Regarding his visit to Yugoslavia, Harriman insisted that it was unplanned and had come about purely as result of invitation unexpectedly issued by Tito. At same time, Harriman said he welcomed invitation since he continued to regard Yugoslavia as useful bridge between Washington and Moscow. In 1948 he had been one of first in Washington to urge full-scale USA aid to Yugoslavia following break with USSR and had been consistent supporter of continued aid since, despite Soviet/Yugoslav rapprochement in recent years. He did not repeat not agree with those who simply wrote-off Yugoslavia as re-admitted member of Soviet Bloc and felt that his earlier faith in their independence of thought and action had been wholly justified over years.

4. He still felt Yugoslavia had important role to play as bridge and channel of communication to Moscow and he intended to appeal to Tito's vanity as statesman to fulfil historic role at time when it was most needed by both East and West. He intended to put bluntly to President fact that nub of issue between East and West today was question of externally supported wars of liberation. Somehow he would try to convince Tito that peaceful coexistence in nuclear age could tolerate no repeat no such exceptions and that it behoved him to so convince USSR.

5. Specifically on Vietnam he would be speaking along lines of a memo of July 22 which, on request, USA had supplied to Nkrumah prelude to his mission to Hanoi. British Ambassador this morning showed me copy of that memo, obtained through British Embassy Washington, most significant feature of which is that it contains at one point clear USA offer to engage in second and much longer pause in bombing of NVN in exchange for some firm indication, which Nkrumah is invited to explore, of willingness to negotiate in Hanoi. Brief alternatively holds out prospect of scaled-down bombing in response to definite diminution in VC activity.

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[102] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), documents 59, 68 (Editorial Note).

6. In course of conversation Harriman showed much of sensitivity to criticism which has seemed to mark Johnson Administration handling of Vietnam issue. He was loud in his praise of British and West German unqualified support for USA military effort, support which he described as worth more because it was public than all unpublicized support being lent by some thirty countries to SVN. His criticism of reluctant allies included Canada. He had definite reservations about usefulness to USA of our activities in ICC, especially that in Laos, and in general showed little appreciation of value of Commissions. On whole he seemed to regard past activities of Commissions as having been inimical to USA interests, only exception having been 1962 majority report on North Vietnamese violations of 1954 Agreement.

7. He was especially bitter about India's lack of impartiality and mentioned that he had sent through Indian Ambassador here a message to Shastri, scheduled to arrive here few hours later, reminding him of great importance that USA attached to preservation of neutral position by India on Vietnam. Harriman frankly warned him that USA would take serious view of any joint Tito/Shastri communiqué that condemned USA for aggression in Vietnam.

[Ross] Campbell

298.
Letter from Ambassador to United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/10

Confidential.
Washington, D.C., July 29, 1965

Dear Mr. [Marcel] Cadieux,

I am enclosing a memorandum of a conversation which I had with Mr. Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to the President, on July 28. The memorandum is, I think, self-explanatory.

I am not quite clear as to how much authority Mr. Valenti enjoys in the White House or the extent of his influence with the President, and I certainly would not want Valenti (and Max Freedman) to become my main channel of communication with the White House. So far as I am concerned it remains with McGeorge Bundy. On the other hand, Valenti does have constant access to the President and I have no doubt can bring matters quickly and readily to his attention, and I do not want to discourage this line of communication as it may prove a useful one. I therefore spoke very frankly to him while making it clear that I was speaking only in my personal capacity and without prior consultation with the Prime Minister.

I think the Minister would be interested in seeing this memorandum, a copy of which I am also sending to the Prime Minister. I spoke to him on the telephone before my conversation with Mr. Valenti and he approved in general terms the approach which I intended to take in my talk, and also gave him a brief account of the conversation on the telephone afterwards.

Yours sincerely,
C.S.A. Ritchie

Enclosure: Memorandum
Pièce jointe : Note

Confidential.
[Washington,] July 28, 1965

CONVERSATION WITH MR. JACK VALENTI, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Max Freedman told me recently that it had been decided in the White House to attempt to strengthen personal contacts with some of the Heads of Mission in Washington and that for this purpose Mr. Jack Valenti had been asked to have a series of luncheon meetings with various Ambassadors during which it was hoped that there would be frank interchanges on both sides. Mr. Valenti would pass on the Ambassadors' remarks to the President.

My meeting with Mr. Valenti took place at Max Freedman's house and with Mr. Freedman as host. There were only the three of us present. (Max Freedman is evidently on terms of close and pretty confidential friendship with Valenti. Freedman seems to consider himself almost as an unofficial member of the White House staff.)

Valenti claimed to be speaking throughout this interview entirely on his own behalf and not as delivering the President's views although he frequently made it clear that what he was saying was a direct reflection of the President's thinking and of his reactions. He began by saying that he had frequently heard the President express his great admiration for the Prime Minister and that he regarded him as one of the outstanding statesmen who understood the realities of the international scene the best. He also said that the President had a "family feeling" for Canada and that it was unthinkable that there should be any real profound difference between us, although there might be problems in our relations from time to time.

As Max Freedman said that the President had again today mentioned to him the Prime Minister's speech at Temple University in a somewhat critical way, I explained the circumstances of the speech and, once again, the Prime Minister's motives in making it. Mr. Valenti said that this episode was past and that it in no way altered the feeling of trust and friendship which the President had for the Prime Minister.

Mr. Valenti then said that Max Freedman had mentioned to him the possibility of the President paying a visit to Canada. He had not yet had an opportunity to talk to the President about this and had no idea of his wishes in the matter. He thought that the President should attempt, within the next six months or a year, to visit Europe, Latin America and even, possibly, Africa and in this framework thought that he should certainly visit Canada at the same time. On the other hand, much would depend on the progress of the war in Vietnam, – if there were critical developments the President would not wish to leave Washington.

With regard to a possible visit to Canada there seemed to be two alternatives: one might be a visit in late autumn – another might be in early spring. Mr. Valenti wondered whether there was any possibility that there might be demonstrations, critical of United States policy in Vietnam, on the occasion of the President's visit. I could not exclude this possibility. I said that although I had no authority to offer an opinion on dates for such a visit, I was rather inclined, personally, towards the spring rather than autumn. Max Freedman suggested that an honorary degree from Dalhousie University might be an appropriate occasion. I said that, speaking as a Nova Scotian, I was attracted by this idea, – certainly the standing of the University would justify it and the choice of Nova Scotia would obviate the necessity for a choice between Ontario and Quebec.

I then said that I would like to give Mr. Valenti a few of my personal thoughts on the impact of the Vietnam crisis in Canada. I said that, as he was aware, the Prime Minister and Mr. Martin had given very forthright and continuous support to the United States position in Vietnam and that, in doing so, they had run into difficulties in the House of Commons from the Opposition. (I referred to Mr. Martin's speech of May 28, 1965, in the House of Commons, a copy of which I promised to send him.) Politically speaking, it was easy for critics to accuse the government of simply identifying itself with the United States position and the government was under pressure to take action to attempt to prevent the escalation of hostilities. I hoped that this background was fully appreciated. Wide sections of opinion in Canada were very much disturbed about the escalation of the war.

In this general connection I referred to the Heeney-Merchant report on Canada-United States relations.[103] I pointed out that although this was an excellent report with very constructive suggestions in it, public opinion in Canada had been focused on one sentence taken out of context and it was being widely suggested in the Press that the report advocated that Canada should cease from public criticism of the United States. The sharp reaction in Canada to any such suggestion showed how sensitive Canadian opinion was to any idea that Canada should simply go along with the United States. This kind of sensitivity was something which the United States would have to bear in mind.

Mr. Valenti then turned to the President's public statement today[104] on Vietnam and said that nobody could be more deeply troubled than the President about the course of events in Vietnam, no one was more conscious of the danger of escalation, and no one was more reluctant to commit United States forces in the area, but he saw no alternative. For example, the President agreed with much of Mr. Walter Lippmann's analysis of the Vietnamese question but, as he had said to Mr. Lippmann, the question was what he should do today and tomorrow at the present stage. He was looking for an alternative and he found none. It was unthinkable that the Americans should just pull out of Vietnam and leave their allies in the lurch. Mr. Valenti emphasized that the President was looking for suggestions, that he would very much welcome any proposal which had any hope of bringing the Communists to the conference table, and that he wished to consult and keep in touch with all those who had suggestions to make. In this connection, Mr. Valenti said that Mr. Pearson with his wide experience of international affairs might be able to be of help to the President, not through public statements but through private exchanges. I said that I was sure that the Prime Minister sympathized with the President's difficulties and was himself deeply concerned over the present situation, and that I was also sure that if the President sought his advice the Prime Minister would readily respond. Mr. Freedman intervened to say that the Prime Minister's stature and influence in international affairs was such that he could give invaluable advice to the President. Mr. Valenti said that it might be that the President would wish to get into communication with Mr. Pearson, possibly by telephone. For the time being he did not think that a meeting would be appropriate as the President was not anxious to publicize or dramatize any such exchanges but to work behind the scenes with those who could give him help and advice. On the other hand, it was possible that for the time being the President might wish to put the main emphasis on the efforts which Judge Goldberg was making within the framework of the United Nations.

I said that I had been interested by the President's references to the United Nations and to his message to the Secretary-General and I wondered if Mr. Valenti would be prepared to comment on them further. Mr. Valenti said that, in the first instance at any rate, it was not proposed to move in any formal way through the machinery of the United Nations. Such action might only bring about a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union in which the Soviet Union was obliged to take a very rigid stand. It was Judge Goldberg's intention to urge the Secretary-General to take soundings with any United Nations' delegations who could furnish any ideas or suggestions for a political settlement. Later, it might be possible to produce a resolution in the United Nations which could be helpful but this would take a lot of preparatory work and, in addition, the dust would have to settle on the Article 19 controversy.

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[103] See/Voir Arnold Heeney, *Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965).

[104] See/Voir "The President's News Conference of July 28, 1965," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 794–796.

Mr. Valenti wondered whether it would not be a good idea for the Secretary-General himself to pay a visit to Hanoi and to take soundings there. He wondered what the possibilities might be for a United Nations force or some kind of United Nations presence in Vietnam. We discussed some of the difficulties involved. I said, however, that the U.N. approach would in general have a great appeal in Canada where there was such wide-spread support for the United Nations. I asked whether the President might be going down to address the U.N. at the forthcoming session. Mr. Valenti did not exclude this but thought it would depend on circumstances at the time. I asked Mr. Valenti how he would assess United States opinion with regard to Canada's support for the United States in Vietnam. He said that while he was not speaking for the President, he considered that in political circles generally there was the feeling that Canada had rather distanced itself from the United States position. I said that, apart from other factors, one had to bear in mind Canada's position on the International Control Commission and that our position was somewhat different from that of some other countries, e.g., Australia. I added that this very fact might give us a greater influence in the uncommitted world and make it more possible for us to be of eventual assistance in bringing about a political settlement. Mr. Freedman added that the Prime Minister's personal influence in the uncommitted world was very great whereas Sir Robert Menzies had virtually none.

Mr. Valenti said that he would like to continue to keep in touch with me on an informal basis but that he did not, of course, wish to give any impression of supplanting normal contacts through the State Department. I said that I was of course fully aware of this aspect of the matter and was in continuous touch with the State Department on this subject. Mr. Valenti said that the issues were so grave and pressing that he felt that the right contacts of this kind had particular value and asked whether he might report the gist of my remarks to the President. I agreed that he should do so on the understanding that these were personal observations of mine and that I was not speaking on specific instructions from my government. He repeated that his own remarks also were personal. I said that I would report them on this basis.

Mr. Valenti said that he would be getting in touch with me further on this whole subject.

It is my assessment of this interview that Mr. Valenti has been asked by the President to get in touch with certain Ambassadors and to report their views to him. I believe that this interview should be seen in the framework of a vigorous diplomatic offensive which the administration is undertaking concurrently with the increased military commitment in Vietnam. The motive of these efforts, and particularly those which Judge Goldberg will put forward in the United Nations, is undoubtedly primarily due to the real desire of the President to secure constructive suggestions and advice which might lead to a political settlement. I do not question the sincerity of this. It is also the case that the administration is anxious to demonstrate that at every stage of the increasing military involvement it is searching for a peaceful solution. Also, by appealing for concrete suggestions and proposals, it may be hoped to deflect more generalized criticisms of United States actions in South Vietnam by saying, in effect, if you don't like what we are doing suggest an alternative and we will gladly consider it.

I think the contact with Mr. Valenti is a valuable one as he sees the President constantly and talks to him freely. On the other hand, I do not know what his relationship is with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, with whom I have been in the habit of discussing these matters in the past and with whom I propose to keep in touch in the future.

Incidentally, Mr. Valenti did not know that the personal letter of July 26 from the President to the Prime Minister on Vietnam had been sent. He merely knew that a number of such letters had been dispatched and remarked in a rather off-hand manner "oh, that was handled by the State Department".

C.S.A. Ritchie

299.
Letter from Ambassador to Yugoslavia to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre de l'ambassadeur en Yougoslavie au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
MG32-B12, vol. 225, 8

Personal and Confidential.
Belgrade, August 4, 1965

Dear Mr. [Paul] Martin,

I don't suppose you will have had time to read my telegram 447 of July 28, reporting the interesting evening I spent with Averell Harriman at my American colleague's house here on July 27. If you had, I am sure you would have recognized in the very brief references to his sensitivity to criticism and to his not very flattering comments about Canada's position on Far Eastern problems that there were some lively moments indeed at that dinner.

I was really quite disappointed in Harriman – or rather in the change in him since I had last known him at the Laos Conference in 1962 as a liberal and rather courageous elder statesman ready to gamble quite a lot to secure peace in the Far East. The Harriman of last week was one who seems to have caught President Johnson's ultra-sensitivity to criticism and over-reliance on American strength. The result, in my judgement, is a United States which is not giving diplomacy a real chance because each diplomatic move is matched by a corresponding one in the military field which negates its effectiveness. It also produces a United States that does not know how to live with allies, since they are demanding too much in the way of endorsement of American views.

Something else struck me which I feel I should record privately – and that is a strong impression I had from some of Harriman's remarks that the United States saw its stand in the Far East not really as against communism but against China. In Vietnam they had, in fact, picked their site for a showdown with China and had hoped that with the deteriorating relationship between China and Russia, that the Russians would stand aside and let nature take its course – and are very angry that Russia is not doing so. What Harriman and the Administration seem to have overlooked is that while they may regard their enemy as China, their propaganda calls the enemy international communism and as long as they couch their struggle in ideological rather than inter-state terms, they are bound to engage the Soviet Union on the side of Peking, since the Soviet Union is, after all, the principal communist state in the world. If the United States think they are having a showdown with China, it would behove them to say so. I don't know whether it has been apparent from other sources that the United States may see its objectives in this somewhat illogical light in the Far East.[105]

Sincerely,
Ross C[ampbell]

300.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6271

Secret.
[Ottawa,] August 4, 1965

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[105] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Sorry to hear about your back and hope all well now. [Ross Campbell]

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Sharp),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Cardin),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. MacEachen),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. MacNaught),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. Favreau),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Tremblay),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Minister of Forestry (Mr. Sauvé),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson),
The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Pennell).

The Acting Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Loughead), (Mr. Wall).

[…]

UNITED STATES REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH VIET NAM

(Previous reference July 28)

The Prime Minister, in reply to a question concerning press speculation to the effect that Canada had been asked by the United States for military assistance in Viet Nam,[106] said it was not the intention of the Canadian Government to provide military assistance of any kind. A reply to President Johnson's letter of July 26th was being prepared, and Mr. Pearson expressed the hope that it would be possible to make both the President's letter and his reply public. Also, further consideration was being given to the possibility of sending to Viet Nam a civilian mobile hospital unit to serve under the International Red Cross.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Prime Minister concerning the kind of civilian assistance which Canada might be prepared to provide in Viet Nam.

[…]

301.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/11

No. Y-576
Ottawa, August 6, 1965
Secret. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, Delhi, Saigon (OpImmediate).
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

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[106] See/Voir "No Troops," *Globe and Mail*, 4 August 1965, p. 6.

VIETNAM

Following is text of reply to President Johnson. Begins:

Dear Mr. President, I am grateful to you for your message which was delivered to me on July 26 by your Ambassador here, concerning your assessment of the situation in Vietnam and the additional measures of military assistance to South Vietnam which you deem necessary as a result of North Vietnamese aggression.

2. I agree with you that the situation in Vietnam remains deeply troubling. It is therefore reassuring to learn from your letter that such measures as you may decide upon will be implemented with all possible restraint and will reflect both determination to meet aggression and flexibility in encouraging its cessation.

3. The scope of the response which you have judged necessary to meet the present situation in Vietnam may occasion concern. For this reason I was particularly gratified to receive your assurances (which you so clearly reiterated in your public statement of July 28) that the Government of the U.S. will continue to seek, as it has in the past, political and diplomatic openings for a political resolution to this dangerous conflict.

4. As I observed in the House of Commons on April 26,[107] the Canadian Government supports the purposes and objectives of U.S. policy in Vietnam: we share your interest and concern in seeing conditions created in which the people of South Vietnam may determine their own future free from coercion directed from outside. The commitments which we assumed under the arrangements worked out at Geneva in 1954 have meant and must obviously continue to mean that our principal contribution towards these objectives must be made within the Geneva framework. Efforts there, combined with measures of economic assistance, have repeatedly demonstrated the nature of our convictions.

5. For the future, Canada will be prepared to continue to play its part in the supervisory commission as long as that can serve a useful purpose in preventing distortions of the facts and perhaps in helping, in your words, "to open a way to a peaceful settlement" which will end "external interference in South Vietnam so that the people in that country can determine their own future".

6. The Canadian Government has already indicated its readiness to contribute substantially to economic assistance efforts in South Vietnam and in that area of South East Asia. In addition, I hope that we will shortly be in a position to announce both our willingness to participate in the Asian Development Bank as well as a further measure of concrete interest in the Mekong project as such through a contribution to the Nam Ngum scheme in Laos, as a result of the consideration we have been giving to these matters for some time. Furthermore, your renewed appeal for increased assistance of this nature will, I can assure you, be given the most careful and earnest consideration with a view to finding adequate means of making a useful contribution within the limits of the possibilities open to us. In this regard, we are exploring, on a priority basis, the feasibility of Canada undertaking a significant civilian medical project in South Vietnam.

7. Finally, I should like to express my interest in the reference you made separately to the possibility of using the good offices of the Secretary-General of the U.N. for the purpose of exploring ways and means of seeking a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. I very strongly hope that the Secretary-General's wisdom and the authority of the U.N. can be used in this situation.

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[107] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 1, pp. 399–400.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 1, p. 399-400.

8. The sooner the U.N. can be brought effectively into the Vietnam situation the better it will be. I know the difficulties in this regard but I also appreciate – as you have certainly shown that you do – the dangers inherent in the present situation.

9. I can assure you, Mr. President, that we will do everything we can to bring the U.N. into the picture in a way which might produce useful results. We are, indeed, considering at this time whether there is any useful initiative that we can take to this end.

Yours sincerely,
L.B. Pearson

Ends.

302.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/11

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] August 6, 1965

VIETNAM: UNITED STATES APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE

On Thursday afternoon, August 5, the Counsellor of the United States Embassy called on the Head of the Far Eastern Division of the Department to leave with him what he described as a "shopping list" for aid to Vietnam. A copy of this shopping list is attached.† You will note that it is divided into three parts, military requirements, military or civil and purely civil. The name of Canada does not appear in this list anywhere, although it of course comes within the category "NATO nation" or "free world nation".

2. In presenting this list the Counsellor of the United States Embassy did not attempt to urge any particular course of action and we were very careful not to ask him why he was handing this list over. We have, in fact, treated it with him as an interesting piece of information but without any connotation that it affects us directly.

3. While the project of humanitarian medical assistance through the Canadian Red Cross is being pursued I would suggest that we do not need to take any further action on this list at this time but the list might suitably be studied with a view to developing some new project within reach of our capabilities and within the limits of our political commitments for rapid use on some future occasion.

4. The word "Recd" which appears periodically through this list does not mean that the item has been received. It is a photographic transfer from the telegram form from which the lists were photographed.[108]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[108] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
August 9/65. Minister strongly approved of the line which had been taken with U.S. Counsellor. J.G. H[adwen]

303.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/11

Secret.
[Ottawa,] August 6, 1965

VIETNAM

The letter from President Johnson to the Prime Minister and his television broadcast on July 28 mark clearly a new orientation in American participation in the Vietnam struggle which has numerous implications for us and other allies of the United States.

Considerable emphasis has been placed on the containment of Chinese expansionism in interpretation of the President's speech, but the basic policy of demonstrating that U.S. promises of protection can be relied upon is one of the President's main arguments in defending his policy. It is also a fact that, even if U.S. promises could be set aside without harmful effects on the Germans, for example, it would be difficult for U.S. internal political reasons for the Administration to take a step which would suggest that past policy had been in error. Unable to make such a change, for either or both reasons, the President must commit himself further and further to the course he has already followed. Thus, by the decision to send large numbers of combat soldiers, the nature of U.S. intervention has radically changed.

Within a very short time the war is likely to take on all the aspects of a war on Asian soil of Americans against Asians. The implications of this can easily be drawn from the film on the CBC's national news last night of American troops destroying a village suspected of harbouring Viet Cong. Formerly these unfortunately necessary operations were carried out by SVN soldiers but increasingly it will have to be done by U.S. combat troops. President Ayub Khan has already remarked to our High Commissioner on the probable effect of this kind of war on the American image in Asia.

President Johnson's hope is that a display of U.S. determination and strength will force the North Vietnamese to the conference table. Even if this works, there is likely to be a protracted period during which the dangers of a direct confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and/or China will be very great.

There are two sets of dangers in Vietnam, one lying in the possibility of miscalculation, the other in the possibility of defeat. In the first category, bombing is the most important and the most immediate. An error about the threshold beyond which the Russians and/or the Chinese cannot tolerate bombing could have serious consequences. So far, the Americans have been careful about their bombing, but desperation or domestic political pressure could lead the Americans to some act which would force a Soviet or Chinese reaction. In the longer term, the danger of defeat for *either* side could create a situation of extreme danger: the Americans might resort to some new form of aerial attack; the North Vietnamese, if it were they who were faced with the defeat of the Viet Cong, might consider some desperate final attempt to achieve victory. For the moment, however, bombing remains the more immediate of these dangers.

The initiation of bombing had two purposes in mind, as we understand it. First, the United States considered that there must be punitive retaliation for specific attacks on U.S. (and later South Vietnamese) installations; second, the United States hoped that making the war expensive for the North as well as the South would induce the North to consider a negotiated solution. It proved incidentally to provide a substantial boost to South Vietnamese morale.

The specific retaliatory nature of attacks has long since been abandoned, and we have no evidence that bombing is having any concrete effect on either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese fighting capabilities. Indeed, it seems to have provided a rallying point in favour of the administration in the North and has proved a political liability in the rest of the world. It has signally failed to bring the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table, and even its beneficial effect on South Vietnamese morale is wearing off as it becomes plain that bombing is no substitute for victory on the ground.

President Johnson has said that he does not wish to destroy North Vietnam or its régime but simply to end aggression against the South. With the military force shortly to be available in the South, would it not be logical therefore to concentrate on the destruction of the Viet Cong in the South, utilizing all the American air and ground forces available for this purpose? In any event, it seems to me that a peaceful settlement with Hanoi will be almost meaningless if there still remains in the South a sizable Viet Cong force, presumably quiescent.

You will have noted that Mr. Harriman told Ross Campbell in Belgrade (his telegram 447 of July 28) that the Americans had informed Nkrumah that the U.S. would desist from bombing North Vietnam in exchange for a firm indication of a willingness to negotiate. Alternatively there would be a scaling down of bombing in response to a definite diminution of Viet Cong activity.

The Americans therefore still consider that there must be a definite link between the bombing and negotiations. So far there has been no sign that bombing of North Vietnam will prove an effective way of starting talks. And yet the bombing of North Vietnam continues to be the least defensible of American actions, and the one most likely to lead to Soviet and/or Chinese involvement, particularly if the war goes on for some time.

The Americans would therefore, it seems to me, gain a great deal by drawing a sharp distinction between bombing operations against targets of opportunity in the North, and bombing intended to destroy or hamper the movement of supplies and men from the North to the Viet Cong.[109]

A negotiated settlement in any case is going to be a pretty fragile affair unless the Viet Cong is administered a severe defeat. It would seem logical, therefore, for the U.S. to concentrate on trying to eliminate the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. At the same time, a cessation of bombing in the North would improve the American international position, lessen the danger of a confrontation with the U.S.S.R. and/or China, make it easier for the North Vietnamese eventually to request negotiations, and also facilitate the return to more normal relations with the U.S.S.R., which the U.S. wants.

The difficulty is to show the Americans that they would have something to gain from a cessation of bombing commensurate with what they would lose in terms of international "face" and domestic political considerations. In the light of all recent communist statements, there is no sign that the North Vietnamese would be induced to negotiate; on the contrary, they would probably claim that the correctness of their point of view had been demonstrated, and their stubbornness would probably be redoubled. The only gain to which one could realistically point would be the elimination of one concrete focus of criticism, but even here there would be a danger that, having won on this point, the advocates of peace at any price would simply demand another concession. The other gain, of course, is a lessening of the danger of escalation.

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[109] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Sound. P[aul] M[artin]

Even if this analysis is correct, the difficulty lies in how to act on it. I think it would be extremely risky at this stage to ask President Johnson to reconsider the bombing of North Vietnam, though it might be feasible when the U.S. build-up in South Vietnam has been completed. I would suggest that we should therefore keep this in mind, waiting for a more favourable opportunity.[110]

In the meantime, President Johnson's Special Assistant, Jack Valenti, in a conversation with Charles Ritchie (his letter of July 29, 1965) has said that he would like to keep the dialogue going and he assured our Ambassador that anything we had to say would reach the President's ear. Perhaps it would be possible for Mr. Ritchie just to discuss our analysis in a theoretical and informal way with Mr. Valenti or Mr. Bundy, with the intention in part at least of soliciting information from the Americans on the way they are thinking.[111]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

304.
Letter from Prime Minister to Ambassador to United States
Lettre du premier ministre à l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/1

Personal and Confidential.
Ottawa, August 9, 1965

Dear Mr. [Charles] Ritchie:

I have read with much interest the memorandum attached to your letter of July 29th regarding your conversation with Mr. Valenti.

As I mentioned to you over the telephone on last Thursday evening, I think you will be wise to develop the contact which he obviously wishes to make with you because he is undoubtedly very close to the President. At the same time, you are right in doing this in a way which will not prejudice your other contacts at the White House and elsewhere which have proved to be so valuable.

So far as Vietnam is concerned, the only advice at the moment which I would pass on to our friends in Washington – and I stressed this in the last paragraph of my letter to Mr. Johnson – is that every possible effort should be made to transfer the issue to the United Nations. I know, of course, the difficulties in this regard which may prove to be insuperable and I have no illusions that, even if these difficulties are overcome, the resulting consideration by the United Nations will be effective. Nevertheless, if I were in charge in Washington, this is what I would try to do unless I were reconciled to a long drawn-out war in Southeast Asia, or what would be worse, an early and complete collapse of South Vietnam's allies.

I suspect that the White House has the United Nations very much in mind as an "escape hatch", assuming, of course, that they see no hope of an immediate military victory and a consequent and early satisfactory political settlement.

External Affairs may have some supplementary comments on your memorandum but this is my first reaction.

Yours sincerely,
L.B. Pearson

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[110] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I think this is a sound view. [Paul Martin]

[111] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
We should pass this on to Ritchie – for discussions with Valenti – but, better still, with Bundy. P[aul] M[artin]

305.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/11

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] August 11, 1965

VIETNAM: U.S. POLICY

Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the Vietnam situation is the fact that the bombings of the North, having failed to make Hanoi agree to negotiations, have become something of a political albatross for the Americans; and as long as this policy continues there is the danger of a major power confrontation either as a result of the escalation process passing the threshold of tolerability for China and/or the U.S.S.R., or as a result of accident or miscalculation. Equally important is the alienation of international sympathy from the U.S.A. and its efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement. This is applicable in all the non-aligned capitals but it is most significant in Moscow where the bombing policy has forced the Soviet Government into a position where it cannot and will not move diplomatically.

2. It is becoming clearer and clearer that the situation in Vietnam may be moving into a stalemate, but at a dangerous military and diplomatic level. One way of escape would be for the U.S.A. to modify its policy on bombing, if not abandon it altogether.

3. The real difficulty, of course, is to ask the U.S.A., having failed in the application of military force in the North, to desist in the open admission of failure or under pressure of opinion from non-aligned nations, without demanding a tangible *quid* from the North Vietnamese for this important American *quo*. Any suggestion in these simple terms would most certainly not be welcome in Washington, although it would no doubt be a gratifying gesture both to elements of public opinion in Canada as well as in most other Western countries including the U.S.A. itself.

4. I wonder however whether it might not be possible to engage the Americans in a discussion of these problems, on a sensitive diplomatic basis avoiding public discussion if at all possible, in an attempt not only to register our concern and to probe their own long-term thinking but also, possibly, to inject a few of our own ideas into their planning.

5. Whatever our approach, it will have to be cautious because of the extreme sensitivity of the President and his senior advisers on these matters; at the same time I believe that the pressures of domestic as well as international opinion are such that some sort of approach would be desirable.

6. The information we have about military activities in South Vietnam suggests that the failure of a major Viet Cong offensive to materialize *may* reflect an element of political restraint. It is not possible to go beyond the word "may" since our information is not extensive in depth or detail, and there are obviously a great many factors at work in the situation on the ground in South Vietnam. Nonetheless the apparent absence of large-scale Viet Cong-originated operations at least provides the basis for a legitimate question. Equally important, it provides a respectable theoretical framework within which we might approach the Americans primarily to test this hypothesis against the background of their fuller range of facts. Even if the Americans are not convinced that the pattern of recent Viet Cong activities warrants such a thesis, the context might provide a more acceptable opportunity for us to suggest the possibility of the U.S.A. itself making (i.e., initiating) such a gesture but in the expectation that any response might be measured in military terms rather than in an open call for negotiations. There are obviously limitations on the extent to which the Communists can publicly admit to reversing their policies too, especially under military pressure.

7. The attached telegram[112] to Washington outlines these ideas in greater detail and authorizes Charles Ritchie to discuss them with his customary senior contacts, preferably William Bundy, in an exploratory spirit. In the circumstances, I believe that this would be our best form of approach; if you agree you may wish to sign the attached telegram of instructions. You will recognize that much of this argument is based on my memorandum of August 6, on which you thought cautious action should be possible.[113]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

306.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/11

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] August 11, 1965

PUBLICATION OF EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE PRIME MINISTER ON AID TO VIETNAM

Mr. Charles Ritchie reports that he has just seen Bundy and that the President is not prepared to agree that his letter to Mr. Pearson or any part of it should be released.

2. Mr. Ritchie says that the President is apparently prepared to agree to the release of a summary of his letter to Mr. Pearson. As to Mr. Pearson's letter, the White House, i.e., Bundy say that of course the Prime Minister is free to publish it if he wishes but they hope that he will not. They would prefer, if something has to be published, that a summary of Mr. Pearson's letter be issued. If this were acceptable, the White House would naturally like to see the summary that the Prime Minister would wish to release. This proposal, that summaries of the two letters might be released, has to be cleared with the President.

3. As an alternative to agreed summaries which might be published, Bundy said that the White House would be prepared to take responsibility for the non-publication of this correspondence. The United States will explain that they have sent letters to a number of countries and that there is no merit in promoting speculation on the significance of the different emphasis which may have been put in the various letters depending on the addressees.

4. Bundy apparently told Mr. Ritchie that if the Prime Minister's letter were to be released they might have to comment and they cannot promise that they would not say, if asked, whether they would not have liked it if we had been willing to provide military assistance. It seems that in the United States there is some controversy as to what the allies of the United States are doing and that what the President has asked these allies to do has an obvious connection with this controversy.

5. It is clear that plans for the immediate release of these letters have now to be abandoned and the alternatives seem to be either to accept the suggestion that we indicate that the United States have been unwilling to agree to the release of the correspondence or an

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[112] See/Voir doc. 309.

[113] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
I think the time has been reached when we might in an exploratory way try this approach. P[aul] M[artin]
Tel[egram] Y-582 signed by SSEA & sent Aug. 12. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

attempt might be made to see what it might be possible to do in devising summaries of these two letters which could be released later if President Johnson were prepared to accept this procedure.[114]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

307.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 1269
New York, August 12, 1965
Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ritchie only) (Immediate).
For Minister, Under-Secretary, Mr. Barton, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Robinson.

VIETNAM

Ralph Bunche called me in today to give me text of a message† from Secretary-General to you covering text of proposals transmitted to countries which took part in 1954 conference on Vietnam: China, France, USSR, UK, USA, North Vietnam, South Vietnam and "to appropriate organs of National Front of Liberation of South Vietnam". Text is also being made available to other two members of ICC.

2. Bunche explained that U Thant had cancelled his earlier request for me to see him as he had decided that he should not repeat not himself give text to Ambassadors of respective countries at UN since press would quickly deduce from Secretary-General's daily list of visitors that an initiative on Vietnam was being taken. Hence message was being transmitted by Bunche and Rolz-Bennett on U Thant behalf.

3. Secretary-General has asked that existence of message should be kept confidential since any public revelation could jeopardize its chance of success.[115]

[Paul] Tremblay

308.
Memorandum from Ambassador to United States to Embassy Officers
Note de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis aux agents de l'ambassade
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/1

Confidential.
[Washington,] August 12, 1965
For: Mr. Kidd, Mr. Cameron, Mr. Langille, Mr. Shenstone, Mr. Beaulne (on return).

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[114] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I think we might make public agreed summaries. I might check ours tomorrow, Friday, and they could be published Saturday. The U.S. one seems OK. It was delivered to me last night, Thursday. [L.B. Pearson]

[115] For U Thant's message, see RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2, Permis New York telegram 1270 of 12 August 1965.
Pour consulter le message d'U Thant, voir RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2, Permis New York télégramme nº 1270 du 12 août 1965.

VIETNAM: EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

I called on Mr. McGeorge Bundy at the White House yesterday at his request to discuss this matter. Mr. Bundy began by saying that he could not understand the necessity for Canadian Government public statements on this subject. He felt that the result was to "dump our problems in the lap of the White House". If the government was now in difficulties about the kind of aid which had been requested of it, this difficulty had been created by their own statements and not by anything said or done in Washington.[116] Mr. Bundy said that the language of the request for assistance contained in the President's letter had been deliberately drafted so as not to be specific. The U.S. understood our difficulty about providing military aid in Vietnam. On the other hand, they would of course welcome "a Canadian battalion" in Vietnam if this were possible. By raising the question of the character of their request for assistance we had placed them in the position where they might have to answer queries from the press as to what they had asked for from Canada. They would try to stonewall such questions; on the other hand, they could not say that they would not welcome Canadian military assistance if they were pressed on this point.

Turning to the Prime Minister's letter to the President, Bundy said that it was patronizing in tone and 95% aimed at Canadian public opinion. When I countered these remarks with a defence of the letter, Bundy showed no sign of being convinced.

Turning to the subject of the publication of the correspondence, Bundy said that the President would not agree to the publication of any direct quotations from his letter. Bundy expressed some surprise that the publication of this correspondence should have been mentioned publicly by the Canadian Government before consulting the President.[117] He gave me to understand that this whole question of the publication of the correspondence had caused personal irritation to the President. At one point he said that this matter required careful handling lest there should be a repetition of the strains between the President and the Prime Minister caused by the Prime Minister's Temple University speech. He said that the overriding consideration should be the preservation of good relations between the President and the Prime Minister. I asked whether it would be helpful if the Prime Minister telephoned the President in an attempt to straighten this matter out. Bundy replied "decidedly no".

I then explained to Bundy the pressures that the government were under to publish the correspondence adding that, while I had no information as to whether there would be an election in Canada, there was much talk of it and that in a pre-electoral atmosphere small incidents could easily become inflamed. I said that I could not foresee that any aspect of the Vietnam question would become involved in the Canadian elections but that I was sure he would agree that it was of the first importance for relations between our two countries that this should not be the case. I hoped that the U.S. administration would keep in mind the political pressures in Canada and the difficulties of the Prime Minister.

Bundy then proposed the publication of two agreed summaries of the President's letter and of the Prime Minister's letter in the terms contained in my telegrams Nos. 2552† and 2553† of August 11. He said that while it was of course the Prime Minister's responsibility as to whether he wished to publish the full text of his letter to the President, publication of this letter would make it much more difficult for the U.S. authorities to deal with questions which might be asked them about the kind of aid they had requested from Canada. I said that

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[116] See/Voir "US Asks PM for Vietnam Aid," *Calgary Herald*, 31 July 1965, p. 1; "Martin Denies U.S. Asked Aid in Vietnam," *Globe and Mail*, 31 July 1965, p. 3; "Martin Denies Division on Vietnam Aid Issue," *Globe and Mail*, 4 August 1965, p. 3.

[117] See/Voir "Pearson Vietnam Reply Going to U.S. Soon," *Globe and Mail*, 5 August 1965, p. 19.

if any U.S. comments were to state or imply that the U.S. had asked Canada for military aid this would cause great difficulty, particularly in view of Mr. Martin's public statement that this was not the case.

Bundy telephoned me today to ask what progress had been made in Ottawa in agreeing to the proposed exchange of summaries of this correspondence. He said that the U.S. administration was beginning to get questions from the press on this subject. They were replying that the question of the form of publication of this exchange was under discussion between the two governments in view of the nature of the correspondence. He urged that publication should take place as quickly as possible – preferably this afternoon. After publication, he suggested that comment both by the U.S. and Canadian Governments should be restricted to a minimum. Questioners could simply be referred to the text of the summaries.

I have today communicated Bundy's latest remarks to Mr. Cadieux who tells me that they will do their utmost to get agreement to the publication of the exchange of summaries as soon as possible.

I have not included all this material in my telegrams to Ottawa although I have used some of it in conversation with the Minister and officials on the telephone.

[C.S.A.] R[itchie]

309.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/1

No. Y-582
Ottawa, August 12, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Delhi; Saigon from Delhi.

VIETNAM

Your reports on continuing series of discussions you have been having with senior officials of administration and with members of White House staff have been of great interest and assistance to us in formulating a comprehensive and accurate view of Vietnam problem. It seems to me, however, that at present stage of development of this situation it might be desirable for us to try to play a rather more active role diplomatically in an attempt to generate some new ideas and to stimulate some new approaches to a problem which shows disturbing signs of reaching a dangerous stalemate. I should therefore be grateful if you could discuss following ideas with your customary senior contacts, and in particular William Bundy, emphasizing that you are under instructions to explore ideas rather than to advance fixed positions.

2. Although we do not repeat not have as full a range of statistics and analysis on a detailed basis of military activities in South Vietnam as does USA, we have been impressed by fact that Viet Cong have failed to mount all-out offensive during current monsoon season which had been predicted last spring. It is true that Viet Cong activities in countryside have been continuing at a relatively high level and that there have been some larger engagements. On whole, however, general picture is one more of continuity of basic techniques and strategy rather than of a significant new departure in tactics or objectives. There have been fairly large-scale actions in addition to usual pattern of terrorism and harassment but it might be argued that these major actions have been fewer in number and less grandiose in conception than might have been anticipated earlier at time of Dong Xoai engagement in June.

3. This may reflect several factors. It may have something to do with newly instituted press practices in Saigon. Again, it may reflect extent to which increased USA bombing activities in both North and South Vietnam have disrupted Viet Cong supply lines, as well as a higher Viet Cong casualty rate. On other hand, it is not repeat not inconceivable that Viet Cong have modified their view of inevitability of Dien Bien Phu repeating itself and a belief that there is less to be gained from large-scale costly military operations which they cannot repeat not hope to win than there is from a slow process of military attrition which creates continuing instability and an increasing foreign presence. It might also be – and in circumstances this can only be speculative – that failure of Viet Cong to mount a major offensive may be related in some way to a deliberate decision to see whether it would be possible quietly to scale down scope of hostilities.

4. If Communists were attracted by idea of a settlement by other than military means, it would be difficult for them to say so publicly or even diplomatically against background of policy and prestige commitments they have already made and re-affirmed many times. About only avenue open to them would be a negative one, namely, to refrain from taking certain actions while continuing a pattern of activities and policy statements which do not repeat not deviate too obviously from past practices. If there were strong differences in objectives among various interested Communist parties, such a negative approach would be only possible way in which more flexible position could manifest itself initially. If observation of Viet Cong activity seemed to suggest that this was case, it might be worth encouragement and further testing, although success of such testing would depend on its being undertaken without any announcement that it represented a change in policy. In its simplest terms, this thesis might be formulated as a series of gestures and counter-gestures of reduction. If it worked, that is, if both sides judged that other was acting as a result of deliberate decision, it would have advantage of saving face for both sides in preliminary move towards a *de facto* cease fire, or towards a situation in which both could accept negotiations.

5. This last possibility seems to us to merit further exploration with Americans, beginning on a factual basis in an attempt to establish whether there has been any change in pattern of Viet Cong activity as we think may be case, and to find an explanation for failure of major Viet Cong military drive to manifest itself.

6. Unless USA can produce reasonably reliable and convincing contradiction of this possible view of recent Viet Cong military activity, you should suggest that this may be opportunity USA has been looking for to make some adjustments in its policy of bombing North Vietnam. It seems to us that a reduction in bombing or even a longer pause than before would be worth the experiment, even if USA authorities are not repeat not completely convinced that the pattern of Viet Cong military activities on detailed examination shows that Communists have been making this sort of gesture. In other words, perhaps the time has come for the USA to make a gesture but in the expectation that the response ought to be measured in military terms, not repeat not in an open call for negotiations.

7. If the main thesis is not repeat not contradicted but doubt is expressed as to the risks involved, you should indicate that we are well aware of difficulties USA would face in making a sudden reversal of policy, and in the first instance at least, we would not repeat not envisage the necessity for such action. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that there are grave dangers involved in a simple continuation of a policy which has, it must be admitted, failed in its primary purpose of inducing the North to negotiate. It must also be recognized that, whatever the problems in arranging it, a cessation of bombing in the North would improve the USA's international position, it would lessen the danger of a confrontation (through the inevitable effects of escalation or through miscalculation) with the USSR and/or China, it would make it easier for North Vietnamese eventually to agree to negotiations, and it would also facilitate the return to more normal relations between the USA and USSR, which both countries evidently wish and which might provide a basis for further steps towards a solution.

I hope you will think this is a proper course for us to take. What we have in mind is an exploratory approach. We are of course aware of the sensitivity in certain quarters.[118]

[Paul] Martin

310.
Memorandum from Ambassador to United States to Minister, Embassy to United States
Note de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministre, ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/1

Confidential.
[Washington,] August 13, 1965

VIETNAM: EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Bromley Smith telephoned me today to tell me that the President, on looking over the summaries of his letter and the Prime Minister's, had come to the conclusion that publication of these summaries would compromise his position with regard to the other governments to whom letters in this series had been addressed and would put in jeopardy the whole principle of private exchanges. He therefore hoped that we would agree to refrain from publication of the summaries. I told him how difficult this would be for us, especially in view of our understanding with McGeorge Bundy that these summaries could be published.

Later this afternoon, having informed Basil Robinson of this change, I telephoned the Prime Minister. He said that in the circumstances the only course open to him would be to issue a statement to the press – probably this evening – which would state that, owing to the President's view that this correspondence was part of a diplomatic series between heads of government and it would be inappropriate to publish it, there would therefore be no publication. The Prime Minister said that his statement would go on to the effect that the Canadian Government position in this matter was as follows – he would then probably give in the form of a unilateral government statement the main points contained in his letter to the President. His first thought had been that, while the President's letter could not be published if the President did not want this, he could publish his own letter but I pointed out that the President had remarked that Mr. Pearson's letter was "hooked on" to various points in his own letter to the Prime Minister and thus would reveal its contents. Mr. Pearson agreed.

I have told Mr. Bromley Smith of the proposed procedure in Ottawa. His first reaction was that this was "an ideal solution" (which indeed it is from the American point of view as it is what Bundy wanted in the beginning). With regard to the attribution of responsibility to the President for the non-publication of this correspondence, I referred Mr. Bromley Smith to McGeorge Bundy's memorandum of August 11 which states "we would also be willing to accept responsibility for our inability to permit textual quotation of a letter which is part of a diplomatic series involving many other countries". Bromley Smith agreed that this was the U.S. position. He said that he would report what I had told him "to the Ranch". I said that I must make it quite clear to him:

(a) that I could not give him the precise language which would be used in the Canadian statement, only my preliminary understanding of what was intended to include in it;

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[118] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
G.C. L[angille] – Ambassador said he would be speaking to Ott[awa] about this, [and agreed?] that it had been superseded (or needed coordination with) Sec[retary]-Gen[eral] appeal. [Michael] S[henstone?]

(b) that this statement might be issued tonight; [119] and

(c) that the Prime Minister had consented to this arrangement, despite his understanding that the publication of the exchange of summaries had been agreed to, in recognition of the President's strong sentiment on this subject.

I am by no means sure that there will not be further trouble over this whole incident. In fact, I think we should be very lucky if something said in answer to press questions – either in Ottawa or in Washington – doesn't exacerbate this situation. McGeorge Bundy will be back in town on Monday and he is the person to deal with if we have to pick up any pieces.

C.S.A. Ritchie

311.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 2640
Washington, August 21, 1965
Secret. Limited Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel 2590† Aug 1.
Repeat for Information: Permis New York (for Tremblay only) (Immediate).

VIETNAM – SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs, yesterday gave British, Australians and ourselves briefing on USA reaction to Secretary-General's message. Although we had appointment to see him on this subject and to explore ideas set forth in your telegram Y-582 August 12 he requested at last minute that we meet jointly on first question because of his heavy work schedule and indicated that he would then see us separately on second question following briefing. In circumstances we agreed to this procedure.

2. Bundy told us USA have not repeat not sought views of other addressees but expect Russians will hold back until Hanoi has decided on its attitude and that French will submit short reply avoiding substance of matter so as to leave open possibility of assuming role of intermediary if progress is made. There is some feeling in State Department that Hanoi may reject outright Secretary-General's approach following Peking's refusal to accept note. Poles will probably react very cautiously at this early stage which might in USA view be all to good since if there are developments they might be able to play useful role.

3. We were told USA reply will have as its aim "enlarging the light and reducing the murkiness". Timing is something of a problem because they wish to consult with South Vietnamese Government prior to final drafting. They are waiting for Foreign Minister Tran Van Do to recover from minor indisposition and expect to have exchange of views with him early next week.

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[119] The Prime Minister's Office published a press release on this subject on 14 August 1965. See "Canadian Letters on Vietnam Slated to Remain Secret," *New York Times*, 15 August 1965, p. 5; Anthony Westell, "Canadian Policy Is Restated: Johnson Doesn't Want Letter on Vietnam Published: Pearson," *Globe and Mail*, 16 August 1965, p. 3.
Le 14 août 1965, le cabinet du premier ministre a publié un communiqué à ce sujet. Voir « Canadian Letters on Vietnam Slated to Remain Secret », *New York Times*, 15 août 1965, p. 5 ; Anthony Westell, « Canadian Policy Is Restated: Johnson Doesn't Want Letter on Vietnam Published: Pearson », *Globe and Mail*, 16 août 1965, p. 3.

4. Bundy suggested USA could agree with Secretary-General's viewpoint that it is necessary to return to essentials of 1954 Agreements. He pointed out that this would be stumbling block, although not repeat not critical one, in their discussions with South Vietnamese. He added that Secretary-General needed someone to educate him on what these essentials are and USA in its reply expects to stress one which Secretary-General did not repeat not mention, viz., non-interference by one party in zone and territory of other (Articles 19 and 24 of Agreement and Article 5 of Final Declaration). USA also intend to point out that North Vietnam has violated these provisions and that it is these violations which is basis for USA intervention at request of Government of South Vietnam. On other hand he agreed that there was "a high measure of verbal agreement" on both sides concerning military neutralization but in its reply USA does not repeat not wish to highlight this aspect so that if negotiations do develop South Vietnam will not repeat not be precluded in any final agreement from calling for assistance should it again be menaced.

5. Bundy reiterated (our telegram 2590 August 14) that by tortured and involved reading of Article 7 of Declaration, Secretary-General has come up with idea that free elections for re-unification are an essential part of Geneva Agreement. In its reply USA expects to skirt this problem as it opens an involved area of dispute which at this stage would not repeat not be profitable.

6. As for cessation of hostilities this will only come about if North stops infiltrating troops into South and if there is reduction in terrorism activities. Again, Americans do not repeat not intend to go deeply into this in their reply to Secretary-General but will point out that they want discussions although they are not repeat not prepared to give up supporting South Vietnam to obtain them.

7. USA hopes to get around Secretary-General's apparent fixation that National Liberation Front is spokesman for South Vietnam since there is no repeat no inclination to get involved in argument now on composition of groups who may negotiate in future. Certainly, USA are not repeat not willing to see NLF become party in any future negotiations, which would have to be between constituted governments. To get around this difficulty USA will frequently refer to position of South Vietnamese Government. It is hoped, however, that if Hanoi will cease its aggression and new Geneva Conference is finally arranged that someone can come up with some formula which will provide role for Front acceptable to NLF and Hanoi.

8. Basically, in its reply, USA Government will attempt in non-argumentative way to restate its position much along lines of its July 21 aide-mémoire to Government of Ghana. We mentioned to Bundy later that we did not repeat not believe aide-mémoire had been released to Canada. He has now provided copy, text of which is reproduced in our telegram 2642† of August 21.

312.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/1

No. 2641
Washington, August 21, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-582 Aug 12.
Repeat for Information: London, Delhi; Saigon from Delhi (Priority).

VIETNAM

We saw William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, yesterday and went over with him ideas set forth in your reference telegram. In so doing we emphasized exploratory nature of our approach. Bundy for his part evinced interest in our exposition and was quite prepared to discuss ideas frankly.

2. Bundy said that USA too had been struck by fact that Vietcong have failed to mount all-out offensive during current monsoon season. Indeed, they had detected some signs that scope and violence of Vietcong activities have slackened somewhat during past six weeks.

3. In commenting on reasons which might lie behind this possible trend, as outlined in paragraph three your reference telegram, Bundy thought that first place must be given to USA air attacks in South Vietnam. Through prisoner interrogation USA authorities have come to conclusion their air attacks are inflicting considerable damage on men and material of Vietcong and in turn seriously upsetting Vietcong morale. At same time these attacks also have quite markedly reduced Vietcong supply capacity and interfered with their efforts to regroup forces. He regarded bombings in North as being of less influence in apparent slackening of Vietcong activities although they were undoubtedly playing part in inhibiting large scale troop movements to South.

4. Bundy felt failure of Vietcong to seek larger engagements and reduction in normal pattern of their harassment activities also reflected decision to test Americans' "will to fight". If true, this week's battle of Chu Lai would have provided answer and given lie to Hanoi propaganda that Americans were willing to fight to last Vietnamese. Result might, however, be intensification of fighting.

5. Whether recent pattern of Vietcong activity could be attributed to politically inspired decision to hold back in order to see if this elicited any response from USA was open to question. This idea Bundy said had occurred to them as a possibility and in fact they were watching developments closely to determine whether there might be any validity in it. At this time, however, he was of firm view that it was too early to draw any conclusions in this regard. Nevertheless, if present apparent trend continued for several weeks more, he believed that it would be quite consistent with administration thinking to consider testing Vietcong intentions by reduced military action on part of USA. (In this connection he referred to paragraph six of USA aide-mémoire of July 21 to Ghana, text of which is reproduced in our telegram 2642 of August 21/65.)

6. Bundy mentioned USA were keeping particularly close eye on North Vietnam 304 Division which is now stationed in Laos and on harassing attacks of Vietcong being conducted against provincial capitals in interior of South Vietnam. If in next two or three weeks this division moved into South Vietnam or if attacks were stepped up against provincial capitals it would be taken as negative sign.

7. Bundy was not certain what any initial scaling down of level of USA air attacks might involve should next few weeks provide sufficient evidence to make it seem worthwhile to test intentions of Vietcong. He mentioned that level of bombing attacks on North is being kept very constant and that extra sorties flown have only been undertaken to search for SAM sites. Reduction in bombing would be easier to implement than longer pause. Possibility of employing pause in bombing as counter gesture presented some difficulties to USA. There was likelihood of establishment of new SAM sites during pause which might deter USA from adopting this course.

8. Thinking somewhat further ahead, Bundy said that if it were decided to embark on gesture and counter gesture programme, and it achieved results, second phase might conceivably be arrived at in which there could be true cessation of hostilities in South. This would be very ticklish period for USA because while on one hand South Vietnamese could establish themselves in areas now only nominally under their control, Vietcong on other hand would be free to move around and consolidate their position. This entailed risks that Vietcong could attain status of alternative government in South Vietnam. On balance Bundy therefore

thought that while there could be temporary *de facto* ceasefire or in fact number of such ceasefires it would be more likely that ultimate real ceasefire would not repeat not come about until final day of negotiations.

9. In conclusion Bundy reiterated that while they did not repeat not dispute potential credibility of views we had put forward, these required some substantiation before they could be accepted as theory on which USA would be prepared to act. It was therefore premature to think for moment of series of gestures and counter gestures. USA would need more hard evidence over ensuing weeks that Vietcong were reducing their activities on basis of political motivation before serious consideration could be given to embarking on this potentially hazardous policy. They would, however, be keeping this possibility very much in mind to see whether developments in Vietcong activities justified measured military gestures on USA side which might facilitate eventual negotiations.

313.
Record of Conversation between Secretary of State for External Affairs and Ambassador at Large of United States, August 18, 1965
Compte rendu de la conversation entre le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et l'ambassadeur itinérant des États-Unis, 18 août 1965
MG32-B12, vol. 229, 46/2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] August 24, 1965

Following are notes made concerning some of the highlights of the conversation between Mr. Martin and Mr. Harriman in the car between Ottawa and Ogdensburg, New York just prior to the Ceremony commemorating the Ogdensburg Declaration late in the afternoon of August 18. Mr. Harriman had previously had lunch with Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin. Since Mr. Harriman speaks very softly it was difficult to catch many of the things he said but the main points below have been checked since with Mr. Martin.

One of the points which came up on two or three occasions during the conversation was whether Mr. Harriman had intended to refer to Canada when he spoke of "reluctant allies" in connection with the Vietnam situation during his visit to Belgrade (reference Memorandum to the Minister dated August 17† and Belgrade Telegram 447 of July 28). He said that he had not intended to refer to Canada and that his general remarks on that occasion had involved a certain amount of "leg pulling". He recalled his conversation with our Ambassador in Belgrade and said that he had found the occasion very stimulating.

Various remarks were made about domestic politics and personal associations in the United States. Mr. Harriman confirmed that there was great and growing support for President Johnson. The pressures of domestic and foreign affairs and the President's own desire to get things done effectively would probably lead to an increasing amount of "personal diplomacy". Mr. Harriman commented that he himself had developed a close personal association with President Kennedy only in the latter days of the former President's life. His contact had been rather with Robert Kennedy.

[…]

The subject of Vietnam came up in several connections, in addition to the "reluctant allies" reference dealt with earlier. The comments of Mr. Harriman at the end of the trip to Ogdensburg may indicate his general attitude. The final settlement of the Vietnam conflict would almost certainly be a long drawn out affair he felt. Mr. Harriman thought that Canada would certainly have a role to play in trying to bring a settlement about. He wondered whether at some point U Thant could assist to bring about a solution. The Russians were obviously embarrassed by the Vietnam situation as it affected their position in world communism and their conflicts with China. This seemed to offer an eventual avenue of approach.

On the other hand, comments made by Mr. Harriman at other points in the course of the conversation did not appear to indicate any belief in the possibility of a change in the Vietnam situation in the immediate future. He was very cautious about commenting on the possibility of any political initiative after the Monsoon season. He said that he did not know what might happen. He commented that the International Control Commission could not be very effective. He was interested, however, in the Minority Report submitted by Canada concerning responsibility for conditions in Vietnam and commented that "you Canadians are very helpful" in bringing forward information of this type. He was also interested in the problems of working with the Indians in the Commission. He wondered whether these problems had been brought to the attention of Shastri during his visit to Ottawa and whether the Indian leader commented on them.

Finally, Mr. Harriman in referring both to his visit to Moscow and to the Vietnam War asked, rather pessimistically, who in the free or uncommitted world could make any useful approach to the Soviet leaders. Could anyone talk to them privately with any effect? He himself did not have much hope.

314.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Secret.
[Ottawa,] August 26, 1965

VIETNAM: U THANT'S MEMORANDUM

You will recall that the Secretary-General recently prepared a confidential memorandum outlining his views on the Vietnam situation and proposing certain steps he might take in the direction of initiating negotiations; this memorandum, the text of which as received from New York by telegram† is attached, was "transmitted" to the seven Geneva powers directly concerned with Vietnam, and to the Liberation Front, and at the same time, it was "made available to the members of the International Control Commission for their information".

2. Since there are many features of the Secretary-General's analysis which are questionable at best (for example in both procedure and substance he has emphasized the role of the Liberation Front at the expense of the position of the Saigon Government) and since we were not specifically asked for comment, we thought it advisable to see how the reactions of others – principally the U.S.A. – might shape up before recommending any particular type of response for your consideration. We have now learned that the Americans, while they obviously have serious reservations about some aspects of the Secretary-General's views, plan to make some sort of forthcoming reply.[120] In these circumstances the Secretary-General's initiative may not become stalled through active opposition or lack of interest at least on the Western side.

3. I therefore believe that it would be appropriate to assert our interest in this project, and in being kept informed, by sending a non-substantive acknowledgement to the Secretary-General in which however reference might be made to the possibility of a U.N. role in the Vietnam crisis.

4. Attached for your signature, if you agree, is a telegram to New York in this sense.[121]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[120] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 129.

[121] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Tel[egram] Y-624 sent Aug. 30. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

315.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. Y-624
Ottawa, August 30, 1965
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Let 708 Aug 13.

VIETNAM – SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEMO

I should be grateful if you could transmit the following reply to Secretary-General's letter. Begins: Sir, I have the honour to acknowledge your recent letter under cover of which you made available, on a confidential basis, the text of your memo on the Vietnam situation and on certain steps which might be taken in the circumstances.

2. I am most grateful to you for having made this memo available to me. I look forward to keeping in close touch with you as matters develop, and as openings may appear for constructive initiatives resulting from or leading to a special UN role in resolving a crisis which is of deep concern to us all. I look forward to the opportunity to discuss this and other subjects which your visit here on September 9[122] will give us. Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Paul Martin. Ends.

316.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/12

No. 774
Saigon, September 13, 1965
Confidential. Bag from Saigon.
Reference: My Tel 251 Mar 19.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Geneva, Permis New York, CFHQ from Ottawa.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Djakarta, Hong Kong from London; Hague from Paris; Tokyo from Ottawa.

VIEWS OF FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO ON INDOCHINA SETTLEMENT

During call on Foreign Minister September 9 on other business, conversation turned briefly to subject of Vietnam settlement. Dr. Do expressed views consistent with and not repeat not too dissimilar to those he had set forth to me in March of this year along following lines:

(a) Objective of settlement should be return of 1954 Geneva Agreements and acceptance of 17th parallel as dividing line between two states which were likely to remain as separate entities for a long time to come.

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[122] This visit was subsequently cancelled.
Cette visite a été annulée par la suite.

(b) Existence of two states having been accepted, relations between them could be described as that of peaceful co-existence with over period of time growing inter-change of commerce, people, etc.

(c) There would have to be a large scale re-groupment to North Vietnam of all the infiltrated cadres so that the Communists would return to the North and only "nationalists" would remain in the South.

(d) Whatever settlement was reached would have to be backed up by effective international guarantees.

(e) Elections could not repeat not be envisaged for considerable time, probably several years after the cease-fire had been obtained; it would be necessary to undertake an extensive programme of economic and social improvement and to attain some stability after years of war so that the population would have valid basis on which to cast votes.

(f) Any vote or plebiscite on reunification of the two Vietnams would have to come at much later date and only after some degree of trust and understanding had been built up as result of number of years of peaceful co-existence between two Vietnams.

2. Foreign Minister Do said that he tried to persuade Generals of validity and reasonableness of these ideas on every possible occasion. He did not repeat not however find it easy to make public reference to them as in his view reasonable objectives because they were in obvious contradiction with recently stated public views of General Thieu and A[ir] V[ice] M[arshal] Ky concerning their disregard for the Geneva Agreements and the 17th parallel and even their talk of liberation of the North.

3. Dr. Do also admitted that there was some variance between his views and those of USA Government as they had appeared in some recent public statements. He felt that American leaders were sounding a bit too eager for negotiation and in particular were showing too much enthusiasm for early elections and even plebiscite leading to reunification of Vietnam. He appreciated that, particularly for Democratic administration in USA, it was difficult not repeat not to speak favourably about desirability of elections but he was convinced that conditions existing in South Vietnam for some time after end of hostilities would not repeat not be conducive to true consultation with electorate and that therefore it was not repeat not helpful to speak on subject repeatedly.

4. SVN reply to U Thant's message (Permis New York telegram 1444† September 8) of which I have just seen copy courtesy of Australian Ambassador is work of Ministry and Foreign Minister Do personally. It is completely consistent with his remarks to me, remarks which he has made to various Ambassadors here. To Australian Ambassador, however, he made additional point that post-settlement adherence of SVN to defensive alliance such as ANZUS or SEATO could not repeat not be ruled out in advance. Foreign Minister Do implied that prior to negotiation SVN could not repeat not undertake that end result would be neutralized SVN. I expect he would be happy with a suitably guaranteed neutral SVN but does not repeat not intend to give that card away in advance.

5. I should perhaps add that Dr. Do gave no repeat no indication in course of our conversation that he thought negotiations were imminent nor that he was doing anything active to promote them. His view which I share is that situation unfortunately still is not repeat not ripe for it, and that constant Western talk of desire for negotiations may well be encouraging intransigence in North in hope that Western terms will be slowly but surely eroded.

[J.B.] Seaborn

317.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/2

No. 2948
Washington, September 17, 1965
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Our Tel 2939† Sep 17 and Our Tel 2942† Sep 17.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva, Saigon, CANFORCEHED, Permis New York, NATO Paris, Tokyo, Delhi (Priority).
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur.

VIETNAM – CONVERSATION WITH RUSK

While most of conversation with Secretary Rusk this morning was devoted to Kashmir, there was brief opportunity to sound him out on Vietnam.

2. In Rusk's view attitude of North Vietnam remained basically unchanged. While occasionally through what Rusk described as "a process of osmosis" there had been indications that Hanoi might be interested in negotiations, follow-up soundings had not revealed anything of real interest. Available evidence suggested that Russians were favourably disposed towards negotiations but Chinese were clearly opposed. Hanoi's position seemed to be somewhere in between.

3. On military side Viet Cong were now suffering substantial losses. Casualties and particularly defections were at a much higher level than previously. The monsoon offensive, which many people anticipated, had not developed and there had been relatively few attacks by Viet Cong of battalion size. Also, Viet Cong had not moved on to what was commonly known as stage three of General Giap's plan.[123]

4. Asked whether this tempo of Viet Cong military activity appeared to be politically motivated, Rusk said they were not inclined to draw any conclusions from scale or tempo of Viet Cong military effort. While it was true that conventional Viet Cong operations were on a somewhat lower scale than expected, their campaign of sabotage and terror remained at a very high level. Main USA military effort was designed to keep Viet Cong on the run and to deny them opportunity to regroup and train forces. Situation on military side was improving slightly.

318.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/2

No. Y-694
Ottawa, September 22, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Saigon Tel 792† Sep 18.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Priority) from Delhi; London, Delhi, Paris, Geneva, CFHQ.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon.

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[123] Stage three of North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap's plan was based on conventional military offensives (as opposed to the guerilla and highly mobile attacks of the earlier stages).
La troisième phase du plan du général nord-vietnamien Vo Nguyen Giap reposait sur des offensives militaires classiques (et non sur la guérilla et les attaques très mobiles des phases précédentes).

BOMBING OF HIEN LUONG BRIDGE

Grateful if you could approach State Department to express our concern over developments reported Saigon reference telegram (correction to paragraph 3 of text will by now have reached you).

2. We find it difficult to believe that five incidents of this nature could have taken place in the area due to miscalculation or pilot error alone. In any event, whatever the explanation, we are concerned on three counts: first, the safety of Canadian and other Commission personnel belong[ing] to MT 76 at Gio Linh whose tasks relate to controls in the DZ; second, Viet Cong subversion in the DZ (and we are well aware of course that the North is constantly violating the DZ) is of such a nature that it will not repeat not be significantly impeded by the destruction of the Hien Luong Bridge; and third, that the DZ itself has a special status which must surely be regarded as useful if only in a symbolic sense. To the best of our knowledge only the Chinese have so far publicly called into question the status of the arrangements surrounding the 17th parallel. In view of what we would assess as the minimal military significance of the bridge or ancillary installations, it would not repeat not achieve any useful purpose in a broader context to demonstrate by such actions that South Vietnam and USA no repeat no longer accept the special status of the DZ, which despite violations by the North has remained one of the few durable features of the 1954 Ceasefire Agreement. Especially if this Agreement is to form a substantive or even presentational basis for any future negotiations about the future of Vietnam, we believe that there would be strong reasons for ensuring the continued existence of at least some concrete features of it. We would therefore hope that special effort could be made to avoid repetition of incidents reported in reference telegram and that other means could be found of dealing with Communist violations of DZ.

3. You might also make the point that incidents such as these make life very difficult for us in the Commission. We have expended a great deal of effort in that context on ensuring that the Commission's public judgments on the situation in Vietnam are not repeat not totally distorted and while we have been unable, despite a concerted effort, to convince Indians of need to deal adequately with subversion problem, we have had some success at least in the negative sense of blocking moves which would publicly embarrass our friends. In certain circumstances it has been possible to modify Commission treatment of these matters on legalistic grounds of lack of Commission competence but where the facts of the matter (i.e., direct South Vietnamese involvement) are undisputed we have no repeat no alternative but to lend our support to Commission findings of violations against the South even though the record of Commission decisions as a whole does not repeat not contain a sufficient number of comparable decisions against the North. In present circumstances it is clear that the DZ has been violated, and because of DZ's special status, any attempt within Commission based solely on legal competence would appear unrealistic or disingenuous. By being forced into a position such as this we think that our ability to play a helpful role at other times is reduced. Although we can understand why our problems within the Commission would not repeat not be a factor of overriding political significance from American point of view, given Commission's record of treatment of problems of concern to them, we believe that State Department would wish to be aware of them.

319.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Defence Liaison (2) Division
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient à la 2e Direction de liaison avec la Défense
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/12

Secret.
[Ottawa,] October 1, 1965
Attention: Mr. H.B. Singleton.

NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS

The DRVN Government's memorandum of September 23 appears to us to be intended essentially as an effort to improve the "image" of North Vietnam's position with respect to a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam problem.[124] We would guess that its release, at this particular time, is related to the beginning of the U.N. General Assembly (indeed the memorandum specifically warns the U.N. that any resolution in furtherance of U.S. objectives will be null and void and will bring discredit to the U.N.) and may reflect Hanoi's concern that American efforts to convince world opinion that it (the USA) is sincerely interested in bringing about a negotiated peace in Vietnam are having some success in modifying the views of non-aligned governments, to the extent that these governments might be prepared to support some sort of resolution in New York which would point an accusing finger at Hanoi. (The Tunisian statement on September 27[125] is a case in point, although there are undoubtedly other factors influencing this position.)

2. In our view the outstanding characteristic of the memorandum, in terms of tone, is a soft-pedalling of some of the more strident statements of the determination to continue fighting that have been issuing from Hanoi recently. The memorandum refers to the determination of the Vietnamese people to resist "U.S. aggression" and to fight on until total victory even if this takes five, ten or more years, but the main burden of the argument developed is to prove that North Vietnam's position is a "reasonable" one, taking into account that – in its view – it is the party being sinned against.

3. In substantive terms we can find no indication in this text of the likelihood of significant concessions being made in the near future; the basic elements of the Northern position would appear to us to remain intact and rigid. There is no reference to calling in volunteers from other countries, but this can be explained by the desire to appear less blood thirsty. There is also no mention of the need, to which Hanoi has referred repeatedly, to exclude the Saigon Government from any negotiations, although the memorandum does refer to the Front as the only legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people. We wonder whether this reflection of greater flexibility may not be more apparent than real since Hanoi knows full well that there is no possibility whatsoever of excluding Saigon. It might be possible to judge other apparent signs of flexibility in this same light.

4. We are convinced that, if and when Hanoi decides to take the prospect of negotiations seriously, their decision to do so will be much more readily evident than they are in this document which seems to us to be presentational rather than substantive in purpose.

K[laus] G[oldschlag]

320.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/12

No. 3165
Washington, October 4, 1965
Confidential.
Repeat for Information: London, Permis New York, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome; CANFORCEHED, Delhi from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Djakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

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[124] See/Voir Chalmers M. Roberts, "Reds Spurn Viet Truce, U.S. 'Trick': Hanoi Was Listening," *Washington Post*, 25 September 1965, p. A11.

[125] See/Voir Louis B. Fleming, "General Assembly Hears Tunisian Defend Viet Intervention of U.S.," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 September 1965, p. 2.

VIETNAM

Discussions last week with Cooper of White House and Miller of State Department Vietnam Working Group indicated that USA authorities are taking mildly optimistic view of recent developments in Vietnam. Military operations are proceeding fairly satisfactorily, and it is considered significant that flow of info from local populace to USA forces (although apparently not repeat not to ARVN forces) has been improving. Officials see no repeat no signs of a let-George-do-it atmosphere developing among South Vietnamese as result of massive commitment of USA troops and indeed ARVN units have been showing more confidence and initiative in their operations, perhaps because they realize that they are assured of support should they run into serious difficulties.

2. Ky's position is considered reasonably sound despite student demonstrations in Hue, and it is felt that even if he were to be removed from office this would probably take place not repeat not as result of a coup but through some kind of orderly collegiate decision by senior officers.

3. Officials have impression that Ky himself is acting with greater deliberation and caution than when he first assumed office. A particularly encouraging sign is fact that certain highly competent individuals who have preferred to remain aloof from government affairs during and since Diem's period have been willing to come forward and work with current regime. Case in point is decision by Vu Van Thai (for whom USA officials have high regard) to leave UN Secretariat and assume post of SVN Ambassador in Washington. Other examples are to be found among Ministers in present SVN Cabinet.

4. Officials understand that there has been some modest progress with pacification programme. Recently promulgated land reform programme did not repeat not go as far as USA would have liked, but still represents a slight step forward.

5. We are told that USA authorities continue to be watching attentively for any indications of willingness to negotiate on part of other side but that virtually no repeat no signs of change in DRVN stand can be detected, e.g., in September 23 DRVN Foreign Ministry statement. We asked whether September 27 Hanoi broadcast from *Vietnam Courier* (which as you know has been carefully studied here) perhaps contained an indirect message on one substantive point, i.e., question of USA withdrawal before or after settlement. Passage in question was statement that "as for how this withdrawal will be carried out, imperialist camp has had a lot of experience, such as withdrawal of French troops from Indochina and Algeria and withdrawal of Americans from Laos and other parts of the world".[126] Point would be that in three cases mentioned, negotiation and settlement preceded withdrawal. Cooper responded that USA authorities had also noted this as practically only point of interest in recent DRVN statements.

6. You will have noted that USA air strikes were extended last week, without any publicity, to Lang Son-Hanoi railway, i.e., DRVN's main supply route from China, and that more strikes in same area are contemplated. Officials here make no repeat no claim however that this will have any significant effect on DRVN public position in near future. On air operations over SVN, USA authorities give impression of distinct satisfaction with results of B-52 raids, despite earlier press scepticism. Cooper told us that target for each B-52 raid was approved in advance by White House and that as many as one in three proposed B-52 operations were vetoed due to proximity of villages or similar factors. Cooper said that B-52s could aim accurately: same was not repeat not always true of armed reconnaissance operations by smaller aircraft. In this connection renewed regret was expressed for attack on bridge in DMZ.

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[126] See/Voir Nguyen Van Vinh, "How Should the Most Correct Solution to the Vietnam Problem Be Understood?" *Vietnam Courier*, 23 September 1965, p. 5.

7. Because of intensity of India-Pakistan dispute and lack of dramatic developments in Vietnam in recent weeks, Vietnamese situation is receiving considerably less Congressional and public attention in USA than it was during spring and summer. Senior members of USA administration also appear to have had their minds mainly on other subjects recently, even though they are still keenly aware that Vietnam continues to be USA's most serious single preoccupation abroad. We have impression that, for better or worse, USA public opinion is becoming increasingly resigned and adjusted to idea of fairly lengthy large-scale involvement in Vietnam and that in absence of some noteworthy change of position on part of DRVN, basic Vietnam situation may drag on much as at present for some months or more, without opening up diplomatically to any extent. Perhaps this descent of Vietnam issue into a sort of tragic normalcy is the best that can be hoped for at present. At any rate danger of wider hostilities does not repeat not seem to be increasing.

321.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/12

No. 3214
Paris, November 2, 1965
Confidential.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Permis New York; Delhi from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL – VIETNAM

In seeing Secretary-General on other matters I learned that USA has asked for a discussion of Vietnam for November 17 Council meeting. Ambassador Cleveland will lead off discussion. Grateful for your comments and instructions in time for November 17 meeting.

[George] Ignatieff

322.
Memorandum from Ambassador to United States to Embassy Officers
Note de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis aux agents de l'ambassade
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/2

Confidential.
[Washington,] November 3, 1965
For: Mr. Kidd, Mr. Beaulne, Mr. Cameron, Mr. Shenstone, Mr. Roberts.

I had an informal talk today with the Soviet Ambassador who lunched with me at the house. The following points arose:

Vietnam

Having in mind the suggestion made to me this morning by Mr. William Bundy (whom I told of my forthcoming lunch with Dobrynin), I asked the Soviet Ambassador whether the temporary cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam would, in his opinion, open the way to the possibility of negotiation. I added that this was a purely personal question and I was not speaking on behalf of anybody. Dobrynin said that he would prefer to turn my question around and say that, until the bombing of North Vietnam ceased there was no possibility of any progress in negotiation.

Later in our general conversation he returned to this subject and said that the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam was a condition for any progress in negotiation although he hastily added that he could not speak for the North Vietnamese and perhaps should not speak of "conditions for negotiation". At any rate, the cessation of bombing would create a different climate in which bilateral conversations between the Soviet Union and the United States might be possible with a view to seeing what progress could be made. He said that up to date the United States had always demanded some positive action on the part of the North Vietnamese authorities before they would consider stopping the bombing of North Vietnam. He went on to discount the former "pause" in U.S. bombing as being of no significance. He said that because of this demand for prior action by the North Vietnamese before bombing of North Vietnam could stop, conversations between Soviet Union and United States representatives on this subject had tended to go around in a circle as they had when Foreign Minister Gromyko was here recently.[127]

Dobrynin went on to say that the more important questions of substance were connected with a possible eventual settlement in Vietnam. For instance, what was to happen to the Viet Cong fighters who had been engaged in civil war? There must be a million of these with their families. Were they to be penalized for their role?

Moreover, if the National Liberation Front representatives were asked to sit at a conference table as members of the North Vietnamese delegation, this would be a complete admission on behalf of the North Vietnamese Government of the United States thesis that the Viet Cong were simply agents of North Vietnam, and so it would be impossible.

As to the future political orientation of South Vietnam, the USSR would be prepared to see free elections in North and South Vietnam at any time, so sure were they of the results. I said that the result would be that the Vietnamese would get on whichever bandwagon looked most promising – the American or the Communist. The Soviet Ambassador asked me what my personal assessment of United States intentions with regard to Vietnam was. Did I think that they would insist on trying to set up a regime based on the 17th Parallel which separated South and North Vietnam? Were they pressing for a complete military victory? Were they in the mood for negotiation? I referred to U.S. official statements on this subject and said that it would be apparent to the Soviet Union that in no circumstances could the United States withdraw from Vietnam and abandon their allies – no Great Power could be expected to behave in such a fashion. Dobrynin did not demur. I then said that it would be interesting to know more clearly whether the North Vietnamese were thinking of United States withdrawal as a prior condition for negotiation, or as a terminal point of a process of negotiated arrangements. Had he any information on this subject? Dobrynin made vague noises and said that the more important questions were those which he had mentioned regarding the substance of a possible settlement.

Dobrynin said that Canada could play a useful role over this whole question of Vietnam. I said that we had a discouraging experience in the visits which Blair Seaborn had paid to Hanoi where he had received a uniformly negative reaction to any possibility of negotiation.[128] He asked me whether this had been true of Seaborn's last visit and I said this was even more the case as he had not even the opportunity to see any senior Vietnamese officials on this last occasion.

[…]

Dobrynin's tone throughout was friendly. It was noticeable that he did not find it necessary to repeat any of the stock attacks on U.S. policy in Vietnam although he did not, of course, show any sign of condoning it or of any softening in the Soviet position but there was a sort

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[127] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 158.

[128] See Chapter 2./Voir Chapitre 2.

of tacit recognition throughout of the fact that it would be impossible for the United States just to pull out of Vietnam. I said that it was fortunate that a measure of prudence seemed to come with power and that, despite the various crises in East-West relations which he and I had discussed in the years that we have known each other, war had been avoided and the main danger now came from those who possessed some nuclear power without a sense of responsibility. He did not disagree.

C.S.A. Ritchie

323.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/12

No. 3519
Washington, November 4, 1965
Secret.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Geneva, Permis New York; Delhi, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Canberra, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM – CURRENT SITUATION

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, asked me to drop in this week to bring us up to date on aspects of current Vietnam situation as USA saw it. His comments on nature of a possible settlement and other topics are reported in separate telegrams.†

2. Bundy described military operations as "grinding on", and he made no repeat no attempt to claim that any corner had been turned in military situation, even though like other USA officials he seemed mildly encouraged by recent trends. He remarked however that USA authorities had no repeat no clear idea of current state of VC morale, and he referred to increase in North Vietnamese regular forces detected in South.

3. In light of recent indications that some senior USA officers might like to see still larger USA forces committed to Vietnam, I asked about plans for USA military buildup. In reply Bundy said USA forces were approaching projected goal of 195,000. However, there were still gaps in USA coverage, notably in IV Corps zone (extreme south of SVN) which was a major source of food and recruits for VC. There might be a small increment in USA forces some time in next six weeks or so.

4. Bundy said that USA officials had not repeat not been able to detect any decline in North Vietnamese morale and determination as result of recent military operations in South and air strikes against North. North Vietnamese statements, such as DRVN Foreign Ministry memo September 23, were perhaps no repeat no tougher than before, but were certainly just as tough. Hints had been made in some of these statements that USA withdrawal need not repeat not necessarily precede negotiations, but this was not repeat not particularly novel; in Bundy's view timing of USA withdrawal had all along been a throwaway card for North Vietnamese. What was not repeat not a throwaway card for them was position and status of Liberation Front. In some respects, North Vietnamese were now using more Liberation Front language.

5. Bundy said that Polish officials in New York had been telling Ambassador Goldberg lately that only way to achieve Vietnam discussions was for USA to cease air strikes against North; however, Poles had been completely unable to say what would happen if strikes did cease. This was a familiar Eastern European line. Bundy wondered what USSR would do in

event of cessation; he personally doubted that Russians would do any more than they were doing now to facilitate a settlement. In this context Bundy said he was intrigued by recent AFP report from Saigon that DRVN Premier Pham Van Dong had made secret trips to both Moscow and Peking in past three weeks.[129]

6. In general, Bundy seemed to believe that very little significant change in overall military and diplomatic situation in Vietnam was likely in near future.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

324.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to North Atlantic Council
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/12

No. Y-796
Ottawa, November 15, 1965
OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 3214 Nov 2.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Permis New York, Delhi, Saigon (Routine).

VIETNAM

Although we have no new material to present to Council, we believe that it might be useful if you were to speak briefly during discussion. We assume that Cleveland's presentation will follow same sort of outline as Bundy-Ritchie conversation reported Washington telegram 3519 November 4 which corresponds more or less to our own current assessment; in indicating general agreement, however, you will appreciate desirability of avoiding any comment on need for or effectiveness of USA military measures (paragraph 3 Washington reference telegram).

2. In discussion of North Vietnamese intentions, you may wish to draw on Seaborn's report of impressions formed on last trip to Hanoi (Saigon telegram 832[130] October 7). It appears to us that there has been no significant change in DRVN position from that reported by Seaborn at that time. Hanoi regime has great sense of historicity and just as French public opinion had profound effect on bringing Indochina war to end on terms which Hanoi thought would work in their favour, so they now seem to believe that protest movement in West including in USA itself will help to bring them victory if they can hold on long enough (as they think they can). What have been portrayed as recent signs of flexibility on Hanoi's part have been in our view primarily tactical moves designed to appeal to public opinion elsewhere (even perhaps opinion in Soviet Bloc) and to make themselves appear more "reasonable". Even if these gestures are subsequently repudiated, they seem to make a lasting impression on audiences for whom they were intended.

3. There have also been signs that Hanoi is becoming concerned with lack of wholehearted support for DRVN cause among Afro-Asian nations. With collapse of Algiers Conference and increasing isolation of China as exponent of "hard line", it remains to be seen how North Vietnam, as main example of hard line in operation, will now present its point of view to world

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[129] See/Voir « L'Évolution de la situation en Asie : Le premier ministre nord-vietnamien vient d'avoir des entretiens secrets à Moscou et à Pékin, » *Le Monde*, 2 novembre 1965, p. 2.

[130] See/Voir doc. 164.

opinion, and whether they will continue to urge their other friends to play down talk of negotiations and refrain from taking soundings looking in this direction (cf. Saigon reference telegram paragraph 6).

325.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 8893, 20-VIETN-1-3/2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] November 19, 1965

U.S. POLICY WITH REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE VIETNAM PROBLEM

Over the past few days the press has carried reports that the U.S.A. had rebuffed or turned down two opportunities to negotiate a settlement in Vietnam since August 1964.[131] In the event that you were called upon to comment on these reports, you might wish to have at hand the following comments on these two episodes especially as they relate to Canadian policy:

(a) *The U Thant Initiative*: From information available to us, it is clear that the Secretary-General did, in fact, attempt to arrange U.S.-North Vietnamese talks in Rangoon in late 1964 and early 1965, although we have never been informed that U Thant offered to let Washington formulate the terms of a cease fire which he would issue. Since Canada is not a party to the conflict in Vietnam, this offer was not made to us; because the Secretary-General's initiative was obviously of some diplomatic delicacy and appears to have involved only Washington, Hanoi and Rangoon, information about it was not widely circulated at the time and it was not until April when you visited New York that the Secretary-General made available to us a full account of his efforts.

Since Canada was not involved and was not aware of these discussions until some time after they had taken place, we were clearly not in a position to influence the decision of the U.S.A. one way or another. It should, however, be remembered that these efforts took place before the U.S.A. had expressed its willingness to negotiate, and may, together with the views of countries such as Canada, have influenced Washington to announce its willingness to undertake unconditional discussions as it did on April 7, 1965.

(b) *The North Vietnamese Approach in Paris*: Having suggested that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might be a useful way of testing North Vietnamese intentions, Canada was following developments in this connection very closely and we were aware that the senior North Vietnamese Representative in Paris had discussed his government's position with the French Foreign Office in mid-May, although from the information available to us the timing and substance of these discussions were such that the position of Hanoi remained vague on important aspects of this problem. This was one of the factors involved in the Canadian Government's instructions to Seaborn at the end of May authorizing him to proceed to Hanoi to take soundings of opinion there.

As you informed the House of Commons on June 7, Seaborn was authorized to "indicate the concern which the people of Canada feel with regard to developments in Indochina. He wanted to ascertain, as well, as a spokesman of the Canadian Government, the reaction of the North Vietnamese Government to the interruption that occurred a few days ago in the

[131] See/Voir James Reston, "Washington: 'Candor Compels Me to Tell You…'" *New York Times*, 17 November 1965, p. 46.

bombing by the forces under the command of the U.S.A."[132] The result of these discussions in Hanoi, however, was not such as to encourage the belief that North Vietnam was prepared for serious negotiations on Vietnam.

2. We have continued to follow subsequent developments in connection with these matters with the closest attention. On two occasions – one an interview between Lord Fenner Brockway and the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow, and the other a recent speech by a Viet Cong spokesman in Helsinki – it appeared that there might have been an element of flexibility in the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong position with respect to negotiations. Both of these alleged statements, however, were subsequently denied by the persons concerned.

3. On the basis of all our sources of information, including the reports of our representatives in Vietnam, we have concluded that there has been little if any perceptible change in the announced Communist position on negotiations. Indeed, if there *has* been any shift in emphasis, it seems in the direction of a harder, more inflexible public line, especially with respect to the demand that the U.S.A. should withdraw its forces from Vietnam *before* talks can begin. It also seems clear that in their own official assessments of the situation the North Vietnamese are attaching very great significance to protest movements in the U.S.A. and elsewhere in the West. They are evidently convinced that, if they can hold out long enough, public opinion in the U.S.A. and elsewhere will exert such pressure on the U.S. government (as domestic and international opinion did on the French government in 1954) that the Americans will be forced to withdraw unilaterally thus obviating the necessity of North Vietnam making any important concessions to achieve their objectives.

M[arcel] Cadieux

326.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 2528
New York, November 24, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington.

VIETNAM

When I saw Secretary-General this morning I also discussed Vietnam and asked whether he saw any hope of making progress towards some solution.

2. U Thant replied in negative explaining that new factor in Vietnam problem is that as a result of recent events, Hanoi is now closer to Peking than to Moscow. At one time Hanoi could be considered equally close to Peking and Moscow but this situation has now changed. U Thant based this conclusion mostly on confidential report that he has had on recent visit of Burmese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to Peking.

3. U Thant recalled that last year Ho Chi Minh even after Tonkin incident had agreed to send an emissary to Rangoon for discussion with Americans (our telegram 349 March 8) and it was most interesting that Ho had done so without knowledge of Peking.

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[132] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 2, p. 2038.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 2, p. 2038.

4. Secretary-General was interested in my remarks that when Shastri visited Ottawa he held view that Moscow influence on Hanoi was predominant but he only admitted that this may have been case in past.

5. I told U Thant that on May 28 after USA bombings had started I asked our representative in Saigon to visit Hanoi and seek an interview with Prime Minister or Foreign Minister with instructions to discuss what Hanoi reaction would be to a pause in bombing. Reply had been that Hanoi would not repeat not be impressed by a suspension of bombings and had reiterated well-known four conditions for negotiations, including prior withdrawal of USA forces.

6. Secretary-General expressed surprise over withdrawal condition because he believed this to be a condition imposed by Peking not repeat not by Hanoi.

7. Last July U Thant had sought a clarification about Hanoi's views on withdrawal before parties could come to conference table. Result of his enquiry was that Hanoi only wished principle of withdrawal to be recognized by USA. In August, however, situation had changed. Latest info confided to U Thant by Hungarian Foreign Minister in September before he left New York was that USA bombing of North Vietnam should be suspended indefinitely. U Thant conveyed this info to Rusk. Last week, however, an official broadcast from Hanoi emphasized that negotiations were impossible unless USA forces were withdrawn from South Vietnam.

8. In brief Secretary-General believed that only hope of initiating negotiations is for bombing of North Vietnam to stop. Secretary-General had something to say about manner in which suspension of bombing should be handled by USA. It should not repeat not be presented as a sort of ultimatum following which talks would be initiated. Bombing should be stopped with nothing being said about it and then perhaps some results would ensue.

9. Commenting on recent article by Sevareid in *Look*,[133] U Thant said that substance of it is accurate except for reference to McNamara. To his knowledge McNamara never came into picture. As we know he had contacted Stevenson in September of last year but did not repeat not get a reply from Stevenson about suggestion for talks in Rangoon until January. (Just last week he had been told by a reliable informant that President Johnson was not repeat not told of his approach to Stevenson before January.) Stevenson's answer had finally been that if talks were to take place in Rangoon there were certain to be some leakage about them and this would have a demoralizing effect on South Vietnamese Government. Last June in San Francisco President Johnson asked to see U Thant without presence of Stevenson, who felt quite embarrassed about it. U Thant had asked Johnson on that occasion why he had been given a negative reply about Rangoon talks. Johnson's reply was exactly what Stevenson had previously told him.

[Paul] Martin

327.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/12

No. 1594
Moscow, November 27, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority from London.
Repeat for Information: London; NATO Paris, Paris, Washington, Permis New York, Bonn from London.

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[133] See Eric Sevareid, "The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson," *Look*, 30 November 1965, pp. 81–86. This issue of the magazine was published in mid-November.
Voir Eric Sevareid, « The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson », *Look*, 30 novembre 1965, p. 81-86. Ce numéro du magazine a été publié à la mi-novembre.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING – EAST-WEST RELATIONS

My telegram 1583† November 25 contains my assessment of present state of Soviet foreign policy. I hope this may be of some use in preparing material for discussions on East-West relations at forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting.

2. I presume one of main preoccupations of meeting is French policy towards NATO, particularly if French attempt is made to exploit new relationship with the USSR for purpose of (a) preventing a greater position of influence for Germany in the Alliance, (b) increasing French independence of action within NATO, and (c) decreasing USA influence in Europe. If this assumption is correct, then a re-examination of Soviet-NATO relations in this light is obviously called for.

3. The amount of damage France can do to NATO, and indeed to Europe, by attempting, whether seriously or not repeat not, to recreate a kind of Franco-Soviet accord with the purpose of controlling Germany, is all too obvious. I wonder if the best, possibly the only, way to obviate this is to restore an American-Soviet great power understanding. The Russians, I am sure, would much prefer to deal with Americans than the French simply because they know in the long run that France cannot repeat not really contain Germany. This can only be done through an understanding with the USA. The very fact of a détente in Soviet-American relations would be enough to put French policies in their proper perspective, even if nothing more substantial came out of it than a tacit agreement to maintain the status quo.

4. This again raises the question of the main obstacle to a start in Soviet-USA talks, the Vietnam War, particularly the bombing of NVN. Although the question of association of Germany with atomic armaments is supposedly one of obstacles to this Soviet-USA dialogue I think it is rather in the Soviet view one of the main reasons for talks. Thus, we get back to the urgent need for a new look at the Vietnam operation in the total perspective of USA, and indeed NATO, foreign policy aims.

5. I cannot repeat not judge from here how important to USA military operations in SVN continued bombing of North is. It has certainly failed so far in its political objectives. Unless it is paying very great military dividends, I wonder if another effort should not repeat not be made to see what would come out of a cessation of bombing – not repeat not necessarily in terms of getting a *quid pro quo* from the NVN as in the past, but in terms of relations with the Soviet Union.

6. I imagine a cessation of bombing of the North at this time would be politically difficult for USA administration to accept in view of increasing casualty lists in South, and for other reasons tied to USA domestic politics. But I wonder if the following type of approach might not repeat not be acceptable to Washington.

7. We might recommend to the Americans a further diplomatic initiative which would have two aspects. The first would be a general reiteration of USA willingness to discuss peace in Vietnam with any government, which might somehow be endorsed by NATO Council. The second move would be a direct private offer to the Russians to suspend bombing of the North if the Russians could demonstrate in any way that this would lead to the negotiating table. This would have the advantage of taking up Soviet propaganda directed at the bombing, and would put them on the spot to reply. It would also demonstrate American readiness to recognise relationship between USA-Soviet relations and war in Vietnam.

8. This second initiative would have to be done secretly if it were to have any chance of success. Drawback is, of course, Soviet skepticism about ability of Americans to prevent news leaks. Russians could not repeat not afford publicly to give impression that they were secretly negotiating fate of Vietnam with Americans.

9. I doubt that such an initiative would evoke a very useful immediate response from the Russians. But if moment arrives when NVN have had enough of bombing it might just possibly provide a way out. It would in any event provide some measure of movement in USA-Soviet relations which at the moment are at a seriously low level.

[R.A.D.] Ford

328.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to Soviet Union
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Union soviétique
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/12

No. Y-814
Ottawa, November 29, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 1594 Nov 27.
Repeat for Information: London, NATO Paris, Paris, Washington, Permis New York, Bonn, Saigon, Delhi (Routine).

VIETNAM

We were interested in your suggestions regarding Vietnam problem. Various possible approaches open to us are being given careful attention as a matter of priority at the moment. While we have doubts about suitability and usefulness of attempting to develop an approach through NATO there may be something we can do in a quiet way through discussions in Washington.

2. To assist us in formulating our position more precisely we would like to know whether on basis of your impressions of Soviet position you have any reason to believe that any offer of a military gesture in Vietnam made to Moscow by Washington would elicit anything more from Soviet Government than traditional disclaimer of any mandate to "negotiate" on behalf of any of principal parties to Vietnam conflict and suggestion that Americans should direct their offers and comments to Hanoi and/or the Viet Cong.

329.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/13

No. 1613
Moscow, December 1, 1965
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate from London.
Reference: Your Tel Y-814 Nov 30.
Repeat for Information: London; NATO Paris, Paris, Bonn, Permis New York, Washington from London; Delhi from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.

VIETNAM AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

My proposal about a new American approach to Russians about bombing of NVN was really made in context of East-West relations not repeat not Vietnam problem per se. As explained in my telegram 1594 November 27, I do not repeat not believe there is much hope of either solving problem of French role in NATO, or of restoring some degree of balance to Western relations with USSR so long as USA-Soviet relations are so strained. Vietnam War, and above all bombing of Soviet ally NVN, are principal obstacles to this.

2. My suggestion was not repeat not put forward with much hope that there would be a useful response from Russians, although I think it might provide opening eventually. Its purpose was to get some kind of USA-Soviet dialogue started again.

3. I agree that chances are that an American offer made to Moscow might risk traditional rebuff but it would depend on manner in which it was presented. If it were put in such a way as to demonstrate the Americans recognized connection between bombing of NVN and relations with USSR it might, without evoking a very encouraging response, at least demonstrate American hopes for eventual return to détente.

4. If this idea were to be discussed with State Department then I suggest it be put in context of NATO-Soviet relations, rather than purely as a Vietnam gambit.

[R.A.D.] Ford

330.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/13

No. 3805
Washington, December 1, 1965
Confidential.
Reference: London Tel 4890† Nov 30.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva, Permis New York; Delhi, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon; Moscow, Warsaw, Vienna from London; Cairo from Paris.

VIETNAM: HANOI'S FOUR POINTS

In assessing possibility of bridging gap between Hanoi's Four Points and official USA position (paragraphs 4-7 of reference telegram) you may wish to refer to William Bundy's comments on the Four Points in paragraphs 2-7 of our telegram 1361 April 29. Unacceptable features of Four Points singled out by Bundy were basically same as those mentioned during recent discussion between Canada House and Foreign Office, i.e., timing of USA withdrawal, and settlement in accord with programme of Liberation Front. These principal issues in dispute may be few in number but they seem to us to be fundamental in character. A compromise on one or both of them by either side would amount to that side's abandonment of some of its basic objectives.

331.
Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/13

No. 4957
London, December 3, 1965
Confidential.
Reference: Washington Tel 3805 Dec 1.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, Geneva, Permis New York, Cairo; Delhi, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon; Moscow, Warsaw, Vienna from London.

VIETNAM: HANOI'S FOUR POINTS

We are grateful to Washington for reminding us of Bundy's comments in their telegram April 29, in light of which we have looked again at Hanoi's Four Points.

2. It seemed to us a helpful aspect of Hanoi's Four Points that they were in the form of statement of principles which would be conducive to settlement of Vietnam problem. For example, Hanoi's requirement that USA must withdraw their troops from South Vietnam and must cease their attacks on North Vietnam is presented as following from principle of recognition of basic national right of Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. We noted that timing is nowhere mentioned as such in the Four Points and it may well be that this omission was deliberate.

3. It is clear of course that USA and North Vietnam would attach vastly different degree of urgency to withdrawal of USA troops. Yet, it seems to us unnecessary to regard the Four Points as having at this stage a chronological significance. Main requirement in Hanoi statement was that Four Points be recognized as a basis for a settlement of Vietnam problem following which "it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference". One can only assume that the purpose of such a conference would be to consider the conditions, modalities, etc. attached to the application of the principles embodied in the Four Points.

4. Our guiding thought in discussions at Foreign Office reported in our telegram 4890 November 30 was to explore the possibility of establishing a common language between USA and North Vietnam. It seemed to us that if both sides could begin by agreeing to certain general principles it would be easier to get negotiations going or at least more difficult for North Vietnam to persist in refusing them. Four principles enumerated by Hanoi impressed us as being so abstract and general as to afford perhaps a convenient point of departure. We noted Bundy indicated USA would have no repeat no objection against two of these principles. As regards the other two principles we gathered that Bundy's objections were directed not repeat not against principles themselves but manner of their application as suggested in Pham Van Dong's statement.

5. It has occurred to us in this connection that if USA decided to stop again their attacks against North Vietnam in order to test its willingness to negotiate, they could reinforce their position by issuing at the same time a statement accepting the four general principles embodied in Hanoi's Four Points. Acceptance of first principle could be qualified by reference to past USA statements on conditions which would permit withdrawal of their troops from South Vietnam. Acceptance of second principle could be followed by appropriate reference to Article 10, 19, 24, 27 of '54 Agreement. As regards the third principle, it seems to us USA could well accept that "the internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves", and ignore altogether the reference to the Liberation Front. There would be an obvious advantage from point of view of getting negotiations started in keeping such a statement as simple and general as possible. If North Vietnam still went on refusing negotiations, such a step would at least have advantage of putting USA in a stronger public position.

6. We agree, of course, with view in reference telegram that principal issues in dispute are fundamental in character. The only point we wish to make in this telegram is that if on basis of acceptance of general principles in Hanoi's statement it were possible to recall Geneva Conference, these issues, which derive from the way each side envisage application of these principles, could appropriately be dealt with in such a forum.

332.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] December 6, 1965

INITIATIVES ON VIETNAM

(A) *Possibility of Introducing a Resolution at the United Nations*

We have been considering the relative advantages and disadvantages of Canada sponsoring a Vietnam resolution at the United Nations before the present session comes to an end. Such a resolution might contain some or all of the following elements in a balanced and non-controversial formulation: an expression of concern over what is happening in Vietnam; an appeal for the exercise of restraint; a call for a cease fire and negotiations leading up to or following the implementation of cease fire arrangements; an invitation to the President of the Assembly, after consultation, to designate a prominent and respected personality acceptable to both sides, to sound out the interested parties about the prospects for a settlement.

Advantages

(a) Such a resolution would provide an opportunity for U.N. members to focus attention on the Vietnam problem in a concrete and practical way.

(b) An initiative of this character would receive wide attention, would meet with the approval of Canadian public opinion, and would follow logically on your opening statement before the General Assembly this year.[134]

Disadvantages

(a) It is almost certain that such a resolution, and any initiative flowing from it, would be rebuffed by Hanoi and Peking who have steadfastly maintained that there is no formal role for the United Nations in connection with the Vietnam problem.

(b) The introduction of a resolution in the General Assembly would provide an opening for debate of the whole Vietnam issue. Although this might be inhibited to some extent by introducing the resolution towards the end of the session, this tactic in itself might be resented as an attempt to choke off debate, and we might find ourselves confronted with the question why we waited until the dying days of the Assembly to introduce a matter of such importance for discussion.

(c) It is doubtful whether a balanced and non-provocative resolution, in the terms in which it would be proposed by Canada would emerge from the process of debate in a form we would find acceptable. The Soviet Union would, at the very least, propose amendments calling for a cessation of bombing and it is our guess that a majority could be mustered in support of this idea. This would force the U.S.A. and probably others, such as Australia and New Zealand, to propose counter amendments which might well fail to carry the requisite support. In sum it is impossible to predict what sort of resolution would ultimately be adopted. It is a fairly safe guess, however, that it would be less moderate and less balanced than anything we would ourselves introduce and it could be altered by amendment as to distort the objectives we had in mind.

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[134] See/Voir Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/24, 24 September 1965.

(d) It is quite clear that the U.S.A. would not regard such a move on our part as helpful. Before the Assembly opened, the U.S. Embassy here, on instructions from Washington, pointed out to us that they hoped that friendly governments would be able to express "clear support for U.S. policy in Vietnam" in any debate on this problem in the Assembly. To the extent that this was not possible it was hoped that friendly governments would help to focus attention on constructive proposals aimed at applying pressure on the other side to agree to negotiate. Finally, they explained that if an item was to be formally inscribed for the session it should in the first instance be on the Security Council's agenda, not on that of the General Assembly.

2. In view of the foregoing considerations we believe that the balance of advantage lies with not attempting to take an initiative at this session of the Assembly.

(B) *Possibility of a Special Political Mission being undertaken by a Prominent Personality Acceptable to Both Sides*

3. Although the prospects do not appear bright for the designation of a "special emissary" by the President of the General Assembly, we have considered whether it might be possible to arrange alternative sponsorship for such an assignment. The North Vietnamese and Chinese maintain that the only acceptable framework within which the Vietnam question can be dealt with is the Geneva machinery. It might therefore be possible to use the Geneva Conference mechanisms – specifically, the Co-Chairmen – to approach the question of designating someone to undertake a special political mission. What we could envisage, as a Canadian initiative, would be a letter from you to Mr. Stewart and Mr. Gromyko suggesting that they appoint such an "emissary" to sound out the parties and to report back to them, as Co-Chairmen, with recommendations as to the further courses to be pursued with a view to bringing the Vietnam conflict into some kind of negotiating context.

4. There are serious difficulties involved in such an initiative:

(a) From what we know of the Soviet attitude at the present time, it appears unlikely that they would agree to act in concert with the British Co-Chairman in an effort which is obviously, if indirectly, designed to get negotiations started.

(b) Even in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union agreed, there might be difficulties in finding a prominent personality acceptable to all sides who would be prepared to commit his prestige to an undertaking, which is more likely than not to be abortive. President Kekkonen of Finland is someone who might be prepared to take this on. If it proved necessary, as well it might, to look beyond an uncommitted European personality, President Nasser might be another possible choice, although his reaction almost certainly would be guided by the prospects of the mission he was being asked to undertake.

(c) The fate of earlier undertakings of this type (i.e., – the Commonwealth Mission) is not such as to encourage hopes for a sympathetic hearing from the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. It is true that the sponsorship in this case would be quite different, and by definition, more acceptable to Hanoi and Peking. However, the rejection of the Commonwealth Mission by these two capitals on grounds of its composition was probably only an excuse: their real objection was to the likely results of a mission which could not be counted on to endorse Hanoi's policy to the letter. On balance, we are inclined to believe that an initiative of this nature, since it stands so little chance of substantive success at the present time, would not be worthwhile.

(C) *Possibility of an Initiative within the Vietnam Commission*

5. Because of our active involvement in the Vietnam situation by virtue of Commission membership, we believe that an initiative in this context offers the most attractive possibilities at the moment. We have presented this idea in greater detail in the talking points prepared for your discussions next week with Mr. Stewart whose co-operation will obviously be necessary and whose reactions we are therefore suggesting you seek before this is further considered.

R.E. C[ollins] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

333.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] December 8, 1965

LONDON'S COMMENTS ON HANOI'S "FOUR POINTS"
AS A BASIS FOR VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS

London's telegram 4957 of December 3 (copy attached) represents an attempt to see whether Hanoi's four points can be reconciled with U.S. objectives to a sufficient extent that a basis for negotiations might appear to exist. The suggestions which London advances raise questions of timing and substance.

Timing

2. We agree with London's observation that the omission of any reference to a specific time-table in Hanoi's four points is probably deliberate. We assume that the pace at which the programme is to be implemented would be regarded as negotiable. What Hanoi insists on is prior U.S. commitment to the *principles* underlying the four points, the most important of which (and from which all the others are developed) is "recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity". As Hanoi has pointed out, once the U.S.A. is prepared to accept these principles in advance, it will then be possible to consider reconvening a Geneva-type conference to work out the details.

3. Timetable and sequence are, however, two different things. We disagree with London's assumption that it is unnecessary to regard the four points as having a built-in chronological sequence. On the contrary, it is clear that the order of events envisaged by Hanoi is:

(1) A cessation of bombing and U.S. withdrawal;

(2) A period of temporary division during which South Vietnam would be run by a Liberation Front Government or a Government with influential Front participation and without any right to call for U.S. or other assistance; and

(3) Reunification.

4. If there were no logical or chronological sequence inherent in the formulation of the four points, it could be argued that the reunification of Vietnam (point 4) might take place before the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam (point 1). This is clearly not the sort of arrangement Hanoi has in mind. Rather, Hanoi's interest lies in securing U.S. agreement to the principle of withdrawal, to the principle of temporary division with South Vietnam neutralised under Liberation Front leadership, and to the principle of reunification. The working out of a precise time-table for the implementation of these principles is of secondary importance from Hanoi's point of view.

Substance

5. The suggestion advanced in paragraph 5 of London's telegram (i.e., that the U.S. could accompany a further cessation of bombing by a statement accepting Hanoi's four points in qualified form) appears to us to be unrealistic. By acting on this suggestion, we would, in effect, be advising the U.S.A. to do two things concurrently which Washington is not now prepared to consider doing separately.

6. The U.S. has made two points clear. In the first place, a further pause in the bombing would be possible "as a step towards peace". But this assertion has been coupled with a question as to what responsive gesture Hanoi might be prepared to make in return (i.e., whether it will, in fact, be a step toward peace or simply a gratuitous U.S. concession). Secondly, the U.S.A. has repeatedly expressed its willingness, in the context of "unconditional discussions" to talk about Hanoi's four points provided that the points other governments (notably those of the United States and South Vietnam) would wish to bring forward are not excluded in advance. In other words, Hanoi's programme could form a part of the agenda for discussions, not the agenda itself.

7. London has suggested that, in accepting Hanoi's four points, Washington might enter certain qualifications. The qualifications proposed by London are substantive from Hanoi's point of view. Any attempt to re-formulate Hanoi's four points in this way is far from being the same thing as a prior U.S. commitment to the four principles involved on which Hanoi insists. Such a re-formulation could be regarded as a face-saving device for Hanoi but there is no evidence that Hanoi is any more disposed to save face at this stage than the United States. That being so, the only advantage in putting forward such a proposal would be to demonstrate Hanoi's rigidity. There is ample proof of this already.

8. As we see it, the problem at this stage is not one of devising forms of words to which the U.S. and Hanoi can both subscribe, but of seeing what common ground there may be between them and of building up some basis of confidence that this common ground is, in fact, genuine. The U.S.A., for example, has made its limited objectives in South Vietnam clear. But when the U.S. Government speaks about creating conditions in which South Vietnam will be able to decide its own future destiny, we have the impression that Hanoi interprets this to mean a return to the situation immediately following 1954. From past U.S. statements about the independence of South Vietnam as a separate state, Hanoi may well have grounds for skepticism on that score. On the other hand, given the record of Hanoi's bad faith in Vietnam as well as in Laos, the U.S.A. can scarcely be blamed for suspecting that, when the four points refer to temporary division and the settlement of South Vietnam's affairs by the people of South Vietnam, this means not only reunification in short order but, in fact, a Communist takeover of the whole country.

9. It seems to us that if common ground is to be established between the two parties, it would be advisable to think in terms of the basic issue at stake, namely, the reunification of Vietnam, and leave the specific formulation of positions for negotiation in due course.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

334.
Record of Conversation between Secretary of State for External Affairs and Foreign Secretary of United Kingdom, December 10, 1965
Compte rendu de la conversation entre le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni, 10 décembre 1965
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

Confidential.
[London, n.d.]

This conversation had been scheduled to last for up to 1½ hours but just before it began the Minister was informed that Mr. Stewart would in fact have to restrict it to not much more than 30 minutes.

The meeting began with some brief remarks by Mr. Stewart concerning the publicity given by the Soviet press to his recent visit to Moscow. *Pravda* had published articles both before and after the visit, neither of them cordial. *Izvestia*, however, had described the visit as "useful and business-like" and as "a positive contribution to Soviet-British relations".

Mr. Martin turned the conversation to Vietnam. He noted that Mr. Stewart's effort to launch an initiative through the Co-Chairmen had been rendered abortive by the U.S.S.R. He assumed that Mr. Stewart was as concerned as he was to find some means of preventing the war from escalating further. If something was not done, "God knows where it will end". Had Mr. Stewart received any indication at all in Moscow that the Russians were seriously exerting themselves to find a basis for negotiation? Mr. Stewart said that the formula that the Russians used was that they were "not authorized to negotiate", the implication being that the decision to negotiate was in Hanoi's hands. Mr. Martin asked whether Mr. Stewart had found the Russians at all disposed to join in calling the Geneva Powers together. Mr. Stewart said he had found no such disposition. The most he could say was that in talking to him the Russians had been perhaps a shade less violent than in their public denunciations of the United States. Mr. Stewart thought the Russians would like a conference but neither Mr. Gromyko nor Mr. Kosygin had been precise on what area a conference should cover.

Mr. Martin asked what could be done now. What would Mr. Stewart think if the International Commission were to appeal in two separate communications to the Co-Chairmen? Mr. Stewart said this might be helpful but he wondered if it would affect Hanoi's line. He feared that the U.S.S.R.'s response to a message from the Commission would depend on Hanoi's reaction. There might be a better chance of having some beneficial effect if all three Commission powers were associated with any such appeal to the Co-Chairmen but he presumed there was not much chance of securing unanimity on such messages in the Commission. He agreed with Mr. Martin that it was essential to continue trying, if only because at some stage the military facts must oblige Hanoi to change its mind.

Mr. Martin recalled Hanoi's four "conditions". What did Mr. Stewart think about these? Mr. Stewart said that it was difficult to know for certain whether United States withdrawal from South Vietnam was a pre-condition of the beginning of talks. Hanoi sometimes seemed a little less rigid on this point. A much more difficult condition was the point in which Hanoi insisted that the Liberation Front programme must be accepted. This was tantamount to settling the affairs of South Vietnam by agreement between the Viet Cong and Hanoi. This was not the formula for a settlement.

Mr. Martin asked how much longer we could stick with the United States in defence of its basic purposes, if we did not show that we were taking extraordinary steps toward getting negotiations started. In this connection, our difficulty was that we did not always know what United States intentions were. Mr. Stewart referred to President Johnson's speech to Johns Hopkins University last spring as containing the basic United States position on its aims in Vietnam. He thought the position as set out in that speech was reasonable and clear. The United States was not prepared for a sham settlement.

Mr. Martin asked Mr. Stewart whether it would be wise to encourage a new pause in the bombing of North Vietnam. Mr. Stewart replied that any suggestion along this line should be made privately to the United States Government. Mr. Martin referred to political difficulties caused for the Canadian Government by the failure of the United States to keep its allies fully informed. He gave as an example the long delay before the Canadian Government was informed of U Thant's initiative. Mr. Stewart said that to some extent he had the same problem. On the other hand, with regard to the U Thant contacts with Hanoi, he thought the situation had been changed by recent statements in which Hanoi had said that they never put out a peace feeler. Mr. Stewart concluded that U Thant had put too optimistic an interpretation on the word he had received from Hanoi. The North Vietnamese were adept at this kind of thing. The end result was that the United States had been borne out in its statement that there had, in fact, been no peace feeler from Hanoi.

Mr. Martin said he had the impression that U Thant was feeling his oats and looking around for new manoeuvres in the United Nations context. He himself (Mr. Martin) had been wondering at an earlier stage whether anything might have been done by the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. There had, however, been not much interest shown by the Africans and an Assembly initiative was no longer feasible at this session.

Referring to the tactical position of the United States, Mr. Stewart said it was important to recall, first of all, that the United States would settle for a genuinely neutral Vietnam. The United States, however, did not wish to forget the lesson of Berlin and Korea where the Communists had hoped that, if they went on saying "no" for long enough, they would get their way in the end. He thought the United States was wise to heed this lesson. The danger of the United States being taken in by Communist negotiating tactics offset the disadvantages for us of going on without fully knowing United States intentions. The real problem now was how to get Hanoi to say what they would do if there was a pause in the bombing. Mr. Martin referred to the possibilities of a prolonged stop in the bombing, say two weeks. That was a suggestion, Mr. Stewart said, that could be made privately. But supposing that the United States did initiate a new pause, it was quite likely that this would be found insufficient by Hanoi as a basis for talks leading to negotiations. The United States would be told that it must agree to the Viet Cong being represented at the talks. And if they gained this, the next thing would be that the Liberation Front must be a full party to the settlement.

Mr. Stewart said that Prime Minister Wilson was now considering what he would say to President Johnson. Mr. Stewart suggested that Mr. Martin might mention his idea of a pause to Prime Minister Wilson when he saw him later in the day. Mr. Martin said he would.

335.
Telegram from Delegation to North Atlantic Council to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. 2446
Paris, December 12, 1965
Confidential. Immediate.
Following for Collins from Cadieux.

POSSIBLE CANADIAN ACTIONS IN VIETNAM

During discussions in London, Minister at various points canvassed ideas which have been developed in Ottawa for action by Canada on Vietnam situation.

2. Of these various ideas Minister is now most attracted to idea of our delegation in Commission working for message to Co-Chairmen proposing that new Geneva Conference be held to draft new terms of reference. Minister mentioned this idea for example to Mr. Stewart who while he made no repeat no commitment seemed to think it was something worth considering further.

3. If you are able to do so it might be useful to Minister in his discussions here in Paris to have some further elaboration of departmental thinking on this point which would provide basis for exchanges for example with USA. Minister intends to discuss Vietnam at some length with Dean Rusk at meeting now arranged for 6 p.m. Paris time Monday, December 13.

4. What we have in mind is that in discussing situation in North Vietnam with USA authorities in relation to relative authority in that area of the USSR and China, a proposal of kind set out above might be helpful. We realize that timing in respect of this idea would be crucial and that perhaps premature exploration of it might provoke USSR reaction which would diminish usefulness of idea at later stage.

5. Another line that SSEA raised with Mr. Stewart which could be pursued further with USA privately repeat privately was whether longer pause in bombing of North Vietnam might be considered, particularly in light of what appears to have been very unimpressive results of these operations so far in preventing movement of troops and supplies from North Vietnam to South.

6. I realize that time factor may make it out of question for Department's views on these important matters to reach us before Rusk interview but your comments would be helpful in discussions that might take place before end of NATO session perhaps at official level.

336.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to North Atlantic Council
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. Y-834
Ottawa, December 13, 1965
Confidential. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tel 2446 Dec 12.

VIETNAM

Our suggestion for Vietnam Commission Special Report calling for Geneva Conference to work out new terms of reference for Commission was based on two major difficulties confronting us in Vietnam: (a) Situation on the ground has changed in virtually every respect from conditions on which 1954 Cease Fire Agreement was based and this makes substantive operations (as opposed to symbolic presence) increasingly irrelevant. Moreover, since February, Commission presence has virtually disappeared from North Vietnam making whole operation decidedly one-sided. (b) Financial problems arising from Chinese refusal to pay their share of common pool expenses (and indeed grudging payment by other contributors) have created an uncertain and highly unsatisfactory situation, not repeat not least because Commission powers are being put in position of financing *de facto* their own participation. This is a radical departure from terms of service originally drawn up.

2. We understand that the Indians, in recognition of these administrative difficulties, are currently considering proposals for scaling down size of Commission commitments in Vietnam possibly involving elimination of Southern team sites except Saigon and DZ. They might therefore be in receptive mood to suggestion for more far-reaching and significant initiative based, at least in part, on Commission's administrative problems.

3. We recognize that sort of Special Report we have in mind would require at least Indian cooperation, and preferably Polish cooperation as well. We also recognize that neither is likely to be forthcoming if Moscow were to indicate that it would not repeat not welcome such an initiative at this time. However, the plan we have in mind has two major advantages: (a) It would obviously be easier for USSR to accept an approach from Commission as such than unilaterally from British. If indeed the Indians prove receptive to our idea, we might be able to encourage them to present the proposal to Moscow as reflecting their own position. (b) A Commission appeal for new terms of reference might appear much less controversial and less difficult to accept in political terms than a more overt call for negotiations.

4. If Indians (and Poles) are not repeat not prepared to cooperate in such a venture we would not repeat not propose making the idea public, since it might very well provide a useful opening at some future time when Moscow is more favourably disposed to cooperate in getting talks started.

5. We are not repeat not sure how receptive USA will be to proposal for another pause in the bombing in present circumstances. They are clearly concerned about increase in North Vietnamese infiltration in the South and while bombing of North Vietnam has not repeat not accomplished all it may have been intended to do, Rusk made it clear only last week that "if what they do has to be done at 5 miles per hour instead of 40 miles per hour that is of

some significance".[135] Bombing is also, of course, a "trump card" in USA hands in sense that it gives USA something they can stop doing in the right circumstances. In any case, because of North Vietnamese impression that USA is under growing domestic and international pressure to bring Vietnam War to an end, it is clear that any new pause in bombing should be based or be seen to be based on autonomous USA initiative.

6. If, therefore, we do not repeat not suggest that Minister explore further pause in terms of a Canadian proposal, there would clearly be advantage in his sounding out USA thinking on that score. He could do so by tying our enquiry to Rusk's own recent statements about willingness to consider further pause if there were any likelihood of responsive gesture from Communist side.[136] We would be interested in any amplification of this formula Rusk could give. We wonder whether USA has considered gradual reduction of strikes, in scope and intensity, on an exploratory basis to see whether it elicits any corresponding response from Communists. Such a reduction would enable the two sides to indicate their intentions to each other without appearing to be responding to outside pressure. It would also provide Americans with opportunity of approaching USSR on basis not repeat not of any proposed course of action but of something which is, in fact, already being done to scale down Vietnam conflict with a view to engaging Russians in exerting whatever leverage they may have in Hanoi.

7. Reports also suggest that possibility of major confrontation may be shaping up within international Communist camp. Since USSR and its Eastern European allies have made so much of bombing, a further pause judiciously timed in relation to the development of the confrontation which we suspect may be shaping up, might help to pry North Vietnam loose from hardline Chinese position. Has USA developed any contingency plans for bombing pause as this might affect Hanoi's position in relation to stresses and strains of Sino-Soviet difficulties. An open break between Peking and Moscow would obviously be an agonizing experience for Hanoi, and we wonder whether recent reports of Pham Van Dong's visits to Peking and Moscow in October, and more recently, speculation about a visit by Ho Chi Minh to Peking, might not repeat not be related to efforts to forestall an open rift.

8. Another line Minister might wish to pursue with Rusk is to approach Vietnam problem by way of a proposal to convene conference on Laos. This has been tried before without eliciting positive response but circumstances may have changed sufficiently to make it worth trying again.

9. It is clear in present situation that events in Laos simply cannot repeat not be isolated from those in Vietnam. If there are risks of escalation of conflict in Vietnam these risks will sooner or later extend to Laos if decision were reached to make determined attempt to interdict Ho Chi Minh Trail.

10. Russians seem to be disturbed about situation that is shaping up in Laos. Soviet Embassy is reported to be trying to see if tacit agreement could be worked out by which Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attacks on Royal Laotian Government forces could be stopped in return for cessation of USA bombing of Laos. Such a deal is clearly not repeat not on since its net effect would be to leave Ho Chi Minh Trail immune.

11. Soviets themselves are taking line that situation now existing in Laos is not repeat not such as had been envisaged in Geneva Agreement. Argument is disingenuous since they would use it to inhibit Commission from doing what it is supposed to be doing unless it has consent of three parties in Laos. Still, it is an argument that could be used to support call for a conference.

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[135] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 915.

[136] See for example/Voir par exemple ibid., p. 911.

12. Critical financial position of Commission is another since it is not repeat not readily evident how Commission can carry out its functions effectively in circumstances of continuing financial uncertainty.

13. There is also possibility of invoking Article 4 of 1962 Declaration on Neutrality of Laos under which parties "undertake, in the event of a violation of threat or violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present declaration". Either Message 35[137] or, preferably, Dong Hene Report[138] which is now in preparation could be used as basis for invoking this article.

14. Since Laos is at least one degree removed from Vietnam situation it may be easier for Russians to respond to call for a Laos Conference. When Polish Ambassador called on Department last week he gave indication in this sense although he did so without reference to any particular timing. Moreover, it is to be assumed that cooperation of Prime Minister of Laos could be enlisted in support of call for a Laos Conference in present circumstances.

15. Objectives of conference would have to be defined very carefully. Settlement reached in 1962 and terms of reference of Commission should not repeat not be opened to renegotiation, since net result would be unfavourable to Laotian neutrality, Commission's effectiveness and Western objectives. Conference could, however, discuss ways in which observance of 1962 settlement might be ensured.

16. Foregoing could be held in reserve in the event that Vietnam Commission initiative were to encounter adverse reactions from Indians and Poles.

337.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Department of External Affairs and Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministère des Affaires extérieures et à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/13

No. 3556
Paris, December 14, 1965
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tels 3548† Dec 13 and Y-834 Dec 13.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris; Delhi from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London.

CONVERSATION WITH RUSK DECEMBER 13: VIETNAM

I asked Rusk his view of prospects for negotiations in Vietnam and in particular whether he regarded first of Hanoi's Four Points (withdrawal of USA forces from SVN) as an objective rather than a pre-condition (paragraph 3 reference telegram 3548). Rusk said that Hanoi's position seemed to have stiffened as of about six weeks ago possibly as consequence of rough treatment given to delegation from Hanoi visiting Peking. Public confirmation of tougher Hanoi line had been given two days ago in Hanoi broadcast stating that USA must accept Four Points. Rusk said he was not repeat not so worried about first point on withdrawal

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[137] See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Press Release,* no. 76, 6 December 1965.
Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Communiqué,* nº 76, 6 décembre 1965.

[138] See/Voir Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Press Release,* no. 45, 22 August 1966.

as Hanoi's position on this seemed to shift from time to time. Third point worried him more as it would require acceptance of programme of Liberation Front for SVN. This was what all the shooting was about and Hanoi would not repeat not get control of SVN by negotiation. I agreed that this was sensible position.

2. Speaking of possibility of pause in bombing, Rusk said USA was "trying very privately" to discover what Hanoi's reaction would be if pause were initiated. So far he had seen no repeat no prospect that anything of significance would happen. USA Ambassador in Poland, Gronouski, whom Rusk had seen December 13, had reported that about two weeks ago Poles had made some approach to Hanoi but apparently no repeat no answer had yet been forthcoming. Rusk did not repeat not know whether this had been a move in the direction of negotiations or enquiry regarding a pause. Whatever it was, Polish approach was of interest as Poles would not repeat not have moved except with Soviet agreement. At same time Hanoi would have to have regard for Peking's attitude before reacting to Polish approach.

3. I asked what Rusk would think if International Commission or two members of it were to address appeals to Co-Chairmen requesting calling of conference on Vietnam. USSR might not repeat not respond but perhaps such an appeal might be useful as part of general effort to demonstrate USA's continuing concern to explore every avenue toward negotiation. Rusk did not repeat not commit himself specifically but indicated my suggestion might be further studied. He said he had been giving some thought to action based on Geneva machinery and spoke of a "rolling barrage" according to which there might first be meeting of Co-Chairmen who would later call in Commission members and subsequently extend conference to include wider circles. Another idea Rusk mentioned, although he appeared to have discarded it for the time being, was that someone of Averell Harriman's standing might go to Geneva and wait there to see if anyone from Hanoi showed up to talk with him.

4. In general comment on prospects for negotiations, Rusk said situation had been accurately put to him earlier in the day by Couve de Murville who had said that there was not repeat not enough in the prospects for agreement to make negotiations interesting at this time.

5. Despite this conclusion, I am inclined to explore further our idea of appeal to Co-Chairmen at propitious time. I was grateful for your reference telegram Y-834 December 13 and suggest that it be sent to Washington for discussion with USA authorities. We will then be in position to decide what further specific action might be taken.

[Paul] Martin

338.
Memorandum from Prime Minister to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du premier ministre au Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
MG26-N4, vol. 281, 845/I41V666 Vietnam Truce 1966 – Secret

Secret.
Ottawa, December 29, 1965

RE: VIETNAM

The American Ambassador called on me this morning, on instruction from the President via McGeorge Bundy, to deliver a message to me. It informed me of the U.S. decision not to resume the bombing of North Vietnam for the time being. Cessation of bombing would continue for some days more, unless there were developments that made this impossible. It was hoped that this might convince the Communists and reassure the friends of the United States that the U.S.A. was genuinely interested in negotiating a settlement. Mr. Butterworth said that they were not optimistic that there would be any positive reaction from the North Vietnamese authorities to the suspension of bombing – which would not be

officially announced, though it will be given some publicity – but they hoped that it would drive a wedge between the belligerent extremists at the top and those on other levels in North Vietnam. The Americans have some reason to believe that a division of this kind was developing. In any event, they would hope for the best as a result of their decision not to resume bombing, while under no illusion that the best would occur. The South Vietnamese Government apparently went along with the U.S. decision to continue the cessation of bombing.

I told Mr. Butterworth that I welcomed, and I thought the Canadian people would welcome, the American decision. It seemed to me to be wise, even if the result turned out to be disappointing. I thought that the timing was particularly good, as it could be linked to other moves such as the Christmas truce and the proposed New Year's truce, all of which together were creating a somewhat better atmosphere for a negotiated settlement.

Mr. Butterworth said that either the President himself or Mr. Bundy would be likely to phone me about the decision mentioned above but that, meanwhile, he had been told to convey the message to me immediately.

L.B. Pearson

P.S. Attached is a copy of the letter from the President which has just been delivered to me.

Enclosure: Letter from Ambassador of United States to Prime Minister
Pièce jointe : Lettre de l'ambassadeur des États-Unis au premier ministre

Top Secret.
Ottawa, December 29, 1965

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

There is transcribed below a copy of a message from the President which I have been instructed to deliver to you:

> "As you know, I have been giving every possible thought to the ways and means by which we might bring about peace in Viet-Nam. For some time the Soviet Union and some Eastern European Governments have hinted that the major impediment to any diplomatic initiatives on their part was our bombing of North Viet-Nam and they have implied that if the bombing were suspended for a while they might be prepared to make efforts to bring Hanoi into line. However, none of the governments has given us the slightest assurance of any specific action that might follow a suspension of bombing.
>
> "Nevertheless I have concluded that I should test the seriousness of these Communist hints to see if some progress toward peace could be made.
>
> "We have stood down bombing of North Viet-Nam since Christmas eve and I intend to continue the suspension of bombing for some days.
>
> "We are advising the governments of the USSR, Poland and Hungary that barring a major provocation, the suspension of the bombing will continue beyond the New Year. I am taking steps to have the word passed directly to the regime in Hanoi through our Ambassador in Rangoon.
>
> "I have no great hope that anything useful will come out of this, but I do not want to leave any stone unturned in the search for peace. Obviously, we can make no commitments publicly or privately that would limit our freedom of action in the event of a major contingency or serious provocation. By the same token, I do not wish to commit myself now to any specific date for resumption.

"We shall, of course, continue our air, ground and sea operations in South Viet-Nam and some reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam.

"In furtherance of this initiative I am sending Ambassador Goldberg to Rome to see the Pope and am also sending Ambassador Harriman to Warsaw to see what can be developed there. While there will undoubtedly be considerable speculation stemming from our continued stand-down of the bombing we do not propose to make any public announcement at this time.

"I did not want to take this action without your being fully informed. The whole story is known to only a handful of my top advisors and I would appreciate it if you would treat this information as a matter to be closely held between the two of us.

"Of course, I should greatly appreciate any advice that you might have and any steps that you might feel you could usefully take. This is an enterprise that has the greatest importance for all peoples of the Free World.

Sincerely,
[Lyndon B. Johnson]"

Sincerely yours,
W. Walton Butterworth

339.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6271

Secret.
[Ottawa,] December 29, 1965

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Cardin),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. MacEachen),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),
The Secretary of State (Miss LaMarsh),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. Favreau),
The Minister of Forestry (Mr. Sauvé),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson),
The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Pennell),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Marchand),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Côté),
The Minister without Portfolio (Mr. Turner).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner), (Mr. Loughead), (Mr. Wall).

[…]

PROPOSED UNITED STATES ACTION CONCERNING VIET NAM

(Previous reference September 8†)

The Prime Minister said that a senior official from the White House in Washington would visit him that evening to discuss a U.S. proposal to maintain the present suspension of bombing in North Viet Nam. The United States was making a sincere effort to exploit the very slight improvement in recent days in the atmosphere surrounding the war in Viet Nam, and while no public statement of this intention had been made, it had already been the subject of substantial press comment. It was important that Mr. Pearson's forthcoming discussions with U.S. officials be kept in strict confidence.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Prime Minister concerning U.S. intentions in relation to the war in Viet Nam.

[…]

340.
Telegram from Prime Minister to High Commission in India and Embassy to United States
Télégramme du premier ministre au haut-commissariat en Inde et à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 11487, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/2

No. G-440
Ottawa, December 30, 1965
Secret. OpImmediate. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Moscow, Warsaw, Kingston (for Minister), Karachi (Immediate); Saigon, Permis New York, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington (Priority).

VIETNAM

Following for Michener:

At request of President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy paid special visit to Ottawa December 29 to discuss with me latest developments in Vietnam situation and particularly current pause in bombing of DRVN.

2. Bundy informed me that on December 28 USA Ambassador Byroade had conveyed to Vu Huu Binh DRVN Consul General in Rangoon message regarding pause, substantive part of which read approximately as follows:

"As you are aware, there has been no repeat no bombing of North Vietnam since December 24 though reconnaissance flights have continued. No repeat no decision has been made regarding resumption of bombings and unless there is a major provocation we would hope that present stand down now in its fifth day could extend into the new year. If your Government will now reciprocate by making a serious contribution towards peace it would obviously have an effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension."[139]

3. Contrary to what happened during five-day pause in bombing last May when USA tried to communicate directly with DRVN representatives, Byroade was courteously received by North Vietnamese Consul General who undertook to inform his Government forthwith.[140] As of time of Bundy's visit to Ottawa, no repeat no reply had been received from DRVN.

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[139] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 257.

[140] See/Voir ibid., document 265.

4. Purpose of Bundy's visit was to inform me of this approach to DRVN and of other supporting démarches made by USA. Averell Harriman has gone to Warsaw to discuss situation with Poles as members of ICC and will later go to Budapest; Arthur Goldberg has gone to Rome to discuss with Vatican and will proceed thence to Belgrade. U Thant in New York has been put in picture by Goldberg before his departure for Rome. Americans have also approached various other governments including Hungarians who have expressed desire to assist and who can be counted on to inform Russians. Latter have been kept informed but have not repeat not been asked to assume role of intermediary as they have indicated that similar request last May put them in awkward position vis-à-vis Hanoi and Peking.

5. Bundy was at pains to emphasize that President was most anxious to extend current pause in bombing at least over New Year holiday and as long after that as seemed warranted and reasonable. He has set no deadline by which pause must produce results and is playing situation by ear. He is looking genuinely and hopefully though with no repeat no untoward expectations for some response from DRVN, and seems to accept fact that first public reaction may be discouraging. With Congress meeting early in new year, however, he cannot repeat not be expected to suspend indefinitely bombing of North which, while not repeat not decisive, is nevertheless significant factor in Vietnam situation.

6. By time this telegram reaches you Indian Government will probably as I urged on Bundy have been informed along same lines. Would you please check with US Ambassador and if he has spoken with Indians you should support American approach by personal call, preferably on Prime Minister Shastri, informing him that we too have been brought into picture by Americans and that we are encouraged by this latest American endeavour to find peaceful solution to Vietnam conflict. Please impress on Shastri that I am convinced this is genuine and sincere attempt by President Johnson and not just attempt to score propaganda points. This attempt may not repeat not be successful but Americans should be given full credit for at least trying. I am persuaded that failure of this attempt will not repeat not necessarily preclude further efforts by USA to find peaceful solution but immediate result of failure will almost certainly be further intensification of USA war effort in Vietnam, North and South, with resultant increase in human suffering and loss of life. If therefore Shastri feels there are any channels open to him to urge on DRVN or their friends (e.g., on Russians during forthcoming Tashkent meeting) a receptive reaction to USA initiative, I would encourage him to use them most vigorously. Any supporting public comment by Indian Government would also be helpful. Another such opportunity to end the conflict in Vietnam may not repeat not present itself for some time to come.

For Karachi:

Please check with USA Ambassador to ascertain whether he has on instructions from Washington informed Pakistanis regarding current pause. If so, and if a suitable opportunity can be arranged, please convey similar comment suitably modified to Ayub Khan or other appropriate Pakistani leader.

For Moscow and Warsaw:

Without making any special approach you may use any of foregoing in conversations you may have with influential Soviet/Polish leaders.

For other addressees:

Foregoing is for your background info. Governments to which you are accredited have been informed. I understand SVN Government has expressed understanding for efforts being made by USA Government.

For Washington:

Please inform Bundy and State Department of gist of message I have sent to Michener for Shastri.

[Lester B.] Pearson

341.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9395, 20-22-VIETS-2/13

No. 4088
Washington, December 30, 1965
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel G-440 Dec 30.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, Rome (Immediate); Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, Kingston (for Minister), Karachi, Delhi (Immediate) from Ottawa; Warsaw, Moscow (Immediate) from London.

VIETNAM

I conveyed gist of your instructions to Delhi this afternoon to McGeorge Bundy (White House) and William Bundy (State Department). Both expressed appreciation for your prompt and helpful action.

2. William Bundy said that Delhi had already received info on USA intentions and that Harriman (who was to see Tito tomorrow) would probably proceed to Delhi January 1 for further talks, to complete contacts with ICC triumvirate. President had sent personal message concerning pause to Ayub of Pakistan.

3. Bundy said there was still no repeat no word of any DRVN reaction to USA approach in Rangoon, but civility of reception accorded to USA Ambassador by DRVN representative had been very noteworthy. USA Ambassador Sullivan in Laos had been instructed to indicate to local DRVN Ambassador that he was available for any contact.

4. Hungarian Government did not repeat not wish to receive Harriman on grounds that secrecy was important if Hungarian efforts were to yield results. So far Budapest channel had produced nothing further.

5. Harriman had very long and productive talk with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki.[141] Latter's initial reaction was that USA was merely offering ultimatum. Harriman strongly emphasized that USA intended nothing to the kind, and Rapacki seemed impressed. Bundy thought it was useful that this key problem had been encountered at the start and – he hoped – defused. Poles had indicated that they would transmit USA views onward in full.

6. McGeorge Bundy began by saying how much he had appreciated an opportunity for the frank and full talk with the Prime Minister. He said that he did not repeat not anticipate any significant response arising out of the present diplomatic activity within the next 2 or 3 days but there should be some development shortly thereafter. It would be serious if there were no repeat no response by a week from now.

7. With regard to Harriman's travel plans, McGeorge Bundy added to what William Bundy had told me by saying that in direct response to a suggestion made by Blair Seaborn during the Ottawa conversation it had been decided that Harriman should visit Cairo also. Despite the fact that a message had been sent by the President to President Ayub, McGeorge Bundy was of the personal opinion that it would also be desirable for Harriman to visit Karachi as he feared that otherwise the Pakistanis would be offended by the comparison between the treatment accorded to Shastri and that accorded to Ayub.

8. In response to my question, McGeorge Bundy said that the Russians had been kept fully in touch with developments through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. They had made it plain that they did not repeat not wish to be used as intermediaries. However, USA

[141] See/Voir ibid., documents 266, 267.

apparently hopes for some helpful diplomatic action on the part of the USSR in due course. Bundy did not repeat not consider that the Shelepin mission to Hanoi[142] was connected with possible peace negotiations but rather that it originated earlier for the purpose of discussing Soviet aid to North Vietnam. However, he did not repeat not exclude that Shelepin, now that he was in Hanoi, might receive new instructions from Moscow. He said that he hoped Shelepin did not repeat not plan to stay ninety days in North Vietnam and act as a kind of "extra SAM-site".

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

342.
Record of Telephone Conversation between Prime Minister and President of United States, December 30, 1965
Compte rendu de la conversation téléphonique entre le premier ministre et le président des États-Unis, 30 décembre 1965
MG26-N6, vol. 36, Johnson, President Lyndon B.

Secret.
[Ottawa, n.d.]

Prime Minister: How is the weather in Texas?

President: Sunshiny and warm.

Prime Minister: I'm glad to hear that. Here the snow is falling and the wind is blowing.

I want to extend my best wishes for the New Year and also to tell you that we had a most successful visit with Bundy last night – I don't know what he told you.

President: Well, it's certainly been very helpful to us.

Prime Minister: I am very much impressed by what you are trying to do. We have already sent some messages to our friends in Asia.

President: I appreciate very much your understanding attitude and your willingness to support us.

Prime Minister: We certainly are going to do anything we can to help.

President: I sent Averell [Harriman] off to New Delhi and he's going back to see Nasser. And then I asked Mac [Bundy] to go up to see you. We are going to touch every base and walk the last mile to give everybody a chance to be affirmative and constructive and to make any suggestion they possibly can.

Prime Minister: Bundy will report to you any views from us which can be of any value and, if there is anything more we can do in the field of diplomacy, we will be very happy to do it.

President: You're a great nation up there and I appreciate your love of humanity and imagination and, if there is anything more you can do or any suggestions to make, just pick up the phone and let me know.

Prime Minister: Well, we have already sent a message to Shastri. You know he is going to see the Russians soon and I thought it might be helpful to let him know.

President: I told Averell [Harriman] to get going, Mac [Bundy] went to see you and George Ball is to see one or two others of our friends. We will have done our best and, after that, the responsibility is theirs.

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[142] See/Voir Peter Grose, "Moscow Sending Mission to Hanoi," *New York Times*, 29 December 1965, p. 1.

Prime Minister: Just one other thing. You may have on, or near, your desk that Air Agreement.[143] It's all settled, I think, and we just have to sign it. The pressure up here against it is beginning to mount and we want to get the matter settled.

President: O.K. I'll look into it. Well, goodbye – best wishes.

Prime Minister: Our best to Mrs. Johnson.

343.
Record of Conversation between Prime Minister and High Commissioner of India, January 1, 1966
Compte rendu de la conversation entre le premier ministre et le haut-commissaire de l'Inde, 1er janvier 1966
MG26-N6, vol. 8, India

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] January 2, 1966

The High Commissioner asked to see me this morning. […]

I finally told the High Commissioner about the recent visit of Bundy to Ottawa to explain the President's peace offensive. I mentioned that I had sent a message to his Prime Minister on the visit. The High Commissioner seemed somewhat sceptical about these moves, mentioning the thesis that they had been made so that their failure would justify a massive escalation of the war by the USA.

I told him that I was sure that this was not the President's purpose, though it might be in the minds of some of the Pentagon people. If so, then the best way to frustrate such people would be to back up the President and help him bring about peace negotiations. I hoped India would do so. The High Commissioner thought that nothing much would result unless the Americans *started* to move out their forces as an earnest of their peaceful plans.

I said that the most that could possibly be expected in this regard would be an assurance that, once there was agreement on both sides to negotiate, then the process of military-phased withdrawal, on both sides and under international supervision, might at least begin.

But as long as the North repudiated *every* move *by anybody* toward negotiation, then you couldn't expect the Americans to proceed except with great caution.

L.B. Pearson

344.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA

No. Y-40
Ottawa, January 19, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.

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[143] See "Air Agreement between Canada and the United States of America," signed 17 January 1966, *Canada Treaty Series*, 1966, no. 2.
Voir « Air Accord entre le Canada et les États-Unis d'Amérique », signé le 17 janvier 1966, *Recueil des traités du Canada*, 1966, nº 2.

VIETNAM

We are disappointed, as President Johnson must be, that current efforts by USA to bring about negotiations have not repeat not yet elicited any significant response from Hanoi. The more we examine position, however, the more inclined we are to think that essential factor is time. It is true that suspension of air strikes against the North has now lasted for almost a month. Nevertheless, question is bound to arise whether suspension has lasted long enough to allow attitudes to evolve on other side.

2. This is clearly something which President will be judging on basis of all info available to him. Meanwhile we have been glad to note statement by White House spokesman that no deadline had been fixed for termination of "peace drive" and that it was too early for President to make any kind of tentative decision until situation, not repeat not only in Washington but in other capitals as well, had been assessed.[144]

3. In light of this statement we would hope that the President might conclude that interests of peace would be served by a postponement of resumption of bombing for a further reasonable period. In expressing this hope, we are guided by following considerations: (a) Our thinking about possibility of Viet Cong responding in military terms was outlined in our telegram Y-17† of January 14. What we had in mind has since been referred to publicly by President Johnson (your telegram 152†, January 14) at news conference January 13.[145] It seems to us, however, that if any kind of pattern is to be established, more time may be required. In particular, it may be necessary to see to what extent current level of PAVN/ Viet Cong activity may have been influenced by impending Tet truce; (b) We have evidence to support belief communicated by President to Prime Minister that there are differences of approach represented within government circles in Hanoi although depth of divergence is still difficult to assess. But if these are real differences, it is reasonable to assume that they are more likely to be resolved in a direction which could lead to negotiations while air strikes remain in suspension than when the country is under resumed attack; (c) Directly related to foregoing factor is possibility that a further prolongation of pause would strengthen Soviet capacity to bring influence to bear on Hanoi's policies. Here again, we can lay no claim to knowledge of true nature of Soviet objectives or extent to which Moscow may be prepared to promote negotiations. It is safe to assume, however, that a strengthening of Soviet influence in Hanoi would not repeat not result in a more difficult position than has prevailed heretofore and that it could, in fact, have a moderating effect. In any event this may be a risk worth taking in present circumstances; (d) Info available to us indicates that a good many countries have arrived at a favourable assessment of USA peace probe and are considering ways in which they can helpfully take up USA Government's invitation to make whatever constructive contribution they can. It seems to us that the more such independent soundings are undertaken, the deeper in long run will be international community's engagement in, or at least sympathetic understanding of, USA efforts to bring Vietnam problem to peaceful solution. We assume that these considerations will be given due weight by USA in assessing impact which any sudden resumption of air strikes might have in circumstances where sincerely intentioned soundings by third parties were still in progress.

4. I should be grateful if you could take earliest opportunity to discuss considerations raised in this telegram with Rusk or Bundy as reflecting our thinking and reactions here.

5. For your own private info at this stage, I want you to know (with regard to point (d) above) that we are planning special mission to Hanoi and Peking to be undertaken by Ronning. This will, of course, take some days to work out in detail and I would not repeat not wish you to mention it to anyone else at the moment, least of all in foregoing context

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[144] See/Voir "Issue Studied Day-to-Day," *New York Times*, 18 January 1966, p. 1.

[145] See/Voir "Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters," *New York Times*, 14 January 1966, p. 32.

where it might appear as only (and specifically Canadian) reason for believing that a further postponement of resumption of strikes against the North would be desirable, which is not repeat not the case. I shall keep you fully informed of plans for this mission as they take shape. I hope to be able to instruct you shortly to inform USA Government about our intentions and, subject to decisions yet to be taken, to arrange for Ronning to visit Washington before his departure.

[Paul] Martin

345.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/2

No. 190
Washington, January 19, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-40 Jan 19.

VIETNAM

In accordance with your instructions, I saw McGeorge Bundy this morning and expressed to him views contained in your reference telegram.

2. Bundy said that our position of course involved serious considerations which had to be borne in mind but that there were other considerations of great importance which had to be taken into account.

3. The USA had not repeat not taken any firm decision regarding the resumption of bombing. At any rate there would not repeat not be resumption until after the Tet period but by that time the pause would have lasted one month. At the time when McGeorge Bundy visited the Prime Minister in Ottawa the USA had not repeat not been contemplating so long a pause and so far as he knew no repeat no one else had expected it to be so prolonged. The Soviet Union had indeed referred in discussion with USA to the need for a three-week pause. Meanwhile there had been no repeat no signs whatsoever of a positive response from Hanoi. On contrary all signs were negative. Shelepin had made no repeat no progress with North Vietnamese. Poles and Hungarians had been equally unsuccessful. There had been no repeat no response to initiative of Ambassador Byroade in Rangoon. The only North Vietnamese reply had been through public statements and broadcasts which showed no repeat no give in their position whatsoever.[146]

4. In these circumstances too long prolongation of pause, especially indefinite prolongation, would be counter-productive. It might be regarded in Hanoi as a sign of weakness. The arguments against resumption of bombing might be pressed indefinitely. The situation would become open-ended and in effect it would be argued that bombing of North Vietnam should be abandoned altogether. (At this point I reminded him that this was not repeat not the position of Canadian Government but that we were speaking of postponement of resumption of bombing for a further reasonable period.) Bundy acknowledged this but said that in some quarters there might be pressure for an indefinite prolongation of pause and that such an argument would make it more difficult for the administration to return to a further pause at some future date if this should be desirable.

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[146] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 742–744.

5. With regard to points made in paragraph 3 of your reference telegram Bundy said:

(a) There was no repeat no evidence of any present trend for Vietcong to respond by a diminution of military activity. On contrary there was a recent accentuation of such activity (see our telegram WX-45† January 18 via special channel).

(b) USA had no repeat no evidence of dissension or debate at present time within government circles in Hanoi. Speaking personally, Bundy said that he had come to conclusion that a decision had in fact been taken in Hanoi and that decision was not repeat not to negotiate.

(c) The Russians could report no repeat no progress in changing attitude of Hanoi. He thought that Shelepin had tried up to a certain point and that Poles had tried also but that Michalowski had no repeat no progress to report from his visit to Hanoi. He was certain that Hungarians had made a serious effort but equally unsuccessfully.

(d) Friendly and uncommitted countries had also made soundings. The Pope, Tito, Ayub and others had all tried their hand but had got nowhere.

6. Bundy welcomed our assessment that USA peace probe had made favourable impression in many countries. He agreed that this was the case and he realized that a resumption of bombing might in certain cases diminish the store of goodwill which had been acquired in international community. He felt, however, that this would be true whenever bombing was resumed.

7. With regard to our statement that a good many countries "are considering ways in which they can helpfully take up USA Government's invitation to make whatever constructive contribution they can", Bundy pressed me rather hard on this. He said he thought he knew most of the initiatives which had been undertaken and which had so far been fruitless but would welcome examples of any new initiatives which might be under way. In this connection I think it very important that USA authorities should be informed as soon as possible of projected special mission of Ronning to Hanoi and Peking, as otherwise it is possible that Bundy will think that we have been concealing this from him. I also very much welcome proposal that Ronning visit Washington before his departure.

8. Bundy concluded that despite certain differences of emphasis in our assessments of situation he very much welcomed this dialogue and would welcome further views at any time which could be discussed in the "completely friendly atmosphere" which prevailed between our two governments.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

346.
Oral Message from Ambassador of United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Message oral de l'ambassadeur des États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
MG26-N6, vol. 10, Vietnam – Correspondence and Memoranda with U.S.

Secret.
[Washington,] January 24, 1966

ORAL MESSAGE

As the Government of Canada knows, the United States and South Vietnamese Governments have now refrained for a month from bombing North Vietnam. During this period, the United States has made the seriousness of its search for a peaceful solution emphatically clear by dispatching senior Presidential emissaries to more than thirty interested governments, and has discussed the question of peace in Vietnam at length with nearly

seventy other governments on the basis of the official, 14-point summary of the American position,[147] Ambassador Goldberg's letter to the United Nations Security Council,[148] and most recently the reaffirmation of basic points contained in the President's State of the Union Message.[149] We have sought in particular to have the fullest possible discussion with governments that have indicated that they are in a position to communicate with North Vietnam and with other interested Communist countries. In every possible way, the United States Government has made clear that it is engaged in a serious search for negotiations or action that could lead to a peaceful solution.

The essential elements of the United States Government position have been communicated to Hanoi, both directly and indirectly, and the availability of a large number of channels for response has been made entirely clear. To date, we have discerned no meaningful Hanoi response either in public or private, but on the contrary, Hanoi and Peiping have continued to reaffirm previous positions, including apparent conditions for negotiations, and have repeatedly denounced the United States and South Vietnamese motives in suspending the bombing, belittling and deprecating the serious effort which has been in progress.

Meanwhile, reliable evidence has continued to accumulate that North Vietnam has been using supply routes running from North Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam, and has continued its infiltration of men and equipment during the period of the bombing pause. Within South Vietnam itself, the level of military action and terrorism has remained high. It will be recalled that during the Christmas cease-fire period, the Communist side committed a large number of violations of its own cease-fire period and extended these violations during the cease-fire period of the South Vietnamese and United States forces, which scrupulously observed the cease-fire and in the end sustained significant casualties in seeking to avoid resuming hostilities after the period concluded. Similar Communist actions have taken place on a significant scale during the current cease-fire period of four days on the occasion of the Lunar New Year (Tet), and there are indications that major military actions on the Communist side will take place immediately following the conclusion of this period. At 5:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time the stand-down of offensive military operations by Vietnamese and Free World forces in observance of Tet came to an end. Eighty-eight cease-fire violations, one per hour, were reported up to the time the Tet period ended. Fifty-six of these were against United States forces, 23 against those of the South Vietnamese Government, and 9 against the Koreans. Total casualties were: 6 of the United States, 4 of the South Vietnamese and 7 Koreans killed; total wounded and missing 74. (Fifty-nine Viet Cong were killed and two captured). In short, both in terms of infiltration and of action within South Vietnam, the Communist side has continued its scale of action in every respect.

A month has now elapsed in the face of the absence of any response by the Communist side either in respect to its willingness to negotiate or in respect to possible reciprocal actions. The United States is greatly concerned over the lack of any reply or reciprocity from the other side. In the light of these movements of men and materials from the North and the continued organized attacks on our own and allied personnel and the public denunciations of our efforts for peace, the United States Government does not feel that it can continue to expose its forces and the forces of its allies to jeopardy.[150]

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[147] See/Voir ibid., pp. 740–742.

[148] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 893–894.

[149] See/Voir "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 12, 1966," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966*, Book I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 7–11.

[150] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
P[rime] M[inister]: Mr. Martin brought this message in to you at 1.10 p.m. – The American Ambassador had just called on him to deliver it. Mary E. Macdonald, Jan. 24/66.

347.
Letter from Ambassador of United States to Prime Minister
Lettre de l'ambassadeur des États-Unis au premier ministre
MG26-N6, vol. 10, Vietnam – Correspondence and Memoranda with U.S.

Ottawa, January 30, 1966

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been asked by the President to deliver to you the following letter:

> Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
>
> As my Ambassador informed your Government early in the week, we were then becoming gravely concerned at the passage of time during our present bombing suspension, with no constructive response from Hanoi either by word or deed. After waiting a few more days, in order to be sure that there was no direct or indirect word of any sort, I have now concluded that we cannot longer continue the suspension. In view of the deep and close relationship between our two countries, I particularly wished that you should personally know in advance that we therefore expect to resume bombing attacks on military targets in North Vietnam Monday, weather permitting. Naturally, I ask that you hold this information in the utmost confidence.
>
> My Ambassador will be furnishing you with a full summary of the evidence concerning North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military activity during the period of the suspension, and also with a summary of the negative diplomatic and public reactions uniformly shown. We expect to make the gist of this information public in a suitable form, so that there may be full understanding throughout the world of what has happened.
>
> I would add one fact in confidence – that we had direct contact with Hanoi representatives not only at the outset of the suspension, but in two separate locations within the past ten days.[151] In the earlier message, we conveyed simply the fact that bombing would be suspended for a period and that further suspension might be possible if there was some response. We avoided any implication of threat and sought to present the suspension as we intended it, as an opportunity to see whether steps might not be taken toward peace. In the more recent contacts, we have put two questions – whether Hanoi wished to give us any confidential indication that it was taking reciprocal military action, and whether Hanoi wished to discuss the apparent obstacles to negotiation represented principally by the so-called four points. The response to each of these inquiries has been totally negative. At this point, I do not know whether it will become necessary to discuss these direct contacts in any way, but I thought it important that you and your Government should know in confidence of their existence. In our view they demonstrate conclusively that Hanoi is not ready, at least now, to move toward peace. This diplomatic judgment is only reinforced by the very hard line taken in Ho Chi Minh's letter to other Communist leaders which was published on January 28.[152]

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[151] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), documents 33, 37.

[152] See/Voir "Text of Ho Chi Minh's Letter on Peace Conditions," *New York Times*, 29 January 1966, p. 2.

In short, we have thoroughly explored every diplomatic possibility and have waited for what seems to us clearly an ample period if any response had been intended through any channel whatever. Meanwhile, the facts on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military activity have accumulated to the point where, in justice to our own forces and the South Vietnamese, we cannot longer refrain from the necessary action to reduce Hanoi's military activity along its supply routes and at its sources.

In taking this decision, I should like to emphasize two points personally to you. First, that our bombing attacks against North Vietnam will continue to be carefully controlled by me personally and to be conducted in a measured fashion against military targets. I am well aware of the concern felt by your Government and others that the conflict may widen. We have no such intentions, and we shall seek to conduct ourselves so as to minimize the risks that the other side could at any time misinterpret our actions, Secondly, although this effort has not induced Hanoi to make any move toward peace, I assure you that my Government will continue to explore every possible avenue toward a peaceful solution. We shall continue to be in the closest touch with your Government and others, and will lend our full support and encouragement to every constructive initiative that may be suggested. In this connection, you should know that we expect to make a full report to the United Nations Security Council on Monday afternoon or Tuesday.

Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,
W. Walton Butterworth[153]

348.
Memorandum by Prime Minister
Note du premier ministre
MG26-N6, vol. 10, Vietnam – Correspondence and Memoranda with U.S.

Secret.
[Ottawa, January 30, 1966]

RENEWAL OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

The U.S. Ambassador, in handing me the President's letter this morning, January 30, 1966, explained to me, along expected lines, why the President had been forced to make the decision to resume bombing; because of the completely negative reaction of Hanoi to the 35 days' suspension and to the persistent and sincere diplomatic moves of the U.S.A. to bring about a negotiation of the conflict and the end of the war. He said that Ho Chi Minh's statement on Friday showed that the Communist regime was as recalcitrant as ever, and did not want any peaceful settlement.

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[153] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Left with me by the U.S. Ambassador, 12 noon, January 30th [1966]. L[ester] B. P[earson]

I told Mr. Butterworth that I regretted the circumstances which had brought the U.S.A. to this decision, to resume bombing, the more so because I did not think that any military solution was possible. The Communists were undoubtedly counting on two things:

(1) World public opinion turning against the U.S.A. if they stepped up their military effort and caused havoc and destruction by bombing the North;

(2) The weakness of the South Vietnam government and the lack of popular support for them in the South. I warned that, if there was another coup in the South, as reports indicated was likely, then it would be almost impossible for the Americans to convince anyone that they were on the side of the Vietnamese democracy against aggression from outside.

I told Mr. Butterworth that I certainly appreciated the President's difficulties and the dilemma he was in. In my view he would have a more difficult time standing up to the domestic advocates of stronger military measures than those who would make concessions to bring the military intervention to an end.

He would also, however, find it difficult to secure an international "consensus" supporting indefinite and "escalated" military intervention.

Chapter 5/Chapitre 5

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE: THE RONNING VISITS (JANUARY–JUNE 1966)

OPÉRATION SMALLBRIDGE : LES VISITES DE RONNING (JANVIER-JUIN 1966)

349.
Memorandum from Ambassador to United States to Embassy Officers
Note de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis aux agents de l'ambassade
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA/1

Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Washington,] January 19, 1966
For Mr. Kidd, Mr. Beaulne, Mr. K.C. Brown, Mr. Shenstone, Mr. Roberts.

VIETNAM

Mr. Ed Ritchie telephoned me today with regard to the possibility of Ronning going to Peking and Hanoi. In the first place, he said that the Minister objected to the term "mission" used in External's telegram Y-40 of January 19.[1] This was not a "mission". Nor was it a bold initiative for solution to the problem in Vietnam. It was a modest move to find out what some important people think (in this connection it would be recalled that Ronning is a personal friend of Chou En-lai and has apparently a standing invitation to visit him). Ronning, for his part, was humble in his estimate of what would be accomplished. He does not want, at any stage, publicity which exaggerates the significance of his visit.

The Department of External Affairs felt that this visit (which originated in the mind of the Minister) could be useful within limits if carefully handled. With regard to publicity, the Minister's preliminary thinking was that there should be no publicity. Ed Ritchie was inclined to think that it might be better to make a short factual statement explaining the objects and limitations of Ronning's visit otherwise there was always the danger of a leak and of consequent misunderstanding.

An important element in all this, which is under study in Ottawa, is the relationship of such a visit to the question of Canadian recognition of Communist China. It is desired that it should be clear to all concerned that this is not a step in the direction of our recognition of the Chinese Communist regime.

With regard to timing, visas have not yet been sought for Ronning. Present thinking is that he might come to Washington in four or five days' time for talks with the Americans and specifically Averell Harriman who is an old acquaintance of Ronning's.

I emphasized to Ed Ritchie: (a) that I should like to be authorized as soon as possible to mention this projected visit to McGeorge Bundy for the information of the President; (b) that I should like to have a pretty precise and clearly defined description of Ronning's projected visit and its objectives to give to Bundy as I did not wish there to be any subsequent misunderstanding with the Americans as to the nature and purpose of Ronning's visit.

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[1] See/Voir doc. 344.

I subsequently spoke to the Minister and made these two points mentioned above to him. He said that this was, of course, a Canadian initiative and they did not require United States' permission to arrange such a visit. However, he agreed that Bundy should be informed in the near future and remarked that I might tell him that we had some initiative under contemplation and would let him know the details later. I propose to check this last suggestion with the Department as it seemed to be more the Minister thinking aloud than a specific instruction.

The Minister stressed to me the extreme secrecy which he desired to have preserved with regard to Ronning's visit. I am left with the vague impression that I have not received the full story behind the projected visit.

C.S.A. R[itchie]

350.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

Top Secret.
[Ottawa,] January 21, 1966

SPECIAL VISITS TO VIETNAM AND CHINA

I attach for your signature, if you agree, a memorandum for the Prime Minister which explains, in broad outline, how you envisage the conduct of this operation.

I shall be submitting to you shortly a series of talking points which will indicate the content we would be giving our approaches in the two capitals.[2]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

Enclosure: Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Pièce jointe : Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre

Top Secret.
[Ottawa,] January 20, 1966

SPECIAL VISITS TO VIETNAM AND CHINA

I propose, if you agree, to ask Chester Ronning to undertake special visits to Vietnam and China. These visits would be focused on the Vietnam problem. Their purpose would be to make an oral presentation of Canadian views in Hanoi and Peking and to sound out attitudes in the two capitals with respect to a settlement of the present conflict. With this object in mind a set of talking points is being prepared for Ronning's use.

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[2] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Mr. Martin spoke to Mr. Cadieux about this memo. He said he did not wish the project discussed by memo. He asked Mr. Cadieux to consider the proposal re: Saigon, otherwise he seemed to accept the contents. J.G. H[adwen] O/SSEA
I asked him if he objected to any provision and he said that he had questioned the Saigon point. He questioned no other points. J.G. H[adwen] O/SSEA Jan. 20/66

2. In proposing these visits I have been guided by a number of considerations. I believe that public opinion in Canada would welcome an initiative by the Government which could be presented as a contribution to the search for peace in Vietnam. In present circumstances no such initiative is open to us directly through the Commission. The proposed visits would make sense in Canadian terms because of our long-standing involvement in the Vietnam problem and Ronning's personal associations with senior personalities in Peking.

3. I have also had in mind the clear invitation extended by the United States to other countries, including Canada, to help in whatever way they can to move the Vietnam problem from the battlefield to the conference table.[3] It seems to me that, however things may shape up in Vietnam in the months to come, such influence as we may have in Washington in relation to this problem could be enhanced if we respond to the invitation in a way that is regarded as useful from the United States point of view.

4. Although I would not put it higher than that, there is just a bare chance that our approaches in Hanoi and Peking may add something to the total picture as it is known. At a minimum, this would provide us with an opportunity at what may be a critical juncture to form an independent assessment of attitudes in the two capitals. We cannot, of course, exclude a refusal by the authorities in Hanoi to receive a Canadian representative whatever his credentials. Even in that event, however, I would consider that some of the objectives behind the proposed initiative would be met.

5. The itinerary we envisage would take Ronning through Saigon to Hanoi and back to Saigon by the Commission courier aircraft. He would then proceed to Hong Kong and enter China from there. I consider that the assignment should be broken into two parts, with the Hanoi visit coming first, in order to emphasize the need to approach Hanoi in a Vietnam (and Commission) context rather than in the context of Hanoi as subservient to Peking. While this distinction may not be reflected in the substance of Ronning's discussions in the two capitals, we believe that a separation of the two visits in this way would have considerable presentational advantage.

6. I am still considering the desirability of having Ronning call on someone in Saigon. This would be designed as a courtesy call and not for the purpose of acquainting the South Vietnamese with the nature of his assignment. I am inclining to the view that this would be an appropriate gesture in terms of our friendly relations with South Vietnam and the growing sensitivity of the South Vietnamese Government in the face of the current diplomatic offensive.

7. I would plan to have arrangements made for Ronning to visit Washington briefly before his departure from Canada. This would in no way be intended to alter the purely Canadian character and content of his assignment. I do think, however, that we should not embark on this project without giving the Americans an opportunity to comment on any special aspects to which they may attach particular importance. Ronning also knows Harriman well from the Laos Conference and this would give him an opportunity of getting a full briefing on where the United States peace probe now stands. We will be consulting Ritchie as to how Ronning's visit might best be handled.

8. We shall be seeking Ronning's advice as to the best way of approaching the Chinese with a request for a visa. He has a long-standing invitation from Marshal Chen-Yi to visit China and may wish to use this channel on a personal basis, at least in the first instance. In any case, I think you will agree that we should avoid using non-Canadian channels if possible. We have established contacts in Hong Kong which would be available to us if Ronning preferred to

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[3] See/Voir doc. 338.

proceed in this way. As regards North Vietnam, we propose to use the Commission channel, either by having our Commissioner present the request for a visa on his first visit to Hanoi or by having the Canadian delegation office in Hanoi do so on the Commissioner's behalf.

9. In the case of China we would make it clear, if necessary, that although Ronning's visit was of an essentially personal nature, he would take the opportunity of conveying a message from the Canadian Government. In the case of North Vietnam, Ronning has no special *locus standi* and his visit cannot be presented as a personal one. The request for a visa will, therefore, have to be based on the fact that he is coming on specific instructions from the Canadian Government, as a member of the International Commission, to present a message.

10. In all the arrangements being proposed I have naturally borne in mind the need to avoid any implication of recognition of Communist China. The conversations proposed would not in my view constitute a government-to-government exchange. Ronning would be approaching the Chinese largely on a personal basis. In doing so he would be continuing a dialogue on Indochina questions, which commenced when he was the senior Canadian representative at the Laos Conference in 1961-62 at which the Chinese were also represented. The justification for a statement of Canadian views and a probing of Chinese attitudes through the medium of Ronning would rest on this previous association.

11. I have also made it clear in my preliminary conversations with Ronning that, if the subject were to be raised with him in Peking, he would have to indicate that he was not authorized to discuss Canadian recognition of Communist China. He should, however, be encouraged, I think, to take advantage of any opportunity that may present itself to probe current Chinese intentions as regards their representation in the United Nations. This would go some way towards meeting the point you made when this issue arose in the General Assembly last autumn and to which an oblique reference was subsequently made in the Government's statement of November 17.[4]

12. I would propose to engage Ronning on a contract basis with a daily professional fee. On the understanding that his assignment would cover a period of 21 days, I have in mind offering him a fee of $150 per day in addition to his expenses. This would not be out of line with fees being paid by the Government for similar services and would also not affect his pension payments.

13. I think that until the operation gets under way and while it is in progress, secrecy would be an essential element of its success. We should, however, be prepared for the possibility that Ronning's trip and the involvement of the Canadian Government might become public knowledge. In that event, we would confirm that Mr. Ronning is visiting Hanoi and Peking; that he has had close associations with China and served as Senior Canadian Delegate at the Laos conference at which Canada, North Vietnam and Communist China were represented; that in order to help us form our own judgement of attitudes in Hanoi and Peking at what may be a critical juncture in the Vietnam conflict, we have asked him to discuss this question with authorities there; and that until the visits are completed, it would not be appropriate to comment further. If the news of Ronning's visits does not break prematurely, we shall want to consider what to say publicly after the completion of his assignment. The content of any public statement at that time would naturally depend on what Ronning has to report.

14. I would be grateful for an opportunity to discuss the foregoing proposal with you.

P[aul] M[artin]

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4 See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/28, 17 November 1965. Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Déclarations et discours*, 65/28, 17 novembre 1965.

351.
Telegram from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Trade Commissioner's Office in Hong Kong
Télégramme du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au bureau du délégué commercial à Hong Kong
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. Y-63
Ottawa, January 26, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.

Following for Thomson and Fraser only.

Grateful if you would immediately get in touch with Ting of China Resources Co. or your next most senior available contact amongst Chinese officials and ask him to transmit at request of Canadian Government the following message from Chester A. Ronning to Marshal Chen Yi:

Message begins: "Excellency, you will recall that when we last met you were kind enough to invite me to visit China when it became possible for me to do so. I would very much like to take advantage of your kind offer at this time in order to renew acquaintances, to visit China and to discuss with your Excellency problems which are of common concern and on which my Government has asked me to express certain views to you. I should be grateful if you would let me know through the medium of the Canadian Trade Commissioner's Office in Hong Kong whether a visit to Peking would be convenient to you at this time. I plan to proceed to Hong Kong from Canada within the next few days and to spend two to three weeks in the area. I would hope to visit Peking during the week of February 7 to 12". Message ends.

2. In delivering this message to Chinese you should request that they handle it as a matter of urgency. You should say that Mr. Ronning's proposed visit to Peking, while in response to a personal invitation from Marshal Chen Yi issued during the Laos Conference at which Mr. Ronning was the Senior Canadian Delegate, is welcomed by the Canadian Government which hopes that the visit can be arranged as suggested.

[Marcel] Cadieux

352.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA/1

No. 273
Washington, January 26, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-40 Jan 19 Para 5.

RONNING'S VISIT TO PEKING AND HANOI – GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S VIEWS

Today Ronning and I had a talk with Governor Harriman about Ronning's projected visit. Ronning began by explaining purpose of the visit along lines familiar to you. He explained that he would be carrying messages from Canadian Government and attempting to probe further the views of Peking and Hanoi to discover whether there was any prospect of peaceful negotiation. He said that we wished to tell Americans and only the Americans of this

proposed visit in view of their special interest and responsibility in the area. Ronning added that we had no repeat no exaggerated expectations of the results which could be achieved but nevertheless considered the visit worthwhile.

2. Harriman responded that speaking personally he was very happy about proposed visit and very much welcomed this development. He said that he could not repeat not express views of USA Government without further consultation. He would like to get their reaction and would hope to be in further touch with us either today or tomorrow.

3. Harriman went on to say that he supposed that it would be useful for Ronning to be in a position during his exchanges in Peking and Hanoi to convey to other side that he had reason to know what USA position was on various points connected with possible negotiation (Harriman distinguished clearly between conveying such info about USA positions and delivering any message from USA and excluded latter.) In order to enable Ronning to be in position to know more fully USA position he proposed to arrange further talks tomorrow between Ronning and USA officials.

4. Harriman then went on to express with considerable frankness his own views on a number of points although it was sometimes a little difficult to know when he was speaking personally and when he was expressing USA Government position.

5. With regard to prolongation of pause in bombing of North Vietnam, Harriman said that the President was now under heaviest possible pressure to resume bombing and that it would be difficult indeed for him to prolong pause much longer (from this and other indications we think that bombing may be resumed in very near future). The pressures on the President came from Congress and also from the military. Harriman recited in terms similar to those contained in Butterworth's oral communication to you January 24[5] (your telegram Y-56†) arguments pointing in direction of necessity of resuming bombing, but he did not repeat not leave any doubt that he personally was opposed to renewal of bombing at this time. We took opportunity to speak to him along lines of your telegram Y-40 January 19 arguing in favour of prolongation of pause. He agreed in particular with the argument that resumption of bombing would make it more difficult for USSR to exercise any influence in direction of negotiation. Indeed he said that resumption of bombing would very seriously embarrass USSR and he seemed much concerned about its effect on Soviet attitude. Harriman also indicated that there was some reason to suppose that there were differences in North Vietnamese leadership with Pham Van Dong possibly taking a slightly more moderate line than some of his colleagues. With regard to our argument that resumption of bombing might complicate certain initiatives on part of friendly or uncommitted governments in direction of bringing about negotiation he said, like McGeorge Bundy (see my telegram 190[6] January 19) that he thought that all such initiatives of which he had any knowledge had been tried and had already failed.

6. Ronning then raised question as to whether there would be any point in his going to Hanoi if bombing were resumed as the atmosphere there in that case would certainly not repeat not be receptive. Harriman argued very strongly that Ronning should not repeat not abandon his visit to Hanoi because of resumption of bombing. He said that the search for peaceful solutions and possibility of contact with other side would remain highly important and continuing objectives even if bombing were resumed. He returned to this point several times emphasizing that visit to Hanoi should not repeat not be abandoned because bombing had been resumed.

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5 See/Voir doc. 346.

6 See/Voir doc. 345.

7. Ronning said that he was far from clear as to position of USA on question of participation of Vietcong in any peace negotiations. There had been various statements of USA position, some appearing to be more flexible than others. Harriman replied that they would not repeat not allow a representative of Vietcong as a government at a conference of governments. This was intolerable to South Vietnam and would pave way to a takeover by Communists in South Vietnam. However, he did not repeat not exclude their participation as a group. He did not repeat not elaborate on this concept. With regard to future of Vietcong should a settlement be reached I mentioned to Harriman the South Vietnamese Ambassador's suggestion to me (see my telegram 50† January 6) that once peace had been re-established there might be a legal Communist party participating in political life of South Vietnam. Harriman did not repeat not exclude this. He said that USA were willing that there should be free elections in South Vietnam under supervision of either ICSC or UN and that they would abide by results of such elections.

8. Harriman suggested that among points that he personally thought might be conveyed to other side was fact that USA would be prepared at any time for bilateral talks with North Vietnam although it would be "preferable" if South Vietnam participated.

9. Another point which Harriman thought might be made was that USA were watching for any sign of a change in position of other side which was real evidence of their desire for negotiation and that they could meet such a development by a further pause in bombing. As he had on several occasions mentioned the possibility of another pause in bombing after its resumption, we pointed out the danger that once bombing was resumed there might be escalation and it might be very difficult to put the whole process into reverse and to bring about another pause. Harriman did not repeat not disagree with this. Indeed he expressed great concern about danger of escalation and referred to military pressures in this direction. He added that there were always "quite a lot of people" who are stupid enough to argue in favour of bringing the whole Vietnamese war to an end by attacking China and destroying Chinese nuclear installations.

10. Harriman dwelt on painful dilemma of the President and his sincerity in searching for peaceful solution. He said that he believed that the peace offensive had real value in convincing governments of President's sincerity although it was difficult to understand how they could doubt this as the President's whole objective was to achieve social progress within the USA and not repeat not to become involved in foreign wars.

11. In view of Harriman's frankness in expressing his own views to us, I am sure you will wish to safeguard his remarks.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

353.

Telegram from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam

Télégramme du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam

RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. Y-66
Ottawa, January 27, 1966
Top Secret. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 48† Jan 22 and Our Tel Y-62† Jan 26.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador only).

VISIT TO HANOI

Following for Commissioner only: Minister has decided that it would be useful at this stage of developments in Vietnam crisis, to take soundings of government opinion in Peking and Hanoi and to convey expression of Canadian Government's views in these capitals. Chester Ronning has agreed to undertake this special assignment on behalf of the Government. Ronning will carry diplomatic passport, but assignment will have character of "special visit" rather than more formal designation of "special mission".

2. You should take first available opportunity to proceed to Hanoi. This will be for ostensible purpose of making your introductory calls. On reaching Hanoi you should seek immediate interview with Chief of PAVN Liaison Mission. You should inform Ha Van Lau that Canadian Government has asked Ronning (who will be known to Ha Van Lau as Senior Canadian Representative at 61-62 Laos Conference) to make special visit to Hanoi to convey message personally to President or Prime Minister of North Vietnam and to discuss views of North Vietnamese Government with respect to problems in Vietnam. We would very much hope that North Vietnamese Government would agree to receive Ronning and that the necessary arrangements could be made. You are authorized to complete (on Ronning's behalf) any visa application form which may be required for this purpose. Details of passport, etc., can be supplied later, if required.

3. We would hope that visit could take place first part of February although timing will obviously have to depend on how long it may take for arrangements to be agreed to by Hanoi, and on airline schedules. You may inform North Vietnamese authorities that according to present plans, we envisage Ronning proceeding to Hanoi from Saigon (and return) via Commission aircraft.

4. If this question is raised by North Vietnamese authorities you may make it clear to them that Ronning's assignment is not repeat not to be seen as continuation of Seaborn's original mandate.[7]

5. It has not yet been decided whether Ronning is to pay a call on South Vietnamese authorities as part of his assignment. There are strong arguments in favour of his doing so and you may be sure that these will be fully taken into account before final decision is taken.

6. You will appreciate that secrecy is of utmost importance to success of this exercise. We recognize that, in arranging for Ronning's trip to Hanoi and back, you will have to go through Commission channels. For this purpose you should take line that Ronning is coming to Vietnam on special assignment to review Commission problems in light of general political developments since inspection team's visit over a year ago.[8]

[Marcel] Cadieux

354.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 3162, 29-1973-6/2

No. 291
Washington, January 28, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority.

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7 See Chapter 2./Voir Chapitre 2.

8 See/Voir doc. 181.

VIETNAM: RONNING'S TRIP

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, contacted me today to say that Secretary Rusk approved idea of Ronning's trip from USA point of view as he (Rusk) welcomed "any constructive initiative". Ronning was asked to bear in mind however that "other developments" might take place at time of visit. It was clear from context that this was intended as reference to possible resumption of bombing.

2. Ronning and I had very useful and informative talk with Bundy yesterday. Bundy said that USA answers to questions recently posed by Japanese might provide appropriate background material for Ronning; those answers are being given to you in Ottawa and have also been provided to us here (our telegram 290†).

3. When Ronning asked whether bilateral talks between USA and DRVN were possible, Bundy said that such talks had been offered to Hanoi during present pause and that Ronning might suggest to DRVN that USA remained willing to talk directly to them at least initially. It might be necessary to arrive at a "predigested conclusion" in such a forum (he apparently meant a mutually acceptable formula which would subsequently form basis of agreement at a wider conference). Bundy stressed that disclosure to SVN of USA willingness to talk bilaterally to DRVN could pose very serious problems.

4. Bundy said one thing that might be worrying North Vietnamese was that elections might be held while USA troops remained in Vietnam and that this would mean rigged elections. This could be discussed between USA and DRVN. USA thought elections should come after both USA and Northern forces had left. Timing was a circular problem; if elections could not repeat not be held till troops were withdrawn, troops could not repeat not be withdrawn till secure conditions prevailed, and secure conditions would be necessary for holding of elections. There could conceivably be a staged withdrawal of USA and DRVN forces *pari passu*.

5. Free elections in South might be in two stages; firstly, elections at provincial level (on analogy of elections held last year) and secondly, general elections under proper international supervision (ICC or some other mechanism).

6. There was discussion of part which VC might play in SVN political life after a settlement. Bundy said that this was a key problem. There would be no repeat no difficulty in having individual VC members participate in political life. It was conceivable that they might also be able to form own party, perhaps under name other than Communist, but as indicated by Greek and Malayan cases, this was complex problem which depended largely on whether Liberation Front would be prepared to function as normal political party or continue its clandestine activity.

7. Ronning stressed that main issue might well prove to be representation of NLF at conference table because of likelihood that DRVN would continue to insist (as at Geneva in 1962) that its own forces were not repeat not operating beyond its borders. Bundy agreed that this was a crucial issue. USA was examining various formulae to deal with problem.

8. Bundy indicated that USA's 14 Points[9] (our telegram 19† January 4) were intended to be merely a compilation of USA positions up to that time; he implied that they were not repeat not necessarily last word, nor a rigid stance. Some of language in points might be sensitive from DRVN point of view. Word "aggression" in point 13 had slipped in; it could be regarded as not repeat not literally there.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

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[9] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 740–742.

355.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 8893, 20-VIETN-1-3/2

No. 63
Saigon, January 29, 1966
Secret. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Geneva, Permis New York, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Hong Kong from London; Canberra, Tokyo from Ottawa.

VIETNAM – MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER PEARSON FROM DRVN PRESIDENT

Following message dated January 28 received today from Kerfoot in Hanoi: "Have just been handed letter for Prime Minister from President[10] which adopts very hard line to negotiations, discussions, peace approach and says USA must recognize Liberation Front as sole representative and negotiate with it; must also prove by deeds acceptance of Four Point stand and must end unconditionally and for good bombing against DRVN. Despite my objection probably letter will be published soon along with many others to Heads of State."

2. We will forward full text as quickly as possible.

[Victor C.] Moore

356.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. Y-102
Ottawa, January 29, 1966
Top Secret. OpImmediate.

VISIT TO HANOI

Following for Commissioner only.

Notwithstanding considerations set out in our telegram Y-67,† we agree with timetable proposed in your telegram 62† of January 28 since any change in your arrangements at this stage would have effect of generating speculations about Canadian activities. In the circumstances we agree that you should proceed [to] Hanoi as planned on February 7 and seek first opportunity after arrival to make contact with Ha Van Lau.

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[10] See "Canada and North Vietnam: An Exchange of Letters," *External Affairs,* Vol. 18, No. 5 (May 1966), pp. 182–184.
Voir « Le Canada et le Nord-Vietnam : Échange de lettres », *Affaires extérieures*, vol. 18, nº 5 (mai 1966), p. 190-192.

2. In light of letter which Ho Chi Minh has now addressed to Prime Minister, it would be appropriate for you to amend substance of your approach by saying that Ronning will wish to discuss points made in Ho Chi Minh's letter.

357.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. 68
Saigon, January 30, 1966
Top Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-66 Jan 27 and My Tel 63 and 65† Jan 29.
For Cadieux from Commissioner.

Our immediately following telegram 69† gives the full text of Ho Chi Minh's message to Prime Minister, which is almost identical with that of messages addressed the same day to other governments.

2. The message is in such explicit and uncompromising terms that it appears in effect to reject out of hand all peace soundings made to date and perhaps makes advisable a reconsideration of the usefulness and desirability of initiating further pressure of this kind for the immediate future.

358.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. Y-70
Ottawa, January 31, 1966
Top Secret. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Hong Kong, Saigon (OpImmediate).

VIETNAM

In all future messages dealing with Ronning's special assignment, he should be referred to as "Smallbridge" rather than by name.

359.
Letter from Ambassador of United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre de l'ambassadeur des États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/3

Secret. Personal.
Ottawa, February 5, 1966

Dear Mr. Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the following message to you from Secretary Rusk:

"Dear Paul [Martin]:

"As you know, Averell Harriman and William Bundy talked to Chester Ronning during his visit to Washington on January 26 and 27, and Walton Butterworth has subsequently discussed the trip with the Prime Minister and yourself. We of course have no objection whatsoever to Ronning's going to Hanoi and Peiping to see what he can find out about their positions on Vietnam. We welcome any constructive initiative that might indicate a glimmer of light on the situation, which so far we have not seen. For this purpose, we have been happy to supply you with our background thinking on some of the key problems, as contained in the responses we had made to a series of Japanese questions addressed to us before Foreign Minister Shiina's visit to Moscow. I do emphasize that this material is for background use only and must not be quoted as the American position, covering as it does several points which would probably lie a considerable distance down the road if and when useful discussions began.

"I must, however, express a shade of concern at the information that we have just had from Walton Butterworth that Ronning's passport will apparently carry the appearance of a formal accreditation as your special emissary with the personal rank of Ambassador. This gives the trip a somewhat more official and formal stamp than we had previously understood.

"I am also more seriously concerned at the possibility that Ronning may find himself engaged in discussion, especially in Peiping, of the problems relating to Chinese representation at the United Nations and even, if I understand your last conversation with Walton Butterworth correctly, questions of recognition. While the latter is of course always a matter for your Government to determine for itself, the issue of United Nations representation is one on which we have always consulted closely and I hope will continue to do so. At the present moment, we have of course not had the occasion for a really good discussion in the light of developments during the last General Assembly session, indeed, we ourselves have not come to anything like a clear assessment of probable trends during the year, and these could in any event be influenced by wider developments and conceivably by the course of events in connection with our present resort to the Security Council. In short, I simply have not been ready as yet to make up my own mind exactly what course may become necessary, and I would hope very strongly that you have in mind nothing more than a listening brief for Ronning in this area, and even that only if the issue may be raised on the other side.

"Frankly, as I have repeatedly said to you, we ourselves still see very grave disadvantages in any move to seat Communist China in the United Nations, and of course would be adamantly opposed to any initiative to do so at the expense of the Republic of China's position in any respect, much less with the acceptance of the kind of conditions Peiping repeatedly laid down last Fall. We have repeatedly recognized that it may be important at some stage to associate Communist China in disarmament discussions, but I am bound to say again that the kind of forum proposed

in the World Disarmament Conference seems to us least likely to produce constructive results and most likely to produce extraneous pressures relating to the Chinese Communist position in the United Nations.

"In sum, I think we shall both have a great deal of thinking to do on this subject in the months ahead and I hope that in the first instance we can do it on a very confidential basis between ourselves. I have therefore welcomed the indication that you are not discussing the Ronning trip with any other government, and I would end by repeating my hope and assumption that he will be listening only as to any matters other than Vietnam, and that in any event we shall have a full opportunity to talk over with you whatever he picks up in any area.

"With warm regards,

Sincerely,
Dean Rusk"

Sincerely yours,
W. Walton Butterworth

360.
Letter from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State of United States
Lettre du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

Secret. Personal.
[Ottawa,] February 10, 1966

My dear Dean [Rusk],

Thank you for your letter of February 5 in which you outlined some of your concerns about Chester Ronning's visit to Hanoi and Peking.

Although I think Chester was already aware of your restrictions on the background thinking contained in your responses to the series of Japanese questions on Vietnam, I have, since receiving your letter, made it absolutely clear to him that this is for his background use only and must not be quoted as the American position. I can assure you, therefore, that the sensitivity of this material will be fully protected.

I have noted your concern that Ronning's designation might give his trip a somewhat more official and formal stamp than had previously been understood. I am glad you raised this point, which is one that I have myself had very much in mind, and I think you might be interested in a brief résumé of how we are handling this problem. There has never, of course, been any question of Ronning's being given any sort of formal accreditation as my special emissary. Our action in this matter has been governed by the differences we see in the nature and requirements of the visits to the two capitals and, over and above this, the nature of Canada's relations with the two governments.

In the case of Hanoi, we have a special relationship with the DRVN through our membership on the International Commission and Ronning's talks with North Vietnamese leaders would, of course, be based on this special relationship. I have considered it necessary to give Ronning a status consonant with our role in the Commission which would lead the Hanoi authorities to accept his presence. He will, therefore, be travelling with a passport designating him as special representative with the rank of ambassador. The latter portion of this designation is, of course, related to Ronning's personal rank within the diplomatic service.

His visit to Peking is of a different nature, resulting as it does from a personal invitation and long-standing connection with China. He will in this case be carrying a separate diplomatic passport designating him in the manner customary for retired ambassadors of the Canadian Foreign Service.

I am glad that you raised the question of the other discussions in which Ronning may find himself engaged in Peking. As far as questions of bilateral relations between Communist China and Canada are concerned, he may, of course, be exposed to views which, on a personal basis, his Chinese contacts would wish to put to him. However, I look upon this aspect of his conversations as being very much a listening operation and have no intention that this particular subject should at this stage be the object of discussion, let alone negotiation.

Chinese representation in the United Nations raises somewhat different considerations. I would certainly agree that this is not the stage to discuss questions of substance with or to put propositions to people in Peking. I have, however, been increasingly concerned in the past few months at the attitude which the Chinese themselves have been taking towards the United Nations, starting with their announced support for a rival organization at the time of Indonesia's withdrawal and culminating in Marshal Chen Yi's statement on the United Nations in his press conference last September.[11] Indeed, you may recall that after the vote on the Chinese representation item I issued a statement in which I drew particular attention to what looked like new Chinese demands and conditions. I expressed the hope at that time that some means could be found before the next General Assembly to obtain further clarification of Peking's intentions regarding membership in the United Nations. The need to obtain this clarification is considered particularly important by the Canadian government and is a subject which I have discussed with Secretary-General U Thant in some depth in recent months. It is my hope that Ronning's talks with Chinese leaders will provide an opportunity to probe Chen Yi's conditions and will perhaps provide us with information which can help our own consultations and review of the situation.

Again, in this area, Ronning's brief will be very much a listening brief and we will certainly wish to discuss with you whatever information he may be able to obtain. In this connection, I entirely agree with your remarks about the need for early and close consultation on the Chinese representation issue and I was glad to learn through Charles Ritchie that you also looked upon our meeting next week as a good first opportunity of starting the ball rolling.

With warmest regards,

Yours sincerely,
Paul Martin

361.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. 103
Saigon, February 11, 1966
Top Secret. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Hong Kong (Emergency) from Ottawa; Washington (Ambassador only).

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[11] See/Voir Vergil Berger, "China Stiffens its Terms for Joining U.N.," *Washington Post*, 30 September 1965, p. A1.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Following received from Commissioner: "Pham Van Dong received me this afternoon and said DRVN would receive Smallbridge happily although he doubted it would produce useful results. He welcomed Pearson's goodwill and asked that his greetings be conveyed. Dong would not repeat not however commit Government as to timing of visit. Liaison Mission will inform me most convenient time for DRVN's leaders and I shall inform it of earliest time Smallbridge could arrive. Next courier flights Saigon-Hanoi are February 17, 21 and 24. Please advise when Smallbridge could make trip and passport particulars. [Victor C.] Moore".

362.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. 104
Saigon, February 11, 1966
Top Secret. Immediate.
Reference: My Tel 103 Feb 10 from Hanoi.
Repeat for Information: Hong Kong, Washington from Ottawa.

SMALLBRIDGE VISIT

Last night Ha Van Lau, on behalf of Prime Minister, told me Smallbridge can be received between the beginning of the second week (at earliest) and the end of the third week (at latest) of March, i.e., between March 6 and March 19. We will try to arrange March courier aircraft schedule to fit.

2. Ha Van Lau at the same time raised the question of publicity, saying he thought we also might wish to avoid any adverse publicity. I confirmed this along the lines of your instructions. He added that during or at the end of this "official visit", DRVN would probably like to make public some agreed statement. I emphasized that, while we believe discussions held in tranquility would be preferable, possibility could of course not repeat not be excluded that the press might get wind of them beforehand (say, through Smallbridge's movements).

3. Prime Minister had told me he would be happy to receive me with Smallbridge. However, I believe I would be superfluous and could get in the way, and I indicated to Prime Minister that I will probably have Wilder go to Hanoi with Smallbridge and, if the latter wishes it, sit in on discussions. As it is probable that DRVN Government will hold a reception or dinner for Smallbridge, I will make preparations to reciprocate with a reception and will plan to go to Hanoi briefly to act as host on an appropriate day during Smallbridge's visit there.

4. I shall report in following telegrams on my conversations in Hanoi, in particular with Prime Minister and on reception Smallbridge may expect. Permdel Hanoi had conveyed to the Liaison Mission my willingness to call on government officials, but we did not repeat not press this (a) because we expected that the only appointment to materialize would be with Ha Van Lau; and (b) because I thought it preferable, in anticipation of Smallbridge visit, for me not repeat not to engage government ministers in substantive discussions. On DRVN initiative, however, my visit was escalated in a fascinating and I believe, significant manner – on the second day, separate discussions with a Vice Minister for Defence and Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and on the third day, first with Foreign Minister himself and then Pham Van Dong. Further, the cocktail party I gave was attended not repeat not only by the Liaison Mission in force, but by Vice Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the

Heads of the American Directorate and of the Press and Information Directorate, with supporting officers. It is a long time since such attention and receptiveness has been displayed on the occasion of a visit by a Canadian Commissioner. This was due, we believe, to the fact that I came with an initiative from our Prime Minister (Smallbridge visit and discussions), in conjunction with recent statements in Canadian House of Commons (in particular Prime Minister Pearson's on extending the bombing pause and on no repeat no Canadian troops to Vietnam)[12] and with the name and reputation of Smallbridge himself. On less solid ground is my conjecture, for which there was some evidence in my conversations, that while there is no repeat no clear change in hard line and DRVN authorities make much of strong support by "socialist" and other countries, they may have a feeling of isolation, and for this reason, too, welcome an overture such as ours.

5. Our initiative is of course open to misinterpretation or abuse by DRVN, but at least Prime Minister Pham Van Dong (as indicated in reference telegram) is under no repeat no illusions concerning practical results of discussions or Canadian Government's position on Vietnam. Nevertheless, his recurring theme was: "in any case, people of goodwill should talk to each other" – our proposal had been made and he would receive Smallbridge in this spirit. He did not repeat not mention Smallbridge speaking with President Ho Chi Minh, but there was no repeat no indication that this is not repeat not a possibility.

6. I had expected we might wait several weeks before being given date for visit. Fact that, having learned from me that I was leaving Hanoi the next day, he made a point of letting me know two hours after our meeting, does indicate I believe, the serious interest he has (with his colleagues for whom he is spokesman) in the proposed discussions (for whatever mixed motives he may have).

7. With regard to the confirmation in writing requested by DRVN reported in my telegram 99† February 9, it became clear by that same evening that a decision had to be made on the spot and that we would get no repeat no further unless we produced a piece of paper. I therefore prepared an abbreviated aide-mémoire and left it with Ha Van Lau the following morning in time for it to be translated and passed up before my calls that day on the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister. Ha Van Lau simply asked if it confirmed my original oral presentation (made strictly according to your telegrams Y-66 January 27 and Y-102 January 29).

8. In order to give Smallbridge visit in Hanoi some leeway, I suggest his arrival there be immediately for the beginning of the period offered by Pham Van Dong. I assume you would wish him to arrive with at least two clear days for Saigon in order to build up the credibility of his "Commission cover". You may also wish to consider strengthening this cover by his stopping over in Vientiane and Phnom Penh en route back to Saigon from Hanoi. In the meantime, in order to ensure he first hears of visit from Candel and to facilitate the coordinating of the schedule of the Commission's courier aircraft with Smallbridge's timetable, I will brief Rahman as per paragraph 6 your telegram Y-66 January 27 as soon as you give me firm date. If courier aircraft schedule follows normal pattern, there will be Saigon-Hanoi flight Monday, March 7 (returning Saigon March 8), followed by flights up and down March 10/11, and March 17/18.

[Victor C.] Moore

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[12] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 1, pp. 61–63, 141–142, 431–432.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 1, p. 61-63, 141-142, 431-432.

363.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. Y-172
Ottawa, February 16, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only), Hong Kong (for Smallbridge).

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Following for Commissioner only: I have noted with interest reception accorded to you by DRVN leaders and their willingness to receive Smallbridge. I was particularly interested in Hanoi reaction to recent Canadian policy statements on Vietnam. This suggests there may be pitfalls in Smallbridge exercise against which you should be on your guard.

2. Smallbridge should plan on arriving Saigon about March 2. He should proceed to Hanoi March 7, return March 11 and plan to depart for Hong Kong immediately thereafter. I am concerned that total time spent in Saigon should be minimum required for inescapable calls. I see no need for stopover in Phnom Penh or Vientiane since Smallbridge's ostensible and real interests relate to Vietnam only.

3. I am prepared to agree to minimum contacts with SVN Government and with Commission. These will be for purpose of dispelling suspicions in Saigon and maintaining cover for visit. This is that Smallbridge will be reviewing problems in Vietnam at first hand with special emphasis on current and possible future role of Commission in relation to these problems. You should inform Col. An officially of proposed visit in those terms, explaining that Smallbridge will be visiting Hanoi as part of same assignment.

4. You should tell Col. An that I would be grateful if South Vietnamese Foreign Minister could receive Smallbridge to give him his current assessment of Vietnam problem and his thinking with respect to peaceful settlement, with particular emphasis on any role Commission may be able to play in present and future circumstances. I would prefer it if any other calls on South Vietnamese leaders could be avoided since I am concerned not to have unnecessary publicity focussed on this exercise. For same reason, you should do what you can to discourage any offers of official entertainment in Saigon.

5. In due course you should inform Indian Chairman and Polish Commissioner of visit and arrange opportunity for discussion of Commission matters, preferably at informal working lunch. These discussions could be based on action already taken here in bringing our thinking to attention of Indian and Polish Governments.

6. As regards Hanoi visit, you should inform Col. Ha Van Lau in letter by bag of proposed timing. As in Saigon, you should explain that, while proposed offers of hospitality are appreciated, I would prefer to have visit handled in unobtrusive way without attracting undue attention. In due course you should firmly resist any form of joint statement concerning visit and its purposes.

7. I believe you should be the only member of delegation to accompany Smallbridge to Hanoi. I would not expect any publicity about visit to be generated on Canadian side. In response to unavoidable enquiries, you should not go beyond line taken in paragraph 3 above.

[Paul] Martin

364.
Telegram from Senior Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du délégué commercial principal à Hong Kong au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. TC-25
Hong Kong, February 17, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

I was asked to call this morning on Deputy Director Leung of the New China News Agency. Fraser went with me.

2. Leung referred to the message addressed to Vice-Premier Chen Yi which I had delivered to the China Resources Co. on February 5. He said he had received a reply, which was read in Chinese and English, and a copy given me. Message begins: "The letter from (Smallbridge) to Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi which Mr. R.K. Thomson asked the China Resources Co. to transmit has been forwarded to Peking. Now, I am entrusted to convey Vice-Premier Chen Yi's reply as follows: Vice-Premier Chen Yi was glad to receive (Smallbridge) letter and recalled with pleasure his meetings with (Smallbridge) in Geneva. At present the Government of USA is accelerating the expansion of its war of aggression against Vietnam and engineering a peace talks plot in many ways. Regrettably, the Canadian Government has taken a position in support of this policy of the USA Government. In these circumstances, it will be inopportune for (Smallbridge) to visit China now. However, Vice-Premier Chen Yi expressed the hope that he would have the opportunity of receiving (Smallbridge) in Peking at an appropriate time in the future". Message ends.

3. We said that Smallbridge and the Canadian authorities would be disappointed with this reply.

[R.K.] Thomson

365.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Far Eastern Division
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

Top Secret.
[Ottawa,] February 21, 1966

MR. MARTIN'S CONVERSATION WITH DEAN RUSK
ON FEBRUARY 19, 1966: SMALLBRIDGE

During his visit to Washington, Mr. Martin had a private conversation with Mr. Rusk at the latter's request.

2. While the conversation covered mainly the question of China and the United Nations, there was also some discussion of the Smallbridge project. Dean Rusk was quite surprised at the Peking reaction and considered that the willingness of Hanoi to talk was an indication, and possibly a significant one, of possible differences between Hanoi and Peking.

3. As he did during the official part of the talks, Rusk stressed the point that USA and South Vietnamese forces now had at their disposal and were shortly to so develop such a fire power that the Viet Cong will no longer be able to sustain large units in operation in the South. The prospect of greater and sustained losses was bound to influence the decision in Hanoi as to negotiations.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

366.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. Y-181
Ottawa, February 22, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tels 132† Feb 19, 135† Feb 22 and Our Tel Y-172 Feb 16.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador only) (Routine), Hong Kong (OpImmediate).

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Following for Commissioner only.

Events subsequent to initiation of this operation have had effect of changing its emphasis even though essential purposes remain the same. Chinese refusal to receive Smallbridge and public attention that has been focussed recently on Canadian exploration of possibility of Commission playing a useful role looking to negotiations, have resulted in situation whereby "cover" and substance of Smallbridge exercise in Vietnam have moved closer together.

2. Minister's agreement that discussions should be held with SVN authorities and with Commission should minimize or eliminate possibility of difficulties arising later (your telegram 132 paragraph 7).

3. In due course we will provide you with full guidance for discussions in both Hanoi and Saigon. In meantime you will already have received by telegram sufficient background info on which to base your discussions, prior to Smallbridge's arrival, with SVN and DRVN authorities and Commission colleagues (i.e., our telegrams Y-157† February 11, Y-163† February 16, Y-170[13] February 16, and PST-16† of February 21).

4. In arrangements you will be making for visit, you should be guided by our general desire to avoid any apparent disparity between Saigon and Hanoi aspects of visit. If you anticipate that some form of official entertainment in Hanoi is unavoidable, you are authorized to agree to SVN offer of something comparable to what you estimate will be type and level of entertainment in Hanoi. There is, of course, no objection to your arranging social occasion where Smallbridge will have opportunity of informal discussion with Indian and Polish Commissioners. We do not repeat not think, however, that special dinner you propose for March 4 or 5 would come within Minister's general conception of Smallbridge visit.

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[13] See/Voir doc. 416.

5. We would have no objection, if this is customary, to having one stenographer accompany you and Smallbridge to Hanoi.

6. It will be evident that reference telegrams have been crossing in transmission. We believe that Minister's instructions and foregoing paragraphs meet various points raised [in] your reference telegrams but if there are any of these questions on which you would like further guidance please let us know.

367.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India and Embassy to Poland
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde et à l'ambassade en Pologne
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/3

No. Y-192
Ottawa, February 28, 1966
Secret. Emergency.

VIETNAM

Please pass following message to Mr. Swaran Singh and Mr. Rapacki as soon as possible: Begins: I thought I should let you know that I have asked Mr. Chester Ronning to go to Vietnam on our behalf. Mr. Ronning (for Swaran Singh only: who will be well known to you) is a retired member of the Canadian diplomatic service who for many years was in close touch with Vietnam problem in his capacity as Canadian High Commissioner to India. He also served as Senior Canadian Representative at the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1961/62.

2. Mr. Ronning will be going to Saigon at beginning of next week and will be proceeding to Hanoi in second week in March. On these visits, which have been arranged by agreement with governments concerned, he will be having wide-ranging discussions on Vietnam problem in general, and the present and potential future role of the Commission. While Mr. Ronning will not repeat not be specifically charged with a mandate to explore the matters which are at present under discussion between us,[14] I look upon his visits to Saigon and Hanoi as an opportunity for him to form a general assessment of the reactions we would be likely to encounter in the event that we were able to agree on efforts by members of the Commission looking towards peace in Vietnam.

3. In the course of his discussions in Vietnam, I have asked Mr. Ronning to establish contact with your Commissioner so as to enable him to report to me on the whole range of problems which are being encountered by our representatives in Vietnam and the difficulties which they face in discharging their responsibilities under the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement in the present critical situation.

4. Mr. Ronning's mandate in Vietnam will not repeat not go beyond the preliminary soundings we have already taken in other quarters and will in no repeat no way be predicated on any kind of understanding – which we have yet to reach between us – in respect of any joint initiative which it may or may not repeat not be possible to undertake in appropriate circumstances.

5. I would be grateful if you would regard the contents of this message as for your own info only at this stage. Ends.

[Paul] Martin

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[14] See/Voir docs 416, 419.

368.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. Y-196
Ottawa, February 28, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Reference: Your Tels 143† and 145.†
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador only) (OpImmediate).
By Bag: Hong Kong.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Following are our views on publicity:

1. It continues to be our wish and intention to avoid publicity on Smallbridge operation particularly while operation is in progress. We gather that this is in line with position now being taken by North Vietnamese authorities.

2. We would wish to avoid any joint statement being issued in course of Smallbridge's visit to Hanoi. We are apprehensive that in such a statement we would be under pressure to subscribe to propositions intended to dissociate us openly from USA. While we have noted North Vietnamese desire to receive Smallbridge as guest of Government, we do not think that circumstances of his visit are such as to warrant an official communiqué.

3. We cannot, of course, guarantee that publicity will not result from Smallbridge operation. Nor can we tie hands of Canadian Government in respect of any comment they may be asked to make on visit in due course.

4. We appreciate North Vietnamese sensitivity to any statements being publicly made about their position and have no wish to embarrass them. Nor would this be in our own interest at present stage of our efforts to explore a good offices role for Commission.

5. In response to enquiries we propose to take following line: Begins: The Canadian Government is concerned about the course of developments in Vietnam. It has been particularly disappointed by the absence of any prospects of a peaceful settlement of the present conflict being reached. In recent weeks it has been giving thought to the possibility which may be open to the International Commission to play some part in the present situation. The Commission is in a special position by virtue of its long association with the Vietnam problem and the access it has to all the parties to the conflict. We have had preliminary discussions about a possible Commission role with India and Poland who are our partners on the Commission. To enable us to carry forward our thinking we have also considered it useful to seek the views of the Governments of North and South Vietnam on the current situation, and any role which the Commission may be able to play in creating conditions in which a peaceful settlement of the conflict may be possible. It was for this purpose that we asked Mr. Ronning to visit Saigon and Hanoi. In the course of his visit to Hanoi, Smallbridge also took an opportunity to deliver the Prime Minister's reply to Ho Chi Minh's message of January 24. Ends.

6. You may wish to ask North and South Vietnamese whether statement on these lines, if it proves necessary to make it, would raise any points of particular difficulty for them. You should not, however, give impression that we are seeking their approval of any specific text.

[Paul] Martin

369.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. Y-204
Ottawa, March 2, 1966
Top Secret. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only) (Routine).
For Commissioner only.

SMALLBRIDGE DISCUSSIONS IN HANOI

Although I am not prepared to interpret it as last word on the subject, Polish Foreign Minister's preliminary negative response (Warsaw telegram 178[15] February 28) to my message concerning possible good offices role for Commission (our telegram Y-170 February 1[6]) indicates that if idea of Commission role is to be kept alive until Poles are prepared to cooperate, responsibility for doing so rests with Canada. In preparing Smallbridge's presentation for Hanoi, we deliberately played down those aspects of it which might be described as "position probing" for fear that such action on our part, pending a reply from Warsaw, might be interpreted by Poles as attempt to pre-empt Commission action by unilateral Canadian initiative. This was my main concern in sending special messages about Smallbridge visit to Swaran Singh and Rapacki (our telegram Y-192 February 28 was subsequently repeated to you).

2. In present circumstances, however, I consider that we now have somewhat greater latitude in formulating a more active probing approach for Smallbridge's discussions in Hanoi. As I envisage it, this exercise will now have three aspects: (a) presentation of reply to Ho Chi Minh's letter;[16] (b) oral presentation of outline of Canadian Government's views as set forth [in] our telegram; and (c) an attempt to obtain clarification of North Vietnam's position by engaging Government representatives in more specific and detailed discussions of prospects for negotiations than would be implicit in activity based only on (a) and (b) above. In a following telegram we are providing series of talking points on which Smallbridge should base this probe.

[Paul] Martin

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15 See/Voir doc. 421.

16 See "Canada and North Vietnam: An Exchange of Letters," *External Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 5 (May 1966), pp. 184–185.
Voir « Le Canada et le Nord-Vietnam : Échange de lettres », *Affaires extérieures*, vol. 18, nº 5 (mai 1966), p. 192-193.

370.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA/1

No. Y-205
Ottawa, March 3, 1966
Top Secret. Emergency from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel Y-204 Mar 2 para 2(c).
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only).
Commissioner only.

SMALLBRIDGE DISCUSSIONS IN HANOI

Following are talking points for Smallbridge's use in Hanoi in probing North Vietnamese views on prospects for negotiations. Begins: We have carefully studied the Four Points which have been put forward by North Vietnam.[17] We have also noted that Government of North Vietnam regards these as representing the sum and substance of Geneva Agreement. It would be of interest to us to have some better idea than we now have of the sequence in which and the conditions under which North Vietnam envisages these points being implemented. In particular, it would be of interest to us to know which of these points are regarded as being precedent to a negotiation looking to peace in Vietnam.

2. Government of North Vietnam has said that these Four Points must be "accepted" by USA before a political settlement of Vietnam problem can be envisaged. What form does Government of North Vietnam consider that this "acceptance" would take? Are there reciprocal undertakings which Government of North Vietnam would be willing to give? And does Government of North Vietnam believe that all this can be done in absence of any form of contact between it and Government of USA either directly or through third parties?

3. Beyond requiring "acceptance" of the Four Points, Government of North Vietnam has emphasized conditions which it would regard as precedent to a political settlement. We take it that the most important of these is the cessation of the bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam. Here, again, is Government of North Vietnam prepared to give some reciprocal undertakings? Moreover, are we right in assuming that the mere cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam – which was in effect for some time recently – is not repeat not sufficient in the view of Government of North Vietnam to provide even the basis for discussions looking towards a peaceful settlement? Are there other specific conditions which Government of North Vietnam expects to be met either as a token of willingness on the part of USA to negotiate seriously on the Four Points, or more generally as a basis for any kind of contact, direct or indirect, between the parties?

4. Government of North Vietnam has undoubtedly studied the Fourteen Points which have been put forward by USA and particularly the statements that USA wishes no repeat no bases in Southeast Asia, that it has no repeat no desire to retain troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured, that the question of reunification should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decisions and that policies of non-alignment or neutrality if adopted by their own choice would not repeat not be opposed by USA as policies for countries of Southeast Asia. We would be interested to know in what respects the Fourteen Points do not repeat not

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[17] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 852–853.

appear to meet the legitimate concerns of North Vietnam. If it is not repeat not a matter of the points themselves, but of the intentions behind the points, is the Government of North Vietnam interested in obtaining clarifications from USA?

5. We have felt it necessary to attempt to obtain clarification of North Vietnam's position because the impression is widely held among many countries that North Vietnam believes that it can hold out indefinitely, until its own terms are fully met. This evident insistence on a military solution creates an impression of rigidity which tends to strengthen those on the other side who advocate the strongest possible military response to what is happening in South Vietnam. This in turn has serious implications for North Vietnam and is a source of legitimate anxiety for other nations less directly committed or involved.

6. Canadian Government has noted willingness expressed on both sides to envisage a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. As far as Government of North Vietnam is concerned, we take this willingness to be contingent on certain conditions being met in advance. What concerns us is that, while present situation with all risks it involves for international peace and security continues, there seems to be a complete blockage of all channels that might be used to bring the positions of the two sides closer together. Are there any circumstances in which Government of North Vietnam would be prepared to see such channels opened?

[Paul] Martin

371.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. Y-212
Ottawa, March 4, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador only) (Routine).

SMALLBRIDGE VISIT TO HANOI

Because of possible implications for question of recognition, we have been giving further thought to cumulative effect of Smallbridge visit, presentation of Prime Minister's letter replying to Ho Chi Minh and joint "communiqué" at end of visit.

2. Legal view of this problem is as follows: A state can always deny, subject to certain exceptions, that its actions signify recognition, but there may be a point at which such assertions lack credibility. From a legal point of view, a communiqué would simply be the final act of the special mission and may be interpreted strictly within the context of the mission itself. But this further extension of the principle which governs special missions might well be questioned. Moreover, any language in the communiqué suggesting that the two representatives "have reached agreement" may in fact – depending on formulation – be regarded as recognition, as the conclusion of a bilateral agreement between two states is an accepted method of recognition and is generally regarded, in itself, as being an act of recognition. An international agreement can, of course, take the form of a communiqué.

3. These considerations underline significance of our earlier instruction that you should resist as firmly as you can any North Vietnamese pressure to issue communiqué at conclusion of visit. We recognize, however, that such action may be unavoidable or that the North Vietnamese will insist on issuing their own announcement. If so, text should specify that conversations have taken place between the North Vietnamese Government and Smallbridge, Special Representative of the Government of Canada, which is a member of the International

Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam. It should not state that "agreement" has been reached on any matters. This form of words would probably be sufficient to indicate that visit flows from our role on the Commission and does not imply a departure from established basis of our relations with North Vietnam, which are not based on recognition.

372.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 160
Saigon, March 5, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only) from Ottawa; Hong Kong (Thomson and Fraser only) from Ottawa.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Smallbridge was received at Saigon airport by the Deputy Head of the Liaison Mission (Col. An was prevented because of preparations for his imminent transfer to RVN Embassy London) and a representative of Foreign Ministry, Protocol. Secretary-General Rahman assisted in the administrative arrangements but, because of delay in aircraft's arrival, was unable to be present himself.

Smallbridge was warmly received by my Indian and Polish colleagues, and his presentation to RVN authorities evoked a very positive response. Apart from numerous informal social contacts, he has had discussions with Rahman, Col. Nguyen Van-An (lunch at Canadian residence), USA Ambassador Cabot Lodge, Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, Ambassador Wendrowski, and Head of State General Nguyen Van Thieu. Prime Minister Nguyen Cao-Ky's absence this week in the provinces made impossible a call on him and Foreign Minister Do's wish to hold dinner of Commissioners in Smallbridge's honour also had to be dropped because of heavy programme of farewell functions for Col. An and departing Poles. However, Smallbridge will meet Prime Minister socially at Secretary-General Rahman's farewell dinner for Col. An March 6. All concerned have apparently met our wish to avoid publicity and so far there has been nothing in the local press nor any curiosity manifested by foreign correspondents.

2. Our following telegrams† will report substance of discussions.

[Victor C.] Moore

373.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 184
Saigon, March 11, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Reference: Our Tel 178† Mar 11.

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Following from Smallbridge: Yesterday, on last day in Hanoi, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong received me accompanied by Moore. Interview lasted two hours during which Prime Minister made frank statement of uncompromising attitude of DRVN to USA and their "puppets in SVN". This was in reply to my outline of purpose of visit. Before end of interview he stated condition which if accepted by USA, could result in negotiations. In present wording it would be unacceptable but it does indicate issue which DRVN considers most important – cessation of bombing and all acts of war against NVN.

2. Although Prime Minister promised at one point he would give us aide-mémoire with exact wording of condition, this offer was subsequently withdrawn. Reason may be that in transmitting offer to USA, Canada could phrase proposal in more acceptable terms. Prime Minister expressed hope that contacts between Canada and DRVN would remain open, indicating they desire reply. It is significant that as result of questioning Prime Minister repeated that condition in no repeat no way applied to cessation of USA military action in SVN. Verbatim report of dialogue will be sent by telegram.

3. In replying to specific questions along lines of your telegram Y-205 March 3, the Prime Minister stated that on acceptance of one condition only DRVN could commence negotiations. He did not repeat not state whether this would be direct or indirect. Before direct talks can take place he would prefer further exchange with USA using Canada as go-between. The condition outlined by him was that the USA "must make an official declaration that it will unconditionally stop for good all military operations against territory of NVN". After further questioning, he agreed that the cessation of military activity would be limited to NVN and did not repeat not include demand for cessation of military action against NLF in SVN. This condition may provide a basis for a counter proposal which might eventually enable the USA to have informal talks with the DRVN. Prime Minister said that he "would look into the attitude of USA reply with all understanding".

4. Prime Minister seemed very anxious that Canadian Government should convey this proposal to Government of USA but he added "please do not repeat not reveal that we have asked you to convey this message". In reply I said that we also do not repeat not wish to have it assumed that we have offered to mediate. He explained that "previous unfortunate experiences with other missions" made it necessary for him to be careful.

5. I made it clear throughout the cross questioning along lines of your telegram Y-205 March 3 that our only purpose was to obtain clarification of attitude of DRVN in hopes of finding some point where there could be a meeting of minds which might warrant preliminary informal talks in advance of negotiations on major issues such as seating of NLF and withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam.

6. Prime Minister said he hoped that Canada would use its good offices because aim of his Government was peace. He added "we do not repeat not want war and we know its results from twenty years' experience". This statement was not repeat not in keeping with his earlier bombastic defiance of USA and his unreasonable analysis of the American military and political objectives in Vietnam which he had said called for a military defeat.

7. I said that ICC provided the only existing international channel between North and South. He could be assured that if he had anything further to say regarding conditions under which DRVN would be prepared to start direct or indirect talks with USA that Moore and Canadian Permrep Kerfoot in Hanoi would always be ready to forward any proposals to Ottawa. I referred to soundings which Canada has been making about possibilities of using International Commission as a channel whenever India and Poland agreed to join Canada with a view to talks leading to a ceasefire – naturally leaving the question of an ultimate conference in the hands of the Co-Chairmen.

8. In conclusion Prime Minister asked me to convey to Canadian Government the sincere appreciation of President Ho Chi Minh and Government of DRVN for the goodwill and good intentions of Canadian Government. He asked that Mr. Pearson be told "that DRVN does wish Canadian Government to bring its good contribution (offices) to this problem and in this spirit to continue this exchange in future".

9. After the previous lengthy interviews with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Minister and Ha Van Lau, each of which lasted one and a half to two hours, I had concluded that we would be given no repeat no indication whatever that there was any intention of deviating from the hardline of determination to fight on for certain military victory. They repeatedly stated "that the greater the escalation of USA troops, the greater would be the ultimate victory". As evidence of their future success, they boasted about "the victory which had already been won over the USA forces by NLF in SVN".

10. Until near the end of the interview with the Prime Minister yesterday, I still feared that there would be no repeat no yielding of the rigid dogmatic DRVN position and was surprised at this even very slight glimmer of hope which Prime Minister gave as a result of persistent questioning about any qualifications which they would make leading to direct or indirect talks with the Americans. He had emphasized that the Four Points constituted the irreducible minimum conditions that USA must accept unconditionally. In the latter part of our interview, however, his attitude and language were greatly modified and he repeatedly expressed the hope that Canada would make available its good offices. In offering his conditions he said that they had already suggested a similar offer in the January 4 Foreign Ministry statement.[18] He emphasized that his present offer did not repeat not include any conditions about military activity in the South and that he hoped it might be used by Canada to "persuade the USA". His clarification was in response to my statement that there was no repeat no point in asking Canada to persuade the USA to do anything unless DRVN was prepared to make some concession.

11. In previous interviews I had not repeat not used a statement made by Averell Harriman to Ritchie and me in Washington. Without quoting him, however, I stated to Prime Minister that Canada knew that USA was prepared to have direct or indirect discussions with DRVN at any time, at any place and on any subject proposed by DRVN. It may have been this statement that finally persuaded him to slightly modify his conditions. I made no repeat no reference to Harriman statement that USA was prepared to have these talks without presence of SVN because I had taken line throughout all interviews that as neighbour and good friend of the USA we were in a position only to clarify American position. When Prime Minister stated that he did not repeat not want to be put in position of having asked us to convey this message to USA, I assured him that it must be clearly understood that we had not repeat not volunteered to carry any messages. To protect our positions, therefore, we would say nothing to press and would carry out this exchange in complete secrecy.

12. Pham Van Dong said "that the talk I am having today is one I have not repeat not had with many people". On the prospects of our good offices, he said "maybe today's talk will bring no repeat no results; maybe on your return Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin will not repeat not succeed in persuading the Americans. But if not repeat not, with a laugh, come again and try another time". He assured Commissioner Moore he would be received at any time.

13. At the Commissioner's reception in my honour that afternoon, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking separately to Moore and me, reiterated the importance of secrecy. Other feelers, he said, had become public, and the DRVN had had no repeat no choice but to issue a denial. He urged that we avoid such a setback. Publicity would be embarrassing to

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[18] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
i.e., so that they can fall back on this formulation if circumstances necessitate repudiation of Smallbridge. [Author unknown/ Auteur inconnu]
See/Voir "Text of Statement by Hanoi on U.S. Peace Effort," *New York Times*, 5 January 1966, p. 2.

DRVN and deadly for the results of the initiative. We told him we would do our best. The seriousness which DRVN attach to the requisite reticence is, we believe, indicated by their sparsely worded press release[19] (our telegram 179† of March 11).

14. The hospitality extended to me as a state guest was cordial and every effort was made to make my stay pleasant repeat pleasant. Especially the Prime Minister welcomed me warmly and accepted me as a "Canadian representative of goodwill". He emphasized that he knew Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin were "men of goodwill". The purpose of this attitude may have been chiefly because Pham Van Dong hopes Canada can help to bring about peaceful negotiations.

15. Moore had done an excellent job in preparing the way for the visit to Hanoi.

[C.A. Ronning]

374.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 188
Saigon, March 12, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Reference: Our Tel 184 Mar 11.

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Smallbridge left by air today for Hong Kong en route to Ottawa with stopovers in Hong Kong and at home in Alberta. He will inform you from Hong Kong of his exact itinerary.

2. While he has given gist of our undertaking with Pham Van Dong in Hanoi in our reference telegram and a verbatim report will follow, there are nuances which call for discussion with you in Ottawa in preparation for next stage of operation.

3. I hope very much it will be possible for you to continue to use Smallbridge, both in Washington (in liaison with Ritchie) and for return engagement, if it materializes, in Hanoi. It could be argued that follow-up could be made more discreetly by Commissioner; however, there would be great advantages to exploiting position and personal standing which Smallbridge has established in Hanoi, and a next visit could be a quick and quiet "in and out", without longer stops in Hong Kong and Saigon, which made operation more precarious this time.

4. His performance was brilliant (as I know you would expect it to be), based on his abilities and unique experience and on his use of a combination of adroitness, persistence and sincerity, which in good part was responsible for whatever success we have had.

5. What we have is an indication that DRVN wish to talk; that they are not repeat not opposed to a role for ICSC when conditions are ripe but wish now to have Canada use its presence on Commission and Commission's facilities as a vehicle for Canadian good offices; and that they have come up with an offer, albeit tenuous. The offer consists in lifting from its context in Foreign Ministry January 4 statement of bombing issue (antepenultimate

[19] See/Voir Stanley Karnow, "Victory on Battlefield Possible, Hanoi Insists," *Washington Post*, 12 March 1966, pp. A1, A12.

paragraph) and making it sole condition for negotiations viz. the stopping of air raids "and all other acts of war" against territory of DRVN. The "other acts", we guess, may include specifically the reconnaissance overflights and possible mining of sea approaches to Haiphong. It thus appears that issue over which they are most concerned is that of acts of war against DRVN territory. Such an admission might encourage Americans to pound DRVN harder in this sensitive spot; it should, however, be borne in mind that this now appears to be very issue which hardens DRVN attitude towards negotiations more than any other. You may wish to pass foregoing as an "impression" to Washington with Smallbridge being able to explain more fully when he visits Ottawa.

6. It has naturally occurred to us that there may be ulterior motives other than the apparent and direct one. It was, however, not repeat not our impression that they are using us, for example, in a "peace campaign" of their own. They have handled the visit very discreetly (the exact text of the press release given us March 11 and sent to you by our telegram 179 March 11 was incidentally carried by all Hanoi papers March 12), they have given us flexibility (and of course themselves too) by not repeat not putting anything in writing, and are insistent on the need for secrecy if the initiative is not repeat not to be stillborn.

7. I would urge again the paramount importance of secrecy. We are here and in Hanoi not repeat not going beyond the DRVN press release and the "exchange of views" line (we have not repeat not yet received your press release)[20] in our dealings with the press, and are being very discreet with diplomatic and RVN colleagues. In the mission we are continuing to impose "need to know" restrictions.

[Victor C.] Moore

375.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 189
Saigon, March 14, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Reference: Our Tel 188 Mar 12.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE:
DISCUSSION WITH DRVN PRIME MINISTER, 08.30-10.30, MARCH 10

Following [from] Commissioner: Discussion between Smallbridge and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong was the culmination for both sides. It was preceded by preliminary talks with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh and Col. Ha Van Lau, all of which were taken down verbatim and doubtless transmitted to the Prime Minister to prepare him. These were supplemented by informal discussions, e.g., at dinner given by Thach. The letter in reply to Ho Chi Minh's message was left with the Foreign Minister. As usual, the substantive part of the interviews was in Vietnamese and English, interpreted. The discussion with the Prime Minister was also recorded verbatim by our hosts.

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[20] The DEA does not appear to have issued a press release.
Il ne semble pas que le MAE ait publié de communiqué.

2. The Prime Minister, accompanied by Le Tan, Deputy Director for South America in the Foreign Ministry, met Smallbridge and Moore at the head of the steps outside Independence Palace. Photographs were taken outside and again in the Prime Minister's reception chamber. Tea was served. An interpreter [and] scribe were also present.

3. The following paragraphs are an approximately verbatim record of the discussion from my notes.

[*Prime Minister*:]

4. You are welcome.

Smallbridge:

5. Thank you for arranging for me to see you, and for the visits arranged for me earlier. As you know from my other talks, with [your] Foreign Minister and the Vice Foreign Minister, the purpose of my visit is to express the Canadian Government's concern about the situation in Vietnam. We feel that Canada, as a neighbour and friend of USA whose welfare is intricately bound up with USA, as a country which understands USA, we may be able to clarify the American position. (Prime Minister laughs). Having said that, I would like to repeat what I said in the previous interviews which I have been privileged to have.

6. Canadian foreign policy is not identical with American foreign policy. I know we are frequently regarded as the puppet of USA and as blindly following the policy of USA. This is by no repeat no means correct, and I think that from an impartial examination of our policy it will be clear that on important occasions we have differed. [On] the other hand, there have been occasions when we have agreed. As you know, there have been public statements by our Prime Minister; he has publicly regretted the bombing of North Vietnam. And it was our Prime Minister, the first of the leaders in the West to do so, who proposed a pause so that hostilities could stop.[21] That is why I say we might be able to clarify the position of USA with respect to one important aspect. The aspect of which I am speaking is the possibility of negotiations and a peaceful settlement.

7. When I say we understand USA at least partially, I believe we also have some understanding of your situation. We know something of the history of your revolution led by President Ho Chi Minh. We sympathize with and support some of the objectives of that revolution. From the personal point of view, I was born and brought up in Central China. My first language was Chinese (Prime Minister laughs) and I could not repeat not speak any other language until I was six to seven years old. From my China days, I have been closely associated with revolution in China. In my father's school there was a students' organization which participated in the 1912 Revolution. And some of these boys took part in the 1922-27 Revolution. I was in China then as a student in Peking, and as a teacher in the school my father founded. I was in China again from 1945-51 during the Civil War and the coming to power of the new regime in Peking, and in charge of the Canadian Embassy for two years after the liberation of Nanking. So I have some personal knowledge of what has been going on in Asia, I know the attitude of Asians with respect to foreign domination and to the powers that formerly controlled them. Since then, I visited Vietnam (Hanoi, Haiphong and Saigon) fifteen years [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu] and was an auditor on the sidelines for the Indochina Conference. I led the Canadian delegation, under the Minister, during the Laos Conference. I was well acquainted with your representative in India, as a friend. During seven years in India, I followed very carefully the activities of all three Indochina Commissions. I mention this only because it may be significant that the Canadian Government has selected me to come here.

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[21] See/Voir Canadian Consulate Philadelphia, "Address by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, on Accepting the 2nd Temple University World Peace Award at the Founder's Dinner of the University's General Alumni Association," Philadelphia, 2 April 1965 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Canadian Consulate, 1965).

Prime Minister:

8. And we have received you with some significance, too.

Smallbridge:

9. They realize my sympathies. For revolution, for reconstruction, etc.

10. There are a few questions I would like to ask, to which I have not repeat not received any specific reply from your officers (Prime Minister laughs). I am not repeat not here to persuade you to change your policies. One purpose is to obtain a clarification of aspects of your policy, especially the Four Points you have outlined. The reason we would like this clarification is that we would like to examine the positions of both sides. We know that concessions USA are prepared to make; we want to know what in the Four Points you are prepared to negotiate informally in direct talks, or indirectly, in preparation for all negotiations. The two specific points which we wonder you might wish to consider as the starting point for ultimate negotiations are (a) the question of the withdrawal of USA troops from Vietnam; and (b) the question of the representation of the National Liberation Front at the conference table. We wonder in both cases whether it is not repeat not possible to reach understanding in order to get over the basic obstacle to peace negotiations.

11. In regard to the question of the seating at the conference table of the NLF, you have stated they must be seated as representing the Government of South Vietnam. USA has stated that they will not repeat not sit down with the NLF as representing the government, but will accept their seating in some capacity. And we are wondering whether or not repeat not there is a possibility of a meeting of minds through informal discussions on this point.

12. On the other issue, the withdrawal of USA troops, you have stated it is a precondition to peace negotiations. USA have stated and we believe they will carry out their intention – that they are prepared to discuss the whole question of withdrawal at the conference. They are also prepared to carry out, in phased withdrawals, a complete withdrawal from Vietnam – phased with North Vietnam withdrawals of forces and aid. We believe USA does not repeat not wish to remain in Vietnam as a military power. We believe them when they say they will withdraw completely before elections are held, so that they will not repeat not be accused of influencing the ultimate decision by the Vietnamese.

13. We are hoping that, if there is clarification of both sides on these two issues, there could be informal negotiations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and USA.

14. In closing the first part of my talk, I should just like to refer again to the concern the Canadian Government feels about the situation in Vietnam. We welcomed the January 4 statement by your Foreign Ministry, and certain aspects of the Four Points, and the letter from your President. These three things gave us some reason for hoping that there could be a peaceful settlement here. We fear for our interests, for the interests of the people of Vietnam, and of the world, the dangerous situation which is developing here with respect to the mistrust of motives on both sides. Both sides are talking about a victory over the other. Your officers have been very frank in giving me the impression that the DRVN is very confident of victory (Prime Minister laughs) and we know the Americans are also confident. That they are gaining a victory in the limited area where they intend a victory.

15. We believe it is not repeat not possible through military means, a military victory, to obtain the political objectives of either side. So we would like negotiations to start in an informal way, in order to prevent war from engulfing the world. We are wondering if Canada can use its influence in any way to help, or possibly in the future, the ICSC. The Commission is the continuing institution from the Geneva Agreements, and both sides say they want to return to the Agreements.

16. Now you must pardon me for continuing so long – the reason is that my Government and I myself are very concerned. Now I am prepared to listen quietly to what you say particularly on the two questions, the question of the withdrawal of American troops and the question of the representation of the NLF at the conference table. Any clarification which you can give on this would be appreciated.

Prime Minister:

17. I welcome your visit there, because I think you are a man of goodwill, because we think Prime Minister Pearson is a man of goodwill. And I shall talk to you frankly, just as you have to me. And President Ho Chi Minh asked me to convey to you his greetings because you are a man of goodwill. But it is not repeat not necessarily that we as men of goodwill can solve the problem. (Mutual laughter.) That is the tragic aspect, because we think USA has not repeat not yet such goodwill. Do you agree?

Smallbridge:

18. I am afraid if you mean that the Government of USA will not repeat not change its policy of withdrawal and of leaving Vietnam to its own, I cannot agree; USA will withdraw its troops.

Prime Minister:

19. For me at present, I do not repeat not think quite the same way, because in fact the political and military circles in USA are intensifying the war. We know this, and you must know it too.

Smallbridge:

20. Yes, we know it, we know the commitment is being increased. We fear that the application of the great power, the momentum of the war, will make it more difficult later to reach an agreement than it is now.

Prime Minister:

21. If you say that, it would be difficult for us to talk.

Smallbridge:

22. I can see the difficulty (Prime Minister laughs), because, as before both sides are determined to have a military victory.

Prime Minister:

23. If so, you rightly understand the intention, and in this respect, you and I agree with each other. The conclusion is that USA has not repeat not the goodwill to find a solution, and therefore in today's talk it is not repeat not easy to come to some agreement, not repeat not that we lack it, but because of the lack of goodwill on the side of USA.

Smallbridge:

24. USA will withdraw and you can obtain your objective by negotiation and at the same time prevent any further build up of forces in Vietnam. Because my Government believes this, and knows that there is a possibility, regardless of your distrust I would not repeat not have come otherwise. You can obtain your objectives in this way, we are certain of it.

Prime Minister:

25. I beg your pardon, but your logic is not repeat not satisfactory. This logically would mean that USA increases its military force in order to withdraw; that it occupies Vietnam in order not repeat not to stay on later; that it intensifies the war in order to cease hostilities. The world understands the American intentions, and the American peace campaign met with failure. Therefore what you say is unacceptable to us. One evidence of their lack of goodwill is that the Four-Point stand has never been accepted by USA. They oppose the third point. Why won't they accept the third point? Because they want to seize South Vietnam, it is clear. And if they say so, we have nothing to ponder over. But now they say they will withdraw, they will not repeat not occupy Vietnam and you say so, too. But take our statement of

January 4 they have taken no repeat no [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu] Ho Chi Minh, they ignored it. So in brief, we are prepared but, because of this attitude of USA what can we do?

26. We therefore must conclude that USA want to fight. That they will fight most strongly, escalating in South Vietnam; that they may open up a battlefield in southern Laos. Because they are the aggressor, history has proved it, and international law leaves it in no repeat no doubt. The common people have recognized this: the Americans are attacking us, we must strike back. They have escalated the air war because they are being defeated. Let us look at the situation at the end of 1964 – American strength was 30,000 troops. By the end of 1965, it was 200,000. But 1965 was the year in which they suffered a great defeat, that is known to us, USA and to you. Others do not repeat not know it. By the end of 1966, their strength will be 400,000, and they will use means of warfare more savage than did the German fascists. But they will suffer bitter defeat. In South Vietnam the people will fight more strongly. The expeditionary corps in South Vietnam changes the situation: the puppet government can no repeat no longer speak of nationalism and the people. This is a colonial war by USA. People will stand up and fight – we are proud and shall not repeat not let USA intimidate us with arms. You should not repeat not support them in this policy. The longer the war, the more bitter their defeat. In the face of escalation, increased forces, etc., we shall strike back. If they use other methods, we shall strike back.

27. You understand our aspirations: independence, and freedom to live quietly on our own territory. USA lies on the other side of the ocean – why should they come here? The Vietnam question is complicated, as you know. To come to a settlement, there are two principles: the Americans must go back to the other side of the ocean, and never oppose this truth. (Note: presumably, Vietnamese aspirations.)

Smallbridge:

28. I realized this before coming here, from your Foreign Ministry statement, your President's letters, etc., so I am not repeat not surprised at the clearcut terms of your position. But I am glad you mentioned this is a complex problem. For a complex problem, there is no repeat no simple analysis, no repeat no simple solution. And there are certain aspects of your position which are not repeat not realistic.

29. We are in sympathy with your objectives: independence in which there will be no repeat no interference by any foreign country. In the conference that would follow, you could have guarantees by the great powers which have been involved.

Prime Minister:

30. The Laos and Vietnam Conferences of 1962 and 1954 produced guarantees; of what use were they? And that is because the problem is so complex, not repeat not simple at all.

Smallbridge:

31. One factor is that USA never signed the Agreement. I know they made qualifications afterwards. Another fact is that the French signed it for South Vietnam. These factors may not repeat not explain the failure. The more important of the two is that South Vietnam did not repeat not sign, they at one time even took action to throw out the ICSC. Subsequently they have not repeat not signed, but they have tolerated the Commission and eventually they have cooperated to some extent. But there is no repeat no point in going back to the causes of the troubles (Prime Minister chuckled) here. There can be no repeat no agreement on the real causes. Both sides disagree completely. In any impartial explanation the problem is so complex, there should be no repeat no black and white. After we came to Hanoi (and before, and when we came), we were under no repeat no illusion about the great gap between the two sides. We are convinced a solution is possible if we can only find elements in the positions of both sides where there could be a meeting of minds. And then I asked the question, in spite of your complete distrust of USA, would it not repeat not be worthwhile to explore through direct negotiations or, because the distrust is too great and would lead to an explosion, to use a third party?

Prime Minister:

32. We are talking.

Smallbridge:

[33.] Yes, but I am not the representative of USA nor am I authorized to speak for you. There are better choices than Canada, there are many others. I can give you one assurance, however: Canada would prefer to see USA and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam engage in informal talks. Let the war go on while you talk (as at Panmunjom in Korea). And then, if you find some grounds for negotiating the main issues, agree then upon a ceasefire and call a conference, and secure guarantees. And if that becomes impossible, you might do as at the Korean peace conference: do without the formality of a peace treaty. But, if the issues discussed are acceptable to both sides, and American troops are withdrawn as a result of agreement, you will have achieved your objective without war, suffering and fear of escalation.

Prime Minister:

34. But all this depends on one thing only: that our Canadian friends should persuade their American friends to adopt the Four Points and our Foreign Ministry statement of January 4. And we are waiting for the reaction of our Canadian friends.

Smallbridge:

35. We would be glad to do this, if you would give us some [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu] that we would have some reason to persuade the Americans to do what you want them to do.

Prime Minister:

36. We cannot repeat not achieve anything at all. You see, the Four Points are the fundamental, unchangeable principle of our people. I think our Canadian friends can understand the correctness of these points. We cannot repeat not reduce anything. The third point is the most important, the main limit condition. Points one and two lead up to point three, and point three must be recognized in order to have point four. Therefore our Four Points will be accepted, or they will not repeat not be accepted. And the January 4 statement is a new step: USA must unconditionally stop all air raids against North Vietnam. The world is urging this now.

Smallbridge:

37. Now we may be coming to a point which, if clarified, may be leading to something. You can provide me now with a clarification which would enable me to bring a message to USA. It is this. We have the two statements by our Prime Minister (which I have already mentioned): our Prime Minister asked for cessation, and he regretted the resumption. USA have already given you a good answer which may meet your compromise in this respect. USA said that, during the pause, there was no repeat no response from the DRVN to any USA attempts the Americans made in the peace offensive. The Americans have made one significant statement. And if I could state to the Canadian Government your position with respect to a very vital issue, we might do what the Chinese say (spoken in Chinese): "If an opportunity comes your way, you must enter into it". (Note: the Prime Minister, though he had professed little knowledge of Chinese, did not repeat not have to await the translation to appreciate the quotation.) I am coming to the point. The opportunity might be the Canadian opportunity I am talking about. If USA Government stops the bombing, is the DRVN prepared to have informal talks either directly, or indirectly with a third party? USA – we believe USA statement that "we are prepared to appoint representatives to meet with the DRVN at any place, at any time, on any subject of the issues that divide us". If they stop bombing, are you prepared to have these informal talks?

Prime Minister:

38. I shall answer you. What we pointed out in our statement January 4 is this: if USA Government declares that it will stop all military action, attacks, against the DRVN for good and unconditionally, definitively. (Note: these variations reflect the translator's search for the exact word.)

Smallbridge:

39. You are asking for cessation of such action against the DRVN, and if that is the case, you are prepared to meet USA to prepare the ground for ultimate negotiations?

Prime Minister:

40. To the sentence I must add: unconditionally and definitively. This is in the official statement. And for our part we will look into the attitude of USA. And with all understanding. Our logic is very clear. It is clear to you, the schemes of USA in attacking North Vietnam. They want to use it as a trump card and that cannot repeat not be. They must officially declare they will stop it unconditionally and for good. We know what we have to do.

Smallbridge:

41. This is not repeat not quite clear.

Prime Minister:

42. This afternoon we will send you an aide-mémoire. You must be quite clear [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu].

Smallbridge:

43. You are limiting what you say to North Vietnam territory?

Prime Minister:

44. Yes.

Smallbridge:

45. This has nothing to do with USA action in the South?

Prime Minister:

46. I have not repeat not mentioned it. Should I?

Smallbridge:

47. Yes.

Prime Minister:

48. We have one objective: USA withdrawal.

Smallbridge:

49. Are you prepared to negotiate this?

Prime Minister:

50. This is in the Four Points. In this connection, the body with the authority is the NLF. They can talk, the two belligerents. There will be small, big and bigger fighting. USA want to ignore the NLF, but they cannot.

Smallbridge:

51. Is that a precondition to talks, or can it be left for negotiations? Is there some possibility of starting informal talks between you? If your sentence is agreed to, can there be talks, with the issues with respect to South Vietnam being left for discussion at a future conference? Informal talks may repeat may lead to a cease-fire, and then to a conference?

Prime Minister:

52. In fact, our position includes many aspects. In brief we can say that informal talks and a cessation of attacks against North Vietnam go together.

Smallbridge:

53. On the latter point, could you clarify it: USA must declare to stop definitely and unconditionally otherwise there will be no repeat no talks. Query: the condition is limited to North Vietnam?

Prime Minister:

54. Correct. About the Canadian opportunity. I know your position and your efforts in contributing to this, should you succeed in persuading USA – I do not repeat not ask you to (Prime Minister laughs), it must be up to you. There have been many previous unfortunate experiences with other missions.

Smallbridge:

55. I am glad you say this. We are not repeat not volunteering.

Prime Minister:

56. Yes, I understand.

Smallbridge:

57. But we are glad to carry to USA the conditions you make, your position.

Prime Minister:

58. But don't ask this (Prime Minister laughs).

Smallbridge:

59. We understand. We could suggest to USA that you would be prepared to have talks, and we are prepared to bring back a reply from USA. They may want to modify the condition. This is an informal arrangement; we have not repeat not volunteered, you have not repeat not asked us, and we will say nothing to the press about this. For the press, I suggest a very repeat very general statement to the effect that the Canadian Government has sent a retired diplomat here with the reply to Ho Chi Minh's letter and to enquire into a use for the ICSC, probing ICSC possibilities; he has come under the auspices of the ICSC, and has had an exchange of views. Something harmless like that. We do not repeat not commit you, you do not repeat not commit us, we do it in complete secrecy.

Prime Minister:

60. As to the info for the press before you leave, that will be in the hands of the Foreign Minister.

61. [We?] should add something about what has just been said, to make it more precise. When USA have made a declaration corresponding to our requirements, we shall, for our part, contemplate it and decide what to do. For our part, we understand what you have in mind (note: we took this to mean that after the American declaration, the DRVN would give consideration to starting talks. Probably an indication that they would not repeat not bind themselves unconditionally to talks, unless the American declaration is satisfactory).

62. Now, the ICSC. We are true to the Geneva Agreements. We maintain a [Group corrupt/ Groupe corrompu] issue receive you because of the attitude of the Canadian Government and because of the fact that Canada is a member of the ICSC in two capacities. On the ICSC I have a suggestion to make to you. Do think it over. For a long time the Commission has done things with which we do not repeat not agree. For the time being, the Commission can do nothing good. If it can do nothing good, let it then abstain from doing anything bad. If it does anything bad, it will not repeat not help, it will bring bad things to you. They do no repeat no harm to us. Furthermore, I will not repeat not advise the Canadian member of the IC to do nothing bad.

63. What is our purpose to enable Canada to have an opportunity. You see, the talk we are having today is one I have not repeat not had with many people. We appreciate the attitude of the Canadian Government. In this issue, in this problem, if you can do something, it is good. We do not repeat not want war, we know what it brings about, we understand it fully. Nobody wants war. Our people have had it now for twenty years, we know it in our flesh and in our soul. We appreciate Canadian goodwill. We are not repeat not lacking it. You know our history: we must be independent, free masters in our territory. We have pride.

64. So, today our talk is between men of goodwill. And because of this goodwill, we receive you, welcome you, and talk frankly and I have exhausted what I have to say. It is not repeat not easy. Maybe today's talk will bring nothing. Maybe on your return Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin will not repeat not have success in persuading USA. But, if not repeat not, come again and try another time.

Smallbridge:

65. I am moved at these expressions of goodwill. We agree and sympathize with your objectives, and while we have no repeat no illusions about any success, we shall certainly do whatever we can to bring about ultimately a meeting on an informal basis. We are not repeat not participating in a peace offensive for USA. We have no repeat no ambitions to be the medium to settle the problem for the sake of any kudos it might bring us. We are hoping merely to make a very modest and informal probing of positions. Because Canada has only one desire: peace and stability in Vietnam, reconstruction and the restoring of what has been lost in the long war.

66. We appreciate what you have said about the ICSC. We may not repeat not have taken a stand in the Commission that has always been approved by you. We have attempted to be impartial in our judgement. It is our intention in the future to use our position on the Commission to continue this impartiality and fairness to both sides.

67. Since the Commission is the only remaining channel for contact on both sides, Mr. Moore will always have his door and his ears open as a Canadian or as a member of the Commission. He is our contact with you. We have indications that in time the other members of the Commission may join with Canada in probing the possibility of a peace settlement.

68. Now I, too, have exhausted everything I have to say. I am grateful to you for having heard me and for having a possibility indicated, a slight glimmer of hope that something may be achieved. I would very much appreciate an opportunity to shake hands with the President; if it is not repeat not possible, please give him my greetings. Personally also we met in Delhi. It has been an honour for me to come as a messenger, bringing our reply, couched in general terms, to his letter, which was also couched in general terms.

Prime Minister:

70.[22] Once again I say to you we welcome you here as a messenger of the Canadian Government, with your goodwill, your feeling for the cause of our people. We hope that our talk today will bring something, from my heart I hope so. In this world goodwill does not repeat not determine the result, but it is precious. For our part, we appreciate your goodwill. I tell you this once again, to express appreciation of your talk.

71. Ho Chi Minh regretted not repeat not to see you. Before I came here, he asked me to give you his greetings.

72. And yesterday's report said that in Canada there is a movement calling for support of the DRVN, a demonstration before Prime Minister Pearson's house.[23]

73. One thing I would ask you to convey to Prime Minister Pearson, no repeat no doubt you will report our talk to him, you will report our point of view, tell him our Government does wish the Canadian Government to bring its good contribution (offices) to this problem. In this spirit we shall in the future tell each other whatever we have to say and so [in] the meantime, Ambassador Moore should come at any time we will receive him.

74. The audience concluded with handshakes, some pleasantries in French, more photographs outside, with the Prime Minister being restrained by Smallbridge from accompanying us all the way to the car.

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[22] The original document skipped from paragraph 68 to paragraph 70.
Le document original passait du paragraphe 68 au paragraphe 70.

[23] See/Voir "Three Call off Vigil in PM's Driveway," *Globe and Mail*, 7 March 1966, p. 9.

376.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

Top Secret.
[Ottawa,] March 15, 1966

RONNING'S VISIT TO VIETNAM

Ronning was due to arrive at his home in Camrose last evening. He has undertaken to telephone us today. If you agree, we will suggest to Ronning that he come to Ottawa tomorrow. Depending on his time of arrival (likely to be 19:05 p.m.) this should give you an opportunity to see him on Thursday morning at the latest.

2. We have been considering how best the message Ronning is carrying can be conveyed to the Americans.[24] It is our view that this should be done by Mr. Ritchie. We do not think that, in view of some of the publicity which has already attended Ronning's visit to the two Vietnams, it would be possible for him to slip unobtrusively into Washington. On the assumption that the Americans are to be informed through Mr. Ritchie, I suggest that we ask him to come to Ottawa on Wednesday to be present when Ronning gives an account of his discussions in North Vietnam and the general atmosphere in which they were conducted. We have sent Mr. Ritchie a warning telegram in this sense which can be quickly confirmed by telephone.

3. I imagine that, after they have received the message, the Americans may be anxious to talk directly to Ronning. It would be my view that the best means of arranging for this would be after consultation with Mr. Ritchie. As I have already indicated, I would not be in favour of Ronning himself going to Washington at this stage. There may, however, be advantage in having someone senior in the State Department come to Canada for this purpose.[25]

4. We have been giving thought to the problem of public presentation of the Ronning visits. As you know, the only thing of substance which has so far appeared about these visits are the two communiqués issued, respectively, at the conclusion of his visits to Saigon and Hanoi. Coupled with the emphasis which has been placed by the North Vietnamese authorities on the need for complete secrecy, I believe that we should try to avoid saying any more than is absolutely necessary so as not to put the North Vietnamese in a position where they may feel obliged to repudiate the approach they have made through us.

5. You will wish, of course, to say something about these visits to the House. I believe this should be done some time early next week, after you have had a full report from Ronning. As I see it, any statement you make should be largely factual. It would refer to the visits

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[24] The United States received an early report on Ronning's mission from Oscar Vance Armstrong, United States Consul in Hong Kong, who spoke with Ronning during the latter's return voyage to Canada. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 97.
Les États-Unis ont reçu un rapport préliminaire sur la mission de Ronning rédigé par Oscar Vance Armstrong, consul des États-Unis à Hong Kong, qui s'est entretenu avec Ronning après son voyage à Hanoï. Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. IV (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 97.

[25] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Minister's comments relate to this aspect of the visits. K. G[oldschlag]

made and the purposes for which you asked Ronning to undertake them; it would also refer to the opportunity which Ronning took to present the Prime Minister's reply to Ho Chi Minh's letter; and you might conclude by saying that you are now studying the results of these visits and their implications for what Canada has been doing to bring this problem closer to a peaceful settlement.[26]

6. The North Vietnamese authorities have informed us that they have no objection to the tabling of the Prime Minister's letter to Ho Chi Minh. Your statement in the House will give you an opportunity to do so. Copies in English and French have been prepared for this purpose.[27]

7. We shall next wish to prepare messages for you to send to Mr. Rapacki and Mr. Swaran Singh. I think that such messages will be expected of you in view of the fact that you gave them advance notice of Ronning's visits and that he was able to have fairly full discussions with the Indian and Polish Commissioners in Saigon. As I see it, these messages would provide a brief account of Ronning's visits and would conclude in some way by saying that, as a result of these visits, you did not feel that the opportunity of the Commission playing a part in the right circumstances was in any way foreclosed. The drafting of these messages would have to be done with considerable care. On the one hand, we cannot of course disclose any of the substantive opening which Ronning found in Hanoi since there is every likelihood that this would filter back to the North Vietnamese through Indian or Polish channels. On the other hand, there are risks in our giving India and Poland only a partial account. In the case of Poland at least we cannot exclude the possibility that the North Vietnamese might themselves inform the Poles of the substance of their conversations with Ronning. In any case, it is always possible that the Poles would wish to check directly with the North Vietnamese whatever account they receive from us of these conversations.

8. In view of the fact that we informed the British of the Ronning visit, we would propose, if you agree, to make a copy of your messages to Rapacki and Swaran Singh available to them. Perhaps we might also bring U Thant into the picture to the same extent.[28] As far as contact with other friendly countries is concerned, we would not propose to take them into our confidence beyond the contents of whatever statement you decide to make in the House.[29]

9. We have had a preliminary discussion about the presentation of these visits to the press. We have agreed that, as far as the Department is concerned, all press enquiries should be channelled through Mr. Fortier. In terms of substance, it is our strong feeling that little should be said to the press beyond the terms of your statement in the House and the exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and Ho Chi Minh. We also feel that we should, to the

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[26] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes. P[aul] M[artin]

[27] See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 39–44. For Martin's statement on Vietnam before the Standing Committee on 4 April 1966, see pp. 19–26.
Voir Canada, Chambre des communes, Comité permanent des affaires extérieures, *Procès-verbaux et témoignages*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 1, no 1, p. 39-44. La déclaration faite sur le Vietnam par Martin devant le comité permanent le 4 avril 1966 se trouve aux pages 19 à 26.

[28] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes. P[aul] M[artin]

[29] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
I agree. P[aul] M[artin]
We can decide about talks with the U.S. after I have talked to Ronning myself. Of course it will be useful for C[hester] R[onning] to be here at that time. My present view is that we can arrange for U.S. people to meet us "somewhere" around here. P[aul] M[artin]

maximum extent possible, discourage further press interest in these visits. The more public attention is focussed on the Ronning mission the more difficult it is likely to be for us to safeguard the highly confidential character of what may well be a series of exchanges over a considerable period of time.[30]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

377.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6321

Secret.
[Ottawa,] March 17, 1966

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Winters),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Sharp),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Laing),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. MacEachen),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Teillet),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. Favreau),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Nicholson),
The Minister of Forestry (Mr. Sauvé),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson),
The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Pennell),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Marchand),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Greene),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Côté).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner), (Mr. Wall).

[…]

VISIT TO HANOI OF MR. CHESTER RONNING

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that, in addition to initiatives which had been taken in relation to the International Control Commission in Indo China, it had been considered useful to arrange for Mr. Chester Ronning to visit Peking, and from this to seek agreement for a further visit to Hanoi for discussions with senior officials of the North Vietnamese government. While initial discussions between Mr. Ronning and officials of Communist China had indicated that the Chinese did not consider the time ripe as yet for such discussions, Mr. Ronning had nevertheless arranged to spend some days in Hanoi for discussions with Ho Chi Minh. Mr. Ronning had been well received by the North Vietnamese,

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[30] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Mr. Cadieux, see Minister's comments on pages 2 and 3. Mr. Collins advised in general terms. J.G. H[adwen]

who had indicated that there was in their view a positive role to be played by the Control Commission and had also expressed the hope that Canada would undertake independent initiatives. While there was therefore cause for some encouragement as a result of Mr. Ronning's discussions, it was important that their nature be kept entirely confidential for the time being. Carefully worked out discussions with the United States would be necessary before further action could be taken. Mr. Ronning would arrive in Ottawa that evening to report to Mr. Martin and the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister said that Mr. Ronning, with his vast experience and knowledge of the Orient, had handled the discussions with great skill and intelligence. Because of the delicacy of these negotiations, it was of the utmost importance that they not be revealed. Any premature publicity would probably result in the North Vietnamese disavowing such negotiations entirely.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Prime Minister concerning discussions which Mr. Chester Ronning had recently had with senior officials of the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi.

[…]

378.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

Top Secret.
[Ottawa,] March 18, 1966

VIETNAM

In the light of our discussions this morning, it is my understanding that we would handle the presentation of the North Vietnamese proposition to the Americans in the following manner:

(1) You would telephone Rusk either in the course of this afternoon or after your discussion with the Prime Minister. You would say to Rusk that Ronning had brought a proposition with him from Hanoi. This proposition would be conveyed to the Americans on Monday by Ritchie and Ronning. It would be your hope that the existence of this proposition would be treated with the utmost secrecy. While it was not our intention to attempt any evaluation of the substance of the proposition at this stage, we attached importance to it as possible evidence of an unblocking of channels. Accordingly, it was our hope that careful consideration would be given to the proposition at the highest level and with a sense of urgency. You would conclude by suggesting that Rusk give you his preliminary reaction as soon as possible after he has had an opportunity to study the implications of the proposition.

(2) Ritchie and Ronning would proceed to Washington on Sunday afternoon by an R.C.A.F. plane. They would meet Bundy, the senior official responsible for Vietnam in the State Department, at some inconspicuous location in the vicinity of but not in Washington. On that occasion a piece of paper would be given to the Americans – drawn as far as possible from the verbatim record of Ronning's conversation with Pham Van Dong – which would represent the closest formulation we can arrive at of the North Vietnamese proposition. At the same time Ronning would give the Americans an oral account of his conversations in Hanoi along with his impressions of what the North Vietnamese proposition means, the areas of uncertainty surrounding it, and the degree of willingness which may exist in Hanoi to consider counter-propositions.

(3) You would expect Rusk to call you as soon as he is able to give you his preliminary reaction which will presumably reflect the reaction of the President. Depending on Rusk's reaction, you could propose that [*sic*]

(4) You should meet Rusk for further discussions on the substance and subsequent manner of handling this matter. Ronning would have made it clear in his prior talks in Washington that the North Vietnamese had indicated a clear preference for using the Canadian channel in any further exchanges for the time being.[31]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

379.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

Top Secret.
[Ottawa,] March 21, 1966

RONNING'S CURRENT DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON

I am attaching for your information a copy of the informal memorandum which was prepared over the weekend for Ronning to take to Washington and to present to the Americans as a basis for his discussions.

2. You will note that this text is a very condensed version of what we see as the essence of the North Vietnamese Prime Minister's "proposition". We have deliberately avoided any kind of assessment or interpretation. It was agreed that Ronning himself would provide a more detailed account of his discussions and of the atmosphere surrounding them in response to questioning in Washington.

3. You may wish to bring this text to the Minister's attention.

4. Copies 1 and 2 of the attached memorandum were given to Messrs. Ronning and Ritchie on Sunday: copy number 3 is on file and copy number five has been destroyed.

5. Ronning and Ritchie saw William Bundy at dinner at the Embassy last night and I believe we are to receive an account of the meeting in the course of today.

K[laus] Goldschlag

Enclosure: Memorandum
Pièce jointe : Note

Top Secret.

Accompanied by Mr. V.C. Moore, Canadian Commissioner, I.C.S.C., Mr. Chester Ronning visited Hanoi from March 7 to 11, as a Special Representative of the Canadian Government.

Mr. Ronning's instructions were to present Prime Minister Pearson's reply to Ho Chi Minh's letter of January 24, and to discuss with the North Vietnamese authorities the conditions in which they would envisage a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, including the possibility

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[31] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
March 19th. In my telephone talks with Rusk this a.m. I followed the suggested line to the letter. P[aul] M[artin]

of the International Commission playing a helpful good offices role in bringing about or facilitating such negotiations. His primary objective was to obtain, if possible, authoritative clarification of the conditions enunciated by the Hanoi Government as required elements in a negotiated settlement.

Ronning was received by, and had discussions with, Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, Col. Ha Van Lau, Chief of the PAVN Mission in charge of liaison with the I.C.S.C., and, on the last day of the visit, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. This final interview lasted for two hours.

All the discussions were marked, on the North Vietnamese side, by repeated emphasis on the necessary acceptance of the "Four Points" as the only basis on which a peaceful settlement could be approached, and by an apparent uncompromising belief in the ultimate "victory" of their cause.

The early part of the interview with Pham Van Dong revealed these same obdurate attitudes, and seemed to suggest that there would be no deviation by the Prime Minister from the determined, confident, hard-line approach registered by the others in previous discussions. Towards the end of the interview, however, and under persistent questioning by Ronning about the conditions Hanoi would require to have met before entering into direct or indirect talks with the U.S.A., the Prime Minister gave the following indication: North Vietnamese willingness to enter into some form of preliminary contact hinges on a commitment by the U.S.A. to cease "bombing and all acts of war against North Vietnam" "unconditionally and for good".

In reply to questioning he made it clear that this condition was limited to North Vietnamese territory and did not encompass U.S. military activity in the South.

It was not clear whether the commitment envisaged by Pham Van Dong was to be given publicly, or diplomatically. (The translator used the term "declaration".) Furthermore, while Pham Van Dong conveyed the impression that Hanoi's response to such a move by the U.S.A. would lead to negotiating contacts, he gave no clarification of whether he envisaged these as being direct or indirect. He said: "In fact, our position includes many aspects. In brief, we can say that informal talks and a cessation of attacks against North Vietnam go together."

He did intimate, however, that he was soliciting a U.S. response, and a further exchange with the U.S.A. through Canadian channels. "For our part", Pham Van Dong said, "we will look into the attitude of the U.S.A., and with all understanding."

It was agreed that what had been said to Ronning would be conveyed to the U.S.A., as a Canadian understanding of the North Vietnamese position, and not on the basis of a request by North Vietnam to do so. It was also understood that Canada was not volunteering to act as a mediator.

Emphasis was laid on the importance of absolute secrecy in any exchange that might develop from Ronning's discussions. Earlier feelers had become public and the North Vietnamese had been forced to issue a denial.

380.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 838
Washington, March 21, 1966
Top Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Commissioner only) (Priority) from Ottawa.

VIETNAM – RONNING

Ronning had two-hour discussion of his trip last night with Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, at my residence. Bundy listened to Ronning's account with great interest, and had full notes taken by an assistant.

2. After describing his various interviews in Saigon and general atmosphere of his reception in Hanoi, Ronning outlined circumstances in which he was successively received at short notice by various North Vietnamese dignitaries culminating with Premier Pham Van Dong. He indicated that DRVN Vice Foreign Minister had taken completely hard line all through interview and had been bitter and almost abusive in his comments. Foreign Minister had likewise adopted entirely rigid and uncompromising line. ICC Liaison Officer Col. Ha Van Lau had displayed same rigid attitude: continued presence of ICC including Canadians was desired but DRVN did not repeat not like all that Canadians did; it was to be hoped that Commission would reach only "good" decisions; no repeat no decisions were preferable to bad ones. Ronning stressed black-and-white tones (terms such as "correct" and "incorrect") in which North Vietnamese seemed to see all issues.

3. Pham Van Dong spoke in lower key and used less fanatical language than his subordinates, but almost to end of interview he took same rigid stance as they had done. He then started to moderate somewhat, perhaps by pre-arrangement, in response to Ronning's repeated query as to whether he had anything of substance to convey. Premier then indicated that DRVN would be prepared to have talks if USA declared that it would stop bombing unconditionally and for good; he reiterated this at Ronning's request, and agreed to record it in aide-mémoire (which was subsequently not repeat not provided on pretext that there had been misunderstanding and that Prime Minister had been speaking of final communiqué).

4. Bundy asked whether Prime Minister had also mentioned necessity of any action by USA in South along with cessation of bombing of North. Ronning stressed that Premier had answered in negative when Ronning enquired whether anything in South was involved as precondition for talks.

5. Ronning went on to say that Premier then started to hedge. Pham Van Dong said he had had talk like this with very few, although previously he had implied that his statement was nothing more than had already been said in DRVN Foreign Ministry statement of January 4. Bundy commented that link between DRVN Four Points and declaration of cessation of bombing was ambiguous in January 4 statement and also in January 24 letter to Heads of Government; it could conceivably be argued, if certain punctuation was accepted, that there was a hint that issuance of declaration on bombing would imply an acceptance of the Four Points.

6. Ronning said that it was clear that Prime Minister wished him to carry away impression that cessation of bombing was the only prerequisite; Four Points would apparently be question for discussion in conference. Premier indicated that he would appreciate Canada using its good offices to convey DRVN position to USA, but that because of previous embarrassments DRVN was very anxious to have exchange kept absolutely secret. Prime Minister said that DRVN was anxious that this channel should be kept open, and that "we will look into attitude of USA with all understanding".

7. Ronning said that he had stressed to Prime Minister that Canada was not repeat not attempting to mediate. It was in order to avoid creating impression of mediating that Ronning had refrained from seeking any modification of the condition for starting talks. During conversations in Hanoi, Ronning concentrated on point that Canada, as close neighbour and friend of USA, felt that President Johnson's statements (e.g., about eventual withdrawal and absence of USA desire for bases) could and should be taken at face value. Strong USA of 1966 should not repeat not be equated with weak France of 1954. DRVN should approach situation with greater realism.

8. Ronning said that DRVN leaders reminded him repeatedly that they expected Hanoi and Haiphong would be bombed but that DRVN as primarily agricultural country could withstand this assault. Ronning encouraged them to believe that USA troops in South would increase to 400,000 (as predicted by them) or more.

9. DRVN leaders professed not repeat not to attach too much practical importance to Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, and they were thoroughly even-handed in their treatment of USSR and China. They said Chou En-Lai would head Chinese delegation to CPSU Congress.

10. Ronning summarized his personal interpretation of talk with Premier as follows. Pham Van Dong conveyed impression that his basic point about unconditional cessation of bombing had been fished out of him, but this may well have been deliberate tactic, coming at end of succession of interviews during which DRVN sought to explore Ronning's brief by holding to hard line. Ronning stressed that he might be entirely wrong in concluding that DRVN was separating bombing issue from Four Points, but this was undoubtedly impression Pham Van Dong sought to create. Ronning thought it was significant that DRVN displayed desire to keep channel open.

11. Bundy indicated great interest in all aspects of Ronning's conversations in Hanoi. Nature of his questions confirmed that he fully understood possible significance of what had been said to Ronning. He was particularly concerned to establish whether Pham Van Dong, in bringing up question of USA declaration on bombing, had stipulated any other condition in this context such as de-escalation in South, prior USA withdrawal, or position of VC in negotiations. Ronning replied in negative.

12. Bundy thought it logical that Communists would seek to establish contact with their enemy through a close associate of that enemy; they almost always preferred talking to an avowed foe than to someone in middle. Indians, UAR and Yugoslavs (latter despised by DRVN) were therefore unlikely to have any real role to play. Bundy wondered if Pham Van Dong had specifically asked Ronning to return, to which Ronning said that DRVN was merely anxious that Canadian channel (rather than any one personality) should remain available.

13. Bundy indicated that Ronning's account, including written summary which we provided, would be studied with great deliberation and care, and he conveyed impression that no repeat no precisely similar signals had reached USA through other sources.

14. Bundy himself remarked that implications of Ronning's talks constituted hard cards to play, and I should think that USA authorities will want to give whole problem very careful study before deciding on any reaction.[32]

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

381.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 235
Saigon, March 23, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 214† Mar 18.

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[32] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 97 n. 4.

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

At the risk of being repetitious, I will touch in the following paragraphs 2 to 8 on the essence of some of the discussions between Smallbridge and myself during and after our visit to Hanoi, March 7-11.

2. The DRVN officials with whom we spoke did not repeat not react negatively to the suggestion that the Commission be used as a possible channel through which talks might be started, or that it might have an effective role when the time is ripe. Our impression was, however, that at the present time they have the more immediately practical hope that Canadian membership in the Commission, providing contacts with both sides, can be used. At the same time they were most anxious we should not repeat not let anyone know that they were in favour of (or guilty of) taking any positive steps to use Canada. There are perhaps two reasons for this wish for discretion: (a) their relations with China, which would presumably not repeat not welcome their making overtures; (b) DRVN leaders do not repeat not want to give the USA any reason for believing they are caving in. This probably explains the hard line given Smallbridge – a rigid policy and a complete distrust of American intentions. A further purpose of these harangues delivered in the preliminary interviews and informal discussions, and continued by the Prime Minister, could be a wish to justify themselves before their own party. After having declared himself in the presence of his colleagues (orally and by verbatim record) that he is in complete agreement with the party line, there was then a gradual transition, with Smallbridge giving him an excuse and opening by persistent questioning. Only then could Pham Van Dong admit to any prospects of negotiation, and then only after cessation of military action against North Vietnam territory. After indicating what he considered to be a concession, he closed the proposal off again in a more rigid way; viz., this has already been said: (in Foreign Minister's memo of January 4). His attitude softened again and in asking us to communicate this to our friends he talked about Canada's and DRVN's goodwill. What we have is still not repeat not much, and not repeat not acceptable to the Americans as it stands, but it is a grain of hope.

3. There was incidentally no repeat no indication that others (for example the Foreign Minister) knew in advance of the proposed offer which the Prime Minister made, and it may be that the Ministry counselled, after the event, against an aide-mémoire. When I asked Vice Foreign Minister Thach about it at my reception the evening before we left, he asked if I did not repeat not agree that the arrangement with the Prime Minister was something not repeat not to put down in writing – it would be better orally. He even hinted at a mistake on the interpreter's part, that was hardly possible, and we left with the clear impression that an aide-mémoire had really been intended. However, it would have had to contain the more extreme demands as well as this "grain", and leaving it as an oral exchange certainly gives us more flexibility for our presentation of it to the Americans (in "persuading" our friends), and would offer more chance of a response – and there was an evident desire to have a response. It seems clear that the issue uppermost in their minds is their own position, not repeat not that of the Vietcong. Possibly in time this preoccupation could lead them to follow the policy typical of Communist governments everywhere – if it is in their own interest to sacrifice any other Communist party or agent: in other words, "our own national and party security is the most important thing in the international Communist campaign".

5.[33] The only question we were asked about calls made in Saigon was put informally – had Smallbridge seen Foreign Minister Tran Van Do as expected, it had been taken for granted in Hanoi that he would have sounded out the DRVN [*sic*] Government in Saigon, and this was not repeat not taken amiss.

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[33] The original document skipped from paragraph 3 to paragraph 5.
Le document original passait du paragraphe 3 au paragraphe 5.

6. The Polish Commissioner, Wendrowski, made the point to us that the Poles also, apart from any possible joint Commission action, have been maintaining a continuing contact and taking soundings in Hanoi (Wendrowski made several visits this year, once with Michalowski), and Tran Van Do told me that on a number of occasions, at Wendrowski's request he has set out in plain terms the RVN position. However, there is not repeat not much the Poles can do until they get the green light from the Russians, who at present are apparently unwilling to embarrass the DRVN and themselves by urging, even through a third party, that the DRVN "negotiate under fire".

7. Smallbridge was impressed with the realistic appraisal by the British ambassador, Etherington-Smith, who made much of his belief that, if there is military success for the DRVN [*sic*] and the Americans, everything else will move in behind it – the psychological effect on the villagers of seeing the Vietcong beaten will be very great. Against this stands belief, based on long experience in Asia, that it is not repeat not possible for a government in Asia backed by foreign troops to carry out pacification – that no repeat no Asian government can in the long run succeed with the support of foreign troops.

8. It is apparent that both North and the South wish the Commission (and especially the Canadian presence it makes possible in both capitals) to continue in being because it leaves a door open to both of them (to the Americans also, as Cabot Lodge pointed out last week). Another motive is of course to substantiate, by their "correct" attitude to the Commission, their protestations of respect for the Geneva Agreements. However, the "current application" of the Agreements has two meanings and this will not repeat not easily come out in the wash: for the South it means a return to 1954 to the 17th parallel and the *status quo ante* for the foreseeable future, the reunification (set?) for some distant date and for the North, it of course means one united country under Hanoi and that without delay.

9. After my visit to Hanoi in February, I reported my feeling of a certain warmth below the surface; and this was again apparent during my visit with Smallbridge. There is not repeat not much hard evidence of it, but there is the fact that they have received us twice in Hanoi (both times warmly and discreetly), they wish to continue this contact, and they want our good offices vis-à-vis the Americans (and this at the considerable irk that the Americans will in their turn interpret their offer as "a sign of weakness" and simply bash them harder). In the South, too, the genuine warmth with which Smallbridge's mission was received by Head of State, Foreign Minister and other officials is evidence of the good wishes which go out to them on efforts for peace in undertaking such "exchanges of views" (and, as in the North, there has been full cooperation in Saigon in dealing with them discreetly and without fanfare). When I saw him off, the last words of the tough Head of the RVN Liaison Mission, Nguyen Van An, now Minister at the Embassy in London, were to wish Canada good luck. Similarly, Bui Diem, the new junior Minister for Foreign Affairs, commented that it had been a very long haul from the colonial period, through nine years of Diem, two years of riots and disorder to the present state where the South Vietnamese have pulled themselves together in order to try again, both militarily and in the political-social-economic field: "We all concentrate on the day-to-day tasks, but each of us lives with a personal agony". In his case, this is the fact that he has relatives, particularly his brother, in Hanoi, with no repeat no certainty of their ever seeing each other again. Like many others Bui wished I had a suitcase big enough for him to ride in on one of the courier flights, not repeat not so much to see Hanoi, but to find relative there. Bui concluded with typical fatalism saying that a peaceful settlement someday can be hoped for but that it is perhaps right that "we should in the meantime suffer – in the past we too have done some things which have not repeat not been very good". The splitting of families North and South is widespread (more so, I would say, than in divided Germany, especially among the educated people and officials). There are other small signs: the excitement among domestic staff in Saigon over a "genuine Hanoi" peach-blossom tree sent me at Tet by the PAVN Liaison Mission, or a student working at

the PPTS[34] who (I learned later) gave me priority on long-distance telephone calls to my family in Canada because of his enthusiasm for what he described as my "peace making" talks in Hanoi in February. There are sizeable defections of Vietcong and PAVN regular troops; there are also sizeable desertions of ARVN troops but both these are perhaps less likely to be out of conviction or ideology than simply because they have had enough of war, especially a war carried out at the present intensity. It is not repeat not surprising that there is a wish for peace, in all walks of life: with the intensity of the warfare mounting, Vietnamese of both North and South are suffering as never before in their "25 years of fighting". By this I do not repeat not mean there is a wish for peace at any price, either in the South or in the North; on the contrary. There is, however, an atmosphere favourable to efforts which could open the door to talks and a cease-fire.

[Victor C.] Moore

382.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India and Embassy to Poland
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde et à l'ambassade en Pologne
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA/1

No. Y-263
Ottawa, April 1, 1966
Secret. Immediate/Immediate from London.
Reference: Our Tel Y-192 Feb 28.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Hong Kong (Priority); Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.

VIETNAM: RONNING VISIT AND POSSIBLE COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Grateful if you could pass the following message to Swaran Singh (Rapacki). Begins: In my message of (insert date on which action taken) I informed you of the visits to Saigon and Hanoi which Mr. Chester Ronning had undertaken, to form a general assessment of the reactions we would be likely to encounter in event that we were able to agree on efforts by members of International Commission looking towards peace in Vietnam.

2. While he was in Saigon, Ronning met and had discussions, not repeat not only with Commissioners as you know, but with the South Vietnamese Chief of State and Foreign Minister, and others; in Hanoi he was received by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and others. These talks encompassed a presentation of Canadian views on problem in Vietnam, and wide-ranging discussions of views of North and South Vietnamese Governments' attitudes towards the problems facing them. There were, of course, exchanges of views on present and possible future role of the International Commission. While in Hanoi, Ronning also took the opportunity of delivering Mr. Pearson's reply to President Ho Chi Minh's letter of January 24. I am asking my High Commissioner (Ambassador) to make copy of the Canadian reply available to you.

3. Needless to say, Ronning's reports on these discussions have raised for consideration many aspects of central issues as they present themselves in Vietnam. Among others, Ronning had confirmed to him the importance the South attaches to a cessation of Northern intervention. He also had confirmed to him the importance the North attaches to a cessation of the strikes against its territory (for Warsaw only add following phrase: "which is also the

[34] It was not possible to identify this abbreviation.
Il n'a pas été possible de trouver cette abréviation.

point emerging from your most recent message[35] to me"). These and other factors will obviously have to be taken into careful account in any approach to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. We are now in the process of taking stock of position in light of Ronning's account of his discussions while he was in Vietnam.

4. I am not repeat not yet in a position to suggest what further steps might usefully be taken in the immediate future. However, I thought that, without entering into a discussion of detail at this stage, I should let you know that nothing which we have learned as a result of Ronning's visit has changed my conviction that there is a role which we, as members of the Commission, may be able to play in working towards a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem in the right circumstances.

5. It is my sincere hope that you share my belief that this possibility should be kept open. I would also hope to keep you informed of our thinking as to the next steps which may be open to us in the light of the developing situation in Vietnam. [Ends.]

[Paul] Martin

383.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 1003
Washington, April 2, 1966
Top Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Commissioner only) from Ottawa.

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

During call April 2 on William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far East, I asked if USA had reached any conclusions about significance of Ronning's conversations in Hanoi. Bundy said he had told Rusk about his talk with Ronning. State Department was now preparing message for DRVN authorities which they hoped Moore would take with him on his next trip to Hanoi, and asked when this would be. Please let me know date soonest.

2. Bundy went on to say he thought USA response should be phrased in such a way as to constitute a reply to Hanoi suggestion only if a suggestion had been intended. Idea was to "smoke it out a bit". Bundy doubted, however, if there would be much give in Hanoi's position, especially in light of disturbances in South.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

384.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 1099
Washington, April 13, 1966
Top Secret. Priority.
Reference: My Tel 1003 Apr 2.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Commissioner only) from Ottawa.

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[35] See/Voir doc. 424.

VIETNAM: OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

I asked William Bundy today whether in light of confused political situation in SVN,[36] USA authorities had been able to reach decision on a message to Hanoi. Bundy replied that for moment USA would probably not repeat not want to take any action but that he was keeping this matter under constant review.

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

385.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 309
Saigon, April 16, 1966
Top Secret. Immediate from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only) from Ottawa.

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

It is now 5 weeks since Ronning's visit to Hanoi and nearly 4 since he was in Washington. While we have had no repeat no sign of impatience on the part of DRVN authorities (and I do not repeat not believe PAVN mission's vociferous reaction to Ottawa reference to Commission meetings can be related), disbelief in American will about negotiation can only be aggravated in Hanoi by this kind of pause. It is of course a pity if the Americans had anything to say, that they did not repeat not act before the present disturbances here, which will understandably tempt State Department to delay further. In all this we are of course only a middleman but I am sure you are bearing in mind that if we return to the chargé in Hanoi, we shall not repeat not be able to convincingly gamble if the American response is long [or] if we return to Hanoi with an empty bag, or one with even less in it than when we came from Hanoi in March (you will recall that last year's unrelated operation petered out awkwardly in this way).

2. A side topic which will inevitably be brought up [in] Hanoi is the frequent reference in the American press to the USA Government's "nearing a decision on the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong" (e.g., UPI of April 6 from Washington[37]), the "no repeat no sanctuary" slogan[38] will probably be taken in Hanoi to mean the same thing. Bill Moyers recently did something to take the edge off this,[39] but it would of course be vital to know beforehand whether there is substance to these rumours of a change of American policy on the Haiphong installations and Hanoi itself.

3. In the light of Washington telegram 1099 April 13, I believe I should delay making a visit to Hanoi except in the company of the other Commissioners for the meeting there some time in May. In the meantime, I shall make a start with visits to team sites and the provinces in DRVN [*sic*], beginning with Vung Tau on April 26-29.

[Victor C.] Moore

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[36] See/Voir Max Frankel, "Vietnam Turmoil Now Slows War," *New York Times*, 12 April 1966, p. 1.

[37] See/Voir "Decision Due On Bombing Hanoi Targets," *Pittsburgh Press*, 6 April 1966, p. 17.

[38] See/Voir Murrey Marder, "Reds Cautioned Again: 'No Sanctuary' in War," *Washington Post*, 27 April 1966, p. A1; Philip Potter, "Ports and Power Plants of North Vietnam Are 'No Sanctuaries,' Says Humphrey," *Sun* (Baltimore, Md.), 12 March 1966, p. A1.

[39] See/Voir "The Lighter Side," *New York Times*, 3 April 1966, p. SM53.

386.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA/1

No. Y-288
Ottawa, April 22, 1966
Top Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel 1099 Apr 13.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Commissioner only) (Immediate) from Delhi.
Ambassador or Chargé only.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

As Rusk and Charles Ritchie are away from Washington, Minister phoned Bundy on his own initiative this morning. He told Bundy that Canadian Government attached greatest importance to channel which had been opened up by Ronning. In current situation it appeared to us to be one of very few channels which held any promise of opening up possibilities of moving toward some kind of peaceful settlement of Vietnam conflict.

2. In these circumstances Minister said he thought it most important that there should be some response to what Ronning had brought back from Hanoi. If there were continued delay in transmission of any kind of response, there was serious risk of misunderstanding being created in Hanoi and assumption gaining ground that what they had said to Ronning was not repeat not being considered seriously.

3. Minister indicated that Moore was likely to be in Hanoi for a formal Commission meeting some time after middle of May and that North Vietnamese might draw significance from his visiting Hanoi at that time without having anything to convey. We were also, however, holding open possibility of a further visit to Hanoi by Ronning.

4. Bundy told Minister they were sorry no repeat no response had yet been formulated to the proposition Ronning had brought back with him. He was hopeful, however, that it might be possible to have something cleared within next two or three days.

5. You should know that Minister also raised this matter in his talk with Harriman on April 20. Harriman had not repeat not been briefed on results of Ronning visit but undertook to speak to Rusk immediately on his return from current CENTO meetings.

6. For your own info only, we are anxious to maintain reasonable degree of momentum in conduct of this exercise. While we appreciate that USA officials have had cogent reasons for acting with deliberation in face of recent developments in South Vietnam, we are also concerned that it may prove difficult to protect Canadian channel if exchanges were to be unduly protracted.

387.
Note by Embassy of United States
Note de l'ambassade des États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 358
Secret.
Ottawa, April 26, 1966

The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his compliments to the Minister for External Affairs of Canada and has the honor to transcribe below the text of a memorandum to the Government of Canada. A courtesy copy of the memorandum will be made available in due course to the Canadian Embassy in Washington.

"MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

"1. The Department of State has carefully studied the memorandum provided by Ambassador Chester Ronning following his trip to Hanoi on March 7-11, and has further considered Ambassador Ronning's personal report to Mr. Bundy on his visit to Washington on March 20. As we have previously indicated, we greatly appreciate this effort by the Canadian Government, and the information it has produced.

"2. We agree that the Canadian channel to Hanoi that this approach has provided should be kept open, and have refrained from proposing a reply up to this point because of the political crisis in Saigon. To have approached Hanoi in these circumstances seemed unwise.[40]

"3. As the Canadian Government is aware, a direct channel between the United States Government and Hanoi was opened in Rangoon during the period of the recent bombing suspension. This particular locale was specifically suggested in another direct approach to a North Vietnamese representative. On the same day that bombing was resumed, the North Vietnamese conveyed an Aide Mémoire to us through this channel setting forth certain inquiries and statements of position.[41] In the middle of February, the U.S. responded to this Aide Mémoire in terms that have been communicated in the utmost confidence to the Canadian Government.[42] We have every reason to believe that our message reached Hanoi, although its representative indicated that there would not be any response from Hanoi in light of the resumption of bombing. In other words, the record stands that a direct channel has been opened, but that Hanoi chooses for the time being not to employ it.

"4. Against this background, and in the light of repeated North Vietnamese statements insisting upon the acceptance of the so-called 'Four Points' before any discussions or negotiations – and insisting that the U.S. demonstrate such acceptance by 'concrete acts' such as the unequivocal and permanent cessation of bombing of the North – the U.S. Government is unable to evaluate the message conveyed to Mr. Ronning as indicating any real 'give' in Hanoi's position. We understand that Prime Minister Pham Van Dong reiterated the Government of the Republic of Vietnam's 'Four Points,' but at the close of the conversation suggested or hinted that Hanoi might be prepared to enter into discussions if the U.S. would declare a permanent cessation of bombing attacks on the North. It seems most probable that this was still intended to be linked

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[40] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
[Check mark] [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

[41] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 51 n. 6.

[42] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
[Check mark] [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]
For the US reply to North Vietnam, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 76.
Pour voir la réponse des États-Unis au Nord-Vietnam, voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. IV (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 76.

with acceptance of the 'Four Points,'[43] although a contrary interpretation is conceivable. In any event, it should of course be clear that the United States Government could not accept a unilateral cessation of this form of military activity without some reciprocal action of the North Vietnamese side involving its infiltration of men and equipment into the South and perhaps also the over-all level of military activity in the South.

"5. In the circumstances, the United States Government believes that a message should be conveyed to Hanoi – either through the regular Canadian I.C.C. representative, or, if desired, Ambassador Ronning – which would explore the meaning of the North Vietnamese suggestion as far as possible and reiterate U.S. willingness to pursue the matter further through the established direct channel.[44] The Canadian channel might continue to be used in the event of a forthcoming response. In view of the complexity of the issues that would be involved in any true reciprocal reduction of hostilities, it would be the U.S. hope, however, that if Hanoi were interested, the matter would be pursued directly as soon as possible. Specifically, the United States Government suggests that an oral message along the following lines be conveyed in Hanoi at the appropriate level:

'A. The Canadian Government has conveyed to the United States Government the views expressed by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to Ambassador Chester Ronning on March 11. The reaction of the United States Government indicated that it could not accept the apparent suggestion that the United States Government must agree to a permanent cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam as a unilateral and non-reciprocated precondition to the holding of discussions. The Canadian Government knows, from the public and private statements of U.S. Representatives, that the U.S. is itself prepared for discussions or negotiations without any preconditions whatever, and that it would also be prepared to consider a reciprocal reduction in hostilities in Vietnam, which could include the question of the bombing of North Vietnam. However, action concerning the latter, as the Canadian Government understands the U.S. view, could not be undertaken unilaterally in the absence of reciprocal measures[45] by North Vietnam. The Canadian Government is confident the United States Government would be interested in any indication the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was interested in such reciprocal action, and if so of what sort. Moreover, interest was expressed by the United States Government as to whether the remarks of Prime Minister Pham Van Dong indicated the possibility that mutual and reciprocal reductions in military activity might in themselves serve to create the possibility for holding of discussions or talks.

'B. The Canadian Government is assured that the United States Government would be prepared at any time to discuss directly and in fullest confidence the respective positions of the United States Government and the North Vietnamese Government and the possible means of reconciling these positions and moving toward a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

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[43] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
? [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

[44] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
? [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

[45] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Reduction in hostilities [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

'C. The Canadian Government knows that the U.S. would be interested in any response, or any indication of its position in any respect, that the Government of North Vietnam might wish to communicate to the Government of Canada.'"

Embassy of the United States of America

388.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. Y-332
Ottawa, May 6, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Hong Kong (for Thomson and Fraser only), Washington (Ambassador only).
For Commissioner only.

VIETNAM: OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Grateful if you could forward following note to Hipwell in Hanoi for presentation to Col. Ha Van Lau. Begins: The Canadian Commissioner presents his compliments to the Chief of the PAVN Liaison Mission, and, on instructions from his Government, has the honour to inform the Chief of the Liaison Mission that the Canadian Government would welcome an early opportunity for a further exchange of views with the Government of the DRVN, in accordance with Canadian Government's understanding of the conversations which Mr. Ronning had with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in March. The Canadian Government hopes that the Government of the DRVN would find it possible to renew these conversations, and if so, Mr. Ronning would be prepared to visit Hanoi again at an early date which would be convenient from the point of view of the Prime Minister and the Government of the DRVN.

2. The Canadian Commissioner would appreciate an indication of whether such a special visit would be acceptable to the Government of the DRVN, and if so, the dates which would be convenient, so that the necessary arrangements can be put in hand.

3. The Canadian Commissioner avails himself, etc. Ends.

For Hong Kong:

Foregoing is for your own advance info only. In due course, and depending on Hanoi's reply, South Vietnamese visa will be required.

389.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

Top Secret.
[Ottawa,] May 10,1966

VIETNAM

I attach for your information the final version of the record of the conversations which Mr. Ronning had with Mr. Bundy and others in Washington. We have now confirmed that this record also reflects the recollection of those members of our Embassy in Washington who were involved in these conversations.

2. It occurred to me that you might wish to have another look at this record in preparation for your discussions with Mr. Goldberg.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

Enclosure: Record of Conversations
Pièce jointe : Compte rendu des conversations

Top Secret.
Ottawa, May 4, 1966

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

The following is a record of the joint and separate conversations which Mr. Ronning and I had with Mr. Bundy and Mr. Kreisberg in Washington on May 2, 1966:

1. The Americans regard this exchange as serious. Because it involves issues which are of the greatest importance from their point of view, they are anxious to re-open a direct channel of communication with the North Vietnamese as soon as that is feasible. Meanwhile, they appreciate the availability of the Canadian channel and would wish to see it kept open.

2. The Americans are not certain to what extent the North Vietnamese may, in fact, have moved away from their insistence on acceptance of the "Four Points" as a precondition of any discussions or negotiations. The passage in the proposed message for Hanoi which touches on "the possibility that mutual and reciprocal reductions in military activity might *in themselves* serve to create the possibility for holding of discussions or talks" was intended to probe further into the North Vietnamese position as regards the "Four Points".

We explained our understanding of the North Vietnamese position as follows: Nothing that had been said to Mr. Ronning in Hanoi suggested that the North Vietnamese had departed in any respect from their insistence on the "Four Points" as an essential element of any settlement of the Vietnam issue. No doubt, they would form the principal subject of any discussions once the way for such discussions had been cleared. All the North Vietnamese had done, if we understood their position correctly, was to detach the permanent cessation of the bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam from the total package of their conditions as the price they would expect the Americans to pay for a willingness on North Vietnam's part to engage in informal talks.

The Americans would like to have this point explored further. They do not insist on the language they have themselves suggested which, we argued, was open to misinterpretation. As far as they are concerned, this is essentially a matter of diplomatic technique. They will be looking into our redraft of the message which covers this point in a different way.

3. While the American draft speaks only of "the question of the bombing of North Vietnam", they do not exclude a complete halt (as distinct from a mere reduction in the scale) of the bombing in return for appropriate reciprocal measures. They have undertaken to see if their draft message can be strengthened in this sense. It would be understood, of course, that such a halt in the bombing would be maintained only for so long as the North Vietnamese kept to their side of the bargain. While this would pose a problem of verification, it was not an insuperable problem.

4. The Americans would be reluctant at this stage to name the specific price for a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam. It is our judgment that this would almost certainly have to include an undertaking on the North Vietnamese side to halt the further infiltration of men

and supplies. It might have to include more. In any case, the Americans feel their proposition is sufficiently clear and that there might be a presentational disadvantage in making it less flexible than it is in its present formulation.

5. The Americans would not regard a mere willingness on the part of the North Vietnamese to engage in informal talks as an adequate price for a renewed suspension of the bombing, even on the understanding that the suspension would be maintained only as long as meaningful discussions were in progress. They pointed to the Korean precedent, arguing that this would put them in the position of fighting with one hand tied behind their backs and involve the risk of heavy casualties.

6. We left a copy of our redraft† of the proposed message to Hanoi.[46] The Americans will let us know within next few days whether this reflects their position adequately.

7. The Americans appreciate the need to say something to the South Vietnamese. They will develop a line which could be used in Saigon and let us know. In this way we will be sure that what we say in Saigon will be on the same general lines.

8. The Americans do not see any significant shift in the North Vietnamese position in the direction of either Moscow or Peking. In any case, they do not think this would make much of a difference in terms of their reaction to the proposition which is to be put to them. The fact is that the North Vietnamese maintained a solid front during the December-January pause and they might be expected to draw considerable encouragement from the developments in South Vietnam over the past several weeks.

9. The Americans told us that the President's reference, in his letter of January 30 to the Prime Minister,[47] to "two separate locations" in which contact had been made with the North Vietnamese during the pause covered contacts in Rangoon and Moscow. We were asked to protect this information closely since the Moscow contact was known to very few persons only. We would gather from the United States note of April 26, 1966 that it was as a result of the approach in Moscow that the North Vietnamese suggested the use of the channel in Rangoon.

K. Goldschlag

390.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] May 18, 1966

VIETNAM

I attach for your approval a record of the conversation you had with Ambassador Goldberg on Vietnam on May 16.

2. I am attaching an additional copy of this record which you may wish to pass to the Prime Minister.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[46] For the final version of the message to Hanoi, see doc. 393.
Pour la version définitive du message à Hanoï, voir doc. 393.

[47] See/Voir doc. 347.

Enclosure: Record of Conversation between Secretary of State for External Affairs and Ambassador of United States to United Nations, May 16, 1966
Pièce jointe : Compte rendu de la conversation entre le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et l'ambassadeur des États-Unis auprès des Nations Unies, 16 mai 1966

Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa, n.d.]

VIETNAM

Mr. Martin: I understand from your Ambassador that he will be giving us later today a final version of the text on which the United States Government would wish Mr. Ronning to base his presentation in Hanoi.

We have had a preliminary word from our Commissioner in Saigon about the request to have Mr. Ronning received in Hanoi. We do not, however, as yet have a definite date for the visit. We would hope to receive this in the course of the current week.

As you know, we have decided that the next visit to Hanoi should again be made by Mr. Ronning. We had considered, of course, whether such a visit might not attract needless attention. Accordingly we had more or less made up our mind that, unless the United States reply was of more than a routine nature, we would ask our Commissioner to act as the channel. However, after the talk which Mr. Ronning had with Mr. William Bundy in Washington on May 2, we had been unanimous in the Department that Mr. Ronning should be the one to go. While it was true that our Commissioner could undertake this task less conspicuously, particularly as regards any attention which might be attracted in Saigon, we had felt that if we did not send Mr. Ronning it might be inferred in Hanoi that we were not attaching the same importance to the reply as we had to the original Canadian message.

From the point of view of the strategy of this exercise I believe that the United States reply is not a bad one. It is unlikely to move matters forward a great deal but it is consistent with the line taken by the United States during the recent bombing pause. It remains to be seen, of course, to what extent the events which have taken place in South Vietnam in the intervening period may have influenced attitudes in Hanoi.

Mr. Goldberg: There have been extensive talks in Washington about this. On the basis of these talks I may say that we very much welcome your initiative. We think that there is a distinct role for you to play in this exercise.

I should add that we have had the same doubts about the matter of "visibility". It was United States experience during the peace probe at the turn of the year that the best contacts we had were those where the "visibility" was least. In this connection you might like to know that it was the Soviet Union which directed us to Burma as a secure venue for direct contacts with the North Vietnamese. However, we accept your assessment that Hanoi will want some assurance at this stage that the proposed next visit by a Canadian representative is regarded as being of more than routine interest.

Of course we would like to revive direct contacts with the North Vietnamese in due course and we hope to be able to do so with your help. If there is progress it would be of interest to us to know where the North Vietnamese would want to resume direct talks with us.

The present is, of course, a period of considerable disturbance. This may have both advantages and disadvantages. If, however, there is a disposition to move on the part of Hanoi, there is no doubt that the modalities of movement can be worked out.

The key intimation made to Ronning in Hanoi was that the United States should cease its bombing of North Vietnam permanently and without condition. At best we regard this as a negotiating position. The President would not agree to another suspension; he believes that it was the unilateral suspension of the bombing by the United States last December which was in large part responsible for precipitating the internal debate on Vietnam.[48]

The United States reply has emphasized a reciprocal reduction in the scale of hostilities. In actual fact there appears to have been a diminution of hostilities in Vietnam. It remains to be seen whether this represents a gathering of forces for a monsoon offensive.

Mr. Martin: As regards the so-called "4 points" I note that the United States Government is interested in the relationship between them and the "proposition" which Mr. Ronning brought with him from Hanoi. It is our impression that Hanoi did not depart in any way from their 4 points as regards any settlement of the Vietnam conflict but only for the much more limited purpose envisaged by our initiative.

It was of interest to us that Hanoi was less inclined to attach importance to a future Commission role than to the use of the Canadian channel. In that respect Hanoi's position seemed to correspond to some extent with that taken by the Soviet Union and Poland. This was not, of course, our own objective but if contact through the Canadian channel is what is favoured for the time being, then that is what must be done as a means of unblocking the channels for direct talks between the United States and North Vietnam. It seemed to us, however, that the Commission was particularly fitted for such a role in view of the access it had to both sides.

Mr. Goldberg: We were interested in the cordial reception which was given to Canada in Hanoi. At the moment we have no direct channel to North Vietnam. The channel we had was, as you know, closed off by the North Vietnamese in February. So you would be doing a great service if you could help to unblock that channel.

Mr. Martin: We have not discussed what we were told in Hanoi with anybody. We have, of course, had to explain Mr. Ronning's visit to the Indians and the Poles. We merely told them, however, that Mr. Ronning was going to Hanoi but that this was not connected with the proposed Commission initiative. The Prime Minister saw the Secretary-General last week and it was agreed that he would say nothing to U Thant about the specific contents of Mr. Ronning's discussions in Hanoi. I myself had an opportunity of discussing our general objectives with U Thant for which we sought and received his imprimatur. He may think it unfair, in due course, that we did not inform him more fully. But, as you know, the people in Hanoi impressed the need for complete discretion on us and we would almost certainly lose whatever confidence they place in Canada if it became known that we had divulged to anyone what we had been told.

Mr. Goldberg: I make it a point of keeping U Thant reasonably well informed of what we are doing. We have talked, of course, of the idea of reactivating the Commission. But I have never in any way exposed the Ronning exercise to him.

Mr. Martin: We also, of course, have had general discussions with a number of countries, including the Russians, the British and the French. In particular, I have had a number of talks with the Soviet Ambassador about what we are trying to do in Vietnam. In our first talk, and in the absence of instructions on his part, I was unable to elicit much of a reaction from him. In our second talk he registered various objections to our proposals including both the matter of timing and the legality of such an initiative which he thought could not be reconciled with any provisions in the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement. I told the Ambassador that I knew of

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[48] This is likely a reference to the public hearings on Vietnam begun in February 1966 by the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator J. William Fulbright.
Il s'agit probablement des auditions publiques sur le Vietnam entamées en février 1966 par la commission des affaires étrangères du Sénat des États-Unis, présidée par le sénateur J. William Fulbright.

nothing that should prevent the three countries serving on the Commission, on the basis of their long experience of the Vietnam problem, to undertake certain probes which might clear the way for a resumption of the Geneva Conference. The last time I saw the Soviet Ambassador he adopted a somewhat different tone; he did not re-open his previous objections except to say that he did not think that the present moment was propitious for the kind of approach we had in mind. All in all, it was hard to say how one should assess the Soviet attitude.[49]

As for the Poles, they have never turned down our proposals although they, too, referred to the matter of timing. It may well be that they have not turned us down because we have appealed to them not to do so and to keep our present exchanges going. We also have the impression that the Poles may not want to appear to be turning down something positive in relation to the Vietnam situation.

Mr. Goldberg: As regards the attitude of the French you may be interested to know that, when I saw de Gaulle last December, he told me he did not think the time was ripe for any constructive initiative on Vietnam and that, in his view, the war would have to go on.[50] On the other hand, when U Thant visited him recently, de Gaulle is reported to have said that nothing was likely to be done until after the next United States elections (by which he meant those of 1968). He seemed to assume that these elections would bring about some re-assessment of U.S. public opinion. This view may represent a reflection of the importance Hanoi attaches to the recent hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

As far as our own soundings are concerned, the Ronning visit to Hanoi is the only episode of any significance. It is interesting, however, to note that the Soviet Press Attaché recently got hold of Pauline Frederick of NBC and told her that the suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam was the key to a settlement of the current conflict; in his view the other conditions posed by Hanoi were not so significant.[51] When this was used by NBC, the Soviets promptly denied it. There is no reason to assume that Pauline Frederick, who is a reputable reporter, had not properly understood what was said to her. It was hard to say whether, in telling her what they did, the Soviets were trying to convey something solid or whether they were primarily concerned to make a propaganda point.

Mr. Martin: I want to tell you that we thought a good deal before we decided to ask Mr. Ronning to undertake the assignment we had in mind. We knew that there might be concern in some quarters in Washington about his liberal views on both Vietnam and China which, of course, he has not hesitated to state. However, we have full confidence in his complete integrity and prudence.

When this assignment was undertaken I had in mind that he should go to China first and only then to Hanoi. I did not want him to go as a Government representative but, of course, it would have been difficult for him not to go in some form of official capacity. In the event the Chinese turned him down, saying that this was not a useful time for him to take up the invitation which Marshal Chen Yi had previously extended to him. It was interesting that the Chinese should have treated Mr. Ronning in this way when, on the other hand, they had more recently agreed to receive Senator Donald Cameron who claims to have been treated royally.[52]

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[49] See/Voir doc. 429.

[50] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 278.

[51] See/Voir "Feeler on Peace is Laid to Hanoi: Russian Quoted on Red Bid for Talks if Bombing Ends," *New York Times*, 23 April 1966, p. 2.

[52] Canadian Senator Donald Cameron was reported to have received VIP treatment when he and representatives of the Board of Grain Commissioners for Canada visited Beijing, April-May 1966. See David Oancia, "Trade Office Bid Vetoed by China," *Globe and Mail*, 2 May 1966, p. 36.
Le sénateur Donald Cameron aurait été traité comme un invité de marque lors de sa visite à Pékin en compagnie de représentants de la Commission des grains du Canada, en avril-mai 1966. Voir David Oancia, « Trade Office Bid Vetoed by China », *Globe and Mail*, 2 mai 1966, p. 36.

Mr. Goldberg: The United States shares your judgment of Mr. Ronning. We quite agree that a man of liberal views was the right man to send to Hanoi in present circumstances. Our sole concern about this mission has been the degree of exposure which anyone other than your Commissioner was likely to incur. This presents a problem to us in terms of our relations with South Vietnam.

How much access do you have to the Chinese?

Mr. Martin: We have contact with them at the trade level but we have no political contact. We have contact, for example, through the Wheat Board but this does not create an opportunity for political discussion.

Senator Cameron, who is the Director of the Banff School of Advanced Management Training, took a group to China. He speaks as though he had been very well received. He had not, of course, been charged with expressing Government policy.

Mr. Goldberg: We have the impression that something is going on in China at the present time. We do not know, however, precisely what.

Mr. Martin: Mr. Gromyko has suggested several times that I go to visit the Soviet Union. I had more or less agreed that I would go at the end of July and I thought that I would go to see Mr. Rapacki in conjunction with that visit in view of the fact that I have had several exchanges with him regarding the Polish position on any eventual Commission initiative. We have a number of public enquiries concerning security under way in Canada at this time and it now looks as if Mr. Gromyko is trying to impress upon me the anti-Soviet implications of these enquiries. The result is that my visit may not now materialize in July.[53] Still, I am convinced that the Soviet Union must share our concern about the Vietnam situation up to a certain point.

Mr. Goldberg: I had a discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin at the time when we submitted the Vietnam issue to the Security Council in February.[54] At that time Dobrynin came close to saying that their position in respect of any move in the Security Council would be governed by whatever Hanoi said. Of course this was prior to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. I had the impression that they were concerned to line up Hanoi against the Chinese and that this involved keeping the regime in Hanoi reasonably well disposed toward the Soviet Union at any cost.

391.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

No. 412
Saigon, May 24, 1966
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: My Tel 410† May 23.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only), Hong Kong (Thomson and Fraser only) from Ottawa.

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[53] Martin visited the Soviet Union in November 1966. See docs 468–474.
Martin s'est rendu en Union soviétique en novembre 1966. Voir doc. 468-474.

[54] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 59 (Editorial Note).

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Following is text of Hanoi telegram CH-141 May 21. Begins: For Commissioner only from Donahue. "[I] was requested to attend meeting with Van Lau today at 1830 hours. After brief exchange of pleasantries, he got right down to business. He gave us well-rehearsed summary of the Vietnam situation, reaffirming time and again that the USA and her satellites were cause of the present situation. He stated that in spite of world opinion concerning her policy, the USA was intensifying and expanding the war.

2. "At the end of this talk he said he did not repeat not have a letter to give me but he did give me an aide-mémoire which laid out the point of view of his Government. I am enclosing full text of this note. He requested that I bring the point of view of his Government to your attention as well as their views on the proposals made by our Prime Minister on May 2.[55] He emphasized this last point.

3. "Following is full text of note: "Paragraph 1 – Everybody knows that the deep root and the immediate cause of the present serious situation in Vietnam lie in the USA policy of intervention and aggression. At present, the USA Government keep sending more USA and satellite troops to South Vietnam in an attempt to intensify and expand its war of aggression there, at the same time it is frenziedly 'escalating' its air war against the DRVN daily committing countless crimes against the Vietnamese people. So far it has refused to recognize the Four-Point stand of the Government of the DRVN and to recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam; it is obvious that the USA policy of aggression vis-à-vis Vietnam remains unchanged. 2. The Government of the DRVN once again affirms that if the USA Government really desires a peaceful settlement it must recognize the Four-Point stand of the DRVN Government, prove this by actual deeds; it must announce a definitive and unconditional end to its air raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Only then will it be possible to envisage a political solution to the Vietnam problem. 3. According to recent reports from Western news agencies, on [1] May, 1966 the Canadian Prime Minister came out with a proposal or measure for a settlement of the Vietnam problem. It is to be regretted that this proposal conforms neither to the fundamental provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, nor to the actual situation in Vietnam. It makes no repeat no distinction between the USA which is the aggressor and the Vietnamese people who are the victims of aggression fighting in self-defence. It does not repeat not meet the Four-Point stand of the DRVN Government. 4. However, out of goodwill, we consider that Mr. Ronning's visit to Hanoi may be agreed to as proposal by the Canadian Government. The timing of the visit will be intimated in due course. Hanoi May 21/66".

4. In answer to my query as to when we might expect the timings for the visit, he answered "I do not repeat not know but I will let you know when I have been given an indication by our leaders". We then considered that part of the conversation closed. The only mention he made of the visit was verbatim to paragraph 4 of the note but I suppose this is typical.

5. After a short one-sided discussion on events in SVN in the last few days, of which I expressed little knowledge, we spent the last 15 minutes of the hour discussing the climate of our respective countries. Van Lau was quite relaxed during this period. After apologizing for butting into my Saturday night we said our farewells. Actual note next bag. I will await word on time. End of text.

[Victor C.] Moore

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[55] Pearson's speech was on 1 May, but was reported in the press on 2 May. See "Pearson Wants UN to Admit Chinese; Urges Viet Ceasefire," *Globe and Mail*, 2 May 1966, p. 1.
Le discours de Pearson a eu lieu le 1er mai, mais a été rapporté dans la presse le 2 mai. Voir « Pearson Wants UN to Admit Chinese ; Urges Viet Ceasefire », *Globe and Mail*, 2 mai 1966, p. 1.

392.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/2

Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] May 27, 1966

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

I have now had an opportunity to examine the Aide-Mémoire which was presented to our representative in Hanoi on May 21. I am attaching a copy of the text for your convenience.[56]

2. It seems to me that the important point in this Aide-Mémoire is that the North Vietnamese are prepared to receive Mr. Ronning as we have requested them to do. I would attach secondary importance to the seemingly grudging language in which their acceptance has been couched.

3. In my view some or all of the following reasons may account for the language used in the Aide-Mémoire:

(1) We have ourselves been concerned about the publicity that will inevitably attend a second visit to Hanoi by Mr. Ronning. This is also something which bothers the Americans in their relations with South Vietnam. It would be idle to expect that the North Vietnamese could ignore the public implications of such a second visit in terms of their own relationships with countries like China.

(2) If the North Vietnamese are bothered by publicity, it stands to reason that they must be all the more bothered by publicity which could reflect on the firm positions they have taken publicly with respect to a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict. Accordingly, whatever position they take with us in private, they can always point to the formal record of their exchanges with us to show that these exchanges took place within the established framework of North Vietnamese policy.

(3) We have already had one experience of the North Vietnamese showing the greatest sensitivity as regards any public statement being made by Canada which could be construed as arising from our exchanges with North Vietnam. It is more than likely, therefore, that the North Vietnamese also wanted to take this opportunity of making it clear to us that the proposals put forward by the Prime Minister on May 2 [*sic*] do not meet their position and do not represent a context in which they would wish our further exchanges to be conducted.

(4) On more general grounds, the North Vietnamese are undoubtedly also concerned to make it clear that the Ronning visit is something that is taking place at our initiative and request and not something for which they have asked or which they would want to appear to be encouraging.

4. In summary, therefore, the significant factor remains that the North Vietnamese are prepared, in principle, to receive Mr. Ronning. They have not yet given us any indication as to the timing of this visit. It is quite possible that, in handling the timing aspect, the North Vietnamese may want to take account of the situation as it is developing in the South.

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[56] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Mr. Pearson: Mr. Martin thought you would wish to see this. J.G. H[adwen] May 30/66
[Stamped] Seen by L.B. Pearson

5. I do not think that we stand to derive any advantage in prodding the North Vietnamese on the matter of timing. I gather from our Ambassador in Washington that this is also the American view although Bundy was at pains to make it clear that they had no wish to inhibit us if we felt that we should do something to hurry matters.

6. I thought you should also know that, after some reflection, we told our Ambassador in Washington that we could see no reasonable objection to his making a copy of the North Vietnamese Aide-Mémoire available to Bundy. I understand that he has now done so. You will recall that in the context of Mr. Ronning's last visit to Hanoi we had to be very sparing in the amount of written information we were able to make available to the Americans if we were not to create misunderstandings as regards the basis of our discussions with the North Vietnamese. The same may be true of Mr. Ronning's next visit depending on the tenor of the discussions. In the circumstances, we thought there might be advantage in passing this particular piece of paper to them which in no way engaged the Canadian position.

7. I understand that a copy of the Aide-Mémoire has been seen by the Prime Minister.[57]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

393.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to Belgium
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Belgique
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA/2

No. Y-402
Ottawa, June 3, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only); Saigon (Commissioner only) from Delhi.
Minister or USSEA only.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Following is final agreed version of text of message which will form basis of Smallbridge's presentation in Hanoi. We thought that it would be helpful to Minister to have this text available as background for his discussions with Rusk on June 5, which will be subject of a separate message. Text begins:

"The Canadian Government has conveyed to the Government of the USA the views expressed by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to Ambassador Chester Ronning on March 11. In doing so, the Canadian Government made it clear that it was not repeat not acting in a mediatory capacity which it had not repeat not been asked by either side to assume. It was acting as a country which had been associated with the problem in Vietnam for the past eleven years as a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control and which was anxious and determined to do what it could to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the current conflict. The primary objective of the Canadian Government at this stage was to facilitate discussions between the two sides in the Vietnam conflict, either directly or through third parties, looking towards the negotiation of a formal settlement.

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[57] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
You saw this in telegram form. J.G. H[adwen]

2. The Canadian Government told the USA Government that, on the basis of the impressions gained by Ambassador Chester Ronning, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam might be prepared to have informal talks if there were an unconditional undertaking by the USA to cease bombing and all acts of war against North Vietnam. The reaction of the USA Government indicated that it could not repeat not accept a suggestion in these terms, that is to say, that it must agree to a permanent cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam as a unilateral and non-reciprocated precondition to the holding of discussions.

3. The Canadian Government knows, from the public and private statements of USA representatives, that the USA is itself prepared to engage in discussions or negotiations without preconditions. If this could not repeat not be done on the North Vietnamese side without preconditions involving the question of the bombing of North Vietnam, the Canadian Government understands that the USA would be prepared to proceed towards talks on the basis of a reciprocal reduction in hostilities in Vietnam of which a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam would be one element. The Canadian Government is confident that the USA Government would be interested in any indication that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was prepared to consider such a reciprocal reduction in hostilities and, if so, what actions would be undertaken by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Canadian Government also believes that the USA Government would be prepared to contemplate the possibility of a mutual and reciprocal reduction in military activity in itself.

4. The Canadian Government knows that the USA would be interested in any response, or any indication of its position in any respect, that the Government of North Vietnam might wish to communicate to the Government of Canada.

5. The Canadian Government is also assured that the USA Government would be prepared at any time to discuss directly and in fullest confidence the respective positions of the USA Government and the North Vietnamese Government and the possible means of reconciling these positions and moving toward a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict." Text ends.

394.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to Belgium
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Belgique
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. Y-114
Ottawa, June 4, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only) (Immediate), Saigon (Commissioner only) (Immediate), Hong Kong (Thomson and Fraser only) (Immediate).
For SSEA, USSEA and Hadwen only.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Following are points you may wish to raise with Rusk:

1. North Vietnamese have agreed to receive Smallbridge on June 14. According to present plans, he will be arriving Saigon June 12. He will spend June 14 to 18 in Hanoi, returning home via Vientiane and Bangkok (i.e., not repeat not through Saigon).

2. We are mildly encouraged by North Vietnamese willingness to receive Smallbridge. We have no repeat no indication of any significant change in North Vietnamese attitudes. On the contrary we would assume that continuing political crisis in South is bound to encourage Hanoi in hard line they have been taking in resolution of Vietnam conflict. As Rusk will be aware, Hanoi's willingness in principle to receive Smallbridge was conveyed to us May 21 in form of aide-mémoire couched in relatively hard terms, and restating more or less in full established North Vietnamese public position. We interpret this aide-mémoire as being

designed to serve two main purposes: (a) to make it clear that Smallbridge visit is taking place on our initiative and is not repeat not something Hanoi has requested or which they would want to appear to be encouraging; (b) to establish a record which could be used to prove (e.g., to the Chinese if necessary) that the Smallbridge exchanges were not repeat not being conducted outside the established framework of North Vietnamese policy.

3. You may wish to inform Rusk that we appreciate the great importance USA Government attaches to position of American prisoners being held in North Vietnam, and we will be instructing Smallbridge to deliver message on this subject in terms requested by Americans (cf. your recent exchange of letters† with USA Ambassador here). We have proposed, however, that an element of discretion be given to Smallbridge in deciding, in the light of circumstances attending his various discussions in Hanoi, on precise context in which this presentation is to be made.

4. With regard to message dealing with bombing of North Vietnam, we have no repeat no changes to propose in text which emerged in light of discussions our officials had in Washington May 2 (text given our telegram Y-402 June 3). However, since this text was prepared, USA has presented substantively similar but presentationally different message to Chinese in Warsaw[58] (see Washington telegrams 1563† and 1564† of May 27 repeated to you), and main aspect of this presentation has now been made known publicly. (We are repeating by separate telegram† relevant extracts of *New York Times* article June 3;[59] State Department comment on this article is given in Washington telegram 1640† June 3 also repeated to you.) While this is not repeat not something you may wish to say to Rusk, we find it difficult to comprehend why a message on these lines should be conveyed to Hanoi through the intermediary which is known to be most vehemently opposed to any form of accommodation in Vietnam. However, Americans undoubtedly had their own reasons for making such an approach. The fact that two parallel messages on same subject are being conveyed to North Vietnamese does raise a practical difficulty. When Canadian officials visited Washington on May 2 to discuss text of message they suggested that there might be advantage in countering what we interpreted as a specific North Vietnamese proposition with a specific USA response (i.e., that USA was prepared to consider an undertaking to cease bombing on condition that and for as long as North Vietnamese were prepared to abide by some specific reciprocal undertakings of their own which would have the effect of resulting in reduction in hostilities). At that time, it was the judgment of State Department that they would be reluctant at this stage to name a specific price for a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. They felt that general language used was sufficiently clear and that there might be a presentational disadvantage in making it less flexible.

5. It would appear that "demanding a specific price" is precisely what Americans have now done. They have also added a new element, namely, mutually acceptable observation. It is conceivable therefore that North Vietnamese may query Smallbridge as to relationship between message conveyed by Chinese and message conveyed through Canadian channels. In such an event, would we be right in telling the North Vietnamese that USA would be prepared to consider cessation of bombing of North in circumstances where this would be a step towards peace, that the message conveyed through the Chinese outlined certain areas in which North Vietnamese could make concessions that would be attractive to USA and South Vietnam, but that fundamental USA interest was still to elicit from Hanoi some indication of areas in which they might be able to move towards reduction of scale and scope of hostilities.

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[58] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. XXX (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 153.

[59] See/Voir John W. Finney, "U.S. Offers China a Nuclear Accord: Would Pledge Not to Attack if Peking Ends Tests – Hanoi Also Gets New Bid," *New York Times*, 3 June 1966, p. 1.

6. We recognize need to bring South Vietnamese into picture in some way as was done when Smallbridge visited Hanoi last time. We have this fully in mind. We intend within next two or three days to work out line which can be used for this purpose by our Commissioner, and if necessary, by Americans in parallel action. We shall also be instructing Smallbridge to pay courtesy call on SVN Foreign Minister during his brief stopover in Saigon.

395.
Telegram from Delegation to North Atlantic Council to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. 400
Brussels, June 5, 1966
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. No Distribution. Immediate.
For Prime Minister. A/USSEA and Goldschlag only.

MEETING WITH RUSK: SMALLBRIDGE EXERCISE

After an hour's discussion on June 5 with Rusk on the problems facing the meeting of the 14 and the regular Foreign Ministers' Meeting of NATO, I raised two questions with him: one having to do with Smallbridge, the other on Law of the Sea (see my following telegram†).

2. Rusk knew that Smallbridge would soon be in Hanoi. He affirmed his view of the importance of this exchange as it was "the only one" now available. The USA continues to hope that their own channels of communication with North Vietnam will be unblocked perhaps as one result of the Canadian effort. I reminded him of the nature of the paper Smallbridge would carry. This contains an offer to stop the bombing on a reciprocal basis without spelling out what would be satisfactory reciprocity. It could be, I suggested, that the public statements concerning the exchange in Warsaw and repeated by an American Senator might affect the credibility of Smallbridge. I said it was natural that I would be concerned about this. In the Smallbridge paper, no repeat no mention of a cessation of infiltration by the North was made. However, in the Warsaw exchange the USA would apparently consider stopping the bombing providing there was a cessation of infiltration by the North. Rusk interposed to say that there would be no repeat no stopping of the bombing unless the infiltration stopped. This may be, I said, but this was not repeat not the same message in the precise terms that Smallbridge would carry. Rusk then observed: "let them spell out what their reciprocal action would be. We will see whether it touches on a halt in infiltration". From his comment it seems clear that he considers this to be one of the forms of reciprocity postulated in the paper that Smallbridge will have with him.

396.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. 450
Saigon, June 6, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Reference: My Tel 309† Apr 16, Your Tel Y-115† Jun 4 and Washington Tel 1564 May 27.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only) (Emergency), Hong Kong (Thomson and Fraser only) (Immediate) from Ottawa.

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

In preparing a fair copy for Ronning's use from what appears to be final text of oral message[60] (Washington telegram 1361† May 10), I have been struck again by lack of any new elements; in fact, it appears that, apart from question of prisoners of war, we shall be going to Hanoi with an empty bag (see paragraph 1(b) of our reference telegram). This impression has been reinforced by McCloskey's Washington statement of June 3,[61] reported here by Vietnam Press Agency, which echoes all substance of our oral message. In fact, his statement is, I believe, very much a reiteration of earlier public statements, and is concurrent with even more damaging *New York Times* report of June 3.

2. The public announcement of the substance of our message is perhaps not repeat not so deadly to the outcome of our operation (the main objective of which is a peaceful settlement in Vietnam) as would be an announcement of the fact that we are engaged in the operation. Nevertheless, for State Department to make public conditions they are presenting confidentially to Hanoi (through Canada and through Chinese in Warsaw) – or the other way round, to offer confidentially throughout only what they have already proclaimed publicly – rules out, I consider, any possibility of a response from Hanoi leaders. Their agreement would amount to an unacceptable loss of face.

3. The Americans appear to be putting Hanoi behind the eight-ball again and to be escalating what was allegedly a serious and practical ceasefire overture into a peace offensive reminiscent of their campaign last January. You will recall that even Cabot Lodge at that time pointed out the folly of driving Hanoi into a corner (see my telegram 61† January 28). I remain convinced that such pressure will be counter-productive. Further, if these tactics raise doubts in even my mind about American sincerity, they will surely convince DRVN leaders of the correctness of their earlier suspicions. We can therefore expect them to withdraw into their corner and foolishly, but doggedly and stubbornly, to continue the war.

4. As for our "small bridge", there is undoubtedly value in our talking to DRVN leaders, even if only for the sake of talking. However, it is open to question how many more times we shall be received in Hanoi if we come only as a mouthpiece to American propaganda. The state will soon be reached, I fear, when the sincerity of Canada will appear to Hanoi to be as questionable as that of USA.

5. We probably have no repeat no choice but to go ahead with the visit now arranged with Hanoi, and I realize there are other Canadian considerations which make this desirable. It is also a little late to go back to the Americans to see if there is not repeat not something they can offer us which will restore a little the damage done by their blowing the gaff in this way. I hope you will make the effort, suggesting to the State Department at the same time that they have a good model of the necessary reticence offered by their President in the White House statement of June 1.[62] We can have sympathy with their domestic considerations, but it would surely be in their domestic interest to eliminate the problem with a ceasefire, rather than to exacerbate it with propaganda which can only temporarily alleviate their domestic difficulties.

[Victor C.] Moore

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[60] See/Voir doc. 393.

[61] See/Voir Richard Reston, "U.S. Tries New Peace Feeler," *Los Angeles Times*, 4 June 1966, p. 1.

[62] See/Voir "Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters," *New York Times*, 2 June 1966, p. 20.

397.
Memorandum from Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs to Far Eastern Division
Note de l'adjoint du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] June 6, 1966

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

The Prime Minister made the following comments at the end of telegram No. 450 of June 6 from Saigon:

> "We should take this message seriously. It would be a sad ending to our initiative in this matter if we became merely an instrument of US propaganda or for putting the DRVN on the spot".

The text of these remarks was sent to the Minister in Brussels by telegram today, with a copy to Washington for the Ambassador only.

Jacques Corbeil

cc. Mr. Ritchie, O/USSEA

398.
Telegram from Delegation to North Atlantic Council to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. 420
Brussels, June 7, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. No Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-405† of Jun 6 and Moore's message repeated to us in Your Tel Jun 6.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only) (Immediate); Saigon (Commissioner only) (Immediate) from Delhi; Hong Kong (Thomson and Fraser only) (Immediate) from Ottawa.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

From USSEA:

I discussed latest telegrams with SSEA. Minister agrees having regard to his conversation with Mr. Rusk (SSEA's telegram 400 June 5 to Mr. Pearson) that it would be best to proceed as already agreed with Washington. Mr. Martin considers that we should have no repeat no illusions as to possible success but as Mr. Rusk said this seems to be the "only" channel now available.

2. Smallbridge's visit should still provide the North Vietnamese with an opportunity to give privately their reaction to USA proposals and to indicate if they have any alternative schemes to bring hostilities to an end. Furthermore, Smallbridge is in a position to explain background of USA proposals and to interpret USA intentions. I am sure you will bring Minister's views to Prime Minister's attention (reference Prime Minister's comment in telegram M-99† June 6).

399.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. Y-406
Ottawa, June 7, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tels 434† and 449.†
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only) (Immediate), Hong Kong (Thomson and Fraser only) (Immediate), Brussels (Minister and USSEA only) (Immediate). Commissioner only.

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

We have discussed proposed dates with Ronning. He is proceeding with his arrangements accordingly. Subject to confirmation, he will be planning to arrive Saigon June 12, proceed to Hanoi June 14 and leave Hanoi June 18 via Vientiane and Bangkok.

2. We agree that we should discard any Commission cover on this occasion not only because it lacks credibility but also because North Vietnamese seemed concerned to keep Ronning visit distinct from Canadian Commission role.

3. We are not attracted by your suggested alternative which is to link Ronning visit overtly with Prime Minister's May 2 [*sic*] address. We take it that one purpose of North Vietnamese aide-mémoire of May 21 was to make it clear to us that this is not context in which they would wish to see further exchanges with us conducted. Accordingly, we think it might be counter-productive to use cover which is known to be unpalatable to North Vietnamese in any public explanation we may be called upon to give of Ronning's second visit to Hanoi.

4. For foregoing reasons, we are inclined to favour a more straightforward explanation and one which is more closely in line with Canadian Government statements since this initiative was first launched. We would say that Canada is on record as favouring peaceful and honourable accommodation of interests of those concerned in current Vietnam conflict: that in line with this objective we have been concerned to explore views and attitudes of all the parties; and that Ronning's second visit to Hanoi should be seen in this general context.

5. It is possible that questions may arise of a more specific nature than could be answered by foregoing "cover". Following explanatory points should therefore be kept in mind: (a) initiative for Ronning's second visit comes from Ottawa, and not Hanoi, although the latter has obviously agreed to receive him; (b) Ronning's brief for his discussions of the Vietnam problem as a whole in Hanoi is a Canadian brief. We are aware of USA thinking on the Vietnam problem and we have been taking soundings of opinion in other interested capitals. This second visit to Hanoi is part of a continuing process. In addition, it will provide an opportunity to give and obtain clarification of certain specific matters of mutual interest; (c) if specific questions arise as to relationship between Ronning mission and much publicised Warsaw exchanges, you could say that we are of course aware of recent USA diplomatic activities, such as the discussions in Warsaw with Chinese representatives. These and other factors have been taken fully into account in planning for Ronning's visit.

6. This would be line taken publicly in response to enquiries. It is obviously less than we could be saying to South Vietnamese in present circumstances. Accordingly, we shall be sending you separate instructions for Ronning's use when he calls on Tran Van Do.

For Brussels:

7. Grateful for Minister's concurrence in these guidelines.

For Hong Kong:

8. Subject to Minister's approval and/or comments, you should bring this message to Ronning's attention immediately on his arrival in Hong Kong.

400.

Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Poland and High Commission in India

Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Pologne et au haut-commissariat en Inde

RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. Y-424
Ottawa, June 10, 1966
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Saigon, Hong Kong, Moscow, London, Paris, Geneva (OpImmediate).

VIETNAM

I should be grateful if you could pass the following message from me to Rapacki/Swaran Singh at earliest possible opportunity, informing them that a similar message is being conveyed to the other. Begins: As you are aware from our earlier exchanges of views, the Canadian Government attaches the highest priority to a peaceful and honourable accommodation of interests between those concerned in the current Vietnam conflict. In line with this objective, we have been concerned to explore the views and attitudes of interested parties, and generally, to do what we can to help bring this dangerous situation to a peaceful conclusion. I know that your Government shares the sense of importance we attach to this problem. Accordingly, I thought you should know that I have asked Mr. Chester Ronning to visit Vietnam again in the very near future for discussions in Saigon and Hanoi. Mr. Ronning will be arriving in Saigon on June 12, and he will be visiting Hanoi from June 14 to 18 for discussions with Vietnamese leaders. I am hopeful that this visit, which is being carried out on the initiative of the Canadian Government, may help to clarify some of the difficult issues which continue to stand in the way of a settlement of the conflict in Vietnam. Ends.

[Paul] Martin

401.

Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam

Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam

RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. Y-425
Ottawa, June 10, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel 450 Jun 6.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador only) (Immediate), Hong Kong (Thomson and Fraser only) (Immediate).

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE – DISCUSSIONS IN HANOI

Following are guidelines for Ronning's forthcoming visit to Hanoi.

2. One of our main concerns is to keep alive diplomatic contact we have established with Hanoi. We have no excessive expectations as regards results likely to be achieved on this round. In particular, we are far from sanguine concerning reception which is likely to be accorded to our substantive message in Hanoi. Nevertheless, we attach importance to the channel as such because it appears to be the only channel of this kind which is currently active and because we cannot anticipate at what point in time this channel may assume real significance.

3. We are also concerned to make it clear to North Vietnamese that this is and remains a Canadian initiative. In the nature of things, it is inevitable that some of the thoughts we convey in Hanoi should reflect American thinking and American preoccupations. That, after all, is inherent in the purpose of the exercise and it is something that also works in reverse direction. When we undertook this responsibility we were fully aware that, in trying to explain the positions and propositions of one side to the other, we could not expect in all instances to encounter a positive response. We were hopeful, however, that this would not lead to a misunderstanding of our own role which was to try to be of assistance in encouraging and sustaining a dialogue between parties to Vietnam conflict in the hope that, in time, this might help to bring outlines of an eventual accommodation into clearer focus.

4. As far as Canadian Government was concerned, we continued to be deeply disturbed by course of developments in Vietnam. We had been encouraged by trend which had developed in post-war years of international community being able to bring its influence to bear on situations of conflict in such a way as to prepare ground for peaceful solutions. We regarded Vietnam situation as disheartening setback to this trend.

5. We were also, naturally, concerned about risks inherent in continuation of armed hostilities in Vietnam not only in terms of their implications for stability in Southeast Asia but also of establishment of broader basis of international understanding and cooperation. We were also concerned about what we regarded as crucial problem in that part of world, which was fulfilment of aspirations of people of Southeast Asia for better life and rising standards of living. This was something to which we were already contributing within measure of our capacity and to which we were prepared to devote additional resources as a means of mitigating social and economic dislocations that current conflict was inevitably bringing in its wake.

6. Having prepared general ground in this way and having, in the process, established essentially Canadian complexion of this second visit, Ronning should then proceed to present message concerning cessation of bombing. Text to be used is that given in our telegram Y-402 of June 3 to Brussels (repeated to you) with third sentence amended to read "twelve years" in place of "eleven years".

7. As we see it, main advantage of Canadian message is that it is less specific in its formulation than USA presentation made to Chinese in Warsaw. It can thus be interpreted in light of paragraph 5 of our telegram Y-114 of June 4 and this should be main impact of Ronning's presentation in first instance. While this is something we must naturally leave to his discretion in light of whole atmosphere of his discussions, we regard it as important that he should do everything he can to elicit some element of response from Pham Van Dong which would enable us to pursue this particular line of approach as a means of unblocking channels between the two sides.

8. Ronning might make the point that, if cause of peaceful settlement of Vietnam problem is to be advanced – as all who have interests of Vietnamese people in mind profoundly hope that it can be – there will have to be willingness on both sides to move beyond their present positions. As far as Canadian Government is concerned, we would of course particularly welcome any move which would have mitigating effect on present scope and scale of hostilities and in this way provide better climate for discussion of substantive issues which

will inevitably have to be embarked upon at some stage. We are satisfied that USA Government are sincere in wishing to work towards peaceful settlement and prepared to take meaningful steps which would further such an outcome. On the other hand, we would be less than frank if we failed to underline what we take to be determination of USA to persist in their present course of policy in absence of some repeat some indication that North Vietnamese were willing to meet them part way.

9. We recognize that, in a situation in which considerable commitments of power and prestige are engaged on both sides, there is an inherent tendency for positions to remain frozen. It would be our hope, however, that if there were to be some beginning of movement this could be accomplished with minimum embarrassment to either party. If there was anything we could do to facilitate matters with this consideration in mind, we would be glad to take whatever action we could to that end.

10. You will want to bear in mind that purpose of our initial soundings in Hanoi was to see whether there was any basis on which way could be paved for direct discussions between the parties. It was in response to probings in this direction that North Vietnamese advanced proposition regarding cessation of bombing which we took to Washington and to which USA have now reacted. While we cannot anticipate North Vietnamese reply it is entirely possible that we may find we have reached end of this particular road. We would not consider, however, that this in any way rules out other lines of approach.

11. Accordingly, if Ronning's presentation fails to elicit any indication of flexibility, second line of attack should be made on basis of paragraph 4 of oral message which expresses interest "in any response or any indication of its position in any respect" which North Vietnamese Government might wish to communicate to Canadian Government. In this context we would hope that Ronning could explore in some detail Pham Van Dong's interpretation of third of Hanoi's Four Points. This is obviously crucial point in USA consideration of basis of any eventual accommodation in Vietnam and you will recall that it formed subject of exploratory contacts in Rangoon during bombing pause before they were closed off by North Vietnamese. (A summary account of these contacts is set out in top secret departmental memorandum† of April 28 which is available to you and might form basis of any further soundings Ronning may decide to take without, of course, indicating Canadian knowledge of these exchanges.) Ronning might also test the ground to see whether North Vietnamese are inclined to follow up their own interest in obtaining further clarification of USA position as regards circumstances in which they would be prepared to envisage withdrawal of military personnel and bases in South Vietnam as part of any ultimate settlement. Themes discussed with you by Ha Van Lau (paragraph 7 your telegram 449 June 5) might provide useful opening for soundings on these general lines.

12. As you know we have agreed (our telegram Y-396† June 2) to transmit message on prisoners (see attachment to our letter Y-368† May 20) in terms requested by USA. We would think that Foreign Minister might be suitable level at which to make this approach. We are prepared, however, to rely on Ronning's judgment having in mind (a) obvious importance of this message to USA; and (b) atmosphere of talks in Hanoi and order in which his appointments with various senior personalities there are scheduled. As regards timing it would be helpful, of course, if this particular matter could be left in abeyance until our main presentation has been completed.

13. It seems likely that Ronning may be questioned about Prime Minister's speech of May 1 (our PST-32† May 2). If he is, Ronning should be guided by interpretation contained in our telegram Y-323† May 4 which was cleared with Prime Minister.

14. It is important that in any event, Ronning should do everything to keep open the contact, regardless of result.

[Paul] Martin

402.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. 1725
Washington, June 10, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-427† Jun 10.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Commissioner only) (Immediate) from Ottawa; Hong Kong (Thomson and Fraser only) (Immediate) from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Bundy readily accepted your proposed revision of your subparagraph (b) and agreed that identity of SVN personality to be informed by Ronning could be settled between Lodge and Moore. Lodge would not repeat not speak to South Vietnamese until Ronning had done so.

2. Bundy expressed very strong hope that Ronning would be authorized to convey to Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane at least general impression of flavour of Ronning's conversations in Hanoi – e.g., whether DRVN attitude was negative or "teasing" or contained affirmative elements.

3. Stressing seriousness and urgency of his request, Bundy said that USA had received indications from a number of sources (including comments by Moore to Lodge) implying that bombing was perhaps now beginning to have severe effect on DRVN. USA was currently giving consideration to "playing about with pace of its actions" in light of these indications. Bundy did not repeat not elaborate but he seemed to be hinting fairly directly that some kind of early change in pattern or intensity of bombing is currently under study.[63]

[C.S.A.] Ritchie

403.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] June 13, 1966

VIETNAM – OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

I understand that you are concerned about the U.S. request that Ronning be authorized to give at least a preliminary account of his discussions in Hanoi to Sullivan, their Ambassador in Vientiane (or Martin in Bangkok).

2. This request was first put to Ritchie by Bundy on June 9, in case some "prompt U.S. response, such as a change in the scale of U.S. activities, appeared desirable" in the light of what emerged from Hanoi.

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[63] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 152 (Editorial Note).

3. On the following day, Bundy reverted to this matter to say that they would be content with a "general impression of the flavour of Ronning's conversations in Hanoi". On this occasion, Bundy was more specific, leaving Ritchie with the distinct impression that an "early change in the pattern or intensity of the bombing" of North Vietnam might be under consideration. If this turns out to be the case – and we have some independent evidence which could be interpreted as supporting such an assumption – it is likely that a concentrated effort will be made to take out oil storage facilities and power stations in North Vietnam.

4. In response to Bundy's request we have taken the line that we think Ronning should report to the Canadian Government in the first instance; that we would, of course, take the earliest opportunity to inform the U.S. Government of the results of his visit; that, subject to these considerations we would be prepared to have Ronning convey to Sullivan anything which he might consider to have "an immediate bearing" on the matters raised by Bundy.[64]

5. I attach for your information relevant extracts from the exchanges we have had with Washington on this aspect of the Smallbridge exercise.

6. It seems to me that there are three points involved in these exchanges:

(1) This is a Canadian initiative. Accordingly, it is right that Ronning should report to the Canadian Government to begin with.[65] If the experience of the last visit is any guide, the matter of interpretation of what is being said in Hanoi is important. We should not, therefore, allow ourselves to be put in a position of reporting Ronning's impressions to the U.S. without putting them through some filter of interpretation and analysis.[66]

(2) If we assume that a change in the pattern of bombing of North Vietnam is imminent, we can also assume, I think, that anything even remotely encouraging from Hanoi might have the effect of delaying such a move. It is with this consideration in mind that we thought Ronning might be authorized to give some idea to Sullivan of the "general flavour" of his discussions in Hanoi, to the extent that they have "an immediate bearing" on this matter.[67]

(3) If Ronning does not make any headway in Hanoi, I am afraid that the U.S. may go ahead with whatever decisions they may already have taken to step up the bombing of North Vietnam. This would be a highly regrettable sequence of events from the point of view of our initiative and perhaps this is a point which should be made in Washington. It is not, however, one over which, in the last analysis, we are likely to have very much control.

7. If, in the light of these considerations, you feel that nothing at all should be said to Sullivan in Vientiane, we can ask MacLellan to speak to Ronning in that sense when he arrives there on June 18. I would propose, at the same time, to explain to Ritchie the reasons why we would prefer to have an opportunity to analyze Ronning's reports of his conversations before briefing the U.S. authorities.

8. Since preparing this memorandum I have learned that Sullivan will be leaving Vientiane on June 13. This should make it easier for us to insist on restricting any briefing to Washington, if you so decide.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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64 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes. P[aul] M[artin]

65 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes. P[aul] M[artin]

66 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
N.B. [Paul Martin?]

67 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes. P[aul] M[artin]

404.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6321

Secret.
[Ottawa,] June 14, 1966

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Sharp),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. MacEachen),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. Favreau),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Nicholson),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson),
The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Pennell),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Pépin),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Marchand),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Greene),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Côté),
The Minister without Portfolio (Mr. Turner).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Milligan), (Mr. Wall).

[...]

VIETNAM: CANADIAN MEDIATION EFFORTS

(Previous reference March 17)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that, for some time, Canada had taken a position that the International Control Commission had a role to play in seeking mediation of the Vietnam war. For the time being, Canada was not promoting a conference of the Geneva powers but was seeking some narrowing of the difference between U.S. and North Vietnam positions. With strong support from the Secretary General of the United Nations and the acquiescence of the United States, Canada had been trying to persuade the Indians and Poles to use the International Control Commission as an instrument. Currently there were discussions with Polish representatives that offered some hope of agreement on the use of the I.C.C. for this purpose.

Mr. Martin said he had talked to the U.S. Secretary of State and it was evident the U.S. were very anxious to bring the war to an end either by an increased military effort or by negotiation.

Mr. Chester Ronning, the former High Commissioner in India, who had been born in China and spoke Chinese fluently, had been asked to undertake visits to Peking and Hanoi to sound out possibilities of peace talks. Mr. Ronning had been refused entrance to Peking by the Chinese Foreign Minister, but had received strong endorsation from the North Vietnamese for a visit to Hanoi. In addition, the new Canadian representative on the I.C.C., Mr. Victor Moore, had had two very long talks with North Vietnamese representatives. It was of the utmost importance that these contacts with Hanoi should be developed, particularly as the United States had no channel to the North Vietnam government.

Mr. Ronning had seen the Government of North Vietnam six weeks ago, with the knowledge of both sides, not as a mediator but merely for exploratory discussions. The North Vietnamese had then said that they might agree at some time that the I.C.C. had a role to play. They wanted Canada to continue to serve as a channel between them and the United States, but insisted that there could be no disclosure of this or North Vietnam would have to disown the arrangement. They had also agreed that they would be prepared, if the U.S. stopped its bombing and agreed that the cessation would be permanent, to start negotiations without insistence on their four points. Any undertaking involving a permanent cessation of bombing was, however, unacceptable to the United States. Five weeks after Mr. Ronning's first visit, Canadian representatives had been in touch with the United States to say that Ronning was going back to Hanoi, and the Americans had agreed to provide him with a response to Hanoi's views.

Mr. Martin said that Mr. Ronning was now on his way back to Hanoi and was scheduled to arrive that day. The visit was being made as quietly as possible but was almost certain to be noticed by newspapermen. He planned to be in Hanoi for four days. The U.S. had asked that, following the visit, Ronning should go to Vientiane, Laos, and report to the U.S. Ambassador there. However, the report that Ronning brought back might well determine whether the U.S. stepped up the intensity of its military effort, and Ronning had been instructed that his first report was to be made in Ottawa. No publicity was being given to the current visit.

The Prime Minister said that the chances of Mr. Ronning bringing anything back from Hanoi were small, especially in view of the current political disruption in Saigon. However, Ronning was a master of his current role and if anything could be done, he would do it.

The Cabinet noted the report by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and remarks of the Prime Minister concerning Canadian efforts towards cessation of the Vietnamese war.

[…]

405.

Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos

Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Laos

RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA/2

No. Y-438
Ottawa, June 17, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Acting Commissioner only) (Immediate) from Delhi, Hong Kong (Fraser and Thomson only), Washington (Ambassador only) (Immediate). Commissioner only.

For Ronning:

This is to confirm previous indications given to you of my attitude towards "briefing" USA representatives in the field. I am strongly convinced that your reporting should be to Canadian Government in first instance and that what we say to USA should be based on careful analysis and interpretation of your impressions. However, I appreciate USA concern to be given earliest possible indication of "general flavour" of your discussions in Hanoi to the extent and only to the extent that this may have "an immediate bearing" on matters raised with Ritchie by Bundy. I am prepared to authorize you to do this on basis of absolute minimum required to meet USA concerns and purely in terms of "general flavour". I believe that, if this needs to be done, it should be done in Vientiane to USA Chargé d'Affaires only and not repeat not to USA Ambassador in Bangkok. You are, of course, free to discuss with

USA Chargé d'Affaires anything relating to your subsidiary presentation on USA prisoners which is a presentation we made on behalf of USA and which was made in parallel with similar presentation in Vientiane in which Chargé d'Affaires has been personally involved.

[Paul] Martin

406.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. 523
Hanoi, [June 18, 1966]
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

After having presented to Vice Foreign Minister Thach the American comments on DRVN Prime Minister's proposal on the first day we were here, I received today the reply from Vice Prime Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in the "absence from Hanoi" of Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. Trinh said that after studying our interpretation of the American reply, DRVN leaders saw nothing in it that had not repeat not already been published in the Western press. He stated with bitterness that DRVN could not repeat not accept to respond to American suggestion that DRVN should pay a price for cessation of "unjust bombing" North Vietnam, which violates accepted international relations between nations. He insisted that DRVN could respond favourably only to the original proposal of unconditional cessation of bombing and other acts of war against DRVN. He then continued to catalogue and denounce American crimes involved in bombing North Vietnam; this proved it is impossible to believe that leaders of a nation guilty of such aggression can be sincere: "all this talk of peace is deceitful words".

2. In associating with Americans, Trinh accused us of also being insincere and lacking goodwill in arguments used in presenting the reply of "depraved" leader of the USA: "you have conveyed to us the savage threats of Americans. It is regrettable that your presentation has not repeat not convinced us of your goodwill".

3. I expressed disappointment that our sincerity and goodwill should be questioned and suggested that if this was the case there would be no repeat no point to continuing our conversation or keeping channel open between Hanoi and Ottawa. The Vice Prime Minister then modified his attitude respecting our sincerity and goodwill and agreed that channel should be kept open.

4. DRVN reply was not repeat not unexpected especially after the airing in the Western press of President Johnson's offer which was almost identical with message Canada had taken so much trouble to deliver. I tried therefore to sound out Vice Prime Minister as to their attitude to broader problem of an over-all cease fire and peace conference. His comments, which included opinion that in view of American attitude, "the time is not repeat not ripe" and the statement "we desire peace" will be relayed to you from Saigon.

5. You may wish to wait until my arrival in Ottawa before giving Washington the full report on the DRVN rejection of their response.

6. Following telegram† gives text of DRVN press release [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu] tonight for issue tomorrow.[68]

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[68] See/Voir "North Vietnam, in Broadcast, Suggests No Policy Change," *New York Times*, 19 June 1966, p. 3.

407.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. Y-445
Ottawa, June 18, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Following for Ambassador only from Minister.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Rusk telephoned me earlier this morning to say that, according to his info, there had been no contact with USA Chargé d'Affaires in Vientiane.[69]

2. I am having repeated to you telegram 305† from Vientiane which indicates that, while Ronning did not see USA Chargé d'Affaires at airport, he did authorize MacLellan to convey certain info to USA Chargé which was done. Apparently, however, this info was confined to matter of USA prisoners only.

3. As you know, we did instruct Ronning in our telegrams Y-427 of June 10 and Y-117† of June 11 to bear in mind urgent USA interest in some indication of general flavour of Ronning's discussions in Hanoi. While our telegram Y-438 of June 16 reached Vientiane only after Ronning's arrival, purpose of this particular message was merely to confirm and summarize my previous instructions and to make sure that this matter was being borne in mind. I am not disposed at this stage to draw any conclusions from Ronning's silence on matters which are of interest to USA. It is entirely possible, however, that impressions he formed were not such as to have immediate bearing on matters raised with you by Bundy or to lend themselves to easy categorization.

4. In any event, I am doing what I can to bring Ronning back to Ottawa with minimum of delay. I am also drawing telegram Y-438 to Moore's attention to make sure that, if there is anything within general framework and limits of my instructions that could have been said to USA, this is done to Lodge in Saigon.

[Paul] Martin

408.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. 527
Saigon, June 19, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Reference: Our Tel 524† Jun 18.
From Commissioner.

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[69] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 159.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE: VICE PRIME MINISTER

The following paragraphs give an approx. verbatim record of Ronning's final formal meeting in Hanoi, with Vice Prime Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh on June 17. The record has not repeat not been seen in final form by Ronning. As suggested in Ronning's reference telegram, strongly recommend you await his arrival in Ottawa before giving Washington full report on the DRVN rejection of American response.

Vice Prime Minister Trinh: How do you feel in Hanoi, Mr. Ambassador?

Ronning: I feel very well physically and mentally. I wish to convey to you in the first place the appreciation of our Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the opportunity you have afforded us to come back. I appreciate very much the welcome and reception, the comfortable manner in which I have been accommodated, and the conversations we have had, especially with your deputy (Vice Foreign Minister).

As we have stated previously, but I would like to re-repeat it, Canada has taken this initiative to return for a further exchange of views because we are very much concerned about the situation in Vietnam, arising out of the hostilities in Vietnam. Because we are so concerned about the tragic and deplorable results of the war, we would like to see a peaceful and honourable settlement, acceptable to both sides. That is why we accepted readily the opportunity to offer the good offices of Canada in trying to bring the two parties together for informal direct talks, or talks through a third party. And the Canadian Government, after studying the suggestion of your Prime Minister made to me on my previous visit, instructed me to go to Washington. I explained this to them – all informally, all orally, with nothing in writing.

The USA has made counter-suggestions and we have put them in terms of our interpretation of what they said. I therefore explained orally to your Vice Foreign Minister as best I could the comments the Americans made on your Prime Minister's suggestion. Subsequently, entirely on my own initiative, I handed to your deputy a piece of paper, that our interpretation of the American suggestions would be [as] clear as I could make it. Of course, we hope that after consideration, you will have something to send back with us for the Americans – further modifications or whatever you wish – and I will take it to my Government. I had the impression your Prime Minister wanted the channel kept open, and the Americans do too – even if it is not repeat not fully satisfactory to one or the other side. We are prepared to continue our good offices in this way.

We are prepared to make this stay a little longer, to delay the aircraft for two or three days, or to make a return visit whenever it seems best to you. We have very limited objectives as far as Canada is concerned: i.e., chiefly to act as a messenger between the two sides, in the hope that direct talks may be renewed or, [if] preferred, talks be done through a third party of choice. Therefore, we would be very happy to bring whatever comments you may have to make. Thank you.

Trinh: Thank you. I have received the reports of your return visit to Hanoi and of your talks with our friends and particularly with our Vice Foreign Minister. And we have thought over the info, the wording you have conveyed to us, and we must tell you frankly, it is the wording of aggressors who are most depraved people. Because these ideas, we have read them all in the Western press; because more than once we have expounded to you that the actions of the Americans in South Vietnam and North Vietnam are unjust actions. And now once again we can hear wordings which smack of aggression. I think I need not repeat not speak long in order to point [out] all the irrationalities of these words. From thousands of miles away, the USA has sent troops here to make aggression against the people. They have brought weapons here to massacre the Vietnamese people; they have brought planes, and warships to shell the DRVN without any grounds. And all these activities are encroaching on the sovereignty of our country – and no repeat no words can describe the atrocity of these

inhumane acts. And now that they have gone deeper into a war of aggression, the Americans urge that the Vietnamese people pay some price for their stopping the aggression. And they still ask some price for stopping hostilities which they should have stopped purely and simply. We have many times expounded the just stand of our Government. The Americans have not repeat not shown any understanding, any comprehension of our Government's just stand. They intensify this aggression: they have brought their strength up from a score of thousands to 282,000 according to their official statement; they have brought troops from some of their satellite countries to help, and have escalated increasingly the air war against the DRVN and now when the DRVN urged them to stop their activities, they from their side have asked some price for it. We consider this aggression as something very evil, very bad. We need not repeat not reiterate here our determination – the strength of our people, the determination of our people to fight and to win. And we need not repeat not reiterate here our preparedness to meet difficulties in order to have independence and freedom. The question is clear and simple. Our demand is that the aggressors who have groundlessly brought troops here, let them withdraw, let them respect the national rights of the Vietnamese people, respect the necessary minimum of international relations between countries and all the deeds of the Americans show to us more clearly that they are aggressive and warlike, that all their talk of peace is deceitful words. As to the encroachment on the territory and security of the DRVN, the only thing demanded of them is that they stop these deeds. Naturally we are prepared to examine their attitude. But we clearly see they have no repeat no goodwill.

As to the good office you have referred to, I have the following remark. In any case you have conveyed to us the savage threats of the Americans. We have thought it over before seeing you today. We try to see your goodwill in your statements in the interviews in the last few days, and we do not repeat not see it clearly. This is regrettable. Naturally, [as] a matter of principle, we do not repeat not oppose contact between you and us. But this should be associated with the interest in your goodwill. No repeat no doubt after your two visits to Vietnam you understand the Vietnam situation better, and the aspirations of the Vietnam people and the desire of the DRVN Government. And our contacts are useful when these contacts reveal your goodwill to contribute to a solution. We regret that this time we do not repeat not perceive it.

These are a number of ideas I express after having reports on the interviews you have had. I would like to know whether you have something to say.

Ronning: Yes. I am of course bitterly disappointed that you have found that in my interviews with your Deputy Foreign Minister I seem to have given an impression which I certainly had no repeat no intention of giving. Particularly when you imply that Canada is merely bringing to you comments on the American proposal, which in my estimation you are misinterpreting. And I should like to reiterate what I said before, and that is, that Canada has publicly expressed, through our Prime Minister, that we do not repeat not approve of the American policy in Vietnam, particularly the bombing of North Vietnam.

Trinh: It is known to me.

Ronning: Therefore it is a little difficult for me to come here with good intentions, with every goodwill, in the hope of bringing together the two sides, to be misunderstood as it appears from the reports you have from the Deputy Foreign Minister. Your words indicate that I have the wrong attitude. If you cannot repeat not accept the real feeling I have about the situation in Vietnam, then there is no repeat no further use in continuing our conversations or this channel.

Trinh: We cannot repeat not accept the attitude or position of the Americans. Here there are two aspects. One is the position of the USA, which we consider to be one of aggression, and bad: aggression against South Vietnam and intensifying and extending the air war against North Vietnam. And they ask some price for stopping these aggressions. This is an attitude which we deem is lacking in goodwill.

This is one aspect. As to the action, the job done by you, during our last interview I told you we took note of a number of points raised by your Government. On account of these points, we agreed to receive you. But this time I must say we do not repeat not see clearly the usefulness of your desire to show your goodwill.

Ronning: That I understand. If you impugn me or my Government's motives, that was, I thought your meaning, and then there could be no repeat no more talk. What you now say, however – if you can accept our sincerity in attempting to do what we are. On both points that the Vice Prime Minister has just stated, I can understand the point of view, and it is quite true that as the result of my two visits here I have a much better understanding of all Vietnam and particularly the attitude of your Government to this whole situation. Maybe I could say a few words about myself to indicate how personally I feel about it.

I said last time that it was significant that my Government had sent me. There are many people more capable than I who could have been sent. The reason I was the one is that they know my attitude to the whole problem of foreign powers in Asia (here followed an illustration.) My Government knows my attitude, one of sympathy to the point of view you have expressed. We still think this war can be stopped. That is why we are still prepared to act as messenger boy. And of course, as a go-between between two strong opposite forces, one tries to present the best possible view, one to the other. We listened very carefully to a very clear and frank analysis by Ha Van Lau yesterday. I said to him: "I wish I could take you to the USA, so that you could present this attitude face to face with American representatives". I am glad to have had this opportunity, even if I do not repeat not come back again. I should like to, to try again. I understand your resentment – you do not repeat not see why you should make concessions to have the Americans do what you think they should do. Now, you may not repeat not like to hear what I am going to say now, as it may seem to present the view of the USA in a better light than it deserves. But as I would like to take Ha Van Lau to the USA, to present so well as he did yesterday, because I would like the Americans to fully understand; so too I would like to bring an American here to express their point of view – you might think it mistaken, but he believes in it. This exchange is of course impossible, so I am trying to do both tasks. Before I tell you the American point of view, let me say this: twice in Washington I have reported to the Americans, without quoting you, your Prime Minister and your Vice Foreign Minister. I gave the Americans the impressions I had received – the determination of the people, especially of North Vietnam, where I had had several days' contact, the impossibility of the Americans bringing these people on their knees to the conference table by bombing. I told them you have an agricultural economy and society. There are few Western observers who understand the significance of this. I told them you have had generations of experience digging in and you can produce enough food to live and as long as that is, so you will have determination never to give in. I said that whether they liked it or not repeat not, they can never subdue these opponents or win this war.

Trinh: But just now they are nurturing the illusion that they can bring us to our knees.

Ronning: Yes, I am coming to that. However mistaken you think they are, understand their motives. Because I think that if the Americans are to deal effectively with you, they must understand your motives and attitude, however mistaken; and vice versa. The Americans, you see, think they are fighting for the independence, territorial integrity and freedom of the people of South Vietnam – so that they have a free choice. And they therefore consider you as the chief enemy and therefore bomb your transport lines supplying the NLF, who are attacking the people the Americans are supporting. And now no repeat no matter how you disagree with them, that is the situation. I am not repeat not trying to justify it, I am just making clear their point of view. And they are therefore building up – no repeat no doubt to 280,000 plus a further 18,000 – evidence of their power and determination. The hope that they have no repeat no morale, no repeat no fighting spirit is mistaken: they have it. Even in a conventional war they have this power and they will use it. Here are two strong parties, with the power to prevent each other from winning.

I am soon finished. The conclusion I come to is this: what can be done most effectively to stop the hostilities? You face, it seems to me, two alternatives. First, a prolonged war with many years of suffering for the people of North Vietnam. No repeat no doubt there will be intensification of hostilities and building up of military power. True, that means prolonged suffering for the people of Vietnam. Second, no repeat no matter how wrong, mistaken, aggressive, "depraved" you think they are, the question is: they are here, how can you get rid of them?

Trinh: Let them go.

Ronning: That is the right solution, let them withdraw. That can be secured. I am thinking out loud as a private man. If, as a result of the American reply, nothing can be done along the lines of the Prime Minister's proposal, and the matter is dropped, then in my opinion – in fact I have instructions from Ottawa to keep this channel open – but I have no repeat no instructions on the following suggestions, they are now my own:

Is it possible now that hostilities might be terminated and that there is sufficient agreement on both sides to have the two Co-Chairmen summon a conference? I know it sounds simple as I put it, whereas it is a very complicated matter, with many details. I do this thinking out loud as a possible alternative to continuing the war. I am not repeat not proposing that Canada mediate. We are not repeat not trying to persuade you to do more than you wish, and we are not repeat not trying to persuade the Americans to do more than they wish. I simply give the best interpretation of the messages in both capitals. While this is entirely my own initiative, I know my Government would approve my carrying your reaction to this, or any modification of it.

Trinh: I have a report of your interview with the Vice Foreign Minister. I understand that after your last visit, you reported the Prime Minister's views to the Americans. This is to say, with respect to the DRVN, the Americans must stop unconditionally their bombing of North Vietnam. Concerning the stand of the DRVN, its basis is the NLF and the NLF declaration: to solve the question of Vietnam the Americans must recognize this and prove it by deeds. For a solution of the South Vietnam question, it must be dealt with by the NLF; and the reunification of Vietnam must be dealt with by the Vietnamese people themselves. These are also fundamental questions referred to in the Geneva Agreements. Therefore, our stand is the Geneva Agreements. But so far, the Americans have not repeat not shown their agreement on all these questions, which I have mentioned – not repeat not even on the question of stopping the bombing. They still ask for some price. They give themselves the right to cope with the struggle of the people in South Vietnam by bombing North Vietnam. More than once we have expressed our attitude. They should stop the bombing, and make a declaration to that effect. Then we can envisage that, with understanding, we would examine their goodwill.

You wanted to contribute something to the question of Vietnam. You should also have a very clear-cut attitude in this connection. And as for us, we have stated and expounded clearly our view. As to your reference to keeping the channel open, I repeat that to this, as a matter of principle, we have no repeat no opposition. For the time being, we do not repeat not oppose meeting with you, or others, to expound our position, to clarify to you the questions you want to understand, if these interviews prove useful and prove goodwill.

Ronning: I am very glad to hear this. I will tell my Government that you are prepared to keep this channel open.

Trinh: We do not repeat not oppose it.

Ronning: If you do not repeat not oppose it, you accept its being kept open. Can we take this to mean the same thing?

Trinh: Yes.

Ronning: I am wondering, since the Americans stated that the bombing of North Vietnam should be taken as one element in preparing for direct talks, whether this one could be combined with the other elements which you have described – for example, the NLF and recognition of the NLF. May I then say to my Government that you are prepared to take steps to end hostilities and prepare for a conference, provided there can be some acceptance by the Americans in this respect?

Trinh: This is a very warlike statement: "one element".

Ronning: I do not repeat not care about that (the interpreter reads back to Trinh in Vietnamese Ronning's relevant statement above). I did not repeat not wish to use "element" in that sense. It was this way: they said that is one aspect of the war. Then instead of considering that as something to be negotiated, let us forget about that, and consider the total war in Vietnam – that is, the war with the NLF in the South and the bombing of the North. I believe it would be better to stop everything.

Then I wonder also, if the Americans make clear their attitude to the NLF (You say they have not repeat not done so? *Trinh*: Correct.) and are prepared to cease activities North and South, whether it would be possible then to prepare the ground, and to ask the Co-Chairmen for a conference for a return to many aspects of the Geneva Agreements?

Trinh: I think that question is clear, as follows.

We have our stand, it seems from the Geneva Agreements. The Americans recognize them as the basis for a solution of the problem. We will go anywhere to solve the question, so far we understand the Americans are stubbornly opposing our stand: withdrawal of troops, the question of bases, their opposition to letting the questions of Vietnam be solved in accordance with the political programme of the NLF and reunification by the Vietnamese themselves. They give themselves the unreasonable right to bomb North Vietnam. All this shows that conditions are not repeat not yet ripe for any political conference. We are prepared to examine the question if our stand is accepted by the Americans and they issue a declaration to that effect. They must stop the bombing of North Vietnam, cancel the bases, stop the aggression against South Vietnam, let the Vietnam problem be solved in accordance with the political platform of the NLF, and leave reunification to the Vietnamese themselves without foreign interference. It depends on the attitude of the USA, whether it shows clearly that the conditions for a conference are there. If we do not repeat not look into the content of the conference, but only into reconvening a Geneva Agreements Conference, then the conference will solve nothing.

I have told you that all the people, North and South, are very earnest about having peace, but not repeat not a peace with the bombing of the North and the gun shells of the Americans forcing us. Because peace must be associated with genuine independence for the Vietnamese people. Now please think, if some foreign aggressor comes to bomb and shell the northern or southern part of USA, do you think the American people would accept what is being forced on us now by them?

Ronning: No repeat no. There is no repeat no difference of opinion between us on this. I have told them. But it has happened, it is a *fait accompli*. Can we now stop it? This is my Government's position.

Trinh: I think I remember I told you last time that we should not repeat not dissociate the past from the present. The scientific attitude would be [to] analyse the "Why? What was the cause?" and proceed to the solution.

Ronning: Yes. I agree –

Trinh: – and peace-loving opinion in the world cannot repeat not allow any country including USA, to put them before a *fait accompli*. If we accepted it, it means accepting the 280,000 troops, and they will remain in Vietnam.

Ronning: The *fait accompli*, I did not repeat not mean it should be accepted. It is the situation as it exists now. I should like to change it, a bad situation. The question is how best to change it.

As to an analysis of the causes, I agree that there can be no repeat no solution until the causes are examined, a solution is dependent on the causes. My point, however, is this: first get the hostilities stopped and then have a conference to go into all that. The question now is how to get it stopped. So I was wondering if we could simplify in general terms the general lines on which some agreement might be reached to bring about the cessation of hostilities and prepare the ground for a solution. The general lines I have in mind are that we ask USA to reconsider and to make clear (underlined) their attitude towards the NLF, agree to a complete cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, to agree to the general principles of the Geneva Agreements which provide that the Vietnamese people should decide their own destinies. Then at a conference of great powers and including those countries directly concerned, guarantees for the sovereignty and integrity of all Vietnam could be worked out.

Trinh: We have spent a long time before on this matter. The question is clear. Since it is your personal view or suggestion, I propose that you go further in explaining our point of view.

As to the exposition of your views in the past few days, of your understanding of the American views, I will sum up their remarks. First of all, the American attitude of demanding some price from the DRVN is a bad one. The party to have asked for some price for it is our side. Therefore, I said this is the attitude of the aggressor, and we are fighting against aggression. As to our goodwill, we have expounded it. Here I have had an opportunity to repeat it to you.

As to Canada or you, Mr. Ambassador, coming here with good offices, you have goodwill and we are prepared to listen to you and to receive you. But we realize that the American stand which you conveyed to us is not repeat not satisfactory. In other words, I say we are not repeat not satisfied with the attitude, and we oppose it. But as to your goodwill, I have expressed my views on it. And when you go back to Canada, please convey to Prime Minister Pearson and Foreign Minister Martin greetings and thanks for their regards to us.

Ronning: Thank you for the very frank manner in which you have given your reply. I am grateful for the expression of your goodwill; we reciprocate in saying to you we have goodwill towards you and please convey to your Prime Minister and to President Ho Chi Minh the greetings of our Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and thank them for having received the representative of the Canadian Government, on his return visit to Hanoi. While we would have liked to carry back a more positive comment on the American suggestion, we fully understand why you find this impossible. And in spite of the fact that we cannot repeat not carry back any message on this proposal on bombing, we appreciate your readiness to keep the channel open – we too wish it to remain open, in case in the future there is something you can convey to us, or we to you, I shall convey to my Government, and I am sure my Government will convey to USA, that you want peace and a peaceful solution. And if there is anything you would wish to propose in the future respecting the overall situation, on hostilities, or if the Americans do, we shall be glad to contact you again.

At this end of the channel there is Mr. Moore: if in between these special visits you wish to have something conveyed, you have the direct approach through him – at any time you wish to make use of us.

Trinh: We have got Ambassador Moore twice since your earlier visit. You were here some days ago for a Commission meeting?

Moore: Yes, two weeks ago. While I in no repeat no way can speak for the Commission, I believe it will not repeat not be so long before we come again as it was between the two previous meetings, eight months and one year. I believe it is desirable and proper that we come frequently to Hanoi as a body.

409.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. 531
Saigon, June 19, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Emergency.
Reference: My Tel 530† Jun 19.

VIETNAM: OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE – ASSESSMENT

We have failed to achieve the main object of phase two of the operation (to convince the DRVN leaders of American sincerity and to induce a positive response); we have succeeded in reaching the secondary objective (the Ottawa-Hanoi channel remains open), and we have had some small success with the minor objective of prisoners of war.

2. The following are some points which Ronning and I discussed during and at the end of the visit, and which I told him I would pass on to you in advance of his imminent arrival in Ottawa.

3. On the day we arrived in Hanoi, it was quite evident, from the reception they gave us, that their expectations were high and that they anticipated something of substance. In the face of all the publicity that had been given to many statements from American sources, including the President, all of which they considered as another peace offensive, our message, which was no repeat no advance over these public statements, was also considered by them to be part of the same pre-election propaganda. Their disappointment was so great, after analyzing our interpretation of the American response, that it was possibly significant that, instead of using the Prime Minister, who had indicated a degree of goodwill and a modicum of flexibility, the leadership chose the rigid, doctrinaire Vice-Prime Minister to deliver the DRVN reply with suitable bitterness appropriate to him as "hatchet man". This choice was perhaps made because of pro-Chinese proclivities of the Vice-Prime Minister and his choice of language was intended to please Peking. If on the other hand it is true that Prime Minister Pham Van Dong was not repeat not in Hanoi, that could account for the utterly undiplomatic wording of the DRVN reply and the implication that we were insincere and lacking the goodwill which the Prime Minister, to the contrary, had given us such warm assurances of accepting. Although Trinh possibly took advantage of Pham Van Dong's absence, it was probably due to the Prime Minister's influence that the hate-filled Vice-Prime Minister modified his words with respect to Canada's attitude. I have had a slight confirmation from Hanoi diplomatic sources that Pham Van Dong was in fact absent from Hanoi last week, and am inclined to believe it was not repeat not a "diplomatic absence" directed at us. As there was no repeat no indication that Ho Chi Minh had returned to Hanoi, we would guess that if the DRVN excuse was genuine, Pham Van Dong may well have joined Ho in Peking with Le Duan last heard of in Moscow.

4. Another indication that they really expected something this time was the upgrading of the level of accommodation and entertainment. Ronning was given the best suite in the guest house, and he, Donahue and I were entertained regally at dinner at the palatial reception house (instead of in the guest house restaurant as last time). It may, however, have also been significant that, in spite of the negative reaction to our message, when the Vice-Prime Minister was confronted with the possibility of our considering the channel to be closed in the face of his accusations regarding our sincerity and goodwill, he changed his attitude to us and gave the assurance that the DRVN does not repeat not wish to close the channel. It was further significant that he was prepared to prolong the interview and discuss terms to

end hostilities throughout the whole of Vietnam in preparation for ultimate negotiations. The problems which he seemed to consider as most important in this context were (a) the American attitude towards and recognition of the NLF; (b) a return to the 1954 Geneva Agreements; and (c) withdrawal of American forces.

5. My reference telegram mentions the hardline offensive carried on by Le Tan throughout his dinner for Ronning. A main theme was the old one, updated: if the Americans are sincere, why do they escalate? To Ronning's response that DRVN must negotiate, Le Tan rejoined, "you are negotiating, but since your last visit there has been more escalation". Finally, he admitted that the DRVN cannot repeat not beat the USA, and declared that they would nevertheless fight on. The repeated exclamation that the Americans "should leave" met Ronning's rejoinder that the fact remains that the Americans are the ones who will decide that. Le Tan's further remark that the Americans must recognize the Four Points as well as stopping the bombing could be a bad augur, indicating that the DRVN might not repeat not be prepared to discuss the Four Points even after the cessation of bombing. However, as I shall mention below, this was the only time during this visit when the Four-Point stand as such was mentioned orally.

6. Thach's performance was interesting, a different role to that of last time. He gave a hard line in immediate response to Ronning's presentation, but qualified it with the words, "this is my opinion", and generally speaking, he was not repeat not as vociferous as last time, perhaps as a result of his Prime Minister's attitude then. Informally, as at his dinner, he went out of his way to create a cordial atmosphere. There were others, of course, who were given a more obnoxious role. Nothing, I think, happens in Hanoi by chance or according to personal whim, and we can on the one hand find in Thach's behaviour some further substantiation of their sincerity in "not repeat not objecting" to our channel remaining open. This was reinforced by Thom's remarks on the way to the airport June 18. He told Ronning that he had been instructed to assure him that the DRVN leaders did not repeat not question his sincerity or goodwill, nor that of the Canadian initiative, but that the Vice-Prime Minister may have given that impression when he expressed his "intense antagonism" to the "false pretenses" of the American peace offensive, upon which we had placed a too favourable interpretation.

7. Thom volunteered that one factor in the outright refusal to even consider the American proposal was the fear that the Americans might have misunderstood the DRVN Prime Minister's proposal as indicating that his Government was anxious to have the bombardment terminated because it was really hurting. He added, "the fact is that we are prepared to accept as inevitable the complete destruction of our cities by aerial bombardment, but shall never come on our knees to a conference table". This was the first indication we have had that they were afraid that the Americans would draw this "wrong conclusion" about [Group corrupt/ Groupe corrompu] Dong's suggestion.

8. The fact that they are still anxious to keep the Hanoi-Ottawa channel open was further evident in the otherwise unnecessary politeness and warmth of the send-off, and in the statements made then by Thom and the usually morose Le Tan, whose daughter presented a bouquet of flowers and kissed the Canadian messenger in front of her beaming father. Some of this was clearly sugar-coating for our disappointment and possibly bruised feelings, with the intention of having us come again or at least stand at the ready. On the other hand, while they undoubtedly tried to pacify us by explaining away the Vice-Prime Minister's inclusion of us in his harsh comments on the USA, the piece of paper handed to us indicates that they have no repeat no intention whatever, at this moment, of changing their rigid position or withdrawing or smoothing over anything they said about the USA. Nevertheless, the Vice-Foreign Minister's read words, "naturally we are prepared to examine their attitude, their goodwill", could be a weak ray of hope.

9. You will see from the record again that discussion with these people is not repeat not easy. Thach, for instance, in the formal meeting, confused the issue of the withdrawal of the Americans with that of the bombing suggestion – although he was quick to acknowledge this.

More tricky, from our point of view, is their one-track tendency to judge our goodwill by the extent we see their point of view to the exclusion of any other. They tend to expound in order to convince us, the go-between. However, there may be the more rational motivation of it being necessary to take a crack at us too, for the record (I recall that in other days envoys bearing bad news had their heads lopped off).

10. Of interest is the one point of any substance to come up at Thach's dinner. Having already jokingly settled with Thach that "the conference" will be at Geneva, Ronning asked about participation by the French. Thach replied, "Why (not repeat not. If the?) 1954 Geneva Agreements are to be the basis, the French hope to be there – although the Americans will not repeat not like to have de Gaulle".

11. A further point of speculation is that if the NLF had been informed or had heard about Pham Van Dong's proposal, their reaction at being excluded may have been such that the DRVN could not repeat not accept any modification, and unquestionably if the Chinese had learned about the proposal, their pressure would have been towards a (refusal?) of any modification. Even if neither the NLF nor the Chinese knew, their presence in the background would be a restraining (influence?). Nevertheless, Ronning was assured by Le Tan before our departure that their proposal still stands – "the Americans are invited to accept it at any time". This attitude might indicate that the DRVN, if it comes to a showdown, will take any action in its own interest regardless of the interests of the NLF as suggested to us by Ronning on the earlier visit.

12. The text of the "paper" given Ronning at the airport June 18 reads as follows: "The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam flatly rejects the extremely insolent stand of the USA Government to the effect that "the USA would be prepared to proceed towards talks on the basis of a reciprocal reduction in hostilities in Vietnam, of which a [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu] the bombing of North Vietnam would be one element". The USA is thousands of miles away from Vietnam. The Vietnamese people have done no repeat no harm whatsoever to the USA. The USA Government has no repeat no right to send troops to invade South Vietnam. It has no repeat no right to launch air raids against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It has no repeat no right to demand that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam accept one condition or another for the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. The USA imperialists' aggression is the deep root and the immediate cause of the present serious situation in Vietnam. Let the USA imperialists put an end to their aggression, and peace will be restored immediately in Vietnam. If the USA Government really wants a peaceful settlement, it must recognize the Four-Point Stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and prove this by actual deeds, it must stop definitely and unconditionally the air raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Only in this way will it be possible to envisage a political settlement of the Vietnam problem. Hanoi, June 17."

13. Le Tan explained the paper was not repeat not a note or aide-mémoire, but simply a summary for Ronning's convenience of the DRVN position. We believe it was given us partly to reciprocate our piece of paper (the "oral message"). It is also probable that, when they had studied their transcript of Trinh's remarks, they noticed that he had forgotten to mention the Four Points; indeed, they had not repeat not been raised as such in any of the formal discussions. This was an easily-made oversight, since the Four Points were not repeat not involved in their original proposal, and the principles of the Four Points were at the basis of much of the discussions. The paper may thus have been an excuse to specify this omission and make clear that the Four Points are still the basis of the DRVN position.

14. After thanking Le Tan for the paper, and after we had gone into the prisoner of war question again and touched on the timing of the press release, Ronning thanked Le Tan for the paper and commented that while the Commissioner's functions in the ICSC are quite separate from these special visits, he is here, or his representative, to receive anything from

the DRVN. He is the necessary channel to start the other channel moving. I added that I would be always at their disposal, and recalled Pham Van Dong's saying that his door would always be open. Le Tan made no repeat no comment beyond an appreciative assent.

15. We had an impression of fierce determination which went deeper than propaganda and indeed comes close to a suicidal tendency. This puts in doubt the possibility of their being "hurt" sufficiently by bombing to talk on any but their own terms. There is also the danger that an "effective" increase in bombing could bring them to the point where, in despair, they would call in the Chinese. Despite their antipathy towards their big neighbour, they might regard them as the lesser (and transitory) evil – they at least are Asians and less hated than the present non-Asian Americans. The immediate desperation could out-balance the memory of centuries, especially when they can recall that in the past, they have in due course got rid of the Chinese more than once. This is speculation and does not repeat not take into account the drain in DRVN manpower and substance in the South, but it would be risky to put it to the test.

16. The immediate question we believe you will wish to consider is what attitude to take when we go back now to Washington. The DRVN clearly believe we have been "used" by the Americans as a tool in a "peace campaign" related to the forthcoming elections. Their reaction was clear on the first day, and again early on in Trinh's statement. It is no repeat no satisfaction to us that my apprehensions have proved correct: the Americans offered them nothing that had not repeat not already been publicly proclaimed, and now the DRVN have withdrawn into their corner. It is to be hoped we shall be asked by one side or the other to go back again, but we would, I believe, have to be more sure of our ground vis-à-vis the Americans, otherwise our next visit would probably be the last.

17. There are of course other factors which made it unlikely that anything positive would emerge on the ground, or for the immediate future. I suggest, for example (a) the Chinese, and the need to tread lightly to ensure the transit of supplies from Europe and not repeat not to provoke them in more general terms, particularly at the present stage of obviously close DRVN-USSR relations; (b) the possible August offensive by the PAVN-Vietcong at the height of the monsoon. You may wish to await the outcome; (c) the Americans' political troubles in the South; the DRVN clearly hope that the situation there may swing further to their advantage. The Americans may have taken this into account, but it does not repeat not warrant their making Canada a party to a propaganda exercise nor, in their own future interest, their aggravating the already fierce suspicion and hostility with which the DRVN already regards any approach they make.

[Victor C.] Moore

410.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6321

Secret.
[Ottawa,] June 21, 1966

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Laing),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Cardin),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),

The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. Favreau),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Nicholson),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Minister of Forestry (Mr. Sauvé),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Pennell),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Pépin),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Marchand),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Greene),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Côté),
The Minister without Portfolio (Mr. Turner).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner), (Mr. Wall).

[…]

VIET NAM – CANADIAN MEDIATION EFFORTS

(Previous reference June 14)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that, as he had indicated to the Cabinet on June 14, Mr. Chester Ronning had now spent four days in Hanoi in discussions with senior representatives of the North Viet Namese government. Mr. Ronning had been more ceremoniously received than during his visit in March but had been subjected to accusations that Canada was not being entirely sincere in her attempts to find a basis for negotiating the war in Viet Nam. The attitude of North Viet Namese ministers had been such that Mr. Ronning had indicated his intention to withdraw from discussions, whereupon their attitude had been somewhat modified. They were not, however, prepared to accept the position which Mr. Ronning had put forward on the basis of discussions with the U.S. administration, to the effect that the Americans would cease bombing if "reciprocal action" were taken by the North Viet Namese. Therefore, while it was impossible to report that any progress had been made as a result of these recent discussions, the Canadian channel of communication with North Viet Nam remained open. In addition, Mr. Ronning had returned with information on matters of lesser importance which was now being assessed by Canadian officials.

Mr. Martin said that the U.S. had requested that Mr. Ronning make a report directly to the United States government on his visit to Hanoi. This proposal had been rejected, on the grounds that it might indicate bad faith on Canada's part, or that Canada was simply acting as a tool of the United States. It was therefore intended that, after Mr. Ronning had discussed the matter with Canadian officials, a report would be made to a senior United States official who was coming to Ottawa that day.

Mr. Martin said that he had been very disturbed on June 18 to hear President Johnson's statement that the United States military effort in Viet Nam would be stepped up,[70] as it had made Mr. Ronning's position very difficult indeed in not coinciding with the proposal which he had been asked to put to the North Viet Namese. He had discussed the matter several times in recent days with Mr. Rusk, and was now reasonably certain that there would be no immediate escalation of the war in Viet Nam. Eventually, however, the American effort would be increased.

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[70] See/Voir "The President's News Conference of June 18, 1966," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966*, Book I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office: 1967), pp. 625–636.

The Prime Minister said that the government owed Mr. Ronning a great debt for the manner in which he had sought to lay a foundation for negotiations and to maintain a line of communication with the North Viet Namese. Mr. Ronning had indicated that the people of Hanoi expected and were preparing for United States bombing attacks, and there was no doubt in his mind that the bombing would be increased during the monsoon season. It was important now to consider very carefully the circumstances under which Mr. Ronning might make a further visit to Hanoi. Such a visit must not be made simply to exchange views, as there was a possibility that such a visit would be interpreted to the effect that his efforts simply represented a "front" for American actions.

Mr. Ronning had commented that the bitterness of the present situation was no worse than that which had pertained just prior to the declaration of a cease fire in Korea in 1954. Therefore, while it was not possible to say that any progress had been made, the Canadian effort should be continued in the hope of an eventual breakthrough to negotiable positions. In the meantime every effort should be made to minimize publicity about Mr. Ronning's efforts.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Prime Minister concerning the recent visit to Hanoi by Mr. Chester Ronning.

[…]

411.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/3

No. Y-449
Ottawa, June 21, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Commissioner only) (Immediate).
Chargé and Shenstone only.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Minister had two interviews yesterday with Kreisberg and USA Embassy Minister Scott. First discussion centered on Canadian Government's concern (as discussed between SSEA and Secretary Rusk by telephone on Saturday) that there should be no immediate increase in the scale of military actions against North Vietnam. Such action would raise difficulties for Canadian Government and would almost certainly affect Ronning's future usefulness. Minister said he was underlining this problem specifically because he had been "alarmed" by President Johnson's remarks over the weekend.

2. Scott and Kreisberg indicated that Canadian concern on this matter was known to State Department, but they had nothing new to add at this time. Kreisberg said that he knew of no decisions looking to new departures in policy but he believed that before anything along these lines were done, advance notification would be given by President to Prime Minister.

3. During discussion we mentioned to Scott and Kreisberg that [we?] found it curious that USA Government had passed its first message on "reciprocity" through Chinese and that info about this presentation had subsequently been made public. Kreisberg explained that publicity had been unfortunate and unintentional. As far as using Chinese channel was concerned he had no specific explanation other than that USA Government had always believed it was wise to be as frank about American intentions as possible with the Chinese and while it was not possible to allay Chinese suspicions completely, USA were at least trying to reduce the areas of genuine misunderstanding to a minimum.

4. Second interview took place late afternoon after Ronning had reported to Minister and Prime Minister. Discussion was much fuller with Minister basing his presentation on series of talking points outlined in our immediately following telegram.[71]

5. Ronning was not present at either of these interviews.

6. Americans have been given verbatim text of Saigon telegram 526† of June 18 on treatment of prisoners.

412.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA/2

No. Y-450
Ottawa, June 21, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-449 Jun 21.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Commissioner only) (Immediate).
Chargé and Shenstone only.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE

Following are talking points from which Minister spoke during second interview yesterday with Kreisberg and Scott:

1. Mr. Ronning visited Hanoi from June 14 to 18. He saw Ha Van Lau, the Chief of the PAVN Liaison Mission; Nguyen Co Thach, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Nguyen Duy Trinh in his capacity as vice-prime minister "in the absence from Hanoi of Pham Van Dong". He was courteously and hospitably received, more so this time than last. The line taken by the North Vietnamese in the discussions was, however, perceptibly harder.

2. Ronning presented the USA position. The North Vietnamese reiterated their willingness to open talks with the USA on the basis of their original proposition, i.e., a unilateral USA undertaking to stop the bombing of North Vietnam for good. They were unwilling to entertain any thought of reciprocity for a cessation of the bombing. The general approach formulated by USA, which was conveyed by Ronning, was equated by the North Vietnamese with the formula mentioned in Warsaw; the latter was already known to the North Vietnamese from public sources and they expressed the strong view that the approach was unacceptable to them.

3. Notwithstanding the fact that no repeat no progress appeared to be possible on the basis of this particular proposition, the North Vietnamese indicated that they would not repeat not wish the Canadian channel to be closed and Ronning was specifically told that they would not repeat not be opposed to its further use.

4. Because we take it that the maintenance of the channel is of interest to USA we would like to draw their attention to the adverse effects which an early escalation of USA activities against North Vietnam is likely to have both retroactively on the Ronning mission and potentially on the future use of the Canadian channel. We would also hope that the USA would not repeat not find it necessary, in any public statements, to refer to North Vietnamese attitudes in a way which might imply that their judgment has been arrived at on the basis of indications provided by Canada as a result of Ronning's visit.

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[71] See next document./Voir le document suivant.

5. It has been our intent to see whether a basis could be found on which it might prove possible for talks to be opened between USA and the North Vietnamese. It appears that, as far as North Vietnamese are concerned, there are no repeat no present prospects of an acceptable formula being devised on the basis of any reciprocal action for a cessation of bombing. We shall be considering and, we hope, discussing with USA other possibilities open to us of making use of the channel to Hanoi.

6. Meanwhile, Ronning will be available to go to Washington to convey the substance and flavour of his conversations in Hanoi to USA officials.

413.
Memorandum from Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
MG32-B12, vol. 229, 46/2

[Ottawa,] June 21, 1966

Mr. Goldschlag informs us that Mr. Bundy will arrive at about 2 o'clock. Mr. Goldschlag will meet him.

2. Mr. Bundy would like to have as his first priority a session with Mr. Ronning.

3. Would you want to be host at that meeting?

4. You should know that Mr. Butterworth is back in town which will affect the dinner plans. You would probably want to have Butterworth and Scott, which together with Bundy, would make four on the U.S. side with Kreisberg.

5. Since you will be free after Orders of the day the meeting with Ronning and Bundy could be held in your office at 3.30, unless of course there is some hold up in the House business. You would probably want to come out anyway, so we can set 3.30 as a firm time, if you agree.[72]

J.G. Hadwen

414.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/15

No. Y-476
Ottawa, June 30, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-474† Jun 30.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Immediate).

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[72] No Canadian record was found of Bundy's discussions in Ottawa. For Bundy's own assessment of them, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 161.
Aucun compte rendu canadien des discussions de Bundy à Ottawa n'a été trouvé. Pour connaître l'avis de Bundy à leur sujet, voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. IV (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 161.

VIETNAM

To supplement reports already available to you of Canadian reaction to USA bombing of oil installations in North Vietnam, you should know that, when USA Ambassador called on SSEA yesterday in connection with another matter, SSEA expressed surprise at having been taken unawares by USA decision to step up air activity against North Vietnam, going on to say that timing of this action was most unfortunate in relation with Ronning's mission and that he was deeply concerned about this particular development. (See our telegram Y-449, paragraph 2.)

415.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6321

Secret.
[Ottawa,] June 30, 1966

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Winters),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Sharp),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Cardin),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. MacEachen),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. Favreau),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Nicholson),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Minister of Forestry (Mr. Sauvé),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Benson),
The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Pennell),
The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Pépin),
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Marchand),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Greene),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Côté),
The Minister without Portfolio (Mr. Turner).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner), (Mr. Milligan),
The Acting Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Pitfield).

[...]

AMERICAN BOMBARDMENT OF HANOI

(Previous reference June 21)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs reported that according to his information the aerial bombardment of Hanoi on June 29 did not reflect a significant change in the Americans' pattern of bombing. Only military targets had been attacked. Nonetheless, he anticipated that questions would be asked as to whether or not Canada had been informed of the Americans'

intention in advance, and in this connection he recalled that he had told the Secretary of State of the United States that Canada hoped there would be no escalation in Viet Nam as it would certainly adversely affect Mr. Chester Ronning's efforts. Though Mr. Rusk had replied that there would be no escalation, and this had been confirmed during Mr. Bundy's recent visit, the United States seemed to believe that by the use of its greater power it can eventually frighten North Viet Nam into submission.

The Prime Minister said that, while he doubted the Americans' assumption and thought it could even lead to the opposite result to what was intended, he felt that nothing could be achieved by Canadian criticism of the bombardment of Hanoi. If pressed to comment, he would adopt the same approach as he had used in Toronto on June 25.[73] He noted that the United States seemed interested in the proposals he had made at that time despite the fact that they involved a course of action hitherto rejected in Washington, namely an American withdrawal immediately upon a cease fire.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs concerning the United States bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

[…]

[73] No published reference to Pearson's comments on Vietnam in Toronto on 25 June 1966 was found. Aucune référence publiée aux commentaires de Pearson sur le Vietnam à Toronto le 25 juin 1966 n'a été trouvée.

Chapter 6/Chapitre 6

AN ICSC INITIATIVE? (FEBRUARY 1966–JANUARY 1967)

UNE INITIATIVE DE LA CISC? (FÉVRIER 1966-JANVIER 1967)

416.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Poland
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Pologne
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/14

Telegram Y-170
Ottawa, February 16, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-157† Feb 14.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Permis New York, CANFORCEHED, Paris, Geneva, Moscow, Vienna, Rome, Canberra, Wellington, Hong Kong (Priority); Stockholm, Helsinki (Priority) from Hague; Belgrade, Prague (Priority) from London; Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane (Priority) from Delhi.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

I should be grateful if you could present following message from me to Foreign Minister Rapacki at earliest opportunity. Begins: I have been giving consideration to the possibility of the International Commission in Vietnam taking some action which might carry us some way forward to a negotiation. To this end, I have had discussions with Indian High Commissioner here as well as with your Ambassador.

2. I am under no repeat no illusion about the difficulties which will have to be overcome if the objective – which I am sure our two Governments share – of a peaceful settlement to this problem is to be achieved. It seems to me, however, that our membership in Vietnam Commission gives us an opportunity to make a contribution in this direction. Indeed, I am concerned about criticism being directed at Commission because of its apparent inactivity in the face of a situation which is of growing international concern.

3. I am aware, from our Commission association and most recently from reports I have seen of contents of your President's reply to President Ho Chi Minh's letter of January 24,[1] that there are substantial differences between the views of our two Governments on the nature of the problem in Vietnam. What matters most at this stage, however, are not repeat not our differences, but whether there are possibilities for a common positive approach to this problem through our Commission membership. I would myself, strongly favour such an

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[1] See/Voir "Net Tightens on Viet Area," *Sun* (Baltimore, Md.), 7 February 1966, p. A1.

approach and have been directing my thinking to the possibilities that may be open to us. I would hope to be able to put some concrete suggestions to your Ambassador in due course. In meantime, I would be very glad to have your reaction to the general idea of a Commission initiative in the right circumstances. Ends.

[Paul] Martin

417.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/14

No. 290
New York, February 18, 1966
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 291† Feb 18.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Immediate), London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva; Delhi from Ottawa; Moscow, Vienna, Warsaw, Belgrade, Prague from London.

VIETNAM: MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH U THANT FEBRUARY 17

Minister began his conversation with U Thant by referring to talks he had had with Rusk on Vietnam during NATO meetings. At that time he had discussed with Rusk possibility for three Governments of ICSC making an appeal to two Co-Chairmen of Geneva Conference.[2] Although Rusk's reaction was favourable, shortly afterwards bombing pause took place and in view of USA peace offensive he had decided not repeat not to pursue matter further.

2. Since then, however, he had considered ways and means whereby ICSC could become vehicle for achieving goals mentioned by [the] Pope in his latest message.[3] He had reluctantly come to view that ICSC could play more useful role towards settlement of Vietnam issue than UN despite fact that strictly speaking Geneva Agreement did not repeat not by itself empower Commission to deal with current situation. His present thoughts were that three members of Commission could usefully probe positions of parties with a view to narrowing their differences and bringing about in due course a negotiating posture. It was obvious to Minister that a call for convening a conference at this stage would be counterproductive.

3. Minister said that recently he had had some discussions in general terms with Indians and Poles as to how Commission could play a useful role in present situation. Indian reaction appears favourable but he had had no repeat no formal reaction from Poles. Minister is awaiting reply to letter he had sent to Rapacki but he had received some indirect indication that Polish Ambassador in Ottawa had spoken of idea in favourable terms.

4. In referring to U Thant's first formula (invitations to five powers plus North and South Vietnam and to NLF) Mr. Martin made point that it was obviously unacceptable to USA. Furthermore, formula concentrated too much on procedural aspect of problem. Real point at issue is position that NLF will have in eventual political settlement. Parenthetically Minister said that if any conference on Vietnam should take place he would not repeat not understand it if Commission's powers were not repeat not invited.

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2 See/Voir doc. 337.

3 See/Voir "Pope Asks Neutral Nations to Back Bid for Vietnam Conference," *Washington Post*, 6 February 1966, p. A22.

5. Minister said that his approach was predicated on his belief that Hanoi is interested in possible utilization of Commission for settlement.

6. U Thant thanked Minister for his confidence and said that since before Xmas he had been almost in daily contact with Goldberg and with Hanoi.[4] Goldberg had sought his views regarding Security Council involvement. He had advised Goldberg against such move. Not repeat not only because Peking and Hanoi are not repeat not UN members but because from point of view of Peking there is present at Security Council table an "usurper" which makes it impossible for them to come to Council. It is obvious to Secretary-General that while Peking could come to Geneva it would never come to New York. Other consideration was that USSR will have to take an intransigent position in Security Council and launch sharp attacks against USA which could only damage USA image. France would also have to take an anti-American position although thanks to Seydoux French attitude in Council was in fact surprisingly mild.[5]

7. Against his advice USA had decided otherwise with results that we know.[6] Question now was whether further peaceful initiatives could be taken and by whom.

8. One possibility was initiative by large group of non-aligned countries. Difficulty, however, is that it is almost impossible for these countries to reach agreement between themselves. Recently he suggested to Tito that he should concert his efforts with only two or three representative non-aligned countries. Tito's initial reaction was not repeat not enthusiastic as he felt that his position vis-à-vis Peking and NLF was weak. U Thant has nevertheless urged Tito to pursue his efforts on basis of his first- and second-best formula. U Thant added, however, one refinement e.g., a preliminary and essentially exploratory conference at which NLF need not repeat not be represented. But Secretary-General added that he personally held view that principal parties would turn down attendance at such conference. U Thant criticized USA suggestion to hear views of governments concerned as well as those of interested groups on ground that Hanoi would reject Ky's hand-picked representatives of various groups from SVN.

9. On whole therefore U Thant feels that some initiative by ICSC is more likely to yield results. Secretary-General gives considerable significance to Ho Chi Minh's specific references to ICSC members in his recent letters. He also believes that DRVN leadership is divided over issue. He thought that Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong belong to "doves" faction while Secretary of Party and NLF representative in Hanoi are completely in Peking's hands. He is also convinced that Peking line that NLF is sole and legitimate representative of SVN is not repeat not shared by Hanoi. Reasons Secretary-General adduces to support this contention are that Ho Chi Minh in 1964 was prepared to send representative to negotiate with USA and long tradition of independence of Vietnam vis-à-vis China. Despite large quantities of small arms provided by China in recent years and substantial gifts of rice given to Hanoi, U Thant remains convinced that Hanoi wishes to uphold her independence.

10. U Thant addressed himself to question of timing of possible peace moves.

11. Like de Gaulle he feels that time is not repeat not ripe to initiate meaningful negotiations. USA will not repeat not be in a position to make perceptible concessions this year because of Congressional elections. More importantly, Secretary-General believes that USSR will not repeat not move till after 23rd Communist Congress to be held on March 27. He described Congress as most crucial and dramatic development in history of socialism.

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4 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
? [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

5 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
! [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

6 See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 791–792.

USSR will either come closer to China or consecrate her rupture with Peking. Secretary-General seems to consider two outcomes as equal possibilities. He thinks for instance that Poland is against complete break with China. If USSR decides to get closer to Peking this means end of East-West détente and a return to Stalin era. Anyway it is clear to him that USSR does not repeat not wish to become involved in a Vietnam settlement now. It would not repeat not agree to any significant move even by ICSC and Secretary-General predicts an adverse reaction by Poland when approached.

12. Reverting to his dealings with Tito, U Thant said that last week Tito reported to him that UAR Ambassador in Hanoi was told by Pham Van Dong that during bombing pause DRVN had withdrawn sizable forces from South Vietnam. Minister expressed some surprise at this info.[7]

13. After expressing his thanks to U Thant for his response, Minister said that he never believed that whatever action might be taken by three governments would produce quick results. Important point was to maintain momentum of efforts leading to negotiations and utilize Commission's standing to good effect. He would like to see members of Commission start talking discreetly to parties with a view to narrowing areas of publicly declared disagreements. We had reason to believe that Hanoi might be receptive. *Inter alia* we saw some significance in relatively cordial reception given by Foreign Minister Trinh and Pham Van Dong to our representative in Saigon who visited Hanoi in last few days.[8] We had also been encouraged by Indians and at least not repeat not discouraged so far by Poles from pursuing our efforts. U Thant agreed that our probings could usefully continue.

14. Reverting to his thesis that DRVN wished to maintain independent line vis-à-vis Peking, U Thant told Minister (indicating that he had not repeat not mentioned this to Goldberg) that after Harriman's visit to Warsaw Poles had despatched special envoy to Peking and Hanoi to explain USA Fourteen Points. In Peking, Michalowski was told that he did not repeat not need to go to Hanoi and that Polish Government could reject out of hand American points as totally unacceptable. When Michalowski informed Ho Chi Minh of Chinese reaction he said that Poles had done right thing in seeking his views. U Thant added that he formed his judgment on Ho's intention vis-à-vis Peking when he visited him and Pham Van Dong in 1955 and has had no repeat no reason since to change his mind. He remains convinced that a settlement of Vietnam issue could be found on basis of independence, neutrality and freedom from outside intervention. Unfortunately, USA is not repeat not prepared to accept his views.

[Paul] Tremblay

418.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/14

No. 510
Washington, February 21, 1966
Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Permis New York, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva; Delhi from Ottawa; Moscow from London; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Belgrade, Prague from London; Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon.

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7 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
? [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

8 See/Voir doc. 362.

VIETNAM: MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH RUSK

Principal topic discussed at Minister's meeting February 19 with Rusk was question of increased ICC role in Vietnam issue. Minister reminded Rusk that in December he had suggested to Secretary of State that Canada would like to explore possible use of ICC to stimulate calling of a conference, and that Rusk had thought this was useful idea. At that time Canada was not repeat not thinking of ICC initiative in any context other than that of bringing about conference. When bombing pause began, Canada decided to let idea ride for a time in order that situation could be assessed when airstrikes were resumed.

2. U Thant had also been thinking on somewhat similar lines and SSEA had discussed possibilities with him as well as with Ambassador Goldberg. Canada was considering somewhat broader ICC initiative than in December and SSEA had already had discussions with Indian High Commissioner in Ottawa which had resulted in a fairly positive Indian reaction. He had also talked to Polish Ambassador in Ottawa and had sent personal message to Rapacki February 17[9] but there had been no repeat no direct Polish response as yet.

3. Canadian thinking was that although Geneva Accord did not repeat not empower ICC to prepare a conference or engage in political probing activities, fact was that Commission membership comprising three distinct political tendencies gave it a uniquely representative quality; of all existing bodies, Commission was thus the most natural to be used for exploratory purposes.

4. SSEA said that Canada was not repeat not suggesting that ICC should press for a conference at this time; there was no repeat no chance of one being held at least until after CPSU meeting in late March. U Thant shared this view. Canadian idea was that if Commission members agreed, ICC might in meantime undertake to carry on preparatory work which could be useful in eventually facilitating agreement. Exploratory talks might be held with various parties to Vietnam dispute to see if the differences between parties might be narrowed down.

5. Minister said that he had mentioned these ideas to U Thant who agreed that they were useful and that Ambassador Goldberg similarly thought they were promising. Ideas had not repeat not been discussed in depth with other governments although Minister had mentioned subject to Yugoslav Ambassador recently. A recent conversation between Canadian Ambassador in Moscow and Menshikov implied that Soviet reaction might not repeat not necessarily be unfavourable; Menshikov had suggested that Canada and ICC should play more active role in Vietnam problem. However, it was too early to be able to assess importance of this conversation clearly. Canada also thought that there might well be interest in Hanoi in an approach such as one we were suggesting.

6. Secretary Rusk responded positively. He pointed out that USA had been trying for long time to find some means to get the two sides into more significant discussions. Conference apparently could not repeat not take place without consent of Hanoi as Moscow seemed to have given DRVN veto on holding of conference. USA had thought at one stage that it might be possible to hold a "conference by infiltration" whereby Co-Chairmen might initially discuss problem among themselves and then add ICC members and others to their deliberations. However, this did not repeat not seem practical at present because Moscow

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[9] Martin's message to Rapacki was dated 16 February 1966, but may have been sent the next day. See doc. 416.
Le message de Martin à Rapacki est daté du 16 février 1966, mais pourrait avoir été envoyé le lendemain. Voir doc. 416.

was evidently highly allergic to idea of taking any political initiative without Hanoi's consent in face of bitter Chinese criticisms of Soviet-USA collusion. He added that USA had no repeat no info from Moscow to support Peiping's charges of collusion but perhaps Chinese knew what Poles and Russians had been saying privately in Hanoi.

7. A "conference *in absentia*" might have provided another line of approach. Rusk recalled that real Japanese peace conference had not repeat not been the group which met formally; actual conference had been held so to speak in Dulles' brief-case as he travelled from capital to capital working out basis on which formal conference might be held. Such an approach could circumvent problems such as who would represent whom.

8. However, since these various approaches seemed ruled out at present the mantle naturally fell on ICC. Rusk wondered if there were any way in which Commission could meet, perhaps on its own admin or financial problems or a topic such as Cambodia, in a location such as Geneva, with strong representation from all three countries. Commission members either singly or together could feel out views of others. Poles for example might talk to Liberation Front and could make trip to Algiers for purpose. In such manner, a basket of positions could be accumulated so that it would be possible to see if there were positive leads. Strangely enough both sides continued to say that Geneva Accords had validity although each side had very different ideas about those Accords. Nevertheless, out of spider's web of views something might be built. ICC could "fan out" to see what could be done.

9. Rusk added that if Hanoi were not repeat not resisting such activity it could constitute a brake on escalation just as a "conference in being" could be a similar brake.

10. When SSEA asked if there were any way in which Poles could be influenced to react favourably, Rusk said that USA had impression during pause that Russians were willing to have Eastern Europeans play more direct diplomatic role than USSR. He recalled that it was Poles who many months ago had originally put forward idea of "conference by infiltration" in Laos context. However, he did not repeat not know whether USA could be of any help with Poles. Americans had had certain difficulties with Poles concerning misinterpretation of basic USA position. In December 1964, for example, Rapacki had thought USA merely wanted a way to save face and get out of Vietnam gracefully – but that of course was not repeat not in cards. During recent pause, Poles seemed to have gone rather far in other direction. USA had some indication of what they had said to DRVN; they had apparently threatened North Vietnamese with what USA might do to an extent far exceeding what USA itself had said. If Poles were now to gain impression that USA was interested in Commission activity because of weak position, criticisms from Senators etc., this would not repeat not move situation towards peace. However, USA could perhaps merely enquire of Poles to see how they viewed ICC idea. Rusk said he had tentative impression that East Europeans were unlikely to want to take much action until March meeting was over. If meeting turned out to be as momentous for future of Communist world as Secretary-General and others thought it might be, it would be all the more important that signal should get through via ICC that USA was still interested in peace despite termination of pause. Relevant fact was that other side would be facing some pretty important decisions very soon. For past three months SVN and USA forces had held initiative and VC casualties were high. Other side would therefore soon have to brace themselves to doing a lot less unless they were prepared to do a lot more.

11. When SSEA asked if USA could do anything to influence Soviet attitude to Commission approach, Rusk said after reflection that this would be considered but that Russians seemed to prefer that USA should not repeat not talk to them directly about Vietnam. Kosygin had implied this clearly during recent encounter in Delhi. However, Rusk hoped that Canada would keep USA informed of progress of its efforts particularly vis-à-vis Poles so that if we thought that USA could be of help even in making simple enquiry in Warsaw, this could be

taken up. Perhaps Indians might be interested in approaching Poles themselves. Rusk mentioned that during recent visit Vice President Humphrey had "hit Indians pretty hard" on taking their ICC responsibilities seriously.

12. SSEA said that Rusk's helpful comments would enable Canada to give more precision to its ideas which had hitherto been worked out only in very general terms. Canada would be keeping in close touch with USA on whole question.

13. On current UN involvement with Vietnam, SSEA remarked that U Thant was strongly opposed to discussion of Vietnam in Security Council. Minister, however, did not repeat not share Secretary-General's view. U Thant thought only place to achieve progress on Vietnam was Geneva or Geneva framework; Russians had indicated to him that they would be forced to make violent speech if matter were openly discussed in Council. Rusk did not repeat not comment on UN issue. Sisco mentioned in non-committal way that Japanese President of Security Council was considering making written or oral statement on results of his consultations and that draft would soon be shown to non-permanent members. When SSEA asked if ICC initiative could be worked into UN deliberations in any way, Sisco said that since Russians so firmly denied UN competence in Vietnam problems, such a move could prejudice prospects of ICC initiative itself.

14. On recent Senatorial hearings Rusk commented that basic difficulty for administration spokesmen was that there was no repeat no way of telling worried Senators what USA really had in mind without conveying wrong signal to Hanoi and Peiping which were part of unseen audience at hearings. USA had no repeat no intention of plunging into escalation but it would be most unfortunate if Hanoi and Peiping derived impression that they merely had to do a bit more and wait a little longer in order to achieve their aims in South Vietnam.

419.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 3162, 29-1973-6/2

No. Y-184
Ottawa, February 24, 1966
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Saigon, London, Washington, Permis New York, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Warsaw, Moscow, Canberra, Wellington, CANFORCEHED.
By Bag: Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM

I should be grateful if you could deliver following message to Swaran Singh at earliest opportunity. Begins: As your High Commissioner will have reported to you, I have been giving thought to the possibilities that may be open to us as members of the International Commission in Vietnam to bring the present conflict closer to a negotiation. I am well aware of the difficulties which any such Commission initiative is likely to face. Nevertheless, it does seem to me that our common membership in that organization presents us not only with an opportunity, but with an obligation to see whether we can do anything which would carry us at least a step or two along the way to a peaceful negotiated settlement.

2. I was pleased to have the preliminary reactions of the Government of India which Mr. Acharya conveyed to me on February 16. I agree with you that an Indian-Canadian majority approach would not be adequate in the circumstances and that Polish cooperation

will be important. I thought I should let you know that I have now sent a message to Mr. Rapacki explaining why I believe the Commission may be able to play a useful role and asking for his views on whether, in spite of our different assessment of many aspects of the Vietnam problem, there are any possibilities for a common positive approach to this problem through our Commission membership. I told Mr. Rapacki that I would hope to be able to put some concrete suggestions to our Commission partners in due course and that, in the meantime, I would welcome his reaction to the general idea of a Commission initiative in the right circumstances.

3. I have also noted your view that, provided we can agree among ourselves, we should consider bringing the Co-Chairmen into the picture at an early stage. I can assure you that this is also very much in my mind. I should tell you, however, that I am not thinking in terms of a Commission initiative directed to the simple purpose of calling for a resumed Geneva Conference. It is my judgment that such a call would not produce results in present circumstances. What I envisage is rather a series of soundings, based on the publicly expressed positions of the parties, to the point where the parties themselves may be prepared to enter into informal contact as a prelude, in due course, to formal negotiations.

4. I visited New York last week to discuss our present thinking with the Secretary-General and Ambassador Goldberg. I subsequently went to Washington for discussions with Secretary Rusk.

5. I thought I should let you know that reactions in both New York and Washington were positive. The Secretary-General does not think discussion of the Vietnam problem in the Security Council is likely to be helpful in present circumstances. He regards the Geneva framework as probably the only one in which progress can be made. He agreed that a probing exercise by the Commission powers could be useful at this stage in narrowing the differences between the main parties in anticipation of conditions in which negotiations might be undertaken.

6. Rusk emphasized that it had been the U.S.A. aim for some time to find means of engaging the two sides in meaningful discussions. This continued to be their aim and they would be prepared to lend whatever support they could to a Commission initiative in the direction I had outlined.

7. I recognize that timing will be an important element in any operation on which we may be able to agree. I would hope that, at some stage, it might be possible for us to meet to consider the form and content of a Commission effort directed towards peace in Vietnam. Meanwhile, I shall be glad to keep you informed of our thinking and of any reactions we get to our present preliminary soundings.

Paul Martin

420.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Soviet Union
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Union soviétique
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/3

No. Y-190
Ottawa, February 28, 1966
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-186† Feb 25.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, Warsaw, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CANFORCEHED; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Hong Kong from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM

I should be grateful if you could deliver following message to Mr. Gromyko at earliest opportunity. Begins: The Canadian Government has for some time now been considering the possibilities and best means of contributing to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. In particular, it seemed to us that there might be a role which the members of the International Commission could play in this because of their long association with this problem, the responsibilities which had been laid upon them by the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement, and the access they had to the major parties to the present conflict.

2. The idea of a Commission initiative looking towards peace in Vietnam was under active consideration towards the end of last year but we subsequently suspended our planning in connection with a Commission initiative in the light of the various soundings that were being undertaken to coincide with the suspension in the bombing of North Vietnam. In view of the essentially negative results of those soundings we have thought it right to resume our efforts to develop a Commission initiative and we have informed our Commission colleagues of our interest in exploring their reaction to the general concept at this stage. I have sent personal messages in this sense to the Indian and Polish Foreign Ministers, and I have also informed the UN Secretary-General, the British Co-Chairman and the USA of our thinking in general terms.

3. We have proceeded from assumption that a straight call for the convening of a resumed Geneva Conference is unlikely to produce results at the present time and in the absence of some pre-conference understandings on matters of substance. Accordingly, we have come to the conclusion that, if any Commission initiative is to be productive, it should be developed cautiously and in fullest consultation with all parties. Our present soundings are designed to that end.

4. We have taken careful note of the publicly expressed positions of the major parties, including Hanoi's Four Points and the Fourteen Points of the USA. We believe that there are some common concepts inherent in these positions although we are under no repeat no illusion as to the gap which still separates them. What is now required, as we see it, is to attempt to clarify the positions of the parties on some of the major issues, to see if there is some common ground that can be established and in this way to lay a basis on which the major parties may be persuaded in due course to enter into formal contact as at least a first step towards restoring peace in Vietnam.

5. As you will be aware, I have recently discussed these ideas in some detail with your Ambassador here. As I have explained to Mr. Shpedko, I have thought it right to keep the Soviet Government informed of thinking and of our diplomatic efforts in relation to our plans because in due course and in the right circumstances, the USSR, as one of the Geneva Co-Chairmen, may have a helpful role to play in arranging a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. While I would hope that the Polish Government may be able to see its way clear to cooperate with Canada and India in furthering the relatively limited objectives we have in mind at the moment, I should like to make it clear that I am not repeat not seeking any expression of approval or support from your Government. The initiative we have in mind is not repeat not directed towards an open call for a conference at this stage. Our planning has therefore taken full account of the official position of the USSR with respect to the Vietnam problem and we have no repeat no desire to develop an approach solely for appearances' sake, which would create embarrassment or add to existing difficulties. My concern is to maintain some kind of continuing momentum looking to the re-establishment of peace which, without creating complications at the present, could be accelerated in the right circumstances.

6. If our thinking, as I have outlined it in this message, presents particular difficulties for the Soviet Government, I would hope that there might be an opportunity for further exchanges between us. Ends.

[Paul] Martin

421.
Telegram from Ambassador to Poland to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Pologne au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9403, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/1

No. 178
Warsaw, February 28, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Reference: Your Tel Y-170 Feb 1[6], Our Tel 156† Feb 22.
Repeat for Information: Belgrade, Prague (Priority); Washington, Permis New York, Paris, Geneva, Moscow, Vienna, Rome (Priority) from London; CANFORCEHED, Canberra, Wellington, Hong Kong (Priority) from Ottawa; Helsinki (Priority) from Hague; Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane (Priority) from Delhi.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

Rapacki asked to see me today and as I had feared he gave negative response to idea of Commission initiative in present circumstances.

2. Minister expressed appreciation for your message and said he had no repeat no doubt Canadian and Polish Governments both sincerely wanted peaceful settlement. Poland also hopes Commission may play a useful role. This is indeed why Poland still participates in Commission activities even though Commission is clearly not repeat not able to operate as envisaged at Geneva. If Poland did not repeat not hope Commission role could be useful in future it would be anomaly to continue participation.

3. Further, Rapacki said Poland as Commission member had constantly looked for opportunities for progress and had been particularly active in December and January during bombing pause. Because specific activities in that recent period were "Confidential between two governments" he would not repeat not spell out details; but he could assure me that up to very last minute Poland had done everything it could. If therefore criticism were directed at Commission for lack of activity it could not repeat not be applied to Poland. Polish activity continued up to moment when situation was brusquely – and Minister added "*même brutalement*" – interrupted.

4. Rapacki repeated Michalowski line that North Vietnam will certainly not repeat not budge under duress and added that even if there were further pause the threat of renewed bombing would leave situation the same. There was of course also the moral point whether any country had the right to bomb another: indeed the only time when Rapacki spoke with a hint of anger was when he said Poland could not repeat not accept that USA had the right to bomb any other country or to hold out the threat of bombing.

5. Rapacki said renewed bombing will not repeat not only cause military damage but will bring grave political consequences for USA as well as for everyone else. The danger of escalation is ever present and despite efforts to avoid escalation it may not repeat not be possible to control this situation. In any event the Poles see no repeat no reason why they should not repeat not believe Ho Chi Minh when he sets unconditional cessation of bombing as essential before any consideration can be given to negotiations.

6. For these reasons Rapacki said that although in certain circumstances there might be a useful role for the Commission he does not repeat not believe that the present moment is favourable. Still, he emphasized that he appreciated motives behind your message and still hoped it would be possible to continue to exchange views with you on this subject. Rapacki added that perhaps he could have direct exchange with you next time in Warsaw as he understood Mr. Wolniak had heard from Mr. Cadieux that you might be able to come here in April. As I had no repeat no word more recent than message of last December which left it uncertain whether visit in 1966 would be possible I merely said I knew you would like to visit Poland when pressure of duties would make this possible.

7. I promised to transmit Rapacki's views to you although I understand that eventually he will provide written reply which will doubtless follow same lines as oral exposition. I said you would certainly be disappointed because although you recognized that important differences exist between parties to Vietnam conflict it was your hope that as Commission has among its members contacts with all interested parties, Commission might thus bit by bit help to narrow the differences. I only added that it seemed to me this would mean probity and perhaps persuasion directed to USA as well as other side. But Rapacki merely repeated that so long as bombing or the threat of bombing continued, Commission action could not repeat not in such circumstances be useful.

[N.F.H.] Berlis

422.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/3

No. Y-206
Ottawa, March [3], 1966[10]
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Warsaw Tel 178 Feb 28.
Repeat for Information: Warsaw, London, Belgrade, Prague, Washington, Permis New York, Paris, Geneva, Moscow, Vienna, Rome, CANFORCEHED, Canberra, Wellington, Hong Kong, Helsinki, Hague, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane (OpImmediate).

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE ROLE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

Reference telegram contains preliminary Polish reaction to our proposal that Commission powers might usefully explore the possibilities of a good offices role in current situation. You will note that a written reply is to be given to us in due course.

2. Although this preliminary reaction is not encouraging, we are not inclined to regard it as a rejection in principle of a more active Commission role in the right circumstances. We are pursuing our soundings in a number of interested capitals and it is our intention to resume consultations with Polish Government in due course and in light of other reactions.

3. Meanwhile our missions should regard Warsaw's telegram as for their own info only.

For Delhi only:

You are authorized to convey substance of initial Polish reaction to Swaran Singh in context of departmental interpretation as given above.

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[10] The date of this document has been corrected based on information found on the same archival file.
La date de ce document a été corrigée en fonction d'informations trouvées dans le même dossier d'archives.

423.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/4

No. 379
Delhi, March 4, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-184 Feb 24.
Repeat for Information: Saigon; London, Washington, Permis New York, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, CFHQ, Canberra, Wellington (Immediate) from Ottawa; Warsaw (Immediate) from London.
By Bag: Hong Kong from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM

Swaran Singh late yesterday expressed to me his appreciation of our Minister's motives in asking other Commission powers to join in using Commission in a cautious initiative between parties to dispute in an effort to lead them into direct contact and negotiations but gave little other encouragement to project.

2. He noted that to use Commission in this way would be to exceed its powers and that Poles were "sticklers for form" in Commission activities. Commission was like a judge and should not repeat not step out of its authorized role to try to influence parties. Furthest he would go was to say that some cautious use of Commission in what he described as essentially a mediation might be made if Poland would agree and he was sure Poland would not repeat not agree unless Hanoi was ready to approach negotiations by this method. His opinion was that Hanoi was not repeat not ready. Time had not repeat not yet come.

3. He continued by asking why use Commission and risk being met with same "no repeat no" that all other intermediaries had received. Direct communication was possible without Commission; India had its contacts as did others; why not repeat not use diplomatic channels?

4. Swaran Singh seemed to have difficulty in visualizing the acts or procedures which Commission members could usefully take at this time. I endeavoured to suggest sort of soundings which are mentioned in telegrams as a means of removing misconceptions which either side may have of meaning of expressed conditions for negotiation of other side. He suspected that this might involve advocacy by Commission of a point of view which would be incompatible with Commission's judicial role. However, he will be glad to have particulars of kind of action which would be taken if all three Commission powers agreed to proceed.

5. A formal reply to our Minister's letter is expected.

6. Following item presumably from official if inaccurate info appeared this morning in *Times of India*. After referring [to] my visit it read "Canadian Foreign Minister has made some suggestions about role ICC in Vietnam could play in reinforcing various moves for peace in that country. Communication is being studied. India has all along been in favour of efforts made by other countries from time to time to restore peace in Vietnam. As far as bringing ICC directly into picture it is felt that essentially this matter should be taken up by British and Soviet Co-Chairmen of Geneva Conference. Since ICC was formed by this Conference its Co-Chairmen alone could give appropriate directions about its functions. Secondly ICC would be able to undertake new responsibilities or take new measures in discharge of functions already assigned to it only if all its three members India, Canada and Poland agree on any course of actions. This does not repeat not seem likely".[11]

[Roland] Michener

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[11] See/Voir "Canadian Message To Delhi On Viet Nam," *Times of India*, 4 March 1966, p. 1.

424.
Telegram from Ambassador to Poland to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Pologne au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/4

No. 212
Warsaw, March 8, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Reference: Your Tel Y-170 Feb 1[6] and Our Tel 178 Feb 28.
Repeat for Information: London, Belgrade, Prague (Priority); Washington, Permis New York, Paris, Geneva, Moscow, Vienna, Rome (Priority) from London; Delhi, CANFORCEHED, Canberra, Wellington, Hong Kong (Priority) from Ottawa; Stockholm, Helsinki (Priority) from Hague; Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane (Priority) from Delhi.

VIETNAM: MESSAGE FROM RAPACKI

Sieradzki, Vice Director of MFA department dealing with Canada [and] USA, asked to see me today and handed to me Rapacki's written reply to your message. Original text in Polish is accompanied by following "unofficial" English translation.

2. Begins: I received your message transmitted on February 22 through the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw, Mr. Berlis. I am also fully informed about the conversations which you held recently with the Polish Ambassador in Ottawa, Mr. Wolniak.

I well understand and share your concern and anxiety. I, too, deplore that in the face of a serious situation the ICSC remains inactive. I still hope that there may come a time in which the circumstances and concurrence of action of its members will allow the Commission, within the limits of its competence and possibilities following from the Geneva Agreements, to contribute to a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese conflict. If we did not repeat not take such a possibility into account, we would have to regard the existence of the Commission as an anachronism and the further participation of Poland in it as a loss of time and prestige. Consequently while systematically analysing the development of the situation in Vietnam I bear continuously in mind also that point of view I consider as purposeful the exchange of opinions on the question of Vietnam between Poland and all countries, especially members of the International Commission. I think it, however, to be urgent and necessary to draw your attention to the question which in my opinion is of key importance for the further development of the situation in Vietnam and not repeat not only in Vietnam.

Guided by the general principles of her foreign policy and by a sense of duty which, in our understanding, the membership in the Commission imposes upon her, Poland has never given up attempts with a view to contribute to a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese conflict.

I believe that you are acquainted, at least in general outline, with the serious efforts which we undertook in the period from end of December last year till end of January in order to create conditions which would subsequently make possible peaceful negotiations. Unfortunately, those efforts were stopped and to a large extent baffled through the resumption of bombing by USA of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Poland's attitude towards the military action of USA against DRV is known to you. For over a year elementary principles of international relations have been systematically violated. It is not repeat not difficult to foresee to what even a tacit acquiescence in practices of that sort might lead.

I avail myself of the confidential character of our exchange of views in order to present the matter with full clarity. Irrespective of any outside considerations a continuation of the USA military action against DRV will be met with a growing assistance for DRV. The territory of the DRV is becoming an area of confrontation engaging increasingly powerful forces. With every month grows the danger, which it will be more and more difficult to control, contain, localize.

As for the Vietnamese conflict itself, USA through bombing and other military actions against DRV will achieve nothing, but will close the road to peaceful negotiations.

No repeat no government which does not repeat not want to be a government of capitulation will negotiate under bombs falling on its country or under the threat of bombardment.

The message of the President of DRV, Ho Chi Minh, to the Chairman of the Council of State E. Ochab of January 24 leaves no repeat no doubt that such is the resolute attitude of the Government of DRV.[12]

The unconditional and final cessation of bombing and of other USA military actions against DRV is the first and basic premise for searching appropriate ways of a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese situation and for preventing very serious and growing threats to a peaceful development of the whole international situation.

All states interested in maintaining and strengthening peace should, in my opinion, use all their influence so that this promise be fulfilled. As for International Commission, taking of a stand on USA military action against the DRV unquestionably comes under her competence and duties.

I agree with you that Vietnamese problem is a complex one. Many other contentious questions are on the agenda. But as long as military actions against DRV continue, discussions on these problems between interested parties serve no repeat no useful purpose and no repeat no undertakings by the Commission will change that.

However difficult the further road to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese conflict might be, attempts should be made, first of all, to eliminate that aspect of the conflict which is most perilous to the whole international situation, i.e., USA military action against DRV, and thereby open up at the same time the road for efforts towards peace in Vietnam itself. In this respect the possibilities of Canada are greater than ours.

I would be glad to know your point of view in this matter. Ends.

3. Following telegram† will contain my comments.

[N.F.H.] Berlis

425.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/4

No. 239
Saigon, March 23, 1966
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tels 90† Feb 4 and 149† Mar 1 and Your Tels Y-158† Feb 11 and Y-213† Mar 5.

CANADIAN ACTION IN THE VIETNAM COMMISSION

Although it has held two emergency meetings to consider incidents in the DZ and one special meeting to say farewell to Polish Commissioner so far this month, Commission has not repeat not had a regular formal meeting since February 11. A meeting scheduled for February 25 was postponed at our request until March 11 and then by general agreement until after arrival of new Polish Commissioner. We concurred in this further postponement both because we saw little prospect of achieving much at next meeting and because of our wish

[12] See/Voir "India Peace Role Hinted by Hanoi," *Gazette and Daily* (York, Penn.), 9 February 1966, pp. 1, 4.

to avoid appearing inconsistent in pushing for findings of Northern violations in Saigon and attempting to promote quite different ends in Hanoi. Time has come we think to decide whether this risk of appearing inconsistent together with possibilities of achieving useful normal Commission action on Southern complaints warrants or justifies a continuation of our passive attitude, an attitude incidentally which must amuse if not repeat not puzzle Indel and Poldel contrasting as it does with persistence of our insistence on regular and frequent meetings during past year.

2. If as is expected new Polish Commissioner arrives before end of this month it should be possible to have the next formal meeting before middle of April and to have them at regular two-week intervals thereafter. Setting of a schedule of this kind will depend, however, entirely on Candel's initiative. The extent of our initiative will depend in turn on your decision about advisability of trying to couple normal Commission activity (which for us means energetic promotion of the consideration of Southern complaints) with more special and perhaps more important exercise which you have recently launched. In reaching this decision you will wish to bear in mind not repeat not only susceptibilities of North Vietnamese and their recent advice about Canada's role in Commission (paragraph 62 my telegram 189 March 14)[13] but also possibilities available to us to achieve more traditional Canadian objectives within Commission.

3. We have at moment only two good cases on pending agenda, those concerning 325th PAVN Division and introduction into DRVN of MiGs and SAMs. First is likely to be disposed of at next meeting since Indel appears willing to support a resolution acceptable to us if not repeat not as strong as we would wish to see adopted. Although the SVN has had photographs of MiGs and SAMs we obtained for them for several weeks it has not repeat not so far seen fit to send them to Commission and until they are received there is no repeat no hope of bringing that case to a satisfactory conclusion. Only potential new case is that related to recent events in the DZ and it is not repeat not likely to be ready for active consideration for some time.

4. Despite our best efforts and those of USA Embassy and despite departure of Col. An to whom we had attributed some of its lethargy, SVM apparently cannot repeat not be prodded into submitting more and better complaints to Commission. Main obstacle appears to be disillusionment of the defence authorities or more accurately their lack of interest in the "useless" work of Commission. You will recall that Foreign Minister Tran Van Do referred to this difficulty when I last raised subject with him (paragraph 13 my telegram 164† March 7). Without a fairly constant flow of new cases we are reduced of course to defending South against Northern allegations and attempting to state citations of South, not repeat not an enviable position since SVM gives us little more support in this defensive role than it does to our attempts at offense.

5. It would seem that there are three possibilities open to us. First, we can concentrate on our hopes of developing a new and more practical role for Commission in finding a way towards settlement of this war. Secondly, we can continue what has become a depressing and demoralizing rearguard action within Commission but without pressing for regular and frequent meetings since our stock of ammunition is all but exhausted. Thirdly, we can make a new attempt to induce South Vietnamese to supply Commission with a steady and substantial stream of well-documented complaints and offers to facilitate investigations. If we are to adopt this third course of action it will probably be fruitless unless initiated at a very high level, possibly by means of a special message from SSEA [to] Tran Van Do, or from Prime Minister to Prime Minister.

6. We should be grateful to know soonest your decision as to how you wish us to try to influence Commission activity.

[Victor C.] Moore

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[13] See/Voir doc. 375.

426.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to North Atlantic Council
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/4

No. Y-257
Ottawa, March 25, 1966
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris.
By Bag: Hong Kong, Delhi, Saigon, Canberra, Wellington, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Warsaw, Moscow.

VIETNAM: CANADIAN APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS

The Canadian Government is convinced that a stable and lasting settlement in Vietnam can be achieved only by negotiations.

2. When the time is ripe for such negotiations, it seems clear that the Geneva Conference machinery – or something like it – will provide the forum most likely to produce results. Unfortunately, however, the time does not appear to be ripe for undertaking negotiations. The publicly stated positions and objectives of the main interested parties still appear to be too far apart.

3. We regret the inability of the UN to come to grips with a problem which has a direct bearing on international peace and security, even if such action were to take the form of encouraging the Geneva powers to exert their influence in favour of negotiations.

4. In these circumstances, we believe that there may be a useful role for the International Commission to play in helping to narrow the existing gap between interested parties, and perhaps in facilitating initial and tentative contacts.

5. Such an undertaking does not, of course, fall within the formal mandate of the Commission as set out in the 1954 Cease-Fire Agreement. As we envisage it, a Commission undertaking would be of a "good offices" nature, based on the common desire of the three sovereign countries represented on the Commission, to contribute to an eventual solution.

6. The Commission offers several advantages as an "instrument": (a) it is the creation of, and one of the few remaining manifestations of the Geneva Conference machinery; it thus symbolizes the continuing interest of the Geneva powers in the Vietnam situation; (b) in its membership, it is broadly representative of most of the major international political tendencies, and has ready access, in one way or another, to interested parties; (c) it is the only organization maintaining regular and direct contact with the two Governments in Vietnam; (d) over the course of nearly twelve years' involvement in Vietnam, its members have acquired a considerable degree of knowledge of the problem and have established a reasonable record of cooperation.

7. We have been discussing the possibilities for such a Commission role, in the right circumstances, with the Indians and the Poles; obviously any such "good offices" assignment could only be undertaken with the full cooperation of all three members. We have also discussed our ideas with other interested parties, including the two governments in Vietnam. Mr. Ronning recently undertook a special assignment on the Canadian Government's behalf to discuss our ideas – and the Vietnam situation in general – in Hanoi and Saigon.[14]

8. The results of all these soundings are now being considered with a view to determining the nature and timing of the next steps which may be open to us. Meanwhile we have been confirmed in our belief that there is a potentially useful role for the Commission in the right circumstances.

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[14] See/Voir docs 372–375.

427.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/4

No. Y-278
Ottawa, April 18, 1966
Secret. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tels 239 Mar 2[3] and 293† Apr 12.

CANADIAN ACTION IN VIETNAM COMMISSION

We have given careful thought to considerations set out in your telegram 239 paragraph 5. It seems to us that there is nothing basically incompatible between three possibilities you regard as being open to us.

2. As long as the Commission continues in operation (and we have no present intention to see it wound up) we believe that there is no alternative for Candel but to continue to follow the major guidelines laid down in the autumn of 1964, namely, to attempt to make the Commission function in a manner as close as possible to that originally intended, and to the extent that this objective is not fully attainable, to demonstrate clearly for the record where responsibility lies for this failure.[15]

3. Thus, in our view Commission must continue to address itself in orderly and regular way to treatment of complaints submitted to it by the parties. While Commission treatment of and decisions on such complaints are unlikely to have much effect on the broader situation in Vietnam, we do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by allowing the Commission to appear to be totally inactive, or more serious, to become inactive in fact.

4. Poldel with Indian acquiescence might be quite happy to see Commission go to sleep now for an indefinite period, and in certain respects this might have advantages for Candel as well. On the other hand, we have a clear interest in protecting ourselves against recurrence of situation in which we found ourselves at time of Tonkin Gulf incidents August 1964 and with commencement of retaliatory air strikes February 1965. In both situations responsibility of one side was matter of public record and admitted while that of other side was much less readily apparent. In effect, Commission action (or in case of Tonkin Gulf, proposed action) amounted to putting official seal on facts already known, thus sanctifying them with appearance of authoritative judgment, without adding any significant element of interpretation to this set of facts, and without contributing anything to a balanced interpretation of the broader problem. In the circumstances and in the interests of preventing distortion, we had no choice but to draw on Legal Report in absence of series of actual Commission decisions. We are naturally anxious to avoid a repetition of this problem.[16]

5. The chances of there being any further reports by the Commission are obviously debatable, but whichever way this is argued, it is clear that the temptation in other quarters to produce another unbalanced report dealing with only one feature of the situation will vary inversely with the amount of material on the record proving that there are two sides to the Vietnam story.

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[15] See/Voir doc. 175.

[16] See Chapter 1./Voir Chapitre 1.

6. It continues to be our intention to insist that the Commission act objectively in relation to the facts available to the Commission, and where facts are clear beyond reasonable doubt, to support findings of violation regardless of which party is in default. On basis of our experience of way in which other delegations interpret their responsibilities it is clear that this is likely to yield an unbalanced record unless (a) special effort is made by Candel in raising SVN complaints; and (b) special effort is made by SVM in submitting adequately documented cases of Northern interference. Material on which such cases can be based would appear to be available in sufficient quantity and we should continue to urge South Vietnamese that, even if Commission's past performance has been disappointing from their point of view, it is in their own long-term interests to have this evidence form part of the Commission record. We shall take advantage of forthcoming visits by General Chieu and SVN Ambassador in Washington, Vu Van Thai, to reiterate this point.

7. One of the most useful forms which South Vietnamese cooperation could take would be to make available at regular intervals groups of PAVN prisoners or rallies for interrogation by Commission team with team report forming part of basis for consideration by Commissioners. Previous cases of this nature appear to have produced best results since they offer fewer opportunities for delaying tactics (cf. Vung Ro). Regardless of substance of complaint, however, we would remind you that we are still interested in obtaining separate and individual Candel reports summarizing interrogation or investigation in a form which could be used subsequently, if necessary, without releasing Commission material as such (i.e., actual team report or verbatim text of Candel statement in Commission).[17]

8. General considerations outlined above suggest that Commission meetings should follow some regular rhythm though they need not perhaps be as frequent as they were a year ago at this time. The important thing is to keep up some form of momentum. Frequency of meetings will obviously depend to large extent on availability of material and of course on your own discretion but we would hope that something like two meetings per month might be possible.

9. While we have noted observations made to Ronning by North Vietnamese, we very much doubt if, in the final analysis, North Vietnamese willingness to use Canadian channel is likely to be influenced one way or another by our action on Commission. In any case, we are not disposed to accept North Vietnamese suggestion that our search for peaceful outcome of present conflict should require us to take or refrain from taking certain positions in the Commissions. This would be particularly damaging course of action in case of Laos Commission which, judging by reactions from Hanoi, is real thorn in North Vietnamese side.

[Paul] Martin

428.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to Soviet Union
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Union soviétique
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/4

No. Y-301
Ottawa, April 25, 1966
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-300 Apr 2[7].
Repeat for Information: Delhi, Washington, Paris, Geneva, London, CANFORCEHED (Priority); Warsaw (Priority) from London; Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Hong Kong from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

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[17] See/Voir doc. 83.

VIETNAM

Following is unofficial text of oral aide-mémoire giving Soviet Foreign Minister's reply of April 21 to SSEA's message of February 28 (our telegram Y-190). Begins: The strained situation in Indochina is the result of the USA actions. The USA has violated the Geneva Agreement of 1954. It is carrying on military intervention in South Vietnam and direct aggression against a sovereign state, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

2. The position of the USSR toward settlement in Vietnam is well known. It was clearly stated again at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. We firmly believe that the Four Points laid down by the Prime Minister of the DRV on April 8/65 and the Five Points proposed by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on March 22/65 which correspond to the Geneva Agreement of 1954 form a basis for settlement in Vietnam. Peace in Vietnam can be re-established if the USA stops its aggression against the sovereign Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its military intervention in South Vietnam, if USA troops and the troops of its allies are withdrawn from South Vietnam, if all American military bases in that country are liquidated, and if the Vietnamese people are given the right to decide their own affairs without any outside interference.

3. For its part Canada is suggesting the idea that the states members of the International Commission in Vietnam should take the initiative for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. In practice this means that the Commission should undertake some extraordinary (unusual) intermediary functions. It is well known that the problem is not repeat not the absence of contacts between the sides in the Vietnamese conflict but the position of the USA which carries on aggression in Vietnam and seeks by arms to force the Government of the DRV and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam to accept the unfounded demands of the USA. Events in Vietnam are evidence that the USA Government does not repeat not in fact want to agree to a settlement in Vietnam which would fully correspond to the basic interests of the Vietnamese people. The USA is carrying on barbaric bombings of the territory of the DRV, is drastically increasing its military forces in South Vietnam and increasing the scale of military operations against the South Vietnamese patriots.

4. If Canada as a member of the International Commission wants to promote a settlement of the conflict in Vietnam, then as it seems to us the Canadian Government could influence the USA Government to stop its acts of aggression against the DRV and military intervention in South Vietnam and to behave in accordance with the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam. Ends.

429.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Soviet Union
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Union soviétique
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/4

No. Y-300
Ottawa, April 27, 1966
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. OpImmediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-190 Feb 28.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, Warsaw, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CANFORCEHED, Saigon, London (Priority).
By Bag: Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM

Soviet Ambassador called on me April 21 and April 22 to present and discuss Gromyko's reply to my message as given in reference telegram. Soviet reply took form of oral aide-mémoire, unofficial text of which is given in my immediately following telegram.[18]

2. In commenting on Gromyko's message I made following points: (a) Canada understood Soviet position as outlined first two paragraphs of Gromyko's message but had no comment to make on it. For our part, we had deliberately steered clear of military involvement in Vietnam situation in recognition of our position on ICSC and to be able to play helpful role in search for peace. (b) Picking up reference to "extraordinary intermediary function" paragraph 3 of message, I reiterated Canadian view of Commission's potential role as being more informal than that, at least initially. Essence of our thinking was that Commission powers, representing different backgrounds but with fund of common experience in Vietnam, might individually or collectively ("as a body") undertake probing process with both sides to narrow existing gap between positions and help set stage for more formal contacts. I said I could see this body at some stage appealing to USA for bombing to be stopped with parallel appeals being made to Saigon, to Hanoi and to the Viet Cong. In meantime, we had been moving on our own in discussions with North Vietnam and with Poles. We had no intention of giving up. I drew Ambassador's attention to my comments on this matter in House of Commons including observation that Polish attitude was not the obstacle to forward movement. (See Hansard, April 22 page 4157.[19]) This was not of course the whole story, but it showed that we were making deliberate attempt not to embarrass anyone involved or assign blame. There were many aspects of this exercise that we had not made public because we did not want to apply pressure on anyone's position, or, for example, to generate pressure for a conference, though this might be feasible at appropriate time. For the moment it was our view that much preliminary work remained to be done. Canadian Government had been very careful in its public statements. I said I saw no reason to depart from my earlier assessments of Vietnam situation. I thought, however, that dwelling on them now was not helpful and that search for a peaceful solution was matter of absolute precedence. (c) Commenting on Soviet point that real problem was not absence of contacts, I acknowledged that USA had made several contacts with DRVN and that Poles had had discussions in Hanoi related to December-January bombing pause but Commission was only group with concurrent access to Hanoi and Saigon. For this reason, UN Secretary-General thought Commission the only hopeful possibility at present time. Our Commissioner was planning to return to Hanoi soon and perhaps Commission would be holding meeting there as well. Full advantage could be taken of these visits. (d) Approach suggested paragraph 4 Gromyko message was unlikely to be productive. Canada was convinced that USA wanted to end war but we had to be realistic. Canada hoped bombing could be stopped but this would not come about just by our asking for it. That is why we thought it important for Commission to try to narrow gap between positions of the two sides. In such a context, point might be reached where Commission would have some prospect of being able to use its influence effectively on USA and the other side to mitigate scale of hostilities. (e) Finally, I said that I interpreted Gromyko's message as advance over last Soviet reaction. I hoped I was correct in reading message as a further exploration of Canadian ideas. It was interesting to me that Soviet Union, like Poles, did not reject idea of Commission role, although both emphasized that time for action was not ripe until bombing stopped.

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[18] See previous document./Voir le document précédent.

[19] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 4, p. 4157.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 4, p. 4157.

3. Soviet Ambassador said that essence of Gromyko's message was that it was necessary to seek ways to stop war and efforts by Canada in this direction would be appreciated. If USA "aggression" stopped there would be possibilities for contacts. Ambassador promised to bring my comments to Gromyko's attention but frankly did not see any hope as long as war continued. Shpedko expressed belief that Commission initiative would be "useless" otherwise. I replied that an unsuccessful attempt was better than no attempt at all. Regardless of attitudes of others, Canada intended to continue its efforts.

[Paul] Martin

430.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/5

No. Y-347
Ottawa, May 11, 1966
Restricted. Routine.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, Saigon, CANFORCEHED.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hong Kong.

VIETNAM: EXCHANGES WITH THE INDIANS ABOUT POSSIBLE ROLE FOR ICC

Following is text of message to SSEA from Swaran Singh forwarded under cover of letter dated April 29 from Indian High Commissioner here. Begins: I am grateful to you for your communication of April 4 sent through your High Commissioner.[20] Your High Commissioner had also conveyed to me on February 26 your message in which you had referred to the possibility that may be open to us as members of the ICC in Vietnam to bring the present conflict closer to negotiation. On March 1, in my absence, your High Commissioner sent me another message[21] from you regarding Mr. Chester Ronning's visit to Vietnam on behalf of the Canadian Government. I thank you for sharing your thoughts with me on this difficult problem. It is possible that in the right circumstances there can be a role which we, as members of the ICC, may be able to play in working towards a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem. In our view, a peaceful solution can best be worked out within the framework of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and, therefore, as you know, we have on more than one occasion suggested the convening of a Geneva type conference. We recognise that at the moment the chances of calling such a conference are not bright, but it is our hope that it may be possible to do so in the not-too-distant future. I am glad to note that you will continue to keep me informed of your Government's thinking as to the further steps which may be open to us in the light of the developing situation in Vietnam. We, on our part, will also continue to bend our thoughts to assess the changing situation. Ends.

2. Following is text of SSEA's reply dated May 9 to Indian High Commissioner. Begins: Thank you for your letter of April 29, under cover of which you forwarded a recent message to me from Mr. Swaran Singh. Needless to say, I was pleased to receive your Minister's comments on my earlier messages to him, dealing with the possibility of the ICC being able

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[20] This was likely a reference to the message contained in Ottawa telegram Y-263 of 30 March 1966. See doc. 382.
Il s'agit probablement du message contenu dans le télégramme nº Y-263 d'Ottawa du 30 mars 1966. Voir doc. 382.

[21] See/Voir doc. 367.

to play a helpful role in paving the way for a resolution of the situation in Vietnam. Please assure your Minister that I attach the greatest importance to continuing and close contacts between us on these matters. Although the time does not appear propitious at the moment for the convening of an international conference on Vietnam, I am convinced that our thinking, and indeed our preliminary efforts, might usefully be directed towards doing what we can to preparing for the time when such a conference has a prospect of being generally acceptable. The possible usefulness of the Commission in this connection to me seems compelling, and should not, I believe, be allowed to recede from the calculations of the parties concerned in the present conflict. Ends.

431.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
MG26-N4, vol. 263, 846/U56 Polyansky

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] June 29, 1966

EXCHANGES WITH MR. POLYANSKY

Mr. Polyansky called on me on June 28. After the press had withdrawn, I outlined to him our conception of the possible role of the International Commission in contributing to a Vietnam settlement and what we had learned from Chester Ronning's visits to Hanoi. I made it clear that it is not our intention to try to exert pressure on the Co-Chairmen to summon a new Geneva Conference and I emphasized the sincerity of the Canadian desire to find a genuine solution.

2. Mr. Polyansky responded by repeating the established Soviet position, although he went rather further than any Soviet spokesman previously in acknowledging the desirability of peace efforts by any government and in appreciation of our efforts. He nevertheless repeated unequivocally that North Vietnam would never agree to negotiations while under United States attack and insisted that Canada's most useful role would be to bring influence to bear on the United States to halt military operations in Vietnam. Pham Van Dong's Four Points and the programme of the NLF figured in their usual place in this disquisition. Mr. Polyansky sought to evade my insistence that if the Soviet Union would bring its influence to bear the fighting could be stopped by bringing up the familiar Soviet argument that they are not authorized by North Vietnam to discuss the question. I pointed out that we were not authorized by the United States to discuss the question, and that in any case the USSR is too powerful a nation to need authorization. At this point I was obliged to suspend our interview in order to go to Cabinet.

3. On the evening of June 28 at the dinner which I gave for Mr. Polyansky at the Rideau Club, I myself spoke primarily about Canadian-Soviet relations and referred only in general terms to broader international problems. Mr. Polyansky on the other hand launched an attack in strong terms on American Vietnam policy and on the alleged "revanchist" policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. In fact he said nothing new – he could have been reading a *Pravda* editorial. However, in the atmosphere of great friendliness and relaxation which had been generated during the dinner and by the two days the delegation has spent in Ottawa, his reversion to this hard tone produced an effect of shock on many of his audience.[22]

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[22] See/Voir "Polyansky Speech Stuns Ottawa Banquet Audience: Assails Bombing by U.S. in Vietnam," *Globe and Mail*, 29 June 1966, p. 1.

4. His statements could not be allowed to pass, and I therefore responded by expressing agreement with his assertion that if we worked together it would be possible to compose our differences. I underlined that this was the entire purpose of Canadian policy, and that our desire was to co-operate with all countries, including the United States – which I described as a great and powerful neighbour resisting aggression – the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, Asia and elsewhere in any steps they might take for the advancement of the cause of peace.[23]

5. Mr. Polyansky then spoke briefly again, taking up the same theme and evidently anxious to repair some of the damage he had done. Afterwards when he was taking his departure we again had a brief exchange about Vietnam in general terms, in which we agreed to pursue the discussion again as soon as the opportunity arose. Mr. Polyansky again showed himself anxious to restore some of the good feeling which he had dissipated.

6. I do not think the nature of his speech is very difficult to explain, given the still limited grasp in the Soviet leadership of the atmospherics of occasions of this sort. He may also have been misled by poor advice from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa on the extent of Canadian public anxiety about United States and German policy, and of Canadian readiness to hear these policies criticized by a Soviet spokesman. Some mark of firmness at some stage is also probably required of him by his own colleagues to balance the many evidences of genuine goodwill shown by Canadians toward him. He was no doubt in any case under instructions to deliver his statement at some stage during the tour. It is unfortunate that he chose this particular occasion, in the presence of the press. I think as his tour progresses this unfortunate impression will be diluted, but it seems unlikely that the euphoria of the first two days can be completely restored.

7. I am sending this account of what has happened to Washington to be passed to the State Department. I am also attaching for release, if you agree, a telegram† to Washington pointing out that Mr. Polyansky and Senator Robert Kennedy will both be in Alberta on July 10-11, and that if the Americans thought it desirable we should be prepared to try to arrange a meeting.

8. Finally, in view of these latest developments, I think it additionally important that you take an opportunity to have another talk with Mr. Polyansky. I shall be seeing him again on July 11. Your own schedule might mesh with his only on the evening of July 4, between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. when he returns to Ottawa for the Soviet Ambassador's reception. If you agree, I shall arrange to have him brought to Sussex Street for half-an-hour's conversation.[24]

P[aul] M[artin]

432.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/6

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] July 4, 1966

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[23] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
You did yourself proud. L.B. P[earson]

[24] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
OK. [L.B. Pearson]

VIETNAM

You have asked us to take another look at the proposal made by the Prime Minister in his speech to the Council of the World Veterans Federation on May 1.[25]

2. The Prime Minister's proposal comprises three main elements:

(1) A cease-fire as a first concrete step;

(2) Equivalent and phased withdrawals from South Vietnam by the main protagonists on both sides under international supervision;

(3) Concrete arrangements to enable the people of South Vietnam freely to choose their own form of government without outside coercion.

3. The Prime Minister's proposal is based on the assumption that the Vietnam conflict will have to end in some form of negotiation and the three elements of the proposal are explicitly intended to fit into a negotiating pattern. This assumption may or may not be valid since it is conceivable that, as in Greece or Malaya or the Philippines, the Vietnam conflict may simply be allowed to phase out by a process of de-escalation on both sides. The parallels are not entirely compelling but we know that the Americans have not discarded this hypothesis and that they are keeping a close and constant watch on the scope and scale of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military activity.

4. If a negotiation were the way in which this conflict is ultimately going to be resolved, it is our impression from the talks which Ronning has been having in Hanoi[26] that a succession of steps on something like the following pattern might be in the minds of the North Vietnamese:

(1) Some form of United States gesture which would satisfy the North Vietnamese that the United States are really serious in wanting to bring this conflict to an end. At the moment the North Vietnamese would seem to regard an unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam as the only acceptable gesture which would persuade them to embark on direct talks with the United States;

(2) Direct talks between North Vietnam (and presumably at some stage the Viet Cong) with the United States and others about the various points of substance on which any ultimate settlement of the conflict is likely to hinge;

(3) A formal Geneva-type conference which would ratify what had been a matter of preliminary understandings between the two sides and at the same time provide the necessary international guarantees for the terms of any final settlement.

5. If the foregoing is an accurate assessment of what the North Vietnamese envisage, it is clear that a cease fire would not represent an acceptable first step from their point of view. Their whole doctrinal position is based on the Vietnamese people being the victims of outside aggression and on the consequential view that they cannot be expected to cease defending themselves until their position has been satisfactorily guaranteed.

6. It is our understanding that the United States would also have doubts about a cease fire as a first step. They would argue that, in the actual conditions on the ground in South Vietnam, a cease fire would tend irreparably to play into the hands of the Viet Cong. This is because there is no such thing as a military front in South Vietnam (as there had been in Korea) and a cease fire could have the effect of freezing Viet Cong military and administrative control over sizeable portions of South Vietnam where such control is currently being exercised by them. It is likely, therefore, that the terms of any cease fire might be one of the

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[25] See/Voir "Pearson Wants UN to Admit Chinese; Urges Viet Ceasefire," *Globe and Mail*, 2 May 1966, p. 1.

[26] See/Voir docs 373–375, 406, 408, 409.

most difficult and potentially crucial points to be covered in any negotiation. What the Americans have said, however, is that they are prepared in such a negotiation to address themselves to a cease fire as the first point of business.

7. There are also presentational difficulties in developing Canadian proposals for a cease fire at this stage. We have undertaken a good-offices assignment which, whatever the immediate prospects, is regarded by both sides as being of a continuing nature. The object of what we have been trying to do is to create the conditions in which both sides might be enabled honourably to engage in direct discussion. In these circumstances, I believe that it might be confusing, if not counter-productive, for us to be publicly associated with specific proposals or formulas for ending the Vietnam war.

8. This would not, of course, rule out our formulating a confidential approach based on the Prime Minister's proposal which could be put to the parties through the channel we have opened. The difficulty here is that this proposal has already been rejected by the North Vietnamese as conforming "neither to the fundamental provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam nor to the actual situation in Vietnam". In their Aide-Mémoire[27] of May 21 to us the North Vietnamese specifically criticized the Prime Minister's proposal on the grounds that "it makes no distinction between the United States which is the aggressor and the Vietnamese people who are the victims of aggression fighting in self-defense" and on the further ground that "it does not meet the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam".

9. In all the circumstances I believe that there are two choices open to us. We can continue to do what we have been doing to see if there is any basis for engaging the two sides in direct talks. While, for the moment, the prospects of success attending our efforts do not seem bright, it is difficult to say that the channel we have opened may not, at the opportune time, acquire significance. Alternatively, we can shift the focus of our approach to some form of public "peace plan" which would reflect growing Canadian concern about the continuation and, indeed, the escalation of the pace of hostilities in Vietnam. Such an approach would have obvious domestic and international attractions but I think that all our information suggests that it would probably be less productive of real results over the longer term than our current, more flexible approach, which, as you know, has deliberately avoided too firm a commitment towards any single element in the total situation.

10. For purposes of reference I am attaching a copy of the Prime Minister's statement of May 1.†

M[arcel] Cadieux

433.
Record of Conversation between Prime Minister and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Soviet Union, July 4, 1966
Compte rendu de la conversation entre le premier ministre et le premier vice-président du Conseil des ministres de l'Union soviétique, 4 juillet 1966
RG25, vol. 10060, 20-1-2-USSR/3

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] July 5, 1966

The conversations at dinner with Mr. Polyansky last evening were not particularly rewarding even if they were friendly and in some respects illuminating.

[…]

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[27] See/Voir doc. 391.

(B) *Vietnam*

On Vietnam, the discussion was prolonged but there was no flexibility on the Soviet side. Mr. Polyansky kept repeating that Canada had great influence in the world and with the United States and that we should use this influence to persuade the United States Government to bring to an end their intervention in Vietnam. Mr. Polyansky felt that the war could stop very quickly if the Americans would cease their bombing operations in the North and withdraw their troops. The Prime Minister again and again stressed that we had done our best to bring about negotiations but that the United States were a big power and there was no hope in an approach which was based on the assumption that only the Americans were wrong. Mr. Martin made a very strong plea to Mr. Polyansky that the Soviet Union should also try to use its influence to achieve positive results. At some point it seemed that Mr. Polyansky was tempted to be a little more forthcoming and he asked what it was the Soviet Union could do but he reverted very quickly to his set line that there was nothing the Soviet Union could attempt until the United States ceased their aggression. In the course of the discussion, the Prime Minister said that the United States had made a mistake in Vietnam and we had to do our best to assist them in extricating themselves. We could only do this, however, if we remained their friends. He also reiterated his suggestion that there should be a general cease-fire and that withdrawal of troops by both sides could proceed in step with negotiations. This elicited no response on the Soviet side. It is clear that while Mr. Polyansky was making an effort to moderate his views on this issue, he was not prepared to depart from the standard Soviet line.

(C) *Talks with the United States*

At one stage during the evening, the Prime Minister said that if Mr. Polyansky were interested, he could arrange for emissaries of the United States Government to come to Ottawa to discuss matters quietly and confidentially with Mr. Polyansky. The latter reacted very negatively. He said he had no mandate to discuss Vietnam with anybody. Then, he went on to argue that the United States had all sorts of contacts with Vietnam and they could use these contacts if they so liked. He said they had access to the United States through the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow who is a mature and intelligent man. Mr. Martin intervened to point out that on the contrary the Americans had lost their contact with the North Vietnamese since January and they were most anxious to establish or re-establish such contacts with Hanoi leaders.

[…]

[Marcel Cadieux]

434.
Memorandum from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Prime Minister
Note de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au premier ministre
MG26-N4, vol. 263, 846/U56 Polyansky Conf.

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] July 6, 1966

CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF THE USSR AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S DINNER, JULY 4, 1966

The Prime Minister offered a dinner for Mr. Polyansky on July 4 which was attended by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Under-Secretary and Mr. Ford. It was the intention to devote the evening to serious conversations and as Mr. Polyansky was ready and willing to do so, a wide range of subjects was discussed.

[…]

Vietnam

The subject of Vietnam dominated the evening and the conversation kept coming back to it. Although no new element in Soviet policy appeared, this is not surprising since it has been clear for some time that the Russians are not prepared to change their policy. What Mr. Polyansky did was give an exposé of that policy in very forceful terms. This morning in Toronto, Safronchuk told me Polyansky's presentation had been close to that given Vice-President Humphrey by Prime Minister Kosygin in New Delhi last January.

Mr. Martin explained to Mr. Polyansky what we were trying to do in Vietnam and the importance we attached to keeping the channel to Hanoi open. He described the Ronning missions and said that the North Vietnamese had agreed that negotiations were possible without prior acceptance of the Four Points provided the Americans agreed to stop bombing the North definitively. However, the Americans had attached some conditions to this and nothing had come of it. Nevertheless, Mr. Ronning had been well received in Hanoi and in our opinion, in spite of set-backs and difficulties, this was the only viable channel of communication between the North Vietnamese and the Americans and should be kept open. The Americans wished this themselves.

Mr. Polyansky said that the Soviet Government fully appreciated Canadian motives in seeking a solution of the problem but in his view we were looking in the wrong direction. The solution lay in Washington. Nothing could be done unless the United States stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. Our biggest contribution would lie in using our very great influence on the Americans to persuade them to stop or, as General de Gaulle had done, to condemn the bombing outright.[28]

He then said that there were many channels to Hanoi available to Washington if there was a desire to use them. It was not a question of communication but of substance. Mr. Martin said so far as he was aware the Americans no longer had any contact with Hanoi, and he again outlined the purpose of our soundings in Hanoi, i.e., to determine if there was not some means of bringing the two parties to the conflict together.

Mr. Polyansky gave the impression of being unaware of the North Vietnamese acceptance of the Ronning proposals, and this was confirmed to me this morning by Safronchuk.

Mr. Martin made a plea to Mr. Polyansky to use Soviet influence to help in seeking a solution. He said it was impossible to expect the Americans to make all the concessions. Hanoi had to do something. Mr. Polyansky said that it was impossible for them to do anything in this direction so long as the bombing kept up. In these circumstances they could only support their ally, and "not only with rifles but advanced war material". They would not escalate the war, since they were not fighting, but if the Americans did so they would have to increase substantially their aid to Hanoi.

Mr. Pearson remarked on the tragedy that the previous good relations between the USA and the USSR had so gravely deteriorated as a result of Vietnam. It was essential that the USA and the Soviet Union reach a peaceful understanding. If this happened all the rest of the world could be more sure of the future. Mr. Polyansky agreed.

Mr. Pearson then asked him if he thought it might do some good to talk to a high American official. He could easily arrange it if Mr. Polyansky wished, but he shied away from this suggestion and later said that the Russians were not empowered to talk about the future of Vietnam on behalf of Hanoi. The Americans should do this directly themselves.

Comment

Since Mr. Polyansky seemed eager to discuss Vietnam both publicly and privately from the moment of his arrival, it can be assumed that he was thoroughly briefed before his departure. His conversation with me last week, his remarks at the Prime Minister's dinner,

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[28] See/Voir Waverley Root, "De Gaulle Criticizes Viet Raids," *Washington Post*, 3 July 1966, p. A10.

Mr. Kuznetsov's conversation with me about June 24, and the entire Soviet stance on this question seems to confirm that the Russians are not prepared to do anything in Hanoi to persuade the North Vietnamese to compromise.

Mr. Polyansky's aim seems to be to convince the Canadian Government that its efforts to seek a compromise solution are wasted and that we ought to concentrate on finding means of stopping escalation of the war by the Americans. Hence he devoted considerable time both at the Prime Minister's dinner and previously in conversation with Mr. Martin in trying to convince us that the Ronning mission was a waste of time and that a channel of communications between Hanoi and Washington was unnecessary.

R.A.D. Ford

435.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
MG32-B12, vol. 226, 23

No. 2163
Washington, July 23, 1966
Confidential. Limited Distribution. Priority.
Following for only the Prime Minister, Minister and Under-Secretary.

CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON

I had the better part of half an hour of private conversation with the President in connection with presentation of my credentials yesterday morning. From this meeting I took away several impressions: (a) President is in vigorous physical and mental condition. (b) His main preoccupation, not repeat not surprisingly, is Vietnam. (c) His attitude towards Canada and Canadian Government is basically friendly. (d) He clearly is unhappy about anything resembling public criticism particularly when it is expressed inside USA. He strongly resents especially tendency of some foreign leaders to criticize USA bombings while refraining from any criticism of what he regards as the much worse actions of the other side. (e) He seems to have a very long memory for favours (or disfavours) given or received. (f) He is obviously tough-minded but very anxious to demonstrate how careful and responsible he is about matters affecting peace and war.

2. None of these impressions is particularly novel or surprising. They add up, however, to a more favourable picture of the President than I had from seeing him at a little distance during Mr. Pearson's visit in January/64.[29]

3. The following fairly detailed account of the proceedings at White House yesterday morning may be of some interest in support, and in elaboration, of the above general impressions.

4. When I arrived at White House I was shown into the Treaty Room with the new Gabonese Ambassador. Our understanding was that we would be taken in turn, with the Gabonese Ambassador first, to the Oval Room where the President would be waiting to receive our credentials. In fact while we were waiting the President came bustling into the Treaty Room and greeted us. He then asked us to sit down beside him and he proceeded immediately to talk to me about how pleased he had been to visit Canada even briefly at time of the

[29] Pearson met with Johnson in Washington 21–22 January 1964.
Pearson s'est entretenu avec Johnson à Washington les 21 et 22 janvier 1964.

Columbia River ceremony[30] and he said with a smile to one of his aides that he hoped to visit Canada again before too long. He referred to the fact that he had close relations with Mr. Pearson and spoke to him on phone fairly often. He then started to leave the room to take up his position to receive our credentials but stopped in doorway and said to me over the head of the Gabonese Ambassador that it was in this room that the Campobello Agreement had been signed.[31] Since obviously hundreds of agreements must have been executed in this room it was interesting that he had taken the trouble to recall for my benefit one which had been signed with Canada.

5. After the President had quickly received the Gabonese Ambassador's credentials in Oval Room in presence of newspapermen and photographers I came through and presented mine. The indicated intention had been that President would then retreat to another room where Gabonese Ambassador and I would jointly meet with him briefly. Again the President departed from the scenario and waving the newsmen out of the room asked me to sit on the little couch and talk with him.

6. This completely private conversation began in rather a low key and conventional style. President observed that USA relations with Mexico and Canada were very important and very special. There were no repeat no guns on either border. He took great pride in this relationship. He knew that many Texans had gone to Canada, particularly to oilfields, and they liked their life there. He referred to the great friendship which Senator George Aiken has for Canada and he remarked with what seemed to be a trace of disapproval that Aiken sometimes appeared to be more Canadian than American.

7. President then asked me whether I had "any comments, suggestions or criticisms" which I cared to make to him. I made some very general reply about how proud I was to be Canadian Ambassador to USA and how much I hoped that any problems that might come up would be satisfactorily resolved. I also expressed to the President the regards of Prime Minister Pearson. I then perhaps a little presumptuously asked President whether he had any views which he would wish me to convey to Canadian Government.

8. President began by saying very quietly and reflectively that he appreciated Canada's understanding of USA difficulties in Vietnam situation. He was grateful in particular for Mr. Ronning's efforts. He emphasized that he had "no repeat no illusions" that these efforts were likely to produce much from other side. He then said that some of his friends in other countries were inclined to be "rather quick to comment" on USA actions in Vietnam. They had not repeat not hesitated to criticize bombings of oil dumps at Hanoi and Haiphong even though only one civilian had been killed in this operation. Yet when Viet Cong had thrown a bomb in a barracks and killed eighty people this had brought no repeat no criticism from any foreign leaders. USA had bombed no repeat no Embassies in North Vietnam but Maxwell Taylor's and Alexis Johnson's offices in Saigon had been severely bombed and Alexis Johnson's secretary had been killed. This also had provoked no repeat no significant foreign comment.

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[30] Johnson and Pearson formally ratified the Columbia River Treaty at the Peace Arch, on the Canadian-American border between British Columbia and Washington State, on 16 September 1964. See *Canada Treaty Series*, 1964, no. 2.
Le 16 septembre 1964, Johnson et Pearson ont ratifié officiellement le Traité du fleuve Columbia à l'Arche de la Paix, à la frontière canado-américaine entre la Colombie-Britannique et l'État de Washington. Voir *Recueil des traités du Canada*, 1964, nº 2.

[31] The 1964 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Relating to the Establishment of the Roosevelt Campobello International Park was signed in Washington on 22 January 1964. See *Canada Treaty Series*, 1964, no. 17.
L'Accord entre le gouvernement du Canada et le gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique relatif à la création du parc international Roosevelt de Campobello a été signé à Washington, le 22 janvier 1964. Voir *Recueil des traités du Canada*, 1964, nº 17.

9. President then spoke with real feeling about the care which had been taken in arrangements for bombing petrol depots. He leaned very close to me (almost nose to nose if not repeat not eyeball to eyeball) and said very earnestly that he wanted us to know they had taken the most extraordinary precautions to insure that targets were hit exactly and that there was no repeat no chance of anything going wrong. He said that people who flew planes were not repeat not youngsters but were highly experienced flyers who had rehearsed whole operation time and again. They were also under his own severe and explicit instructions that they were not repeat not to regard themselves as under orders to bomb unless the harbour was clear and the weather and other conditions were considered by them to be absolutely right. As the President expressed it (while graphically drawing his own lower eyelids down with his fingers under his glasses) they were directed that they were not repeat not to drop their bombs unless they could "see with their own God-given eyes" the precise target which they were to hit. There was to be "none of this radar stuff". He said he was not repeat not going to have them kill a lot of civilians or "drop a bomb down the smoke stack of some Russian ship". In event bombs were right on target. Only one civilian was killed and he was a guard at the site and was in the process of giving the alarm when he was hit.

10. The President reverted to his criticism of foreign leaders for expressing themselves so vigorously about such careful operations while at same time saying nothing about indiscriminate killing by the other side. He mentioned Canada as one [of] the countries in this connection but I suggested that this was not repeat not accurate. He also referred particularly to Prime Minister Wilson and in a rather disparaging tone to "Mrs. India".[32] All of these people he said were ready to call for a halt to USA bombings but said nothing about what the other side should do. Their "grand idealism" was not repeat not too impressive.

11. President said rather vehemently that "we had stood back and taken it for thirty-seven days" and nothing good had resulted. Suggestions for suspending the bombings with no repeat no action by other side were often inspired by "enemies" who were more subtle and devious than some people might realize. President remarked that recent intelligence intercepts had indicated that these same "enemies" were starting a move again to try to get one-sided suspension of USA bombing.

12. President said that none was more anxious than he was to get a settlement. He was "prepared to go barehanded" into any room where the others would be willing to meet him. He would be happy to "leave his guns outside". As he has said publicly, he declared "let the others say where they will be and I will have Rusk there in no repeat no time".

13. President remarked that there were only two ways (presumably in addition to the possibility of a satisfactory settlement) by which USA could be taken out of Vietnam. Either the enemy would have to put enough force into area to compel USA to leave (and President said with a slight smile this was unlikely) or enemy might cause him enough trouble at home in USA to "bring him down". President did not repeat not comment on this latter possibility but his manner seemed to imply that it was unthinkable.

14. President then moved on to talk about his attitude towards Canada, particularly in relation to Vietnam situation. He said with emphasis "I like Mr. Pearson". He went on to indicate that he did not repeat not like speeches in USA "in his own yard" telling him what to do. I remarked that I was sure that any speeches made in USA by members of Canadian Government were not repeat not intended to cause difficulties. It was inevitable that we sometimes had had different views. President said that he thought Prime Minister of Canada would not repeat not have liked it very much if USA President had made a critical speech in Canada. I should stress that none of these remarks about speech-making was expressed very emotionally. Instead, President simply seemed to be recording again a point which he knew he had made before.

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[32] This is a reference to Indira Gandhi (1917–1984), prime minister of India at the time.
Il s'agit d'Indira Gandhi (1917-1984), première ministre de l'Inde à l'époque.

15. President recalled that some time ago Mr. Pearson had spoken with him on phone about problem of a piece of lumber legislation which Senator Morse was supporting. Prime Minister had indicated that this legislation would cause serious trouble in Canada. President remarked that he had told Prime Minister immediately that he would veto legislation although he realized it would cause him a good deal of difficulty with Senator Morse and others. It had been a rather painful experience later to find Mr. Pearson expressing views (presumably on Vietnam) which were supporting those of that "mean, small, miserable, ticky little man Morse".

16. President said that none of this affected his regard for Canada and Mr. Pearson. He said he knew that when the Canadians were asked to help they did so. He referred to case of Cyprus where he had spoken to Mr. Pearson and had expressed hope that Canada could intervene since it would be impracticable for USA to get into that situation without bringing in other great powers. Mr. Pearson had said that Canada would act immediately and he had been as good as his word.[33]

17. President then made some rather harsh remarks about Prime Minister Wilson. He said with some heat that "Wilson had dissociated himself from our bombings.[34] How could he dissociate himself when he had never been associated except possibly in selling things to the other side?"

18. At one point in course of this conversation in Oval Room President referred to importance of foreign aid and asked how much of Canada's GNP was being put to this use. I mentioned the rough figures and said that Government was moving towards one percent of GNP in next few years. President then did some mental calculations and said that it looked as though we and they were doing about the same proportion.

19. As the President rose to move into the other room he put his hand on my shoulder and asked me to tell Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin that they should continue to understand USA position in Vietnam. Also they should keep up the kind of work which Ronning had been doing "if only to make sure that nothing is missed".

20. As we went into the hallway I started to take leave of the President but he insisted that I continue with him "for a cup of coffee" into the room where the Gabonese Ambassador was patiently waiting. As we entered the room the President said rather apologetically to Gabonese Ambassador that he had kept me behind to talk about some special USA-Canada things such as "coasts and borders". He then made some remarks to Ambassador about the success that he was having with some African grasses on the ranch in Texas and went on from there to talk about population problems and need for more agricultural development. He referred to arrangements for Washington Ambassadors to visit various places in USA and said that he hoped at some time a visit might take place to his "rundown farm" and also they might be interested in seeing some of the work being done in desalting sea water. He concluded by asking Gabonese Ambassador whether he had any suggestions, comments or criticisms that he would care to express privately. Gabonese Ambassador said that he had none at present time. In brief, conversation with Gabonese Ambassador although friendly enough was not repeat not very substantial. Fact that it had to be carried on through an interpreter made it even less productive.

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[33] Canada contributed a military contingent to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) established in March 1964.
Le Canada a fourni un contingent militaire à la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre (UNFICYP), créée en mars 1964.

[34] See/Voir Bruce MacDonald, "Wilson Dissociates U.K. from Bombing: Raids Necessary, McNamara Declares," *Globe and Mail*, 30 June 1966, p. 25.

21. After President had said goodbye to us, he came back into the room again and took us out to enjoy the beautiful view towards Jefferson Memorial from the balcony which President Truman had added to White House. This seemed to be an afterthought which reflected President's pleasure at showing off his home. It contributed to impression that the President likes to be a friendly and hospitable man. He finally left with some parting words about his doors being always open.

[A.]E. Ritchie

436.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10842, 20-1-2-USA/4

No. 2181
Washington, July 26, 1966
Confidential. Limited Distribution. Immediate.
For Minister and Under-Secretary only.

MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY RUSK

Following are notes we have prepared on discussions that took place on July 22 at lunch Secretary Rusk gave for Minister in Washington:

[…]

Vietnam

12. Secretary of State told SSEA [that] USA Government had demanded explanation from Mrs. Gandhi on joint Indian-Soviet communiqué referring to "imperialists" and bombings of Hanoi-Haiphong POL installations.[35] Rusk had asked specifically whether India considered USA as imperialist power. If answer was no repeat no, Indians would be urged to say so publicly. What he found most irritating was double standard of critics who professed to be scandalized at destruction of oil facilities in Hanoi area but closed their eyes to attacks against USA Embassy and personnel in Saigon. Secretary of State said he had not repeat not discarded idea of "conference by accretion" which could start as small group prepared to discuss Laos situation, for instance, and might eventually provide occasion for broader talks on Vietnam. He had confidence that eventually "something is going to break". While situation had become more manageable for USA, it was now beyond means of North Vietnam to push USA out of country. As in other previous cases, crisis might move to fast denouement.

13. SSEA recalled similar observation made to him by Secretary of State some six months ago. He asked whether Secretary of State had new grounds for optimism. Secretary of State referred to President's statement on July 20 that about 15 to 20 percent of men recently captured were boys from 12 to 16 years of age suffering from various diseases.[36] Rusk said that according to interviews of some 150 prisoners, effectives of 324th Division were depleted and troops were short of weapons, food and military supplies.

[…]

[A.]E. Ritchie

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35 See/Voir G.K. Reddy, "End Bombing of North Viet Nam," *Times of India*, 17 July 1966, p. 1.

36 See/Voir "The President's News Conference of July 20, 1966," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966*, Book II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 744.

437.
Memorandum from Head, European Division, to Far Eastern Division
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Europe à la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/6

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] July 27, 1966

CALL BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Minister today to discuss a number of subjects, among them Vietnam.

2. Under instructions, he handed the Minister a statement outlining the Soviet Government's position on recent developments in Vietnam. This is attached.†

3. After reading it through quickly, the Minister said that it appeared to be consistent with public Soviet declarations and seemed to represent a hardening in the Soviet position. He expressed the hope that this was not in fact the case. Turning to the Canadian position, Mr. Martin explained that we have been very careful not to say anything publicly that would make our efforts to encourage at least preliminary discussions leading toward negotiations more difficult. He therefore did not wish at present to comment on the declaration of the Soviet Government.

4. Mr. Martin went on to say that in his talks with the United States Secretary of State last week, he had also been careful, although speaking frankly, to preserve an objective position. Mr. Rusk had informed him that the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was confined to military objectives and that only one life had been lost in the operation. Canada continues to be prepared to do whatever is possible, and in spite of Mr. Polyansky's repeated view that the war could not be ended by the action of third parties but only by the action of the United States, the Minister repeated his belief that there was a role for the ICSC and that by preserving objectivity Canada might find opportunities for useful employment of the "Ronning technique". In reply to an observation by Mr. Shpedko that the USSR would be very glad if Canada had any success in influencing the United States, the Minister said that he knew of no prospect of action by the U.S. unless it were accompanied by reciprocal action by the DRVN. He then went on to remark that he understood that the USSR was pulled two ways – that it considers the war regrettable but for a variety of reasons cannot say so. Nevertheless he still hoped to persuade the Soviet Union that the ICSC could accomplish a great deal. A joint declaration, for example, by Mrs. Gandhi, Mr. Gomulka and Mr. Pearson would be very difficult for the world to ignore.

5. The Ambassador again repeated that the United States alone could put a stop to hostilities, to which the Minister replied that he was familiar with the Soviet position and that if he did not comment further it did not mean that he was fully in agreement with it. Equally, there could be no doubt about the Canadian position. We had no wish to embarrass the Soviet Union and for this reason Mr. Martin pointed out he had made it clear in the House of Commons that we could not support Mrs. Gandhi's appeal for reconvening the Geneva Conference.[37]

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[37] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 7, pp. 7424–7427.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 7, p. 7424-7427.

6. To this the Ambassador replied that the point was not in such hints that the Soviet Union might be put in a difficult position but that such a conference could accomplish nothing unless hostilities had first come to an end.

7. After some general comments on the dangers of escalation and broadening of the war the conversation passed to another topic.[38]

J[ames] G[eorge]

438.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/6

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] July 27, 1966

PROPOSAL FOR AN "EXPANDING" CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM[39]

You will recall that an idea along these lines was first mentioned to you at the NATO meetings last December. In the course of the subsequent Vietnam peace feelers, the U.S.A. considered the possibility of not waiting for a formal Geneva Conference to be called to send a senior representative – possibly Averell Harriman – to Geneva "just to see who might turn up to talk to him". It was intended that a gesture of this nature would demonstrate U.S. willingness to enter into discussions or negotiations, and the failure of representatives of "the other side" to appear would provide adequate proof of where responsibility lay for a continued lack of progress towards a political solution. In the end, however, this turned out to be only an idea, and the proposal was never acted on.

More recently, public appeals by Prime Minister Gandhi and the efforts of Prime Minister Wilson in Moscow, have focussed attention on the possibility of reconvening the Geneva Conference.

As you know, we have not believed that this idea stood any chance of success at the moment and the Moscow visits of the Indian and British Prime Ministers have confirmed this view. North Vietnam and China are, at the moment at least, resolutely opposed to formal negotiations, and in these circumstances, the Soviet Union has been unable to exert influence or to appear to be exerting influence, in the direction of stimulating negotiations. [40]

Given this failure to enlist Soviet support and co-operation, the possibility remains of the British Co-Chairman acting unilaterally (presumably after one final appeal to Moscow, which would again be rejected) in issuing invitations to a Geneva Conference on some such grounds as the gravity of the situation demanding action by all those countries seriously interested in restoring peace in Vietnam.

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[38] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Mr. Bauer, Mr. Delworth (on return): 1) First task is to send text of Soviet communication to Moscow and other interested missions. 2) We may want to consider whether this calls for a reply. Hearn's impression is that Minister [illegible/illisible] would be inclined to leave matters where they are. 28/7/66 [K. Goldschlag?]

[39] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Please note Minister's comment, page 1&4. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

[40] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I agree with this reasoning. P[aul] M[artin]

On the surface, this proposal appears to offer certain advantages:

(a) it would constitute definite action, as distinct from only issuing appeals, aimed at getting negotiations started;

(b) it would force the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam to respond, either by attending (which is out of the question) or by explicitly declaring their unwillingness to attend;

(c) the latter, and most likely outcome, would show, for international opinion, that Communist intransigence is responsible for the failure to settle the Vietnam problem by negotiations.

It is doubtful, however, whether on balance any such unilateral move by the British Co-Chairman would be helpful in moving the Vietnam issue one inch closer to a negotiated solution and even the presentational advantages of such a move would be open to serious doubt. You will recall that the participants of the 1954 Geneva Conference were the following:

United Kingdom
U.S.A.
U.S.S.R.
France
China
Laos
Cambodia
North Vietnam
South Vietnam

Of these nine countries, the U.S.S.R., China and North Vietnam would denounce the British move as "illegal" and refuse to attend a meeting which would be described (at least in Peking and Hanoi) as part of the "imperialists' peace swindle". Given this resolute opposition by the Communists, Cambodia would almost certainly not attend. Perhaps more important, the French would unquestionably refuse to lend themselves to a manoeuvre which did not carry at least Soviet and North Vietnamese concurrence, and accordingly would be regarded by them as not *sérieux*. This leaves Britain, the U.S.A., South Vietnam and conceivably Laos. In the case of the latter two it is by no means clear that their attitudes would be anything more than reluctant acquiescence – and in the light of South Vietnam's experience in Geneva in 1954 – even that much cannot be taken for granted. In other words, it is questionable whether even under U.S. pressure Saigon would wish to put itself in the position of appearing to be pressing for a negotiation when the North was showing no sign of anything other than a determination to achieve military victory. From the South Vietnamese point of view, this could be tactically disadvantageous. But even if Laos and South Vietnam did show a willingness to go along with a British call for a Conference, the end result in terms of participants would be overwhelmed by the British and American presence. In short, the best that could be hoped for would be four out of nine countries agreeing to attend; at worst, only two. In either event, while the "gesture" of convening such a group might make a favourable initial impact, in terms of demonstrating a willingness to negotiate, this would soon wear off, and the delegates in Geneva might find themselves looking faintly ridiculous.

In all the circumstances, we believe that a unilateral move by the British to convene a Geneva Conference would have serious disadvantages which seem to us to outweigh any momentary presentational advantages flowing from it:

(a) it would have no chance of substantive success in terms of inducing the Communists to attend against their will – there is certainly no evidence that they can be "shamed" into attending;

(b) that being so, it might end up by making those who would be prepared to respond to the call look naive or ridiculous – this would not be regarded as a serious way of trying to end what is, in effect, a major armed conflict;

(c) in the long run, it might be counter-productive in the sense that those who are skeptical about the U.S. position – and this would certainly include the French Government as well as wide sections of public opinion in many Western countries – would not be convinced by a diplomatic pantomime which, it would be clear, was foredoomed to failure. This could have significant consequences in hardening opposition to the U.S. position or skepticism about U.S. sincerity in seeking a peaceful accommodation.

In the final analysis, such a venture would be seen as a "too clever by half" trick with which it would be unwise to be associated (assuming that Canada, which did not participate in the 1954 Conference were somehow invited this time under some sort of formula expanded to include the Commission powers as was done in 1961-2). We believe that the time has passed for diplomatic "optical illusions". Our own efforts, however limited the results achieved have been so far, have been based on the assumption that the circumstances call for seriously intentioned diplomatic efforts and I would think our credentials in that regard might well be called into question if we lent ourselves to an exercise on the lines mentioned to you by Rusk.[41]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

439.
Record of Informal Meeting between Prime Minister and Prime Minister of United Kingdom, July 29, 1966
Compte rendu de la réunion informelle entre le premier ministre et le premier ministre du Royaume-Uni, 29 juillet 1966
MG32-B12, vol. 226, 20

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] August 2, 1966

Also present:

Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs
H.E. Sir Henry Lintott, British High Commissioner
Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the British Cabinet
Mr. Halls, Private Secretary to Prime Minister Wilson
Mr. R.G. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet
Mr. J.C. Langley, Department of External Affairs

After the usual exchange of courtesies, Mr. Wilson suggested that he begin the exchange of views by reporting briefly on his Washington visit.[42] He had spent some four hours with the President (including a luncheon at which a number of senior Senators and members of the press had been present) and, despite press speculation that he was "going to be clobbered", he had found the President very friendly; he considered the visit most successful. The President had been reassured that prospective changes in British defence expenditures did not imply a change in British defence policy and there had been a useful though brief exchange of views on Vietnam and on international liquidity. The President's speech of welcome at the luncheon had been particularly warm and helpful.

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41 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I concur in these views. P[aul] M[artin]

42 See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. XII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), document 266.

Vietnam

The Prime Minister said that he thought President Johnson was counting on the effect of the bombing of North Vietnam to produce a break in the situation. He had been impressed with the knowledge displayed by the President, in a recent conversation with our Ambassador in Washington, on the details of the bombing, the care taken by the United States in the air strikes, etc. Nevertheless, it seemed that the United States secured little credit from world opinion for the care being exercised.

Mr. Wilson replied that the President had spoken in similar terms to him, there was no doubt the United States was prepared to carry on indefinitely in Vietnam in the expectation of some weakening in the North. The United States was willing and anxious to talk with Hanoi provided there was some reciprocal action on the other side.

Mr. Wilson said that he had spent some nine hours with Mr. Kosygin during his recent visit to Moscow (including five hours with only interpreters present). Mr. Kosygin had been extremely offensive about the President but had spoken even more roughly about China. He had clearly been misinformed about United States opinion and determination to carry on in Vietnam and Mr. Wilson had taken the opportunity to make clear both the President's determination and that public opinion in the United States was behind him. He had cited a recent Gallup poll which had indicated 86% support for the President on the policy of bombing North Vietnam and had disabused Kosygin of his notion that industrial workers and farmers were opposed to the President's policies. Mr. Wilson then asked for the Prime Minister's assessment of the Ronning missions to Hanoi.

The Prime Minister replied by describing briefly the nature of these missions, saying that we were not discouraged by the second trip to Hanoi. A good atmosphere had been maintained and we had indications that the North Vietnamese wished to keep this channel of communication open. Some headway had been made on the prisoners problem and the attitude to Ronning had been generally friendly although the North Vietnamese were highly suspicious and we had feared that the resumption of United States bombing so soon after the Ronning visit might have appeared more than coincidental to them. The message which Ronning had taken to Hanoi was that the United States was prepared to stop the bombing if there were some reciprocal action. This was a slight advance on the published position. The Prime Minister went on to say that our contacts with the Russians, most recently during the Polyansky visit, indicated a very reserved attitude towards any involvement in such initiatives vis-à-vis North Vietnam. Like Kosygin, Polyansky had displayed a vicious attitude towards the United States.

Mr. Wilson commented that the Russians feared that support for any steps which were unacceptable to Hanoi would drive the latter towards China and increase the risk of Chinese intervention. In Moscow Kosygin had shown no interest in the possibility of a conference on Cambodia and had not, in fact, even been briefed on the recent letter to the Co-Chairmen.[43] One point that he had made to Kosygin was that, if there were to be a conference on Cambodia, Cambodia should be the sole subject of discussion and should not be used as a convenient device towards a conference on other Indo-China problems. It seemed to him that it was important to try to get something moving on Vietnam and he had put several alternative proposals to Kosygin, including the idea of a large Geneva conference, the Polish idea of a conference of the two Co-Chairmen and the three Commission countries, and the possibility of a cessation of United States bombing in response to the blocking of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Kosygin had not responded and it must be admitted that these proposals assumed a large change in the attitude of Hanoi as compared to their position at the time of the 37-day bombing pause last Christmas. Mr. Wilson doubted that such a change was likely during the

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[43] See/Voir Terence Prittie, "Cambodia Seeks Border Controls," *Guardian*, 1 July 1966, p. 13.

monsoon period. As far as the United States attitude was concerned, he thought that the President would accept any reasonable solution for Viet Cong representation at discussions (although Pham Van Dong's position that only the Viet Cong could represent Vietnam was clearly unacceptable). The President was worried about the hardening of world opinion and had, indeed, been at some pains to avoid any appearance of the United States behaving like a nation at war. He appeared to be encouraged by the recent developments on prisoners of war,[44] not least because those Americans and Britons most opposed to his stand on Vietnam had associated themselves with the appeal to Hanoi.

[…]

440.
Letter from Ambassador to United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
MG31-E44, vol. 5, 4

Secret.
Washington, D.C., August 10, 1966

Dear Marcel [Cadieux],

I have just returned from my official call on Secretary McNamara. The main points emerging from the conversation are reported below. I assume that Basil [Robinson] and Ralph [Collins] will be interested and you may wish to pass these informal notes on to the Minister as well. Needless to say I found McNamara a very pleasant and impressive person.

[…]

Vietnam

I observed that a newcomer to Washington was bound to be deeply impressed by the extent to which so many things seemed to be dominated by Vietnam. McNamara agreed that this was the case but said he did not see any alternative at a time when the situation there was such that several hundred thousand Americans were actually fighting there and a substantial part of the country's resources were being put into that fight. He made no prophecies about the future and said nothing about any study that may have been undertaken regarding the possible scale of future operations.

Secretary McNamara observed rather worriedly that one of the things that bothered him most about the situation was the repeated evidence that neither side seemed to have much understanding of the other. He referred to the pause in the bombing (which, he said, he had supported) and noted how easy it would have been for the North Vietnamese to have "got the U.S. into a cul-de-sac" if they had shown the slightest understanding of U.S. mentality. During that pause he became quite concerned that the North Vietnamese might in fact become aware of this possibility and might offer some words rather than deeds that would have prevented the U.S. from resuming operations. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, who was present at the interview, interjected that if the North Vietnamese had been making any signs at that time, our side may have also shown an incapacity to understand them. McNamara replied that he thought the lack of understanding existed on both sides.

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[44] See/Voir Robert E. Dallos, "No Trial in View for U.S. Captives, Ho Chi Minh Says," *New York Times*, 25 July 1966, p. 1.

I asked whether the fact that the North Vietnamese had not proceeded against the U.S. prisoners might perhaps show that they were not completely insensitive to U.S. and other Western attitudes. McNamara said that it was possible but there was no way of knowing whether the North Vietnamese had ever really thought seriously about taking action against the prisoners. If they had been contemplating that possibility and had deliberately decided to refrain from doing so, that would have shown a better understanding of U.S. psychology and the inevitable U.S. reaction than other responses from the North Vietnamese had indicated. While the significance of their behaviour about the prisoners must remain a little doubtful, McNamara nevertheless agreed that it was a good thing that they had not in fact acted. There might be some cause for encouragement in this episode.

On the other hand, McNamara said he had seen no readiness on the part of the North Vietnamese to enter into any kind of negotiation. He remarked that in the light of what Ronning had encountered, he wondered whether we really saw anything specific that could be done now. He thought that advice in the situation would only be valuable if there was some reason to think that progress could be made. The U.S. could always, of course, capitulate but he did not think that anybody wishes to see that happen. Short of that, he could not think of anything more that could be done now. He said, rather weakly, that it was desirable to maintain contacts with the North but he obviously was not very hopeful of anything being accomplished at an early date.

[…]

Yours sincerely,
A.E. Ritchie

441.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
MG26-N4, vol. 281, 918 Campobello Visit 1966 – Secret

No. G-175
Ottawa, August 22, 1966
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: London, NATO Paris, Paris, Bonn, Brussels, Hague, Rome, Geneva, DISARMDELGVE, Permis New York, Canberra, Wellington, Delhi, CANFORCEHED, PMO, PCO; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Copenhagen, Oslo, Athens, Ankara, Nicosia from Paris; Moscow, Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Accra, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, Karachi, Dar es Salaam from London; Lisbon, Georgetown, Colombo, Kingston, Port of Spain, Havana from Ottawa.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AUGUST 21: FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS

Meeting included approximately 90 minutes of talks followed by private lunch. President advanced no repeat no new proposals and forecast no repeat no major shift of policy (although see reference to Chinese representation below). No repeat no attempt was made either by President or Prime Minister to seek concrete agreements on any specific items. Further reports on discussions will be prepared in due course but this telegram is designed for background guidance of missions, who will naturally wish to know promptly main highlights of meeting.

General

2. President gave impression of being in very good physical health. He was obviously much preoccupied but in no repeat no way overwhelmed by burdens of office. In his contributions to conversations he tended to concentrate or was encouraged to concentrate on following subjects: Vietnam; domestic economic problems; domestic political outlook; relations with Europe; and Chinese representation. He was, however, very attentive to views expressed by Prime Minister on additional topics, including in particular Canadian economic trends; Rhodesia; NATO; Caribbean; and Law of the Sea. Meeting took place in most friendly atmosphere throughout.

Vietnam

3. Responding to Prime Minister's question whether there was any sign of diplomatic break in Vietnam situation, President said he did not repeat not expect such a development until North Vietnamese were convinced that they could not repeat not win and until they realized that the price they would have to pay for continuing the war was unacceptably heavy. USA policy was to convince them on these points by gradual and careful application of pressure without, however, going far enough to provoke Russian or Chinese intervention. On basis of meeting one week ago with General Westmoreland, President seemed disposed to hope for perceptible improvement in military situation beginning in October, but he clearly entertained no repeat no exaggerated expectations of early victory. Effectiveness of present USA military measures was manifested in such evidence as increasing numbers of mid-teenage Viet Cong prisoners, inadequate training, and declining morale. Bombing of oil dumps and supply routes was affecting 70 percent of North Vietnamese POL reserves. He did not repeat not take this as determining factor since oil supplies for war in South Vietnam could be introduced from other sources. In assessing general effect of USA military measures, he did not repeat not go beyond asserting that they were at present making it more difficult for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to conduct military operations.

4. President made only brief reference to such peace-seeking efforts as Ronning mission. While recognizing that such efforts had been worth making, he clearly did not repeat not consider that situation was ripe for successful prosecution at this time.

5. President spoke at some length on domestic sentiment in USA on Vietnam. Giving examples from primaries held recently in California, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Tennessee, he expressed confidence that, unless some serious error were to be made in prosecuting war, mid-term Congressional elections would reflect fairly broad support for administration's Vietnam policy. He anticipated some loss of seats but questioned if loss would be as high as 50 to 70 forecast by his critics.

6. Prime Minister in course of discussion on Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting recalled proposal put forward in London last year for Commonwealth peace mission to Hanoi.[45] President did not repeat not react when Prime Minister wondered whether it might be desirable at forthcoming meeting to pursue another similar initiative.

[…]

Relations with USSR

8. Prime Minister spoke of Polyansky visit to Canada, emphasizing frankness and comprehensive nature of talks. Prime Minister stressed difficulty of convincing Polyansky that USA was in Vietnam for reasons other than staying there. […]

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[45] See/Voir doc. 283.

442.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/4

No. 768
Saigon, September 3, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority from Delhi.
Reference: My Tels 530† and 531 Jun 19.
Repeat for Information: Washington from Ottawa.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE – CANADIAN CHANNEL PROSPECTS

As you know, while I held myself available as usual I did not repeat not seek an appointment with DRVN leaders during the Commission's visit to Hanoi August 16-20 nor did I mention the "Canadian channel" during the official session with Ha Van Lau. However, in conversation with him at the reception August 19, I made a point of referring to the channel being open for any use that could be made of it and my own availability and that of my Permrep. Ha Van Lau responded by recalling the assurances given on Ronning and my departure from Hanoi June 8 (paragraph 7 reference telegram 530 and paragraphs 8 and 14 of reference telegram 531[46]).

2. The visit, despite Ha Van Lau's familiarly uncompromising and critical official comments, went off in the usual atmosphere of cordiality as far as our bilateral relations with Hanoi are concerned. This was also noticeable on informal occasions both with Ha Van Lau and his PAVN Mission colleagues and with Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, who I met both at our reception and at the Indonesian national day reception (you will recall he had a major role during both Ronning visits). Our Permreps have carried over effectively this relationship between the visits from Saigon, including the very useful July l visit by alternate delegate Brigadier Danby. Major Donahue continued this good work throughout his tour of duty and Major Fletcher has now taken over.

3. As for the prospects for the Canadian channel I must confess to having become very doubtful that it will be used in any practical way towards a resolution of the Vietnam problem. The point of view held by Cabot Lodge and others here is very convincing that if they have anything of real substance to convey the DRVN (and also the Americans) would use a less "visible" channel and that given the consequences to their own "face" and personal position of Northern leaders would not repeat not enter into cease-fire talks; instead when they have taken a realistic decision and are ready to implement it they would disengage quietly and let the war in the South run down. In the meantime, both sides may continue to use us for their own purposes as a sounding-board for their points of view and for the propaganda. There is perhaps nothing wrong with that since even a channel used for such purposes may be better than nothing. But I believe it would now be illusory to have expectations of any tangible results from the Canadian-Saigon-Hanoi link. We have all put our hearts into this role here and in Ottawa and with full sincerity, but I believe we must face this unpalatable conclusion. Whether we stand to gain some political advantage from merely maintaining this link is another question but going through the motions in such an abortive exercise could soon become transparent and leave our motivation and sincerity open to question. We would of course not repeat not be alone in this given the propaganda froth stirred up with some regularity by British, Indian, French and indeed American "peace initiatives".

[Victor C.] Moore

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[46] See/Voir doc. 409.

443.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/17

No. 776
Saigon, September 7, 1966
Secret. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 558† Jun 25.
Repeat for Information: Delhi (Immediate); London (Immediate) from Delhi; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome (Immediate) from London; Washington, Permis New York, CANFORCEHED (Immediate) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Wellington, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo, Canberra from Ottawa; Hanoi, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM PROSPECTS – CABOT LODGE

Since the conversation reported in my reference telegram, I have met Cabot Lodge on a number of occasions socially and the delegation has been in close contact at various levels with Americans on matters of common interest. When I called on him September 5, he expressed interest in my last visit to Hanoi and, as usual, we had a very frank and friendly discussion.

2. On the "Canadian channel" and on how and when the Hanoi regime would extricate itself from its dilemma, he expressed himself along already familiar lines. He believes personally that when Hanoi is convinced that the Vietcong infrastructure cannot repeat not be maintained in the face of American and allied pressure, they will then move to disengagement. He acknowledged that they had not repeat not yet been convinced and that indeed, while there has been success in certain areas in the Republic of Vietnam, this would have to be extended much more broadly in order to be effective and convincing. When that moment comes, he believes the DRVN regime will pass the word, possibly through the Canadian Delegation (but see also my telegram 768 September 3) that they are willing to break off military engagement if the Americans and the ARVN do likewise; this message would carry the rider that if anyone says they said this, it will be denied. Lodge went on to say that once he had received such a message, steps would be taken at once to act on it, and military hostilities could then come to a halt. In this he thought there was a close parallel with the ending of hostilities in Malaya. In Canada and in the USA one naturally tends to think in terms of negotiations, a Geneva Conference and a signed document, but this, he believes, is not repeat not the way Hanoi (or Asians generally) will act. Using the method he foresees, they would save that vital thing, their face. He mentioned that he had been particularly disappointed in Mrs. Gandhi's initiative in July.[47] At the time he had great expectations, on the assumption that she would not repeat not have made such a statement without some assurances from Moscow in advance of her visit there. As it turned out, she clearly had none and was rebuffed in Moscow. He thought that we agreed with him that such was not repeat not the way to achieve anything practical.

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[47] See/Voir J. Anthony Lukas, "Mrs. Gandhi Urges British-Soviet Bid on Vietnam Talks," *New York Times*, 8 July 1966, p. 1.

3. With regard to the hostilities in Vietnam, he did not repeat not suggest any date, unlike Rahman (within the month) or Foreign Minister Tran Van Do (not repeat not before the end of the year). He found interesting the suggestion that the North needed "a military success" before-hand and agreed that they were certainly waiting to see how the situation develops during and following the elections in South Vietnam and particularly for the outcome of the American elections in November. We agreed that the Hanoi leaders have no repeat no understanding of the American mentality and system. He commented that the only people they had got to know well outside Asia were the French who, of course, are a different kettle of fish. I mentioned to him again that this is one of the points we frequently make in Hanoi; namely, that it is illusory to think that Americans will become impatient or fed up and will then give up in Vietnam: on the contrary their reaction would be to hit harder and, if in 1968 there were a new administration and president, the chances are they would implement an even more forceful policy in Vietnam. Speaking of this year's elections, Cabot Lodge commented that it was particularly true that such expectations by Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues are bound to be disappointed. He forecast that the Democrats, two years after their "ridiculously large" majority, would this time lose 35 seats; they would, however, not repeat not lose them to opponents of President Johnson's Vietnam policy. On the contrary, the seats of those Democrats who have been opposing the President's policy would go to Republicans who have been supporting it and who will continue to do so, even though they oppose him on other issues.

4. He expressed great disappointment with the failure so far of the ICSC to take on duties on the Cambodian border. This request should have been grasped, coming as it did in the form of an invitation from the country concerned; he could not repeat not understand why the Indians had dragged their feet in not repeat not seizing this rare opportunity to do something constructive in limiting the war. He added that such supervision by the ICSC would have the full cooperation of the Americans. While it would be a big job, similar tasks had been carried out elsewhere and the operation would be quite feasible. We touched on the Indians' unhappy psychosis, so evident again following the Russian reaction to the Dong Hene Report of the Laos Commission.[48]

5. Cabot Lodge said as a matter of course that the USA would welcome anything which would bring an end to hostilities in Vietnam and anything which could localize or reduce them. I mentioned my impression that the East Europeans, despite their ostensible worry that the situation here could expand into a major world war, are so far prepared only to urge us to persuade the Americans but are themselves not repeat not prepared to do the other part of the job, to persuade the Hanoi regime; the conclusion seems inescapable that they must believe the situation is not repeat not at the most critical stage which would demand them to sacrifice some of their face in order to avoid a conflict between the USA and China involving the USSR and her satellites. Cabot Lodge rejoined that de Gaulle has also shown a lack of comprehension. The present conflict in Vietnam is a relatively small affair contained in a corner of Asia, and in this sense is a guarantee of there not repeat not being a third world war. If the Americans were to pull out, with the Chinese Communist area of control moving in behind them, the situation would not repeat not be long in posing a threat to Australia, New Zealand and Japan. This would be quite a different matter both in the scope of the conflict and in the weapons used. He added that he believed Canada's point of view would in such circumstances also be different, as he believed we looked on both Japan and Australia

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[48] See "Vietnam – Report on the Dong Hene Incident," *External Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 9 (September 1966), pp. 373–376.
Voir « Laos – Rapport sur l'incident de Dong Hene », *Affaires extérieures*, vol. 18, nº 9 (septembre 1966), p. 388-391.

strategically in the same way the USA did. I said I thought that this was certainly so and at least we would do more than we are now doing in saying, albeit frequently, that we support Americans in their Vietnam policy. He said that he personally knew Canada so well and had so many Canadians in his family that he understood our position entirely. He spoke particularly warmly of his close and long association with the Minister and the Prime Minister in New York at the UN.

6. We touched on the anomaly of the attitude of those very "moral" critics of the American action in Vietnam that make such a fuss about killing in action of Vietcong and infiltrated North Vietnamese whose lives would be forfeit if the Americans were to pull out and leave them to the mercies of the Hanoi regime.

7. I raised with him the unbalanced picture being given of the fighting in Vietnam by correspondents stationed here and the failure of his Government, and of other interested governments, to do anything to make the facts known: the impression given by reporters is that Americans are doing fighting whereas in fact the RVN forces are still double the Americans and are suffering twice as many casualties. I also took advantage of the opportunity to ask again for his intervention with respect to air activity on the part of Americans during the hours of the flight of the ICSC courier aircraft between Vientiane and Hanoi. He made a note to take action on both these latter points, on which I shall be reporting separately.

[Victor C.] Moore

444.
Memorandum from Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/4

Secret.
[Ottawa,] September 15, 1966

VIETNAM

In his telegram 768 of September 3, our Commissioner questioned the continued usefulness of the Canadian channel to Hanoi.

You indicated at the time that you did not share the arguments put forward in that message and that you would wish to see whatever reply was being prepared before its despatch to Saigon. I now attach a proposed reply for your approval.[49]

As you know, we are approaching the point where physical access to Hanoi is becoming fraught with considerable risks to the safety of Canadian personnel flying to and from Hanoi. A separate memorandum on this question† is being prepared for your consideration within the next day or two. In the meantime, I think it would be right for us to assure our Commissioner that, whatever our assessment of the future potentialities of the Canadian channel, the question of the safety of Canadian personnel within his area of responsibility will be considered on its own merits. It is the purpose of the last paragraph of the attached reply to provide that assurance.[50]

H.B. R[obinson]

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[49] See next document./Voir le document suivant.

[50] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Agreed. P[aul] M[artin]

445.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 3092, 20-VIET-1-3-USA/2

No. Y-652
Ottawa, September 19, 1966
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel 768 Sep 3.
Repeat for Information: Washington.

OPERATION SMALLBRIDGE – CANADIAN CHANNEL PROSPECTS

It is too early, in our view, to anticipate when or in what fashion conflict in Vietnam might end. It has always been in our mind that conflict might end by a process of de-escalation on the ground. This was pattern in Greece and Malaya and it could be argued that there are clear advantages to both sides in Vietnam in avoiding difficult compromises which any negotiation around conference table would inevitably entail.

2. On other hand, we have to recognize that Vietnam situation is not repeat not entirely parallel to situations encountered in Greece and Malaya. Commitments of power and prestige in Vietnam conflict are immeasurably greater, a major power is directly engaged in combatant role, and at least two major powers (USA and China) may be said to regard whole future pattern of political organization in Southeast Asia as hinging on outcome of this conflict.

3. All this would seem to suggest that it would be premature to dismiss prospect of a negotiation at some stage, either consequent upon or independent of phasing out of actual fighting. Indeed, it is arguable that if ending of Vietnam conflict is to lead to stable settlement in Southeast Asia, a negotiated solution of issues which are involved in present conflict is pretty well inescapable.

4. Be that as it may, it would be wrong to assume that we are attaching excessive expectations to existence of Canadian channel to Hanoi. Nor is there any disposition to make use of this channel in circumstances where absence of productive results is foregone conclusion. Canadian Government's whole public position has been based on use of quiet and unspectacular methods to see whether beginning could not repeat not be made towards a peaceful solution of this conflict. All in all, therefore, we would not repeat not envisage our being involved in any exercise which, as you put it, could "leave our motivation and sincerity open to question".

5. It is quite possible, of course, that neither Hanoi nor Washington may avail themselves of this channel as course of events unfolds. On other hand, we cannot repeat not exclude this possibility. As Lodge himself has suggested (your telegram 776 September 7), it cannot repeat not be assumed that, even if de-escalation is course chosen by North Vietnamese, indication on these lines may not repeat not be passed to Americans through use of Canadian channel. But even if it were to turn out otherwise, we believe that it is useful to offer parties to conflict option of using potentialities of Canadian channel in circumstances where there is continuing risk of miscalculation and failure of communication in both directions.

6. As to factor of "visibility", this is something which, as you know, we have had to take into account in planning for Ronning's visits to Hanoi. On both occasions, balance of judgment suggested that "visibility" would not repeat not be likely, at that stage, to prejudice purpose of mission. If, on other hand, time ever came where factor of "visibility" became crucial, there is no repeat no reason why channel need necessarily be synonymous with Ronning personally.

7. In underlining continuing value which, as you will see, we attach to existence of this channel, we want to make it clear that we shall be considering very serious question of safe access to Hanoi in its own context and on its own merits.

[Paul] Martin

446.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. Y-676
Ottawa, September 22, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-668† Sep 21.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva (Priority); CANFORCEHED, Saigon (Priority).
By Bag: Delhi, Warsaw, Moscow, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.
Following for Hadwen.

VIETNAM

Following are comments on Secretary-General's three-point proposal:[51] It is important to be clear what this proposal is and what it is not. What it is, essentially, is a description of one conceivable sequence of events leading to negotiations. It is not a sequence of interlocking steps with a built-in timetable which, if accepted by the parties, would automatically create a negotiating situation.

2. First point recognizes, as we do, importance of stopping of bombing of North Vietnam as catalyst in opening up approach to Vietnam settlement. Real problem is to find way to get it stopped. Our own recent experience with Ronning missions has shown that USA would be willing to consider *de facto* cessation of bombing in return for some discernible diminution of Northern support for war in South. In other words, in USA thinking cessation of bombing would be part and parcel of (but not unilateral concession precedent upon) a mutual reduction of hostilities in Vietnam.

3. Ronning missions made it clear that North Vietnamese are adamantly opposed to paying any price for getting bombing stopped. From their point of view bombing must be stopped unconditionally and for good before anything else can happen. No doubt this point of view is pretty widely known by this time and lies at the basis of Secretary-General's isolation of bombing of North Vietnam as first and autonomous step in his three-point package.

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[51] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 819.

4. Between seemingly irreconcilable positions of USA and North Vietnam some middle course will need to be found. This, it seems to us, can be done only on basis of some formula which would link an ostensibly autonomous cessation of bombing with an ostensibly autonomous reduction of Northern military activity in the South. If this cannot be done simultaneously, as appears unlikely in face of vigorously held position of North Vietnamese, answer may lie in developing some time sequence over which these steps can be phased on basis of binding understandings arrived at in advance between parties themselves. Goldberg seems to have this in mind.

5. Insofar as Secretary-General's second point is concerned, we agree that any de-escalation of hostilities would be worthwhile and may be indispensable for creating a proper negotiating climate. Real problem, however, is not in specifying it or describing it as necessary step, but in creating conditions in which it can take place. There is also problem of how far such a de-escalation is to be carried. A simple freeze might be a sensible and attainable starting point. But the closer a de-escalation gets to a complete ceasefire, the greater the problems on both sides and the less likely they are to be susceptible to solution in anything short of a full-fledged negotiation.

6. Secretary-General's third proposal raises question of status of Vietcong in settlement equation. In Secretary-General's formulation, assumption seems to be that problem centres on assuring the Vietcong a voice in negotiations. As we see it, this is essentially a procedural question and not the real issue. At press conference July 28/65 President Johnson said "we have said we would negotiate anywhere, at any time. The Vietcong would have no repeat no difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem. I think that could be worked out".[52]

7. Hanoi's insistence on recognition of role of Viet Cong, it seemed to us, relates not so much to giving them a seat at conference table as to accepting (by agreeing to deal with them as an independent group) the proposition that they have established their claim to a major if not the major role in future political life of SVN (this right having been won by force of arms rather than by exercise of free choice of SVN electorate). This is meaning of Hanoi's third point in four-point position of April/65, i.e., that affairs of SVN must be settled by SVN people in accordance with National Liberation Front programme without any foreign interference. It seems to us that what Hanoi is seeking is prior commitment to this principle as symbolized by Viet Cong presence at negotiations and not just Viet Cong presence itself. It is thus not a question of free expression of differing views but rather of prejudging the nature of the political settlement emerging from such negotiations.

8. On preliminary analysis it could be argued that Secretary-General's proposal leans in direction of Hanoi in that it appears to ask for prior and unilateral USA concessions on two points (cessation of bombing and acceptance of Viet Cong). On other hand, Secretary-General no doubt considers, as French do, that balance of rights and wrongs in Vietnam justifies a set of proposals which looks to USA to take first and unrequited steps in unravelling course of events.

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[52] See/Voir "The President's News Conference of July 28, 1965: Why We Are in Viet-Nam," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Book II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 803.

447.
Telegram from Permanent Mission to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/17

No. 1731
New York, September 26, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, NATO Paris, Paris, Geneva (Priority); Moscow from London (Priority).
By Bag: Warsaw, Belgrade, Saigon, Prague from London.

SSEA'S TALK WITH GROMYKO

Interview between SSEA and Gromyko September 26 at USSR UNdel took place in cordial atmosphere and concentrated on Vietnam and Chinese representation issues.

2. In preliminaries SSEA referred to good atmosphere created by Polyansky visit. Gromyko agreed and expressed appreciation of USSR Government for hospitality accorded to Polyansky. Gromyko said he looked forward to SSEA's visit. SSEA expressed hope that Gromyko would visit Canada. Gromyko thanked him noncommittally and mentioned that he had visited Canada en route to New York when Gromyko's plane stopped at Gander.

3. Discussion then focussed on Vietnam situation, SSEA emphasizing that risks of Vietnam situation as it was developing was matter of main concern to Canada as to USSR and expressed hope that USSR might play similar role in respect of Vietnam as they had in India-Pakistan dispute at Tashkent. If Soviets could play such mediatory role it would have tremendous bearing on improvement in East-West relations generally.

4. Gromyko said that he knew of Canadian interest in this problem. As to Soviet position he would try to avoid repetition but stressed point that USSR could not repeat not undertake to negotiate or mediate. No repeat no one had asked them to do so nor did Gromyko see basis for such negotiation in present situation. This did not repeat not mean, however, that USSR was not repeat not willing to discuss problem with other governments.

5. There was only one way according to Gromyko that problem of Vietnam could be helped. This was "that Americans must stop their aggression". More specifically this meant that USA should stop bombing unconditionally – stop military activities – stop sending troops and state when they are going to withdraw, timing of withdrawal being matter for discussion. USA must state their position on these four points unconditionally according to Gromyko.

6. To stop bombing must be first step. Gromyko said this should be "beginning of beginning – the minimum". Gromyko alleged that USA policy was going in opposite direction. Each of measures suggested by Goldberg[53] had condition attached and Soviet conviction was that USA intended to carry on war.

7. Soviets were likewise convinced that other side was prepared to carry on war indefinitely in absence of change in USA policy.

8. SSEA pointed out that Canada had no repeat no forces in Vietnam and had no repeat no intention of sending any (fact which Gromyko applauded). Canadian position was based on participation in Commission. Canadian Government had made known more than once its wish that bombing should be stopped. Problem now was to find some way of ending war.

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[53] See/Voir Arthur J. Goldberg, "Initiative for Peace," [Statement made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly on 22 September 1966], *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 55, No. 1424 (10 October 1966), pp. 518–525; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 244 (Editorial Note).

One of most fruitful possibilities might be to seek reciprocal withdrawal from demilitarized zone in Vietnam. This required Polish cooperation as well as Indian and Canadian. Indians were disposed to cooperate. Poles presumably under obligation to consult Soviet Government and reflecting Soviet concerns about their position in Communist world were reluctant. SSEA expressed hope that Poles could be given encouragement to support active role for Commission.

9. SSEA went on to refer to Ronning mission. Two messages had been conveyed through this channel and only short time ago Canadian Government had been assured that this channel would remain open and could be used.

10. As regards Gromyko's emphasis that USA policy had to change, SSEA said it was obvious that USA could not repeat not allow itself to be humiliated by unconditional withdrawal. Some way had to be found to end fighting without humiliation of either side. Gromyko broke in to say "argument about humiliation cannot repeat not be applied to aggressors".

11. Gromyko said further that question of channels for communication was matter of secondary importance. Main question was possible basis of settlement and in this regard American proposals in his view could not repeat not be accepted by other side.

12. SSEA expressed grave concern if it turned out that there would be no basis for compromise and asked whether there was not repeat not great danger of Chinese involvement.

13. Gromyko replied that there was not repeat not only danger of Chinese involvement as result of "USA provocation". There was also real danger of Soviet involvement because USSR was giving aid to its North Vietnamese ally. If present course of events continued there was great danger of confrontation between three powers in Vietnam.

14. SSEA asked Gromyko whether he had spoken along these lines as frankly to Rusk as to himself. Gromyko said he had spoken along these lines but without avail; USA statements seemed to favour peaceful settlement but their actions were going in different direction.

15. SSEA questioned whether there had been "no repeat no change" in USA position and pointed out that Goldberg statement reflected change. Previously USA had insisted that there should be cessation of infiltration accompanying cessation of bombing. Goldberg's statement to UNGA indicated USA would stop bombing if there was some unspecific action of de-escalation on North Vietnam side.

16. SSEA then stressed importance of trying to use every possible channel in establishing contacts between both sides. He asked whether for instance good offices of those countries with special relations with mainland China might not repeat not be used such as Algeria, Cambodia and UAR. Gromyko insisted that question of primary importance was not repeat not that of channels but of USA policy. Gromyko had told Rusk that if bombing were stopped unconditionally then it might be possible to obtain some "positive" results from North Vietnam. SSEA said that he did not repeat not see possibility of having USA act unconditionally in regard to Four Points mentioned by Gromyko (paragraph 5 above).

17. SSEA pressed Gromyko to react to his suggestion that Poland might be encouraged to take more cooperative attitude to suggestion that Commission should work for reciprocal withdrawal from demilitarized zone in Vietnam. Gromyko adopted firmly negative attitude. He said that he could not repeat not speak for Vietnam and did not repeat not think that this suggestion would ease situation. He would not repeat not give undertaking to pursue it.

18. On Chinese representation, SSEA asked Gromyko whether he thought that admission of mainland China might have bearing on finding solution to Vietnam problem. Gromyko replied that it would create more favourable atmosphere generally; he was not repeat not sure what specific effect might be. SSEA asked whether Goldberg's statement might be regarded as positive move in direction of finding solution. Gromyko demurred saying it seemed to be move towards "two China" policy which would not repeat not provide basis of solution.

19. Discussion ended with understanding that it would be continued when SSEA met with Gromyko in Moscow.

448.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/17

No. 1735
New York, September 26, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
[Reference: Our Tel 1731.]
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, NATO Paris, Paris, Geneva (Priority); Moscow (Priority) from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Belgrade, Saigon, Prague from London.

SSEA'S TALK WITH GOLDBERG

Later on September 26 SSEA saw Arthur Goldberg and told him of substance of his conversation with Gromyko as reported [in] reference telegram. SSEA stressed particularly how concerned he was at emphasis Gromyko had placed on material involvement of USSR in Vietnam and of risks of three power confrontation. (See paragraph 13 reference telegram.) SSEA also told Goldberg of the emphasis which he had placed in his talk with Gromyko on importance of getting response from Hanoi to latest proposals contained in Arthur Goldberg's speech last week in plenary of UNGA.

2. In reply Goldberg said that Gromyko had not repeat not taken same line in his talks with Rusk last Saturday.[54] He had by no repeat no means excluded possibility of Soviets doing something about response from Hanoi. In fact, opposite was USA impression of what Gromyko had to say.

3. As regards Gromyko's emphasis on cessation of bombing having to be first and immediate step towards de-escalation of war, Goldberg said this was precisely what USA was prepared to do. All that they had asked in return is some reassurance that there would be some de-escalation on Hanoi's side.

4. When SSEA asked what form this de-escalation might take – would USA for instance accept mutual withdrawal from demilitarized zone as real first step in de-escalation – Goldberg answered in affirmative. As regards response from Hanoi, Goldberg said that he had just received message from Rusk that Raffaelli (Agence France correspondent in Hanoi) had filed story which seemed to suggest that proposals made by Goldberg last Thursday might be seriously considered in Hanoi.[55] This might be indirect way of letting USA know that Goldberg offer was being seriously considered.

5. SSEA said he would look into Raffaelli report immediately (Goldschlag-Ignatieff telecon refers). This may or may not repeat not be same report to which U Thant made reference in conversation with SSEA (see our telegram 1698† September 23).

6. As regards question of Chinese representation, Goldberg told SSEA that interpretation which he had given of USA position as stated by Goldberg last Thursday was correct, i.e., that there had been move in USA position. This had been approved by Washington beforehand and no repeat no firm decision he believed had yet been made on final USA

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[54] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 247.

[55] See/Voir Louis B. Fleming, "Hanoi Press Report Stirs Faint Peace Hope," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 September 1966, p. 12.

position to be taken on Chinese representation at current session of UNGA. SSEA mentioned to Goldberg what Gromyko had said about settlement of this question being one of factors that could improve climate leading to solution of Vietnam problem and Goldberg agreed.

[George] Ignatieff

449.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/17

No. 1760
New York, September 27, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, NATO Paris, Paris, Geneva (Priority); Warsaw, Moscow (Priority) from London.
By Bag: Belgrade, Saigon, Prague from London.

SSEA'S TALK WITH RAPACKI

SSEA's discussion with Foreign Minister Rapacki of Poland this morning concerned Vietnam almost exclusively. Mr. Martin said he was very concerned about seriousness of situation and that he was certain there was a role for ICSC. He said that for instance if an appeal for cessation of bombing were made by three countries on Commission it would be difficult for USA to ignore it. He said that Indians seemed ready to do something along this line and that if something were not repeat not done soon further expansion of war was likely. Mr. Martin added that from his conversation with Gromyko it appeared that USSR position was that bombing must first be stopped, whereas proposals made by Goldberg, although an advance on USA's previous position, assumed some response from other side. In this context and with danger of further expansion it was important for us to try to do something.

2. Rapacki said that Poland had tried at various times to use its influence with North Vietnam but that this had been much more complicated when air attacks on DRVN had transformed problem. He said that there was a sort of mechanical determinism in process of escalation which was not repeat not a policy at all but a process which proceeded with its own inexorable momentum. In this situation problem was to find something that would lead to negotiations. Mr. Martin had said that he was sure USA wanted a peaceful solution and he (Rapacki) was equally sure that DRVN wanted a peaceful solution whereas on other hand he felt there was ground for some doubts as to whether USA did so. It was fair to ask what were risks of a cessation of bombing in comparison with risk of continuing mechanism of escalation. Rapacki said that in January Harriman had told him that USA was looking for just one signal that there would be a response to a pause in bombing.[56] Rapacki insisted that there had been some indication of a response just two days before bombing was resumed. At that time even an extension of pause might have sufficed. Now, however, situation was different. After all Poland had done in January to urge a response in Hanoi, it was even more difficult now to urge a response until bombing had ceased. SSEA asked Rapacki whether he could spell out what sort of response there might be from Hanoi to a cessation of bombing by USA.

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[56] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), document 266.

Rapacki replied that first it would be a clear demonstration by USA of a willingness to restore peace to Vietnam and secondly that even if it did not repeat not lead immediately to negotiation, it would improve prospects for return to Geneva.

3. SSEA said that he was sure USA would not repeat not retreat or withdraw without some indication of reciprocal action and commented that U Thant also had no repeat no doubt that USA wanted to negotiate a solution. Rapacki replied that he found it difficult to believe that public opinion in USA would sustain government indefinitely in its present course and repeated his lack of certainty about USA intentions. He had seen Rusk and had found him very firm. Mr. Martin suggested that he should also speak to Goldberg who had confidence of President. Rapacki agreed and said that he intended to see him. He thought USA elections in November would probably not repeat not affect situation but referred to a "new element" in situation. By this he said he meant that he was sure that if bombing were stopped unconditionally there would be a reciprocal response from other side but that bombing would have to be stopped first. This latter point was afterwards confirmed by Winiewicz, Vice Foreign Minister, who was also present.

[George] Ignatieff

450.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/17

No. 1761
New York, September 27, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, NATO Paris, Paris, Geneva (Priority); Moscow, Delhi (Priority) from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Belgrade, Saigon, Prague from London.

SSEA'S TALK WITH SWARAN SINGH

SSEA had a discussion with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh of India yesterday afternoon immediately after latter's speech in debate on South West Africa. Singh referred to this as a most difficult problem and added that only solution was for UN to revoke mandate and establish direct control of territory. He had no repeat no suggestion as to how this could be implemented, however, except to say that it was up to Security Council to decide on implementation.

2. Referring to election in India next February, he explained that this had prevented Mrs. Gandhi from attending Prime Ministers' Conference because of immediate problem of choosing candidates for the more than 3,500 seats in all legislatures throughout country. As to his own part in this, Singh said he thought it was time he had a long rest but that it did not repeat not seem to be a good time to retire. Singh also said that at Prime Ministers' Conference, Pearson had saved Commonwealth from a split on racial lines from which it might not repeat not have recovered but he felt sure that crisis in Commonwealth was over and that it would survive present shocks over Rhodesia.

3. Mr. Martin said that our main concern now was Vietnam and that concern was increasing with increasing involvement of three great powers. He told Singh about his conversation with Gromyko and latter's reaction to suggestion that USSR might urge Hanoi to respond to Goldberg's proposals last Thursday. He asked Singh if he thought there was any possibility

of Poland cooperating in bringing about a withdrawal of both sides from DZ. Singh agreed with seriousness of possibility of escalation which he agreed was leading toward major confrontation and that India had put forward proposals in this connection at risk of being misunderstood. Problem was how to achieve negotiations. Singh said there was no repeat no possibility of this while bombing continued and cessation of bombing must therefore be a first step.

4. SSEA said that he was sure USA would not repeat not be willing simply to withdraw and would not repeat not be humiliated. He was also sure that there could be no repeat no cessation without some assurance of reciprocal step on other side. He was also sure that USSR would do nothing to persuade Hanoi to respond favourably to USA proposals until bombing had ceased. Singh said that Kosygin had made this clear to India on grounds that they could not repeat not urge a fellow Communist state to negotiate while under attack. He did not repeat not think Hanoi would make any real response until bombing had ceased and therefore reiterated again need for a cessation as a first step. He added that if Americans were to cease bombing unconditionally they would be in a position to resume bombing if no repeat no reciprocal step were taken. On other hand, he was sure that if USA crossed DZ, a direct confrontation would result leading to a world war.

5. Singh told SSEA that India had sent one of its senior ambassadors as Consul General in Hanoi a few months ago and that he was in close touch with government there. Their conclusions from his contacts were also that Hanoi would do nothing leading to negotiation until bombing had stopped and that he had come to conclusion that only corollary to this was that there was a "reasonable chance" of negotiations if bombing were to cease. He mentioned that he had arranged to see Secretary of State Rusk on October 5 and he would put this position to Rusk, adding that he was convinced USA wanted to stop war and that, having demonstrated its strength and ability to act, was in a position to stop bombing unconditionally, retaining a free hand to resume if there was no repeat no adequate response. Mr. Martin told Swaran Singh of Agence France-Presse despatch to which Goldberg had referred (our telegram 1735 September 26) and that Goldberg had attached considerable importance to it.

6. In conclusion, Mr. Martin said he hoped that Swaran Singh would be able to visit Ottawa soon but it was clear that there would be no repeat no possibility of this in immediate future and it was left to Indians to take any further initiative on this point.

[George] Ignatieff

451.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. 1662
Moscow, September 29, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Repeat for Information: London; Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Candel New York from London.
By Bag: Delhi, Saigon, Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw from London; Tokyo from Ottawa.

VIETNAM – TALK WITH PODGORNY

During my talk with President last night, subject of Vietnam was raised by him. Although we had been discussing Canadian-Soviet relations he was apparently anxious to say a few words about dangers of situation in Vietnam and in fact conversation on this subject lasted 40 minutes.

2. Podgorny said Vietnam was a worrisome, worse a dangerous, situation and it was necessary for America's allies to do something to prevent it becoming more serious. He gave usual picture of impermissibility of a great power intruding on affairs of a small Asian country, and of bombarding territory of North Vietnam. This had to end before something much worse happened. Canadian position in world affairs was an important one and we were much respected. Was it not repeat not possible for Canada to try to get Americans to stop war in Vietnam? He recognized that Canada supported USA position but not repeat not in all respects.

3. I said Canada supported general American aims in Vietnam but we did not repeat not believe a solution could be found on a military basis, and we had on several occasions expressed opinion that bombardment of NVN should be suspended. We had been as assiduous as any country in trying to find a peaceful solution to Vietnam problem but we did not repeat not believe any useful purpose was served in simply demanding that USA leave Vietnam. It was obvious that they would not repeat not do so, and nobody could now push them out militarily if they chose to stay.

4. I said we were in constant touch with Washington on this problem as well as other interested countries, but our influence with Americans could decrease if we attempted to persuade them to do things which were clearly impossible for them. I said, for example, that President de Gaulle had wasted a great opportunity of seeking a compromise in Vietnam by needlessly alienating American opinion. There had to be a compromise but it was very difficult for Canadian statesmen to work away at the problem without any hint of response from other side. If we extracted concessions from Americans, would Soviet Government for its part be prepared to seek concessions from its allies?

5. Podgorny said he presumed I meant DRVN but it was not repeat not "honourable or decent" for them to seek to impose a settlement on Vietnam. DRVN was subjected to an unreasonable and illegal attack and all USSR could do was support it in whatever course it wished to follow.

6. In any event, President went on, they could hardly be expected to urge a negotiated settlement on DRVN when they did not repeat not believe in sincerity of USA intentions. I said I thought he was wrong and that Americans did wish for a peaceful solution. We had therefore been disappointed that proposals made by Ambassador Goldberg in UNGA had been rejected out of hand. Podgorny said this was a clever propaganda move in UN to forestall condemnation of USA policies and was hardly to be considered a serious move.

7. In any case, President continued, he had not repeat not been referring to seriousness of USA willingness to negotiate. He was quite sure they would like to do this. What they were not repeat not convinced of was USA protestations that they wished to withdraw. Canadians had frequently referred to need to avoid a humiliation of USA. First, he said, USA was too big to need to worry about humiliation. But, second, and more important, what kind of settlement did I think could take place in Vietnam which would permit Americans to withdraw without humiliation?

8. I said to give a correct picture I would have to go back to origins of the conflict, and to NVN interference from very beginning with peaceful evolution of a political entity in SVN. Americans would be prepared to withdraw if NVN interference stopped and South was given opportunity to create a viable society.

9. That, Podgorny said, is where problem arises. We all know that that cannot repeat not be done, and it is difficult to convince me Americans do not repeat not know it also. So what it amounts to is you want us to convince the SVN to give up fight, because they are still doing bulk of it in spite of what USA says about DRVN forces in the South, give up their legitimate aspirations, give up all their sacrifices in order that Government of SVN can consolidate its position and Americans complete their network of bases.

10. I replied that it would not repeat not do any harm to test American intentions. Why not repeat not try out Goldberg proposals and see if there is not repeat not some basis for progress. If it proves futile then NVN can continue the fight. If it might seem risky, so was alternative. He replied that he did not repeat not see why Americans could not repeat not equally take "risk" of stopping bombing as a first step on road to peace. I said I was sure they would if NVN would give slightest hint somehow that North would also take a small step forward.

11. He did not repeat not respond to this but urged Canada to do something about bombing. Then he referred suddenly to Ronning missions. He said first mission was clearly a Canadian mission but second one was a Canadian-USA mission since he brought a message from President Johnson. What were they to think of that?

12. I said there was not repeat not much point in Ronning missions unless it were used as a channel for peace and this meant transmitting USA messages to Hanoi and NVN messages to Washington. In any case, as I understood it, DRVN was quite satisfied with our role in this and prepared to keep channel open.

13. I said he had referred on several occasions to dangerous situation caused by Vietnam War, and it seemed to me this had been made even more dangerous by recent development in China. He immediately agreed that nature of developments in China was obscure and added to danger of situation in Southeast Asia, but he would make no repeat no comments on China itself.

14. Concluding this part of our conversation, Podgorny said it indicated that there were many differences in our approach to this problem. He hoped that, if he came to Canada next year, question would have been resolved but he would consider it essential to talk over such burning questions with Prime Minister and other Canadian leaders. He recognized our sincerity. He would like to see us take a more independent line with USA than we had. De Gaulle had shown the way.

15. I said I thought our record of independent thought and action was pretty good; we possibly could see a little more objectively than either USSR or USA because of our role in ICSC.

16. Podgorny agreed but concluded by saying that there was one thing absolutely certain and that was that Americans would leave Vietnam. Only thing to be decided was whether it could be done reasonably or whether it would be accomplished with great damage to their prestige in the world, and possibly at risk of many other of their foreign policy objectives.

17. I put in last remark to effect that we therefore seemed to agree Americans would withdraw from Vietnam. It was up to all of us to make sure that it was done in such a way that peace of world was not repeat not disturbed, and this required compromise on both sides.

[R.A.D.] Ford

452.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. 1700
Moscow, October 5, 1966
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority from London.
Repeat for Information: London; NATO Paris, Paris, Rome, Bonn, Washington, Permis New York from London.
By Bag: Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw, Saigon, Delhi, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa.

SCHLESINGER'S ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM PROBLEM

Presumably Schlesinger's brilliant and lucid analysis (as published in *New York Times* October 1)[57] will become an important document in discussion of Vietnam problem.[58] I thought therefore I might comment on two aspects which he only just touched on but which, viewed from Moscow, are of vital importance.

2. Schlesinger makes it clear that USA administration's motivation in Vietnam policy is a conviction that China is the enemy and that a line must be drawn to contain it. Fact that line is drawn through Vietnam and is difficult to hold is irrelevant. Schlesinger has not repeat not, however, fully gone into implications. Russians for one, however, will certainly have done so.

3. If containment of China now clearly supplants other USA aims in Vietnam then it becomes even more difficult for Russians, as well as Chinese and North Vietnamese themselves, to believe USA proclamation of intention to withdraw eventually militarily from SVN. Russians at any rate are convinced no repeat no SVN regime can survive without direct USA support (see our telegram 1662 September 29 describing Podgorny's views on this subject). It must be even more difficult for them to accept in view of USA military build-up in Thailand about which there has been a good deal of nervous speculation recently in Soviet press; and of USA effort to build up an Asian-USA string of bases around China as evident in Manila Conference, which Soviet papers have condemned for this reason.

4. Thus Communists, and for once this would lump together Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Russians, must be reinforced in their suspicion of USA intentions because usual contradiction between USA statement of political aims and actual action no repeat no longer applies. In other words, for Communists, main USA aim is clear, establishment of a military foot-hold in Asia for purpose of containing China. Therefore to them proclamations of intent to withdraw eventually from Vietnam would be considered by Communists solely as camouflage for real aims.

5. Some time ago (our telegram 197† February 7) I said I thought USA estimate of China as a country poised for territorial expansion was all wrong. Analogy with comparable period in Soviet history seemed to indicate that Chinese belligerency was outcome of serious internal problems. Intervening events tend to reinforce that view. And, in any case, as Polyansky said to me last summer, if China has territorial ambitions they lie to the north, not repeat not to the south, although Chinese hope to re-establish zone of influence in Southeast Asia is another matter.

6. Assuming a threat to Southeast Asia from China, either from territorial expansion or through political domination, means chosen by USA to combat it seem erroneous. First and most obvious criticism is that it is a mistake to risk a land war in Asia with China, on the worst possible terrain, and surrounded by an indifferent, if not repeat not hostile population. And if threat is primarily spread of Chinese influence then obviously military methods are not repeat not best weapon to adopt.

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[57] See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Schlesinger Suggests That We Recover Our Cool and Follow a Middle Way Out of Vietnam," *New York Times*, 18 September 1966. This article was reprinted in the *New York Times*' European edition on 1–2 October 1966.
Voir Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., « Schlesinger Suggests That We Recover Our Cool and Follow a Middle Way Out of Vietnam », *New York Times*, 18 septembre 1966. Cet article a été repris dans l'édition européenne du *New York Times*, les 1er et 2 octobre 1966.

[58] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I agree – it is very good. [L.B. Pearson]

7. Nevertheless, if China is indeed a serious threat then surely every effort should be expended (a) to exploit to the full Sino-Soviet split and to accentuate common American-Russian interest in face of a strange Oriental menace; and (b) to work towards formation of a community of interest with those Asian countries which are capable of resisting expansion of Chinese influence – Japan, India, Pakistan.

8. Present USA policy in Vietnam is predicated, on the contrary, on a military cum political effort in Vietnam which increasingly alienates strongest Asian countries and assumes nature of an American war in Asia. As regards failure to exploit Sino-Soviet split I have already written exhaustively on this subject. In retrospect, however, it is frightening to think what might have happened (and possibly still could) if Chinese had accepted Soviet overtures and agreed to restore unity of action with Moscow to combat "American aggression" in Vietnam.

9. If my analysis of manner in which Russians, Chinese and North Vietnamese, in spite of their differences, view USA intentions in Southeast Asia is correct, conclusion logically is that Communists have decided USA is building military network against China, that this is principal reason for intervention in SVN (and Thailand) and that aim of negotiations on part of USA would be to consolidate their position on mainland at reduced cost in lives, money and political prestige.

10. In this case, unless Americans can convince Russians, Chinese and North Vietnamese that they have different and limited aims, no repeat no alternative would appear for Americans except to continue and possibly step up war effort. And even if Americans could convince Russians and North Vietnamese that they did not repeat not intend to maintain large permanent military presence on Asian mainland, there would still remain problem of convincing Chinese. Once again in this context necessity arises of Americans being able to exploit Sino-Soviet split by having a plausible set of war aims to present to Russians.

11. In spite of this depressing conclusion I see one glimmer of hope, but that depends largely on ability of Americans to establish some kind of communications with Russians.

12. I think it is clear that Russians would not repeat not be unhappy to see Chinese prevented from extending their influence and prestige into Southeast Asia. Determined Soviet efforts to maintain and increase their own influence in Hanoi demonstrates this. Therefore there is a certain community of interest between Soviet [Union] and USA in containing China. But Russians are immobilised on this score so long as (a) there is an ideological tie between Moscow and Peking; and (b) USA attacks its ally NVN.

13. In last few weeks tone of Soviet comment on developments in China indicates new theme of denunciation of CPC for following an anti-Soviet, anti-proletarian, and most important, anti-Marxist line. If this continues, and I believe it will, and proves popular with other Communist parties and governments, then ideological basis for Soviet need to compete with China in its tough line over Vietnam will disappear. From what I have seen, other Communist governments, and presumably many of the CPs as well, would welcome some means of disengagement from Vietnam, and a return to policy of détente with USA, if this could be done without too great loss of prestige for world Communist movement.

14. Therefore if Americans were able to convince Russians that they were serious in their wish to withdraw eventually from Vietnam,[59] and their ability to do so, it might be possible to make progress with North Vietnamese, whether or not repeat not Chinese continued to reject totally any idea of a negotiated settlement.

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[59] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This is the crucial point. [L.B. Pearson]

15. To convince Russians then becomes hub of matter, and Schlesinger's suggestion of de-escalation becomes important, provided it included cessation of bombing of NVN. I do not repeat not see how process of convincing Russians and North Vietnamese of genuineness of USA intentions can get started, or any reasonable Soviet-USA dialogue take place, unless this first step is taken.

16. I think points I have raised in this message are going to be crucial in coming months. Grateful for your views.[60]

[R.A.D.] Ford

453.
Summary Record of Discussions at the Fourth Canada-Japan Ministerial Meeting, October 5–6, 1966
Compte rendu des discussions de la quatrième réunion ministérielle Canada-Japon, 5 et 6 octobre 1966
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

Confidential.
[Ottawa, n.d.]

Item 1: International Situation in General

Mr. Martin began the discussion by reviewing current preoccupations among which the conflict in *Vietnam*, he said, stood out as one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the post-war years. The dangers there are two-fold; first, in a situation which has directly engaged the interests of three of the world's great and powerful nations, and in which very large commitments of military power have been made, there is obviously a risk of major confrontation which, once it occurred, would be difficult to contain. The longer the hostilities continue, the greater the risks of a major confrontation become. U.S. Secretary of State Rusk had made it clear to Mr. Martin that this danger was very much on the minds of members of the American Government. In view of this danger, and because a military solution of Vietnam's problems is not possible, Canada has sought to open up other perspectives which might yield a stable settlement through negotiations.

The second danger, an equally important one, is the problem of providing an adequate and secure basis on which newer nations can build a stable political and economic future for themselves in accordance with their own wishes and not the wishes of others imposed upon them. This concept has been challenged in Vietnam. Mr. Martin noted that there are differences of opinion on whether the means being used to meet that challenge will be fully effective in doing so. The fact remains, he said, that the basic principles at stake have far-reaching implications for the future prospects of stability and peace in Southeast Asia and beyond.

Canada's awareness of these problems is related to its membership on the International Commission in Vietnam. Mr. Martin said that it was a matter of regret to the Canadian Government that the settlement worked out in Geneva in 1954 and 1962 has not proved durable and that the cease-fire which the International Commission was established to supervise has given way to open and seriously developing hostilities. Like Japan, Canada has tried to find a way out of this impasse. Canada has sought and will continue to seek to turn the responsibilities of our Commission membership into opportunities for constructive action. Last January, with the strong approbation of the United States, the South Vietnamese,

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[60] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This is an excellent analysis and it might be a good thing to show it confidentially to a few Americans. [L.B. Pearson]

and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Canadian Government sought to establish a role for the International Commission as a means of ultimately bringing about the holding of a conference. Canada has been able to persuade the Government of India that the International Commission could play such a role, but has not been able to persuade Poland. It is regrettable that the Poles expressed the hope that Canada would not persist in this plan; they said that this might raise difficulties later with respect to any agreement on a role for the International Commission in any settlement.

Mr. Martin said that Canada's established contacts in the two Vietnamese capitals may prove useful as a means of communication. The Canadian Government has had direct contacts with Hanoi through the Ronning missions. He stated that although it was not possible to discuss Mr. Ronning's visits in detail, it could be said that the channel he opened remained open, and that the Canadian Government had confirmation that the North Vietnamese wanted it kept open. The Canadian Government, Mr. Martin said, was prepared to continue using this channel or to use the channel of the International Commission itself. Mr. Martin noted that the United States have invited countries to use any channel they can to bring about talks to see if a negotiated settlement can be reached. He further noted that the Canadian Government had not deemed it desirable to engage in open criticism of the United States even though certain aspects of American policy have caused Canada difficulty.

[…]

454.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 8599, 20-1-1-12/3

No. 3048
Washington, October 7, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 2957† Sep 30.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Candel New York, Rome; CFHQ, Delhi, Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, Wellington, Canberra from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi; Moscow from London.[61]
By Bag: Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Hong Kong, Jakarta from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: MANILA MEETING AND CANADIAN POLICY

Chester Cooper, who as Special Assistant to Harriman is playing important role in USA preparations for Manila meeting, developed further for us yesterday USA views on conference as outlined by Bundy in reference telegram. Cooper confirmed that agenda of conference would consist of military review, problems of pacification and "revolutionary development", SVN economic stabilisation and political evolution, and prospects for peaceful settlement.

2. Cooper said that military review was unavoidable but that discussion at meeting would be 80 percent on non-military topics; and USA hope was that major attention could be devoted to peaceful settlement item. President would also emphasize theme of peace during his speeches in area.

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[61] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
[Copy] from London to Manila. Done. Oct. 21/66. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

3. Cooper said that it would be unrealistic to expect this particular meeting to come up with bold new ideas for peace initiatives. Governments such as those of Korea, Thailand, and SVN in particular had hitherto not repeat not gone nearly as far as USA in expressing interest in various negotiation proposals (New Zealand has similar impression about attitude of Koreans etc., as indicated in paragraph 5 Wellington telegram 445† October 7). USA objective would be to try to secure support of participants for a formulation of peace aims which would represent an advance on SVN Four Points (Tran Van Do's statement of June 22/65[62]), and which would go as far as possible towards basic USA position as expounded in recent Goldberg statement, although probably in different words. However, it was unlikely that more conservative participants would be willing at this stage to subscribe fully to all elements in Goldberg presentation (cf. Bundy's reference to sensitivity of Liberation Front issue for SVN Government). In any case it was exceedingly difficult for genuinely new attitudes to be developed in a major multilateral conference of this kind, which will be covered by some 500 correspondents.

4. Cooper thought therefore that only significant departures from or advances on Goldberg statement might be concerned with postwar era – e.g., proposals for regional economic cooperation, Mekong development etc., which would be relatively uncontroversial. He indicated incidentally that British Foreign Secretary statement yesterday[63] suggesting Geneva Conference with full seating of VC was not repeat not considered particularly helpful here; as Cooper put it, "we knew he had to make it but…".

5. Cooper's and Bundy's comments on nature of USA objectives at Manila are in line with President's public statement on meeting at his press conference yesterday.[64] Because of pre-electoral period in USA and present state of political uncertainty in SVN as Constituent Assembly finds its feet, it is our impression that our USA informants are honest in saying that Manila meeting is not repeat not expected to break new ground. At same time, USA seems anxious to do all in its power to avoid impression that meeting is merely a "war council" or public relations stunt.

6. In this situation you will doubtless be considering whether there are any discreet initiatives that Canada might take to help ensure that Manila meeting is not repeat not a cause of increased tension in area, but instead contributes to prospects for peace.

7. It seems to us that most useful thing that Canada might do in short time remaining before Manila meeting (October 24-25) would be to ensure that all governments participating in Manila meeting, and not repeat not merely those of USA, Australia and New Zealand with which we are in constant touch, have a very clear idea of basic elements in Canadian position on Vietnam as expounded in various statements by Prime Minister and SSEA over past few months. We could for example explain Canadian view that purely military solution of Vietnam struggle is not repeat not possible, outline various ways in which Canada has endeavoured to facilitate a settlement (e.g., Ronning) and remind governments of our suggestion that ICC may at some stage be a useful tool in helping to restore peace in Vietnam. We might re-affirm our readiness to play our part in appropriate peacekeeping operations. Other themes would no repeat no doubt suggest themselves to you. Canadian views could be presented quietly and in low key, with explanation that we thought government in question might find an exchange of views of some use during period in which government was reviewing prospects in preparation for discussion at Manila Conference. Main recipients of Canadian views would presumably be Koreans, Thais and Filipinos, although similar

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62 See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 883.

63 See/Voir Alan Harvey, "Brown Urges Vietnam Peace Talks," *New York Times*, 7 October 1966, p. 10.

64 See/Voir "The President's News Conference of October 6, 1966," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966*, Book II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 1117–1124.

statements could be provided to other participants (SVN, USA, Australia, New Zealand) which are already familiar with Canadian position, so that we could indicate that we were speaking to all participating governments in similar vein.

8. It might also be desirable to remind governments of our growing non-military aid to SVN and our early and continuing interest in assisting with regional development programs in area, e.g., Mekong. In this context, however, if our comments are to have much influence we might have to do some urgent rethinking on subject of our apparent reluctance to play significant role in next stage of Mekong scheme, i.e., projects in Cambodia.

9. In advancing these very tentative ideas for a closer Canadian dialogue with Asians and others on Vietnam, I should make it clear that we have had no repeat no particular hint from American sources that they would like us to do so. On other hand, I can see no repeat no reason why they should not repeat not welcome such Canadian approaches which we would of course discuss with them in advance in view of their own objectives for Manila Conference.

[A.]E. Ritchie

455.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. Y-700
Ottawa, October 11, 1966
Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Moscow, Delhi, Saigon, CANFORCEHED, Geneva (Priority).
By Bag: Warsaw, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

MINISTER'S TALK WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL, OCTOBER 7

Vietnam

Minister recalled that there had been a number of South Vietnamese complaints to ICC about use of demilitarized zone for infiltration by armed elements of North Vietnamese forces. These complaints culminated in advice to Commission on July 21 that substantial engagement with infiltrated forces had taken place south of seventeenth parallel. This advice was coupled with request to Commission to take adequate measures to end infiltration by extending controls undertaken by Commission to western part of DZ. So South Vietnamese subsequently offered to produce North Vietnamese prisoners to substantiate their complaints and undertook to provide Commission with necessary logistic support to facilitate its controls.

2. Bombing of DZ had commenced on July 30 and had continued intermittently since then until it was suspended on September 27 over portion of eastern sector of DZ.

3. Minister said that extension of major hostilities to DZ had been of concern to both Canada and India in part because zone embodied important concept of disengagement which had resulted from Geneva Agreement. It had been our concern to return to *status quo ante* in DZ and, if this were successful, to move beyond this first step to see whether area of disengagement could be extended by using Commission as umbrella for future action. Accordingly we had pressed for investigation of both bombing and infiltration of DZ and institution of more effective controls in future in such a way as to afford credible guarantees to each side that zone was not repeat not being used to detriment of the other.

4. It now appeared that we were unlikely to be successful in these efforts. Initial Indian enthusiasm for action had cooled, presumably because Indians had come to appreciate that any such action would be regarded with disfavour in Hanoi. Poles, for their part, had made it clear to us that if we persisted in pressing for any meaningful disengagement in DZ, this could have results which would be detrimental to our efforts to map out a future role for ICC. We assumed that Polish representations to us reflected unwillingness in Hanoi to contemplate any arrangement at this time which involved reciprocal action on their part.

5. In reply to Secretary-General's question as to whether Commission disposed of adequate manpower and logistic support for effective control of DZ, Minister said that manpower would not repeat not be a problem and that we had been offered necessary logistic support by USA and South Vietnam.

6. In concluding this part of discussion Minister said that publicity which had attended limited suspension of USA bombing over portion of eastern sector of DZ had not been helpful. For his own part he proposed to confine himself to language used in ICC statement[65] (Saigon telegram 887† October 6) which he read to Secretary-General.

7. Secretary-General then told Minister that there was no substance to recent reports about fresh efforts on his part to bring about conditions for a Vietnam settlement. However, some two weeks ago Cambodian representative had come to see him on behalf of Sihanouk to seek his reaction to following line of action: Cambodian delegation was thinking, at end of general debate, of making a statement comprising two elements. First it would endorse Secretary-General's three-point proposal. Second, it would subscribe to objectives advanced in Sihanouk-de Gaulle communiqué,[66] i.e., withdrawal of USA forces according to specified timetable and eventual neutralization of Indochinese states. Cambodian representative said he thought they could count on support from 20 to 25 delegations for such a statement.

8. Secretary-General told Cambodian representative that, while he could not be formally involved in drafting process, he was prepared to comment privately on any text shown to him on understanding there would be no reference to his having been consulted. Secretary-General also suggested it would be useful if Sihanouk could get green light for proposed statement from Hanoi and, if possible, also from NLF. Finally, Secretary-General warned that, if such a statement were made, it could be expected to generate further debate.

9. Cambodian representative had returned September 28 with a text which had apparently been discussed so far only with Algerians. After reading text Secretary-General had asked that all references to himself be deleted. Specifically, he had suggested that his three points should not be described as Secretary-General's proposal and that statement should not include any request to him to continue to serve cause of peace as this was not really relevant to essential purpose of such a statement. Secretary-General had also warned that any reference to Gen. de Gaulle's proposition was bound to be controversial and that, in any case, de Gaulle was concerned with ultimate objectives whereas Secretary-General's own concern was to create congenial climate for negotiations. Cambodian representative undertook to convey these comments to Sihanouk.

10. Meanwhile, Gromyko had seen Secretary-General on September 30 and again on October 3. He had said he understood that Cambodians were discussing their proposal with Eastern Europeans, that he was not very happy about it and that Hanoi was unlikely ever to agree to statement on these lines. Czech Foreign Minister had also told him that, to be acceptable to Hanoi, any such statement would have to condemn USA aggression.

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[65] See/Voir Ward Just, "ICC Calls DMZ Probe Impossible," *Washington Post*, 8 October 1966, p. A1.

[66] See/Voir "The French-Cambodian Communiqué," *New York Times*, 3 September 1966, p. 2.

11. Secretary-General then reviewed some of his more recent contacts with Hanoi. He said he had seen Mai Van Bo, North Vietnamese representative in Paris, in July/65, shortly before Stevenson's death. He had asked Mai Van Bo at that time whether Hanoi insisted on USA withdrawal prior to any negotiation. Reply had been in negative. All that was required, according to Mai Van Bo, was a binding assurance that USA would, in fact, withdraw their troops at given stage. If USA stopped bombing and landing reinforcements in South, this would be adequate in clearing way to negotiating table. This info had been conveyed to Stevenson in Geneva.

12. Secretary-General commented parenthetically that it was unrealistic of USA to demand reciprocity for cessation of bombing. Even if such reciprocity were offered, it would be virtually impossible to check on any let-up in infiltration from North. Secretary-General also thought that USA announcement of reinforcements being landed while bombing pause was in progress last January was bound to call into question, at least as far as Hanoi was concerned, seriousness of intent behind whole peace offensive. (Secretary-General seemed to think it should be possible to land USA troops in SVN without fanfare of publicity.)

13. Secretary-General then turned to proposals he had formulated on August 12 of last year and which had been conveyed to main parties.[67] Peking had refused to accept his communication on grounds that they were not authorized to receive anything coming from Secretary-General. Hanoi, after initially accepting it, had returned communication five days later with seal still intact. Secretary-General declined to speculate whether this meant that his proposals had remained unread.

14. Last contact Secretary-General had had with Hanoi representatives was in Moscow in July of this year. He said he had written to Ho Chi Minh in advance saying he was going to be in Moscow and would appreciate it if North Vietnamese Ambassador there could be instructed to receive him. Secretary-General appears also to have asked Ho whether there was anything he might want him to convey to USA. Ho's reply had been friendly. He had encouraged Secretary-General to pursue his good offices and had said he would be glad to instruct his Ambassador to see him.

15. Secretary-General did not elaborate on results of his conversation with North Vietnamese Ambassador. He reported, however, on curious exchange he had had with North Vietnamese on use of interpreter for interview. North Vietnamese had apparently told him it would not be necessary to bring French interpreter from New York since Soviet Foreign Ministry was being asked to provide services of an interpreter. When Secretary-General arrived in Moscow, North Vietnamese Ambassador had let it be known that interpreter would be provided by Embassy. This evidently caused considerable concern in Soviet Foreign Ministry who were probably worried that Embassy interpreter might be someone oriented towards Chinese point of view.

16. Secretary-General told Minister that Hanoi had just reacted to his three-point proposal through columns of *Nhan Dan*.[68] Reaction had amounted to polite rejection of his second point (i.e., scaling down of all military activities in SVN as means of bringing about a ceasefire) on grounds that it failed to distinguish between aggressor and those fighting aggression to preserve their independence. Secretary-General interpreted article as indicating that Hanoi could accept his first and third points. Secretary-General conceded that his first point (i.e., cessation of bombing) was addressed unilaterally to USA; he argued, however, that his third point (i.e., willingness of all concerned to enter into discussion with "those who are actually fighting") was equitable since it envisaged presence not only of NLF but also of Saigon Government at negotiating table. He said he had made this clear to Hanoi.

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[67] See/Voir docs 307, 311, 314.

[68] See/Voir Drew Middleton, "Hanoi Bars Part of Thant's Plan," *New York Times*, 11 October 1966, p. 1.

17. Secretary-General told Minister that he had disclosed much of this background to President Johnson when he saw him earlier that afternoon. He had also asked President whether he seriously thought Hanoi could be asked to come to conference table in face of manifest Chinese opposition. Secretary-General argued this could have been achieved two years ago (i.e., at time of his own major initiative) but that Chinese influence in Hanoi had increased substantially since then. As regards evolution of situation, Secretary-General thought Russians would have to make up their minds soon whether to break with Chinese or not, and that indications seemed to suggest they would.

18. Minister asked Secretary-General whether he had given any thought to visiting Hanoi. Secretary-General replied in negative saying that, while Ho Chi Minh had never criticized him, he could scarcely afford to receive him in face of Chinese strictures.

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456.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in United Kingdom
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. Y-701
Ottawa, October 11, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Candel New York, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Moscow, Delhi, CANFORCEHED, Geneva (Priority); Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Hong Kong from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

MINISTER'S TALK WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY OCTOBER 8: VIETNAM

Following is summary of Minister's conversation with British Foreign Secretary in New York October 8:

2. Minister reviewed Canadian efforts to create conditions in which it might be practicable to bring Vietnam conflict to negotiating table. Minister recalled that, last December, he had envisaged Commission serving as catalyst in getting talks between parties underway. This had been discussed with both Rusk and Stewart.[69] USA bombing pause and accompanying peace offensive had intervened and this had been followed by USA putting Vietnam issue to Security Council. Secretary-General had regarded this as unwise move. He was personally convinced that Geneva framework was only avenue for making progress towards Vietnam settlement. Accordingly, he had endorsed our idea of bringing Commission into play as channel for probing positions of two sides and seeing whether there was any way of bridging gap.

3. Indian reaction had been tepid but we had impression that they could be brought round if Poles were prepared to go along. Poles, while not repeat not rejecting idea of a Commission role as such, did not repeat not believe time was ripe for such a move. This had been substance of Rapacki's reply to Minister's message.

4. We had concluded at time that Polish position was unlikely to change in absence of Soviet acquiescence. Accordingly, we had discussed our thinking with Soviet Ambassador in Ottawa; message setting out our objective had also been sent to Gromyko. We had made it clear to Russians throughout that we were not repeat not intending to call for convening of conference, that we were fully aware of embarrassment this would cause them in present

[69] See/Voir docs 334, 337.

circumstances, and that our main object was to bring about situation in which parties themselves could be brought into unobtrusive contact. Minister said this approach had paid off; when Polyansky visited Canada this summer, he had told Minister our position had been noted and that he had been asked to explore further our thinking as regards future role for Commission.

5. Brown asked Minister whether he was saying that one might be doing harm by pushing USSR at this time. Minister replied in negative. He thought that, as one of Co-Chairmen, British were entirely within their rights in pursuing idea of new Geneva Conference. For our part, we would of course welcome reconvening of conference if this could be brought about. All we were saying was that it did not repeat not seem realistic to expect this to happen in present circumstances. We had taken same position in commenting on Mrs. Gandhi's proposals this summer.

6. Minister also told British Foreign Secretary about our current efforts to bring about some measure of disengagement in demilitarized zone. In this we had run into strong Polish opposition to point where Rapacki had warned us that, if we persisted in pressing our efforts, this might well prejudice future role we were trying to map out for Commission. It was our judgment that Poles were taking position they did because they could not repeat not be associated with anything which was putting pressure on Hanoi.

7. All in all, therefore, there was very little progress discernible in any direction. Secretary-General had just informed Minister that he had formulated no repeat no fresh initiative beyond three-point proposal which, as far as he was concerned, still remained on table.

8. As regards significance of USA Congressional elections, Brown said it had been made clear to Wilson when he visited Moscow in January that USSR looked to forthcoming elections to complete President's isolation. They had argued that USA was already isolated internationally and that elections would confirm President's isolation nationally. Russians obviously expected that this would lead to greater willingness on USA side to make concessions.

9. Brown wondered whether, if forecasts of outcome of elections were accurate, President might not repeat not decide on some change in USA position before elections. More specifically, he wondered whether Goldberg proposals should not repeat not be read as pointing in that direction.

10. Minister pointed out that President had shown consistent interest in peace and de-escalation. He did not repeat not think that Goldberg proposals represented any new departure. In essence, they were Goldberg's formulation of USA position. On balance, therefore, Minister doubted if we could look to any change in USA position before forthcoming elections. In particular, it was highly unlikely that USA would be prepared to envisage any unilateral action on their part without at least some measure of reciprocity from Hanoi.

457.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to Yugoslavia
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Yougoslavie
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/17

No. Y-704
Ottawa, October 12, 1966
Confidential. Priority from Paris.
Repeat for Information: Hong Kong, London, Washington, Paris, Moscow, Delhi, CANFORCEHED, Geneva, Candel New York; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER, OCTOBER 8

Vietnam

Nikezic could not repeat not see Hanoi making any forward move. He said Hanoi was simply not repeat not persuaded USA would withdraw from Vietnam in any circumstances. This was based on their assumption that USA presence was related not repeat not only to Vietnam situation but to containment of China. In final analysis, what was involved here was a question of confidence.

2. Minister said he was disturbed to see this skepticism shared by USSR. If this position were genuinely held by Soviet Government, it would be serious in terms of possibilities of wider involvement in present conflict. He said he sometimes suspected that position was a little synthetic. In any case, there was no repeat no doubt in our minds that USA were entirely sincere in wanting to get talks started and to withdraw from Vietnam. But they would not repeat not withdraw without some assurance that right of free choice was vouchsafed to South Vietnamese.

3. Nikezic recalled that Harriman had come to Yugoslavia last summer and again in January of this year. Yugoslavs accepted USA proposals as sincere. They took it that USA want to maintain some political and strategic position in Southeast Asia and this was understood. But there was doubt in Yugoslav minds whether, in face of inherent momentum of conflict, USA was able to gauge how its commitments might expand in, say, a year's time.

4. As for Yugoslavia's relations with Hanoi, there had been no repeat no regular contacts since 1958. Yugoslavia supported general position of Hanoi. They believed bombing should be discontinued and NVN left alone. As regards SVN, they believed parties directly concerned should discuss future among themselves. On other hand, Yugoslavia did not repeat not agree that USA could be asked to withdraw their forces in advance of talks. Nor did they subscribe to NLF claim to be sole genuine representatives of people of SVN at any negotiation. They did not repeat not think NLF had shown requisite strength to support such a claim. North Vietnamese, of course, would like Yugoslavia to support their position in its entirety and had reacted adversely to Yugoslav failure to do so.

5. As Nikezic understood position, Hanoi was conducting its own war. They had not repeat not consulted Moscow when they started it and they had not repeat not consulted Moscow when they began to assist it directly. Hanoi felt they had been sold down the river in 1954. They suspected Russians of having let them down to achieve measure of international détente. They also distrusted Chinese. Whole relationship between Hanoi, Moscow and Peking was very complex.

6. Yugoslavs think Hanoi was at fault in not repeat not responding with some initiative during bombing pause last January (USA were also at fault in resuming bombing). Yugoslavs also think Hanoi would have been well-advised to accept Radhakrishnan proposal for sealing borders.[70] When all is said and done, Hanoi stands to lose from USA intervention. At same time, there was little prospect of their rigidity being moderated by increase in USA forces. Indications from Hanoi even suggested that North Vietnamese were ready for invasion by USA; they would go underground in that eventuality rather than yield.

7. Nikezic thought USSR shared Yugoslav view that maintenance of world peace was overriding objective. They were not repeat not, however, able to say so openly. They also had an interest, of course, in strengthening NVN against both China and USA. As Brezhnev had recently put it to Yugoslavs, "we cannot repeat not abandon them even though they are not repeat not people who do what we say".

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[70] See/Voir Sharokh Sabavala, "India Pushes Proposal for Peace in Vietnam: Proposal Detailed," *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 May 1965, p. 6.

8. Nikezic argued that USA are only ones who have necessary strength and margin for manoeuver. If NLF accepted a cease-fire for three months, in what state would their forces be at end of such a period. Yugoslavs could make good guess on basis of their own experience. Russians had put it to partisans in 1943 that they should negotiate with Mihailovich side. They had refused because their forces would have said, if leadership is prepared to negotiate, why should we get ourselves killed. By 1944, they had felt strong enough to negotiate because they were convinced they had won the war. (Nikezic did not repeat not elaborate on analogy with NLF situation.)

9. Minister explained role we envisaged for ICC in Vietnam. He said he thought ICC could play a helpful part in creating conditions for a negotiation although he would not repeat not exaggerate possibilities. Poles had taken position that time was not repeat not ripe. We accepted this as their sincere judgement but could not repeat not ourselves agree that time was not repeat not always ripe.

10. In recent weeks we had tried to see whether situation in DZ could not repeat not be turned to good account by effecting some limited disengagement of forces there. If this could be done by agreement on both sides, it might have valuable effect and conceivably could be tried elsewhere. However, Poles had warned us that, if we persisted in our efforts, we might well prejudice any future role for Commission. We assumed that Poles could not repeat not afford, any more than could Russians, to be associated with any action which appeared to be putting pressure on Hanoi.

[…]

458.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. 3123
Washington, October 14, 1966
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
Reference: Moscow Tel 1700 Oct 5.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Bonn, Permis New York; Moscow from London.
By Bag: Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw, Saigon, Delhi, Hong Kong from London; Tokyo from Ottawa.

VIETNAM AND SOVIET-USA RELATIONS

We have read with interest Mr. Ford's very stimulating reference telegram. In this message we are putting forward some thoughts on problem as seen from Washington.

2. One of main conclusions reached in Mr. Ford's analysis (paragraphs 14-15) is that if Russians could be persuaded, perhaps by diminished military activity, that USA really had no repeat no intention of maintaining military bases in Vietnam, they might be encouraged to influence North Vietnamese towards negotiations. We wonder, however, whether, as Mr. Ford puts it, "to convince Russians is hub of matter". Even if Russians could be persuaded that USA intended eventual withdrawal from SVN, leaving it neutral and independent of both sides, it seems to us far from certain that they could at this time be successful in persuading Hanoi authorities to seek negotiated settlement on such a basis, since neutral and truly independent SVN is not repeat not what Hanoi envisages. Furthermore, even if North Vietnamese are more sympathetic to Moscow than to Peking in Sino-Soviet dispute, this does not repeat not necessarily mean that they are so amenable to Soviet influence or pressure that they would go against their own concept of their national

interest; in addition, even most anti-Chinese among North Vietnamese must be conscious of risk of affronting their gigantic neighbour; if DRVN were on point of collapse and almost prepared for political solution, Soviet assurances about eventual USA withdrawal might tip balance and influence Hanoi towards negotiation. But there is no repeat no evidence that Hanoi is on point of collapse. It might therefore be difficult in circumstances to convince Americans that it would be worthwhile to pay steep military price of ending bombing and de-escalating unilaterally: in hope that this might conceivably persuade Russians of USA intention to withdraw, and that in turn Russians might conceivably be both able and willing to persuade Hanoi to negotiate. Chain of possibilities seems to us to be too fragile as yet.

3. Russians and Americans might both be satisfied, *faute de mieux*, with genuinely neutral and independent SVN, perhaps associated with other Southeast Asian countries in a group strong enough to resist Chinese pressure. But for Russians to suggest to Hanoi that they end war in expectation of this outcome, when Hanoi has fought long and with remarkable success for quite different one, might force North Vietnamese to conclusion that China was their only real friend. Important USA purpose in Vietnam is to show their friends and allies, in Europe as in Asia, that USA is as good as its word. Similarly, one of Soviet purposes in backing Communist Government in Hanoi must be to demonstrate to smaller Communist states and Communist faithful at large that socialist motherland does not repeat not abandon its children in their hour of need.

4. As Mr. Ford points out, a key problem is Communist interpretation of USA aims in Vietnam. As Americans see it, their Asian policy has consistently been directed ever since 1949 towards containment of Communist ambition, which has increasingly (but not repeat not solely) taken form of Chinese ambition. Most American officials would not repeat not go quite so far as to describe China as "a country poised for territorial expansion" in literal sense, but there is a widespread belief here that for a mixture of ideological and other motives, China desires to expand its influence and authority far beyond its present limits, and in some cases at direct expense of USA influence and authority; this would not repeat not necessarily be done by annexing territory but by turning small peripheral countries, specifically including those of Southeast Asia, into Communist clients.

5. Reality of Chinese interest in expanding northwards (paragraph 5 reference telegram) is questioned here on grounds that Chinese have largely failed, through lack of resources, to develop their own northern regions (Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang) as areas of food production and population settlement. Southeast Asia is considered another matter; reference is made to China's traditional interest in area, historical southward pressure of Chinese civilization, economic value of this food-surplus region, powerful asset of ten million overseas Chinese, and postwar record in Vietnam, Malaya and Thailand. Strong feeling here is that without defensive military action, these countries might all be Communist today; that far from "strongest Asian countries" being alienated (paragraph 8 reference telegram), Japan and India seem well pleased (if quietly so) to see USA honouring its commitments; and that display of USA determination in Vietnam may also have influenced events in Indonesia to some extent.

6. American policy has been designed to react to this presumed Chinese threat and – equally important – to demonstrate to potential allies that USA can be counted on to meet such threats in area and elsewhere. But what Communists should realise is that this is not repeat not a new policy, but indeed a rather elderly one; they would be wrong to conclude, as suggested in paragraph 9, that USA is now "building military network against China", that this is principal reason for intervention in SVN and Thailand, and that USA is merely seeking to use negotiations to consolidate position on mainland at reduced cost. What Americans feel they are doing is to try to preserve a military network erected long ago, i.e., in early 1950s and which did not repeat not involve any significant American military presence on mainland until, as they see it, successive Communist attempts to overrun network made this necessary, first in Korea, and later in Vietnam, and subsequently Thailand. USA desire appears to be that protective network should eventually be able to function once again without USA forces physically

present on mainland – an idea recently voiced by Marcos of Philippines. Communists do not repeat not seem to realise how matters look on other side of barricade, nor repeat nor to comprehend that Americans feel they have been fighting a defensive battle all along line for a decade and more. It is all very well to say that Russians are immobilised from cooperation with USA in Far East as long as USA attacks their ally NVN (paragraph 12); but Americans similarly feel immobilised from reaching accommodation with Communist states in Far East as long as a Communist government attacks their ally SVN. Of course, there are imperfections in USA view of things (their "ally" is to some extent their own creation) but their belief in rightness of their own cause is none less strong for all that. Communists will not repeat not be able to cope rationally with USA policy in Far East until they are enabled to see that USA considers it is reacting rather than acting in Southeast Asia; and that Americans (government and public) are impelled by moral as well as real political considerations in area. Russians may dismiss as hypocritical American protestations that they are in Vietnam to defend right of SVN people to determine own future, and certainly this is far from whole story, but it is an important psychological element in situation with which Russians and others should reckon.

7. On another facet of problem, American officials have pointed out to us importance to Vietnam War of internal Chinese developments. These developments must, they think, be causing extreme disquiet in Hanoi. If present upheaval led to internal situation so chaotic that China could no repeat no longer give adequate support to Hanoi, or if it resulted in basic re-orientation of foreign policy (neither of which Americans think impossible), Hanoi would have little choice but to settle politically. However, until dust settles in China, Hanoi and Washington both may decide to postpone any major re-evaluation of situation.

8. In brief, our feeling is that although there is a certain USA-Soviet community of interest in SVN war – to contain China and to discredit Chinese theory of national liberation and people's war – it is Hanoi backed by Peking which seems to have final say, and Hanoi does not repeat not at present share above-mentioned community of interest. Furthermore, it may not repeat not at present be possible to convince Communists of limited nature of USA aims in areas through a change of USA tactics, without in American view running risk that change in tactics might merely result in non-attainment of these aims. Important psychological factors are of course present on each side and need to be taken into account by other.

9. For these and other reasons, we are inclined to view that for moment there is very little that can be done to improve prospects for early settlement through tactic suggested by Mr. Ford until course of military conflict convinces one party or other that time is no repeat no longer on his own side. This could of course happen any time but we do not repeat not think it has happened yet. Meantime there seem to us to be very severe limitations on influence which would be exerted by such community of interest as exists between USSR and USA.

[A.]E. Ritchie

459.

Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. 2041
New York, October 17, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Moscow Tel 1700 Oct 5, Washington Tel 3123 Oct 14.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, Geneva, Rome (Priority); Delhi, CANFORCEHED (Priority) from Ottawa; Moscow (Priority) from London.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh from Delhi.

VIETNAM AND USA/USSR RELATIONS

As seen from UN, particularly in light of interviews which SSEA had with Gromyko, Rapacki, David and Nikezic, as well as talks with Goldberg, Brown and other Western leaders, paramount issue seems to be not repeat not so much question as to whether USA and USSR have common interest in regard to containing China, discrediting Chinese ideology, or even on broader issues such as restricting arms race, especially nuclear weapons. In these respects, no repeat no doubt USA-Soviet interests do tend to intersect. Main problem seems to be how compromise can be found between divergent political aims of Hanoi and Washington regarding Vietnam.

2. Most striking aspect of current Vietnamese developments in military field from here is degree to which neither USA nor USSR seem able to control events. On USA side escalation of war (despite obvious and repeated intention to contrary) in response to constant infiltration from North has created logic of increased effort, which in view of USSR (as Gromyko indicated to SSEA) risks USA confrontation not repeat not only with China but also with USSR herself because of Soviet aid to Hanoi both moral and material.

3. Unanimous remedy advocated from Communist side is unilateral cessation of bombing of DRVN by USA. For her part USA has indicated willingness to cease bombing provided there is de-escalation on side of Hanoi. All Communist representatives here, however, are agreed in pointing out limitations of possible Soviet action in latter direction. They have said in effect that to insist on ceasefire and ending of infiltration is to put in jeopardy attainment of essential political aims of NLF and Hanoi regime; and that Soviet Government cannot repeat not do this without prejudicing her claim to leadership among Communist countries (and indeed enabling Chinese and others to say that Russian revisionism has led to abandonment of support of concept of wars of national liberation entirely).

4. While initiative in military field obviously lies with Washington in de-escalating bombing, in political field initiative seems to lie almost entirely in hands of Hanoi. If Hanoi were assured in some way that adoption of conference method would leave them possibility of attaining their political aims gradually by political methods, it might be possible to bring hostilities gradually to close. To expect USA to accept this kind of approach, however, especially at time of Congressional elections seems too much.[71] It is therefore political realities in Vietnam and in USA rather than question of USA-Soviet community of interest which as seen from here looms as main obstacle to ending war in Vietnam. And it is hard fact that cessation of bombing will not repeat not be enough to ensure fruitful negotiations unless some way is found of providing for reconciliation of divergent political aims of Hanoi and NLF on one side and USA and Saigon on other.

[George] Ignatieff

460.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Multiple Posts
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à plusieurs missions
RG25, vol. 10101, 20-CDA-9-MARTIN/5

No. S(M)-955[72]
Ottawa, October 18, 1966
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority.

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[71] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Nor at any other time. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

[72] To/À : Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Bonn, Candel New York.

MINISTER'S VISIT TO EUROPE

You will by now have received our telegram S(M)-946† October 18 asking for comments on draft paper on Eastern European attitudes towards FGR, subject which we are proposing Minister raise during discussions in Warsaw and Moscow.

2. Other main subjects of international interest proposed for discussion in Warsaw and Moscow will be Vietnam, disarmament and European security.

3. On Vietnam, we propose to review the problem in general terms with special reference to Soviet, Polish and Canadian positions (common ICSC membership will be particularly relevant in Warsaw) and efforts which have been made by Canada and others to promote peaceful settlement. More specifically, in both capitals, Minister will probably wish to explore Communist thinking about nature and "shape" of political settlement which might be acceptable from their point of view, and the possibilities for realistic action leading in that direction. For example, cessation of bombing is an obvious element in pattern of events leading to settlement. Accepting Soviet (and Polish) emphasis on importance of this factor, what do they see as next step, how do they envisage process of arranging series of "understandings" by which further steps might take place, and what contribution might they be prepared to make in terms of diplomatic action.

[…]

461.
Memorandum from Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs to Far Eastern Division
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 9396, 20-22-VIETS-2/18

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] October 18, 1966

VISIT OF JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

The Japanese Ambassador paid a courtesy call on the Minister today to thank him for the arrangements made when the Japanese Ministers were in Canada. He and the Minister exchanged compliments on the value and usefulness of the meetings.

2. The main conversation concerned China policy. […]

4. There was a brief exchange on Vietnam, the Japanese Ambassador being anxious to determine whether we saw any signs of flexibility in the USSR position. Mr. Martin said that he did not see any such signs himself. The key to the question, Mr. Martin thought, lay in the events taking place inside China, of which no one seemed very well informed.

5. The Japanese Ambassador asked why Mr. Martin thought the USSR was being so rigid on the Vietnam question. Mr. Martin said that he thought there were perhaps three elements:

(i) that the USSR might not feel confident enough of its ability to secure a solution in Vietnam to make any attempts which were not sure of being accepted;

(ii) the Minister thought that concern at the position of China was an inhibiting factor;

(iii) Mr. Martin thought that the USSR might remain uncertain of long-term United States objectives and afraid of the consequences of supporting a movement toward a solution in Vietnam if the United States did not carry out its declared purposes there.

6. Mr. Martin also said that it was his assessment that there would not likely be any important development on Vietnam until after the U.S. elections.

J.G. Hadwen

462.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 10624, 21-13-VIET-ICSC-11/2

No. 933
Saigon, October 20, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tels 911† Oct 12, 894† Oct 3 and paragraph 5 Our Tel 858† Sep 30 and Your Tel Y-130† Oct 16.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London; Washington, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Paris, Geneva from London.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Hanoi, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM – COMMISSION PROSPECTS

In our conversation October 15 on his return from Phnom Penh, Rahman again raised the well-worn but still open question as to what the Commission should do now (paragraph 3 of reference telegram 911). He wondered if I had any further indications from Lewandowski about the Poles' attitude to the Commission's future. I had not repeat not but I mentioned frankly to Rahman that consideration was being given on the Canadian side to this problem – whether we should join the Indians and Poles in their alleged wish to do nothing or whether we should engage the Indians in an effort to balance the work of the Commission by taking some action on the many outstanding Southern complaints. I pointed out to him again that if the Commission were to become inactive, it would have to be an inactivity *in toto*, not repeat not simply on one side only. He said (for what it is worth) that he understood this fully.

2. Somewhat in this context, Rahman made one of his "let's get away from it all" proposals after the Commission dinner he gave the following day in honour of the new British (Co-Chairman) Ambassador – a few days in Dalat, with a side trip to the teamsite at Nha Trang for a day. Nothing so far has come of an earlier project for a tour of all teamsites by the Commissioners in the ICSC aircraft but Lewandowski has latched on to the revived Dalat visit with enthusiasm and is pressing Rahman to come through with it. It is now scheduled for November 4. Rahman envisaged our establishing ourselves there complete with wireless and having a meeting. It is indicative of Lewandowski's general attitude that he would like us to go into "retreat" literally: "there is in any case nothing for us to do in the Commission". It is difficult to guess whether a Polish re-assessment is at the back of this. Is it perhaps significant that the new Polish-DRVN trade and economic assistance agreements provide for military supplies for use in Vietnam? According to AP of October 18 from Warsaw, the Polish Vice-Premier in his speech referred to "civil and defence supplies…to repulse the American aggression in Vietnam".[73] While arms and equipment from the other East European countries, especially Czechoslovakia, are here in abundance, no repeat no Polish military supplies have ever, to the best of our knowledge, been identified or, until now, promised.

3. These and other considerations are no repeat no doubt in your mind in preparing for the Minister's visit to Warsaw. It would be helpful if you could let us know the date of the visit, whether it is already public knowledge, and whether you would wish me to engage Lewandowski more closely on this or other subjects in the context of the visit.

[Victor C.] Moore

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[73] See/Voir "Poland Signs Pact to Help N. Viet Nam," *Patriot-News* (Harrisburg, Penn.), 18 October 1966, p. 4.

463.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 8599, 20-1-1-12/3

No. Y-718
Ottawa, October 21, 1966
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 3048 Oct 7.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Candel New York, Rome; CFHQ, Delhi, Tokyo, Wellington, Canberra from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi; Moscow from London.
By Bag: Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Manila.

VIETNAM: MANILA MEETING AND CANADIAN POLICY

We have carefully weighed pros and cons of suggestion outlined your reference telegram. We see certain disadvantages in proposed action which can be summarized as follows:

(a) We have no essentially new points to present at this stage and established Canadian position is adequately known to those with whom we have been exchanging views on a continuing basis (i.e., essentially USA, Australia, and NZ).

(b) While we agree that some good might result from Canadian approach to those participants who are inclined by and large to take a hard line on terms of Vietnam settlement (i.e., South Korea and South Vietnam), we wonder whether it would really be in our interests to get caught in cross-fire between hard-liners and advocates of a more conciliatory position at Manila. We are also doubtful whether, in matters such as this in which many of participants regard their own national interests as being directly engaged, any presentation of Canadian views is likely to carry great deal of weight.

(c) In view of fact that Canada is not repeat not, and does not intend to be, combatant in Vietnam, unsolicited advice from us to effect that we regard military solution in Vietnam conflict as being both impracticable and undesirable might not repeat not be well received.

(d) It is too early to assess significance of Manila meeting. For our part, we regard it as useful forum in which governments with military commitments in Vietnam will be able to sit down together to co-ordinate their policies and discuss common objectives. We must recognize, however, that immediate repeat immediate interests of these Governments and their commitments in relation to Vietnam conflict do not repeat not coincide with our own. Therefore, we believe that whatever the results which may flow from Manila meeting, we would be preserving a freer hand for our own future efforts if we did not repeat not become directly involved in a dialogue with the participating Governments at this stage.

2. Minister has indicated that on balance these disadvantages tend to outweigh possible advantages of action you have proposed. He has suggested nevertheless that it might be useful to draw attention of participants to Canadian view of potential role for International Commission in helping to resolve Vietnam problem. This has particular relevance for Thailand, Philippines and South Korea with whom we have not repeat not developed detailed dialogue on Vietnam. Accordingly, we are proposing to call in Thai and South Korean representatives here to brief them generally on Canadian thinking as regards opportunities which may be open to Commission. Since there is no repeat no Philippine representation in Ottawa and since we would prefer for various reasons not repeat not to interject ourselves into proceedings in Manila itself, grateful if you could find early opportunity to speak to your Philippine colleague in Washington.

464.
Note for File by Head, Eastern European Section, European Division
Note au dossier du chef de la section de l'Europe de l'Est de la Direction de l'Europe
RG25, vol. 9404, 20-22-VIET.S.-2-1-1/4

Secret.
[Ottawa,] October 28, 1966

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SSEA
AND MR. CHESTER RONNING IN NEW YORK ON OCTOBER 26

The Minister met with Mr. Ronning at the Delegation offices on the morning of October 26.

Vietnam

2. Mr. Ronning considers that it is important for the Prime Minister or the SSEA to speak at an early date with Mr. Dean Rusk or with the President of the United States to make the following points:

(a) It is impossible for the United States to offer the North a high enough price to have them stop their aid to the Viet Cong. They regard the war as a civil war and must continue to assist their brothers in the South. Hence to the DRVN the American offer to stop bombing the North if the North will stop infiltrating troops into the South is no *quid pro quo* at all – quite apart from DRVN refusal to admit that the infiltration is taking place.

(b) In March when Mr. Ronning visited Hanoi there was a firm offer from the DRVN to start talks with the U.S.A. unconditionally (i.e., without prior acceptance by the USA of Pham Van Dong's Four-Point programme) provided the USA would cease "all warlike acts" against the North. Pham Van Dong made it clear that the talks could be direct or through an intermediary. Moreover he emphasized that the talks could begin even while American military actions in the South continued and without the participation of the Viet Cong.

(c) We do not know whether the DRVN would still be willing to enter into unconditional talks with the USA in return for a cessation of bombing, especially since there has been some escalation in the conflict since March of this year. Nevertheless Canada is prepared to make enquiries once again in Hanoi to see if this *quid pro quo* still is applicable. The best thing would be for the USA to make no public declaration of the cessation of bombing. In order to meet the American point that talks could drag on indefinitely and so protect the North from any direct attack, the USA could inform the DRVN that the bombing would not be resumed as long as the talks were fruitful.

3. Mr. Ronning felt that Canada was in a specially favourable position to undertake these soundings in Hanoi because we have repeatedly made it clear that we wanted a cessation of fighting; because we expressed our support for an international conference at a time when this was still feasible; and because we had expressed our misgivings about bombing of the North, proposed a pause in the bombing and urged that the pause in the bombing which took place in January of this year should be extended.

4. Mr. Ronning thought it particularly significant that, when he met with Pham Van Dong in March, the offer to enter into talks with the USA had come at the end of a long conversation during the previous part of which he had stuck close to the hard party line. When he made his offer to enter into talks, he did so rather nervously as if he were "going out on a limb"; he may even have been exceeding his agreed instructions. Mr. Ronning thought that it was very significant that he had expressed willingness to start talking with the USA without the Viet Cong being present and while military action was continuing in the South.

China

5. Mr. Ronning said that he was sure that the country was not going to disintegrate as some wishful thinkers in the West and even in other communist countries have suggested might happen. Mao's fear of counter-revolutionary tendencies in China was a real one and he was now resorting to extreme means to combat this possibility. He said that while China was now more reluctant than it was in 1951 (at the time of the crossing of the Yalu River) to engage in hostilities with the U.S.A., it was prepared to do so if the war in Vietnam escalated too far (Mr. Ronning did not indicate what that point might be). The Chinese seemed to have accepted fatalistically that their country would sooner or later be attacked by the U.S.A.

J.B. Seaborn

465.
Telegram from Embassy to Poland to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade en Pologne au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. 1449
Warsaw, November 7, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Repeat for Information: London; Washington, Paris, NATO Paris from London; Delhi, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Delhi.

FUTURE OF VIETNAM COMMISSION

In course of our discussion of Vietnam problem, Rapacki also touched on future of Commission. He said that, if he did not repeat not believe in possibility of Commission playing a positive role in right circumstances, he would not repeat not see any reason for maintaining Polish participation in Commission in face of conditions which are so different from those envisaged at Geneva.

2. If there was agreement between us on possibility of joint action looking towards peaceful solution of conflict, Rapacki said he thought we should also agree on preserving this possibility by doing nothing that was calculated to aggravate present course of events.

3. Canada and Poland had their divergences within Commission. These divergences were rooted in our different appreciation of origins of present conflict. In practice they found expression in respective legal positions we had taken in Commission.

4. Rapacki said he thought that Canadian position could be reduced to two propositions. First, that Commission had no repeat no responsibilities in relation to Final Declaration. Second, that Commission had to act on premise that USA was not repeat not party to Geneva Agreements.

5. Poland could not repeat not accept practical implications of these propositions which are, in essence, that Commission should operate as if USA were not repeat not involved in Vietnam conflict. If that were accepted, it would follow that USA should be held immune from Commission judgments. Result would be one-sided Commission actions which, in practice, would work to clear detriment of side which Poland regarded as being victim of aggression. This would not repeat not, in Polish view, advance cause of peace in Vietnam to which both of us attached importance.

6. Rapacki said he was not repeat not proposing that we change our legal position. It was a fact, however, that present circumstances differed substantially from those prevailing twelve years ago when Commission received its mandate. Accordingly, we should not repeat not really be held to criteria for Commission operation which were valid at time Geneva Agreements were concluded.

7. Rapacki reiterated that Commission should be maintained in existence for such future contribution as it may be able to make to peace in Vietnam. For the present, however, he proposed that Commission limit its activities on following lines. First, it would receive complaints of each side and transmit these to other side and to Co-Chairmen. Second, it would undertake any good office functions requested by either side. Rapacki thought this course of action would reflect realistic assessment of what Commission could accomplish in present circumstances and establish basis of more harmonious cooperation between us on which it might be possible to build as and when opportunities opened up for us, as states rather than specifically as members of Commission, to make contribution to peaceful solution in Vietnam.

8. Minister replied by pointing to Canadian conception of international peacekeeping. In light of that conception, it would be difficult for us to contemplate situation in which Commission was being allowed to lapse into virtual inactivity. We were aware of course of criticism to which Commission had been exposed as a result of its demonstrable inability to influence course of events in Vietnam. We had ourselves considered, in light of that criticism, whether Canadian participation in Commission should be continued.[74] We had decided that, in all circumstances, it was right for us to stay in Vietnam and we were glad that this judgment was shared by Poland. We had some difficulty, however, with argument that Commission should do nothing in uncertain expectation of some future role materializing for Commission in altered circumstances.

9. In subsequent discussion with Michalowski two further points emerged. First, Poles envisage procedures they advocate in Vietnam being carried over into other two Commissions. Second, they would probably not repeat not be opposed to some running down of team sites in South Vietnam so long as this was not repeat not done in any formal way by Commission decision.

10. Minister suggested that discussion of Polish suggestion be continued in Saigon but Rapacki argued that it would be better to consult on this at some distance from scene of events.

11. We do not repeat not propose to give Poles any final response to their suggestion while we are in Warsaw. In first place, this is obviously something we cannot repeat not resolve by ourselves in absence of full consultation with Indians. Secondly, their suggestion will clearly require further clarification. While it might serve our purpose to avoid findings against either party in future work of Commission (which has involved us in so much effort to arrive at reasonably balanced record), it is quite another matter for Commission to abdicate its responsibilities for investigating complaints brought before it by either party and to act merely as post office for transmission of unsubstantiated allegations to Co-Chairmen. It is also clear that mandate of Laos Commission is of quite a different order and that translation of Polish suggestion into Laos context would be entirely unacceptable in sense that it would place unverifiable Pathet Lao allegations on same basis as complaints of RLG which is legitimate government of country whose independence, neutrality and territorial integrity 1962 Agreement was designed to protect.

12. Grateful if posts concerned would comment on implications of Polish suggestion to Ottawa. Meanwhile suggestion should be treated as for Canadian Eyes Only.

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[74] See Chapter 3./Voir Chapitre 3.

466.
Telegram from Embassy to Poland to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade en Pologne au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. 1458
Warsaw, November 8, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Repeat for Information: London; Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Delhi from London; CANFORCEHED (Priority) from Ottawa; Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: CANADIAN PRESENTATION

In opening discussion on this subject Minister expressed concern being felt by Canada about course of conflict in Vietnam. This was a problem in relation to which Canada and Poland had assumed common obligation and which was basic to evolution of relations in other parts of world. For our part we did not repeat not think problem was amenable to military solution; it was possible in practice that USA with its great strength could bring about such a solution but consequences of such a course would raise problems of much wider dimensions. Meanwhile the longer conflict lasted the more difficult it would be to unravel position and the greater the distrust on each side about long-range intentions of other.

2. Minister then reviewed what Canada had done to give expression to our concern about developments in Vietnam. In particular, he spoke of role we envisaged for members of Commission on basis of their long experience of problem and access they had to both sides in making at least a beginning towards peaceful resolution of conflict. While we had taken note of Rapacki's view that time for such an initiative was not repeat not ripe, we continued to feel strongly that unless situation was to be allowed to develop with all attendant dangers there was responsibility devolving on all of us to do what we could to help parties find way out of present impasse.

3. We recognized that bombing of North Vietnam was issue which would somehow have to be resolved before further progress could be envisaged. Our record on this issue spoke for itself. On other hand, there could be little hope on moving forward so long as USA was expected to make all the concessions. We accepted logic of North Vietnamese position that they were sovereign and independent country which should not repeat not be subjected to military activity. We also, however, accepted logic of converse argument as it applied to South Vietnam. We had been encouraged by Goldberg formulation of USA position in UNGA which suggested that some time sequence might be used to induce North Vietnamese to take some reciprocal action in return for cessation of bombing. Alternatively, and without claiming to speak on behalf of USA, we thought it possible that USA might be prepared to stop bombing as prior and unreciprocated act if there could be tacit understanding between two sides that some reciprocal measure of disengagement would follow after agreed interval.

4. Minister then turned to problem of NLF. In our view NLF representation at any conference was secondary problem which as USA had said was not repeat not regarded as insurmountable. Real problem was part NLF might expect to play in future political arrangements in South Vietnam. In that regard USA had made it clear they would accept results of genuinely free election. They were not repeat not prepared on other hand to concede to NLF political rights based on claims which have not repeat not been put to test of free ballot.

5. There appeared to be doubt about ultimate intentions of USA in Vietnam. This applied in particular to USA commitment to withdraw their military presence and abandon their bases in appropriate circumstances. Gromyko had expressed doubt about credibility of USA

assurances and this doubt was evidently shared by Rapacki. For our part we accepted USA assurances as genuine and sincere. We had no repeat no doubt whatsoever that USA did not repeat not want to stay in Vietnam once right of free choice was vouchsafed to South Vietnamese. We thought that recent USA statements including formulation of Manila communiqué[75] would have removed any lingering doubt on that score. USA did not repeat not need strategic presence on Southeast Asian mainland and they would not repeat not be there today if it had not repeat not been for events in Vietnam.

6. We had made suggestion as to procedure by which it might be possible to arrange for halt in bombing. We also wondered whether it might help if one were to try to formulate series of propositions covering major points outstanding between two sides and to which both sides might be able to subscribe in some manner. Points to be covered in such a formulation might include (a) return to provisions of Geneva Ceasefire Agreement; (b) reaffirmation of USA commitment that they have no repeat no intention of maintaining troops and bases in Vietnam; (c) endorsement of principle of reunification of Vietnam on basis of exercise of free choice in both parts of country; (d) endorsement of principle that people of South Vietnam should be free to determine their own future without outside pressure or interference. If mutually acceptable formulation of these points – which were inherent in Four Point programme of North Vietnam – could be achieved and bombing could be halted on basis of some measure of reciprocity from North, would North Vietnamese be prepared to negotiate or alternatively accept tacit return to *status quo ante* without negotiations?

7. In summing up, Minister said we were concerned about demands for unilateral action by USA. We were convinced USA would not repeat not be defeated nor driven out of Vietnam. This was not repeat not matter of face for them but involved right of small nations to order their own affairs. In our view therefore all indications pointed to political solution. As countries not repeat not devoid of influence with two sides and as members of Commission with unique experience of Vietnam situation we felt strongly that Canada and Poland had special responsibility to bring their influence to bear on Vietnam situation in direction of peaceful solution of a conflict which was central to our common interest in lessening international tensions.

467.
Telegram from Embassy to Poland to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade en Pologne au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. 1460
Warsaw, November 8, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Reference: Our Tel 1458 Nov 8.
Repeat for Information: London (Priority); Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Delhi (Priority) from London; CANFORCEHED (Priority) from Ottawa; Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: POLISH PRESENTATION

Rapacki began by saying we appeared to have common appreciation of serious implications of any further escalation or expansion of conflict. There was difference, however, in our assessment of origins of Vietnam situation.

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[75] See/Voir "Manila Conference Documents," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 55, No. 1429 (14 November 1966), pp. 730–735.

2. Poland felt USA had made big mistake in becoming involved in Vietnam. But Poland also felt that if USA had not repeat not committed that mistake in Vietnam they would have committed it somewhere else. USA policy was proceeding from so-called position of strength. But international situation was evolving and USA policy was at variance with that evolution. Inevitable consequence of USA policy was contest of strength and it was probably no repeat no accident in light of USA assessment of Chinese position. That context was precipitated in Vietnam. USA is now confronted with dramatic choice. Either they will have to become involved more deeply or they will have to withdraw in conditions which are likely to become increasingly more difficult.

3. Neither Poland nor DRVN wanted to see situation in Vietnam reach point of crisis. Hanoi was not repeat not yet spokesman of Peking nor executor of Chinese directive. Study of pronouncements emanating from two capitals would confirm this assessment. DRVN commanded support of other socialist countries both in its struggle and in entirety of its policy to protect basic interests of whole Vietnamese people. With help of its friends DRVN would continue to be able to protect and defend interests of its people.

4. But what was most important was to arrive at just solution of present conflict by peaceful means. This could be achieved only on one basic condition which was to stop bombing. DRVN could in no repeat no circumstances be expected to yield to ultimatum inherent in continued bombing of their territory. Its friends had neither right nor inclination to ask them to do so. As to what DRVN might do if bombing stopped, Rapacki said he must tell us frankly he did not repeat not know nor would any of us know for so long as North Vietnam was being subjected to military pressure.

5. Rapacki said he thought USA had changed direction in mid-course. In course of conversations he had had in Washington in December/64 Rusk had put forward as one of his basic theses that he would not repeat not discuss with Ho Chi Minh problem of South Vietnam which was not repeat not his concern. Two months later bombing of North Vietnam had started. One of publicly stated objects of bombing had been to bring Hanoi to negotiating table and yet it would have been possible to do just that some months previously.

6. Bombing pause earlier this year had similarly implied ultimatum to DRVN. In essence USA had been saying to DRVN that we will maintain pause if you come to conference table or if you stop your so-called infiltration or if you give us some indication of what you are prepared to do. While peace proposals at that time had for obvious reasons been couched in somewhat different terms, they were not repeat not such as to be acceptable to any self-respecting government.

7. To expect DRVN to meet USA demands as precondition to cessation of bombing amounted to expecting everything from DRVN and nothing from USA. Only solution was to stop bombing as unilateral act. So long as bombing continued DRVN had no repeat no option but to continue fighting and its friends had no repeat no option but to continue their help. Once bombing stopped hands of DRVN would be untied as would hands of all those who are concerned to arrive at peaceful solution of present conflict.

8. Rapacki went on to say that Poland regarded conflict in context of whole international situation. In this they proceeded from a number of premises. First, world peace depends on understanding between two great powers; at least this was situation today although one could not repeat not be sure that it would be situation tomorrow if chain reaction which had been set in train in Far East continued on its course. Second, Peking could not repeat not permit collapse of DRVN. Third, USSR could not repeat not permit collapse of Peking and Chinese were fully aware of that fact; that was one reason why Peking felt free to do what they were doing in their relations with USSR. Fourth, escalation in Vietnam is no repeat no longer a policy; it is becoming a mechanism. And it is carrying us beyond brink towards a real abyss.

9. Rapacki said he found a good deal of understanding for first three of these premises in his discussions in USA. But this had not repeat not been true as regards escalation. USA appeared to be convinced that they could control course of events: that they could turn

military activity on or off with complete certainty as to results. Therein lay real danger and Rapacki wondered if USA appreciated it. Canadian possibilities of impressing this point on USA were greater than Poland's. After all if it were not repeat not for mechanistic momentum inherent in escalation we would not repeat not have wars.

10. Rapacki went on to wonder if halting of bombing would really be disaster for USA. Was it not repeat not rather a halt on road to something much worse. While he accepted Canadian contention that Vietnam situation was not repeat not analogous to situation in Algeria where balance of strength had been much less favourable to French he still felt that USA would gain considerable international prestige if bombing ceased.

11. What would be consequence of cessation? Rapacki said he could not repeat not claim to speak on behalf of DRVN. Accordingly, he could not repeat not say whether cessation would lead to conference situation. What he could say was that without cessation nothing was likely to happen. He could also say that if bombing ceased element of gravest risk would be removed from international situation. New situation would be created in which those who have influence in Hanoi would be able to take steps towards peaceful solution of conflict. Was this not repeat not risk worth taking as against much greater risk inherent in continuation of present conflict?

12. Summing up discussion of Vietnam on concluding day of our visit, Rapacki made following points: (a) We are agreed on serious implications of further escalation or expansion of conflict. (b) So long as DRVN remains under threat of bombing it has no repeat no choice but to fight on and its friends have no repeat no choice but to help. (c) Vicious circle must be broken. This can be done only by those who started bombing and who by virtue of their greater strength can afford to take such a step. (d) If USA stops bombing, new situation would be created in which those able and entitled to do so can take steps towards peaceful resolution of conflict. (e) As to what guarantees could be given to USA that efforts would in fact be deployed in Hanoi in such a situation, this is practical question which merits practical answer but not repeat not chiefly from Poland; nor has question been put to him in his discussions in USA. (f) As to what points would need to be covered if situation came about in which discussions became possible, this was question for DRVN to answer. (g) In present situation Commission should operate in manner which neither disturbs cooperation between members nor prejudices eventual peaceful solution.

468.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. 1994
Moscow, November 9, 1966
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Flash.

Following for Prime Minister from SSEA.

I have had a very useful three-day visit to Poland. Mr. Rapacki and I had long and intensive discussions which concentrated mainly on Vietnam and European security. You will have seen departmental telegrams reporting on these talks. I am convinced that they were helpful to our general objective and that there is some possibility eventually of a situation in which the Poles could be useful in making progress in Vietnam. I have agreed that senior officials of our two countries should meet in the near future to discuss in detail the possibilities for the future role of Commission of Vietnam.

2. I have just arrived this afternoon in Moscow, but the initial contacts with Polyansky and Gromyko and a number of other ministers during a frank exchange after lunch suggest that my talks here will also be intensive. Whether we can make any immediately useful advances remains to be seen. I will report again when we get home.

3. From the word which I have had the House seems fairly quiet. I am of course deeply interested in the reaction to our China initiative[76] and I am following that as closely as I can. None of us had any illusions that it was going to be an easy exercise but I remain firmly convinced of its urgency and necessity. My regards.

Paul [Martin]

469.
Telegram from Embassy to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/7

No. 1998
Moscow, November 10, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 1994 Nov 9.

Following for Robinson and Collins.

Reference telegram reports understanding with Poles that our senior officials should meet in near future to discuss future role of Vietnam Commission.

2. This should be read in conjunction with reports of ministerial delegation from Warsaw. What is envisaged by Poles is discussion of their proposal that Vietnam Commission be allowed to lapse into virtual inactivity as a means of not repeat not complicating positions in Vietnam for the present and preserving basis for possible future cooperation among Commission powers. There was no repeat no indication on part of Poles of any disposition at this stage to discuss actual possibilities which may be open to Commission powers at some future time to lend their influence in direction of peaceful solution of conflict.

470.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 2009
Moscow, November 11, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Reference: My Tel 2008† Nov 11 (Immediately preceding tel).
Repeat for Information: London; Washington, NATO Paris, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Permis New York from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Belgrade, Prague from London; Saigon from Ottawa.
For Prime Minister from SSEA.

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[76] Canada was pursuing a diplomatic initiative at the United Nations related to the potential seating there of the People's Republic of China.
Le Canada menait une initiative diplomatique aux Nations Unies concernant la possibilité que la République populaire de Chine devienne membre de l'organisation.

CONVERSATION WITH KOSYGIN – VIETNAM

In my immediately preceding telegram† I reported on discussion with Chairman of Council of Ministers on our bilateral relations. Bulk of conversation was devoted to Vietnam.

2. I made a general statement on Vietnam giving Canadian views on subject more or less along lines of my statement to Gromyko,[77] concluding that among other things we hoped for an early solution of Vietnam problem so that perspectives for better relations between East and West could be fully developed. Mr. Kosygin then made a fairly long statement on Vietnam starting on premise that although USSR was not repeat not directly involved it was clear that they could not repeat not stand aside. As we knew, they were obliged to give all possible support to their allies in repelling "aggression". And in his opinion no repeat no commission of lawyers could come to any other conclusion than that the USA was an aggressor.

3. Kosygin said that "we highly appreciated statements of Canadian Government" when USA started bombing Hanoi and Haiphong last June,[78] adding "our Vietnamese friends also appreciated them". Question now, however, is how to solve the problem. In his opinion this can only be done by Vietnamese people themselves. Only programme of USSR [for] Vietnam is contained in the Four Points of DRVN and the programme of SVNLF. "We have no repeat no other programme to discuss with you".

4. Kosygin then turned to possible role of ICSC which I had mentioned to him. He suggested that Commission could discuss with USA what might be sequence of trying to implement points of "Manila programme". He suggested Commission, for example, might ask what would be schedule of withdrawal of American forces or what would be time limits implementing Manila proposals. After all, he said, President Johnson had made proposals, why does Commission not repeat not discuss them and find out from Americans what they really mean?

5. Kosygin then went on that he personally thought that principal thing to do to end war is to give real assistance to Vietnam particularly by condemning "the aggression". The more countries that will do this, the more world public opinion will force aggression to cease. He said he realized Canada was an ally of USA but why should we have to support Americans when they commit "aggression". He said that USSR would not repeat not do so if one of its allies in Warsaw Pact committed aggression. In his view public opinion had to be rallied against "aggressor" to end war in Vietnam.

6. I replied that Canada is one of the smaller countries but it is at same time an independent one and an ally of USA. Nevertheless, we had taken an objective course in Control Commission and we continue to do so. There was no repeat no point in trying to seek a solution by going back over past history but I would find it impossible to agree with his charge that USA was the aggressor. I then mentioned that in the Majority Report of 1962 we had found the North and the USA to be in violation of the Geneva Agreements. In any event, main aim was surely to seek a solution of the problem now.

7. It seemed to be generally agreed that one of first steps had to be an end to bombing but even here question is how do we go about it. It would be quite futile merely to ask for a condemnation of USA and it would certainly not repeat not get talks started. In my opinion there was a real danger of escalation and we had to work to avoid this.

8. I said that we firmly believed USA wishes to withdraw from Vietnam. Furthermore, we were doing all in our power to promote a peaceful solution even to point of complicating our relations with Washington. But we as a smaller power found it a great pity that one of the

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[77] See next document./Voir le document suivant.

[78] See/Voir "U.S. Air Strike May Set Back End of Conflict, PM Tells House," *Globe and Mail*, 30 June 1966, p. 1.

two greatest powers in world did not repeat not feel it could do something to help. I mentioned Mr. Kosygin's constructive action at Tashkent Conference which I said had been greatly admired in Canada. I realized situation in Vietnam was not repeat not comparable but I hoped that my visit to Moscow might help to persuade USSR in context of our developing friendly relations to do something about Vietnam. In meantime what Mr. Kosygin had said would receive most careful consideration of Canadian Government.

9. In conclusion, Mr. Kosygin assured me that USSR was doing nothing to inflate conflict and doing a great deal to protect people against aggression. He added we could be assured that USSR was doing nothing to inflame situation. However, in last analysis what happened in Vietnam did not repeat not depend on them.

[Paul] Martin

471.
Telegram from Embassy to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 2011
Moscow, November 11, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Repeat for Information: London; Washington, NATO Paris, Paris from London; Delhi, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: DISCUSSION WITH GROMYKO

Minister made substantially same presentation as in brief prepared for Moscow (as summarized in Warsaw telegram 1458 November 8). He made special point, however, of expressing hope that countries like USSR with influence in North Vietnam would use that influence to urge recourse to peaceful solution of conflict. In particular, he thought that, if any indication could be given to USA of response which would follow action on their part to stop bombing, this might have helpful effect on course of events. If USSR wanted conflict in Vietnam to be brought to an end, as we believed they did, Minister appealed to Gromyko not repeat not to take position that unilateral cessation of bombing was only way to advance matters. We did not repeat not think it was reasonable for any of us to refuse to use our influence on grounds that time was not repeat not ripe. In face of prospect of conflict expanding and conceivably involving others, there was surely no repeat no better time than present for bringing our influence to bear on situation.

2. Gromyko began by saying he appreciated importance Canadian Government attached to ending Vietnam conflict. It has to be borne in mind, however, that it was USA which had unleashed conflict by violating Geneva Agreements. These agreements provided for unification of Vietnam by means of elections to be held in 1956. Instead provisions of Geneva Agreements had been wrecked by introduction of USA troops and establishment of bases in Vietnam.

3. There was some reality in concept of two Vietnams in sense that country had been temporarily divided at Geneva. But Agreements had provided for single Vietnam on basis of there being only one Vietnamese people and this was the greater reality.

4. As regards crucial issue of bombing of North Vietnam, Gromyko said that this must be stopped. Without cessation of bombing, there was no repeat no possibility of ending war. But this was only part of question. If we wanted to see war ended, USA must not repeat not only stop bombing, they must withdraw their troops, abandon their bases and cease all forms of

intervention in internal problems of Vietnam which are for Vietnamese people alone to resolve. USA had not repeat not been elected by anyone to decide how this should be done. Only Government of DRVN in North and NLF in South were competent to take these decisions as to future of Vietnam because only they were competent to express will of Vietnamese people. This was general context in which USSR saw cessation of bombing. In their judgment it was only "first of first steps" that would have to be taken to provide basis for solution of conflict.

5. USA had stipulated conditions for cessation of bombing. Sometimes these had been specific; at other times USA had asked merely for general indication as to what Hanoi would do. In any case, bombing would have to be stopped unconditionally. It was wholly unacceptable for country which had started bombing to impose conditions for stopping it. If USA refuse to accept logic of this position, it was hard to say how long war would last. Vietnamese people were determined to pursue war until they had achieved victory. They would spare neither effort nor resources to that end and they would have support of their friends.

6. USSR had tried their best to explain this position to USA at various times and at various levels. Unfortunately, there was no repeat no evidence that USA were prepared to change their approach to Vietnam problem. USA could stop war without loss of prestige. Considerations of prestige had been raised and inflated artificially but they could not repeat not be held to apply to major power like USA. If there was flexibility in USA position, it might be in loading and unloading of troops. USSR could detect none in USA policy.

7. If USA wanted to end war, they could find dozens of ways of stopping bombing at once and without conditions. They were prone to claim that they had done so last year but it was not repeat not correct to depict pause as having been unconditional. While USA did not repeat not speak of conditional pause in their public statements, they had told many governments privately that, if matters did not repeat not turn out right, bombing would be resumed. This conditional aspect of pause was not repeat not lost on DRVN.

8. USSR was sometimes being asked whether they could not repeat not say what response might be if bombing did stop unconditionally. But question itself implied a condition. Be that as it might, USSR was in no repeat no position to say what response would be from other side. All they could say was that general atmosphere would be more favourable.

9. As regards opportunities open to Commission to bring about settlement in Vietnam, Gromyko said frankly that he did not repeat not see what it could do. In first place, Commission powers differed in their conception of Vietnam problem and would find it difficult to arrive at common denominator. Secondly, Commission's mandate did not repeat not provide for functions we seemed to envisage for it.

10. Nor did Gromyko think it was realistic to think of reconvening of Geneva Conference in present circumstances. This had been made clear to Brown. Vietnamese feel – and USSR believe not repeat not without justification – that such a conference could be used to impose conditions on them.

11. As to propositions which we thought might enable some progress to be made towards a negotiated settlement, Gromyko was skeptical. These propositions proceeded from concept of division of country and their effect would be to consolidate USA violations of Geneva Agreement. Accordingly, USSR could not repeat not associate itself with such an approach which was at variance with its own.

12. Gromyko was not repeat not convinced by USA assurances that they would withdraw their military presence in Vietnam. This was because they could not repeat not afford to do so as long as country was divided. Rusk had told him two and three years ago that USA were ready to withdraw their troops; but he had also said that, in event of adverse developments, troops would be brought back.

13. As far as reunification was concerned, Gromyko did not repeat not exclude this taking place on basis of free elections. But there could be no repeat no free elections in absence of withdrawal of USA troops and cessation of USA intervention. Vietnamese people were wholly qualified to decide who should represent whole country. As far as USSR was concerned, present puppet rulers in Saigon did not repeat not constitute a government and had no repeat no claim to represent views of Vietnamese people.

14. USSR appreciated efforts of certain countries to contribute to solution of Vietnam conflict. But sometimes even good intentions ran counter to realities and requirements of a given situation. USSR accepted Canadian presentation even if our positions differed. But they were inclined to think that our influence could be more usefully deployed in Washington. Extent to which this could be done would depend on our own assessment of possibilities.

15. As for USSR, it supported principles and positions of DRVN and NLF as expressed in their four- and five-point programmes respectively. USSR regarded these programmes as affording equitable basis for settlement of Vietnam problem. They were not repeat not themselves party to negotiations. That was role USSR could not repeat not assume. However, since others were interested in problem and prepared to state their positions, USSR saw no repeat no reason why it should not repeat not do likewise.

16. In view of Gromyko's very hard presentation of Soviet position Minister thought it right to make following comments by way of summary and conclusion:

(a) While we had no repeat no wish to delve back into history, we could not repeat not agree with Soviet contention that USA was first to violate Geneva Agreement or that they are aggressor in Vietnam. We had been associated with India in Commission report of 1962 which had come to different conclusions.

(b) We had no repeat no quarrel with Soviet thesis that it was for Vietnamese to decide their own future. We could hardly agree, however, with their proposition that NLF fully represented interests of people of South Vietnam.

(c) Unlike USSR we believed that USA was not repeat not opposed to reunification of Vietnam. We also believed USA was entirely serious in its commitment to withdraw from Vietnam in appropriate circumstances. We were disturbed about continuing Soviet doubts on that score which could lead to misunderstanding and miscalculation.

(d) We agreed that USA could end war without loss of prestige. It was not repeat not our judgment, however, that this was issue which preoccupied USA. If public opinion in USA was divided, it was much more divided over extent of USA participation in war than over general conditions in which USA withdrawal could be envisaged.

(e) As for stopping of bombing, whatever might be desirable course, we did not repeat not think it was really conceivable that USA should be expected to do so unilaterally. Accordingly, we thought it right for some encouragement to action being given to USA in form of indication of what response might be forthcoming from other side.

(f) We still thought that Commission powers, acting in their capacity as sovereign states, could exercise their joint influence in direction of peaceful solution in Vietnam. We agreed, however, that it would not repeat not serve any useful purpose for Commission powers to call for reconvening of Geneva Conference in present circumstances. We had ourselves refrained from doing so in full recognition of Soviet position.

(g) We continued to think that USSR could bring its great influence to bear on solution of this conflict as it had done at Tashkent. We were ourselves not repeat not without influence in Washington though we would not repeat not wish to exaggerate extent of influence we could muster. But if we are expected to impress on USA desirability of taking certain steps, it was hardly unreasonable for us to expect others to use their influence in similar direction in Hanoi. Worst possible course was to permit war to continue with all the attendant risks of more serious situation developing in Asia and inhibiting impact this was bound to have on any further progress towards international détente.

472.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 2014
Moscow, November 11, 1966
Confidential. From London.
Repeat for Information: London; Washington, NATO Paris, Paris, Candel New York, Bonn, Rome, Delhi from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade from London; Hong Kong, Tokyo, Saigon from Ottawa.

MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH POLYANSKY NOVEMBER 10

Accompanied by USSEA and myself, Mr. Martin had almost an hour's talk yesterday with First Deputy Prime Minister Polyansky. Discussion was serious and atmosphere very friendly. Polyansky took occasion to thank Minister personally for very useful visit to Canada last summer, and to recall with appreciation frank conversations that had taken place with him and with Prime Minister.

2. Mr. Martin mentioned Vietnam problem and rest of conversation was devoted to this subject. Minister said he understood fully Soviet position, but he remained convinced that countries desirous of maintaining peace in world had somehow obligation of getting negotiations on Vietnam started.

3. On question of future use of ICSC, Polyansky offered view that Commission had been one-sided and as result it had "simply helped aggressor", and anyway he could not repeat not see how Commission could be utilized. Canada might nonetheless have a role, as member of ICSC and ally of USA: role would be to stop Americans from bombing North and to persuade them to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam. Only solution to problem lay in Washington.

4. Minister agreed that cessation of bombing is necessary to end war but problem is first to find a way to do it. He argued that Canada's [role] in ICSC had not repeat not been one-sided and produced examples to prove it. He explained in some detail Canadian idea on role that Commission should have. He said that Canada is trying to influence USA and urging others to see what could be done to end bombing and get talks going, but he was convinced that without some reciprocal move from North, USA would not repeat not move in this direction.

5. Mr. Martin said he could not repeat not understand why USSR would not repeat not play a role in Vietnam similar to one it played in solving Indo-Pakistani conflict at Tashkent meeting. If Vietnam War were ended great possibilities would open for expansion of East-West relations, including improvement in USA-USSR relations which USA wanted, as was clear from President Johnson's October 7 speech.[79]

6. After stressing that USSR did not repeat not identify Canadian policy with USA, Polyansky said he understood and sympathized with Canadian efforts to seek a peaceful solution but once again he thought this had to be directed towards influencing Americans. Role and influence of ICSC was in his view negligible and in any event Canada could exert its influence on USA without ICSC.

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[79] See/Voir "Remarks in New York City Before the National Conference of Editorial Writers, October 7, 1966," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966*, Book II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 1125–1130.

7. In conclusion, Mr. Polyansky said that he agreed with Mr. Martin that if Vietnam situation could be solved it would create great opportunities for better relations between Eastern and Western countries. He noted that some small steps had been taken, but much more could be done in future if Vietnam problem were liquidated.

[R.A.D.] Ford

473.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 2021
Moscow, November 12, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Reference: My Tel 2020† Nov 12.
Repeat for Information: London; Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Bonn, Washington, Permis New York from London.
By Bag: Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw from London; Berlin from Bonn.

MINISTER'S VISIT: CONVERSATION WITH BREZHNEV

Culmination of Minister's visit to Moscow was reception by Secretary-General of Communist Party, Brezhnev, in his offices in Central Committee building. It is most unusual for Brezhnev to receive foreign guests from non-Communist countries, particularly in his working office in the Party headquarters. It is equally extraordinary for him to give one hour and a quarter of his time, and indeed he appeared willing to extend conversation further if it had not repeat not been for need to go to Gromyko dinner.

2. When Minister referred later to Brezhnev as one of most important men in Soviet Government, Gromyko corrected him: "the most important". And in joint communiqué of Minister's visit Russians carefully put him first. Manner in which he spoke, and way in which Gromyko referred to him, also showed his senior position.

3. Minister was accompanied by USSEA, myself, Hadwen and Pearson. Only Gromyko and Shpedko were present besides Brezhnev.

Bilateral matters

4. Brezhnev referred to similarity of our climatic conditions and said he had particularly heard of this when he worked in virgin lands of Kazakhstan. He had found many Soviet experts were interested in adopting some of Canada's experience in agriculture. He was personally still interested in this, as well as in other aspects of relations with Canada.

5. Minister, at Brezhnev's request, gave his impressions of Moscow, and went on to say that value to him of visit was in much more accurate picture he now had of USSR and its policies and he thought these personal contacts essential. Talks with Gromyko had been most frank and useful and he believed sound results were bound to come from them. He mentioned great success of Polyansky visit and interest in Canada in developing better relations with USSR.

6. Brezhnev said he had had full report from Polyansky on his visit and they had been much impressed. Indeed, everyone now called him "the Canadian".

7. It is a positive fact, Brezhnev said, that many Soviet people are now going to Canada, political figures, regional representatives, technicians, agricultural experts, and they all have found many interesting and useful things in Canada. "We are happy to have good relations with Canada".

8. Brezhnev said his talk with Minister had been facilitated by political conversations Mr. Martin had held with Kosygin, Gromyko and others which had "clarified the situation". For his part he wished to express satisfaction that Mr. Martin had come to Moscow because one important part of Soviet policy is to develop relations with all countries, and Soviet interest in talking with Canadian Minister was natural. He repeated they were most happy that he had come to Moscow to see for himself and to have frank talks with Soviet leaders.

9. Referring to Canadian foreign policy, Brezhnev said that he could comment quite frankly that they were satisfied with a number of actions taken by Canada in international affairs. But if problem of bilateral relations is considered as a whole, he could state firstly that "we wish to develop our relations with Canada and to have them as deeply-rooted as possible. And in this connection I again stress the importance of this visit".

10. Minister replied that Canada was also anxious to promote most harmonious possible relations with USSR. Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence had not repeat not always been understood or accepted in the West, but this was no repeat no longer true. Minister then referred to our position as closest neighbour of USA, a friendly country which did not repeat not attempt to dominate us, but Canada had a great desire also to have friendly relations with USSR, and indeed all countries. This he was sure was especially true of our allies in NATO.

12.[80] Mr. Martin said Canada recognized war was impractical as an instrument of policy, and our aim is to reduce dangers of war everywhere, at this moment especially in Asia. He was certain that his talks in Moscow would prove rewarding. There could be no repeat no doubt about desire of Canada to get along with USSR, although in past this had not repeat not always been easy.

13. Finally, Mr. Martin said that Canadians knew Americans probably better than any other people in world and he solemnly wished to assure Brezhnev that in spite of what they might think of events in Vietnam, USA is also truly dedicated to the aim of worldwide peace and prosperity. This was the feeling not repeat not only of 20 million people in Canada but of people of North America as a whole.

International Affairs – General

14. Brezhnev gave Minister a brief but interesting résumé of international position of USSR, which he described as good. "We think so because in spite of the enormous military power of USSR we have proved that our policy is a peaceful one". He said that they invariably adhered to policy of peaceful coexistence with all countries irrespective of their economic and social systems. We do not repeat not fight with anyone, although some other countries are at war. In the UN we are making specific and constructive proposals which appeal to all countries. We are a hospitable country "open to all peoples who want to develop relations with us". Our foreign policy is supported by many countries throughout the world.

15. Strength of their policy, he said, lies in the fact that it is well founded ideologically and practically, stemming from the teachings and experience of Lenin. Our [Soviet] experience shows it is correct and is gaining sympathy throughout the world. Total acceptance will not repeat not come at once, but Lenin's teachings are finding more and more supporters. Of course, he added, the situation in the world today is very complicated. He was not repeat not referring to tactics in international policy, which naturally have to change with situations, but to basic problems. And from this it sprang that they had different relations with different countries.

16. Brezhnev reverted to Minister's statement about peaceful policies of Canada and of USA. He said there should be no repeat no doubt about peaceful policy of USSR. They were ready to take any steps to extinguish hot-beds of war. For this reason, Vietnam worried them also. They realised Canada was preoccupied with problem and wished war to stop. But war

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[80] The original document skipped from paragraph 10 to paragraph 12.
Le document original passait du paragraphe 10 au paragraphe 12.

was started by USA and it should be up to them, not repeat not other countries to stop it. It is a bad government that starts a war without knowing how it can be ended. Americans had consulted no-one in starting war and certainly not repeat not USSR. "Now they are tendering us flowers of peace". But this is not repeat not so easy.

17. There is no repeat no military solution, he said; and the war in Vietnam could last twenty years because of nature of terrain, climate, type of guerilla warfare, and character of Vietnamese people "who besides are not repeat not alone". He hoped the USA understood all this.

18. USA, he went on, are making proposals and pronouncements that they want to stop war. We are not repeat not authorized by Vietnamese people to speak, but it is our view that if USA seriously wants to stop war they must stop bombing of North for good and unconditionally. This would create favourable situation for further consideration of this problem.

19. On one hand, Brezhnev said, Americans talk of peaceful solution but this is always accompanied by some warlike statement to the contrary, i.e., that additional troops were being sent, new strategic plans were being drawn up, etc. In these circumstances it is not repeat not possible to take USA declarations seriously. There are many facets to this problem, but basic to it was this contradiction between actions of USA in Vietnam and peaceful statements from Washington.

20. War in Vietnam caused great concern to many states. The war itself is abhorred by people of Vietnam, and indeed of all countries. One thing he thought USA should think about is process of political isolation of USA which is taking place. This will leave a great mark on them. It will be a long time before people of world can accept that USA is a peaceful nation.

21. But every state, he said, must form its own policy and we have full respect and understanding for Canada's independent policy. Your position as a friend and neighbour of USA gives you particular importance in this problem. "I am not repeat not saying this to engage you in a quarrel with USA. We don't want that. Indeed, we also want good relations with USA".

22. Mr. Martin in reply spoke briefly to effect that Canada's aim was a peaceful solution and we were doing what we could within our limitations to this end – and this was finding a way to end war. Time did not repeat not permit him to make a commentary on Mr. Brezhnev's interesting remarks, which he considered very important. He assured him that they would be carefully considered by Canadian Government.

Internal affairs

23. During course of discussion Brezhnev spoke about some of problems of economic growth in USSR, one of greatest of which is vast scope of construction projects. Very size created difficulties and they were working hard to try to keep pace with demands of technology and mechanisation. New industrial methods had constantly to be introduced.

24. However, in general he was satisfied with internal situation because they had no repeat no really acute problems to hinder their progress. Many of their economic plans were over-fulfilled. For first nine months of 1966 industrial growth was 8.5 percent. Tempo of growth was satisfying and national income was also increasing rapidly. This will give opportunities next year of introducing many new economic and social measures to increase standard of living.

25. Mr. Martin said this greatly interested him and possibly Brezhnev would like to know that Canada, which so greatly resembled USSR geographically, was also forging ahead. Our GNP at end of war had been 5 billion and was now 60 billion. Canada is now basically an industrial nation in spite of great importance of our agricultural production. This was accomplished largely by mechanisation. Result was that Canada was enjoying period of great prosperity, like indeed many other Western countries.

26. Brezhnev expressed surprise and obvious interest in this picture of Canadian economic progress.

27. In conclusion, he called for greatest effort to effect further development of relations with Canada in every field – trade, cultural, technical and scientific exchanges, and in the political field as well. "We are far from having exhausted all possibilities in this", he said.

28. Meeting, which was conducted throughout on a most cordial basis, ended on this friendly note.

[R.A.D.] Ford

474.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 2035
Moscow, November 14, 1966
Confidential. Priority from London.
Repeat for Information: London; NATO Paris, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Washington, Permis New York from London.
By Bag: Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw from London; Berlin from Bonn; Saigon from Ottawa.

MINISTER'S VISIT – CONVERSATION WITH PODGORNY

On last day of his visit Mr. Martin was received by President Podgorny. He was accompanied by USSEA and myself. Although it was expected to be a purely courtesy visit, in effect Podgorny was anxious to discuss matters of substance.

2. Minister began by saying that he had had very useful talks with Gromyko and although they had not repeat not reached agreement on all things there was a considerable degree of accord and he believed his visit would lead to a very great improvement in relations between Canada and USSR and he hoped might also contribute to a better international atmosphere.

3. Podgorny expressed his gratification with this and added that of course it was difficult in present state of world affairs to agree on many things. He hoped eventually that international situation would develop in such a way that there would be more international understanding.

4. Podgorny himself then raised question of Vietnam by saying that probably Minister and Gromyko had not repeat not reached agreement on this subject. He mentioned that he had just received USA Ambassador Foy Kohler who was about to leave Moscow and he had not repeat not reached agreement with him about Vietnam.

5. As regards Soviet-Canadian relations, however, President found no repeat no reason to think that two countries could not repeat not reach an understanding because our relations were developing on the whole very satisfactorily. He referred to recent developments such as trade agreements, establishment of direct air services, and the parliamentary delegation headed by Polyansky who had reported most favourably on his reception in Canada and useful meetings and talks he had had. Podgorny said that when a Canadian parliamentary delegation returned to USSR they will see that Canadian hospitality can be matched.

6. Mr. Martin told Podgorny that he had not repeat not yet had chance to assess fully importance of his visit but he was quite sure to start with that our relations were bound to improve. He had no repeat no doubt of good intentions of USSR on this score. He hoped that Canada, which occupied a unique position as an American country, an Arctic neighbour, a member of NATO and a member of Commonwealth, might be able to contribute to better relations between USSR and all our associates. He believed his visit was a testimony to this,

as had been Polyansky's visit to Canada. A free exchange of views was natural and it would be unnatural if we did agree on everything. However, in so many different fields such as trade and exchanges our relations were going very well. He recognized that Russians were not repeat not happy with trade imbalance but he was sure President realized we were making an effort to correct this.

7. As regards Vietnam, Minister made same points he had with other Soviet leaders, again stressing importance of finding a way out of present impasse. He said that he felt it was possible to end war and in this International Control Commission would be able to play a role. He concluded that Canada was going to keep on trying to find a peaceful solution.

8. Mr. Podgorny reverted to Canadian-Soviet relations mentioning that they would be happy to see trade more in balance, purchase of Canadian wheat was important to both countries but we should not repeat not think indefinitely of trade in these terms. He knew that Canada produced many other things which USSR would be interested in buying and similarly he thought we could find many things of interest in USSR. There was a basis, he thought, for developing good bilateral relations and also for working together in UN and indeed outside of it. He was a little intrigued by Mr. Martin's reference to NATO but only commented that he did not repeat not see how being a member could aid Canada in its international affairs. Nevertheless, this was no repeat no obstacle to developing good relations with his country.

9. Vietnam, President said, is a difficult problem. He had just told Ambassador Kohler that USA must stop bombing North and find the courage to leave Vietnam. Manila Conference made many references to American withdrawal but, he said, people just do not repeat not believe it. Number of troops is constantly increasing in South Vietnam so no repeat no one believes peace talk which remains just talk.

10. Podgorny said that Soviet Government regarded International Control Commission differently and did not repeat not see how it could participate in a solution of Vietnam problem. It was up to USA to solve it. Neither Canada nor USSR can decide this question. Solution must be found by USA with help of its allies, in particular Canada and UK. Unfortunately, nothing indicated that Americans were looking for a non-military solution.

11. Mr. Martin said that all members of NATO are collectively and individually interested in good relations with USSR. In West it was clearly recognized that everything must be done to extend détente between East and West and to solve problems which divide two blocs.

12. Mr. Martin said he was not repeat not in Moscow as spokesman of USA but Canadians knew Americans well and have closest possible relations with them. He said he was convinced that Americans also share Canadian desire for better relations with all countries and referred to President Johnson's speech of October 7. He said that he had no repeat no doubt of this nor of statements that USA wants to withdraw from Vietnam and to liquidate its bases there.

13. Mr. Martin agreed that Control Commission was not repeat not legally entitled to try to solve Vietnam problem. But he thought it could help in a modest way to narrow the gap. In same way Canadian Government thought it could contribute to a solution to problem. If Canada could work for a peaceful solution, he believed other countries could and should do likewise. In any event, Canada could not repeat not accept Soviet position that only way to solve Vietnam problem was by a unilateral act on part of USA. Some movement was also required from other side.

14. In conclusion, Mr. Martin reiterated invitation to attend Expo 67 and hoped that by time Mr. Podgorny came to Canada, war would be over in Vietnam and that they could work together for consolidation of peace in the world.

15. Podgorny extended his thanks for invitation and said that he could not repeat not at this stage say whether he would be privileged to go to Canada but in any case there would be a representative at highest level. He also hoped that by time of Expo, situation would be better and that there would be a chance to discuss more agreeable subjects than Vietnam.

16. Podgorny concluded interview, which lasted for more than an hour, by asking Mr. Martin to transmit his greetings and wishes for success in future to Canadian Government and people.

[R.A.D.] Ford

475.
Record of Conversation between Secretary of State for External Affairs and Pope
Compte rendu de la conversation entre le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et le pape
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

Confidential. Restricted Distribution.
[Rome,] November 15, 1966

AUDIENCE WITH HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI

I accompanied the Minister on his call to His Holiness who received us shortly after 12. The audience lasted about 40 minutes during which the Pope made many kind references to the role of the Minister in particular and of Canada in the field of international affairs. The time was roughly divided between an account which the Minister gave to His Holiness of his recent visit to Europe and an exchange on the steps which might be taken to bring about a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

2. In welcoming the Minister, the Pope first wished to express his thanks and his congratulations for the role which the Minister is playing personally in attempting to improve the international situation and to bring about peace in Vietnam. The Minister then proceeded at the invitation of His Holiness to give a report of his talks with leaders in socialist countries.

3. As to Vietnam, the Minister explained that for 12 years Canada has been a member of the International Control Commission in Vietnam, together with Poland which represents socialist countries, and India which is the interpreter of the third world and which also has special relations with socialist countries. Through the Commission, Canada has access both to Saigon and to Hanoi. Because of our experience of and contacts with developments in Vietnam, Canada has reached the conclusion that there might be a role for the Commission to play in bringing about a beginning in discussions which could lead to a political solution. His Holiness intervened to say that this had also been his conviction; he had expressed the hope in the past that the Commission could utilize its diplomatic resources to facilitate a settlement in Vietnam.

4. The Minister said that in Poland the view had been expressed by Mr. Rapacki, and by the other Polish leaders that he had seen, that the one way to bring an end to the conflict in Vietnam would be for the United States to stop their bombing operations. If this were to happen, the hands of North Vietnam would be untied and then it might be possible for the friends of North Vietnam to take action which could be helpful. The Minister added that he had enquired from Mr. Rapacki what would happen if the United States were to take the step suggested and stop their military operations in the North. He had to report that the Poles had been unwilling to be specific as to what reciprocal action might be taken. As to the Commission, they did not agree that it could play a useful role now.

5. The Minister then referred to his talks in the USSR, where he had had an opportunity of discussing the Vietnam situation with Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Podgorny and Mr. Kosygin. The attitude of the Soviet leaders had been similar to that of their Polish colleagues. In their view the United States was the aggressor and there was only one way to bring an end to the Vietnam war; the United States had to stop bombing as a first step. Even if this were done, the Soviet leaders were not prepared to say anything more but that this would result in an improvement in the atmosphere.

6. The Minister stressed that while some of his officials did not perhaps fully share his view, he was inclined to think that socialist leaders both in Poland and in the Soviet Union were trying to convey the impression that they wanted peace in Vietnam and that if the bombing operations were to cease they would try to be helpful within the limits of what they could do.

7. The Minister mentioned that he had also discussed with the Soviet leaders such problems as disarmament and European security. He could report that there was a desire on the part of socialist leaders to negotiate agreements with the West. It was obvious that in their view Vietnam was an obstacle to further progress. If this could be removed, it might be possible to develop the present détente. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders, for a number of reasons, seemed to be anxious to develop bilateral contacts with Canada and with other Western countries. In the case of Canada, one of the considerations they no doubt had in mind was the expectation that because of our close relations with the United States, we might be able to influence them to make decisions in accordance with Soviet wishes.

8. His Holiness reiterated the very high regard that he had for Canadian leaders and the admiration that he felt concerning the role which Canada was playing in the affairs of the world. He felt that as a powerful country, close to the United States, Canada had a position of influence and that its leaders, because of their moderation, were being listened to in all quarters.

9. Referring to the Vietnam situation, His Holiness said that his impression was that North Vietnam was not entirely free to pursue an independent policy and furthermore that socialist countries were unduly rigid on the Vietnam problem; they had an attitude which was unreasonable. They expected the United States to take unilateral action and they seemed to be unwilling to consider taking reciprocal steps towards a negotiated settlement.

10. Then His Holiness dramatically enquired directly of the Minister as to what could be done to bring an end to hostilities. He recalled he had discussed his Christmas appeal with Mr. Harriman during one of the latter's recent visits to Rome. Speaking confidentially he said that he had indicated to Mr. Harriman that very likely he would renew his Christmas appeal this year. Mr. Harriman had said that he would hope that the Pope would not make his appeal in terms which would put the onus for action only on the United States. The Pope said that he would of course use prudent language and take into account the United States position.

11. The Minister said that he could not speak as a member of the Canadian Government but that as an individual, as a Catholic, as a man who was concerned with restoring peace in Southeast Asia, he could only agree that it would be desirable for the Pope to renew his Christmas appeal. In this regard, he could say that he had been struck during his visit to Moscow and Warsaw by the high regard in which the Pope was held. While in Poland he had thought of calling on Cardinal Wyszynski but this had been discouraged by the Polish leaders. There was no doubt, however, that the faith there was still very strong. On Sunday, while being driven around Cracow, he had seen masses of people going to or coming from church. In this respect it was possibly significant that the Polish Ambassador had given a luncheon for the Minister before he left Ottawa to which he had invited the Cuban Ambassador, as acting dean of the diplomatic corps, the Soviet chargé, the Italian Ambassador and the Apostolic Delegate. When the Polish Ambassador had mentioned this project the Minister had expressed doubt whether the Apostolic Delegate would accept, the Polish Ambassador had replied that he had had many a vigorous argument with the Apostolic Delegate but he was confident that he would accept. The Pope said that Mons. Pignedoli, who the Minister indicated was very well liked in Ottawa, would be likely to be listened to because he was a direct, sincere and competent man. While he had not pursued the idea of seeing Cardinal Wyszynski, the Minister added that he had attended Mass at the cathedral; (the Pope intervened to say yes, the Cathedral of St. John). The Poles had not been too happy at the idea but in the end this had been arranged and had had some effect.

12. The Soviet leaders were also interested in papal initiatives. For instance, when His Holiness had gone to the United Nations, the Minister was to have lunch with Mr. Gromyko. The lunch was to be held somewhat late and it would have been difficult to reach the United Nations buildings in time. The Minister had called Mr. Gromyko to enquire whether the luncheon could be held earlier. Gromyko had agreed readily indicating that he too was very keen to listen to the Pope. Furthermore, after His Holiness had spoken in the United Nations, Gromyko had on the same day repeatedly indicated to the Minister that he was very happy with the initiatives which the Pope's visit to the United Nations had represented. The Minister went on to say that His Holiness should be aware of the fact that his initiatives had a great impact for good on world opinion; they should be continued.

13. The Minister went on to say that in his view, he would be inclined to suggest to the United States, although he had not finally made up his mind on this point, that they might well consider whether it would not be in their interests to take the Soviet leaders at their word, to suspend bombing operations in Vietnam and then, in changed circumstances, to appeal to the Soviet leaders to undertake efforts to bring the Vietnamese conflict to an end. His Holiness felt that then it would be very difficult, the United States having taken this step, for the other side not to face their responsibilities and not undertake in some fashion to use whatever influence they might have in Hanoi.

14. His Holiness wondered whether it was possible to establish contacts with the North Vietnamese and whether in particular Mr. Ronning, of whom he knew, an experienced diplomat and a man of high dedication to peace, could not suggest to Hanoi leaders possible contacts with the Church authorities. The Minister recalled that some time ago we had tried to deliver a communication to the Hanoi leaders concerning a possible meeting between Mons. Pignedoli and North Vietnamese bishops. The North Vietnamese had then indicated that they were unwilling to receive such a document. The Pope lifted his hands and said that they were obviously not disposed to agree to a dialogue and to cooperate in bringing the conflict to an end.

15. The Pope stressed that so far as he was concerned in his position he welcomed the efforts that Canada was making individually and as a member of the Commission to restore peace. He fully agreed that such efforts should be continued and that all forces should be mobilized to bring about peace. He complimented Mr. Martin particularly on his role as the leader of Canadian diplomacy; he readily blessed this great role on behalf of the Church. He indicated a willingness, in so far as he was concerned, to discharge fully the obligations of his office in promoting peace and suggested that if at any time he was in a position to extend help he would gladly do so if Mr. Martin, as a political leader, thought that this might be helpful. In this respect, he felt that the activities of Canada in seeking peace were in harmony with those of the Church.

16. In conclusion, and before taking leave, the Minister said that Mr. Pearson, who was a Nobel prize winner, had given his life to the pursuit of peace and that if he had been calling on His Holiness he would have confirmed the dedication of our country to respect for human and spiritual values and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. As a colleague of Mr. Pearson, who had known him well over the years and had been associated with his policies, Mr. Martin could assure His Holiness that these objectives were those of the Canadian Government and of the country as a whole and that they were determined to continue to pursue them. The Pope said that he welcomed these assurances from Mr. Martin. As leader of the Church he could only extend his congratulations for the efforts made, offer his assistance if this would be helpful, and his blessing for the success of the undertaking.

17. The Pope asked the Minister to convey his high regards and personal greetings to Mr. Pearson.

[Marcel Cadieux]

476.
Telegram from Embassy to Italy to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade en Italie au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 1444
Rome, November 15, 1966
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris; Delhi, Moscow from London; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Delhi.

VIETNAM: DISCUSSION BETWEEN SSEA AND FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI

Following discussion of Chinese representation at restricted session in Fanfani's office on morning of November 14, Canadian and Italian delegations met in conference room at MFA. SSEA reported on his recent discussions of Vietnam problem in Warsaw and Moscow. He gave full report of discussions in both capitals along lines already reported to you and we shall therefore not repeat not give details again here.

2. Points emphasized by SSEA with respect to discussions in Poland were: (a) Poles said USA must stop bombing and urged Canada to convince USA that this is only way to put end to conflict; (b) Poles were non-committal as to what might happen if bombing were stopped unconditionally though Rapacki hinted that Poland would then try to make constructive move; (c) Poles gave no repeat no indication that Hanoi might respond with reciprocal action if bombing were stopped but said that atmosphere would be better; (d) With respect to ICC Poland said that it could perhaps play useful role in future but that it could not repeat not do so now and that nothing should be done by ICC which could jeopardize possible future usefulness.

3. On discussions in USSR, Minister said that all leaders to whom he spoke had been insistent that bombing must stop before any progress could be made on Vietnam problem and that Canada's most useful role was to urge USA to accept this fact and act accordingly. Minister's attempts to persuade Soviet leaders that they as representatives of major power had obligation to try to bring about change of attitude in Hanoi elicited no repeat no direct response. SSEA told Fanfani that his personal impression subject to more careful examination of reports later was that if bombing stopped Soviet leaders would be in easier position to encourage North Vietnam to take some reciprocal action.

4. Fanfani said that end of Vietnam conflict would contribute to forward movement on European questions. He felt that Manila meeting indicated that USA was adopting more flexible position on Vietnam and that Hanoi should somehow be urged preferably through Communist countries to take advantage of greater opportunities now offered. One important thing was to give clear statement as to kind of Vietnam which was envisaged by USA after peace had been restored to the area.

5. Fanfani's impression was that since about mid-September all Eastern European states, including Poland, had lined up firmly behind USSR on Vietnam problem in order to make it abundantly clear that Hanoi could count on full support of European Communist countries. In this way they hoped to diminish Peking's influence in Hanoi. We could expect no repeat no initiative from Eastern Europe at present time.

6. SSEA summed up discussion on Vietnam by stating that Poland and USSR seemed in complete agreement on fundamentals of problem but that his reception in Warsaw was a little more cordial and the Poles had a bit more flexibility in approach. Gromyko had said it would be waste of time for George Brown to propose conference now. Fanfani commented that purpose of conference would be to ratify an agreement worked out elsewhere.

477.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 3467
Washington, November 16, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Robinson Ritchie telecon Nov 15.
Repeat for Information: Moscow (Immediate) from London.

SECRETARY RUSK'S CONCERN OVER VIETNAM STORIES

Around 10:30 last night Secretary Rusk phoned me at home to ask when Minister was likely to be back in Ottawa. He explained that he was much concerned over "these press stories out of Moscow" which he later identified as principally an AP report indicating that Canada might join with USSR and some other governments in calling for a unilateral cessation of bombing.[81] Secretary Rusk said rather vigorously that USA does not repeat not want to be confronted with any suggestions for this kind of unilateral action. He asked me to ensure that Mr. Martin and Prime Minister were aware of USA attitude.

2. I said that I had not repeat not seen particular press stories which he had in mind but I thought it most unlikely that they had any foundation. All of confidential reports which we had received on Mr. Martin's conversations in Moscow had emphasized need for action by both sides.

3. Secretary Rusk then indicated some puzzlement at timing of these press stories out of Moscow since he understood that Canadian party had left there two or three days before. He had understood that Mr. Martin and his officials had been in Rome for past two or three days. I confirmed that this was case. Implication of these remarks by Secretary Rusk was presumably that stories must have come from a Moscow source, presumably on Soviet side.

4. Secretary Rusk repeated that USA Government did not repeat not want to be taken by surprise with some public call for unilateral termination of bombing. He added that President was aware of these stories before he entered hospital late yesterday afternoon and that he shared Secretary Rusk's concern.

5. I undertook to communicate USA views to Ottawa quickly in order that they would be available to Minister on his return this morning.

[A.]E. Ritchie

478.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 2057
Moscow, November 17, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Washington Tel 3467 Nov 16.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Immediate) from Ottawa.

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[81] See/Voir "Canada May Ask Bombing Pause," *Spokesman-Review* (Spokane, Wash.), 16 November 1966, p. 11.

VIETNAM

Readers may infer from fact that AP story was filed well after departure of delegation that AP's "informed sources" are Moscow-based and in or close to this Embassy. I can assure you categorically that story is not repeat not based on anything I or members of Embassy have said either to press representatives or in our post-visit briefings of friendly diplomatic colleagues. Local AP representative has not repeat not in fact been in contact with this Embassy since visit.

2. During regular call on me this morning, John Best, CP correspondent here, said he had filed this story[82] and also shown it to his AP colleague who evidently filed it also without attempting in any way to secure confirmation. Best states that his story was based on conversation with Minister in Leningrad from which he gained impressions (a) that Mr. Martin had been encouraged by his talks here to think a cessation of bombing would yield movement toward a Vietnam settlement; and (b) that Minister was considering a personal appeal to USA authorities in this direction.

3. Best had discussed first of these impressions with me November 15, presumably before he filed his story. I said I could not repeat not offer comment on accuracy of a conversation in which I had not repeat not taken part but that it had been my clear impression from talks here that Russians wanted bombing stopped but would offer no repeat no firm expectation that movement toward peace talks would ensue. Best's second impression as to Minister's possible appeal to Americans did not repeat not arise in my November 15 talk with Best, who incidentally takes full responsibility for report.

4. It is also relevant to record that USA Chargé Guthrie called on me yesterday and I gave him a full briefing on visit. *Inter alia* I made it clear that Minister had repeatedly stressed to Russians his belief that there had to be some response, hint or gesture from Hanoi before Americans could be expected to stop bombing operations. I gather Guthrie has not repeat not reported this but when he does it will serve to support Mr. Ritchie's démarche to Harriman reported in his telegram 3478† November 16.

[R.A.D.] Ford

479.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
MG32-B12, vol. 229, 43

No. 2059
Moscow, November 17, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Repeat for Information: London; NATO Paris, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Washington, Candel New York from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade from London; Berlin from Bonn.

SSEA VISIT TO MOSCOW

It will have been apparent from earlier telegrams that Minister's visit went extremely well, and it was obvious that Russians were determined that it should be so. Their arrangements, while customarily doubtful till last minute, were impressive and fully bore out

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[82] See/Voir John Best, "Russia Stands Pat: Canada May Ask U.S. to Halt Hanoi Bombing," *Globe and Mail*, 16 November 1966, p. 1.

their intention to ensure visit's success. As Ambassador Shpedko remarked to me, this visit was at level normal for Western Prime Minister, and if Mr. Pearson came they would arrange one fit for a king.

2. Amount of time devoted by Gromyko and other high officials to this visit was striking. Two formal sessions of talks totalled more than five hours; and with their attendance at long luncheon, two dinners, ballet performance and arrival and departure (for Leningrad) ceremonies, Gromyko and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov had time for little save Canadian matters for two and a half days. Calls on Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Polyansky each lasted longer than planned and cordiality and interest they displayed was gratifying. In light of his particular interest, it was perhaps not repeat not surprising that Polyansky chose to attend two social functions organized by Gromyko, but wide attendance of Ministers and senior officials on these occasions was certainly flattering. Deputy Prime Minister Kirillin, Secretary of Presidium of Supreme Soviet, Mayor of Moscow and senior diplomatic officials attended SSEA's dinner at residence; Deputy Prime Minister Kirillin, Ministers of Culture, Education, Civil Aviation, Merchant Marine, Fisheries, Secretary of Presidium, Mayor, Chairman of State Committee on Cultural Relations, together with numerous Deputy Ministers and many senior officials and journalists attended other functions. Moreover, Deputy Foreign Minister Malik accompanied SSEA on Leningrad visit, where all arrangements also were of a high order. For example, Minister occupied state box decorated with Canadian flag at theatre performances in both Moscow and Leningrad.

3. It should be stressed also that this attention was by no repeat no means perfunctory. In speaking both privately and at social gatherings Gromyko and others expressed warm interest in Canada and spoke with conviction of possibility of improving and extending relations. Frankness of private talks on subjects where our views were distinctly different was also encouraging. We have reported separately on press coverage of visit which in our view was highly satisfactory.

4. High point in political terms was of course Mr. Martin's call on Party Secretary-General Brezhnev. While this had been mooted in our preliminary talks with MFA, there was no repeat no subsequent mention of it until call was arranged at last minute for late on last day of Moscow portion of visit.

5. There is no repeat no doubt that this unusual gesture was intended by Russians to underline further seriousness with which they viewed SSEA visit and importance they attach to formal improvement in relations with Canada, something which was solemnly stressed by Brezhnev. I suspect Gromyko also recognized that in substantive terms he had been coolly unresponsive on points of greatest interest to Mr. Martin, and wanted to ensure that this factor did not repeat not detract from overall impact of visit. However, I think decision had probably been taken some time ago for Brezhnev to receive SSEA if this proved possible.

6. Russians in making visit as cordial as possible were probably motivated by same reasons which have prompted them to improve their formal relations with Canada over past few months, and with most other Western countries. It is also notable that, in spite of British policy on Vietnam, Soviet Government is taking steps to maintain and improve bilateral relations between USSR and Britain. Although there may be at bottom of this some desire to drive a wedge between USA and its closest allies, it seems to me that Moscow is anxious to keep its relations with Western world in balance and, inhibited from developing its relations with USA at this moment, wishes to make sure that its views are received in Washington via Ottawa and London. Brezhnev's statement that USSR was not repeat not against good Canadian-USA relations and indeed itself would like good relations with USA is significant in this context.

7. Apart from this interest in Canada when Soviet relations with Washington are frozen, there are other solid reasons for Soviet policy. Canada (with UK and Japan toward which advances are also being made) is among most advanced industrial countries in West and Russians are clearly interested in our trade and technology. They therefore foresee very significant economic and commercial results from their relations with Canada.

8. From the political point of view of course they are intrigued by our independent policies, and, as in case of de Gaulle, they feel least they can do is to explore the possibilities this presents. Furthermore, their policy presents a public proof of their attachment to peaceful coexistence, and it can enhance Soviet image in Canada and other Western countries in a way which can facilitate a continuation of their activities, both overt and subversive.

9. In brief, SSEA visit can be seen as highly successful in bilateral terms from both Canadian and Soviet viewpoints. Like Polyansky visit it has demonstrated interest of both governments in pursuing trend toward improvement, intensification and diversification of relations. If in terms of movement toward a settlement of international questions, above all Vietnam, visit was unproductive of actual results, I believe we should be neither disappointed nor discouraged. Soviet leaders did not repeat not respond positively to SSEA's expositions but they did give him most careful, thorough and high-level hearing. In context of Minister's determination to explore every possibility of movement toward a settlement, this in itself was most useful.

[R.A.D.] Ford

480.
Telegram from Permanent Mission to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 3096, 20-VIET/4

No. 2861
New York, November 27, 1966
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Limited Distribution. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington (for Ambassador and Beaulne only).
From Hadwen.

SSEA'S CONVERSATION WITH DEAN RUSK

Following for Prime Minister:

I thought I would send you as soon as possible record of my conversation with Dean Rusk in Washington at lunch on Friday, November 25. We had a good friendly conversation in which we both put our respective positions vigorously as record shows. These notes were prepared by Y. Beaulne who checked them with me in New York last night. Text begins:

"Secretary of State of USA received SSEA in his office and had lunch with him in Madison dining room. Only other persons present were Walter Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Yvon Beaulne. Talks which lasted two and one quarter hours did not repeat not follow a set pattern. Subjects were raised, dropped and resumed at various points in course of conversation which took place throughout in a relaxed and cordial atmosphere. Secretary of State was obviously less interested in persuading SSEA on points of USA policy than in preserving personal rapport which made it possible to discuss in a frank and friendly manner questions of concern to both countries. Following is a summary of main topics discussed during meeting.

[…]

Visit to Eastern Europe

Most of conversation related to visit of Mr. Martin to Eastern Europe. Mr. Rusk had seen reports of visit to Moscow which had been communicated by Ambassador to Mr. Harriman but not repeat not reports of visit to Warsaw. Mr. Martin wondered whether one of reasons why he had been paid so much attention by most important persons in Soviet hierarchy was not repeat not fact that Gromyko had a selling job to do and had seized this opportunity to have his own presentation of Western views corroborated. Mr. Martin said he had found Brezhnev impressive. Soft spoken, less rigid than Kosygin, he seemed more interested in domestic than foreign affairs but was conscious of his strength and power as most important man in USSR.

NATO

Mr. Martin said that there had been no repeat no comment against NATO on part of his hosts during his stay in Poland and Russia. Only once in course of his visit were USA described as "aggressors". This occurred in a statement by Kosygin about Vietnam. Mr. Martin had rejected charge that USA was aggressor in Vietnam and had urged USSR to look forward to a solution of problem instead of going back over past history.

[…]

Vietnam Commission

Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Martin if during his conversations in Warsaw he had secured any indication that ICSC would be in a position to play a part in demilitarization of so-called "demilitarized zone" in Vietnam. Mr. Martin replied that role envisaged by Rapacki for Commission was rather negative. It would consist mainly in receiving grievances of each side and reporting them to other side and to Co-Chairman. Mr. Martin added that such a view of Commission's activities was of course not repeat not shared by Canada. Canada had accepted a commitment and Canada was determined to live up to it. Mr. Martin had agreed to study Polish ideas and intended to go over ground again with Mr. Rapacki. So far as Russians were concerned, they did not repeat not seem to believe that Commission would do much to bring about a settlement in Vietnam.

Cessation of Bombing

During Mr. Martin's recent call on His Holiness Paul VI shortly after Mr. Harriman's visit, Pope had indicated that he might wish to advocate a Christmas truce as in previous years but not repeat not in a way that would appear to be inimical to interests of USA. Mr. Harriman would know of Pope's ideas in this connection.

Mr. Martin referred to several occasions on which his Russian and Polish hosts had argued that there was no repeat no possibility of ending war unless bombing of North Vietnam ceased. Each time Mr. Martin had insisted, as Mr. Pearson this week in Ottawa, that it was unrealistic to expect USA to stop bombing North Vietnam unless North Vietnam gave some indication of its intended response.[83] In Moscow Gromyko had told him that he could not repeat not tell what response would be. All he would say was that atmosphere would be improved. In Warsaw Rapacki had stated that if USA stopped bombing North Vietnam unconditionally that would be a new situation. Mr. Rusk expressed appreciation for Mr. Pearson's and Mr. Martin's statements of USA position but observed that neither Poles nor Russians were prepared to guarantee what they would do, let alone what Hanoi would do if USA agreed to a cessation of bombing. USSR had suggested last autumn that bombing

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[83] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 10, pp. 10285–10286.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 10, p. 10285-10286.

operations be suspended for 15 to 20 days. USA had suspended bombing operations for twice that number of days and only sign from Hanoi had been an increase in North Vietnamese trucking activities.

Mr. Martin said that according to Rapacki there had been a response from Hanoi. It was contained in January letter from Ho Chi Minh which asked USA to end unconditionally bombing operations against North Vietnam and to accept Four Points of DRVN. According to Rapacki word "accept" was a faulty translation of French "*reconnaître*" in authentic text of letter. Mr. Rusk replied that whatever semantics of case, USA had proposed discussions on basis of points 1, 2 and 4 and asked that point 3 (on NLF programme) be revised. There had never been an answer from Hanoi. Fact that Communists have now upped their price should entitle USA to know what their response would be. Mr. Rusk thought it unfair that all pressure was exerted on USA to bridge gap simply because USSR and its allies would not repeat not move.

Mr. Martin ventured personal view that if bombing stopped something would have to be done by other side. USSR and Polish Governments would be hard pressed by Canada to take some concrete steps. Mr. Rusk replied that USSR had not repeat not lifted a finger to get Laos Agreement working despite fact that USA had made a notable concession in accepting Soviet candidate Souvanna Phouma. In exchange USA had received nothing: North Vietnam did not repeat not withdraw its troops and ICC was not repeat not allowed to function by Pathet Lao. Ignorance could not repeat not be pleaded. After crisis of Berlin and Cuba all obstacles to communication with USSR have been removed.

Nevertheless, Mr. Martin said there remained obstacles to understanding. Communists were not repeat not sure of real intentions of USA, [or] so they argued. Where would they stand if USA bases were not repeat not withdrawn? Gromyko had told Mr. Martin that he would have to increase USSR assistance in supplies and manpower to North Vietnam as war went on. If USA did not repeat not do something then there would be no repeat no end in sight. Mr. Gromyko had said that Hanoi was now as independent of China as it would ever be.

Mr. Rusk countered that USA was not repeat not going to give up South Vietnam because of danger that China could enter war. This risk had to be faced. "We are not repeat not going to permit seizure of South Vietnam by North Vietnam by force. If Big Brother wants to, there will be a bigger war. If Canada can come back with an indication that peace will result from stopping bombing, the bombing will be stopped". Mr. Martin's basic impression of this part of conversation was that Mr. Rusk was deeply troubled over war in Vietnam and anxious to find any reasonable way of bringing it to an end.

Proposed meeting of ICC in Geneva

After luncheon Secretary of State took SSEA to his office and they had a few words together in private. Mr. Martin gave Mr. Rusk a complete set of his telegraphic reports to DEA on his meetings in USSR and Poland. At same time Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Martin whether it would be worthwhile to suggest that Canadian, Indian and Polish representatives should meet in Geneva to discuss role of ICC. They could also examine whether it would be possible to "start something going". USA could not repeat not cease bombing unilaterally unless there was reciprocal action and as there was little likelihood at this time that such reciprocal action would be taken it would seem desirable to initiate some movement through a meeting of this kind. Mr. Martin replied that in view of Polish position on inactivity of Commission he did not repeat not think that Poles would accept such a suggestion. However, he stated that he would be willing to study it and he was anxious to help if he could. Mr. Martin reminded Mr. Rusk that he (Rusk) had suggested earlier a meeting of those Geneva powers which agreed to come together in hope that others would join them. Mr. Rusk had also suggested previously a meeting only of Commission members. Mr. Rusk's present idea was of same order.

Attitude of Soviet Co-Chairman and of Poles to earlier ideas had not repeat not been helpful at that time. However, he undertook to have Mr. Rusk's latest suggestion studied without delay. Mr. Martin's impression is that Mr. Rusk is most anxious to find a way to initiate a move towards eventual negotiation and is exploring all possible avenues to this end.

In response to Mr. Martin's question, Mr. Rusk confirmed that USA would take every possible action to protect safety of Commission aircraft on its runs to Hanoi." Text ends.

481.
Telegram from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. Y-806
Ottawa, November 28, 1966
Secret. Flash.
Reference: Washington Tel 3569† Nov 25.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Delhi, CFHQ; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Bogota, Hong Kong from Ottawa; Warsaw, Moscow from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.
For Minister from USSEA.

VIETNAM – COMMISSION ROLE IN GETTING NEGOTIATIONS GOING

Rusk's suggestion (reference telegram) that it might be possible for Commission powers to organize embryonic conference is not repeat not new. You will recall that Canadian initiative in proposing "good offices" role for Commission grew out of consideration that was being given about this time last year to possibility of getting some sort of discussion going within Geneva framework on basis of administrative difficulties facing Commission and fact that its terms of reference had been out-distanced by events. Broad outlines of our thinking in this connection were discussed with Stewart and Rusk at time of NATO ministerial meeting last December and in these conversations Rusk first raised with you possibility of a "rolling barrage" according to which there might first be a meeting of Co-Chairmen, who would later call in Commission members, and subsequently extend conference to include wider circles. These ideas were held in abeyance because of diplomatic activities accompanying December-January bombing pause. Developments during this period convinced us that call for any kind of conference at this time would not repeat not have been useful and our thinking moved instead in direction of probing exercise conducted by Commission. In the end you will recall this did not repeat not work out as we had hoped and we therefore decided to proceed on our own.

2. USA thinking about establishing Geneva Conference nucleus was next discussed with us during pause (i.e., possibility of installing someone such as Harriman in Geneva and waiting to see "who might turn up to talk to him") and again when you met Rusk in Washington on February 19. Washington telegram 510 February 21 (which was repeated to Permis New York) gives an outline of Rusk's ideas as presented at that time and your reaction to them in light of our own efforts and in particular our assessment that any kind of conference proposal would not repeat not meet with positive response from Communist powers concerned.

3. Most recently concept of an "expanding" conference on Vietnam was discussed when you were in Washington towards end of July when the basic suggestion was apparently that in the light of Soviet intransigence, British Co-Chairman might act unilaterally in issuing

invitations to Geneva Conference. Our analysis of the implications of this possibility with which you indicated your agreement was outlined in memo dated July 27, text of which is set out in my immediately following telegram† for your convenient reference.

4. Basically, our approach to these problems has not repeat not changed. Our continued scepticism is based on expectation that Communist reaction to any conference proposal whatever its presentational form would be negative. This was certainly impression conveyed to you in both Warsaw and Moscow. Moreover, by attempting a move of this sort prematurely and having it turned down we would run risk of making a potentially useful technique more difficult to revive at a time when circumstances might suggest the likelihood of a more helpful or more positive Communist response.

5. You will recall that when you were in Warsaw the Polish Foreign Minister put forward certain suggestions about the form which the Vietnam Commissions might take for the future. Although no repeat no substantive Canadian reaction was conveyed to Rapacki we agreed to pursue this matter with Poles bilaterally in first instance. This is in our interest since Indians are likely to cast their influence in support of Polish suggestions which we have yet to consider in light of relatively negative reaction of Poles to any substantive role for Commission in present circumstances it seems unlikely that Poles would be prepared to lend themselves to anything which might look like the beginnings of a conference [*sic*].

6. For all these reasons we believe that it would be desirable to keep this possibility in the background for the moment and not repeat not raise it with Indians or indeed other interested countries until we have an opportunity to see whether there is any direction in which Rusk's idea can be developed. We believe it is important that we should if possible maintain the initiative in this connection and any premature discussion with others might weaken the possibility of our doing so.

[Marcel] Cadieux

482.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 2635
Delhi, December 2, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: London (Immediate); Permis New York, Washington (Immediate) from Ottawa.

SVN COMMISSION POWERS INITIATIVE

According to T.N. Kaul, Secretary EA-1, who just spoke to me with the concurrence of his Minister, the MEA is sufficiently interested in a conference initiative by the three ICSC powers, India, Canada and Poland, along the lines of the detailed programme developed by Roger Fisher, Harvard Professor, to consult Canadian and Polish Ministries. He asks me and proposes to ask Polish Ambassador here without waiting for our response to ascertain from our Governments whether they would be willing to study the project through their representatives here in Delhi under Chairmanship of the Indian Minister of External Affairs.

2. Essentially the project is for the three Commission powers acting under the authority of the last paragraph of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference of 1954 to ask the conference powers and combatants including NLF who are willing to do so (either directly or through others) to meet with Commission powers in Delhi to advise them how the Control Commission could best carry out the Geneva Agreement. The invitation to the meeting would call on the USA to discontinue bombings two days before the meeting date and all

parties to refrain from any major military operations or the deployment of military forces in Vietnam during the meeting. The Poles would be asked to make preliminary overtures to North Vietnam and Canada to do the same with USA. The detailed project is presented in two papers dated November 3 and 16, which I am informed are the product of private discussions which Fisher initiated with our Assistant Permrep at the UN, Gordon Cox, plus a Pole and an Indian. Presumably Mr. Cox could supply.

3. Kaul seems ready to proceed hopefully along these lines particularly if he gets Polish cooperation. Project may look like usurpation of Co-Chairman's role but as USSR cannot repeat not take Chairman's initiative it might be pleased to see Polish and other initiatives for which USSR would not repeat not be directly accountable.

4. Assuming you can secure Fisher papers, should appreciate your instructions about reply to be given to Kaul. If further info needed, shall obtain use of Kaul's only copies of Fisher documents and report more fully.

[Roland] Michener

483.
Record of Conversations between Secretary of State for External Affairs and Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, December 7, 1966
Compte rendu des conversations entre le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Tchécoslovaquie, 7 décembre 1966
MG32-B12, vol. 227, 26

Confidential.
[Ottawa, n.d.]

The conversations were held on December 7 from 9.15 to 11.00 a.m. and again from 5.15 to 7 p.m. in the Committee Room of the Privy Council, East Block.

Present on the Czechoslovak side were:

Foreign Minister David; Ambassador Zemla; Mr. Trhlik, Head of the 6th Department, MFA; Mr. Johanes, Personal Secretary to the Foreign Minister; Mr. Novotny, Embassy First Secretary; Mr. Strasik, Interpreter.

On the Canadian side were:

SSEA; USSEA; Mr. Halstead; Mr. Cornett; Mr. Fortier; Mr. Seaborn; Mr. Murray; Mr. Weidman.

[…]

Vietnam

5. Mr. David said that Czechoslovakia was greatly worried by the situation in Vietnam – the escalation of military actions, the air-raids on the DRVN, the destruction of hospitals built by Czechoslovakia, the increase in foreign troops and equipment in South Vietnam. The USA was acting in violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and of the Charter of the United Nations. American expressions of interest in a peaceful solution were not matched by their deeds, and by so speaking they deceived world public opinion. It was clear from the extension of their network of bases in South-East Asia that they intended to remain in the area and they wanted the bases to be used against movements of National Liberation in that part of the world.

6. Czechoslovakia supported fully the DRVN and the NLF. The US Government should unconditionally stop its air-raids against the DRVN, should respect the right of the peoples of South Vietnam to decide on their own destiny without foreign intervention and should recognize the NLF as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people. The USA was responsible for everything that was happening in South Vietnam. Canada could do a lot to change the course of events because of its influence in Washington.

7. Mr. Martin said he shared Mr. David's concern over the expansion of the conflict. The main purpose of his recent visit to Poland and the USSR was to discuss Vietnam. He had not made great progress but the exchange of views had been useful and he was not pessimistic. All members of the international community had an obligation to try to bring the war to an end and all should use the influence they had with their friends to that end.

8. Canada, said the Minister, is convinced of USA good faith when it says it wants the conflict brought to an end. It does not intend to remain in Vietnam nor to continue to occupy bases in the area. It had other ways of maintaining its presence in Asia if it wanted to. It was not realistic to think that the USA would say publicly that it would stop the bombing unconditionally and forever, but it would stop given some indication of reciprocal action. Violations of the Geneva Agreement were not all on one side and it was equally important that the DRVN stop its intervention in the South. It was a fact that there were two communities in Vietnam, the Communists in the North and the non-Communists in the South. This did not mean that the present division would necessarily be permanent and eventually no doubt the area would be neutralist. Mr. Martin said that he could not accept Mr. David's contention that the Viet Cong were the sole representatives of the people of South Vietnam but, as the USA had made it clear, there was no reason why the Viet Cong could not be a party to the ultimate settlement.

9. Canada, as a member of the ICSC, had urged a role for the Commission which might lay the ground-work for a conference. Poland, however, was not convinced that this was possible in present circumstances even though it did not exclude the possibility for the future. As no tripartite arrangement was possible, we asked Mr. Ronning to visit Hanoi. The authorities in Hanoi still consider the Ronning channel open and he will return there whenever it seems useful. In conclusion, he appealed to Czechoslovakia to intervene with Hanoi and urge that some indication be given as to what it would do in response to a cessation of the bombing. We must, he said, take advantage of the Christmas/New Year's truce to make a herculean effort to seek a permanent cessation of the bombing and to get negotiations under way.

10. To this, Mr. David said that the USA must match its deeds to its words. The USA had started the conflict and it should have known beforehand how to stop it. The two sides could not be attributed the same level of guilt. Czechoslovakia was not authorized to start negotiations on behalf of the DRVN. The responsibility rests with the USA for it has provoked the dangerous situation.

11. Mr. Martin concluded by saying it was apparent that neither the USSR nor the USA wanted the war to continue. Perhaps the USA should stop the bombing but it must have some indication that the DRVN would similarly put an end to the infiltration from North to South.

[…]

484.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to North Atlantic Council
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. Y-844
Ottawa, December 13, 1966
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Flash.
Reference: Our Tel Y-842† Dec 13.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Washington, Permis New York, Geneva, Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Saigon.

VIETNAM – PROPOSALS FOR A COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Following is text of proposed memo to Minister outlining our suggestions regarding most useful way of approaching current proposals for action by Commission.

Begins: You will recall that in your conversation with him in Washington about two weeks ago, Rusk raised with you the possibility of the Commission powers "getting something going" which might lead to negotiations on Vietnam. We have examined the possibilities for such action in the light of the objectives Rusk has in mind as well as on the basis of the suggestions Rapacki put to you in Warsaw and a set of proposals drafted by Prof. Fisher of Harvard which have now attracted official Indian interest. Our analysis of these possibilities, with special reference to the Fisher proposals, is outlined in our reference telegram.

2. Although there are obvious flaws in the Fisher proposals, they are in line with our own earlier thinking and there is enough in them to provide a realistic basis for a workable initiative. The problem will be to shape these proposals in such a way as to give them a maximum chance of commanding a fair hearing on both sides.

3. As matters stand, the Indians have asked the Poles and ourselves whether we would be prepared to meet in Delhi to discuss these proposals in a preliminary way. Assuming a positive Polish reaction, the next step envisaged would appear to be a Canadian sounding in Washington. While this is obviously something which remains to be negotiated, the present assumption is that, if the Poles do respond affirmatively, they would almost certainly insist that any forward movement, including the prospects of a Polish sounding in Hanoi, would hinge on what we can discover in Washington with regard to USA willingness to stop the bombing.

4. The Polish response to the Indian "invitation" is of course difficult to predict. On the one hand, it is unlikely that they would take too enthusiastic a view of a set of proposals which, if implemented, would amount in the end to a Vietnam Conference regardless of the veneer given to it. On the other hand, if the Poles were to suspect that we, or more important the USA, might take a negative view of this scheme they could feel tempted to lead the Indians to believe that their own reaction would have been positive if there had been any hopeful signs from USA and its friends. Whatever the substantive attractions of the Fisher proposals, we believe that this aspect of the Indian "invitation" merits careful study since we would wish to avoid casting ourselves in role of blocking a sensible looking Commission initiative. Similarly, we would wish to avoid, if at all possible, putting the USA in that position.

5. When all is said and done, we do not see how we can decline Indian "invitation" at least to discuss these ideas in Delhi regardless of Polish response which, if it is positive, could be a hopeful sign. In such circumstances, our objective would be to modify the basic proposals into something more workable – although even at this stage, and supposing the Poles agree to preliminary talks in Delhi, it must be recognized that strong Indian-Polish pressure could develop to focus the Commission's full attention on stopping the bombing without any counterbalancing military concessions.

6. If the proposed meeting in Delhi does in fact take place, it appears that we would be asked, at an early stage, to undertake consultations with the USA. This being the case, and in the light of the considerations outlined above, we believe that there could be advantage in not waiting for our "consultations" with the Indians and Poles to reach that stage, and informing the Americans now about this project. This would enable them to take a close look at the project, and our own ideas in relation to it, to see whether a positive response could be developed to the Fisher proposals in some modified form. In giving them advance notice, however, we believe that we should emphasize the need to avoid saying anything about it since we suspect that the Poles may be looking for opportunities which would absolve them from being the first to throw cold water on this initiative even before the initial meeting of Commission powers proposed by the Indians.

7. You may therefore wish to discuss these matters with Rusk by way of follow-up to your recent conversation with him in Washington. Alternatively, you may judge that the pressure of business in Paris would not give you an adequate opportunity to discuss the prospects for a Commission initiative with Rusk in the detail which would be essential for forming an impression of U.S. thinking. In that case, we would propose that you might simply inform Rusk that we have been looking at the question he raised with you in Washington and that you will be asking Ritchie to give an account of our thinking to Bundy as a preliminary to your discussing the latter further with Rusk.[84]

485.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to North Atlantic Council
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. Y-849
Ottawa, December 14, 1966
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tels Y-842, Y-844 Dec 13 and Y-848† Dec 14.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Washington, Permis New York, Geneva, Delhi (Routine).
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Saigon.

VIETNAM: PROPOSALS FOR COMMISSION INITIATIVE

For USSEA:

In light of our analysis of various proposals looking towards use of Commission to bring about some form of international discussion of Vietnam conflict, we envisage progress being made on following lines:

(1) There would be preliminary meeting of representatives of Commission powers which could be held in Delhi. It is conceivable that Poles would decline to attend. It is also conceivable, however, that Indians would encourage Poles to attend by committing themselves to work with them towards an appeal for cessation of bombing without any meaningful countervailing undertaking from North. To preclude such a situation Canadian attendance at such a meeting would have to be subject to certain prior understandings including following (a) all decisions concerning possible action by Commission powers must be unanimous; (b) in appealing for cooperation of main parties Commission powers would aim at some balance in what is expected of them by way of reductions in military activity; (c) Commission would hold itself responsible (again by unanimity) for taking effective measures to satisfy each side that commitments undertaken by other were being carried out.

(2) Purpose of this preliminary meeting would be to formulate basis for consultation by Commission powers with 1954 Geneva powers and others, with a view to seeking fresh guidance on how International Commission should interpret its original responsibilities in very different circumstances prevailing in Vietnam today. In Canada's view, such consultation should be held in Geneva, or in some other generally acceptable centre outside countries

[84] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 351 n. 3.

sponsoring consultation or invited to attend it. As far as timing is concerned, aim might be to link this initiative to one of three limited truces which have been announced for between now and early February.

(3) We do not envisage planned consultation taking form of full-fledged conference, at least to begin with. There are two reasons for this. In first place, very concept of conference is likely to frighten off North Vietnamese and their friends. Secondly, formal conference poses prior problem as to who should be invited and in what capacity; in present circumstances we think this problem is better finessed than faced. This can most readily be done by three Commission powers calling upon interested parties, individually or in groups, to put their views before Commission powers. This would enable interested parties to present their views without kind of commitment which would necessarily arise in conference situation. It would also, of course, facilitate informal contacts at periphery to extent that interested parties wished to take advantage of them.

(4) In light of all we know, it is clear that cessation of bombing constitutes indispensable element in any forward move if it is to stand chance of being considered by other side. By same token, we recognize that from point of view of USA, this element cannot stand alone and in isolation from all other aspects of military situation. Whatever the package which it may prove possible to negotiate as prelude to international consultation, we think that cessation of bombing would have to be chronologically first step, with other steps to follow in prearranged sequence. Presumably it would be for preliminary meeting of Commission powers in Delhi to determine what total package to be aimed at should look like and to arrange for reactions to total package, and how it might be broken down, to be sought from Washington and Hanoi. If bargain can be struck which is substantively and presentationally acceptable to parties, Commission powers would then call for implementation of these measures as necessary to provide appropriate climate for proposed international consultation.

486.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

Secret.
[Ottawa,] December 19, 1966

VIETNAM – COMMISSION INITIATIVE

I attach for your signature, if you agree, a telegram asking our High Commissioner to convey a personal message from you to the Indian Foreign Minister.[85]

The message has been drafted with the following purposes in mind:

(1) It expresses your positive reaction to the suggestion for a preliminary meeting of Commission powers to be held in New Delhi which has been put to us by Indian officials;

(2) It is not specifically directed to the proposals which have been formulated by Professor Fisher of Harvard University; this is in part because we would regard these proposals as providing merely a basis for discussion and in part because we assume that you would wish

[85] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Mr. Martin's desk. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]
2 tel[egram]s for signature. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]
Tel[egram]s signed and sent Dec 19/66 7.15 p.m. [Peter McKellar?] 19 Dec.

to cast your message more specifically in terms of the proposals you have previously put to your Polish and Indian colleagues for Commission action aimed at bringing a peaceful solution of the Vietnam conflict within the compass of achievement;

(3) In line with the paper which you showed to Mr. Rusk in Paris, the message sets out some broad concepts which we believe to be important in guiding our joint endeavours if the proposed Commission initiative is to be productive of real results.

While there is a good deal to be said for letting the Indians make the running with the Poles at this stage, we realize that you would wish to say something to Mr. Rapacki in the light of your recent discussions with him in Warsaw. Accordingly, we are now considering the possible terms of a message from you to Mr. Rapacki having in mind that it is our interest not to do or say anything which might conceivably frighten off the Poles by implying more ambitious objectives for the proposed preliminary meeting in Delhi than they could reconcile with their own position of support for the purposes and policies of the North Vietnamese government. I think we can assume that, if the Poles respond positively to the Indian suggestion, Mr. Rapacki's proposals to you will not require separate consideration since they will presumably be raised by the Poles at the Delhi meeting.[86]

I am also attaching a second telegram† to Delhi explaining to Mr. Michener why your message to Mr. Chagla should be conveyed without supporting commentary, but expressing an interest in preliminary Indian reactions, and in any indications of Polish reactions to the Indian suggestion.

R.E. Collins for M[arcel] C[adieux]

487.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. Y-859
Ottawa, December 19, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel 2635 of Dec 2.
Repeat for Information: London, Permis New York, Washington, Saigon, Geneva, Paris, NATO Paris, Moscow (Routine).
By Bag: Warsaw, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.
Following for High Commissioner.

VIETNAM: COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Please convey following message from me to Foreign Minister Chagla as soon as possible. Begins:

My dear colleague,

1. As you will be aware, I have been giving thought, for some time now, to the possibilities which might be open to us as Commission powers to take some action aimed at bringing the conflict in Vietnam closer to an eventual peaceful solution. You will recall that I raised this subject with your predecessor in a message which I conveyed to him in February of this year.

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[86] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Agreed. P[aul] M[artin]

2. In the intervening period we have all, I think, watched with concern the course which this conflict has been taking. We have also, each of us acting within our individual capacity, attempted to see whether there was any positive influence we could bring to bear on the situation in Vietnam. I think you will agree that the results so far have fallen short of our expectations.

[3.] I believe it was your predecessor's judgment that we would be going beyond the responsibilities assigned to us at Geneva if we were to pursue the course which I regarded as holding some promise at that time. As I recall, it was also his view that this raised questions which engaged the responsibility of the Co-Chairmen, at least in the first instance. Subsequent experience suggests, I think, that we cannot look to an agreed initiative in this matter being taken by the Co-Chairman in present circumstances.

4. Given this situation, I am more than ever convinced that there is an obligation which rests upon us as Commission powers to seize any opportunities which may present themselves to us for constructive action.

5. It is from this perspective that I have considered the suggestion made to our High Commissioner earlier this month by your officials. As I understand it, this envisages a preliminary meeting in Delhi of Indian, Canadian and Polish representatives to examine the possibility of a Commission initiative looking towards a broader consultation on the problems confronting the Commission at this time.

6. It is probably inevitable that any preliminary discussions we have will be wide ranging and touch upon all aspects of the Vietnam problem in its broadest sense. With this in mind there are one or two points which I should like to put to you at this stage.

7. I think we are agreed that any Commission initiative which seeks to contribute to a reversal of the present course of events in Vietnam must be such as to command the cooperation of the major interested parties. That being the case, I very much agree with the views expressed to me by your predecessor that we should aim at proceeding on the basis of unanimity. In view of the nature of the problems involved, it seems to me that any majority approach is unlikely to produce the results we would like to see achieved.

8. It is possible that, on the basis of our preliminary discussions, we may see advantage in calling upon the parties to take certain steps in an effort to facilitate our endeavours in arranging an international consultation. I assume we are agreed that it would be unrealistic to expect any such call to have much chance of being heeded unless it were balanced in some way which would reflect the responsibilities of both sides in relation to the present situation.

9. In conclusion, I should like to say this: from the discussions which I have had in the last month or so, in European capitals, in Washington and at the U.N., I am convinced there is a strong desire in many quarters to see this issue moved into the channels of a peaceful resolution. You and I have no illusions, I think, with regard to the formidable problems which remain to be overcome if this is to be done. Nevertheless, it has always seemed to me that this is precisely the situation in which the unique position of the Commission powers can be brought into play. Accordingly, I want you to know that my reaction to the suggestion for a preliminary meeting in Delhi is positive and, assuming that there is a substantial measure of agreement between us on how we might proceed, I am ready to make Canadian representatives available to participate in such a meeting as soon as it can possibly be convened. If we were able to take advantage of the forthcoming cease-fires in Vietnam to carry forward our joint endeavours, that would be all to the good.

Paul Martin

488.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/8

No. 3850
Washington, December 19, 1966
Secret. Limited Distribution. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-849 Dec 14.
Repeat for Information: NATO Paris, Paris, Permis New York, Geneva, London; Delhi from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London.
For USSEA.

VIETNAM: PROPOSALS FOR COMMISSION INITIATIVE

I reviewed with Assistant Secretary Bundy this afternoon proposal for Commission initiative as described in reference telegram. Although Bundy had not repeat not yet had opportunity to familiarize himself with all aspects of proposal since his return from abroad, he had been in touch with Secretary Rusk and could confirm that latter was "inherently sympathetic" with this "very imaginative proposal".

2. During review of various points in reference telegram Bundy offered no repeat no comment on question of unanimity among Commission members or on proposed link of initiative to truces. When I pointed out that NLF would logically be one of "interested parties" upon which Commission powers would call for views, Bundy replied "we see point". He appreciated that inclusion of ICRC and Secretary-General might fuzz status of NLF representative.

3. When I asked whether question of cessation of bombing would pose any difficulty Bundy said that inclusion of this point was "understandable". He emphasized that from USA point of view important aspect was agreement on "pre-arranged sequence" mentioned in reference telegram. As indicated by Goldberg's statement such a chronological arrangement was "not repeat not unacceptable" to USA.

4. Bundy offered no repeat no objection when I indicated that you might decide to move very promptly to initiate consultations with Delhi.

[A.]E. Ritchie

489.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. 2784
Delhi, December 20, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-859 Dec 19.
Repeat for Information: London, Saigon; Washington, Permis New York from Ottawa; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva from London.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.
For SSEA.

VIETNAM: COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Message delivered to Chagla who received it with evident pleasure. He expressed thanks, agreement with your views and satisfaction that your concurrence would "strengthen his hand with Poles" who have not repeat not yet responded. They will be approached again. Chagla will reply further to your message.

2. Chagla seemed pleased with Goldberg's request to Secretary-General which he described as significant advance in USA position because they cannot repeat not very well refuse unconditional cessation bombing if Secretary-General after visiting Hanoi recommends it.

[Roland] Michener

490.
Memorandum from Departmental Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs to Far Eastern Division
Note de l'adjoint ministériel du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] December 20, 1966

NOTES ON MEETING BETWEEN HIGH COMMISSIONER OF INDIA AND SSEA TUESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1966

General Chaudhuri, High Commissioner of India, called on the Minister at 12:30 p.m. Tuesday, December 20, to deliver a reply from Foreign Minister Chagla to Mr. Martin's note of congratulations on Chagla's becoming Indian Foreign Minister.

2. After the amenities, Mr. Martin raised the subject of the Indian proposal for a meeting of the International Control Commission members in New Delhi. After reviewing the background of the Commission's activities since January, 1966, Mr. Martin handed to General Chaudhuri the text of New Delhi telegram number 2784 of December 20 (attached).[87] He said that he was very pleased at Mr. Chagla's reaction. Now the question was how to involve the Poles, who were presumably not free agents like Indians and Canadians. When the Minister was in Poland, Mr. Rapacki had suggested a meeting of the members of the ICC in Warsaw in order to discuss a passive role for the Commission so as not to prejudice its possible future usefulness in any negotiations. At that time, Mr. Martin had rejected this suggestion because of Canada's commitment to a positive role for the Commission. However, he still had not formally replied to Mr. Rapacki's suggestion, and this reply might be a vehicle for presenting the Indian proposal to the Poles. The Minister added that the coming Christmas truce and his conversations with Mr. Rusk about the Vietnam problem while they were at NATO constituted an opportunity for Commission action not to be missed.

3. The Minister then speculated about the future. After a preliminary meeting as proposed by the Indians – to suit the Chinese and National Liberation Front this might well occur at a place other than Delhi – consideration might be given to meeting individually with the several parties in the Vietnam dispute, as well as with neutral non-governmental bodies such as the Red Cross. The Minister hoped that a series of such meetings might open up new avenues toward progress. The Minister told Mr. Chaudhuri that Dean Rusk was aware of the

[87] See previous document./Voir le document précédent.

Indian initiative; he also revealed that the Poles currently have a parliamentary mission visiting North Vietnam. Mr. Martin suggested that this group might very well be sounding out the North on its position. In response to General Chaudhuri's question on what he knew about North Vietnam thinking, Mr. Martin replied that the North had told Mr. Ronning that it would sit down at the negotiating table without insisting on its four-point proposal as a pre-condition. He also had information to the effect that the Ronning channel to North Vietnam was still open as far as Hanoi was concerned.

4. He felt that it was most important for the members of the Commission to keep working on every possible front, especially since he was certain that the United States would not unconditionally cease bombing North Vietnam, nor were the North Vietnamese ready to negotiate without any sign of American de-escalation. The North Vietnamese may be suffering more than is publicly revealed, but there is no positive evidence of this except for the assessment offered by the United States. As well, Mr. Martin felt that North Vietnam, having held out as long as it has, may continue its effort since it is aware of the domestic political dilemma facing the United States administration.

5. As for the USSR, Mr. Martin felt it may well be doing more than is generally realized in attempting to moderate the position of the North Vietnamese and bring an end to the conflict. Some members of the External Affairs Department believe that the USSR do not really wish an end to the war; however, the Minister's judgment was entirely different. With this sentiment, General Chaudhuri agreed.

6. The Minister insisted that the initiative proposed by the Indians must be kept alive. If the Poles refused an invitation to meet with the Indians and Canadians in Delhi, perhaps their invitation to a conference in Warsaw could be accepted as a means of keeping the dialogue going. The Minister then returned to the point that the Commission should deal with all sides. He specifically mentioned meeting with the National Liberation Front.

7. The Minister concluded by mentioning that some of his ideas on this subject had come from a Professor of International Law at Harvard named Fisher. He suggested that General Chaudhuri might care to read Professor Fisher's article and consider its implications. General Chaudhuri promised he would do so and would contact the Minister if he had any suggestions to offer.

Peter McKellar

491.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. 2788
Delhi, December 21, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-859 Dec 19 and My Tel 2784 Dec 20.
Repeat for Information: London, Saigon; Washington, Permis New York from Ottawa; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva from London.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: COMMISSION INITIATIVE

For SSEA.

When Polish Ambassador Ogrodzinski and wife made formal farewell call today he gave me no repeat no encouragement to think that Poles would accept Indian invitation. Polish view as he had it from his Foreign Minister two or three days ago (apparently not repeat not

yet known to Chagla) was that initiative of Secretary-General at request of Goldberg[88] now "occupied the stage" and not repeat not only held greater promise of achievement but suited Poles better than putting themselves "in the forefront" as would the Indian plan for initiative by ICSC powers. Apparently his instructions, with which he did not repeat not seem to disagree, were quite clear and unless changed at the source seem to destroy possibility of unanimous action here even in organizing proposed preliminary discussion.

2. Perhaps you will wish to make representations in Warsaw either before or after Chagla has played his "strengthened hand" as to which I shall try to keep you informed.[89]

[Roland] Michener

492.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. Y-869
Ottawa, December 22, 1966
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Flash.
Reference: Your Tel 3313† Dec 20.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Moscow (Priority); Saigon (Priority) from Delhi; Warsaw (Priority) from London.
For Ignatieff.

VIETNAM – COMMISSION INITIATIVE

I have now had two separate opportunities to speak to Rusk on the phone about significance of Goldberg's letter to U Thant.[90] I am satisfied, on the basis of my talks with Rusk, that in putting this matter to U Thant, USA had no repeat no intention to cut across proposals we are currently pursuing with Indians and to which USA continue to attach very great importance.

2. Nevertheless, there are obvious pitfalls in a situation where USA appear to be pursuing parallel approaches through different channels. One of these is that Poles may already have been given a plausible excuse for declining to cooperate in a Commission initiative on the grounds that U Thant is better placed in their view to move matters forward in Vietnam. Another risk is that unless he is brought into the picture promptly U Thant might once again be put in position where he would have good reason to cast serious doubt on USA sincerity.

3. Accordingly, I would like you to take first opportunity to bring U Thant fully into the picture. In doing so you should base yourself on following material (a) our telegram Y-849 December 14 but with first sub-paragraph of paragraph 1 redrafted as follows: "There would be a preliminary meeting of representatives of Commission powers, which could be held in Delhi, on the assumption that there would be broad measure of agreement between the three participants that all decisions concerning, etc." (b) our telegram Y-859 December 19.

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88 See/Voir Robert H. Estabrook, "U.S. Asks Thant's Aid for Cease-Fire Talks," *Washington Post*, 20 December 1966, p. A1.

89 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
We must get word to the Sec[retary]-Gen[eral] so that the full implications of the Goldberg reply are understood. P[aul] M[artin]

90 See/Voir "Text of Goldberg's Letter," *New York Times*, 20 December 1966, p. 6.

In latter telegram we did not repeat not consider it necessary to spell out details of possible on-the-ground role for Commission in agreeing to meet in Delhi, although this idea would inevitably be raised in Delhi talks as discussions progressed to point where it would have practical relevance.

4. Before you call on U Thant, I would ask you to see Goldberg and put it to him that there might be advantage in your seeing U Thant jointly. In making this suggestion I have following considerations in mind: first, it is obviously for Americans and not repeat not for us to explain to U Thant the relationship between their invitation to him to bring about discussions looking towards a cease-fire and Commission initiative which we are discussing with Indians with full encouragement and support of USA. Second, in light of Delhi telegram 2788 December 21 it is entirely possible that we may jointly wish U Thant to use his influence in persuading Poles to participate in preliminary discussions of Commission powers which we envisage being held in Delhi. Third, it appears to me that there would be very great advantage in exploring with U Thant possibility of integrating Commission initiative with U Thant's current efforts to bring about conditions in which a cease-fire could be discussed (you might remind Secretary-General of the interest he expressed about a year ago in attempting to activate Geneva machinery and in possible role for Commission in this context). I make this proposal not repeat not because of any intrinsic attachment I have to proceeding in one way as against another. I do so because I am persuaded, on basis of all my recent conversations with Rusk, that sequence of steps which is implicit in proposed Commission initiative is more likely than any other to provide context into which an American cessation of bombing of North Vietnam can be fitted.

5. In view of our close association with Indians in working out a viable Commission initiative, I shall be informing Chagla of reasons why I think it important at this stage to bring U Thant into the picture. You may wish to keep in touch with your Indian colleague in New York on basis of my instruction to Delhi.

6. I would ask you to let me know as soon as your consultations with U Thant have taken place. Meanwhile info contained in this message should be held closely by all addressees other than Washington.

[Paul] Martin

493.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. Y-872
Ottawa, December 22, 1966
Confidential. Flash.
Reference: My Tel Y-869† Dec 21 to Permis New York.
Repeat for Information: Permis New York, Washington (Immediate), London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Moscow (Priority); Saigon (Priority) from Delhi; Warsaw (Priority) from London.

VIETNAM – COMMISSION INITIATIVE

For reasons outlined in my reference telegram I have decided that if Commission initiative we have been discussing with Indians is to move forward, it is essential that Secretary-General be brought into the picture immediately. Accordingly I should be grateful if you could speak to Foreign Minister Chagla in following terms: (a) I am grateful for indication of his positive initial reaction to my message; I have also reviewed our thinking on these matters with Indian High Commissioner here; (b) Polish response is obviously crucial to

forward movement and I hope Chagla will continue to keep me informed of progress of Indian-Polish discussions; (c) I would like him to know, in confidence, that we have had some indications that Polish response might well be negative on grounds that USA has now placed problem in hands of Secretary-General and that his efforts would be more likely to produce results than those of Commission powers; (d) quite apart from any effect which USA appeal to Secretary-General may have on Polish attitude towards moving forward on a Commission basis, I think it would be unprofitable, if not repeat not potentially counter-productive, if two operations geared to very much the same objective were to get off the ground at about same time and in virtual isolation from each other; (e) in all the circumstances, I concluded that it would be right to bring Secretary-General generally into the picture without delay. I have accordingly instructed my Permrep in New York to explain Canadian thinking on these matters to Secretary-General today. I have also asked him to keep in close touch with Indian Permrep about this; (f) it occurs to me that there might be advantage from all points of view if we explored possibility of integrating concept of a Commission initiative with any activity Secretary-General may be contemplating in response to Goldberg letter. I say this because (i) it may be helpful to us to have Secretary-General's assistance in enlisting Polish cooperation; (ii) significant reduction in military activity in Vietnam, which Secretary-General is pursuing, is also firmly built into proposals we intend to consider at our meeting in Delhi; (iii) on basis of tentative discussions I have had with Rusk in light of Goldberg letter to Secretary-General, I believe that sequence of steps I can envisage as forming part of Commission initiative we have been discussing could provide context in which USA may be prepared to cooperate in a militarily significant way; (g) if time had permitted, I should very much have preferred to concert our approach to Secretary-General with Indians; I hope, however, that Chagla will agree that this approach is calculated to advance our common interest in moving forward on this matter.

[Paul] Martin

494.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. 3354
New York, December 22, 1966
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Flash.
Reference: Your Tel Y-869 Dec 22.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva (Priority); Moscow, Warsaw (Priority) from London; Saigon (Priority) from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: COMMISSION INITIATIVE: TALK WITH U THANT

In accordance with instructions in your reference telegram, I saw U Thant at noon today to bring him fully into picture as regards proposals we are currently pursuing with Indians and to persuade him that Commission's initiative taken by India and responded to favourably by Canada was in no repeat no way in contradiction with any initiative which Secretary-General was taking on Vietnam but should be viewed as complementary to it. In support of my remarks, I gave him a copy of message conveyed by SSEA to Foreign Minister Chagla on December 20 and supported it with material contained in your telegram Y-849 December 14 with revision to sub-paragraph of paragraph 1 requested in your Y-869 December 22. U Thant's response on whole, though guarded at first, seemed to become more

responsive as we gave him info explaining (a) fact that it had been an Indian initiative (b) supported by Canada and (c) would be proceeded with on basis of unanimity and (d) required for its success cooperation of Poles.

2. We recalled also to U Thant that he had favourably responded in past to idea of role for ICSC in helping to bring about a ceasefire and in bringing parties together and that activities of ICSC unlike public appeal made to him by Goldberg had a chance of escaping too much public attention.

3. Latter point was particularly made in response to expressed unhappiness on part of Secretary-General to amount of publicity which had attended Goldberg's letter (our telegram 3300 refers) latter circulated as a Security Council document. He would have to make a formal reply to this communication but in meantime press constantly speculated as to what he was doing about it and with whom he was in touch.

4. When I explained to him that while I had kept Goldberg informed, we felt that joint approach was undesirable, Secretary-General readily agreed saying that USA open association with any initiative in regard to Vietnam in present circumstances insofar as other side was concerned was regarded as a "kiss of death".

5. U Thant said that as next step he would see Parthasarathi, Indian Ambassador, and would later get in touch with Polish Ambassador. He thought that while he wanted to give matter careful consideration, he thought that what we had proposed made good sense and that he would let us know in due course action he took.

6. Immediately on leaving U Thant I got in touch with Parthasarathi and urged him to confirm to U Thant when approached that initiative was Indian and importance of having Polish cooperation as well as ours if initiative was to have success. I gave him a copy of SSEA's message to Chagla.

[George] Ignatieff

495.
Telegram from Deputy Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent adjoint auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. 3363
New York, December 23, 1966
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Flash.
Reference: Our Tel 3361† Dec 23.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva; Delhi (Immediate) from Ottawa; Warsaw (Immediate), Moscow from London.

SAIGON-VIETNAM COMMISSION INITIATIVE

In response to my request, Bunche has just phoned to say that Secretary-General on his own initiative volunteered following info about his conversation with Polish Permrep Tomorowicz at noon today. Interview had been arranged at Tomorowicz's request but Secretary-General did not repeat not indicate whether Tomorowicz had raised any other subject. Interview had lasted nearly an hour which U Thant had explained in terms of Tomorowicz's slowness in expressing himself in English (as latter has spent nearly 7 years in England – in Polish Air Force during war and a subsequent posting to Polish Embassy in London – this is not repeat not exactly credible and we have always found him very fluent in English). Secretary-General had described Tomorowicz's attitude to proposal

for Commission initiative as "sternly negative". Main point Tomorowicz raised was fact that Commission discussions could not repeat not be kept secret and any publicity would evoke strong reaction from Peking which Poles consider inevitable and unacceptable. U Thant said that he had put to Tomorowicz his considered opinion that proposal for Commission initiative was a good one and that it did not repeat not conflict with any plans or views which he himself had. In this sense U Thant had favoured proposal. Bunche was unable to say whether Tomorowicz had undertaken to convey Secretary-General's views to Warsaw although it may be assumed that he would at least report conversation. Bunche was unable, however, to say whether Secretary-General had specifically asked for Polish reconsideration on basis of views he had expressed. As Secretary-General had volunteered above info, Bunche felt he was unable to put any specific questions to him.

[Gordon] Cox

496.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to Poland
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Pologne
RG25, vol. 9516, 100-11-3/1.2

No. Y-875
Ottawa, December 23, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Permis New York, Paris, NATO Paris, Moscow, Delhi, Geneva, Saigon from Delhi.

VIETNAM: COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Grateful if you could transmit following message to Foreign Minister Rapacki tomorrow December 24 which would allow Poles time to study report they will undoubtedly be receiving from their Permrep in New York resulting from interview with Secretary-General today. Text begins:

My dear colleague, Since my return to Ottawa from my visit to Europe in November, I have thought a great deal about some of the matters I had the pleasure of discussing with you in Warsaw. I think it will not repeat not surprise you if I say that the problem of Vietnam has been foremost in my mind, especially in light of the invitation our Indian colleague Mr. Chagla has extended to us recently. As a result of our recent talks, I think we have a clearer understanding of each other's views on the Vietnam problem, and I hope that it may be possible for us to translate this in due course into constructive action.

I was encouraged by your view that you do not repeat not exclude a role for the ICC in helping in the achievement of an ultimate settlement in Vietnam. Indeed, I recall you saying to me that if such a role did not repeat not lie within the realm of possibility, there would be no repeat no reason for maintaining the Commission in existence. At the same time, you felt the time had not repeat not yet come for such a role to be undertaken. In the meantime, I think we agree that the Commission is facing increasing difficulty in relating its mandate to the present situation which is in so many fundamental respects different from the circumstances prevailing when its mandate was drafted. I believe that this is something which could profitably be discussed between representatives of our three countries in the near future. It is also conceivable that we might wish in due course to seek the views of other interested parties.

The invitation which our Indian colleague has now extended to us to participate in a preliminary informal meeting in Delhi would give us an opportunity to exchange views on this subject. I have informed him that, if there is a substantial measure of agreement between our three countries on how we might proceed, I would be prepared to authorize Canadian representatives to attend.

I thought that you might be interested in this indication of present Canadian thinking in formulating your own response, which I hope will be positive, to Mr. Chagla's suggestion. In the event that we can agree to hold such discussion[s] in Delhi, it is probably inevitable that they will touch on broader aspects of the Vietnam problem since it is not repeat not possible to separate Commission's difficulties from the context in which they arise. I would, however, regard such discussions as preliminary, exploratory and certainly at this stage without any kind of commitment. Paul Martin. Text ends.

497.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. Y-877
Ottawa, December 28, 1966
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Permis New York, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Moscow; Warsaw from London; Saigon from Delhi.

VIETNAM – COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Following is relevant extract from letter dated December 27 which we received today from Indian High Commissioner.

Begins: "I have just heard from New Delhi that Poland is not repeat not inclined at present to the holding of a meeting of the ICC countries and they wish to wait and see the progress of U Thant's efforts. As distinct from the Canadian viewpoint, Poland does not repeat not wish our initiative to be integrated with that of U Thant. While you may have heard this from your own High Commissioner in Delhi, for the time being India is not repeat not pursuing the proposal to hold a meeting of the supervisory powers in Delhi." Ends.

498.
Telegram from Ambassador to Poland to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Pologne au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. 1689
Warsaw, December 28, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Reference: Your Tel Y-875 Dec 23.
Repeat for Information: London (Immediate); Washington, Permis New York, Paris, NATO Paris, Moscow, Delhi, Geneva (Immediate) from London; Saigon (Immediate) from Delhi.

VIETNAM – COMMISSION INITIATIVE

I saw Director General Michalowski at MFA today and we discussed SSEA's message to Rapacki and Indian initiative. Although Poles may eventually agree to meeting in Delhi, Michalowski made clear that they would not repeat not do so immediately.

2. According to Michalowski, original Indian suggestion to them was for meeting in Delhi at Foreign Minister level and with very ambitious agenda. When Polish Ambassador in Delhi said he thought it unlikely that Rapacki would feel able to attend, Indians then suggested that Secretary-General of Foreign Ministries might meet, or failing that, ambassadors. I judged from Michalowski's remarks that Poles were scared off by original Indian invitation which according to Michalowski's version sounded too elaborate, complicated and unrealistic.

3. Michalowski then referred to message from Mr. Martin which he described as being "much more reasonable" and which could be said to grow naturally from discussions which had taken place in Warsaw in November. But for the limited proposal put forward in SSEA's message, Poles did not repeat not see that there was any immediate urgency.

4. They would envisage such a meeting at the level of Ambassadors resident in Delhi but Polish Ambassador is about to leave and his replacement who will only arrive in February will need some time to settle in and fulfil protocol obligations before becoming involved in substantive work. In any event Michalowski maintained that American bombing of residential quarters of Hanoi represented escalation of war which made it difficult to envisage even limited preliminary meeting of representatives of Commission countries at this moment.

5. Michalowski said that when they "could see some signs that it is timely" then they could envisage kind of meeting proposed by Mr. Martin. I could not repeat not draw out Michalowski on what "signs" he had in mind. He did agree that unilateral cessation of bombing would not repeat not be essential but only indicated in vague terms that there would need to be some indication on USA side that they were seriously interested in de-escalation. In other words, Michalowski said that American declarations about wanting peace were not repeat not enough when they were accompanied by signs of increasing military activity which even extended to bombing residential areas.

6. Michalowski made only casual references to U Thant along with appeal by Pope,[91] etc. He made no repeat no suggestion at all that any activity by U Thant would affect possibility of meeting of Commission powers. According to Michalowski they have sent message to their Ambassador in Delhi explaining more limited kind of meeting which they understand to be proposed by Mr. Martin. I gather Poles expect their Ambassador to have further discussion with Chagla and are waiting for report on this meeting.

7. It is obvious to me that SSEA's message to Rapacki was very helpful and timely. Even though Poles are likely to move slowly I think it would be difficult for them to resist indefinitely a meeting of kind which has been put in acceptable perspective by Mr. Martin. There could probably be exchanges of views about level of representation and there will certainly need to be a patient approach to timing. But only hope of getting Poles to agree to meeting at all is to begin modestly and hope that once talks begin it will be possible to make progress.

[N.F.H.] Berlis

499.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 28605, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/3

No. 3368
New York, December 28, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Flash.
Reference: Our Tel 3363 Dec 23 and Collins-Ignatieff Telecon Dec 28.
For Prime Minister, SSEA, USSEA, Mr. Collins, Mr. Goldschlag.

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[91] See/Voir Robert C. Doty, "Pope Voices Hope Truce Will Lead to Vietnam Peace," *New York Times*, 23 December 1966, p. 1.

VIETNAM – COMMISSION INITIATIVE:
DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL

As agreed in reference telecon, I saw U Thant at noon today and went over with him points made in your telegram Y-872 December 22 to Delhi. I also left with him a copy of SSEA's message to Rapacki as set out in your telegram Y-875 to Warsaw. I mentioned that reference to indications that Polish response might well be negative were based on what was probably an initial personal reaction by Polish Ambassador in Delhi and that Chagla had pressed Poles to agree to Commission meeting in light of Canadian concurrence. I said that Indians, like us, considered possibility of Commission meeting as still open and that it was in light of this that you had sent your message to Rapacki on December 23 adding that fact that there had been no repeat no immediate response indicated that Poles were giving matter further serious consideration.

2. U Thant then confirmed that he had seen Polish Permrep Tomorowicz at noon on Friday (as reported in our reference telegram) at latter's request. He said that Tomorowicz had asked for appointment to convey to him some "very secret" info about efforts to bring about direct talks between USA and North Vietnamese which Tomorowicz had asked U Thant not repeat not to divulge to anyone and not repeat not even to his advisers in UN. After Tomorowicz had conveyed his info, U Thant had told him (as Bunche had reported to us) that he was aware of Indian proposal concurred in by Canada for a Commission initiative, that he thought it was a good move that did not repeat not conflict in any way with any plans of his own, and that he hoped some progress would be made along that line.

3. U Thant then said that although he had undertaken not repeat not to divulge info Tomorowicz had given him and had not repeat not discussed it with any of his advisers he felt he should tell someone and that in particular Mr. Martin should be aware of what Tomorowicz had told him. Speaking first from memory he said that Tomorowicz had shown him a memo on a series of talks between Ambassador Lodge and Polish Commissioner Lewandowski at home of Italian Ambassador D'Orlandi in Saigon beginning on November 14. It was not repeat not clear who had initiated talks but they were intended to outline a scheme for reduction and eventual cessation of hostilities and a degree of agreement had been reached which enabled Lewandowski to discuss understanding which had been reached between Lodge and Lewandowski with authorities in Hanoi. Lewandowski returned from Hanoi and saw Lodge again on December 1 with Hanoi's suggestion that USA proposals be put direct to North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw on December 6. USA agreement to this, with a caveat about some "differing interpretations" of details, was conveyed to Hanoi and Warsaw, and Rapacki had then consulted in Warsaw with USA Ambassador Gronouski, but USA bombing of Hanoi on December 2 and again on December 13-14 had brought operation to a close when Hanoi informed Rapacki that in view of bombings of Hanoi they could no repeat no longer regard agreement to engage in direct USA-DRVN contacts as being undertaken in good faith by USA.

4. At this point U Thant said that while Tomorowicz had allowed him to read memo he had not repeat not been authorized to allow him to keep it but had agreed to U Thant's taking notes which he had prepared himself and which he then went over with us. At first meeting on November 14 an understanding was reached that an attempt should be made to work out a plan for de-escalation of conflict beginning with unconditional prior cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. There would be no repeat no announcement of cessation of bombing as a victory or in any other way which would embarrass North Vietnamese or any other direct linking of it with any subsequent steps. Cessation of bombing was to be a unilateral undertaking with only assurance that it was a pre-requisite to any further steps toward negotiations. There would, however, be an understanding that a "package deal" would be worked out in context of which a de-escalation on both sides would take place and that assurances about complete USA withdrawal and dismantling of all USA bases together with "understandings" on any proposals which DRVN and Front for Liberation of South Vietnam

would be included. It was understood that first phase would provide only for cessation of bombing and that "after a certain period" all subsequent matters would be dealt with in direct negotiations, purpose of which would be to reach understandings on any proposals DRVN, NLF and USA would wish to include.[92]

5. A second meeting had been held following day (November 15) at which it was stated Lodge had agreed to some understandings on certain of additional elements, including arrangements for neutrality of South Vietnam after USA withdrawal and dismantling of all USA bases. It also included an understanding that there would be no repeat no insistence on an announcement or any other formal expression of North Vietnamese withdrawal from South Vietnam. It was also agreed that unification of two parts of Vietnam would be discussed by two Governments of Vietnam at a stipulated time.[93] At this meeting, Lewandowski had asked if understanding so far reached had approval of Washington and Lodge had replied in affirmative whereupon Lewandowski had gone to Hanoi. At a third meeting on December 1 after Lewandowski's return, Lodge had been informed that DRVN authorities insisted on having USA suggestions put to a DRVN representative directly with comment that if USA was sincere in its proposed undertakings there could be an immediate end to hostilities, and only condition about a direct meeting was that it should be kept absolutely secret and that any leak would result in an immediate repudiation and denial by Hanoi that direct discussion was taking place. Lodge agreed to both conditions.[94]

6. At a further meeting in home of D'Orlandi on December 3, after checking with Washington, Lodge had suggested a direct discussion between a DRVN representative and Gronouski in Warsaw on December 6 to confirm proposals he had put forward. Lodge said that no repeat no "big names" would be sent to Warsaw and that discussions would be undertaken by Gronouski but he also warned that there might be "differing interpretations" of some of details which had been mentioned in outline of "package deal". At this meeting there had also been some reference to bombing of Hanoi on December 2 as an indication that USA was not repeat not willing to proceed in good faith.[95]

7. On December 5 Rapacki had discussed matter with Gronouski in Warsaw asking for an explanation of "differences of interpretation" and also why USA had intensified bombing of North Vietnam. Gronouski had replied to latter point that he would explain it at proposed meeting with DRVN representatives but that it was essentially a matter of pre-planned raids which were conditional upon weather conditions. Rapacki had commented that USA seemed to attach more importance to military considerations than to political negotiations and had warned that Hanoi would not repeat not yield to this sort of pressure.[96] No repeat no further progress in arranging direct talks between Gronouski and Hanoi representatives seems to have been made before renewed bombing of Hanoi on December 13-14 and Gronouski had been informed through Rapacki on December 16 that DRVN would not repeat not proceed with discussions in view of this evidence of USA's bad faith. Rapacki had informed Gronouski that USA must accept full responsibility for this negative result.[97] Gronouski had tried to justify bombing of Hanoi by fact that DRVN deliberately installed military targets in built up civilian areas, but he continued to leave door open to direct talks with DRVN representatives with assurance that USA was willing to proceed on basis suggested. Rapacki had replied that in view of extension of bombing he doubted very much whether

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92 See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 306.

93 See/Voir ibid., document 308 n. 3.

94 See/Voir ibid., document 322.

95 See/Voir ibid., document 326.

96 See/Voir ibid., document 327.

97 See/Voir ibid., document 342.

DRVN would be prepared to continue arrangements for direct discussion and gave it as his considered opinion that effort had failed. U Thant commented that he agreed with Rapacki's conclusion, and his own impression was that there seemed to be a lack of direction, coordination and control in USA Government with Pentagon going in one direction, CIA in another, and State Department in a third. He agreed that we must all continue to do what we could to bring about a cessation of hostilities. He repeated that in his view proposed initiative of ICSC could be useful provided it was conducted in secrecy. He did ask, however, whether we thought it would be possible although it was outside its terms of reference for Commission to consider issuing an appeal for cessation of USA bombing. Secretary-General will probably include this in reply to Goldberg letter.

You will recall a reference to talks between Lodge and Lewandowski in paragraph 4 of Saigon's telegram 1116† December 5 and also some additional impressions of Italian Ambassador D'Orlandi's and Lewandowski's reactions to them in subsequent paragraphs of that telegram. D'Orlandi's reference to "everything is vague" may well have related to Lodge's caveat about "differing interpretations" rather than to Vatican initiative and Lewandowski's reference to "different logic" of North Vietnamese as being incommunicable to "white Europeans" may be closely related to same point. In any case it is unfortunate that U Thant has been given only Polish side of this story, which confirms his own impression, derived from his effort beginning in August/64 to arrange through Stevenson for direct USA-North Vietnamese discussions, of USA unwillingness or inability effectively to coordinate whatever efforts they make or are made on their behalf to bring about a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

In view of Secretary-General's explicit request for secrecy, I have addressed this to Ottawa only and you may wish to pass it for Ambassadors only at other directly interested posts.

[George] Ignatieff

500.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 28605, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/3

No. 3369
New York, December 28, 1966
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Flash.
Reference: Our Tel 3368 Dec 28.
For Prime Minister, SSEA, USSEA, Collins and Goldschlag.

VIETNAM – COMMISSION INITIATIVE:
DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL

In reading over reference telegram I am reminded of one further point U Thant made. He reiterated his obligation to reply to Goldberg's letter (paragraph 3 our telegram 3354 December 22) and said that he had spoken to Fedorenko and Algerian Permrep Bouattoura about it on December 19 confirming Goldberg's info in paragraph 4 our telegram 3353† December 22. In this connection, however, he added that Fedorenko had asked him about secret direct talks that were already in progress between USA and North Vietnamese representatives. Secretary-General had told Fedorenko that he knew nothing of this, which was of course at that time [the] case and U Thant speculated that Fedorenko had heard of and was referring to discussions about which Tomorowicz had informed him as reported in my reference telegram.

[George] Ignatieff

501.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 28605, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/3

Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] December 29, 1966

VIETNAM

I am sending you herewith copies of telegrams 3368 and 3369 of December 28 from Mr. Ignatieff. These messages appear to open a window on another phase in the pursuit of a Vietnam settlement of which, so far as I know, we have had no previous knowledge.[98]

2. There are a number of questions which inevitably arise from the account given in these messages:

(a) If the account given by the Polish Permanent Representative to the Secretary-General and related by the Secretary General to Mr. Ignatieff is substantially accurate, it is not a little surprising that, at a time when these efforts were under way, Mr. Rusk should have encouraged you to develop a quite separate initiative looking towards some form of Vietnam conference when you saw him in Washington on November 25. It is also difficult to understand why, when you put a Canadian set of proposals to Mr. Rusk in Paris on December 15, Mr. Rusk should have urged you to pursue these proposals without, as far as our records show, giving you any intimation of the other line of approach which the United States was pursuing at that time. According to the account given to us by U Thant it was not until December 16 that the United States Ambassador in Warsaw was informed by Mr. Rapacki that no further progress in that direction could be made in view of the renewed bombings of Hanoi which had taken place on December 13-14;

(b) Even if Mr. Rusk had taken the opportunity of giving you some intimation of their exchanges with the Poles, it would still be difficult to understand what advantage the United States could see in pursuing at least three separate and simultaneous approaches to a Vietnam settlement (this would include the Goldberg appeal to U Thant) which could not readily be reconciled with one another and which were being conducted in circumstances where some of the intermediaries concerned did not know what undertakings might have been given and what mandates might have been entrusted to others.

(c) If the version of the account given by the Polish Permanent Representative to U Thant is anything like an accurate reflection of what happened, it is hard to explain how the United States would have been prepared to prejudice the results of this initiative by their bombing of military targets in the Hanoi area on December 2 and 4 and again on December 13 and 14 which appear to have come closer to populated areas of the city than any previous United States bombings. The difficulty of explaining why this was done is compounded by our understanding that approval for such bombings must be given personally by the President.

(d) If the version of the account given by the Polish Permanent Representative to U Thant is not accurate, it would clearly be very much in the interests of the United States to give their version to U Thant without further delay. As matters now stand U Thant could hardly come to any other conclusion than that the United States has once again vitiated a situation which held some promise of opening up an avenue towards a peaceful conclusion of the Vietnam conflict.

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98 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
See comments on pages 2 and 3. K[laus] G[oldschlag]

(e) It is interesting to note that the substance of what is said to have been discussed between the Americans and the Poles is virtually identical with the approach towards a Vietnam settlement which you put forward in your discussions with the Poles and the Russians in the course of your visit to Eastern Europe in November. For your convenience I am appending to this memorandum the relevant extracts from the full Canadian presentation which formed part of your brief at that time.

3. I suggest that, as a first step, you authorize me to have telegrams 3368 and 3369 repeated to those of our Heads of Mission who should have this information available to them strictly on a need-to-know basis. I have in mind only our Ambassadors in Washington and Warsaw, our High Commissioner in Delhi and our Commissioner in Saigon.[99]

4. As a second step I would suggest that you authorize Mr. Ritchie to make an appointment to see Mr. Rusk without delay to seek his reaction to the account of United States-Polish exchanges which was given to us by U Thant in the strictest confidence. In terms of our future relations with the Secretary-General I regard it as of the utmost importance that U Thant's confidence be fully respected.[100] If, as we think is likely and desirable, the Americans subsequently decide to bring U Thant into the picture, they should appear to be doing so strictly on their own initiative. They would have to be warned against disclosing any knowledge that U Thant has already been given one account of these exchanges, not to speak of the fact that U Thant has conveyed this account to us. Indeed, the Americans might take the line with U Thant that it is they who informed us of their exchanges with the Poles because of our current direct interest in these matters and that they thought it right at this stage to bring U Thant into the picture in view of the fact that he was seized of the Goldberg appeal and had also now been acquainted with the thinking of the three Commission powers as regards another avenue of approach to a Vietnam settlement.

5. Having authorized Mr. Ritchie to seek an appointment with Mr. Rusk you may then wish to speak to Rusk on the telephone yourself.[101] I suggest that you do so only in terms of supporting Mr. Ritchie's request for an appointment. You might wish to say to Rusk that certain additional information has come to our attention which we feel is sufficiently important not only on its own account but also in relation to our Commission efforts to seek Rusk's reaction; that you had asked Mr. Ritchie to see him; and that you would hope to have an opportunity in due course to pursue this matter personally with him. I would suggest that you do not enter into the substance of the matter at this stage because of the relative insecurity of the communications facilities available to you and also because it is obviously important that we do not draw any inferences or conclusions from the account which is now available to us until we have given Rusk an opportunity to provide us with the United States version of the story along with whatever comments he may see fit to make on the further possibilities which may be inherent in this line of approach.

6. We do not regard the Polish response to our own approach as being entirely negative. Clearly, however, the present does not appear to be the right time for us to put further pressure on the Poles to respond in an affirmative way. What I would envisage is that after a month or so we may want to take another sounding in Warsaw in regard to a preliminary meeting of Commission powers which could be held unobtrusively and without commitment on the part of those involved. It would be useful, of course, if at that time we could be provided with something in the way of a positive indication of United States interest which might be

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[99] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Minister agreed. K[laus] G[oldschlag]

[100] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Minister agreed. K[laus] G[oldschlag]

[101] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Minister undertook to do this on Jan. 1/67. [Klaus Goldschlag]

sufficient to induce the Poles to lend their co-operation to the development of a Commission initiative. I say this because, after their recent experience, the Poles are bound to feel that they have once again been let down by the Americans. To the extent that this accurately reflects their current mood, they are less likely to be disposed to make another try.[102]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

502.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. 1231
Saigon, December 31, 1966
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel Y-875 Dec 23.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London; Washington, Permis New York from Ottawa; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Moscow from London.
By Bag: Bogota from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Last night at Foreign Minister's reception Polish Ambassador Lewandowski, after engaging me in bantering but leading talk on current Commission agenda, asked me if I had heard about the Indian invitation to a meeting in Delhi. He noted on the side that he did not repeat not normally discuss things with Rahman or me separately, but he had been asked by Warsaw for his views and had already spoken to Rahman: what did I think of the proposal? I said I had no repeat no personal views. We believed it a very useful idea; it could do no repeat no harm, and on the contrary would demonstrate the awareness of the problem on the part of the Commission and its member countries, of the need to discuss it and our readiness to do something about it.

2. Lewandowski rejoined that he too had thought this at first but was now inclined to believe such a conference would be the last straw for the Commission. The divergencies of views are too great for anything to be achieved and, if we have a conference which can only conclude with a meaningless communiqué, the Commission would be held up to international public ridicule to an extent that would kill it. I countered this as best I could: holding a meeting is itself action of a sort, people are not repeat not likely to expect us to come up with a miraculous solution but would accept it as a proof of our intentions. To this he replied that a meeting was one thing – we could do just as well in Saigon – but what is proposed is a conference.

3. We then slipped back into Commission business on the basis of his remark that he would prefer the Commission to be quiescent, to which I replied that we had for our part indeed been very quiet, but it had to work both ways. He grinned and acknowledged he had got the point. We reverted finally to the objectivity of Canadian voting, which I had referred to at this week's meeting on SAMs and MiGs, suggesting that the only honest and objective course, since he admitted these weapons were in the North, would be for him to follow our example

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[102] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Minister approved tel[egram] Y-885† to Washington containing instructions for Mr. Ritchie. In light of what he told me about his conversations with Rusk at NATO, however, I thought these instructions should be accompanied by a brief account of what Rusk had told the Minister. This is given in tel[egram] Y-134.† K[laus] G[oldschlag]

on a good many of his items in the past, and vote with us condemning the North. Lewandowski laughed and said, "Try me: put your resolution to the vote." That remains to be seen but I would rate the remark simply as one of the better jokes of the evening.

[Victor C.] Moore

503.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 28605, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/3

No. 2
Washington, January 2, 1967
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-885 Jan 1.
Repeat for Information: Permis New York (Ignatieff); Warsaw (Ambassador) from London; Delhi (High Commissioner) from Ottawa; Saigon (Commissioner) from Delhi.

VIETNAM: POLISH-USA TALKS

I called on Secretary Rusk this a.m. to speak to him in accordance with your telegram, emphasizing your view that it was important that Secretary-General should be given balanced picture of recent events, and your desire to know whether USA authorities saw any connection or contradiction between their talks with Poles and other current initiatives such as our efforts to persuade Poles to join in holding talks in Commission context. I indicated that you had been somewhat surprised not repeat not to have had more direct info on talks with Poles, particularly since Poles themselves had probably assumed, in interpreting our own approaches to them, that we were already aware of USA-Polish contacts.

2. I stressed that if Americans found it desirable to speak to Secretary-General in order to correct possible misapprehensions on his part, it was important that absolutely no repeat no indication should be given to him that USA had received info on his talk with Tomorowicz from Canadian or any other source as he had spoken to Ignatieff in strictest confidence. I added that we had no repeat no reason to believe that Polish action in speaking to Secretary-General and Secretary-General's action in informing us implied that either Poles or Secretary-General were disseminating info widely or irresponsibly. Poles had logical reason to keep Secretary-General informed, and Secretary-General (who had not repeat not even told his own staff) had relayed info to us only because he felt we should know because of our own consultations with him on our ICC initiative. I also commented that we had no repeat no means of judging accuracy of Polish version of events which would permit a more definite judgment about what their motives might be. I then gave Rusk oral account of sequence of events as relayed by Tomorowicz to Secretary-General, and at Rusk's request I left with Assistant Secretary Bundy relevant extract from Permis New York telegram 3368 December 28 (from second sentence of paragraph 4 ("at first meeting…") to sentence in paragraph 7 ending at top of page 6 ("…effort had failed").

3. Rusk was clearly very appreciative of our action in warning him of info received by Secretary-General. He said that USA Government so far was [has?] given no repeat no info on recent contacts with Poles to any other Government – neither British nor South Vietnamese nor other Vietnam troop contributors nor Indians. This was because Poles had been so fanatically insistent (allegedly on behalf of Hanoi) that nothing be said to anyone else; perhaps insistence was based in part on Hanoi's fear of adverse reaction from Chinese and possibly some elements within Liberation Front. Rapacki, who could have no repeat no reason to think that USA had infringed his request for secrecy, had said in his turn that he had not repeat not told any other government. In this respect he had "lied like a sailor" as USA

now knew that at least one other government had been informed (Bundy told me later this (was?) USSR). He also confirmed to me that Italian Ambassador in Saigon had at least some info on talks but thought that he was discreet (cf. Saigon telegram 1116 December 5). Rusk made further point that by time he learned of Indian proposal for ICC initiative from SSEA in Paris in mid-December, operation with Poles was already far advanced.

4. Rusk said that Polish account given to Secretary-General was partly inaccurate and very incomplete. He was particularly interested to learn that although Polish account had been conveyed to Secretary-General December 23 it recounted events only up to December 16. After that date and before December 23 there had been significant further developments[103] about which he hoped to be able to give me some further details after he had had time to consult and consider problem further. He wondered why Pole had cut story off when he did. Thinking aloud, Rusk speculated that it might be desirable for our representative to ask U Thant to seek info from Poles on subsequent development.[104] He said this idea would be studied urgently by USA authorities, as would question of USA representative discreetly speaking directly to Secretary-General.

5. Rusk said it was important to bear in mind that USA-Polish talks had been about a Polish rather than a USA formulation. Poles had pressed Americans to say that Lewandowski's formulation of USA stand was in fact American view, without providing any statement of position from other side. Some provisions in Polish formulation were in direct contradiction with others, and there were also generalities which would have had to be more specifically defined. For this reason Americans had pointed out to Poles that there were problems of interpretation of their formulation and had proposed talks to grapple with those problems. Americans had encountered great reluctance on Rapacki's part to transmit their remarks (notably concerning differences of interpretation) to Hanoi. Moreover USA had never seen Hanoi's shadow on what Poles had said to them, nor had Americans been able to tell what Lewandowski had said to North Vietnamese. Main Polish effort had been to persuade USA to authorize them to tell Hanoi that Polish formulation of USA position was accurate. Commenting on phrase in paragraph 4 Permis New York telegram 3368 that first phase of deal would provide only for cessation of bombing and that after a certain period all subsequent matters would be dealt with in direct negotiations purpose of which would be to reach understandings, Rusk said that as far as USA was concerned action on these other matters had to be agreed upon in advance even though action itself might be scheduled to come later.

6. I raised question of USA bombing raids in Hanoi area in early December and said that timing of these operations could create unfortunate impression not repeat not only on Secretary-General but also on many others when contacts with Poles became known. Rusk made several points in reply. He remarked rather forcefully that Poles had harped on bombing raids but had made no repeat no mention of major Communist attack on Saigon airport day before he (Rusk) had landed there to discuss Polish talks with Lodge; an abortive attack had also been made on main Saigon bridge on very day of Rusk's visit. I interjected that it might be argued that USA raids had more direct relationship to subject matter of USA-Polish talks than activities in South which could be represented as a local operation. Rusk said that North Vietnamese Generals in South were giving orders; moreover, if Communists were reluctant to give instructions of a type which would let local commanders know what was going on, USA had similar problem with its own local commanders. Furthermore, Washington authorities did not repeat not know that strikes in Hanoi area were to be carried out on those particular days; they were dependent on weather, and order had been given for them weeks before. In any case

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[103] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), documents 345, 346, 348.

[104] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
No. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

USA authorities were pretty sure now that December 13-14 raids had made no repeat no difference to Polish operation; previous raids December 2-4 may have caused Rapacki to delay but Rusk was not repeat not sure they had made that much difference either.

7. Rusk went on to say that it had never been put to Americans that talks were conditional on any action with respect to bombing. He said sarcastically that Communists had been left free to bang away at Saigon but Poles were now implying by their attitude that USA should have stopped what it had been doing without seeing any offer from North Vietnamese side. USA had of course struck in Hanoi area before. Reverting to more general contents of talks with Poles, Rusk pointed out that Americans had never been taken up on question of what he termed "a two-phase transaction" and there had never been any serious talk about content of any such arrangement. Bundy said to me later that USA had had in mind a cessation of bombing which would have no repeat no apparent or public link with package of other actions to be undertaken by both sides but which would in fact be part of same arrangement.

8. On relationship with ICC initiative, Rusk said that USA authorities had seen and still saw no repeat no conflict at all between ICC proposal and Polish talks. Commission initiative had much wider capability of action than direct USA-DRVN contacts would have; exchanges of view in ICC context could for example take into account problems such as Cambodian border and the DZ. In this connection TASS correspondent had remarked privately to Rusk other day that perhaps a conference on Cambodia would be a good way to start. Another advantage of ICC proposal was that it would have served to take attention away from Warsaw talks. Indeed USA had urged Poles to adopt favourable attitude to ICC initiatives particularly as useful distraction from bilateral USA-Polish operation; Americans had hoped that this argument would appeal to Poles because of their obsession with need for secrecy.[105] Rusk thought it even more desirable to press ahead with ICC proposal now that direct USA-Polish channel was "not repeat not at present a live prospect". I remarked that Poles might assume that Canada would be acting on behalf of USA in pressing on with ICC idea after failure of USA-Polish exchange for which they held USA responsible. Rusk said that this depended on what real Polish role had been; if they had been honest brokers and desired to leave door ajar they might be willing to take part. If they had not repeat not been able to bring Hanoi around with considerable amount that USA had put in their basket, they might see advantage in another tack via ICC.[106]

9. In conclusion, I emphasized that we understood extreme delicacy of this whole matter for USA and would continue to treat it as highly confidential. Rusk expressed appreciation and indicated that he hoped to be in touch with us again fairly soon on problem. He also showed interest in timing of Moore's forthcoming visit to DRVN and enquired about Canadian facilities for communicating with him in Hanoi.

[A.]E. Ritchie

504.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. 29
Delhi, January 7, 1967
Confidential. Flash.
Repeat for Information: London; Washington, Permis New York (Priority) from Ottawa; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Moscow, Warsaw (Priority) from London; Saigon from Delhi.

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[105] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), document 351.

[106] See/Voir ibid., document 355.

VIETNAM COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Latest development here is invitation from T.N. Kaul made informally at Polish Ambassador Ogrodzinski's farewell reception today for me to meet him, Kaul (or Chagla if preferred), and Polish Ambassador on Tuesday, January 10 for discussion of possible Commission initiatives as recently proposed by Indians. Pole had already agreed and I accepted expressing preference for meeting first with Kaul for India rather than Chagla. I had in mind reserving meeting with Chagla until special Ottawa representatives available here. Kaul thinks such special representation would not repeat not be acceptable to Pole for Tuesday meeting.

2. Explanation of move was encouragement given by statements in Hanoi, presumably Pham Van Dong to Salisbury January 3,[107] and in Paris, Mai Van Bo at diplomats' lunch,[108] which MEA regard as a step forward. Consequently, India wants initial meeting before Polish Ambassador leaves in few days' time, as latter is now willing to meet.

3. Meeting is exploratory and no repeat no agenda or specific program is yet proposed but I shall meet Kaul alone Monday, January 9 at noon to discuss possibilities.

4. In absence of specific instructions, I shall participate Tuesday on basis that meeting will be confidential except as unanimously agreed by the three of us and I shall make no repeat no commitments without reference. Hope to report more after Monday discussion with Kaul and to have your guidance as soon as possible for what might be the beginning of unanimous and constructive action by the Commission countries.

[Roland] Michener

505.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. Y-67
Ottawa, January 9, 1967
Confidential. Flash.
Reference: Your Tels 29 Jan 7 and 34† Jan 9.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Permis New York, Paris, Geneva, Moscow (Immediate); Warsaw (Immediate) from London; Saigon (Immediate) from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Although it is obviously too soon to regard developments reported first reference telegram as encouraging, we are interested to note indication of Polish Ambassador's willingness to participate in tripartite meeting before his departure.

2. You have received all relevant messages exchanged on this subject and you will be aware of sort of problems which we could envisage forming substance of discussions (in first instance) between Commission powers e.g., future *modus operandi*, financial difficulties, possible reductions in Vietnam Commission's superstructure including teamsites, etc.

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[107] See/Voir Harrison E. Salisbury, "Hanoi Premier Tells View; Some in U.S. Detect Shift," *New York Times*, 4 January 1967, p. 1.

[108] See/Voir Waverley Root, "Hanoi Offers To 'Examine' U.S. Proposal," *Washington Post*, 6 January 1967, p. A1.

3. As you know, however, we would not repeat not regard as particularly significant a meeting or series of meetings of Commission powers to deal only with current Commission problems. Such questions have their own interest for us, but in the broader context of Vietnam problem, this is relatively limited. As we see it, real value of Delhi meeting (or meetings) is that they would provide unobtrusive and reasonably credible cover for other forms of diplomatic activity which the three participants may decide they can usefully undertake within the context of a unanimously agreed Commission approach. Such a view takes into account Polish sensitivities and it is also, in our opinion, the soundest political basis on which to operate at the moment. In this context, we are in full agreement with assessment outlined by Harrison Salisbury in story filed last week from Hanoi and entitled "Hanoi is Tough".[109] Relevant extract reads as follows: "In light of all these considerations it seems apparent to most experienced diplomats in Hanoi that what is needed are not repeat not headlines, publicized missions, pressures or formulas but quiet and painstaking uses of old-fashioned confidential techniques of the pre-electronic era".

4. We believe you were right, in your preliminary interview with Kaul, to stress the need for balance in any Commission approach. What concerns us most, however, is prospect of Indian-Polish attempt to turn current exercise into yet another appeal for cessation of bombing without attempting to prepare the way by arranging circumstances in which such an appeal would yield intended results. In the right circumstances (which might well be in conjunction with Tet truce) such a Commission appeal might provide an "occasion" on which parties could pin appropriate responses but we believe that these responses must be pre-arranged. It is in this process that we believe Commission powers can make their distinctive contribution. Our philosophy in this sphere has always been that Commission can help the parties to do something they have judged to be in their interests and have agreed tacitly or otherwise to do. Conversely, we do not repeat not think that any useful purpose would be served by Commission becoming vehicle for putting pressure on parties (or more likely, on only one of them) to do something which we have no repeat no reason to believe they would be prepared to do simply in response to Commission exhortation. Rather we see first steps in terms of quiet soundings which Poles might be able to undertake in Hanoi, and Canada in Washington. On basis of results yielded by these soundings it might be possible to work out agreed basis, acceptable to both sides and at that point, Commission powers' activities could then move into public realm. This is why we have attached importance to principle of unanimity and confidential character of first phase of activities.

5. For your own confidential guidance at this stage, we could envisage programme being developed along lines of four points which Kaul mentioned to you (paragraph 2 of your telegram [34?] January 9). It would have to be understood, however, that point (a) is not repeat not dealt with in isolation but that there is intrinsic relationship between (a) and (b) not repeat not necessarily in terms of simultaneity but certainly in terms of firm preliminary understandings as to precise scope of (b) and agreed time sequence between (b) and (a). Such understandings, as we have suggested above, will of necessity involve prior confidential consultation with both sides.

6. You should also know that there have been some press enquiries here based on reports from Delhi that Commission powers are meeting or are about to meet in Delhi. Although press coverage has been minimal there may be tendency to have it increase after first meeting actually takes place. We have replied to enquiries in low key saying that we are in continuing and almost daily contact with other two Commission powers on wide range of questions

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[109] See/Voir Harrison E. Salisbury, "Hanoi is Tough: Leaders Say They Will Never Yield," *New York Times*, 8 January 1967, p. 175.

involving administrative and political matters relevant to operation of Indochina Commissions. It is not repeat not therefore unusual that there should be discussions in Delhi since India is Chairman-power of three Commissions. As far as Vietnam problem is concerned, the Canadian Government has long held that there may be a constructive role which ICSC can play, if parties to conflict so desire, in helping to reverse course of hostilities in Vietnam. In event of local press enquiries, this latter idea should not repeat not be volunteered but used only in response to question aimed at this point.

7. It would be useful if you could find suitable opportunity in course of Tuesday meeting to make reference to problem of press enquiries (and line we have taken here) in context of your point that meeting should be confidential except as unanimously agreed by the three.

[Paul] Martin

506.

Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam

Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam

RG25, vol. 28605, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/3

No. Y-70
Ottawa, January 9, 1967
Top Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Flash.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Ambassador).
For Senior Military Adviser and Senior Political Adviser only.

VIETNAM: CONTACTS IN HANOI

Grateful if you could forward this message (which should not be discussed with anyone in Saigon) by courier bag to Commissioner in Hanoi.

2. In our continuing discussions with Americans on possible Commission initiative, on Polish-USA contacts and on role of UN Secretary-General, it was suggested that you might, during current discussions in Hanoi, make certain points, at your discretion if you had high level contacts with North Vietnamese representatives. Points suggested were as follows:

(a) While Mr. Moore is not repeat not carrying any message from the USG, it is the present Canadian understanding, on the basis of careful discussions with the USG, that the USA would be prepared to consider cessation of bombing and accompanying actions that would take place in two stages. The first stage would consist of the cessation of bombing, to be followed by a second stage involving appropriate military actions on both sides which, in the aggregate and taken with the first stage, amounted to an equitable reciprocal reduction of hostilities. Both stages would have to be clearly agreed in advance. This USG view appears to be an amplification of the position stated by Ambassador Goldberg in September and is designed to meet Hanoi's apparent position that the first move must be a cessation of the bombing. This general subject was of course discussed with Ambassador Ronning last June, and Mr. Moore has no repeat no doubt that the USG would be interested if Hanoi wished to express any views on it.

(b) If it were at any time desired by Hanoi, the USG would be prepared for direct conversations with Hanoi representatives at any designated point. The purpose of such conversations might be to discuss such an arrangement for the reduction of hostilities or any other matter that Hanoi wished to consider. Again, Mr. Moore has no repeat no message from the USG on this subject, but is prepared, if Hanoi ever wishes, to offer to transmit any message by secure means.

(c) Mr. Moore noted that there have been no repeat no USG bombings in the Hanoi area or any exceptional attacks in general since December 14. (This point might be made in response to expected Hanoi claims that USA bombing in December was in some sense an escalation. We do not repeat not suggest that Mr. Moore seek to rebut such charges other than to refer to American statements that there was no repeat no intentional attack on Hanoi itself.) (Comment on point (c) is given in separate telegram.†)

3. In suggesting these talking points USA did not urge that you be instructed to make such a presentation. After careful consideration we judged that no useful purpose would be served by a Canadian presentation along these lines which would contain nothing that has not repeat not already been put to North Vietnamese by others, but would in fact be something substantially less than full basis of USA-NVN exchanges through Poles of which as far as North Vietnamese are concerned, we are presumed to be unaware. We had similar experience in connection with one of Seaborn's visits when "message" was really only carbon copy of what USA had said earlier to Chinese in Warsaw to be passed to Hanoi. Resulting interview between Seaborn and Ha Van Lau was unproductive and in our view had effect of downgrading channel.[110] We did not repeat not wish to repeat this experience, especially in present circumstances when it may be possible to develop something useful through Commission medium.

4. At the same time, we thought that it would be useful for you to have this reflection of current USA thinking as background for any discussions you may be having in Hanoi. We would not repeat not wish you to draw on these points in any way. By having them available, however, it may be possible to assess more accurately the significance of comments which may be made to you in Hanoi.

5. It is unlikely that North Vietnamese will raise with you possibility of Commission initiative. We would not repeat not wish you to become involved in discussion of this subject at least until we have been able to judge degree of Polish interest as manifested at first preliminary meeting in Delhi tomorrow.

6. There has been a certain amount of press interest here and in Washington based on your current visit. Line we have taken in answering enquiries is embodied in following suggested statement prepared for possible use by SSEA in House. Begins: I can confirm that our Commissioner went to Hanoi on January 6 for the purpose of paying the normal farewell calls prior to the termination of his assignment in Vietnam at the end of this month. We naturally hope that he will have the opportunity, in the course of his visit, to have conversations with at least some senior personalities in North Vietnam. Any reports we receive from him will, of course, be of particular interest in the present situation and in the light of the statements which have recently been made by representatives of North Vietnam both in Hanoi and Paris. There is no repeat no substance, however, to the report that Mr. Moore is carrying any special proposals to be put before the Government of North Vietnam at this time. I would prefer to look upon his visit as a continuation of the close contact we have tried to maintain with the thinking of representatives of that Government as regards a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict. (Ends.)

[Paul] Martin

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[110] See/Voir doc. 140.

507.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. 38
Delhi, January 10, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-67 Jan 9.
Repeat for Information: London, Saigon (Immediate); Washington, Permis New York (Immediate) from Ottawa; Warsaw, Paris, Geneva, Moscow (Immediate) from London.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: COMMISSION INITIATIVE

MEA phoned to say this morning's meeting is postponed since Pole has not repeat not received his instructions. No repeat no indication when he will be ready.

[Roland] Michener

508.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/9

No. 70
Delhi, January 12, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tels 29 Jan 7, 34 Jan 9, 38 Jan 10.
Repeat for Information: London (Immediate); Washington, Permis New York (Immediate) from Ottawa; Paris, Geneva, Moscow, Warsaw (Immediate) from London; Saigon (Immediate) from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Our hopes for some unanimous action here are completely deflated. The Polish Ambassador had agreed with Kaul to the three-party meeting last Tuesday as reported. Being about to leave he had been somewhat out of touch and asked for new instructions which arrived Tuesday morning and were to much the same effect as Rapacki's reply to our Minister. The Pole told Kaul that he was prepared to meet him and me but saw little point in doing so simply to announce that his Government did not repeat not see any scope at this time for useful Commission action and preferred to continue consideration of such action by bilateral discussions. Kaul had advised us of the adjournment pending receipt by the Pole of his instructions but did not repeat not advise us of the Pole's subsequent request after receiving his instructions to cancel meeting, thereby leaving us in suspense and in ignorance of the true situation.

2. I cancelled my attendance at Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment today for the ceremony of renaming it in honour of the late Homi Bhabha in expectation that the Pole had his instructions and that the meeting would be held before his final departure from Delhi on Saturday morning January 14.

3. As Kaul was not repeat not available today due to Muslim holiday I went to see Ogrodzinski at his home and got the story from him. He believes that one reason for the Polish reluctance to begin a Commission initiative is that the USA knows quite well that the cessation of bombing is a condition precedent to any negotiations with or commitment by Hanoi and that the USA also has assurances through its various approaches including Secretary-General that Hanoi will respond positively if the Americans stop bombing North Vietnam. On this account the Poles are unwilling while such bombing continues to make any overtures to Hanoi to obtain advance assurances for the Commission of what Hanoi will do after cessation.

4. The only salvage is the willingness of the Poles to continue bilateral discussions with us and Indians directed to finding a role for the Commission or the Commission countries at the right time.

[Roland] Michener

509.
Letter from High Commissioner in India to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre du haut-commissaire en Inde au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/10

Confidential.
New Delhi, January 16, 1967

RE: VIETNAM: COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Dear Paul [Martin],

I think you will be interested in a recapitulation of the events of the last ten days which had raised our hopes that the Poles had finally decided that there was some purpose of proceeding with tripartite talks, Indian, Canadian and Polish, in Delhi as proposed some time ago by the Indians and the subsequent *volte face*.

Ogrodzinski, the Polish Ambassador, who has now returned to Warsaw, was a decent fellow with whom I had established quite good relations. If he talked, one could rely on what he said; otherwise he held his peace. You will recall that he appeared to be expecting authority from his government to join the Indians and ourselves in exploratory discussions because he postponed his departure for a few days for this purpose. On Saturday, January 7, T.N. Kaul, former Indian Ambassador in Moscow and now a Secretary (E.A.l) in the M.E.A., (i.e., First Assistant to C.S. Jha whom we would call the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs) invited me to attend a meeting with him and the Pole on Tuesday, January 10. On the same day the Pole confirmed to me that he had agreed to this meeting. I reported this at once by flash telegram No. 29 of January 7.

On Monday, January 9 Hicks and I met with Kaul to find out what was in the wind, as reported in my telegram No. 34 of January 9. The proposed meeting for Tuesday, January 10 was still on and had been fixed for 11 a.m. On Tuesday, about 10:30, Kaul sent a message to Hicks that the Pole wished to postpone the meeting because he had not received expected instructions from Warsaw. In this state of affairs I postponed my intended visit to Bombay for the re-naming on January 12 of the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay in honour of the late Dr. Homi Bhabha.

As nothing further had been heard from the M.E.A. on the 12th I went to see the Pole who told me he had requested the adjournments before his instructions had come. When they came they were to the effect that he was to tell the meeting that the Poles did not consider that the Commission could initiate any unanimous action which would be useful at this time and that the Poles would prefer to continue discussions bilaterally with us and with Indians

about possible Commission initiative. He also indicated that the Poles were not prepared to make any preliminary soundings in Hanoi or even to approach Hanoi until the Americans had discontinued bombing. This I reported in my telegram No. 70 of January 12.

It was disappointing to see the first evidence of Polish willingness to join in exploratory talks wither so quickly, particularly because your "soft approach" to tripartite discussions as proposed in your letter to Mr. Rapacki seemed to suit the Polish taste, at least as it was reflected here in Delhi. This was more encouraging than Kaul's most recent ideas for using the Commission to add its voice to the general clamour for unconditional cessation of bombing without providing for reciprocal concessions by North Vietnam and, more important, without preliminary soundings by individual Commission governments to assure that there would be appropriate responses from all of the combatants.

It seems to me that if the Commission is to be effective in bringing about even a de facto reduction or cessation of hostilities, it must first establish a programme by confidential arrangements with the parties concerned as was contemplated by the Indians when they first suggested meetings in Delhi.

I have put down separately and enclose my thoughts of what such a programme might be, based somewhat on Professor Fisher's ideas.[111] Of course this will not now be the subject of discussions of tripartite talks in Delhi unless Canada and Poland send special envoys here for the purpose, because the Polish Ambassador has gone home and his successor will probably not arrive until after the Indian elections in late February.

Incidentally, I commended Mr. Berlis to Mr. Ogrodzinski and suggested that he get in touch with Berlis when he resumes his duties in the Polish Foreign Office. I have also written to Berlis to commend Ogrodzinski to him.

I hope this false start here has not been embarrassing as well as disappointing. Presumably you will keep up the pressure on the Poles to join in making use of the Commission, particularly if all efforts of others towards negotiation are unproductive. The Poles seem to hold the key, at least, their cooperation is essential. I am satisfied that the Indians would follow an agreed Canadian-Polish programme. At the moment they seem to be concerned with saving the Poles from embarrassment caused by the Indians having let out too much information about what was going on in Delhi.

With kindest regards and good wishes for a happy centennial year,

Yours as ever,
Roly [Roland Michener]

Enclosure: Memorandum by High Commissioner in India
Pièce jointe : Note par le haut-commissaire en Inde

Confidential.
[New Delhi,] January 16, 1967

Problem

The ICSC Commission in Vietnam for some time has been quite unable because of extensive hostilities in both South and North Vietnam to perform its continuing responsibilities under the Geneva Protocol of 1954 of supervising and controlling the settlement.

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[111] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
John [Hadwen]: I would like comments on this quickly. P[aul] M[artin]

The problem is to determine what action within the mandate and competence of the Commission or its governments (the Three) can now be unanimously taken to obtain the consent of the combatants to a pause or reduction in fighting in preparation for an agreed cessation of all hostilities so as to permit negotiations to proceed towards general military and political settlements.

Scope of Action

1. The talks should be confidential except as may be mutually agreed and any action agreed upon should have the unanimous support of the Three.

2. The action taken should be in accordance with the mandate of the Commission and within the scope of the responsibilities of control and supervision assigned to the Three.

3. In view of the numerous unsuccessful approaches recently made to one or more of the combatants by diplomats, the Pope, the Secretary-General of the U.N., the British Foreign Secretary and others, and the inability of the Co-Chairmen to agree to act, it would not appear to be productive for the Three simply to add its own appeal for cessation or reduction of hostilities without first using their respective entrees to suggest privately and endeavour to obtain agreement of the principal combatants to a specific and progressive programme of reduction of hostilities leading to complete de facto cessation for the purpose of negotiations.

Suggested Action

In line with the foregoing and the declared positions of the combatants themselves, it appears that progress could be made if the DRVN, the SVN and its allies and the NLF would individually assure the Three that as a means to preparing the way for peace talks or at least for reduction of hostilities they would respectively act in accordance with the following programme so long as each combatant carried out its part in good faith.

1. The USA would discontinue the bombing of NVN unconditionally as of an agreed future date (Date I).

2. Within a specified number of days after Date I, all combatants would suspend unconditionally aggressive military action of all kinds. (Except in defense against any local action taken in breach of the understanding whether through ignorance or otherwise).

3. The de facto cease fire secured by this means would be observed continuously notwithstanding minor infractions so long as negotiation to settle and regularize cessation of hostilities were proceeding in any form.

4. To assist in preserving the de facto cessation of hostilities each combatant would undertake to make no movement, reinforcement or disposition of military forces, weapons or materials except as necessary for maintenance.

5. The Commission as constituted or as reinforced by the respective governments would offer its services to assist (a) in the maintenance of the de facto ceasefire and (b) in the promotion of negotiations for an agreed ceasefire, looking towards the withdrawal of extraneous military forces and eventually to a settlement of military and political problems.

6. For this purpose the Commission would sit in continuous session from Date I in convenient neutral territory and invite to meet with it either separately or together, for the purpose of advising the Commission about maintenance of the peace, and of consulting about the place, time and method of negotiations for an agreed ceasefire or truce and otherwise as might be expedient in preparation for a general conference or settlement, the following parties, the SVN and USA and any or all of their allies, the DRVN and the NLF and possibly the representatives of any member of the Geneva Conference which wished to advise the Commission in the context.

7. The Commission would continue in session until a ceasefire agreement had been reached through its good offices or the combatants had agreed on other methods of negotiation.

8. The minimum assurances of the combatants referred to above by which the foregoing programme should be proceeded would be

a) from USA to stop bombing NVN as from Date I, which Canada should seek to obtain.

b) from NLF for itself and its allies to stop all offensive activity, to be obtained by Poland (the present mood of the Poles does not seem to be very encouraging for this initiative).

c) from SVN and its allies to stop all offensive action, to be obtained by India.

510.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/10

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] January 30, 1967

VIETNAM: COMMISSION INITIATIVE

You have asked for our comments on the suggestions put forward by Mr. Michener in his attached letter to you.

2. I think we have always recognized the limitations of any Commission initiative looking towards a settlement of the Vietnam conflict. In essence, the Commission has no means of compelling either of the parties to agree to specific measures which it does not in present circumstances regard as being in its own interest. What the Commission can do is to provide a framework within which measures can be co-ordinated which the parties are prepared to take on their own account.

3. That is why it has always formed part of our thinking about a Commission initiative that it must be preceded by private and confidential discussions with the parties concerned and this is also reflected in Mr. Michener's proposals. The questions which arise, therefore, are whether a Commission initiative can be gotten off the ground in present circumstances and, if it can, what the content of such an initiative should be.

4. On the basis of our recent discussions with the Poles we are not persuaded that we could count on the necessary Polish cooperation at this time. After their recent experience in acting as an intermediary between the United States and the North Vietnamese, the Poles appear to have reverted firmly to the position they have held for some time, namely, that no fruitful initiative to bring the Vietnam conflict closer to an international settlement can be taken until the United States has stopped the bombing of North Vietnam as a unilateral and unreciprocated act. Beyond that it is becoming increasingly evident that the Poles will be wary of any initiative which it would be difficult to conduct without attracting public attention and comment. They appear to be firmly convinced that the objective which third parties should be pursuing is to bring the two main parties, i.e., the United States and North Vietnam, into direct contact. This is a point of view which, by and large, we share and it is, indeed, the basis on which we undertook our own soundings in Hanoi in March and June of last year.[112] As far as the Poles are concerned, we think they would be inclined to favour discreet bilateral channels to accomplish this objective as against using the Commission at that particular stage of an approach toward a Vietnam settlement.

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[112] See Chapter 5./Voir Chapitre 5.

5. In summary, while the Poles have made it clear that they are interested in continuing their dialogue with Canada, we assume that they attach greater importance to the potential part we may be able to play in influencing the Americans bilaterally than in the eventual possibility of Polish-Canadian cooperation in a Commission initiative.

6. As for the substance of the initiative which Mr. Michener has proposed, it appears to be focussed primarily on the achievement of a *de facto* cessation of hostilities in Vietnam as a prelude to the negotiation of a formal cease-fire agreement. This is evident from that section of Mr. Michener's proposals in which he states the problem and also from paragraph 5 in the section dealing with suggested Commission action.

7. In theory, this is an approach which has a good deal to commend it. In the first place, the restoration of a cease-fire in Vietnam is wholly within the framework of the Commission's original mandate. Secondly, it is undoubtedly on a termination of active hostilities in Vietnam that international attention and concern are primarily focussed.

8. In this respect, Mr. Michener's approach to the problem is different from that envisaged in the original Fisher proposals and also from that envisaged in our own adaptation of those proposals. The Fisher proposals start with the concept of a conference, the purpose of which would be to seek the views of all the parties as to what the Commission can and should do in present circumstances to carry out its appointed mandate. It is only in order to provide an appropriate climate for such a conference that the Fisher proposals would look to the parties to take certain steps by way of a suspension of offensive military action and the deployment of men and materials into the area of conflict. Within the framework of Mr. Michener's proposals, on the other hand, the suspension of hostilities appears to assume a more central position as an objective of Commission action.

9. As we see it there are two difficulties which we are likely to face if we were to proceed on that basis. The first is the general difficulty of reconciling this kind of approach with what we take to be North Vietnamese thinking about the sequence of steps which would have to precede an ultimate settlement. From all we know, the North Vietnamese insist on the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam as a first and catalytic step in the absence of which no progress whatsoever can be envisaged. Once the bombing has ceased, we assume that the North Vietnamese would be prepared to enter into informal and preliminary contact with the Americans. The purpose of such contact would almost certainly be to explore the extent to which the Americans were prepared to accept the 4-point programme which has become the basis of North Vietnamese thinking about an ultimate settlement. At some stage, no doubt, the North Vietnamese would expect the Viet Cong to be associated with these contacts. As far as we can see, it would only be when these contacts had yielded some preliminary understandings on the major issues outstanding between the two sides that the North Vietnamese would be prepared to enter into a full-fledged negotiation. The purpose of such a negotiation would presumably be to secure international ratification of the understandings reached in this preliminary way and to secure such international guarantees as would be necessary to ensure that a settlement on agreed lines was, in fact, carried into effect.

10. If this is a correct analysis of the North Vietnamese approach, we must assume that a cessation of hostilities on their part is not among the early steps to which they would be prepared to agree. The reason for this is relatively obvious, the fact being that the North Vietnamese would not wish to abandon the option of achieving their objectives by military means until they could be reasonably certain that an acceptable political settlement was likely to emerge from any negotiations. The reason for this attitude, as explained to us by people like the French and Yugoslavs, is that the North Vietnamese might have difficulty in allowing their war effort to crank to a halt and to start it again in due course if it appeared that a negotiation would not yield an acceptable political result from the North Vietnamese point of view. That is also presumably why the North Vietnamese were reported to have reacted negatively to the second of U Thant's 3-point proposal, i.e., the scaling down of all military activities in South Vietnam as a means of bringing about a cease-fire.

11. There is also a more specific difficulty which arises in connection with any proposal which ties a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam into a broader programme which envisages a total suspension of hostilities on both sides, even if the two were to be separated by some agreed interval in time. The difficulty is that the North Vietnamese continue to maintain that the cessation of the bombing must come first and that it must not be accompanied by any condition, whether explicit or implicit, which could be interpreted as requiring a North Vietnamese response in military terms. Such a package is implicit not only in U Thant's 3-point proposal but also in the presentation which Mr. Goldberg made in the General Assembly on September 22, 1966 and which was itself intended to set out the limits within which the United States would be prepared to cooperate in the implementation of the U Thant proposals. You will recall that this kind of package also formed part of your presentation in Warsaw and Moscow last November without eliciting a positive response in either capital. This is not to say that a package on these lines is unreasonable; it is merely to suggest that the North Vietnamese are unlikely, in present circumstances, to be persuaded to accept it.

12. When all is said and done, however, Mr. Michener's proposals hinge on the prospects of any form of Commission initiative in present circumstances. You will recall that, when this possibility was last explored in some depth in November and December, we had before us the Fisher proposals, a positive reaction from the Indians, what appeared to be an expression of interest from the Poles, and active encouragement from the United States. Some of these factors have since been overtaken by events and it is our judgment that, for the time being at least, it might be more profitable to look for progress in another direction. However, if and when we have indications that the idea of a Commission initiative could usefully be reactivated, we would certainly want to review Mr. Michener's proposals as a basis for forward movement.

H.B. R[obinson] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

CHAPTER 7/CHAPITRE 7

FINAL EFFORTS (JANUARY 1967–APRIL 1968)

LES DERNIERS EFFORTS (JANVIER 1967-AVRIL 1968)

511.
Letter from Faculty Committee on Vietnam, Victoria College, University of Toronto, to Prime Minister
Lettre du comité des professeurs sur le Vietnam, Collège Victoria de l'Université de Toronto, au premier ministre
MG26-N6, vol. 10, Vietnam – Correspondence, Faculty Committee on Vietnam, Victoria College

Toronto, January 15, 1967

Honourable and dear Sir:

The fact that the cruel devastation of Vietnam has been going on for such a long time does not render the continuing rain of explosives and chemicals more acceptable.

The fact that so many have already pleaded so often for an end to this terror does not make the suffering of the uncountable victims more bearable, nor does it make the situation less dangerous. Indeed, with each escalation, the possibility of Chinese intervention and a world war becomes more real.

We call upon the Canadian Government to demand, unequivocally, an immediate, unconditional and permanent end to the United States bombings of North and South Vietnam, and the earliest possible withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the area. We further call upon the Canadian Government to reveal all military production contracts related in any way to the Vietnam war, and to consider following the example of Sweden in refusing to sell arms to the U.S. until this intervention ceases.

Yours very sincerely,
[Professor Peter Hughes
Faculty Committee on Vietnam,
Victoria College, University of Toronto]

512.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
MG26-N4, vol. 277, 313.312 D-F – Secret

Secret.
[Ottawa,] January 16, 1967

USE OF CANADIAN-ORIGIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN VIET NAM BY THE U.S.

One of the questions which can be expected to come up at your meeting with the Faculty Committee on Viet Nam tomorrow is that of the use of Canadian-origin military equipment in Viet Nam by the U.S. The following paragraphs provide an up-to-date account of this subject. An extra copy of this Memorandum is attached in case you wish to send it to the Prime Minister.[1]

2. Prior to 1965, Canadian exports of military equipment to the U.S. had been averaging about $150 million per year. The decision in the summer of 1964 to commit U.S. units for combat duty in Viet Nam greatly increased the requirement of the U.S. for various lines of materiel, and in 1965 Canadian exports increased by 55% over the preceding year. This trend continued in 1966, and the year-end totals are expected to show that exports to the U.S. reached $320 million, or more than double the average for the 1959-64 period. There is no way of establishing what proportion of this total represents materiel which is required in connection with the Viet Nam war, but the Department of Defence Production has recently estimated the value of such materiel to be about $90 million per year. The most conspicuously Canadian item of equipment in Viet Nam is probably the Caribou aircraft (which, we understand, is being used there by the Australian as well as the U.S. forces); other items would range from electronic equipment to ammunition and explosives.

3. This situation has attracted a certain amount of public attention in Canada, and has led to a number of enquiries being directed to the Government. The position which Ministers have taken in replying to such enquiries has comprised two main elements:

a) Because of Canadian Membership on the International Control Commission, the Government does not permit the export of military equipment from Canada to Viet Nam.

b) It has been a long-standing policy of successive Canadian Governments to place no restrictions on the export of military equipment to the U.S. or on the use which the U.S. armed forces may make of such equipment, just as the U.S. Government does not seek to control the use which is made by the Canadian Forces of equipment purchased in the U.S.

4. Canada's relations with the U.S. in this field are currently governed by the Production Sharing Agreements of 1959 and 1963.[2] These Agreements, which were entered into in the aftermath of the cancellation of the "Arrow" aircraft, reflected a conscious decision that the production of major weapons systems to meet limited Canadian requirements was no longer feasible, and that the continued existence of a defence industry in Canada required the co-ordination of Canadian defence development and production with the requirements of the U.S. As a result of these Agreements, military equipment produced in Canada is accorded duty-free entry into the U.S. and is exempted from the "Buy American" Act.[3] In addition, the U.S. Department of Defence has made some very substantial financial contributions to Canadian development projects (a notable example is the Buffalo aircraft), and a number of U.S. defence industries have established or expanded subsidiary companies in Canada. The Canadian Government and Canadian industry also receive a wide range of advanced military industrial information which the U.S. does not make available to other countries. The

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1 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Mr. Martin thought the P[rime] M[inister] would want to see this. J.G. H[adwen]

2 The Defence Production Sharing Agreement was signed in 1956 and formalized in 1959; the Defence Development Sharing Agreement was signed in 1963.
L'Accord sur le partage de la production de défense a été signé en 1956 et officialisé en 1959; l'Accord sur le partage du développement industriel pour la défense a été signé en 1963.

3 See/Voir An Act making appropriations for the Treasury and Post Office Departments for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1934, and for other purposes [Buy American Act], Public Law no. 72-428, Chapter 212, Section 2 of Title III, 47 Stat. 1520 (1933).

progressive integration of the North American defence industrial base is undoubtedly an important factor in the development of a sophisticated technology in Canada. At a rough estimate, exports of military equipment and civil "spin-offs" from military research and development projects now represent perhaps 25% of total Canadian exports of manufactured products.

5. It must be acknowledged, however, that, whatever the benefits of the production sharing arrangements, they have created a difficult situation for Canada with respect to the Viet Nam war. The fact that the export of military equipment to Viet Nam would be inconsistent with Canadian membership on the I.C.C. was recognized by the Government when it placed an embargo on such exports.[4] This embargo is however of little more than symbolic significance in view of the large quantities of Canadian materiel which are regularly and openly being introduced into Viet Nam by the U.S. Fortunately neither the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese, nor the Polish members of the I.C.C. have sought to make political capital out of this situation to date, but the potential for causing embarrassment to the Canadian Government is there for them to exploit at any time they see fit. Within Canada, criticism has come mainly from those groups who are opposed to the U.S. role in Viet Nam and has tended to be based on moral grounds rather than on legal considerations related to our position on the I.C.C.

6. It is sometimes suggested that, at a minimum, we should seek U.S. agreement not to use equipment of Canadian origin in Viet Nam. This avenue was in fact explored, but without useful results, in the summer of 1965 when the U.S. sought to purchase a quantity of smoke ammunition from Canadian service stocks. Canadian unwillingness to permit this sale caused some irritation, at least on the part of the U.S. military authorities, and our offer to agree to the sale on the basis of assurances that the ammunition would not be used in Viet Nam was rejected. Our experience in this affair indicates that the U.S. is not in fact prepared to accept any limitation on its freedom of action with regard to the use of military equipment it purchases from foreign suppliers. To our knowledge, Sweden is the only Western country to decide, in the light of this situation, that it should place an embargo on further exports of arms to the U.S. So far as Canada is concerned, our participation in arrangements leading to the integration of Canadian and U.S. defence industry, with the result that Canada has become the sole source in North America of certain lines of military equipment, clearly implies a long-term commitment not to place restrictions on the export of arms to the U.S. The consequences of attempting to reverse this policy would thus have far-reaching effects, not only in the economic sphere, but also on our political relations with the U.S.

7. A set of talking points† for possible use in discussions with the Faculty Committee is attached.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

513.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
MG26-N4, vol. 277, 313.312 D-F – Secret

[Secret.]
[Ottawa,] January 18, 1967

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[4] See/Voir "Pearson Says Canada Cannot Stop Arms Being Used in War," *Globe and Mail*, 8 January 1966, p. 4.

VIETNAM

A delegation from an organization calling itself the "Faculty Committee on Vietnam" centered on Victoria College in the University of Toronto, was received yesterday morning by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Prime Minister's office. The members of the delegation were Professors Peter Hughes (English), John Polanyi (Chemistry), David Gauthier (Philosophy) all of the University of Toronto, and Professor James Steele (English) of Carleton University. The purpose of the meeting was to present to the Prime Minister and Mr. Martin a letter of "appeal" to the Canadian Government (copy attached),[5] bearing approximately 350 signatures, and to discuss some of the issues raised in the letter.

2. After reading the letter the Prime Minister began the discussion by saying that the Committee's concern about the situation in Vietnam was understandable and that this feeling was fully shared by the Government as a Government, which felt strongly that every effort should be made to "bring this slaughter to an end". While the Government, the Prime Minister said, might not agree with everything the Committee thought it ought to do, it was doing *everything* it *could* do.

3. Mr. Martin agreed with the Prime Minister's statement that the bombing was obviously the key element in the present diplomatic-military situation. The Prime Minister noted that he had been the first Western statesman to advocate publicly that a let-up in the bombing would be a constructive step, and that this position had also been taken in the House of Commons by spokesmen for the Government. Unfortunately, this position, at the fairly early stage at which Canada had enunciated it, had not been conspicuously successful in terms of achieving constructive diplomatic or military results.

4. At the same time, the Prime Minister noted that he would also want some contribution or gesture from North Vietnam, and this in turn raised the question of what other steps the U.S.A. might be prepared to take; in the first instance, there was the obvious question of withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam, and on the basis of all the evidence available to them, the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were clearly doubtful about U.S. intentions in this connection.

5. As far as the International Commission was concerned, the Prime Minister said, Canada felt that this organization could prove to be a very constructive factor in the situation. Canada has been doing everything it possibly could through its Commission membership, and in this context he referred to recent press reports of the attempt to get some form of talks started in Delhi.[6] Although efforts in this direction had not been fully successful, Canada's efforts would continue. The Prime Minister reiterated the Government's intention to do everything it possibly could to end the war which was having unfortunate effects not only in Vietnam but throughout the whole world.

6. A member of the delegation expressed the view that one of the basic problems (and the one which gave rise to the deepest misgivings) was the failure of the U.S.A. to make clear, and in reasonable terms, what its objectives were in fighting the Vietnam war. In reply, the Prime Minister said that his own interpretation of U.S. objectives was three-fold: to bring the war to an end, to bring about peace talks and to let the Vietnamese people decide their own future for themselves, and this would include the possibility of reunification if the Vietnamese people so decided. The Prime Minister said that Canada accepted the sincerity of U.S. purposes in broad outline, although there were obvious differences between the Canadian and American Governments' views of tactics and the likelihood of certain measures achieving

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5 See/Voir doc. 511.

6 See/Voir Anthony Westell, "Report Canada and India Join in Secret Peace Bid," *Globe and Mail*, 13 January 1967, p. 1; David Van Praagh, "Poles Veto Indo-Canada Peace Effort," *Globe and Mail*, 16 January 1967, p. 1.

the desired results. Turning to the Committee's letter for an example, the Prime Minister referred to the question of bombing and said that a simple "demand" for its cessation (as specified in the letter) would not be taken very seriously and would in fact have undesirable effects in terms of Canada's credibility in Washington.

7. At this point, Mr. Martin explained that Canada's potential usefulness in helping to bring about a peaceful settlement in Vietnam depended in large measure on Hanoi's assessment of Canada as a country which would be listened to seriously and which would have influence in Washington.

8. The delegation reverted to the question of the ambiguity of U.S. objectives, which led many observers to suspect that Washington's true aims involved a deliberate confrontation between Communist and non-Communist systems in Asia with the U.S.A. committed formally to the proposition that the Communist system must not be allowed to succeed. The Prime Minister was asked whether it would not be possible to seek a public clarification from Washington on this basic question. The Prime Minister replied that if this *were* the true definition of U.S. purposes, it would not be acceptable to him. The Prime Minister went on to say, however, that he did not believe that this was the cornerstone of U.S. policy nor did he believe that the U.S.A. wanted to remain in South Vietnam or to make it a base against the "advance of Asian Communism". He said that his own interpretation of U.S. aims was that if North Vietnamese forces were removed from the South and the bombing stopped, and a cease-fire instituted, the U.S.A. would begin the process of withdrawal. The end result would undoubtedly be a two Vietnams solution (something like Korea although the two situations were not really comparable) with each of two units having a government decided by the Vietnamese themselves. Things being what they are in North Vietnam, there would be no change there, but there would quite probably be some changes in the South. The Prime Minister then commented briefly on the difficulty of getting the North Vietnamese to believe in the sincerity of U.S. motives, and particularly of Washington's willingness to withdraw from Vietnam. Canada had tried on many occasions to make this point in Hanoi, and Mr. Ronning, whose credentials were about as credible as any Canadian's could be, had certainly done so. Similar attempts had been made by others, but all these efforts to convince the North Vietnamese had not made much of an impression on the leaders in Hanoi.

9. Speaking personally, and specifically requesting that he not be quoted, the Prime Minister then said that it was his belief that the U.S.A. might be well advised to stop the bombing without demanding a reciprocal gesture from Hanoi, and that if he were speaking privately with President Johnson he would make this point. On the other hand, if the argument were advanced publicly as advocated by the Committee, the President simply would not listen to Canada anymore.

10. Mr. Martin indicated full agreement with the Prime Minister's comments and stated that such a development (i.e., the exclusion of Canada from the U.S.A.'s confidence) would be "disastrous" for our relations with Hanoi.

11. Members of the delegation then turned their attention to the question of sales of Canadian-made military equipment to the U.S.A. for use in the Vietnam war. Canada, the spokesman argued, had repeatedly and publicly rejected the idea of achieving a military solution in Vietnam and yet continued to sell increasing amounts of war materiel to the U.S.A. to be used in the attempt to achieve precisely that kind of solution.

12. The Prime Minister reiterated his belief that there could not be a military solution in Vietnam, and while he knew that this would not be well received among certain quarters in the U.S.A., he had recently said so publicly in an interview with Peter Newman.[7] He

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[7] See/Voir Peter C. Newman, "Pearson Speaks," *Toronto Daily Star*, 23 December 1966, p. 6.

believed that the U.S.A. could not achieve a military victory but he also believed that the other side could not do so either. "So if you have a war which neither side can win, the only sensible thing to do is stop it". As far as Canadian "involvement" was concerned, there were no shipments of war materiel from Canada to Vietnam. Sales of military equipment between Canada and the U.S.A. were however a different story and had to be seen and judged against the background of Canada-U.S.A. trade balances, Canada's North American and Atlantic defence commitments and the inability of a smaller country such as Canada to equip itself from its own independent resources with the most effective and sophisticated means of defence. After explaining briefly some of the historical background to our defence production agreements with the U.S.A., the Prime Minister observed that "there is no use kidding ourselves – some of this Canadian-made equipment finds its way to Vietnam". But this, he continued, was a very small part of the total exchange pattern between the two countries. There was of course the possibility that Canada could seek assurances from the U.S.A. that no Canadian-made items would be used in U.S. operations in Vietnam but this would probably lead to the abrogation of the agreements. Canada had in fact explored such a possibility about a year ago in connection with one particular item being shipped to the U.S.A. and this had been the likely result indicated in response.

13. Finally, a member of the delegation suggested that Canada might urge the U.S.A. to press the South Vietnamese Government into direct negotiations or contacts with the Liberation Front, with Washington and Hanoi respectively occupying "standback" positions in such arrangements. The Prime Minister did not commit himself to any particular view of this proposition, commenting only that he thought that such a proposal would run up against immediate South Vietnamese opposition and that the U.S.A. did not, in his view, command the kind of influence in Saigon that was sometimes alleged.

14. The Prime Minister undertook to forward a written reply to the Committee's letter setting forth the Government's position in as much detail as possible.[8] (I understand that in speaking to the press afterwards, the delegation expressed the hope that they would receive this reply at an early opportunity, evidently to form the basis for further discussions – which may well be of a public nature – by the Committee.) If you agree, Far Eastern Division will assume primary responsibility for the preparation of such a reply, but with DL(2) Division contributing appropriate paragraphs, taking the foregoing account into consideration, on the question of exports of Canadian military equipment to the U.S.A.

K. Goldschlag

514.

Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures

MG32-B12, vol. 227, 25

No. 165
Saigon, February 2, 1967
Flash.
Reference: Our Tel 164† Feb 2.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London, Washington, Permis New York, CANFORCEHED, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome.

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[8] See/Voir doc. 526.

VIETNAM: CANADIAN ARMS SALES TO USA

Following is text of unclassified telegram received today from Chief of Liaison Mission of PAVN High Command. To Canadian Commissioner Saigon with info copies to Chairman ICSC, Indel and Poldel. Begins. The Chief of the Liaison Mission of the VPA High Command has the honour to bring to your notice the following. According to reports from Ottawa on January 18/67 Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson stated in the House of Commons that the Canadian Government would not repeat not stop selling military equipment to the USA on account of the war in Vietnam.[9] The Liaison Mission considers this to be an extremely serious action. It is knowledge [*sic*] that the USA is waging a war of aggression in Vietnam in flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam. In this juncture Canada is selling weapons to the USA is tantamount [*sic*] to lending a hand to the USA aggressors in Vietnam and is completely at variance with her position as a member of the ICSC for control of the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam. The Liaison Mission requests you as the representative of the Canadian Government on the ICSC in Vietnam to clarify the January 18/67 statement of the Canadian Prime Minister. The Chief of the Liaison Mission takes this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of its highest consideration. Text ends.

515.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/10

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] February 6, 1967

VIETNAM

In the attached paper† I have endeavoured to set out the present negotiating positions of the United States and North Vietnam to the extent that they are known to us. The question which arises on the basis of that analysis is whether there is any possibility of bridging the gap which still separates the positions of the two main protagonists in the conflict in Vietnam.

2. As regards procedure, I do not believe that it would be productive to pursue the idea of a Commission initiative for the time being. Such an initiative could not be gotten off the ground without Polish cooperation and the Poles have made it clear that they see no present prospect of forward movement other than on the basis of a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

3. The Poles themselves believe that the efforts of third parties in present circumstances can best be directed towards bringing the United States and North Vietnam into direct contact. I am inclined to share the Polish assessment which, as you will recall, also reflects the assessment on which we based the two Ronning missions in March and June 1966.

4. As regards the matter of substance, I believe that the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam is and remains the key to any unblocking of the continuing impasse. The practical question, therefore, is how much of a response it would be realistic to try to extract from the North Vietnamese in return for a cessation of the bombing. The Americans argue that a mere

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[9] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 11, pp. 11944–11946.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 11, p. 11944-11946.

willingness to talk is not a sufficient response from their point of view. They have their own public opinion to reckon with. In particular, they are concerned that, if they cease bombing North Vietnam, this would release both men and materials in the North for use in the South. In such a situation the United States Government would be open to the charge that it was putting its own forces in the South in a position where they had to fight with one hand tied behind their back.

5. To obviate such a situation, would it be possible to envisage a proposition on the following lines:

(a) the United States would agree to cease the bombing;

(b) the North Vietnamese would not be required to respond in terms of an actual de-escalation; they would, however, let it be known in some way that they were prepared not to take advantage of a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam to escalate the rate of their movement of men and supplies into the South;

(c) conceivably this may have to be coupled with a similar undertaking by the United States not to escalate the rate at which their men and supplies were being deployed into South Vietnam;

(d) within an agreed time limit of the suspension of the bombing, the two sides would enter into direct contact.

6. This kind of arrangement may be difficult to negotiate. The United States may regard it as involving an imbalance of concessions from them although the President said at his press conference on February 2 that "just almost any step" on the North Vietnamese side would be regarded as warranting a suspension of the bombing.[10] The North Vietnamese, on their side, may be disinclined to accept any arrangement which required them to give specific undertakings in return for a cessation of the bombing. On the other hand, the arrangement does have the merit of not involving an actual de-escalation which, it is clear, would offer much greater presentational problems to the North Vietnamese in terms of their relations with and support for the Viet Cong.

An alternative formula might involve:

(a) a United States undertaking to cease the bombing of North Vietnam on the understanding that

(b) the North Vietnamese, in the talks they are prepared to have, would agree to discuss a mutual de-escalation as the first item of the agenda.

7. These formulas are attempts to narrow the gap which still separates the positions of the two sides. In all such attempts the problem is whether to aim at a minimal package or something more extensive. In this particular case it seems to me that the minimal package is preferable because it is clear that the parties themselves would be reluctant to entrust to third parties the working out of formulas on matters which they see as properly falling in the context of a bilateral negotiation.

8. The real difficulty I can see in trying to inject any formula into the negotiating process at the moment is that we may well be at the periphery of a real negotiation which is going on without our full knowledge. More specifically, we do not know whether such a negotiation may not already have moved beyond the parameter within which our suggestions are designed to fit. If such a negotiation is, in fact, now in progress, I would suspect that it is geared to the Lunar New Year truce which begins on February 8 and which may extend anywhere from four to seven days.

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[10] See/Voir "The President's News Conference of February 2, 1967," in *Public Papers of the President of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967*, Book I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 128–134.

9. I would suggest, therefore, that we defer putting our ideas to the Americans until it is clear that the truce has come and gone without visible evidence of a preliminary accommodation between the two sides. At that point, there may be advantage in having Mr. Ritchie discuss our analysis of the present negotiating positions with United States officials. This would give him an opportunity not only to see whether our ideas are regarded as providing a useful basis for further exploration but also possibly to learn more about the trend and direction of other negotiating contacts which may have been set in train.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

516.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 8893, 20-VIETN-1-3/4

No. Y-158
Ottawa, February 8, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Saigon Tels 164 and 165 Feb 2.
Repeat for Information: Saigon from Delhi; Warsaw from Paris; Paris, NATO Paris, London, Geneva, Moscow, CANFORCEHED.
By Bag: Phnom Penh, Vientiane from Saigon.

NORTH VIETNAMESE PROTEST REGARDING CANADIAN SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO USA

USA Embassy representative called on Department February 6 to seek clarification of North Vietnamese protest.

2. In explaining background to this incident we gave Embassy copy of Saigon telegram 165 giving text of communication and drew attention to Prime Minister's statement in House (our telegram Y-153† February 3) pointing out that it was bilateral communication not repeat not protest to ICC as first press reports had indicated.[11]

3. We explained our view that North Vietnamese protest was "minimum reaction" to Prime Minister's remarks in House January 18 (PST-22† January 19) which in turn had arisen as a result of representations on this subject made by a group of university professors recently. Canadian sales of military equipment to USA (and fact that some of this was inevitably finding its way to Vietnam) have undoubtedly been known to Hanoi for some considerable time, but to best of our knowledge, this matter had never previously arisen in official Commission context, or in course of our bilateral conversations with North Vietnamese at various levels. Prime Minister's recent public comments, however, could scarcely be totally ignored by North Vietnam since they would obviously believe that anything having even an indirect bearing on Vietnam situation would be legitimate subject for official comment. Also of possible relevance was fact that North Vietnamese now seem to be making deliberate effort to play into domestic controversy, and differences in public opinion on question of Canadian arms sales to USA have attracted certain amount of press attention.

4. We expressed belief that North Vietnamese protest was largely pro forma in that they almost certainly did not repeat not expect it to have any real effect on Canada-USA relations in production sharing field. We based this view to large extent on way in which matter had been handled. Although Hanoi had given publicity to their reaction first in *Nhan Dan* then in

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[11] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 12, p. 12614.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 12, p. 12614.

releasing texts of their communication to Canadian Commissioner, they had raised it with Candel only at level of senior political advisor and presentation was made by Deputy Head of PAVN Liaison Mission in relatively casual way. If matter had been of serious substantive concern in Hanoi (and not repeat not essentially presentational as result of Prime Minister's January 18 comments) they would probably have wished to raise it with Moore in course of his farewell discussions previous week or indeed on one of his earlier visits. This had not repeat not in fact been done.

5. Finally we informed Embassy representative that we were now considering what form Canadian reply would take. Although no repeat no decisions had yet been reached on substance or timing of Canadian response we thought that one possibility might be routine presentation to PAVN Liaison Mission of official text of Prime Minister's January 18 comments.

6. Foregoing conversation took place before Saigon telegram 177† February 8 was received.

517.
Telegram from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Poland
Télégramme du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Pologne
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/11

No. Y-165
Ottawa, February 9, 1967
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, Geneva, Delhi, Saigon, CANFORCEHED, Moscow.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM

Polish Ambassador called on SSEA February 7, at latter's request, to discuss Vietnam. SSEA began discussion by referring to Rapacki's recent message† in text of which he had been particularly interested in use of phrase "other possibilities" by which he hoped the Polish Foreign Minister had meant a joint search for means to bring Vietnam war to an end. Although there was a great deal of current speculation about possible peace-feelers and much coming and going in form of publicized visits, SSEA expressed doubts as to whether anything really new and significant was happening. Recent interview between North Vietnamese Foreign Minister and Burchett[12] had revealed nothing more than Ronning had learned last March. Senator Kennedy's discussions in Paris[13] had apparently yielded nothing and it was difficult to see how current visit of Soviet Premier to Britain could advance matters further. (Polish Ambassador replied to question by SSEA at this point by saying that he knew nothing about specific points Kosygin intended to discuss in London, although Vietnam problem would undoubtedly arise in general terms, nor indeed did he know anything in wider context about any probes Soviet Government might be conducting.)

2. SSEA emphasized urgency with which he viewed current situation and his belief that coming six weeks or two months could be critical. If nothing was done by countries such as Canada and Poland war would go on indefinitely since USA was determined not repeat not to be "humiliated" and present Congress was likely to take harder line than its predecessor as shown by references to "victory" which were already beginning to be made.

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[12] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 843–844; "Red Writer Gives Hanoi's Views: 'It's Up to U.S.,'" *Washington Post*, 8 February 1967, p. A12.

[13] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), document 38.

3. In light of this assessment, SSEA expressed willingness to get together immediately with Rapacki for secret meetings since it would be necessary to act as quietly as possible. He asked Ambassador whether Rapacki would like to come to Canada for this purpose although this, like possible visit to Warsaw by SSEA, might attract too much attention. Ambassador replied non-committally saying that he was sure his Minister would welcome such talks if there was some indication that this could contribute to peaceful settlement. But Polish assessment he said was comparable to Canadian assessment in that USA was not repeat not at the moment prepared to stop bombing of North Vietnam, to which SSEA added that USA would require something by way of counterpart gesture.

4. SSEA told Ambassador that Canada was prepared to "go a long way" to bring Vietnam war to an end. He expressed confidence that Canada could get USA to stop bombing, but that to do so USA would have to have something in return even though it was not repeat not given publicly or designed to happen simultaneously. Canada and Poland if they acted courageously could exert the necessary pressure on their respective friends to come to such an arrangement. When Ambassador asked SSEA what specific action he wished Poland to take, SSEA replied that Poland should press North Vietnam for agreement to some form of reciprocal action. Canada did not believe that friends of North Vietnam were exercising the influence they should. Canada could and would, in circumstances where elements of reciprocity seemed likely, undertake to convince USA but we have no repeat no special standing in Hanoi although we were quite prepared to use Ronning again if this seemed desirable.

5. Positions taken by Ambassador throughout conversation suggested that he was drawing on general background briefing rather than any new or specific instructions or information. The points made included the following:

(a) If bombing stops, North Vietnamese Government will find itself in new position with greater freedom of action. But bombing tied Hanoi's hands since they could not repeat not be seen to capitulate to military pressure.

(b) If this first step could be taken by USA, Ambassador was certain that others would take necessary steps to show goodwill. He did not repeat not however specify what these steps might be or how they might be fitted into pattern of de-escalation prior to negotiation.

(c) Communist countries were not repeat not interested in widening the Vietnam war or in strengthening military potential of North Vietnam to extent that Hanoi could create broader problems. Such assistance as they had been giving to North Vietnam was limited to strengthening defence capability. Behind this policy lay assessment (presumably Polish and Soviet) of danger of further escalation which would bring in Chinese and create situation which would then be impossible to control.

(d) Countries supporting North Vietnam did not repeat not wish to establish any "beach-heads" for themselves in Vietnam, but the longer bombing continued the more entrenched these positions would become.

(e) Liberation Front, which was supported by, but independent of, Hanoi, was strongly influenced by Chinese. The longer bombing continued making resistance necessary, the more deeply entrenched Chinese influence would become established in South Vietnam. Ambassador seemed to be arguing that if bombing stopped permanently, Chinese influence in North and with Liberation Front would diminish, thus making it possible for Polish (and Soviet) influence to reinforce what he implied was existing North Vietnamese desire for peaceful settlement in absence of US military pressure.

[Marcel] Cadieux

518.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/11

No. 586
Washington, February 13, 1967
Secret. Limited Distribution. Immediate.
SSEA and USSEA only.

VIETNAM: BOMBING PAUSE

This message is to confirm report which I gave to Minister and Goldschlag on February 12 of points which Secretary Rusk had made to me in response to inquiry which I had directed to Bundy. Mr. Rusk phoned me about 5 p.m. that day to ask that following comments be conveyed to Mr. Martin: (a) No repeat no authorized USA statement about a bombing pause had been issued. (b) Any statement that anyone else (and that presumably included ICC) might make on basis of an assumption of a pause in bombing "might be overtaken by events". (c) What will in fact happen about bombing may be affected by what comes in from Hanoi. (d) Press speculation about a possible link between absence of bombing and Kosygin-Wilson talks in London is well founded. Rusk added that of course those talks end today (implication being that unless something extraordinary came in from Hanoi, bombing might resume in next day or two).

[A.]E. Ritchie

519.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/11

No. PST-27
Ottawa, February 14, 1967
Unclassified. Priority.

MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

During the Commons budget debate on February 13 the SSEA made a statement on the Canadian Government's policy in regard to the hostilities in Vietnam.[14] Mr. Martin first emphasized that the aim of Canadian policy was to enable Canada, along with other countries, to try to bring the war to an end, and he urged his critics in Parliament and in the country to understand the circumstances in which foreign policy must be conducted. While respecting the right of dissent and discussion, he pointed out that in matters of negotiation, particularly when questions of war and peace are involved, the Government should not be expected on every occasion to make disclosures which are not in the best interests of achieving the objectives which all may have in mind and he urged the advocates of political activism to reflect on the practical consequences of their proposals.

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[14] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 12, pp. 12962–12966.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 12, p. 12962-12966.

2. Referring specifically to the question of the bombing of North Vietnam – which he considered to be the key to whole problem – he said it was unlikely these would stop simply in response to a demand or appeal by the Canadian Government. It would, on the other hand be self-defeating if Canadian public statements were to have effect of slamming doors instead of opening them, or of closing off potentially useful dialogues instead of stimulating and nurturing the confidential exchange of viewpoints. He favoured quiet diplomacy.

3. Explaining what Canada was trying to do, he indicated that our access to both USA and North Vietnam placed us in good position to make judgement of the position of parties to conflict. Canada has tried to devise formulas which stand some chance of bridging gap separating positions of the two sides. Canada has also tried to make ICC available to parties when circumstances are right. He believed circumstances might now be ripening.

4. Mr. Martin indicated that ICC may not repeat not be instrument that will finally be used to promote agreement, but it was our duty to be ready for the slightest opportunity to achieve that end. Adding that opportunity may not repeat not be far away, he said "I feel there are elements in the present situation that should convince India, Poland and Canada to recognize that there may be a special role for them in Vietnam situation as it is now unfolding".

5. He emphasized that other channel of communication established by Ronning missions remained open and he dismissed as without foundation report that Ronning's services would no repeat no longer be used because of statements made by him in exercise of his right to express private opinions.[15]

6. Mr. Martin then restated Canadian position on settlement of Vietnam conflict under seven points: 1) A military solution alone is neither practicable nor desirable. 2) Peace discussions should take place on basis of Geneva Agreement. Without prejudice to ultimate solutions the first stage of any settlement will have to envisage a return to *status quo ante*; i.e., conditions ensuing from 1954 Geneva Ceasefire Agreement. In practice this involves a continuation of *de facto* division into two Vietnams if only to allow for scars resulting from quarter century of conflicts to heal and new dispositions to be agreed for eventual reunification of country. 3) We recognize unity of people of Vietnam at same time as we recognize that temporary division of country reflects political realities of situation and cannot repeat not be abrogated by force. It is for people in two parts of Vietnam to decide how soon and under what conditions preparations for reunification can be set in train. They must enjoy principle of self-determination. 4) Any Vietnam settlement will have to involve an international presence. "We believe it is generally agreed that as soon as conditions permit there must be a withdrawal of all outside forces from both parts of Vietnam. This would be consistent with terms of Geneva Agreement. The same applies to military bases maintained in Vietnam". There would likely have to be international supervision of any settlement agreed to by parties. While we have no repeat no firm views on what form this might take, Mr. Martin assured House that if it were decided that three ICC members should assume new mandate in an expanded form "Canada would be prepared to co-operate fully in constitution of new supervisory force". 5) It is for Vietnamese people themselves to determine their own political future and institutions under which they live. 6) There is merit in proposals made for neutralization not repeat not only of Vietnam but of wider area in Southeast Asia. 7) In Southeast Asia there is a close link between requirements of stability and requirements of economic development.

7. Mr. Martin expressed hope that Governments of North and South Vietnam would take note of this statement of our view concerning the nature of possible peace settlement and would regard it as an earnest of our desire [*sic*] to help bring about an end to war in Vietnam.

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[15] See/Voir "Ottawa May Release Ronning as Viet Envoy," *Calgary Herald*, 4 February 1967, p. 1.

8. Turning to question of sale of Canadian military equipment which finds its way to Vietnam, SSEA referred to Prime Minister's statement in House January 18 and added that Canadian Government does not repeat not itself authorize shipment of arms direct to any theatre of war.

9. At conclusion of his statement, Minister informed House of news of resumption of operations against military targets in North Vietnam and added that "in spite of this news, which I had hoped might be otherwise, we must renew our determination to contribute in some way to bringing about a cease-fire".

520.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6323

Secret.
[Ottawa,] February 14, 1967

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister without Portfolio (Mr. Gordon),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Sharp),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Mr. Laing),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. MacEachen),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Teillet),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada and Registrar General of Canada (Mr. Favreau),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Nicholson),
The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Minister without Portfolio (Senator Connolly),
The Minister of National Revenue and President of the Treasury Board (Mr. Benson),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Pennell),
The Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources (Mr. Pépin),
The Minister of Manpower and Immigration (Mr. Marchand),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Greene),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Côté),
The Minister without Portfolio (Mr. Turner).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner), (Mr. Beetz).

[…]

VIET NAM

The Prime Minister congratulated the Secretary of State for External Affairs on his statement the previous day in Parliament on Viet Nam. He regretted that the United States had chosen to resume bombings of Viet Nam.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that in recent weeks he had been closely exposed to public opinion, particularly in the universities, regarding Canadian policy towards Viet Nam. In his view opinion was very divided. There was a very vocal element, partly inspired by the NDP and in some cases organized by the Communists which was pressing the government to be more critical of United States policy and to pursue a "more independent"

line. The government generally faced a considerable dilemma on this issue. For some time now, with the tacit encouragement of the United States, Canada as a member of the International Control Commission in Viet Nam had been working painstakingly to pursue every avenue that might lead to cessation of hostilities and the opening of peace talks. There was now general agreement with Poland and India, the other two members of the ICC, that the Commission had a role to play but there was not agreement as to when it should be used. Earlier attempts in December to use the Commission had been aborted by the unfortunate escalation by the United States of its bombing.

Mr. Chester Ronning, the former Canadian Ambassador to India, whose views on Viet Nam were well known had made two visits to Hanoi, with the agreement of the United States, with a view to determining what might be a satisfactory basis for negotiation. On the last visit there had been some advance in the position of Hanoi in that the North Viet Nam Government had agreed that talks might be initiated if the United States would halt the bombing. The North Viet Nam Government had made it equally clear that if any publicity was given to this proposal they would refute it immediately. The position which was made known to Ronning at that time, however, now had been publicly announced by the Viet Nam Foreign Minister. It was not acceptable to the United States, who refused to stop the bombing unless some positive concession was made at the same time by the North Viet Nam Government. Although the United States had resumed the bombing after the truce they had shown a willingness to have the truce extended if this could be arranged. In the event, this did not prove possible and the timing of the resumption of the bombing was particularly regrettable in the light of the discussions which were being concluded on the same day between Prime Minister Wilson and Mr. Kosygin.

The essence of the Canadian dilemma, *Mr. Martin* said, was that it was important to maintain Canada in a position in which it could be a possible intermediary in the truce talks. The Canadian Government was a credible intermediary only as long as it appeared to North Viet Nam that Canada enjoyed the confidence and the trust of the United States. If the Canadian Government were to criticize the United States Government as some of the more vocal public elements advocated, Canada's capacity to act effectively as a peace-maker would be severely prejudiced. Another complication was the presence of Canadian military equipment in South Viet Nam. This equipment had been supplied under the Defence Production Sharing Agreement and, while none of it had been shipped directly from Canada, the presence of Canadian arms in Viet Nam was embarrassing, particularly in view of Canada's position on the Control Commission. Poland, who was also a member of the Commission, had supplied arms directly to North Viet Nam but Mr. Martin said he had been reluctant to mention this in his statement because of the importance of maintaining good relations with Poland in the Commission with a view to the eventual role that the Commission might play as a peace-maker.

The Prime Minister said that he was fully appreciative of the difficult position in which the Secretary of State for External Affairs found himself. At some stage, however, it might be necessary to let the Americans know, in the appropriate way, that if Canada was to continue to play effectively the role of an intermediary a greater degree of co-operation and understanding might be required of the United States.

During the discussion, these points emerged:

(a) Several Ministers regretted that the Canadian public was ignorant of the helpful but thankless role which Canada was playing. *Mr. Martin* pointed out that at this stage any publicity about Canada's efforts would be counter-productive to the cause of peace.

(b) Some Ministers expressed concern that Canadian arms were finding their way to South Viet Nam, though these were being sold to the United States under the Defence Production Sharing Agreement. *Other Ministers* felt that it would be a great mistake to disturb this arrangement, particularly since several other countries were supplying arms to the United States. Some Ministers also suggested that it would be a mistake to cut off these

arms shipments and give the impression that Canada wished to be neutral in the struggle between the United States and the aggressive forces of communism. That was not the view of most Canadians.

(c) In reply to a question, *Mr. Martin* said that at the appropriate stage it would probably prove possible to send Ronning back to Hanoi but that, in Ronning's own view the time was not propitious now.

(d) One Minister said that he found it difficult to reconcile the various elements of Canadian policy and felt that the net result left Canada in a weak moral position. *Mr. Martin* said that he did not share this view. Canada's views with respect to the bombing had been put forcefully although quietly to the United States Government. The question of the use of Canadian military equipment in Viet Nam was more embarrassing but he had endeavoured to explain this in his statement the previous day. In his view Canada's record would look very good when the full story could be told.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and other Ministers concerning the role which Canada was playing in efforts to bring about peace in Viet Nam.

521.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/11

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] February 14, 1967

VIETNAM

I have already submitted to you an analysis of the negotiating positions of the United States and North Vietnam as we understand them at this point in time. Based on this analysis I have also submitted to you two ideas which might conceivably be a basis on which the gap still separating the negotiating positions of the two sides might be closed.[16]

In the conversation you are to have with Mr. Goldberg on February 16 you might make the following points:

1. It has been clear to us ever since Ronning visited Hanoi last March that a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam was likely to be the key to the resumption of bilateral contact between Hanoi and Washington. Subsequent developments appear to have confirmed this judgment.

2. We understand the United States position as being that a response purely in terms of willingness to talk would not be regarded as adequate in return for a cessation of the bombing.

3. The ideas we have formulated seem to us to provide a reasonable basis for further exploration. The second of these ideas would be simpler to implement than the first. On the other hand it is our judgment that the first is more likely to prove of interest to the United States. The intent of that idea would be to achieve without the bombing of North Vietnam a situation as regards northern infiltration into South Vietnam which is now being achieved only by virtue of the bombing.

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[16] See/Voir doc. 515.

4. We would like the United States to consider these ideas and to let us know whether, in their view, there would be value in developing them and, in due course, trying them out on the other side either directly or through, say, the Poles or the Russians.

5. We would gather from Goldberg's speech at Howard University on February 11[17] that there are some gaps in United States knowledge of the North Vietnamese position. If these gaps are genuine, as distinct from being rhetorical, would the United States be interested in our exploring the area covered by these gaps in our next discussions in Hanoi. If so, would the United States wish to formulate some specific questions which could form a basis for enquiry in Hanoi.

6. We expect our new Commissioner to reach Saigon on March 1 and arrangements could be made for him to visit Hanoi at an early date thereafter.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

522.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/11

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] February 17, 1967

VIETNAM

The Minister of the United States Embassy called on the Department yesterday at his request.

2. Mr. Scott reviewed the American assessment of the North Vietnamese negotiating position essentially as set out in my memorandum of February 13. In other words, the Americans continue to consider that Hanoi is embarked on a major propaganda campaign to put pressure on the United States to stop the bombing in return for a vague undertaking to talk. Other factors may, however, be reflected in recent North Vietnamese statements, including possible fresh assessments which Hanoi has made about the course of political and military developments in the South and the unfolding of the situation in China. On balance the Americans do not regard a serious move toward peace by Hanoi as likely in the near future. They believe, however, that the overall situation is such that the prospect of a move on these lines is significantly greater today than it has been for a very long time.

3. It is against the background of what they consider as primarily a propaganda campaign that the Americans assess the significance of the recent meetings between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Kosygin.[18] Mr. Kosygin evidently began by backing the North Vietnamese negotiating

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[17] Goldberg gave the speech at Howard University on 10 February 1967, not 11 February. See "Excerpts from Goldberg's Howard University Speech on Vietnam Peace," *New York Times*, 11 February 1967, p. 8. Goldberg a prononcé son discours à l'Université Howard le 10 février 1967, et non le 11 février. Voir « Excerpts from Goldberg's Howard University Speech on Vietnam Peace », *New York Times*, 11 février 1967, p. 8.

[18] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), document 80 (Editorial Note).

position both in public and private. When, by the end of last week, it became clear that he had failed to shake British insistence that there would have to be reciprocal "action" in return for a cessation of the bombing, Mr. Kosygin appeared to take a more realistic approach to the problem of finding a basis on which the bombing could be brought to a halt. The Americans surmise that Mr. Kosygin was in touch with Hanoi in the course of his London visit but that the North Vietnamese produced no reply to whatever proposition had been put to them by Mr. Kosygin. The Americans further consider that Hanoi's real response was contained in Ho Chi Minh's subsequent reply to the Pope's message of February 8 which is couched in very hard terms.[19]

4. The Americans think that it may very well have been intended to make the British the prime target of Hanoi's propaganda campaign. In view of the firmness shown by Mr. Wilson this manoeuvre had failed. The Americans hope that this lesson may have beneficial effects in Hanoi and that sooner or later the North Vietnamese will conclude that their campaign had been a "flop".

5. In the light of this Mr. Scott went on to deplore the interpretation which had been given to your recent statement in the House by George Bain in his column in the February 16 issue of *The Globe and Mail*[20] (copy attached†). The article suggests that your statement, and more specifically your 7-point prescription for a Vietnam peace settlement, had been designed to accommodate the 4-point programme of the North Vietnamese. The article made no reference whatsoever to the principles and arrangements which the United States have said would need to be reflected in any ultimate settlement. In present circumstances this kind of article, which would be widely read in Canada and presumably elsewhere, could only have the effect of suggesting to the North Vietnamese that the propaganda pressure they were trying to put on the United States was paying international dividends. If that was the interpretation given to the article in Hanoi, its effects would be to confirm the Vietnamese in their position and thereby delay the prospects of peace. Mr. Scott was careful to emphasize that, if there was any question as to whether the United States were going to leave Vietnam with their tail between their legs or whether they were going to intensify the scale of hostilities, the prospects lay decidedly in the latter direction.

6. In reply we showed Mr. Scott the full text of your 7-point programme. We said that a careful reading of these points would show that they were in no way at variance with the United States conception of what would constitute a reasonable settlement of the Vietnam conflict. All the points had been very carefully qualified and there could be no question of their having been tailored to the demands of the North Vietnamese. We said that the interpretation which Bain had placed on your statement was his alone, that it was not based on official guidance, and that in the final analysis we had no control over the way in which individual representatives of the press chose to deal with policy statements of this kind.

7. Apart from the substance of the questions under discussion, the interview was interesting for the tone and manner of Mr. Scott's presentation. He was obviously concerned, and even troubled, by the possible implications of the Bain article, and indicated that he regarded the points he was making as being of more than routine importance.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[19] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 852, 858.

[20] See/Voir George Bain, "Pointers to Peace," *Globe and Mail*, 16 February 1967, p. 7.

523.
Draft Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Projet de note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 13978, 37-22-1-5/3

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] February 20, 1967

DRAFT
PREVENTION OF CANADIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT GOING TO VIETNAM

You invited our views on the possibility that the Government might act to prevent the use in Vietnam of Canadian military equipment sold to the United States. As explained below it is most unlikely that the United States would agree to provide assurances that such equipment would not be used in Vietnam, so for practical purposes the main subject for examination is an embargo on sales of military equipment to the United States.[21]

Any decision on this matter must clearly be taken in the context of our general policy regarding the conflict in Vietnam and the role of the United States there. The position taken publicly by the Canadian Government has been that we support the purposes and objectives of the U.S. policy in Vietnam,[22] in so far as that policy has been designed to allow the South Vietnamese to make their own decisions as to their future development and institutions by deliberate choice between alternatives rather than having one particular solution forced upon them under the guise of a "liberation struggle" conducted in the interests of North Vietnam.

This reflects our view, based on direct and continuing contact with developments in Vietnam for well over a decade and endorsed by majority decision of the Commission in 1962 that the present Vietnamese conflict developed essentially because of North Vietnam's deliberate and persistent violation of the Geneva settlement of 1954, and that the South, unable to cope unaided with an insurgency supported from outside, asked for and was given assistance by the United States in the exercise of the right of self-defence.

Although we have had reservations about some aspects of U.S. strategy[23] (specifically the bombing of North Vietnam) in furthering their objectives, we have never taken issue with the legitimacy of the U.S. presence in the Vietnam situation. To do so would run directly counter to the facts as we know them and the assessments formed over the years of our own involvement in Vietnamese affairs. Far from assigning blame to the Americans, our assessments have led the Government instead publicly to pin-point responsibility on North Vietnamese aggression.[24] Speaking to the Canadian Society of New York on March 5, 1965, the Prime Minister said: "As I see it, the struggle in Southeast Asia today is basically an attempt to establish the principle that armed assistance from outside to 'wars of national liberation' constitutes aggression and must be checked". You have for your own part been more explicit in identifying North Vietnamese policies as the basic disturbing factor in the area.[25]

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[21] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I think so. P[aul] M[artin]

[22] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
We should look at this again. P[aul] M[artin]

[23] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes. P[aul] M[artin]

[24] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Yes. P[aul] M[artin]

[25] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
We ought to look at this. P[aul] M[artin]

It is quite clear that those who do not share this assessment, and criticize "Canadian complicity", regard the U.S. presence in Vietnam as the disruptive factor in the situation. In such circles it is U.S. policies which are seen as "aggressive", and for this reason they urge the Canadian Government to dissociate itself from the U.S. position both in general terms and through specific acts such as withholding the supply to the United States, despite our defence production sharing arrangements, of Canadian military equipment. To acquiesce in the latter proposal would carry the clear implication that the Canadian Government had totally reversed its earlier judgment about the nature of the Vietnam conflict[26] and was now regarding the U.S.A. as the aggressor whose actions could not be supported even indirectly. In fact, this would amount to the imposition by Canada of a sanction against the United States, perhaps the most provocative way in which any country could dissociate itself publicly from United States purposes and objectives in Vietnam and therefore a most unlikely way to influence United States policy in a useful direction. To our knowledge, no other Western country, except Sweden with its long tradition of neutrality, has taken or is contemplating taking such a step; even France, which has been sharper and more unrestrained in its criticism of United States policies in Vietnam than any other of the friends and allies of the United States, and which is formally bound by the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement as one of its two signatory Parties, has not so far as we know taken any action to interrupt its arms sales to the United States or to place end-use restrictions on them.[27]

While such an act on Canada's part might have some short-term impact on the military capability of the United States, and thus cause some redisposition of the latter's resources, it is clear that it would not significantly affect in the longer term the level of the effort which the United States can maintain in Vietnam. Most critics of Canadian policy are doubtless well aware of this, and probably appreciate that the prime consequence of any act of this kind would be to precipitate a major political confrontation between Canada and the United States which could be portrayed elsewhere as a major falling away of support and sympathy for the objectives of United States policy in Asia on the part of one of the U.S.A.'s traditionally closest friends and allies. Canadian measures of this kind, at this crucial stage of the Vietnam conflict, however they might be presented, would be regarded in the United States and elsewhere as a general condemnation of United States policy and as such would undoubtedly be bitterly resented by the U.S. administration, the Congress and the majority of the American people who would consider it as "a stab in the back" by their closest friend and ally. Apart from its consequences on the totality of Canada-U.S.A. relations, it would probably intensify the division in domestic opinion in the U.S.A. which already seriously restricts the efforts of the administration to obtain an acceptable settlement, and would almost certainly increase Hanoi's intransigence. It would also put a serious strain on Canadian relations with a number of other friendly countries, including the U.K. which has had to stand up to considerable political pressure on the Vietnam issue, and, more directly, with Australia and New Zealand which have judged it in their own national interest to make a military contribution to the joint U.S.-South Vietnamese military efforts; the effect of a suspension or abrogation of our agreements with the United States, in the Vietnam context, would constitute a censuring of these manifestations of Australia and New Zealand policy.[28]

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[26] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Not necessarily. [Paul Martin]

[27] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
N.B. [Paul Martin]

[28] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
We do not advocate abrogation of the agreement. P[aul] M[artin]

One argument commonly adduced to support the case of the Government's critics is based on Canada's membership on the International Commission in Vietnam. It is asserted that, by virtue of this position, Canada has assumed the obligations of "neutrality", and that this posture should be relevant to all aspects of Canadian policy. This contention merits careful examination.

In assuming the responsibility of membership in the International Commission, Canada undertook no legal obligations in respect of its bilateral relations with Vietnam (either North or South) or in respect of its relations with the U.S.A. or any other countries. Such legal obligations as are defined by the Cease-Fire Agreement rest with the Parties. With regard to the importation of arms and war materials into Vietnam, it is the Parties who undertook not to strengthen their military capability in general, and not in terms of specific sources of supply; conversely, the Commission powers undertook only to supervise the implementation of the Agreement by the Parties, and did not formally agree to take, or refrain from taking, any specific actions in their relations with the two Parties (much less in their relations with third parties). It is obvious, of course, that Commission powers by the political logic of their position in Vietnam, are under some sort of constraint not to facilitate violations of the Agreement by the Parties. This however is a very different proposition from saying that Canadian sales of military equipment to the U.S.A., which the latter subsequently deploys in Vietnam, are *illegal* or run counter to Canadian treaty obligations.

From the beginning Canada has interpreted its mandate in the Vietnam Commission as requiring the exercise of *judicial impartiality* with respect to the facts, in assessing and judging the complaints of breaches of the Agreement submitted to the Commission by the Parties. This, too, is quite different from "neutrality" in the Vietnam context in the sense that Commission members in all aspects of their foreign policy should treat both sides in exactly the same way and refrain from forming a judgment on the issues involved in the conflict. This was clearly never intended when the Commission was established in 1954 on the basis of the *troika principle* with two members each representing, respectively, one of the two major political systems, and the third representing the "non-aligned". It was precisely because of Canada's NATO membership (and close relations with the U.S.A. and France) that we were asked by the members of the Geneva Conference to become a member of the Commission; the same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of Poland. It is therefore a distortion of historical fact to argue today (even though circumstances in Vietnam have changed radically since 1954) that Commission membership requires a posture of "neutrality", not only in respect of relations with the Parties in Vietnam, but also with outsiders.

An examination of the Polish position is instructive in this context. Poland is not and does not claim to be "neutral" in its relations with the Parties, in its assessment of the Vietnam conflict nor in its general foreign policy orientation. In its bilateral relations, Poland has recognized the Hanoi government (but not Saigon) and provided it with aid including substantial quantities of transport and communications equipment. Poland has moreover made known its general support for the North's cause and, in endorsing the Bucharest declaration of the Warsaw Pact powers last July, it has even gone so far as to express willingness to send volunteers to Vietnam if and when the North Vietnamese call for them. In comparison with the non-committal position taken by most NATO countries, this looks like a very un-neutral stance indeed.

The North Vietnamese have no doubts about Poland's role in the Commission and, similarly, they have a clear understanding of the Canadian position. While they cannot be expected to approve our position (in the sense that it is not designed to further their interests) and while they may feel bound to register dissatisfaction from time to time, we have reason to believe that they are sophisticated enough to accept it.[29]

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[29] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Agreed. P[aul] M[artin]

These various considerations clearly support the view that Canada's basic position on Vietnam has been and remains sound. Unless the Government is prepared completely to abandon this position by entirely dissociating itself from all aspects of the U.S. role in Vietnam, a reversal which would automatically bring about a fundamental impairment of our relations with the United States[30] and serious difficulties with several other countries which are close friends, it would in our view be most unwise to interfere with the flow of Canadian produced military equipment and supplies to the United States. Apart from the political implications and consequences suggested above, any such change in our policy would have serious economic implications which deserve careful consideration.

A cutoff of defence sales to the United States would undoubtedly have an important impact on our financial and economic relations with that country in their broadest sense. At the very least we would have to expect a much less sympathetic attitude among United States officials, if not an actively hostile one, in dealing with a wide variety of questions affecting Canada's economic interests, in contrast with the present rather indulgent and understanding approach to our problems on which we have come to rely. Similarly, we should expect a much cooler attitude on the part of the American public generally, with the very important implications this would have on such matters as investment and re-investment in Canada, the purchase of Canadian goods in the United States, and tourism in Canada for such events as Expo 67. While it is not possible to quantify the economic impact of these changed attitudes, it is quite clear that it would be very important.

It is of course possible, although perhaps less likely, that public and Congressional reaction would be so hostile that the United States Government would be led to specific and deliberate acts of economic retaliation. In that event there would be any number of damaging measures open to them, ranging from the termination of our exemption from their interest equalization regulations through the cancellation of the overland exemption for imports of Canadian oil (which has been justified to Congress on the grounds of its contribution to joint North American defence) or a decision to discontinue the automotive agreement when it comes up for review in 1968. The impact of possible steps of this kind would obviously be extremely serious for the Canadian economy.[31]

Apart from such general consequences in the economic field, account must be taken of the direct impact of an arms cut-off on employment in our defence and defence oriented industries, on our balance of payments, and on our production sharing and military procurement arrangements with the United States. Some indication of the importance of these factors will be apparent from the following:

a) The termination of our bilateral arrangements for defence research, development and production sharing, which would quickly follow on any interruption in the sale of Canadian produced defence items to the United States, would have a major impact on our defence industries involving some $600 million annually. It would involve the outright loss of some $300 million annually in sales of technically sophisticated products. Moreover, the reduction in the total market would seriously impair the competitive ability of Canadian industry to retain the remaining sales of some $300 million annually in Canada and other foreign markets such as Europe. At least 125 Canadian companies located in all provinces of Canada except Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island depend to varying degrees upon their defence export sales to maintain their competitive position in commercial markets, both domestic and export, for identical or inter-related products.

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[30] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Now I agree. P[aul] M[artin]

[31] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This would not cause a reprisal but I am not suggesting we ought tempt the U.S. P[aul] M[artin]

b) In terms of employment of Canadians, the $300 million of sales to the United States results in the fulltime employment of 13,000 to 15,000 persons on the basis of major contracts alone. To fulfill these major contracts, many sub-tiers of industrial activity are involved employing a further 110,000 persons who would be affected in varying degrees. Skilled specialists, engineers, scientists and technicians are predominant in these industries.

c) There would be a loss of various important research projects in Canadian industry and universities totalling some $60 million annually, which have promoted a substantial increase in new product development here. For example, virtually the entire research and development activity in the Canadian Marconi Company could be affected since it is closely related to U.S. requirements for the resulting end products.

d) Apart from the loss of actual defence business with the attendant reduction of employment, Canada would lose many other advantages, facilities and special concessions not enjoyed by other countries, including opportunities for overseas sales of such items as CF-5 aircraft which are produced here under U.S. licence, the benefits of specialization through the production of various sole-source equipment developed primarily with the United States market in mind, and the cessation or severe curtailment of the flow of advanced and classified technical data which has enabled Canadian industry to avoid much of the "technological gap" about which the European countries are increasingly troubled.

As stated in the introduction to this memorandum, we do not think there is any prospect of the United States agreeing to the imposition of end-use controls. This conclusion is based in part on the very negative reaction of the Americans in 1965 when they were sounded out regarding end-use controls for smoke ammunition. A further consideration is that although Canadian produced items are not necessarily used in Vietnam itself, the United States' interest in these at present arises primarily out of their general military buildup for the Vietnam conflict. In short they would have relatively little practical interest in Canadian items which could not be used in support of their Vietnam efforts. There are, moreover, two final considerations which in our view would be of overriding importance for the United States. First, sensitivity about national status and sovereignty would probably raise insuperable domestic obstacles to any U.S. acceptance of end-use controls on items bought for the armed forces; secondly, the United States could not logically agree to end-use controls without implicitly acknowledging that its policy in Vietnam might be open to legitimate criticism.

Summary and Conclusions

The Government has consistently maintained that the origin of the conflict in Vietnam and the principal barrier to its resolution is the continuing aggressive support from North Vietnam for the insurrection in South Vietnam, and that the South Vietnamese Government was entitled to request U.S. military support against this threat to its territory. Consequently, while not hesitating on occasion to criticize aspects of U.S. strategy and diplomacy in Vietnam, the Government has not disputed the right of the United States to conduct military operations in support of the Government of South Vietnam. This position involves no legal conflict with Canada's role as a member of the International Commission; this role requires of us only impartiality in judging the complaints of the Parties and does not inhibit our freedom of judgment of the issues involved or our relations with the two governments in Vietnam or, still less, with third parties such as the United States. We see no reason for the Government to alter this general position.

The supply on a substantial scale of military equipment from Canada to the United States, and vice versa, is a manifestation of our continental defence partnership and the interdependence of our economies. In various forms and under a variety of arrangements it has been a fact of our defence posture and of relations with the United States since the

Second World War. It began long before the present Vietnam conflict and will probably continue long after it. Interference with this process would have only a minor impact upon the U.S. war effort in Vietnam, and would be significant primarily as a provocative condemnation of the U.S. role in Vietnam. There is no reason, however, to suppose that it would lead to a more accommodating U.S. policy in Vietnam and thus help to resolve the conflict. It would, moreover, inflict serious direct damage to Canada's economy and very probably indirect injury on a considerably greater scale.

From this it seems clear that no action should be taken to curtail defence exports to the United States unless the Government is prepared to confront the United States publicly on a matter which the latter considers vital and thereby accept a fundamental impairment of our relations with that country as well as serious difficulties with other friendly countries. Although our assessments support the present policy, should such a change nevertheless be contemplated it should surely be conducted in such a manner as to maximize the benefits and minimize the harmful consequences; we can see few benefits, and truly formidable disadvantages both political and economic, in forcing an open breach with the United States over Vietnam by imposing an embargo on the supply of defence equipment.[32]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

NOTE: I propose to discuss this with the senior officers tomorrow at 10 a.m. I am consulting Mr. Ritchie. If you agree, we could review this with you later in the week or early next week. M[arcel] C[adieux][33]

524.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/11

No. 734
Washington, February 21, 1967
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Permis New York; Delhi, Warsaw, Moscow from London; Saigon from Delhi; CFHQ from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: USA THINKING

Main point emerging from Dier's informal conversations here this week with Assistant Secretary Bundy and separately with Cooper (Assistant to Harriman) was importance attached by USA officials to presumed Soviet change of attitude on Vietnam. Cooper, who was sent to London to provide personal liaison on Vietnam between Prime Minister Wilson and President Johnson during Kosygin visit, said that as result of Soviet willingness to transmit message to Hanoi concerning need for some *quid pro quo* by DRVN in return for cessation of bombing, he had thought for a time during Kosygin visit that USA might be very close to achieving its objectives in this respect. (These are remarkable words from experienced official such as Cooper; compare Wilson's public statements that a solution had

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[32] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Generally I agree. But it would be interesting to know how much of our military equipment goes to Vietnam. P[aul] M[artin]

[33] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Put on my desk. P[aul] M[artin]

been a hair's breadth away during Kosygin visit.[34]) It was extremely significant that USSR had been prepared to counsel Hanoi in direction of a settlement, although there was no repeat no question of any Soviet willingness to apply any kind of pressure on DRVN. He seemed to discount entirely suggestion that Russians might have been merely pretending to advise Hanoi.

2. Cooper remarked that a related point of interest was that Russians were now for first time willing to talk about existence of two factions within Hanoi regime (London telegram 823† February 13). Wilson had told Cooper that Kosygin seemed to imply that Foreign Minister Trinh and Ho Chi Minh himself were in more moderate group regarding a settlement, and that Prime Minister Pham Van Dong was among those who had a different approach; however, Wilson was not repeat not altogether sure that he had understood Kosygin correctly on this point.

3. Assistant Secretary Bundy commented in similar terms, although in less detail, on significance of apparent new Soviet attitude, and he added, without elaboration, that private Soviet interest in tackling Vietnam problem more positively than in past had also been evident in discussion between Kosygin and new USA Ambassador Thompson.[35]

4. Bundy seemed to believe that Moscow might now acquire pivotal importance in process of working towards settlement, and in this context he referred to appointment of new DRVN Ambassador in Moscow, who it was hoped would be more alert and competent than his predecessor.

5. Although Cooper appeared to think that conflict could conceivably terminate fairly soon in what he termed a "quick and dirty end" for which organisations such as ICC should be prepared, Bundy said he thought that a lengthy and difficult period of private USA-DRVN contacts, during which general lines of future settlement would emerge, was likely to precede stage at which cessation of bombing and a matching move by Hanoi would take place. Hanoi's action might be later in time than bombing cessation, but linked to it as second phase. Bundy also mentioned that such a move by Hanoi might be followed by some additional de-escalatory action by USA. (He did not repeat not elaborate, but we surmise that a USA freeze on troop movements into SVN might be contemplated at that stage.)

6. In answer to question on future role for ICC and its member governments, Bundy said there were two aspects: (a) possible role in facilitating contacts leading towards peace talks, and (b) possible supervisory role during disengagement or after a settlement.

7. On first aspect Bundy wondered whether it might be worthwhile testing Polish reaction once more to idea of a Delhi meeting of ICC member governments, or reopening bilateral Canadian-Polish dialogue e.g., by replying to Rapacki's message. After events of past fortnight, it was conceivable that Polish position would have changed somewhat. (Saigon telegram 232† February 20 indicates that if Polish position has in fact moderated, Lewandowski for one has not repeat not heard about it.) Bundy made his suggestion in very tentative manner, and he left impression that USA officials were not repeat not currently thinking in terms of intermediaries to any significant extent, except perhaps via Moscow.

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[34] According to a press report from London, England, the "hair's breadth" comment was made by "an authoritative British official." See "'Secret Peace Plan' Revealed by Wilson," *Calgary Herald*, 14 February 1967, p. 1. See also David Wood, "Mr. Wilson Hoped Against Hope Until Last Moment," *Times* (London), 14 February 1967, p. 1.
Selon un article de la presse londonienne, le commentaire mentionnant « à un cheveu » a été fait par « un haut responsable britannique ». Voir « 'Secret Peace Plan' Revealed by Wilson », *Calgary Herald*, 14 février 1967, p. 1. Voir aussi David Wood, « Mr. Wilson Hoped Against Hope Until Last Moment », *Times* (Londres), 14 février 1967, p. 1.

[35] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), document 85.

8. On supervisory role, Bundy developed interesting idea that at a later stage, a renewed ICC attempt to conduct controls in DMZ could perhaps be useful (in context of an arrangement involving bombing cessation) as a means whereby DRVN could tacitly assure USA that it was not repeat not engaging in massive infiltration, without needing to make any statement to this effect. Poles could be expected to follow Moscow's lead in such an arrangement and Indians would not repeat not be an obstacle. Bundy had nothing particular to say about other supervisory roles for ICC, except to make point that Commission could have additional tasks suddenly thrust upon it; such tasks would presumably need Co-Chairmen's approval and adequate financing. Bundy seemed to think that plans to cope with new tasks would have to be – and could be – speedily developed in light of circumstances prevailing at time. Cooper, in contrast, thought it would be very useful if Canada could develop its own ideas in near future on what would be required (personnel, transport, etc.) to enable ICC to carry out expanded responsibilities in context of a ceasefire which in his opinion could occur without much warning, perhaps even in next six months. It would seem that USA authorities have not repeat not developed any very firm ideas concerning future role for ICC, though they obviously think it may come to have considerable importance in certain circumstances.

[A.]E. Ritchie

525.
Memorandum by Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/11

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Limited Distribution.
[Ottawa,] February 21, 1967

VIETNAM

The following are the main points which emerged from a conversation which the Prime Minister and I had with Mr. Goldberg on February 16.

2. Mr. Goldberg said that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Kosygin had had a very good series of talks on Vietnam. The publicity which had been given to these talks on the British side had not exaggerated their importance.

3. It was clear, of course, that there were limitations to the degree of influence which the Soviet Union could bring to bear on Hanoi. The Soviet Union was almost certainly not in a position to dictate to Hanoi the course which it should pursue. Within these general limitations, however, it was apparent that the Soviet Union was now prepared to cooperate actively in the search for a solution to the Vietnam conflict. (This confirms the impression I had personally formed last November on the basis of my conversations with Soviet leaders.[36])

4. Mr. Kosygin had apparently been anxious to ascertain, at the very outset of the London talks, whether Mr. Wilson was in direct touch with the President of the United States and, more specifically, whether he carried the President's confidence. When this had been confirmed to Mr. Kosygin, the talks started in earnest on what might be done to bring the Vietnam conflict to an end.

5. Mr. Kosygin began by putting forward the proposition which had recently been put to Wilfred Burchett by the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, that is to say, that there could be direct talks between North Vietnam and the United States once there had been a cessation

[36] See/Voir doc. 475.

of the bombing and other acts of war against North Vietnam. Mr. Wilson countered by saying that the United States would be prepared to stop the bombing but that this required some form of reciprocal action on the part of the North Vietnamese. In the view of the United States the North Vietnamese willingness to enter into direct contact with the United States did not constitute a sufficient measure of reciprocity. Accordingly, Mr. Wilson tried to persuade Mr. Kosygin to use his influence with Hanoi. If he did so, Mr. Wilson for his part was prepared to use his own influence with Washington.

6. At one point in the talks Mr. Kosygin called Mr. Brezhnev on an open line from London. After this telephone conversation, Mr. Kosygin indicated that he would be prepared to cooperate. He then sent a long message to Hanoi from London. (Information from British sources, however, is in terms of messages having gone from Moscow to Hanoi.) According to Mr. Goldberg there was no evidence that Mr. Kosygin had received a reply to this message.

7. The most significant development in this exchange was that, when Hanoi received Mr. Kosygin's message, they sent a delegation to Peking. The United States and Britain do not know whether the Russians are aware of the despatch of this delegation. They find it difficult to believe, however, that the Russians are unaware of this development.

8. Be that as it may, both the Americans and the British regard this development as highly disturbing. It appears to imply at least that, despite the internal turmoil in China, the Chinese are continuing to exert pressure on Hanoi to prolong the war. It also implies that the North Vietnamese have achieved less freedom of action than might have been supposed against the background of the unfolding of the internal situation in China. In this context Mr. Goldberg referred to the presence of some 100,000 Chinese in Vietnam which is appreciably higher than recent reliable estimates.

9. In summary, while Mr. Kosygin had proceeded from a relatively restrictive position at the beginning of the talks, he had been considerably more forthcoming after his telephone conversation with Mr. Brezhnev. It would also be fair to say that, right up to the very last, he had tried to cooperate with the British in finding a basis on which a beginning could be made on the road to an eventual solution.

10. According to Mr. Goldberg, Mr. Wilson had addressed an "almost frantic plea" to the United States not to resume the bombing. Once the bombing had been resumed the Soviet Union had made no secret of its considerable annoyance.

11. Mr. Goldberg said that he had found the President absolutely adamant that there was no chance of anything happening about the bombing of North Vietnam unless the North Vietnamese were prepared to do something specific about their infiltration of men and supplies into the South. Mr. Goldberg attributed the President's very firm position in part at least to the "formidable presentations" which the military were making to the National Security Council.

12. As regards his forthcoming trip to Southeast Asia, Mr. Goldberg said he hoped to have an opportunity of addressing the Constituent Assembly in Saigon. This presentation would be made primarily on the basis of his professional background as a judge and lawyer. He did not suggest that he would be embarking on any process of negotiation. In other words the purpose of his visit would be very much in terms of "reviewing the troops", although he had previously indicated to us, that when he did visit Southeast Asia, he hoped that this would not be the main purpose of such a visit.

13. In the course of the conversation we made a passing reference to some ideas which had been formulated here as a possible basis for future progress. We indicated that we might wish to raise these ideas more formally at an appropriate time and in an appropriate context. It was Mr. Goldberg's view, with which we agreed, that it was best for the moment to allow the dust to settle.

14. The same consideration would also apply to the possibility of another Ronning mission. We told Mr. Goldberg that Ronning had volunteered to go to Hanoi again. We also reminded him of the fact that it was Ronning to whom the North Vietnamese had first privately put the proposition which had recently been put publicly by the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister to Wilfred Burchett.

15. We wondered aloud at one stage in the conversation whether the time might not have come for us to consider relinquishing our role on the Commission. Mr. Goldberg responded emphatically that such a move would not, in his view, contribute to an evolution of the Vietnam situation in the direction we were all seeking.

P[aul] M[artin]

526.
Letter from Prime Minister to Faculty Committee on Vietnam, Victoria College, University of Toronto
Lettre du premier ministre au comité des professeurs sur le Vietnam, Collège Victoria de l'Université de Toronto
MG26-N6, vol. 10, Vietnam – Correspondence, Faculty Committee on Vietnam, Victoria College

Ottawa, February 21, 1967

Dear Professor Hughes,

I was glad to have had the opportunity on January 17 to discuss with you, and some of your colleagues on the Faculty Committee on Vietnam, the issues raised in the letter you delivered to me at that time.

I need hardly tell you that the situation in Vietnam is one to which the Government attaches great importance in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. That importance reflects not only the implications of the problem for world peace and the international processes of change by peaceful means, but also the concern, which the Government shares with responsible citizens, at the toll the hostilities are taking in terms of human suffering as well as of wasted resources and lost opportunities for human betterment. On these points, I think there can be few differences of opinion.

The real problem, of course, for governments no less than for individuals, is in translating hopes and convictions into constructive action. Constructive action, in turn, depends on a realistic assessment of the nature of the situation which it is desired to change and of the likely consequences of any given action, whether public or private, in relation to the problem. Therefore at every stage we must ask whether any particular step is likely to advance the issue any distance towards a solution; or even towards a more satisfactory state of affairs. Any answer to this question becomes doubly difficult in the context of problems where the direct involvement and the direct responsibility for action rest essentially with others.

Let me be more specific. I realize, as the public debate over Vietnam here and elsewhere over the past few years has shown, that it is possible to arrive at different assessments of the rights and wrongs of the various positions represented in the conflict. This is inevitable, and in the long run, useful in a free society, always provided of course that the differences of opinion are genuine and based on the fullest possible range of facts. But whatever the view one might hold about the origins and development of a situation such as we face in Vietnam today, I believe that the right and proper course for the Canadian policy-maker is to seek to establish that element of common ground on which any approach to a solution must ultimately rest.

This is precisely the direction in which we have attempted to bring Canadian influence to bear – the search for common ground as a base for a solution to the Vietnam crisis by means other than the use of force. We have spoken publicly about our belief that a military solution is neither practicable nor desirable and we have encouraged the two sides to enter into direct contact to prepare the ground for formal negotiations at the earliest practicable time.

In what might be called a process of public diplomacy, the parties themselves have gone some distance over the past year or so in defining their positions. This open exchange of propositions is of course useful in settling international problems, but it must I think be accompanied by other less conspicuous efforts since public positions are generally formulated in maximum terms. One aspect of these quiet efforts could be an attempt to develop a dialogue with the parties, stressing to them the urgency of seeking more acceptable alternatives to the means being used to pursue their objectives; another might be an attempt to find channels by which the parties could, in quiet confidential ways, move out beyond their established positions, abandoning where necessary, tacitly or explicitly, those aspects of their positions where compromises must be made in the interests of a broader accommodation.

As I have said, I am convinced that the Vietnam conflict will ultimately have to be resolved by way of negotiation. But I do not think that a Geneva-type conference (or indeed any other conference) will come about simply because the Canadian Government declared publicly that this would be a good idea. It will come about only when those who are at this time opposed to such a conference can be convinced that it would be in their best interests to attend and negotiate in a genuine desire to achieve results. And in the process, confidential and quiet arguments by a responsible government are usually more effective than public ones.

Similarly, when it comes to making channels, or "good offices", available to the parties to enable them to make contact with each other, I think that too many public declarations and disclosures run the risk of complicating matters for those concerned.

In short, the more complex and dangerous the problem, the greater is the need for calm and deliberate diplomacy. That may sound like an expression of timidity to some of the proponents of political activism at Canadian Universities and elsewhere today. I can only assure them with all the personal conviction I can command that in my view it is the only way in which results can be achieved. Statements and declarations by governments obviously have their place and their use in the international concert, but my own experience leads me to believe that their true significance is generally to be found not in initiating a given course of events, but lies rather, towards the end of the process, when they have been made possible by certain fundamental understandings or agreements reached by other means.

As far as the bombing of North Vietnam is concerned, there is not the slightest doubt in my mind that this is one of the key elements, if not the key element, in the situation at the present time. You may recall that I was one of the first to suggest publicly that a pause in these activities might provide openings for negotiations. Subsequently, I have repeatedly stressed that I would be glad to see the bombing stopped, northern infiltration into the South stopped, and unconditional peace talks begin. This has been and will remain, in broad outline, the Canadian Government's position – a position which we have adopted not in a spirit of timidity, but in a sense of reality because we believe it corresponds to the facts, and because we believe that a negotiation involves reciprocal commitments. Any other position taken by the Government, I am convinced, would be unhelpful.

In your letter you also called upon the Government to reveal all military production contracts related in any way to the Vietnam war, and to consider refusing to sell arms to the U.S.A. until the intervention in Vietnam ceases. While I can appreciate the sense of concern reflected in your suggestions, I think it might be helpful if I were to try to put this question in a somewhat broader perspective than the problem of the Vietnam war alone.

Relations between Canada and the U.S.A. in this field are currently covered by the Defence Production Sharing Agreements of 1959 and 1963, but in fact they go back much farther and find their origins in the Hyde Park Declaration of 1941. During this extended period of co-operation between the two countries, a very close relationship has grown up, not

only between the Canadian defence industrial base and its U.S. counterpart, but also between the Canadian and U.S. defence equipment procurement agencies. This relationship is both necessary and logical not only as part of collective defence, but also in order to meet our own national defence commitments effectively and economically. Equipments required by modern defence forces to meet even limited roles such as peace keeping are both technically sophisticated and very costly to develop, and because Canada's quantitative needs are generally very small, it is not economical for us to meet our total requirements solely from our own resources. Thus we must take advantage of large scale production in allied countries. As the U.S.A. is the world leader in the advanced technologies involved, and because real advantages can be gained by following common North American design and production standards, the U.S.A. becomes a natural source for much of our defence equipment. The U.S./Canadian production sharing arrangements enable the Canadian Government to acquire from the U.S.A. a great deal of the nation's essential defence equipment at the lowest possible cost, while at the same time permitting us to offset the resulting drain on the economy by reciprocal sales to the U.S.A. Under these agreements, by reason of longer production runs, Canadian industry is able to participate competitively in U.S. research, development, and production programs, and is exempted from the "Buy American" Act for these purposes. From a long-term point of view, another major benefit to Canada is the large contribution which these agreements have made and are continuing to make to Canadian industrial research and development capabilities, which in turn are fundamental to the maintenance of an advanced technology in Canada.

In this connection, I should perhaps point out that the greater part of U.S. military procurement in Canada consists, not of weapons in the conventional sense, but rather of electronic equipment, transport aircraft, and various kinds of components and sub-systems. In many cases the Canadian industries which have developed such products to meet U.S. and continental defence requirements have at the same time been able to develop related products with a civil application, or have been able to use the technology so acquired to advance their general capabilities. For a broad range of reasons, therefore, it is clear that the imposition of an embargo on the export of military equipment to the U.S.A., and concomitant termination of the Production Sharing Agreements, would have far-reaching consequences which no Canadian Government could contemplate with equanimity. It would be interpreted as a notice of withdrawal on our part from continental defence and even from the collective defence arrangements of the Atlantic Alliance.

With regard to your specific request that we reveal all military production contracts related in any way to the Vietnam war, there is so far as I am aware no way in which the Canadian Government – and perhaps even the U.S. Government – could ascertain the present whereabouts of all items of military equipment purchased in Canada by the U.S.A. Such equipment goes into the general inventory of the U.S. armed forces and may be used for such purposes and in such parts of the world as the U.S. Government may see fit. The converse is true of equipment which is purchased in the U.S.A. by the Canadian Government. This long-standing arrangement – which is sometimes known as the "open border" – reflects the collective defence relationship of Canada and the U.S.A. and is an important element in the broadly-based co-operation of the two countries in the defence field. It would not in my judgment be consistent with that relationship for the Canadian Government to seek to impose the sort of restrictions which you suggest, nor am I convinced that, by taking such a step, we would be contributing in any practical way to achieving a political solution to the Vietnam problem.[37]

Yours sincerely,
[Lester B. Pearson]

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[37] Pearson's letter was published in the press on 10 March 1967, with a further reply from the Faculty Committee. See "Mr. Pearson Tells Where He Stands on Vietnam," *Globe and Mail*, 10 March 1967, p. 7. La lettre de Pearson a été publiée dans la presse le 10 mars 1967, avec une nouvelle réponse du comité des professeurs. Voir « Mr. Pearson Tells Where He Stands on Vietnam », *Globe and Mail*, 10 mars 1967, p. 7.

527.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 3097, 20-VIETNAM/1

No. 758
Washington, February 23, 1967
Confidential. Canada Eyes Only. No Distribution. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel E-655† Feb 21.
USSEA and Langley only.

USE OF CANADIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN VIETNAM

Without attempting to comment in detail on your thorough memo I can say that in my judgment it certainly does not repeat not exaggerate seriousness of issues which would be raised by any deliberate interference because of Vietnam with deliveries of such equipment to USA. While many Americans might understand Canadian concern (and even disapproval) over Vietnam situation I believe that very few people in this country would understand or sympathize with deliberate withholding by Canadian Government of military supplies destined for USA.

2. It may indeed be undesirable to relate this subject too closely to Vietnam War. It might be better to look at it in terms of basic USA-Canadian relations, more or less disregarding Vietnam situation. Simple fact would seem to be that USA has been prepared to rely on us for certain items of military equipment (as we in turn rely on them). If we decided for one reason or another not repeat not to allow such items to be delivered, we would undoubtedly be considered to be an undependable supplier. The perhaps rather primitive reaction here would almost certainly be that we were acting in bad faith and were letting USA down. Merits or demerits of Vietnam situation might not repeat not then seem too relevant. General attitude would probably be that however much we might disagree with them, this was no repeat no way to behave.

3. I have no repeat no doubt that our relations with USA would be fundamentally altered by any such development. One can only speculate on number of matters that might be affected. It would seem to me quite possible that virtually every relationship with USA would be involved including particularly our own defence arrangements. It is hard to see how any system of common defence could be maintained in atmosphere which would result from such action. The "open border" would presumably also be a fairly early casualty. Generally, the economic consequences and other effects would be very serious indeed.

4. Moreover, if I may presume to say so, it would seem to me unlikely that such action with respect to combat equipment alone would really satisfy those critics in Canada who disapprove strongly of any aid or comfort to USA side of war in Vietnam. Would not repeat not such critics then argue that it was insufficient for Canadian Government to withhold combat weapons? To be really effective (and logical) ban would have to extend to items which might be used to support combat operations. Same logic might even extend to metals, chemicals, and other materials or components that might go into military items which in turn might be used in Vietnam. It is not repeat not clear to me where such a process would stop.

5. Even if it may be considered fanciful to imagine process going beyond deadly weapons, I believe that even this start on process would do most of damage to our relations.

6. While it may be somewhat imperfect from certain points of view, is not repeat not present policy really best one that can be reconciled with continuing relations between USA and Canada? We do not repeat not provide things specifically for use in Vietnam War. We do however supply whatever is needed by USA armed forces generally just as we expect them to supply whatever our forces require. These would seem to be elements of a policy which is defensible in terms of Canadian interests and Canadian welfare.

[A.]E. Ritchie

528.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/11

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] February 24, 1967

VIETNAM

In my memorandum of February 6, I endeavoured to analyse the negotiating positions of the United States and North Vietnam as we see them at the present time. Since this memorandum was prepared Mai Van Bo, the North Vietnamese Delegate-General in Paris, has had a conversation with representatives of the *New York Times* which adds one or two useful glosses to our analysis.[38]

2. *First*, we suggested that there had, in fact, been some development in the North Vietnamese position that there was a relationship between the cessation of bombing and the commencement of bilateral talks between North Vietnam and the United States. One way in which the North Vietnamese position has developed is that what was privately said to Mr. Ronning last March is now being said publicly. Beyond that the position has been refined a good deal over the past year.

3. When this matter was first put to Mr. Ronning, Pham Van Dong said that if the United States declared that it would stop all military action against North Vietnam unconditionally and for good, then for its part the North Vietnamese would look into the attitude of the United States and would do so "with full understanding". At another point he put the proposition in this way, "when the United States have made a declaration corresponding to our requirements we shall for our part contemplate it and decide what to do". At still another point he summarized the North Vietnamese attitude by saying that "informal talks and a cessation of attacks against North Vietnam go together".[39]

4. When the same proposition was made publicly for the first time on January 6 by Mai Van Bo in Paris, he said that if the United States stopped the bombing of North Vietnam this new fact would be studied and that, if Washington subsequently proposed talks, this proposal also would be studied.[40] In this formulation, as you will note, the North Vietnamese still did not state explicitly that there would be a direct and automatic relationship between the cessation of bombing and the beginning of talks.

5. This relationship was, however, clearly inherent in the proposition put to Wilfred Burchett by the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister when he said,

> "If it (i.e., the United States) really wants talks, it must first halt unconditionally the bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is only after the unconditional cessation of United States bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that there could be talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States".

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38 See/Voir Tom Wicker, "Paris: Teatime Beneath the Chinwhiskers," *New York Times*, 23 February 1967, p. 34.

39 See/Voir doc. 375.

40 See/Voir Waverley Root, "Hanoi Offers To 'Examine' U.S. Proposal," *Washington Post*, 6 January 1967, p. A1.

6. Mai Van Bo has now confirmed to representatives of the *New York Times* that this further development in the North Vietnamese position, as put forward by their Foreign Minister, was conscious and deliberate and that it constitutes an "important gesture of goodwill" towards the United States.

7. *Second*, you will recall that we wondered whether there was any significance to be attached to the omission of the phrase "for good" in the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister's reference to a cessation of bombing being a pre-condition to the establishment of direct contact between North Vietnam and the United States. We pointed out that the omission might or might not be significant in view of the fact that other statements and commentaries being made at about that time did stipulate that the cessation would have to be not only unconditional but permanent.

8. Mai Van Bo has now made it clear that the North Vietnamese continue to insist that the cessation of the bombing must be both permanent and unconditional. He said that the North Vietnamese would not talk "under bombs" or "the threat of bombs", adding that any cessation of bombing which was not clearly labelled permanent and unconditional would leave the threat of bombing intact and would accordingly constitute an unacceptable interference with any talks which might be instituted.

9. Asked how a distinction could be made between a temporary and a permanent halt of the bombing, Mai Van Bo answered that the United States would have to declare at the outset that the halt was permanent and unconditional. This reference to a "declaration" is interesting since it is very much in line with the "undertaking" which Pham Van Dong stipulated in his discussions with Mr. Ronning last March.[41]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

529.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/12

Secret. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] March 3, 1967

VIETNAM: BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

It is now just over two years since the United States first instituted the bombing of military targets in North Vietnam as part of its prosecution of the war in the South. Over that period a number of arguments have been put forward on the United States side to justify the continuation of the bombing of North Vietnam as an important, if not indispensable element of the totality of the United States policy, both in the military and political realm, to end the insurgency in the South and to create conditions in which the South Vietnamese will be able to determine their own future free from outside pressure or intervention. More recently it has become clear that, as far as the North Vietnamese are concerned, the bombing has become a key element in any approach to a settlement of the Vietnam conflict by other than military means. In the light of this background it may be useful to examine the position which has now been reached.

2. One of the arguments which has been advanced in support of the bombing of North Vietnam is that this has had a salutary effect in terms of improving the morale of the South Vietnamese Government, people and military apparatus. This was undoubtedly an important

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[41] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I wish to discuss this with Mr. Goldschlag. P[aul] M[artin]

element at the time when the bombing was instituted on February 7, 1965, a time when there was a real prospect of the whole South Vietnamese position collapsing in the face of mounting pressure from the Vietcong with North Vietnamese support and under North Vietnamese direction. While it is possible to argue that the South Vietnamese continue to look upon the bombing of North Vietnam as just retribution for Hanoi's intervention in the South, the position in South Vietnam has changed sufficiently in the interval to call into question the need for the continuation of the bombing strictly in terms of maintaining and strengthening South Vietnamese morale. The military position for one has improved out of all recognition and, whatever the prospects may be of putting an end to the insurgency for good, it is generally recognized that there is now no possibility of the other side achieving a military victory over the combined forces of the United States and their South Vietnamese and other allies. On the political front too gradual progress towards a constitutional form of government, which will be internationally more acceptable and internally more representative of the interests of the people of South Vietnam, must be putting pressure on the National Liberation Front by calling into question its claim to speak for the overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese people.

3. Another argument which has been used to explain the bombing is that it is intended to demonstrate to the North Vietnamese that they cannot expect to escape paying some price for their intervention in the South and persuade them to abandon their effort to achieve their political objectives by military means. It is interesting to note that, while the North Vietnamese profess publicly to a determination to continue their fight regardless of the damage and dislocation caused by the bombing, and while most outside observers have made a good deal of the effect of the bombing in terms of consolidating North Vietnamese national unity and the national will to resist, the actual course of developments has been in the opposite direction. The North Vietnamese have let it be known, privately at least since March 1966 and publicly since January 1967, that they are prepared to establish direct contact with the Americans for the purpose of bilateral talks. And they have been giving these indications precisely in relation to the bombing of North Vietnam which they have asked to be stopped as the sole condition for engaging in talks. To this extent, therefore, it could be argued that the bombing has had some effect on North Vietnamese attitudes although it has so far fallen short of inducing them to come to the conference table and has not reduced the rate of infiltration.

4. The third, and in many ways the most compelling argument for continuing to bomb military targets in North Vietnam is that this helps to impede the flow of North Vietnamese men and supplies into the South even though it does not interdict it. This argument clearly needs to be looked at again in the light of Mr. McNamara's presentation in closed hearings before the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on January 23, 24 and 25, portions of which have now become public.[42] In this presentation McNamara went beyond saying that bombing up to the present had not significantly reduced the actual flow of men and material to the South. What, in fact, he is reported as having said is that he doubted whether the current scale of infiltration was below the level planned by the North Vietnamese or the level necessary to support North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces in the South at the present time. If this is what Mr. McNamara actually said it would seem to cut completely across the whole argument the Americans have put forward publicly in insisting on drawing a relationship between the bombing and the infiltration, other than that the bombing obviously does lead to a certain degree of dislocation in the North and undoubtedly raises the expenditure in men and resources which is required to sustain the North Vietnamese effort in the South at the level they consider necessary. It is also relevant to note that, if Mr. McNamara is reported correctly as saying what he did, this would correspond with the Canadian military

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[42] See/Voir George C. Wilson, "McNamara Cites Limits in Bombing," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1967, p. A1.

assessment which is that the North Vietnamese could raise the level of their infiltration into the South quite significantly if they so desired notwithstanding the continuation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

5. In terms of the arguments originally advanced in support of the bombing, therefore, the following conclusions could be drawn: *First*, the bombing has undoubtedly raised the morale of the South Vietnamese. In view of the overall change in the South Vietnamese position over the past two years, it is arguable that the bombing is no longer essential to the maintenance of South Vietnamese morale. *Second*, while the bombing has not brought the North Vietnamese to the conference table, it appears to have had sufficient impact to induce the North Vietnamese leadership to express their willingness to enter into bilateral talks with the United States. *Third*, the bombing has not apparently reduced the flow of North Vietnamese infiltration below the level which the North Vietnamese themselves regard as being required to sustain their military effort in the South; it has, on the other hand, increased the cost of this infiltration to the North Vietnamese by diverting some 300,000 people from other activities to repair bomb damage and to cope with the resulting dislocation.

6. If the above analysis comes reasonably close to being accurate, it raises some questions to which it would be useful to have answers:

A. The President has been reported by Mr. Goldberg as being completely adamant that there can be no cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam without reciprocity in terms of the pace[43] and scale of infiltration. Mr. Goldberg attributed the hardness of the President's position on this issue to the "formidable presentations" made by the military before the National Security Council. It is difficult to understand why the President would be taking the attitude he is reported to be taking if the presentations made by the military before the National Security Council are on the lines of the presentation reported to have been made by Mr. McNamara before the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees (i.e., that the bombing up to the present had not significantly reduced nor was any bombing he could contemplate in the future likely to reduce significantly, the actual flow of men and material to South Vietnam). That being so, one would have to assume that the presentations made by the military before the National Security Council do not reflect Mr. McNamara's judgment and that he may, in fact, be concerned to counter a military argument which, if fully accepted, would lead the President to place an even greater emphasis on military action against the North as a means of achieving a solution in Vietnam.

B. Whatever may be the original rationalization for the bombing, there are no doubt some in the United States Administration and among the military who would argue that the bombing raises the cost of aggression to North Vietnam and that, so long as the North Vietnamese are doing what they are doing in the South, they ought not to expect to remain immune from the consequences of their action. The corollary of this view would be that the North Vietnamese must be pressed by a continuation of the bombing to make a meaningful gesture in military terms either by stopping the infiltration of men and supplies into the South or by at least reducing the flow by a significant margin. Alternatively, it may be considered that, if the North Vietnamese were not prepared to do that, they would at least have to improve their present offer which goes no further than to have "talks about talks". Conceivably North Vietnamese willingness to enter into a meaningful negotiation, which could be presented as a real step towards peace, might be regarded as fair reciprocity for a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. In either case, however, it would be difficult to reconcile these expectations (which would involve significant political decisions on Hanoi's part) with the President's indication at his press conference on February 2 that "just almost any step" on the North Vietnamese side would be regarded as warranting a suspension of the bombing.

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[43] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
(Rate) P[aul] M[artin]

C. It may be, of course, that the United States do not regard the present as a propitious time to initiate the process of negotiation. Indications on these lines have been reported to us by our mission in Saigon on the basis of discussions with members of the United States Embassy there although this assessment has been disputed by our Embassy in Washington. The fact is, nevertheless, that the United States regards the course of military developments in South Vietnam as encouraging and they no doubt look to the formation of a constitutionally elected government in South Vietnam as impinging significantly on the position which the National Liberation Front has been endeavouring to stake out for itself. In these circumstances, it is conceivable that the United States may be insisting on a reciprocal gesture of de-escalation by the North Vietnamese because they are reasonably certain that this is something the North Vietnamese cannot do without, in fact, appearing to give public notice that they are prepared to sell the Vietcong down the river. On the other hand, if this is in fact the attitude held in responsible quarters in the United States, it would be difficult to account for the encouragement which was initially given by the United States Administration to Polish efforts last November and December and to the subsequent efforts which Mr. Wilson made to secure Mr. Kosygin's cooperation in a move towards peace in Vietnam.

D. If Mr. McNamara has been accurately reported, our own idea that the North Vietnamese might be asked to give an undertaking not to escalate their infiltration into the South in return for a cessation of the bombing would appear to be largely irrelevant. Our idea was formulated on the assumption that the United States could not, in terms of their own public opinion, suspend the bombing of North Vietnam without some guarantee that their forces in the South would not thereby be placed in a prejudicial position. If the facts are that the North Vietnamese level of infiltration at the moment is for all practical purposes exactly what it would be regardless of the bombing, the problem of protecting the position of American forces in South Vietnam does not really arise.

7. It would obviously be premature to try to draw any firm conclusions from the above analysis, at least until we have a much fuller account of what Mr. McNamara said than is at present available to us.[44] We have no reason to think that, in a matter which has raised so much international and domestic uneasiness as has the bombing of North Vietnam, the United States would follow a wholly irrational policy. Presumably if they saw a balance of advantage in stopping the bombing – or, indeed, if they saw no overwhelming disadvantage in doing so – they would not be as adamant as they have been in demanding a greater degree of reciprocity for such an action on their part than the North Vietnamese are likely, in present circumstances, to be prepared to offer. Presumably the Korean precedent is not without influence on current United States thinking. They undoubtedly consider that they are now in a favourable position both militarily and, to a somewhat lesser extent, politically in South Vietnam. In such a situation they presumably see little advantage in conceding anything of substance in return for a mere offer to talk, without any substantial counterpart in military terms, and in circumstances where the other side has given no indication that they are genuinely committed to a peaceful resolution of the present conflict. The United States probably feels that to be drawn into talks in these circumstances would merely add to the political pressures on them without any countervailing prospect of real progress towards an acceptable solution.[45]

P[aul] M[artin]

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[44] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
It would indeed. [L.B. Pearson]

[45] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Mr. Hadwen: Re: P[rime] M[inister]'s comments page [point] 7. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

530.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/12

No. 294
Saigon, March 7, 1967
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London; Washington, Permis New York, Canberra, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Wellington from Canberra; Hanoi, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

CONVERSATION WITH GOLDBERG

Accompanied by Wood I called on Justice Goldberg at USA residence at mid-day March 5. Appointment had been arranged previous evening at reception given by Lodge. Both had just returned from helicopter tour (no repeat no flak jackets) to VC stronghold immediately south of Saigon for delayed lunch with wives to which we were invited on arrival. Atmosphere was friendly, frank and cordial.

2. This attitude was maintained when four men adjourned to Lodge's study for discussions. Goldberg led off with short dissertation beginning with phrase he had used in our talk in New York (again attributed to Mr. Pearson) that this was the time "to let the dust settle". He said that what he had heard and seen so far on his visit here confirmed his view that the North Vietnamese are being hurt progressively by the increasing USA military pressure and only by this means will they be brought to accept the fact that they cannot repeat not prevail against the strength and determination of the USA and allied countries. (It is interesting to note that this reflects more fully the view Bundy put forward in Washington on my visit than the previous line Goldberg expounded in New York. It was also noteworthy that in Lodge's presence the Justice did not repeat not cheerfully state that he is one of the doves of the administration. Perhaps helicopter trips over enemy territory constituted a nice refinement of high-level brainwashing. Goldberg then went on to reiterate another Bundy thesis that just because American bombings (and the new artillery and naval bombardments and river mining) are continued and even stepped up is no repeat no valid reason why talks leading toward an accommodation between the belligerents should not repeat not be arranged. He also supported the thesis that it would be naive to agree to (more?) talks while the war went on unless a pretty firm package deal for final settlement was agreed on in advance. He referred briefly to the Korean experience and appears to have accepted the "Panmunjom syndrome", a point which he had not repeat not touched on in our talk in New York but which you will recall was emphasized to me in Washington.

3. Later Goldberg strongly advocated the essentiality of complete secrecy in the conduct of any talks or negotiations with the North. It was quite apparent that he was thoroughly disillusioned with the Wilsonian concept of open diplomacy and was particularly bitter against the Poles for manner in which they had inaccurately publicized peacefeelers recently. However, there was in his comments no repeat no implication that the discretion of Canadians was in any way suspect. He said in fact that he and administration in Washington fully recognize that Canada is closest and best friend of the USA and our country is always given special consideration. He then made mention of his recent visit to Ottawa and expressed his personal appreciation of talks he had with Mr. Martin and the Prime Minister.

4. Ambassador Lodge picked up a laudatory comment of his colleague on potential of ICC to give what appeared to be a set lecture on unique value of this international organization. To illustrate his long-standing affection for Commission he referred to an incident of some time ago when he vetoed a project of USA Army to take over compound and residence of Commission. Lodge then went on to suggest very pointedly that I would have a unique opportunity as a Canadian to speak to leaders of North Vietnam who he said were cognizant of Canada's record of objectivity as a member of ICC and our consistent support of UN peacekeeping operations. He added also that it was well known that Canada had reputation of having confidence of USA as a close but independent friend. With these advantages Lodge then suggested it [Group corrupt/Groupe corrompu] I tell Hanoi that despite such incidents as speeches by Senator Robert Kennedy (Goldberg's comment was that Bob was a good friend but did not repeat not understand problem), present policy of Johnson Administration was firm, determined and would be maintained indefinitely until some sign of accommodation from North were made known. Such a sign he said could well come through us especially if it were pointed out in Hanoi that their position in negotiations would have been stronger six months ago than it is today and would be correspondingly weaker six months hence. For this reason USA could not repeat not go on making proposals to Hanoi because such action would be misconstrued as a sign of lack of determination. Likewise speeches such as Senator Kennedy's, sincerity of which Lodge recognized, unfortunately encourage Hanoi to doubt American tenacity.

5. Neither Goldberg nor Lodge make any direct reference as to what form of settlement Washington would accept but Lodge stressed importance of modalities, especially fact that it would be absolutely essential to reach a deal whereby Government of North Vietnam would not repeat not lose face. (He quoted what he claimed to be a Chinese saying, that it was better to lose your head than your face.) Implicit in this of course was fact that USA likewise could not repeat not lose face and Lodge expounded further (I thought more for Goldberg than for us) that Oriental mind has a peculiar logic not repeat not fully comprehensible to most Occidentals and therefore a high degree of flexibility was an essential if negotiations of possibly unforeseen variations were to come to fruition.

6. Unfortunately, this briefing as such it was ended prematurely because of Goldberg's tight schedule and we had not repeat not opportunity for questions except that on leaving we did ask Goldberg what timing he envisaged for opening of meaningful discussions with the North. Reply was that USA is ready immediately but crucial decision still rests with Hanoi. Both he and Lodge had indicated earlier the military pressure was key and that time was only unpredictable. Incidentally, Goldberg mentioned that President de Gaulle had told him in Paris recently that essential difference between former French and present American situation in Vietnam amounted to 2,000 helicopters.

7. It was interesting that Lodge and Goldberg should ask that Canada should carry the ball for USA after Bundy had played down such a possible role and only suggested that ICC as such might be involved at a later stage in any negotiations which eventuate. It is perhaps not repeat not too cynical to conclude that having tried unsuccessfully to utilize the Poles and having written off the Indians as channels to Hanoi, the USA has now decided to call on the third team.

8. Naturally I made no repeat no commitment in response to these suggestions and as I am now engaged in formal calls here which will take some time, I would ask for your comments and evaluations if necessary before my first visit to Hanoi in about two weeks' time.

[Ormond W.] Dier

531.
Telegram from High Commissioner in India to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissaire en Inde au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/12

No. 414
Delhi, March 7, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 412† Mar 6 and Your Tel Y-224† Mar 3.
Repeat for Information: Saigon, London; Washington, CANFORCEHED, Permis New York, Canberra (Immediate) from Ottawa; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome, Warsaw, Moscow (Immediate) from London.
By Bag: Wellington from Canberra; Hong Kong, Tokyo from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

POSSIBLE APPEAL BY ICC

T.N. Kaul raised with us yesterday afternoon, March 6, possibility of a new attempt at issuing a Commission peace appeal. He said that Indians were disturbed by escalation of Vietnam war since Tet Truce and felt Commission should make concerted effort to prevent any further deterioration which would destroy any hope of peace for months or years.

2. Following is draft text which Kaul gave us for our comments.

> The ICC had hoped that, to create an atmosphere for beginning talks by all parties concerned towards a peaceful settlement of the problem of Vietnam, in accordance with the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the cease fire, which started on the 8th February on the Tet New Year festival, could have been extended. The Commission regrets that this was not repeat not done. The ICC believes that it is still possible to create an atmosphere for peaceful talks if the bombing of North Vietnam is stopped unconditionally, followed by the cessation of all hostilities throughout Vietnam. The ICC would, therefore, like to make an urgent appeal towards this end in view of the recently observed marked escalation of hostilities characterised by such announced measures as the resumption of bombing of DRVN territory, bombardment from warships of areas in the DRVN, the movement of troops into the demilitarized zone followed by firing of heavy artillery across the zone, the laying of mines in rivers and the general intensification of aerial attack. The ICC feels that these, amongst other things, will dangerously vitiate the atmosphere for any peaceful settlement and thus make it increasingly difficult to achieve the objectives of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.
>
> The ICC regrets that instead of being able to supervise and control the Cease Fire Agreements of 1954, it has to become a helpless observer of large-scale hostilities in Vietnam. The ICC regrets the rapid escalation of hostilities in Vietnam with increasingly wider involvement and earnestly hopes that all Governments dedicated to the peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem will support this appeal and take measures towards the fulfilment of its objectives.

3. Kaul did not repeat not present any convincing reasons why he expected an appeal would have a chance of success at the present time. It would at least "do no repeat no harm". He has also given text to Poles and has not repeat not yet had any indication whether they would

favour such an appeal. It was also Indian understanding that U Thant's efforts in Rangoon[46] had been fruitless. (He said Kannampilly's recent visit to Rangoon was not repeat not connected with U Thant's visit).

4. We gave Kaul the comments in paragraphs one and two of your reference telegram and pointed out that catalogue of recent escalations of hostilities in fourth sentence of proposed draft appeal would not repeat not be considered by you as a balanced assessment of recent events. Kaul's only comment was that it was fact that USA and SVN forces had taken measures outlined.

5. We had impression from Kaul's conversation that proposed text does not repeat not represent very thorough preparation or thought on Indians' part but rather reflects desire of Indian Government to appear to be "doing something" about Vietnam situation. Kaul also suggested that Commission appeal need not repeat not have any publicity but could be sent to all governments concerned simply as an expression of Commission's views and a request for a return to conditions envisaged in Geneva Agreements.

6. When we pointed out the very slim likelihood that such an appeal at this time would be effective, he said the Commission must take some action to justify its existence. If Commission cannot repeat not have any effect on situation in Vietnam, he said, perhaps it would be best if it were to pack up altogether although, he hastened to add, this would be a retrograde step. As you know, Kaul does not repeat not inspire trust at best of times but we cannot repeat not help wondering whether this manoeuvre is in fact designed to invite rejections by one or both sides and to prepare ground for Indian move to withdraw from Vietnam Commission altogether.

7. While, as mentioned above, we gave Kaul verbally comments in paragraphs one and two of your reference telegram, it might be useful if we could be authorized to give him an aide-mémoire containing your comments to be sure that this will be presented to Indian Ministers.

[Roland] Michener

532.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Poland
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade en Pologne
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/12

No. Y-236
Ottawa, March 9, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Saigon, Moscow, Geneva, Permis New York.

VIETNAM

Polish Ambassador called on me today on instructions. He said Rapacki would be glad if it were possible for us to meet somewhere in Europe. It was Rapacki's intention to be present during final stages of negotiations of non-proliferation agreement. In Polish estimation that point was likely to be reached in not repeat not too distant future. If I were also contemplating being in Geneva at that time, this would provide good opportunity for meeting.

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[46] See/Voir "Thant Holds Talks in Rangoon with North Vietnamese Envoys," *New York Times*, 4 March 1967, p. 1.

2. I told Ambassador that I would be in Britain for three days at end of March and possibly again around April 18. As regards possibility of meeting in Geneva, I said that we welcomed progress which was being made in bilateral discussions between USA and USSR. At the same time, I pointed to problems inherent in drafting of safeguards article which might take more time to resolve than Poles apparently thought. Be that as it may, I said I would be entirely prepared to meet Rapacki even if this were to involve travelling to Europe especially for this purpose.

3. Ambassador asked whether USA was likely to be putting forward any new constructive suggestions on Vietnam in context of meeting which Mr. Pearson was due to have with President Johnson. I said that plans for meeting were in suspense for the moment. Nor could I see any present prospect of change in USA position. In particular, I said it would be unrealistic to believe USA were ready to stop bombing of North Vietnam in absence of some reciprocal military action by other side. It was entirely clear by now that mere offer to enter into talks would not repeat not be regarded as adequate reciprocity by USA.

4. This assessment notwithstanding, I said I could see no reason for suspending our efforts to bring about some preliminary discussions between two sides. It seemed to me that USSR had recently taken significant step to help bring Vietnam conflict to peaceful conclusion. Perhaps this brought us closer to time when good offices of Commission powers could usefully be brought into play.

5. In this context I took opportunity to assure Ambassador that there was no misunderstanding of his Government's position at this end. Canada and Poland agreed that there was a role for the Commission to play in right circumstances. Our only differences related to timing of such an operation. I said I respected Polish position as it had been put to me by Rapacki and had been careful to make this clear in my public statements.

6. In sum, it seemed to me that we might be entering a more difficult period as regards Vietnam. While we had not given up hope of bringing two sides into direct contact, it seemed to me that we were unlikely to advance prospects of an accommodation by basing our efforts on unrealistic assumptions.

7. Ambassador said that North Vietnam also faced difficulties if it were to try to negotiate itself out of the bombing. Position had been complicated by recent escalation of USA military action against North Vietnam. If USA could see its way clear to de-escalating hostilities, Ambassador was confident there would be a response from other side. (Ambassador did not repeat not elaborate on this point but it is just conceivable that he may have been trying to suggest that real difficulty from North Vietnamese point of view was with concept of a *negotiated* de-escalation.)

8. As regards position of China, I said that until Mr. Kosygin's recent visit to London it had appeared to many of us that China was so preoccupied with internal developments that Hanoi probably enjoyed as much freedom of action as it had ever enjoyed. Subsequent indications suggested that China continued to be major factor in North Vietnamese thinking.

9. Ambassador said that China was trying to exert strong influence on NLF but that North Vietnam was not repeat not quite in same position. China was basically concerned to assert herself as major power in Asia and she was trying to create situation in which no Asian problem could be solved without her participation. Nevertheless, Ambassador agreed that present trend suggested it might be possible for USA and USSR to co-operate in bringing about and guaranteeing a Vietnam settlement.

[Paul] Martin

533.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commission in India
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut-commissariat en Inde
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/12

No. Y-232
Ottawa, March 10, 1967
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Reference: Your Tel 414 Mar 7.
Repeat for Information: Saigon, London, Washington, CANFORCEHED, Permis New York, Paris, NATO Paris, Warsaw, Geneva.
By Bag: Moscow, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM – POSSIBLE APPEAL BY ICC

I continue to think that there is a role for Commission to play in right circumstances. Whether this is directed towards reversal of course of military events in Vietnam or towards paving way for political contacts between parties will depend on circumstances themselves. I am glad to note, therefore, that Indians too are continuing to entertain possibility of Commission action on these lines.

2. There are certain premises on which any action or appeal by Commission must inevitably be based. That such action can be effectively taken only on basis of unanimity is, I believe, agreed among all of us. That it must be based on careful preparation is presumably self-evident. Above all, however, it seems to me that Commission action should be such as to hold out reasonable prospect of producing results. In essence, this means that it must reflect what it is realistic to assume that the parties may be willing and able to do at any given time. Any other course would in my judgment court risk of failure and detract from opportunities which may be open to Commission in more propitious circumstances.

3. It is with these general considerations in mind that I have examined specific suggestion put to you by Indians. I am not repeat not sure how well thought out that suggestion has been but I am inclined to suspect that it was formulated on spur of moment. Accordingly, I agree with generally cautious position you have taken in discussion with Kaul. As far as Kaul's suggested text for appeal is concerned, I agree that the selective listing of specific types of military activities tends to give the "appeal" a one-sided appearance. This would be difficult for us to accept since it would run counter to the facts as the Commission knows them. In other words, I think it would be difficult for Commission to justify the specific references Kaul has drafted which appear to prejudge matters on which Commission has not yet been asked to pronounce itself, while leaving wholly out of account activities by both sides on which Commission has, in fact, recently passed formal judgment.

4. On more general grounds, I have some reservations about the usefulness of Commission action in terms and circumstances where this is unlikely to have any real effect on course of events in Vietnam. If, as I believe, there is a role for the Commission in due course, it follows that Commission should not repeat not prematurely spend its credit by taking action for action's sake and without any prospect of being able to influence situation. Furthermore, I think Commission would be well advised to allow dust to settle on recent abortive initiatives and to see whether Secretary-General's discussions with North Vietnamese offer any chance of being usefully followed up.

5. I know that, in carrying forward your discussions with the Indians in this matter, you will avoid giving impression that our reaction to Indian enquiry is in any sense negative. We support principle of Commission initiative and we are entirely prepared to pursue discussion of these and other ideas which may be put forward. Indeed, there are ideas which we may

ourselves wish to put forward in due course. In terms of tactics, I would suggest that you play along with Indians for time being, at least until we know Polish reaction at which time we will probably want to review position.

6. I do not think it would be to our advantage to treat Indian approach as being in nature of formal proposal. Accordingly, I would be in favour of continuing to treat with Indians on oral basis. Speculation in paragraph 6 of your reference telegram would tend to support the view that we had best avoid putting our comments in writing at this stage.

[Paul] Martin

534.
Memorandum from Head, European Division, to Far Eastern Division
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Europe à la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/12

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] March 15, 1967

SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE MINISTER MARCH 14 – VIETNAM

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Minister on March 14 to inform him of the discussions which Mr. Kosygin had had in London about Vietnam. According to the Ambassador Mr. Kosygin expressed support for the proposal of the Foreign Minister of the DRVN for the unconditional ending of the United States bombing and the opening of negotiations. He also pressed for a joint Anglo-Soviet appeal to the United States to accept the DRVN proposal, on the grounds that such an appeal would be a great step towards ending the war and restoring peace in Southeast Asia. The Ambassador said that unfortunately the Soviet initiative was not supported by the British, whose ideas on Vietnam did not seem to differ from those of the United States and were "completely unrealistic".

2. The Minister replied that he had been greatly interested in Mr. Kosygin's efforts and in his London statements on negotiations. However, what the Foreign Minister of the DRVN had said to Wilfred Burchett was not news to him. He had known that this was the position of the DRVN ever since March 1966. He then told the Ambassador in confidence that Mr. Ronning had learned in Hanoi in March 1966 that the Four Points were not a condition precedent to negotiations. Canada has promised the North Vietnamese not to tell anybody about this, except one party, whose identity the Ambassador could guess. He felt able to reveal this to the Ambassador now, since the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister's interview with Burchett and of course because of the great importance of the USSR in this matter. Nevertheless the Minister emphasized that he had known then and knew now that without some reciprocal military action by the DRVN the United States would not stop its bombing. Canada therefore regarded the bombing as one of the keys to the question but not the only solution.

3. The Ambassador enquired the Minister's views as to the particular role of the ICSC under the present circumstances. The Minister replied that there was definitely a role for the ICSC – if not for all three of its members then for one of them. It would be better however if any action taken were under Commission auspices. If all three members as representatives of a very wide body of opinion could agree on the steps to take this would have great influence, not perhaps as great as Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Wilson might have had, but in the Minister's opinion nevertheless very great influence on the United States.

4. The Minister added that a month ago he had thought that China was too preoccupied with its own problems to be much concerned with Vietnam. He did not think so now and possibly the only solution would be for the United States and Soviet Union to work together. Canada was nevertheless very active and taking great care not to take sides in order to preserve its credibility with both the United States and the DRVN.

5. The Soviet Ambassador insisted that in the Soviet view the statement of the DRVN Foreign Minister to Burchett had changed the situation. It had been said some time ago that the DRVN Four Points and the NLF-SVN program were an obstacle to negotiations. This was not true now. The DRVN was ready to negotiate. The next step therefore was for the United States to stop the bombing. If they did not stop but escalated instead the next step could be war. Any influence which was to be exerted should be exerted on the United States first of all.

6. In reply the Minister repeated that there was no reason to believe that the United States would stop the bombing unless there were reciprocal military action. The United States had made it clear that a mere offer to talk would not be enough and this had been evident since Mr. Ronning's first conversation in Hanoi. There was therefore nothing new in the situation since the Burchett interview. It was admittedly unclear exactly what reciprocal military action constitutes (and the Minister expressed regret that the United States would not accept an offer to negotiate as adequate). He said nevertheless that he could suggest a number of actions to the North Vietnamese which in his view would be adequate but did not at present feel free to do so.

7. The Minister then said that he had recently exchanged a number of messages with Mr. Rapacki. Poland still did not think the time right for Commission action but if they would agree to such action this could go a long way. He expressed the view that the war would end in one of two ways – either like the Korean war or through the sort of mediation Mr. Kosygin had exercised at Tashkent. This could be carried out possibly by Poland, or by India, or by the Commission itself. Canada was taking the greatest care to ensure that it would remain an acceptable mediator should the parties decide to make use of our services. The Minister added that within the last two weeks Hanoi had indicated that Mr. Ronning would be welcome if he cared to make another visit; he would send him back immediately if there were the slightest ground for doing so.

8. The Soviet Ambassador commented that there was no lack of possible mediators. The difficulty he said was in developing clear-cut ideas. In his view there was little point in maintaining contacts if the bombing were to continue. The Minister replied that he fully understood the Soviet and the Polish positions and acknowledged that the situation was harder than ever. But just as he had launched the idea of using the ICSC after the United States had made the mistake of putting the Vietnamese question before the Security Council, so he returned to the same idea now. He realized that the Soviet Union was sceptical but he knew what the United States thought of it. He therefore invited the Ambassador to think over what he had said and to return on March 20 to discuss the matter further.

J.G.H. Halstead

535.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/13

No. 346
Saigon, March 21, 1967
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel Y-232† Mar 13 to Delhi.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London; Washington, CANFORCEHED, Permis New York, Canberra from Ottawa; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Wellington from Canberra; Hong Kong, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE APPEAL BY ICC

At yesterday's informal meeting of the Commission, Rahman brought up the subject of a possible appeal by the ICC. As you know he had already raised this subject individually with ourselves and Poldel. On this occasion he did not repeat not discuss the substance of the matter but simply asked that we consider it. The Polish Commissioner did not repeat not receive any instructions and we for our part having in mind your telegram Y-232 March 13 did not repeat not feel it was necessary to express any views until we had a better idea of Polish reaction. We had of course already indicated to Rahman the views expressed in your telegram Y-224† March 3.

2. We were somewhat surprised that Rahman had raised this matter in the Commission even though it was an informal meeting since we had assumed that the venue for discussion had been transferred to Delhi. However, since it now seems apparent that Rahman wishes to pursue the matter here, we should be grateful to know in due course what you would like us to say when and if the Poldel receives instructions. We note from your telegram Y-232 that you will be reviewing this later when Polish reaction is known.

536.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/13

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] March 23, 1967

VIETNAM

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Minister this morning, at the latter's request, to continue their discussion of the Vietnam problem. In taking the initiative to resume the dialogue, the Minister wondered whether the Ambassador had any comments to make on the matters discussed earlier, to which Mr. Shpedko replied that he had had no reaction from Moscow as yet.

2. The Minister then reviewed recent developments:

(a) *Publication of the exchange of letters between President Johnson and President Ho Chi Minh*.[47] These letters provided further evidence of the hardening of positions on both sides. In President Johnson's letter, there did seem to be a new element, namely, the willingness to undertake a reduction in military activities following the opening of talks. Apart from this, however, a noticeable hardening of U.S. attitudes had been taking place, which was disturbing in itself, and because it would make the problem the more difficult to resolve in the long run.

(b) *Secretary-General's Proposals*:[48] Since the Ambassador had not seen a text of these from Moscow, the Minister summarized them briefly as involving (i) a general military standstill, (ii) direct talks, and (iii) a formal conference. Canada had signified its support for the Secretary-General's proposals. Our preliminary view, however, was that Hanoi would probably not accept them, and this was unfortunate.

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[47] See/Voir "Texts of Johnson's Letter to Ho Chi Minh and of the North Vietnamese Reply," *New York Times*, 22 March 1967, p. 10.

[48] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), document 107.

(c) *Minister's talks with Chester Ronning in Ottawa earlier this week*. The Canadian Government would not hesitate to call on Mr. Ronning's services again to undertake a special assignment in Hanoi, but there seemed to be little that such a mission could achieve at the moment; it was Mr. Ronning's view that China had lost none of its influence in Hanoi.

3. The Ambassador expressed skepticism about U.S. willingness to listen to "outside voices", for example, U Thant's. Mr. Martin hastened to assure the Ambassador that his doubts were not well-founded, and that the U.S.A. had taken a sympathetic view of the Secretary-General's proposals. There could be no doubt whatever that Washington wanted the war to end, but at the same time there was no weakening of U.S. determination in insisting on a reciprocal military gesture by North Vietnam.

4. The Minister again expressed the conviction that if the three Commission powers could act together they could exert a great influence on the situation. "How could their combined request be ignored?" It was essential, however, that such an appeal be cast in reasonable terms. There would be no point, for example, in suggesting that the Commission appeal only for a cessation of the bombing; but something of wider applicability *could* be helpful and it *could* influence the U.S.A. If, therefore, the Soviet Union had any way of encouraging Poland to take an agreed position with Canada and India, this might be useful, in leading to an early termination of the war. Again, the Ambassador expressed skepticism and emphasized that the first constructive step was for the U.S.A. to take, and it was to order a cessation of the bombing of the North. The Minister replied that this was a non-productive line of argument since it could scarcely be plainer that nothing of the sort was going to happen except in the context of military reciprocity. It was conceivable, in his view, that if agreement were reached that the three Commission powers should act, the Commission might be able to devise a form of reciprocal military action which would not embarrass Hanoi.

5. The Ambassador said that he had given Moscow a detailed report on his earlier conversation with the Minister, but he had had no response. He assured the Minister, however, that the Canadian position was understood in Moscow; the Soviet Government agreed that it was important to continue the search for a peaceful settlement.

K[laus] Goldschlag

537.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9398, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/13

No. Y-257
Ottawa, March 23, 1967
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Your Tel 346 Mar 21.
Repeat for Information: Delhi from London; Warsaw from Paris; London, Washington, Permis New York, Paris, Geneva, CANFORCEHED, Moscow.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE APPEAL BY ICC

We share your surprise at Rahman's action in raising this possibility since our impression has been that Indian MFA, having put forward their suggestion, were now prepared to let matters rest for the time being. Absence of any sign of Polish interest has of course contributed to this impression.

2. We continue to believe that present circumstances are not repeat not propitious for any kind of Commission appeal. We would hope that this technique might be held in reserve for possible use when conditions suggest that it might offer prospects for success.

3. You should find early opportunity to confirm the assessment in preceding paragraph to Rahman. You should also refer, in general terms, to current efforts of UN Secretary-General of which we (and India) have been kept informed and which we have been following with close interest. You should tell Rahman that in recent message to UN Secretary-General, SSEA indicated Canadian willingness to see ICC associated with his initiative if, as matters evolve, it seems there is general agreement that this could usefully be done (our telegram 249† March 21 to Permis New York). In meantime we think it would be unwise to pre-empt Secretary-General's efforts.

538.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/14

No. 1263
Washington, April 3, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva; Moscow, Delhi from London; Warsaw from Paris; CFHQ from Ottawa; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: PROPOSAL FOR COMMISSION INITIATIVE

Chester Cooper, Special Assistant to Governor Harriman, took opportunity of Moore's call on him March 31 to suggest that it might now be opportune to raise once more with Poles and Indians possibility of a meeting of Commission governments on Vietnam along lines discussed in December and January.

2. Cooper said that there was at present "nothing going on" in sphere of direct dialogue between USA and DRVN. It was conceivable that earlier Polish reluctance to become involved in substantive discussion of Vietnam in Commission context had been due to Polish knowledge that attempts were being made to use other channels (e.g., via Poles themselves up to mid-December and subsequently via USA messages to DRVN culminating in recently published Ho-LBJ correspondence). Now, however, it could be pointed out to Poles that dialogue between combatants had ceased and that a meeting of representatives of ICC governments in Geneva, Delhi or elsewhere involving or leading to consultations with parties directly involved was highly desirable as means of re-establishing contact. Meeting should be on middle level as foreign ministers would be too conspicuous and ICC Commissioners were not repeat not appropriate for special purpose of meeting.

3. When we mentioned that contacts with Soviet and Polish Ambassadors in Ottawa last month (e.g., your telegram Y-236 March 10[49]) had produced no repeat no evidence of increased interest in ICC role in promoting talks, Cooper admitted that chances of positive Polish or Russian response seemed slim but that one never could tell when their position might change and that a renewed effort might be worth making.

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[49] Ottawa telegram Y-236 was dated 9 March 1967. See doc. 532.
Le télégramme nº Y-236 d'Ottawa est daté du 9 mars 1967. Voir doc. 532.

539.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/14

No. 1393
Washington, April 14, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva, Permis New York, ConGen New York; CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Delhi from London; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon; Moscow, Warsaw from London.

VIETNAM: SSEA'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 11

During conversation on other matters yesterday Deputy Assistant Secretary Unger enquired about purpose and background of SSEA's statement to External Affairs Committee[50] which he said he had been reading with great interest. He wondered what next step was likely to be and whether ideas contained in statement were being submitted for official expressions of view by other governments.

2. We said that as far as we were aware proposals in statement had not repeat not yet been conveyed in any formal way to other governments, even fellow-members of ICC, although statement was public and would of course be expected to come to attention of countries interested in Vietnam problem. Approach outlined in statement was of course general in character and might conceivably be subject to some elaboration during further public discussion e.g., in External Affairs Committee or elsewhere. We added, however, that we were sure that you would be glad to hear any comments e.g., on four-stage proposal or on other aspects of statement which USA authorities might like to make at this stage.

3. Unger said that he could not repeat not comment extensively as he had not repeat not yet been able to study all facets of statement. He was however interested by fact that we had returned to idea of effective re-establishment of status of DMZ despite discouraging response of other side last October when effort along these lines had been made in eastern sector of zone accompanied by USA "mini-pause" in that area.[51] Any Polish interest in our ideas would of course be highly significant.

4. In separate encounter yesterday Rufus Smith, Country Director for Canada, said that he as well as other officials had read statement with care and was impressed by its measured and objective tone. He went on to ask same questions as Unger concerning purpose of statement and referred like Unger to DMZ aspect.

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50 See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 1, no. 10, pp. 305–315.
Voir Canada, Chambre des communes, Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures, *Procès-verbaux et témoignages*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 1, no 10, p. 305-315.

51 See/Voir doc. 455.

540.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs and High Commission in United Kingdom
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures et au haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/14

No. 1436
Washington, April 18, 1967
Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Paris, NATO Paris, Permis New York, Geneva; Delhi, Moscow, Warsaw from London; Saigon from Delhi.
By Bag: Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.
For SSEA [in London].

VIETNAM

I was called in today by Averell Harriman to hear in advance comments which USA will make publicly on proposals contained in SSEA's speech of April 11. Comments were in form of statement which will probably be released at State Department press briefing tomorrow noon April 19.[52] Because exact text of statement had not repeat not been cleared by Pentagon and White House, Harriman could not repeat not give it to me. Instead he read it out but said he did not repeat not expect any substantial changes to be made as main lines had been approved.

2. Harriman remarked before reading statement that Government in Saigon had commented on Minister's proposals in way which USA thought very good.[53] USA had told Saigon Government that it would join in favourable response. He then read statement which said that USA Government had studied Mr. Martin's four-point proposal and thought it offered considerable promise for de-escalation of conflict and for moving on to political settlement. USA supported statement of Government of SVN which commented favourably on Mr. Martin's proposals. It would be important step forward if forces on both sides withdrew from DZ and "significant area" on both sides of it. If DRVN was prepared to withdraw its forces from DZ and from strip ten miles wide immediately north of DZ and to cease all military activity in and over this area, USA would be prepared to take same action in consultation with Government of SVN in and over comparable area south of demarcation line. USA was prepared to provide ICC with all equipment necessary to increase its effectiveness. When forces of two sides were separated USA would be prepared to enter into talks which could lead to de-escalation of fighting and political settlement. Talks could be public or private.

3. After reading statement of which above is summary, Harriman observed that Hanoi had apparently rejected SSEA's proposals. He said that USA, however, thought there was such "legitimate promise" in proposals that it had decided to support Saigon's statement. If anything came of proposals USA would be "more than happy". In reply to question Harriman said USA withdrawal proposed in statement could not repeat not begin until there was clear indication that other side intended to do same. Harriman pointed out that suspension of

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[52] See/Voir "U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area North and South of Viet-Nam DMZ," [Department Statement, 19 April 1967], *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 56, No. 1455 (15 May 1967), p. 750.

[53] See/Voir "Canadian Peace Plan Wins Saigon Support," *Globe and Mail*, 19 April 1967, p. 8.

bombing during Tet truce had been ended mainly because of evidence that Communists were moving large numbers of troops into or near DZ. These troops were still there and had been augmented. USA could therefore not repeat not consider leaving area undefended until it had reasonable certainty these troops would be withdrawn.

4. I undertook to pass above info to you. Text of statement will follow as soon as published.

[A.]E. Ritchie

541.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Multiple Posts
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à plusieurs missions
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/14

No. Y-296[54]
Ottawa, April 18, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel W-58† Apr 10.

VIETNAM: MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 11

Following notes are intended for your guidance in discussing statement with representatives of Government to which you are accredited.

2. Statement made by Minister is substantially identical with text sent to you. There are, however, one or two substantive changes to which reference will be made in this message. You will wish, in due course, to compare minutes of External Affairs Committee with text currently available to you.

3. Statement falls into four main parts. First of these covers a recapitulation of Canadian position, including definition of Canadian interest in Southeast Asia, nature of our responsibilities in Vietnam, direction of our efforts to help bring about peaceful solution of Vietnam conflict, and role we envisage for Canada in conjunction with any eventual settlement.

4. Other governments are most likely to be interested in future Canadian role. As regards our willingness to cooperate in constitution of a new supervisory force, you should explain that this does not repeat not go beyond what Minister has said on previous occasions in House and elsewhere. In delivering this part of statement, Minister qualified it by saying he would be prepared to recommend acceptance of such a responsibility to his Cabinet colleagues. Statement is also qualified by reference to Canada's capacity to assume such a responsibility as a limiting factor. In setting out Canadian position you should add that another qualification would obviously have to relate to conditions under which a future peacekeeping force in Indochina might be asked to assume its mandate. This point was made explicitly in House on February 13 when Minister explained that "we shall have to consider in the light of our experience what powers and what resources should be given to such a force if it is to carry out its mandate effectively and with the best interest of the parties in mind".[55]

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[54] To/À : London, Washington, Moscow, Permis New York, Paris (Immediate); Saigon (Flash) from Delhi; Warsaw (Immediate) from Paris; Delhi (Immediate) from London.

[55] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 12, p. 12965.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 12, p. 12965.

5. As regards Canadian willingness to play significant part in economic recovery and rehabilitation in Southeast Asia, this was stated by Prime Minister in his Temple University speech on April 2/65[56] and again, a few days later, by Minister in House on April 8[57] in response to President Johnson's April 7 proposal for a greatly expanded cooperative effort for economic development in Southeast Asia to be initiated under UN. Point was reiterated by Minister in House on January 25/66 when he said Canada was prepared "to devote further substantial resources to regional development in Southeast Asia in which I hope both communities in Vietnam could play their full part and derive their full benefit".[58]

6. Second part of statement attempts to review negotiating positions of main parties (i.e., USA and North Vietnam). We have tried to couch this review in objective terms and will be interested to learn whether our assessments reflect those of others. In preparing these assessments we have drawn not repeat not only on public material but on results of our confidential discussions, including discussions with North Vietnamese.

7. Because we have stated it to be our objective to seek minimum basis on which main parties might be brought into preliminary and informal contact with each other, our assessment of negotiating positions is directed to that aspect of problem. It should not repeat not, therefore, be regarded as an exhaustive assessment. We have tried to safeguard our position vis-à-vis Hanoi in this regard by pointing to limitation of our analysis in relation to their Four Points.

8. There was, incidentally, no repeat no intention in our analysis to justify apparent North Vietnamese insistence on permanent (in addition to unconditional) cessation of bombing. In fact, this passage was omitted by Minister in his main presentation of statement although he drew on it in course of subsequent discussion. All passage was intended to do was to suggest to those who doubted North Vietnamese insistence on permanence of any cessation that, in terms of strict logic (and even if what has in fact been said by North Vietnamese representatives were ignored), they could hardly insist on bombing cessation being unconditional without also demanding that it be permanent.

9. Third part of statement contains so-called four-point proposal and is part which has attracted main public attention in Canada and elsewhere.

10. One question which you will be asked is why this proposal was advanced at this time. Reasons are both general and specific. You should explain that Canadian Government continues to be deeply concerned about course of conflict in Vietnam. We regard demilitarized zone and Cambodian frontier in particular as areas where some kind of insulating action would be helpful. We are also concerned that, for first time since December/65, there appear to be no repeat no significant initiatives in sight. We think that, in such a situation, it is useful to throw out some kind of lifeline around which new suggestions for approach to a peaceful solution of Vietnam conflict might coalesce. While we have made it clear that we regard prospects of any formula commanding general acceptance at this time as unpromising, we think there may be advantage in directing future mediating efforts along a "return to Geneva" axis, if only because both sides continue to say that they accept Geneva cease-fire arrangements however differently they may interpret their implications.

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56 See/Voir Canadian Consulate Philadelphia, "Address by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, on Accepting the 2nd Temple University World Peace Award at the Founder's Dinner of the University's General Alumni Association," Philadelphia, 2 April 1965 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Canadian Consulate, 1965).

57 See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 26th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 1, pp. 94–97.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 26e législature, 3e session, vol. 1, p. 94-97.

58 See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 1, p. 236.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 1, p. 236.

11. Minister has made it clear that what we are putting forward is not repeat not a firm and immutable proposal but a general line of approach which could serve as basis for exploration with the parties. There is some logic to sequence of stages we have proposed (i.e., measure of disengagement, freezing of level of conflict, cessation of active hostilities, and regroupment and repatriation) but package implied at each stage and, indeed, assignment of particular measures of de-escalation as between different stages should be regarded as negotiable.

12. Moreover, while there is logical sequence implicit in our proposal, there is no repeat no particular time sequence we have proposed. While we would naturally welcome most rapid possible implementation of whole sequence, this is probably an unrealistic expectation. In particular, we could envisage first stage (cessation of bombing and return to *status quo ante* in demilitarized zone) being implemented as a self-contained package and well before agreement was reached by parties on succeeding steps. As regards final step (release of prisoners, withdrawal of outside forces, and dismantling or conversion of bases), we presume that commitments made at Manila would be applicable as far as withdrawal of USA and allied forces is concerned.

13. You will note that, under sequence envisaged in Minister's proposal, actual cease-fire would come about only at third stage. This is deliberate. We believe that a cease-fire poses significant political problems (e.g., implications of Vietcong control) which have a bearing on shape of eventual political solution and which will need to be discussed, if not repeat not negotiated, by parties in advance. That is one reason why Minister emphasized throughout his statement that military and political aspects of Vietnam problem would probably have to be tackled in parallel. In other words, it is our assessment that there may well be reluctance on both sides to end military phase of conflict beyond all possibility of reversal before at least some elementary political understandings have been reached.

14. We regard first stage as crucial to whole sequence. Insofar as it envisages cessation of bombing and all other military action against North Vietnam, we assume that North Vietnamese would be prepared, upon its completion, to enter into direct talks with USA. These talks would presumably be related to subsequent stages of cease-fire sequence as well as to elements of eventual political solution.

15. It is inherent in first stage of our proposal that there should be a measure of military reciprocity on other side. We have envisaged this reciprocity in terms of re-demilitarization of DZ. We have not repeat not yet sought USA views as to whether they would regard this as adequate *quid pro quo*. Moreover, we do not repeat not know whether North Vietnamese would be prepared to contemplate closure of this particular channel of infiltration. If they were, we think that it would not repeat not be necessary to put them in position at any stage of having to admit that they had forces in DZ. All that would be necessary would be to agree that, as from given date, Commission would be permitted to resume full control of all parts of DZ, with additional logistic support (e.g., helicopters) if necessary. Accordingly, package, seen in those terms, would be cessation of bombing of North Vietnam in return for resumption of full Commission control over DZ to ensure that relevant Geneva provisions are observed.

16. You will note that statement contains element of uncertainty as to whether all North Vietnamese infiltration would stop at first stage (when provisions against use of South and North Vietnam, respectively for hostile acts against the other would be reactivated) or at second stage (which envisages reactivation of prohibition against reinforcement of troops or arms). Aside from infiltration across DZ, which would definitely fall within first stage, we would prefer to leave this matter vague as something which could be negotiated in due course.

17. Final portion of Minister's statement reiterates some of the elements which Canadian Government would like to see reflected in ultimate political settlement. These passages should be read in conjunction with Minister's statement in House on February 13 and earlier Canadian Government statements. In essence, what we envisage is existence of two Vietnamese

communities for some time to come, beginnings of cooperation between them on basis of mutual advantage and as foundation for reunification as and when this is choice of majority within both communities. Within South Vietnam itself we express hope that it may be possible to accommodate Vietcong supporters within constitutional framework now being evolved once hostilities have ceased. As regards area as a whole, Minister's statement can be read as reflecting interest in proposals for neutralization as means of arriving at stable arrangements over longer term but on basis of consent of countries directly affected.

For London:

Please seek Minister's approval for above background guidance.

For all addressees:

On confirmation of Minister's approval, you should take early opportunity to discuss statement at appropriate level. We leave it to your discretion what part of guidance you may wish to use to explain background of Canadian thinking.

For Saigon:

You should hand copy of statement to Ha Van Lau when you go to Hanoi. As you know, Hanoi has already reacted to four-point proposal in *Nhan Dan* editorial of April 16.[59] While reaction does not repeat not specifically mention Canada, we have assumed all along that element of obvious reciprocity envisaged at first stage of our sequence would pose difficulties for Hanoi. Accordingly, we suggest that you do not repeat not highlight four-point proposal in your discussions other than to emphasize that it is a line of approach and that we regard it essentially as providing a basis for explanation. You should say that we have done our best to interpret North Vietnamese position as we understand it but that it would clearly be helpful to us to know whether there are any elements in our presentation of their position which they would regard as not repeat not accurately reflecting North Vietnamese approach to an eventual settlement of Vietnam conflict. As regards South Vietnamese authorities, you will, of course, want to take account of their favourable preliminary reaction in your discussions with them.

542.

Telegram from High Commission in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/14

No. 2030
London, April 19, 1967
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Limited Distribution. Flash.

CANADA-UK MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE – FIRST SESSION: VIETNAM

Prime Minister Wilson chaired first session of ministerial talks at Ten Downing Street this morning. In view of wide range and extremely frank discussion, we are reporting highlights by telegram. Fuller report is being prepared and will be cleared with Ministers.

2. Initial meeting was limited to discussion of Vietnam (including Kosygin visit), NATO, non-proliferation and Common Market. Since Wilson spoke fully and frankly regarding his discussions with Kosygin on Vietnam and emphasized need fully to protect security of his remarks (which he stated would be denied if they became public) we are dealing only with Vietnam in this telegram and are limiting initial distribution to you.

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[59] See/Voir "New Bid Spurned by North Vietnam: Canadian Proposal is Called 'Crafty Scheme of U.S.,'" *New York Times*, 17 April 1967, p. 10.

3. Wilson opened discussion by referring to recent developments including SSEA's own initiative which he noted had according to press reports been rejected by North Vietnam and he asked whether North Vietnamese look at every Western initiative as being American inspired.

4. SSEA stated that suggestions made last Tuesday were not repeat not put forward as formal proposals and were not repeat not expected to be immediately acceptable. There had neither been consultation with USA nor North Vietnam beforehand. Canada realized that no repeat no one is currently in mood to accept compromise. However, SSEA believed that at some point in time his most recent suggestions might be of interest to North Vietnam. He noted that U Thant's proposals had been rejected and it seemed wise to keep an iron in fire. While no repeat no official reply had so far been received from North Vietnam we realized that an editorial is one type of DRVN response. However, our new Commissioner in Saigon would make his first call on North Vietnamese leaders within a few days when he would give them full text and see whether there is any immediate reaction. SSEA went on to say that North Vietnam had turned down all proposals that had not repeat not branded USA the aggressor. This difficulty had impeded U Thant's proposals which was why he had suggested to USA that they take initiative. Finally, Canadian proposals had been put forward at this time because both sides say they respect Geneva Agreements and continue to be bound by them. Wilson asked at what level Dier would have discussions. Martin noted that while previous Commissioners had met Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence he believed that Dier might be restricted to the Foreign Minister on this occasion.

5. Wilson provided info concerning Kosygin talks which SSEA said was new to us. Wilson wondered whether when Kosygin proposed dates for his visit he had taken into account that they would coincide with Tet truce and were timed to "have a go" at de-escalation. Wilson claimed Kosygin had never been asked by Hanoi to negotiate, and during discussions Wilson had declined Kosygin's suggestion that he ask USA to stop bombing. Wilson said he had known Kosygin for years and had had long afternoon chat with him on Vietnam before larger ministerial meeting. The two had spent hours in private trying to discover initiatives which would help although in public Kosygin had continued to blacken the USA.

6. In Kosygin view the Americans by continuing the war were strengthening the hands of China. Kosygin in private discussions was very frank about the Chinese. He suggested that neither USA nor Britain had knowledge of extent of Chinese strength. Kosygin was particularly forthright in discussing Western trade with China (and Wilson stated that in this context he referred to Canada as well as other Western countries); in Wilson's view Kosygin looks on China as USA looks on Cuba.

7. Wilson expressed view that Kosygin, in attempting to achieve prolongation of Tet truce, must have considered that more liberal leaders in China were on top at the time in the Cultural Revolution and the London initiative might have succeeded in continuing the ceasefire.

8. Martin asked if Wilson knew the nature of message sent by Kosygin or whether a reply had been received. Wilson stated that there was no repeat no doubt at all that a message had been sent. Wilson recalled that he had pulled Kosygin's leg at one stage when Kosygin said he was not repeat not in touch with Hanoi. Kosygin then confirmed that message had gone.

9. Wilson also dealt with Kosygin's attitude to Geneva Co-Chairmanship. He found the Russians totally allergic to another Geneva Conference. He attributed this to fact that China would be there or would boycott meeting and put pressure on North Vietnam not repeat not to attend. In Wilson's view, the Co-Chairmen cannot repeat not take the first initiative, although they might come in on the second or third stages but as first step all those fighting the war must come together. Wilson noted that Kosygin had never mentioned South Vietnam as such. One possibility for progress Wilson thought might be a conference limited to the

two Co-Chairmen and the three countries represented on the Commission. However, Britain would have no repeat no decided views until she knew what the views of USA and North Vietnam would be.

10. At last night at Chequers, Kosygin said latest American response looked like an ultimatum and asked how Hanoi could accept it. Wilson suggested that if Kosygin could tell him that Hanoi was actively considering USA proposal, he would tell the USA but he received no repeat no reply from Kosygin.

11. SSEA suggested that American reaction to recent events had been a hardening of their position and he did not repeat not think they would stop bombing in advance of some indication of reciprocal measures by Hanoi. As an example, he mentioned a possible agreement on part of North Vietnam not repeat not to increase infiltration. Since Americans say they can measure infiltration, such an agreement might prove useful. Wilson remarked that the big difficulty during Kosygin visit in February had been preparations for increased infiltration during Tet truce through demilitarized zone.

12. Wilson quoted Kosygin as saying that USSR would continue supplying sophisticated equipment to North Vietnam, and latter in these circumstances could endure bombing for years. Wilson admitted that this could have been a propaganda statement by Kosygin but he believed Kosygin had been sincere in his belief.

13. SSEA referred to Rusk's idea some time ago of a Commission appeal[60] and noted that India had made proposals for ICC initiative in December,[61] although initial terms were unacceptable to us. SSEA underlined desirability of demonstrating that progress could be achieved.

14. Wilson noted that Kosygin had dwelt a great deal on statement made by DRVN premier to Australian journalist Burchett in January. SSEA remarked that when Ronning saw North Vietnam premier in March last year latter no repeat no longer held out for prior acceptance of their Four Points to start negotiations. Wilson suggested that opening of talks would not repeat not necessarily mean end of fighting and that Burchett interview need not repeat not be interpreted as having involved ceasefire proposals.

15. At end of this discussion both Wilson and officials reiterated Wilson's wish that discussions be restricted for our info only. This probably was basis of British insistence that no repeat no exchange be made of notes taken at meeting.

543.
Memorandum from Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
MG26-N4, vol. 281, 845/I41V666 Crisis 1967 – Secret

Restricted.
[Ottawa,] April 19, 1967

VIETNAM

The South Vietnamese Government has now expressed public support for some of the general ideas which Mr. Martin put forward in his statement to the External Affairs Committee on April 11. A copy of the text of the statement issued in Saigon is attached for your information.

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60 See/Voir doc. 480.

61 See/Voir doc. 482.

2. You may be asked to comment on this statement in the House. In reply you may wish to take the following line which is also the line we are recommending to Mr. Martin in response to an enquiry we have received from him in London:

1. We have made it clear that the objective of Canada's diplomatic efforts has been to try to establish a basis on which the two sides in the Vietnam conflict may be brought into direct contact;

2. The ideas put forward by Mr. Martin were intended to provide a basis for exploration with the parties directly concerned;

3. We naturally welcome the interest which has been shown in and the support which has been given by the Government of South Vietnam to some of these ideas;

4. In the final analysis, as Mr. Martin pointed out in the Committee, the test of any viable formula for ending the conflict in Vietnam will be its broad acceptability to both sides.

3. The United States Government will be commenting on our proposals at the State Department's press briefing at noon today. It is my understanding that the line which will be taken at that time is generally as forecast in the attached telegram No. 1436 from Washington. You will note that the United States reaction does not amount to unqualified acceptance of our proposal. More specifically, it appears that the United States would not be ready to regard the re-demilitarization of the de-militarized zone as an adequate *quid pro quo* for the cessation of the bombing and other military action against North Vietnam.

4. If the United States reaction becomes public before the House meets, I would think that this could be accommodated within the four points suggested above without substantial change. In any case, I would not suggest that we place any specific interpretation on the United States reaction (along the lines of the last sentence in the preceding paragraph) until we have seen the full text of what is said in Washington and the replies which may be made to anticipated questions.

H.B. Robinson

544.
Letter from Ambassador to United States to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/14

Personal and Confidential.
Washington, D.C., April 20, 1967

Dear Marcel [Cadieux],

Last evening, by accident, I had the frankest conversation I have yet been through with Secretary Rusk. I think you should have a record of this talk for your own edification. You will know best to what extent you would wish to pass all or any of it to others. As you will see, it was a pretty free-swinging exchange.[62]

Best regards,

Yours sincerely,
A.E. Ritchie

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[62] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
The last sentence in para[graph] 9 may seem cryptic, but that is because Rusk expressed himself pretty crudely. A.E. R[itchie]

Enclosure: Memorandum by Ambassador to United States
Pièce jointe : Note de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis

Confidential.
[Washington,] April 20, 1967

INFORMAL TALK WITH SECRETARY RUSK ABOUT VIETNAM, FRANCE, ETC.

Yesterday evening I found myself, by invitation, at a reception at the Vietnamese Embassy in honour of the delegations to the 7 nations meeting on Vietnam. The other Ambassadors at the reception were mainly, if not solely, from countries with troops in Vietnam.

2. Secretary Rusk was among those present. After he had been around the room talking with various people (and having had several sociable drinks) he came up to me and greeted me rather warmly as though it was a bit of a relief to meet someone who had not been in the tedious SEATO/7-Nation sessions over the past couple of days. I hastily remarked that I was not present as a troop contributor. Rusk said with a smile, "We would welcome you in that capacity". He added, "Why don't you put some Canadian troops into the demilitarized zone". He went on to observe with just a trace of fairly good-humoured sarcasm that if anybody started shooting at us we could count on the United States to point out that this was contrary to some international undertaking or other.

3. I replied that it looked these days as though any Canadian troops that might be put into the DMZ would catch the fire from both sides. Rusk said that we would have no worry about the southern side since they were building a barrier that would ensure that nothing came at us from the south. I made some remark about "boxing ourselves in" in the DMZ and I added a little pugnaciously that Canadians had been used to being in a box before and had shown that they could look after themselves.

4. This about ended the rather relaxed and bantering exchange regarding Canadian troops which I am sure was not intended as more than a slightly biting conversational gambit.

5. Rusk then turned to the reactions of various parties to Mr. Martin's four points. He said he hoped that the response of South Vietnam and the United States had been appreciated in Canada. He also hoped that Canadians would draw the right conclusion from this incident but he rather doubted that we would do so. By this I assume he meant that he hoped we would recognize that it was the North which was the party really unwilling to start any negotiations. He said that the northern reaction had not been surprising. I said I did not think the North had reacted specifically. I noted that the State Department spokesman today had indicated that in his view the North had not turned down the propositions. I continued that our representative was in Hanoi today and we hoped he would have a chance to discuss our ideas directly with the North Vietnamese. Rusk thought the outcome of such a discussion was fairly predictable.

6. I then asked Rusk whether he was accompanying the President to Adenauer's funeral and he replied that he was. I went on to speculate about the possibility that this might provide an occasion for President Johnson and President de Gaulle to get together. Rusk reacted very sharply and said that if I were suggesting anything of the sort to Mr. Martin, I would be wise to correct such an impression. Rusk began his argument about the unlikelihood of such a confrontation by saying that it would be inappropriate and discourteous to the Germans to use a funeral as an excuse or cover for serious political conversations with other mourners. I said this seemed to me rather a new-fashioned idea since my reading of history suggested that some rather important political discussions or even negotiations had taken place rather close to the bier at certain state funerals in the past. Rusk said reflectively that there was some truth in this and that even he managed to have some quite substantial talks with Kosygin at certain Indian funerals.

7. Rusk then turned to the more serious argument that President Johnson had no reason to play up to General de Gaulle. With great feeling Rusk said that I should keep in mind that de Gaulle had now done to SEATO what he had previously done to NATO. For all practical purposes France had withdrawn from the SEATO arrangement and in fact from South East Asia as a whole. In the case of NATO, according to Rusk, de Gaulle had peremptorily required the shifting of hundreds of thousands of Americans in violation of seven or eight formal bilateral agreements. Why should President Johnson attempt to make up with the head of a government which was doing these kinds of things?

8. I said that I thought Mr. Hasluck of Australia, in his opening speech of the SEATO meeting, had taken a more charitable view of France's attitude to SEATO and had given the impression that he still regarded France as a member and as a contributor to SEATO's budget. Rusk simply shrugged his shoulders at this remark.

9. I went on to say that my, perhaps not-too-well-founded, impression had been that President Johnson was personally not unfavourable to the idea of renewed contacts with France and with de Gaulle. I said I thought President Johnson prided himself on the fact that the trouble between the United States and de Gaulle had not started during his term of office. Wasn't it likely that in the context of the Adenauer funeral, where neither leader had to feel that he had given in to the other, a substantial conversation might develop between Johnson and de Gaulle, even though it might not have been intended in advance. Rusk then said rather explosively and graphically what he thought neither President Johnson nor President de Gaulle should be prepared to do to each other.

10. Rusk returned to the argument about the proprieties and I said that I personally saw nothing about a state funeral which needed to inhibit serious political conversations on matters affecting the welfare of many people. Rusk said that President Johnson would undoubtedly have a fairly full talk with Chancellor Kiesinger but I could take it for certain that Mr. Johnson would not have more than the briefest social conversation with President de Gaulle. Anything beyond that would be discourteous to the German mourners and would be undignified.

11. At about this point in the conversation, which had been a dialogue between Rusk and me alone, Governor Harriman, who had been standing back, moved in slightly hesitatingly. He mentioned to Secretary Rusk that he had talked to me about the U.S. statement on Mr. Martin's proposals and that he had indicated how constructive the U.S. had found these ideas. He added that he had been trying to speak with the Secretary during the day, without too much success. Rusk said rather apologetically that he had been "up to his ears in Foreign Ministers all day". Harriman said that he was speaking to the Russians to emphasize to them that the United States took these ideas seriously. He was a little vague about the name of the person with whom he had been talking. Rusk noted that Dobrynin was away in Moscow. Harriman mentioned the name Zhukov but Rusk said that was not the name of the second-in-command whose name, as he recalled it, was Zinchuk and he too had left Washington. Harriman seemed a little confused and remarked that it was not much use talking to the third man in the Embassy. From all this I had the impression that Harriman may not have known, or at least had not remembered at that hour of the evening, that the person with whom he had been talking was Yuri Zhukov, an editor of *Pravda*. Nothing was said by either Rusk or Harriman about what they might or might not be doing through their own Embassy in Moscow.

12. This about ended the conversation with Rusk as he left a few moments later.

13. Just before I departed I had a brief word with Bill Bundy who said he hoped that we welcomed the remarks which they had made publicly about our latest ideas on Vietnam. He said quite frankly that no one necessarily thought that such ideas would get anywhere at this time. At least for the record it was important that the U.S. should be seen to be taking a positive attitude.

14. Bundy added rather quietly that the South Vietnamese were becoming much more amenable these days. They were obviously also wishing to give the appearance of being in a conciliatory mood. He said it was a little unfair that when the South Vietnamese responded quickly and positively to our ideas the world press gave them very little attention and even less credit. The similar but later U.S. statement got a much more prominent play.

15. As the Australian delegation collared Bundy at that point to take him off to dinner, I did not have a chance to discuss with Bundy the extent to which he really thought the U.S. comments were genuinely favourable to the specific proposals we have made. In particular I did not get into the matter of whether they recognized that the first stage might include cessation of the bombing in the North.

A.E. Ritchie

545.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9397, 20-22-VIETS-2/20

No. 1087
New York, April 28, 1967
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: My Tel 1086† Apr 28 and Candel New York Tel 1672† Sep 22/66.
SSEA, USSEA, Mr. Hadwen, and Far Eastern Division only.

VIETNAM: SSEA'S INTERVIEWS WITH ARTHUR GOLDBERG

SSEA's talk with Goldberg was frank and useful to extent that it confirmed from Goldberg himself seriousness of current prospects of war escalating further and helplessness of those who advocated avoiding such risks like Goldberg and McNamara in face of President's determination to press ahead with military escalation even at risk of affecting President's chances of re-election in 1968. Main hope that Goldberg held out was for Canada possibly with help of UK and Poland at highest ministerial level to throw out ideas for negotiation in hope they might be taken up in direct dialogue between Washington and Hanoi. Most hopeful point about Washington's position, Goldberg stressed, was that there had been no repeat no retreating so far from position he had stated at 21st UNGA on September 21/66 when he said "we are prepared to order cessation of bombing of North Vietnam moment we are assured privately or otherwise that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on other side".[63]

2. Minister started conversation by telling Goldberg of his talk with Rostow in Bonn in which Rostow while taking tough line which included expression of view that Canadian attitude was too "pious" did indicate that USA administration was looking to find some way

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[63] Goldberg made this statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 1966, not 21 September. See Arthur J. Goldberg, "Initiative for Peace," [Statement made in plenary session of the UN General Assembly on 22 September 1966], *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 55, No. 1424 (10 October 1966), pp. 518–525.
Goldberg a fait cette déclaration à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies le 22 septembre 1966, et non le 21 septembre. Voir Arthur J. Goldberg, « Initiative for Peace », [déclaration faite à la plénière de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies le 22 septembre 1966], *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 55, nº 1424 (10 octobre 1966), p. 518-525.

out of present dangerous escalation. SSEA stressed that in speaking with others concerned he had made USA position clear that they would not repeat not be pressured into stopping bombing unless there was indication of reciprocal action from other side. SSEA said that Dier was now in Hanoi and although North Vietnam had at least "editorially" turned down latest Canadian ideas flown like a kite by SSEA some days before they were at least prepared to examine statement. SSEA had made it clear that he did not repeat not expect positive reactions to ideas – positions were hardening on both sides. However, Washington had reacted after Saigon had expressed support for Canadian ideas but SSEA stressed that he did not repeat not regard Washington statement as constituting acceptance of Canadian ideas and would have to make that clear in any public comment. While reaction from Hanoi seemed on face of it negative, statement made in last 48 hours by Foreign Minister of Hanoi to Tokyo press correspondent seemed at least to have noted difference between Canadian conception of first stage (of four stages) and form in which USA had commented on first stage.[64] This might mean that Hanoi might be prepared to take a more careful look at Canadian ideas. SSEA said that he particularly wanted to have Goldberg's views at this time when some flexibility on USA side was so essential; otherwise, a most dangerous situation affecting world peace might develop [as] a result of current military escalation.

3. Goldberg agreed with SSEA's analysis including his assessment of American reaction to SSEA's four-stage procedural move towards Geneva Accords. Expressing himself very frankly he said he was very worried; President had "dug in" and his own influence, whatever it may have been before on question of Vietnam had become "drastically limited". There had been a chance after Polish intermediary offer that bombing might have been at least suspended but now question of "face" and national pride had entered into picture on both sides and prospect was grim indeed. He was convinced that President would persist in present course even if it cost him his re-election and would not repeat not allow domestic political considerations to prevail in deciding on how to prosecute war in Vietnam.

4. Only way in which he could see a useful influence might be brought to bear was if several world leaders at top level might perhaps get together and throw out some ideas rather like SSEA had done which could conceivably result in private dialogue between Washington and Hanoi in utmost diplomatic secrecy and in carefully chosen venue. Goldberg thought Moscow would not repeat not be satisfactory in this respect as Hanoi was worried about Chinese reactions. In this connection Goldberg wondered why Hanoi had published Johnson letter; he thought it was probably due to a leak occurring which led Hanoi to publish correspondence in order to satisfy Chinese.

5. SSEA stressed that Canadian Government was under pressure constantly in House of Commons to associate itself with appeals to stop bombing. It was with great difficulty that Government had resisted these pressures.

6. Goldberg said that public appeals or putting forward of formal proposals publicly at this stage would be counterproductive. As regards bombing, he understood it to be USA calculation that power plants could be knocked out without too much other civilian damage but he wondered whether attacks in North might not repeat not open door to Chinese intervention. He thought that Chinese were quite anxious to intervene despite public views to contrary.

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[64] This may have been a reference to the following report: "Vietcong Accept a Truce to Mark Buddhist Holiday," *New York Times*, 28 April 1967, p. 1.
Il pourrait s'agir de l'article suivant : « Vietcong Accept a Truce to Mark Buddhist Holiday », *New York Times*, 28 avril 1967, p. 1.

7. Developing his argument against further public proposals, Goldberg agreed that an appeal such as Foreign Minister Brown's idea to convene conference on Laos would not repeat not be useful. He thought it would be much better as he had already indicated for four or five top leaders to get together quietly and produce some ideas which might be floated as a kite in same way as SSEA's ideas had recently been put forward. According to Goldberg, mediation efforts to be successful should (a) be at a high enough level; (b) should not repeat not be too substantive in content; and (c) should have proper regard to balance in relation to both sides. In this connection he thought that Pope had been more successful in presentation than U Thant.

8. Another important factor that Goldberg mentioned was that in any ideas that may [be] put forward to try to bring two sides to conference table proper regard should be given not repeat not only to face-saving and balance but to visualizing how end result of settlement might look to both sides.

9. SSEA said that main difficulty was to try to decide what should be best first step to bring parties to conference table. Reference had been made in USA statements to reciprocal action. Question was what kind of reciprocal action. Goldberg indicated that he had made suggestion personally to President that USA should at once de-escalate in bombing, concentrating its attacks only on infiltration routes to encourage reciprocal reduction in infiltration. This had been rejected. Difficulty now was that North Vietnam insisted on prior condition of cessation of bombing while USA side set prior condition of assurance that there could be some kind of de-escalation. There seemed to be only two directions to go – either to continue to try out various peace feelers or indefinite military escalation.

10. Following this line of thought, Goldberg asked whether SSEA had considered three ICC powers meeting with two Co-Chairmen of Geneva Conference. SSEA told Goldberg about efforts made in this direction both from Delhi and Ottawa and negative responses from Warsaw. Soviet role in all this was still somewhat unclear even after Harold Wilson's account given to SSEA at recent London meetings. Goldberg confirmed that from special sources USA was satisfied that (a) a message had gone from Soviet Government to Hanoi at time of Kosygin's visit to London and (b) that there had been a talk between Kosygin and Brezhnev. Results, however, were not repeat not clear although presumably they must have been negative as far as Hanoi was concerned probably due to Chinese influence.

11. As regards prospect of a 48-hour truce next month in connection with Buddhist anniversary, both SSEA and Goldberg agreed that this had its dangers because Hanoi regarded a limited cessation of bombing as form of ultimatum. As to pressures on USA to continue bombing pause, Goldberg said he had on several occasions warned Washington about dangers of escalation because of possible Russian and Chinese reactions which had not repeat not materialized. He was now suspect of "crying wolf".

12. Only hopeful thing Goldberg could say about first stage was to recall that on September 21 he had been authorized to state precisely that USA was prepared "to order cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam moment we are assured privately or otherwise that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on other side". This statement in its full text had been circulated to all USA missions abroad as basis of any further discussions with foreign governments on question of peace negotiations. Therefore, it should be taken as still authoritative position of USA. Question was to find what Hanoi might be prepared tangibly to do to enable USA commitment to stop bombing to be put into effect.

[George] Ignatieff

546.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/14

No. 1090
New York, April 28, 1967
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: My Tels 1086 and 1087 Apr 28.
SSEA, USSEA, Mr. Hadwen and Far Eastern Division only.

VIETNAM: SSEA'S TALK WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL

This talk mainly provided occasion for SSEA to bring U Thant up-to-date with Canadian Government actions up to and including SSEA's speech on Vietnam to Columbia[65] and Dier's visit to Hanoi. U Thant gave account of his talks with Asian governments during his recent visit to Southeast Asia and his apprehension (which he stressed as not repeat not confirmed or likely to be confirmed) that Soviet Government is going to furnish North Vietnam with long-range missiles capable of attacking USA bases outside Vietnam of intermediate or even Polaris type. U Thant expressed grave concern about prospects if escalation continued.

2. At outset SSEA recalled reactions to Secretary-General's original three-point proposal and that Canadian Government supported it. He also explained how Canadian Government was under pressure to urge USA to stop bombing and explained why in order to maintain creditability of Canadian position on ICC as having influence with Washington, public denunciation of USA was impractical. Present situation was that USA was only prepared to stop bombing if some action was taken reciprocally on other side. There was no repeat no hope of expecting USA to take unilateral action. Explaining latest Canadian ideas, SSEA explained that four stage plan was intended to enable both parties to accept Geneva Accord as basis of negotiation and had been floated with a view to suggesting procedure which might result in ceasefire. They were not repeat not put forward as formal proposals to be accepted or rejected but to be studied and negotiated. SSEA stressed that ideas had been put forward without prior consultation with anyone (SSEA added that if Secretary-General had been available in New York, SSEA would have liked to have informed U Thant because of his special mediating role). It was SSEA's understanding that while there had been "editorial" rejection of these ideas by Hanoi they were still willing to study these ideas. While USA seemed to have accepted Canadian ideas, in fact they had not repeat not endorsed ideas especially in so far as first stage [was] involved – stopping of bombing of North Vietnam and military disengagement were required as well as withdrawals from demilitarized zone. SSEA mentioned that from interview given by North Vietnam senior official to Japanese press correspondent in last forty-eight hours it would seem that Hanoi may have grasped difference between USA and Canadian interpretations of first stage; anyway Dier had reported that Hanoi was prepared to study statement as whole. Concluding his assessment, SSEA said that in his judgement situation in Vietnam was at its most critical stage and that it was essential that all concerned make every effort if situation was not repeat not to become even more dangerous.

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[65] See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 67/13, 27 April 1967.
Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Déclarations et discours*, 67/13, 27 avril 1967.

3. U Thant said that he shared SSEA's analysis completely. As result of his recent visit to five Asian countries he had found unanimous view that only way to get negotiations started was for USA to cease bombing or at least stop for month or so. He had made this point to Ellsworth Bunker in interview in Delhi on way to assume his new responsibilities in Saigon. U Thant had tried to support his argument for cessation of bombing by pointing out that USA had roughly half million troops in Vietnam. According to USA intelligence, number of North Vietnamese regulars in South Vietnam numbered about 40,000. (Bunker said figure was 45,000.) Comparison therefore of USA to North Vietnam regulars was better than 10 to 1. Even if 10,000 more North [Vietnamese] were to infiltrate over period of month, ratio would still be at least 9 to 1 even if USA did not reinforce, which they probably would. U Thant told Bunker that he could not repeat not see why USA was not repeat not prepared to take risk. Bunker told U Thant President was absolutely firm in his judgement that there would be no repeat no cessation of bombing without effective assurance of de-escalation from other side.

4. U Thant confirmed what SSEA had learned from Goldberg direct that Goldberg's influence in Washington on Vietnam had waned as had all others counselling against escalation.

5. U Thant told SSEA that he had warned Washington two months before it was announced that agreement had been reached between Soviet, Chinese and Hanoi authorities about trans-shipment of Soviet arms through China. Arrangements were now in effect whereby Hanoi took charge of trains carrying Soviet arms for North Vietnam at transit points on Soviet side of border and accompanied shipments in transit through China to North Vietnam.

6. Much more serious development had now reached U Thant's attention regarding Soviet supply of missiles to North Vietnam. U Thant recalled that Moscow had for some time been training North Vietnamese personnel in operation of SAMs. According to info which he had just received, Moscow had now agreed to train North Vietnamese personnel in handling of intermediate and long-range missiles – weapons of over 500-mile range. These were most modern sophisticated weapons of Polaris type and might even be of Polaris range. With these weapons North Vietnam would be able to attack USA bases in Thailand, Philippines or other Pacific bases and fleet. This could bring on World War III and was most dangerous development in Vietnam war so far.

7. U Thant said he told Goldberg and that latter had suggested he might have private talk with President. U Thant did not repeat not seem to be sure whether he would or would not repeat not speak to President. He told SSEA of account which he had been given by Prime Minister of Afghanistan of latter's talk recently with President Johnson. Prime Minister had come with list of bilateral questions which he wanted to discuss. President had not repeat not allowed his guest to get word in edgewise in interview: President talked for over hour giving his own assessment of situation in Vietnam. He told Prime Minister that what USA was doing to Vietnam now was comparatively "soft" and that USA as world's strongest power could "give them hell". Afghan Prime Minister left with impression that there was no repeat no point in discussing anything else and that he was presumably expected to be messenger for this threatening kind of talk.

8. SSEA told Secretary-General that if danger of escalation into world war was as great as he (U Thant) apprehended then he carried very great responsibility. U Thant countered that all concerned had great responsibility. He admitted that he was extremely worried about situation and prospects.

9. U Thant said that in his view perhaps best hope was developing direct talks between Government of Vietnam and Vietcong (NLF). He had been told by Indian Consul General in Rangoon that representative of Vietcong in Hanoi was flexible and seemed to be able and willing to speak quite frankly. This Vietcong representative had indicated he was prepared to have talks to Premier Ky. U Thant had discussed with Foreign Minister Do possibility of discussions between South Vietnam and Vietcong and Do seemed to be willing to try this privately.

10. U Thant said that it was very important that both Hanoi and Viet Cong should be reassured in some way about ultimate kind of settlement that South Vietnam and USA were working towards. He did not repeat not think that Hanoi would agree to de-escalation or negotiations until there was both cessation of bombing and some assurances on USA side of their political intentions. U Thant believed that Hanoi believed that it was USA's intention to seek Korean type of settlement i.e., partition at 17th parallel. Hanoi would not repeat not agree to perpetuation of division of Vietnam. Moreover, elections to Constituent Assembly were in Hanoi's views intended to produce result of having General Ky play role of "Syngman Rhee". It was great pity that Cabot Lodge had emphasized military role in any newly constituted government in his parting statement because this only confirmed Hanoi's suspicions. Private talks between South Vietnam and NLF could conceivably clarify these apprehensions and even lead to coalition.

11. As regards role of Soviets, U Thant confirmed that in his view Soviets would act only as messengers and would not repeat not try to impose anything on Hanoi that Hanoi would not repeat not agree to. U Thant expressed view that Kosygin was more level-headed than Brezhnev but doubted that Soviets would put pressure on Hanoi.

12. In conclusion, U Thant returned to importance which he attached to dialogue between South Vietnam's representatives and NLF which would dispel idea that South Vietnam was pledged with USA to perpetuate division of country. It was possibly emphasis placed in four points put forward by SSEA on demilitarized zone which had led to Hanoi's objections. They were suspicious of anything which smacked of Korean-type settlement. U Thant expressed desire to keep in touch with us on further developments relating to Vietnam.

[George] Ignatieff

547.

Telegram from Deputy High Commissioner in United Kingdom to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme du haut-commissaire adjoint au Royaume-Uni au ministère des Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

No. 2385
London, May 3, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 1284† Apr 28.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, Permis New York, Delhi, Geneva, CANFORCEHED, Canberra from Ottawa; Saigon, Vientiane from Delhi.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Kuala Lumpur from London; Phnom Penh from Saigon; Hong Kong, Tokyo from Ottawa; Wellington from Canberra.

VIETNAM: BRITISH VIEWS

We continue to encounter somewhat depressed atmosphere in Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office, about Vietnam. British apparently received cold reception in Washington and are now uncertain what stance to take on Vietnam when Brown encounters Gromyko in Moscow on May 19. Foreign Office is currently preparing documentation setting forth various recent ceasefire proposals and available reactions to them from participants in Vietnam conflict. British paper will apparently emphasize SSEA's proposals of April 11 and SVN response as well as USA suggestions. Although this exercise will assist in organizing discussion it does not repeat not contain anything new and British doubt it will elicit cooperation they seek from Soviet Co-Chairman. As far as other Indochina questions are concerned British have no repeat no intention to raise Laos or Cambodia ICC affairs while in Moscow.

2. We gather British have been unable to obtain any concessions from USA to take to Moscow. We were informed that Soviet Embassy in Washington had been informally putting it about that USSR would escalate its arms supply to DRVN in step with USA escalation of northern bombing. British are concerned about this trend of development but we obtained clear impression that Brown had been unable to make much progress in his discussions on this question with Rusk when in Washington for SEATO meeting. Reasons for this are no repeat no doubt complicated by many factors but appear to have been influenced by British handling of Far Eastern defence questions. Apparently, British neglected to give USA sufficient notice of reductions they intend to implement in defence forces east of Suez. USA Embassy learned of Healey's proposed trip to Singapore and Malaysia and of British force intentions just before Brown and his delegation left for Washington. We gather USA authorities made their displeasure plain to British delegation, not repeat not only for effect that Healey's Far Eastern visit would have on public opinion but also for lack of prior Anglo-American consultation on matter of such current importance to USA as defence in Far East.

3. As might be expected official British comment on these matters is elliptical and incomplete but we obtained impression that USA is so far unprepared to offer anything further to British and USSR at this time which might assist them in their search for a peaceful solution in Vietnam. You might wish to consider whether anything could be usefully done by Canadian Government in this situation perhaps by attempting to persuade USA to consider lengthy bombing pause beginning with proposed truce for Buddha's birthday, which could perhaps be implemented in response to an appeal to both sides from Co-Chairman in connection with application of SSEA's four-point proposal. There is of course possibility that another bombing truce would assist DRVN in augmenting buildup that appears to be developing in and near DMZ. While USA undoubtedly needs to take many factors into consideration, they might be interested in making every effort to forestall possibility of frontal attack developing across the DMZ or at least for presentational reasons to have assumed public position where PAVN contravention of DMZ, if it developed, would clearly and unequivocably place DRVN in wrong. There will not repeat not be many more opportunities in near future affording honourable means for USA to stop bombing North Vietnam and there appears to be few other ways of calling DRVN bluff except by unilateral cessation on part of USA. If you see any prospects in some variant of this approach by linking SSEA's proposals with initiative by Co-Chairmen you may wish to consult British for their assessment of possibilities.

[Geoffrey S.] Murray

548.
Memorandum by Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

Secret.
[Ottawa,] May 3, 1967

MR. MARTIN'S CONVERSATIONS DURING THE ADENAUER FUNERAL PERIOD

The following is a brief summary of some of the conversations which Mr. Martin had with various dignitaries during the Adenauer funeral period.

[…]

USA – Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow

The Minister had a conversation with Mr. Rostow to which he attached very great importance. I have not had a full report from him of this conversation. Essentially, however, it consisted of Rostow saying that the U.S. would be prepared to stop the bombing of

North Vietnam and indeed stop the war in general if we (Canada) or any other country could "deliver the goods", i.e., secure an undertaking of some reciprocal action from the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Martin several times returned to the thesis (following this conversation) that, he believed, the U.S. authorities would be prepared to respond to almost any, even procedural, idea which we could bring forward that would be attractive to the North Vietnamese. It was Mr. Martin's judgment that the U.S. authorities would be glad of almost any pretext to begin a de-escalation of the conflict. In the meantime, however, their positions seem to have hardened and their responses to North Vietnamese military action were increasing in severity.

Mr. Rostow also said that while the U.S. can measure to a considerable extent the level of infiltration from the North, it is not possible for the U.S. to determine with any accuracy in the short term whether this level of infiltration is rising or falling. Mr. Martin considered that this was an interesting statement since it affected the kind of response from the North which the U.S. would judge an acceptable basis for negotiation.

Mr. Martin also told me that Mr. Rostow "did not think much" of Mr. Martin's latest four-point proposal.[66]

[…]

J.G. Hadwen

549.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

No. 521
Saigon, May 4, 1967
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 507† Apr 29.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London; Washington, CANFORCEHED, Permis New York, Canberra from Ottawa; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Wellington from Canberra; Hong Kong, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

INTERVIEW WITH NVN PRIME MINISTER

At three o'clock on April 28, the day of my scheduled departure from Hanoi, I received word that the Prime Minister Pham Van Dong would receive me at five o'clock. Wood accompanied me to the interview which took place at the Presidential Palace. (The location apparently has some protocol significance since we were told by the delegation interpreter that the Prime Minister also receives people at his own office.) At the steps of the palace we were met by Lt. Col. Anh Vu, the Deputy Head of the PAVN Liaison Mission, and an interpreter. We were then conducted to the reception room where the Prime Minister was

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[66] On at least two copies of this memorandum in Martin's private papers, this line was corrected by hand to read "Mr. Martin also told me that Mr. Rostow did not think Mr. Martin's latest four-point proposal would be accepted." See MG32-B12, vols 227/28, 228/35.
Sur au moins deux copies de cette note dans les documents personnels de Martin, cette ligne a été corrigée à la main pour indiquer « Mr. Martin also told me that Mr. Rostow did not think Mr. Martin's latest four-point proposal would be accepted. » Voir MG32-B12, vol. 227/28, 228/35.

waiting at the entrance. He was wearing a light grey Chinese-type suit similar to the one he wore in the recent photo in *Life* magazine and expensive-looking chukka-type boots. He looked healthy, relaxed and confident. In contrast to the stoney-faced reception accorded us at the PAVN Liaison Mission, Pham Van Dong was smiling, courteous and seemed intent on creating a relaxed and informal atmosphere. Perhaps out of deference to the extremely hot weather beer was served instead of the traditional tea.

2. After the initial courtesies had been exchanged, the Prime Minister speaking through the interpreter said that DRVN appreciated Canada's good intentions. He thought that Prime Minister Pearson had "to some extent" good intentions. It was for this reason he had received Ronning and it was for the same reason that he was receiving me today. He hoped it was still so (i.e., that we had good intentions). He personally had maintained good relations with Canadian Ambassadors over the years beginning with Brig. Lett. By way of illustration he recalled once sending a Christmas card to the Canadian Ambassador. But he went on, it was not repeat not enough just to show goodwill. He was afraid that Canada was too committed to the American viewpoint and that we were not repeat not really independent. Nevertheless, if Canada showed goodwill, DRVN would appreciate it.

3. Turning to the ICC, the Prime Minister said that they had always maintained good relations with the Commission because DRVN respected the Geneva Agreements. They were striving for a correct implementation of the Agreements. After 13 years all they asked for was the Geneva Agreements. At this point we intervened to say that Mr. Martin's recent four-point suggestions had envisaged a return to the Geneva Agreements. He shook his head and laughed saying that was our view but their view was quite different. He asked what could the four points bring out and then answered his own questions with "nothing". They only pleased the Americans. The DRVN did not repeat not need anybody's four points. They wanted one hundred percent independence. (At this stage the Prime Minister began speaking directly in French without using the interpreter.) It was apparent Prime Minister had not repeat not read Minister's statement to the External Affairs Committee. We urged him to do so saying that he would not find it unsympathetic to North Vietnam. It has attempted to set forth the position of the parties as we understood them. If it did not repeat not reflect the North Vietnamese views accurately, we would be glad to know of any divergencies.

4. Pham Van Dong said that the ICC would perhaps have a role to play. He went on "if you have goodwill there will be work to do". They appreciated Canada's goodwill. They want Canada to have an attitude in the Commission that was "*positive*, *digne*, *libre*". They wanted Canada to support DRVN's right to liberty.

5. On the war in general Pham Van Dong said the Americans were carrying out a policy of escalation. But it would not repeat not work. The Vietnamese were a proud people. They would fight to the end. He himself would take up a rifle. He admitted that America had great power but drew our attention to the military efforts against them in the South which would continue and increase. Although he stressed the military aspects of the Vietnam problem and appeared to believe they would have a paramount effect on an eventual solution, he finally agreed that the war must end with a "*débouchement politique*". However, a political solution would have to confirm Vietnam's nationhood and distinguish between the aggressor and the victim. As first step the Americans must unconditionally stop the bombing and all acts of war against "*nous*". (By this we understood him to mean DRVN.) We asked "what will you do then?" and he replied "*nous causerons*" (we shall talk). Later he reiterated that as long as USA demanded reciprocity on (de)-escalation they would fight. But if USA stopped unconditionally, they would talk.

6. We said we were certain in our own mind that the USA did not repeat not harbour ill will against North Vietnam and had no repeat no wish to destroy the country or bring about the downfall of Ho Chi Minh and the Hanoi leadership. The one time Prime Minister replied "Well then why are they bombing us?" We said we understood the Americans claimed there were military reasons for the bombing.

7. During this part of our conversation Pham Van Dong made some unkind remarks about the Americans, being careful to note however that we Canadians were of course different. The Americans he said did not repeat not understand "certain things". They had no repeat no finesse. They had got too rich too quickly. They thought they could buy the world with their dollars. At one point he referred to remarks I had made the previous day to Col. Vu at our reception about Cabot Lodge's belief that DRVN would have been in a better bargaining position six months ago and could be in a worse one six months from now. Pham Van Dong said he could not repeat not agree with this analysis. Quite the contrary. They would be in a stronger position six months from now. As for Cabot Lodge he must be a disappointed man. He had failed to achieve his objectives. He was leaving Saigon "with bowed head". The Prime Minister also observed seemingly with a trace of sympathy in his voice that President Johnson was being pulled this way and that by various groups in the USA.

8. We referred to the proposed truce during Buddha's birthday anniversary next month and wondered whether that might serve as a beginning for something. In reply he first asked whether we were aware that the Viet Cong had offered to extend the truce for two days and then agreed that the truce offered "possibilities" adding after a moment's reflection "under conditions".

9. As it was now getting close to the time when we were scheduled to leave for the airport, I prepared to take my leave. The Prime Minister asked me to convey his regards to Prime Minister Pearson and Mr. Martin. He then took me by the arm in a friendly fashion and accompanied me to the head of the steps outside the building. He said he regarded our conversation as "*entre nous*" and hoped we would treat it with discretion and not repeat not give publicity to the substance. He said, "*ne criez* [*pas*] *sur les toits*" and "*aux journalistes*". (This may have been an allusion to Estabrook's *Washington Post* article which mentioned Brig. Chubb.)[67] I said he could count on our discretion and thanked him again for his courtesy in receiving me.

10. We shall be commenting on this interview and the one with PAVN Liaison Mission in a separate telegram.

[Ormond W.] Dier

550.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

No. 523
Saigon, May 4, 1967
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 291† Apr 26.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London; Washington, CANFORCEHED, Permis New York, Canberra from Ottawa; Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Tokyo from Ottawa; Wellington from Canberra; Hong Kong, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

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[67] See/Voir Robert H. Estabrook, "Canadians Say Hanoi Adamant," *Washington Post*, 2 March 1967, p. A20.

DISCUSSION WITH PAVN LIAISON MISSION

On April 24, accompanied by Wood, I made my first call on the PAVN Liaison Mission. We were received correctly but unsmilingly by Lt. Col. Anh Vu, the Deputy Chief of the mission, who had with him Major Trinh, the mission's third ranking officer, and an interpreter. Col. Ha Van Lau, we were told, was absent in Europe.

2. The meeting began with the usual preliminary courtesies on both sides while tea was served. When I mentioned that my wife had been disappointed on not repeat not being able to accompany me, Col. Vu said perhaps it could be arranged on my next visit but that in fact the Foreign Ministry had advised all diplomatic missions to evacuate dependents because of the air raids. (British representative had not repeat not heard of any such advice.) Once the preliminary courtesies were over, Lt. Col. Vu got down to business. He said DRVN wanted to retain normal relations with their Canadian "friends". They would like to see Canadian members of the ICC make a contribution to the work of the Commission. But to their deep regret they had been disappointed in their expectations. The history of the Commission over the past 10 years had testified to this. (Here Col. Vu indicated that these views were shared by Col. Ha Van Lau.) DRVN valued highly the Geneva Agreements. They had implemented them correctly and would like to see the other side do the same. But during the past 13 years the USA had intervened and sabotaged the Geneva Agreements. There were now almost half a million USA and allied troops who with SVN forces were waging a barbarous war in Vietnam. To DRVN regret the ICC had ignored this intervention. The Canadian and Indian members had given a distorted picture of the situation and had taken "awful" decisions. The DRVN felt that the resolutions on 325 Division and SAMs and MiGs "distorted the facts" (same language as Poldel used in the Commission). DRVN had given aide-mémoire to Candel and Indel pointing out they considered resolutions were hostile and benefitted only the Americans; to date they had had no repeat no reply from Candel.

3. Col. Vu then turned to the question of Canadian sales of arms to USA. He spoke along same lines as DRVN written communication to Candel and the Commission – namely that these arms were used in Vietnam and this was inconsistent with Canada's position on ICC. He complained that Canada had not repeat not replied to this protest.

4. In my response I said that Canadian Government wished to maintain good relations with DRVN. I then brought up the Chubb affair saying that we were sorry to have been so long in replying but that we had wanted to investigate the matter thoroughly. As a result of these investigations, we could say categorically that Brig. Chubb had made no repeat no statement to the press. In fact, he had never even met Estabrook. Col. Vu accepted this reply but suggested that since the report had appeared in the press, we should make a public denial of the allegation. I said that I doubted this would be possible or indeed helpful but we would consider the suggestion.

5. On the sale of arms to USA, I spoke along lines of Prime Minister's press release and gave a copy to Col. Vu. He said he would accept the press release but this did not repeat not mean DRVN accepted its contents. DRVN had raised matter because Canada was member of the ICC. Canada knew full well the provisions of the Geneva Agreement which prohibited the introduction of arms into Vietnam. Canada was getting more involved, first sending Caribou aircraft to SVN which they had raised with us in the past and now sending weapons to SVN. We might say this was done as part of binding agreement with USA but Geneva Agreement was also an international agreement. DRVN was surprised because they saw same contradictions in the Canadian position. On the one hand, we wanted to make a contribution to a solution and, on the other, we were selling arms to the USA.

6. We replied that in our view there was no repeat no inconsistency in the Canadian position. The sales complained of did not repeat not amount to arms in the usual sense of the word. They involved in some cases electronic equipment which had peaceful uses also. The equipment went into the general USA inventory and it was impossible for us to keep

track of or control these items once they had been sold to USA. Moreover, sale of arms to the USA in North America did not repeat not involve Canada in an introduction of arms into SVN. So far as the Caribou were concerned, this matter had been raised by Col. Vu with Wood January 20. At that time, Vu had also said they had referred to the matter previously. We had checked our files and could find no repeat no record of DRVN bringing up the Caribou before that occasion. Col. Vu said he would consult his records.

7. In the end there was no repeat no meeting of minds on this matter. Col. Vu made it clear DRVN consider it a political question and were unlikely to be shaken from their position that selling arms to the USA is inconsistent with Canada's position on the ICC. It was left that I would take note of their continued protest and refer it to you. Col. Vu said that so far as they were concerned the question continues and DRVN will have opportunity to comment again.

8. On the question of the two resolutions, I said that you were still considering the DRVN protest but that it clearly would be impossible to cancel resolutions adopted by the Commission. However, we had no repeat no intention at the present time of publicizing the resolutions. Canada had tried to maintain a measure of objectivity in the Commission over the years. There were two sides to the war in Vietnam and Commission actions could not repeat not reflect only one of them. The history of the Commission showed that many more resolutions had been passed against RVN than DRVN. In voting for the two resolutions, Canada had had no repeat no intention of making a political judgement.

9. Col. Vu came back stubbornly. DRVN wanted to believe in Canada's objectivity. Foreign Minister Trinh had told Moore of DRVN's attitude to the Commission; namely, that if it could not repeat not do anything good at least it should not repeat not do anything bad. Moore's answer had been given in the two resolutions. The resolutions had undermined the basis for the existence of the Commission. Candel and Indel were using their majority position to turn the Commission into an instrument for American aggression. It was a question of Canada's political attitude. Col. Vu said they were not repeat not afraid that the contents of the resolutions would become public. Publication would harm the Commission more that the DRVN demanded that we cancel the resolutions because they wanted to cooperate [*sic*].

10. When I asked what would their reaction be if SVN asked the Commission to cancel similar resolutions against them, Col. Vu avoided the question saying they were not repeat not asking us to side with the DRVN or do something beyond the CFA, only that our actions should conform to the Geneva Agreement. This meant no repeat no introduction of foreign troops and respect for the integrity and sovereignty of Vietnam. The DRVN was not repeat not bombing Chicago or New York and it must use every means to defend itself. Why did Candel and Indel not repeat not say that the USA had violated the Geneva Agreements? Why did they not repeat not condemn the aggressors? Where was our objectivity in this respect? DRVN wanted to cooperate with the Commission but Canada had compelled it to review its attitude. If Canada did not repeat not cancel the resolutions, the DRVN would have to reconsider its attitude to the role of Canada and India on the ICC. If Canada wanted good relations "please cancel the resolutions. If not repeat not you must bear the responsibility". Col. Vu reminded us again of the aide-mémoire which had been given to us in March and had not repeat not yet been answered. He said DRVN had been patient but there was a limit to their patience.

11. We suggested that he should not repeat not blame Moore for the resolutions since these resolutions had been on the agenda for some time and it was in fact not repeat not the Canadian Delegation which had taken the initiative for the series of meetings at which the resolutions had been adopted. Discussion of this subject was finally terminated with Col. Vu apologizing for raising these painful matters at my first meeting and expressing the hope that I would work for good relations.

12. I then referred to Mr. Martin's statement before the External Affairs work committee. I gave Col. Vu a copy of the statement and asked him to let us know whether it accurately reflected the DRVN's position. Col. Vu noted that the four-point suggestions amounted to a return to the Geneva Agreement in four stages. NVN newspapers had reflected to some extent their views on the plan but he would like to clarify some points. The main point they wished to make was that the USA was the aggressor and Vietnam the victim. The USA had sabotaged the Geneva Agreements. The DRVN had shown its goodwill in statement made by Foreign Minister Trinh on January 28 and in Ho Chi Minh's letter to President Johnson. Johnson had ordered a resumption of the bombing before Ho had replied to his letter but Ho still showed goodwill. If the USA really wanted peace it must stop the bombing. Only after a cessation of bombing raids and of other acts of aggression against Vietnam could there be peace in Vietnam. The Canada plan made no repeat no distinction between the aggressor and other people. It was aimed at making it possible for the USA to occupy the South perpetually and would result in a permanent division of Vietnam. The Canadian plan met the USA's demands for reciprocity and eluded the question of the cessation of bombing of the North. It meant that the aggressor was equated with the victim and so was in line with USA propaganda. The DRVN could not repeat not therefore accept the Canadian proposals. At another point Col. Vu said the Canadian proposals were "very difficult". Since he had used the term "impossible" earlier I asked whether he meant "very difficult" or "impossible" and he replied "impossible". Any plan, he went on, that did not repeat not recognize the rights of the Vietnamese people would not repeat not be acceptable. From a subsequent remark we judge this meant that the plan must request the Vietnamese people to settle their own problems. Continuing his onslaught against the USA, Col. Vu observed that ever since the USA had started to "clamour" for peace it has been escalating the war. Their talk about peace was deceitful. The American people including the press and intellectuals now realized this. At one point Col. Vu said that the USA could make direct contact anytime they wished through NVN missions in socialist countries.

13. You will note from the above that Col. Vu took a hard and repetitious line throughout our discussion. Of the three issues outstanding, we would judge that the Chubb affair will probably be allowed to lapse with time, the sale of arms question has not repeat not been laid to rest but is probably not repeat not imminently critical, while the matter of the two resolutions is still very serious and will require a further response on our part in the near future.

[Ormond W.] Dier

551.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

No. 1675
Washington, May 5, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: London Tel 2385 May 3.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, NATO Paris, Rome, Geneva, Permis New York; Canberra, Tokyo, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Delhi from London; Saigon from Delhi. By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Wellington from Canberra; Hong Kong from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE BOMBING PAUSE

Despite growing intensity of hostilities north and south of 17th parallel, I am inclined to doubt that it would be in Canada's interest or effective at this time to attempt to persuade USA to consider lengthy bombing pause on occasion of proposed truce for Buddha's birthday as suggested in reference telegram. Mood here seems fairly grim and determined at present and there appears to be general conviction in Washington based on developments during and since Tet pause that Hanoi is not repeat not yet ready for any genuine compromise. Unfortunately, Canada does not repeat not appear to have any basis for arguing to contrary judging from Dier's preliminary report on his talk with Pham Van Dong.

2. It is speculated in reference telegram that Americans might be interested in pause as means to forestall DRVN attack across DMZ or to put DRVN unequivocally in wrong if it did attack. However, one of main arguments used by USA administration to justify bombing of North is that such activity helps to reduce American casualties in South. This argument has flaws but it would be more relevant than usual in case of a large-scale conflict in DMZ area since American bombing just north of frontier could in fact have significant military effect on DRVN ability to continue combat. Reaction of USA authorities might well be that we were merely asking them to incur additional USA casualties in return for an illusory propaganda gain which was highly unlikely to lead to meaningful negotiations in view of Hanoi's maintenance of intransigent stand (e.g., its rejection of President's latest confidential overture last month).

3. Administration also seems to feel rather strongly that fruitless pauses are highly unsettling to USA public opinion and are apt to result – once pause is over – in impatient pressures for still more vigorous military action against North Vietnam.

4. There may well come a time when changed circumstances in both USA and North Vietnam make it desirable and necessary for Canada to press strongly for a bombing cessation in interests of peace but in my opinion that moment has not repeat not arrived. When it does, we will need every scrap of our influence in order to help persuade USA to act.

[A.]E. Ritchie

552.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] May 8, 1967

VIETNAM

You asked for our comments on General Norstad's prescription for a settlement of the Vietnam conflict.[68]

2. According to the attached message,† General Norstad's prescription is twofold:

> 1. The President should designate a time and place where he would meet with the leaders of all countries and parties involved in the Vietnam conflict with a view to bringing about peace in Vietnam;

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[68] General Norstad's proposal does not seem to have been announced at the time.
La proposition du général Norstad ne semble pas avoir été annoncée à l'époque.

2. The President should order a unilateral cessation of the bombing without any condition of reciprocity on the understanding, however, that he would be justified in escalating the war if the negotiating effort failed.

3. This is no better and no worse a prescription than many others which have been put forward. You will note, in particular, that it bears a strong relationship to the first and third of U Thant's three-point proposal of last year. The common element in many of these proposals is the unilateral cessation of American bombing which, however desirable, we know to be unachievable and hence unrealistic in present circumstances.

4. It is also worth pointing out that General Norstad is probably wrong in his assumption that a cessation of the bombing would clear the way for a Geneva-type conference. The North Vietnamese have never said that it would and our best information suggests that it would not. There are a number of major issues (i.e., United States withdrawal from South Vietnam, right of Vietnamese to settle their own affairs, recognition of National Liberation Front, and conceivably settlement of war damage claims) on which the North Vietnamese are likely to want preliminary assurances from the Americans before they are willing to move into a full-fledged conference situation.

5. All in all, therefore, I do not think that General Norstad's approach is likely to carry this matter appreciably closer to the prospects of a settlement.[69]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

553.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

No. Y-328
Ottawa, May 9, 1967
Confidential. Flash.
Reference: Saigon Tels 521 May 4 and 523 May 4.
Repeat for Information: Saigon, London, Paris, Geneva, Delhi, CANFORCEHED (Flash).
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM – DIER'S TALKS IN HANOI

I should be grateful if you would forward the following message to Rusk as soon as possible. Begins: My dear Dean, As you may be aware, our new Commissioner in Vietnam, Ormond Dier, recently visited Hanoi to pay his introductory calls on representatives of the North Vietnamese Government. During his stay in Hanoi, which lasted a little over a week, he had two main interviews, one on April 24 with the Deputy Head of the PAVN Liaison Mission (in charge of relations with the ICC) and the other, subsequently, with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. I thought that you might be interested in the texts of Dier's reports of these two discussions which I am forwarding herewith. Although these reports reveal nothing substantively new, they have been of interest to me for two main reasons. First, because the Prime Minister agreed to receive Dier at all; in the light of current North Vietnamese "displeasure" with us as reflected in Dier's discussion at the Liaison Mission we had half expected that he might not be received by any senior personality, which makes the relative cordiality of Pham Van Dong's reception of interest. Secondly, I was interested in Pham Van Dong's reiteration of North Vietnam's willingness to talk if the bombing stopped;

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[69] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I would like to discuss this. P[aul] M[artin]

although this proposition in one formulation or another dates back as far as I know to the first Ronning visit in March of 1966, the way it emerged in Dier's interview seems to me to be the most unambiguous statement of the "if one then the other" principle I have seen. Our officials will, I know, be in contact to discuss in detail these and other matters on a continuing basis. Beyond that, I can only say that I would welcome an opportunity to review with you in person the Vietnam situation in its broadest terms, and I hope that before long we may be able to do so. With kindest regards, Sincerely, Paul Martin. Ends.

2. I understand that you will be seeing Bundy this afternoon. You may wish to give him, as basis for discussion, attachments to my message to Rusk, and outline nature of message itself.

[Paul] Martin

554.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

No. Y-350
Ottawa, May 15, 1967
Confidential. OpImmediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva, Delhi, Saigon, CANFORCEHED, Permis New York.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Phnom Penh, Vientiane.

VIETNAM – SSEA'S STATEMENT APRIL 11

Apparently on instructions from his Ambassador, USA Embassy Minister Scott called on Department last week to seek explanation of SSEA's comment in House May 8 (our telegram M-133† May 9) when he said "We have not had any reaction from USA Government to this phase (i.e., cessation of bombing) of suggestions that we have put forward".[70]

2. Scott referred to official State Department reaction welcoming Canadian suggestions of April 11 as helpful and indicating USA willingness to suspend all military activity *in and over DZ*.

3. Since it seemed likely on basis of Scott's approach that at least USA Embassy here had not really understood intention behind first phase of SSEA's suggestions, we discussed with him relevant extracts from our telegram Y-296 of April 18. We pointed out that first phase of Canadian suggestions had been conceived as a loose package comprising elements of major interest to both sides. North was obviously interested in a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam, not just DZ. On other hand, USA was interested in stopping or limiting infiltration through DZ. At same time, North refused to make reciprocity, as demanded by USA, part of the bargaining position. We had attempted to square this otherwise impossible circle by linking a cessation of bombing with a possible Northern willingness to say that as of certain date ICC would be at perfect liberty to control DZ, thus making tacit but effective reciprocal military gesture. In view of importance USA has attached to DZ, we had thought that "bargain" we had suggested might well qualify for USA acceptance in light of Goldberg's September 22 speech to UNGA and President Johnson's description of USA reciprocity requirement as "just almost any gesture".

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[70] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 14, pp. 15523–15524.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 1re session, vol. 14, p. 15523-15524.

4. We informed Scott that our own enquiries about State Department's reaction had indicated that USA Government had not interpreted first phase as we had intended it. Instead, it was clear that USA Government had separated DZ problem out from others and treated it as an issue on its own, beyond which cessation of bombing of North Vietnam would have to be considered as a further matter which would require another form of reciprocal military gesture in the South. We had thus concluded that USA had not in fact "accepted" first phase of Canadian suggestions, and this was basis of SSEA's remarks in House May 8.

555.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6323

Secret.
[Ottawa,] May 17, 1967

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Winters),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. Gordon),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Sharp),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Mr. Laing),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. MacEachen),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Robichaud),
The Secretary of State (Miss LaMarsh),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),
The Minister of National Revenue and President of the Treasury Board (Mr. Benson),
The Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux),
The Solicitor General (Mr. Pennell),
The Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources (Mr. Pépin),
The Minister of Manpower and Immigration (Mr. Marchand),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Greene),
The Registrar General of Canada (Mr. Turner),
The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada (Mr. Trudeau),
The Minister without Portfolio (Mr. Chrétien).

The meeting of the Cabinet was not attended by any persons other than Ministers. The Prime Minister indicated to me the nature of the discussion in order that a record of the essential facts could be kept.

The meeting was entirely to discuss the policy of the government in relation to Vietnam and the position for the government and for the President of the Privy Council arising out of statements made by him concerning Vietnam in the course of the week-end of May 13th-14th.[71]

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[71] See/Voir "Vietnam Policy: New Attack on U.S. by Gordon," *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 May 1967, p. 3; Anthony Westell, "Reaction to Gordon Attack on U.S. Expected from Opposition Today," *Globe and Mail*, 15 May 1967, p. 1.

The Prime Minister had prepared a statement of the government policy on Vietnam which he had shown to the Secretary of State for External Affairs in advance. The statement was read to the Cabinet and included the following points:

(1) The policy of the government toward the Vietnam conflict had not changed since the statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Committee on External Affairs on April 11th.

(2) The important thing, from the point of view of the government's policy, was to end the war. It was not important at this point to establish blame or responsibility in connection with it. No single country bore sole responsibility and, to concentrate condemnation and criticism on the United States, and to make public pronouncements to that effect, was wrong and unnecessary. It made no contribution to the achievement of the objective of ending the fighting.

(3) The government agreed that there could not be a military solution to the conflict.

(4) The government's policy was to do everything it could in all ways that would be effective to bring about peace. It did not think that this normally requires "to publicly condemn or publicly proclaim".

(5) The government must not do anything to prejudice the discharge of its responsibilities or the exploitation of opportunities as a Member of the International Truce Commission.

(6) If the fighting was not soon ended, the danger of escalation and expansion would increase. Therefore, the bombing of North Vietnam should stop along with infiltration from the North into the South. It was hoped that the United States, as the strongest of the warring parties, "will take the initiative by bringing the bombing to an end and demanding that talks begin at once for an armistice and a settlement".

(7) Canada would take a part in an international force to supervise any cease fire and armistice and in the re-habilitation of Vietnam.

The statement of policy as read by the Prime Minister concluded with the following sentence: "Every member of the government agrees with this policy and will make no statement or adopt no attitude that will make its pursuit more difficult."

The statement also included, as a part of it, the following: "When statements are made in public that are critical or give advice to the parties to the Vietnam conflict, they should be made by the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs; unless they have been approved in advance by either of the above."

The Prime Minister advised me that, while there was a good deal of frank and even blunt exchange of views the entire statement of policy was, as indicated, agreed to with no qualifications or exceptions.

R.G. Robertson
Secretary to the Cabinet

556.
Memorandum by Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9001, 20-VIETN-1-4/2

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] May 17, 1967

VIETNAM

With reference to the following paragraph on page 5 and top of page 6,[72] I passed to the Minister in Cabinet comments arising from my reading this statement to the Under-Secretary and Mr. Collins on the telephone:

> "We hope that the U.S.A., as the strongest of the warring parties, will take the initiative by bringing the bombing to an end and demanding that talks begin at once for an armistice and a settlement."

2. Mr. Cadieux and Mr. Collins wanted the Minister to know that in our view, there was no repeat no hope that the U.S. would take the position suggested in this paragraph. If this was a position which the Government wished to take in private negotiations with the U.S., then it could be pursued through diplomatic channels as vigorously as the Government wished. However, if the statement was made publicly it would mean using the same technique as that of Mr. Gordon which was being criticized.

3. Mr. Delworth later asked me to make sure the Minister realized that this represented a departure from Canadian policy to date because the Government had so far taken the position that there ought to be some sort of balance between what was asked of the U.S. and what was asked of the North Vietnamese.

4. As far as the rest of the statement is concerned, the Under-Secretary thought that it could easily be made publicly.[73]

J.G. Hadwen

557.
Memorandum from Head, Far Eastern Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] May 18, 1967

VIETNAM

On his copy of Paris telegram 1367† of May 12, the Minister indicated his interest in considering the suggestion advanced by the Embassy in the concluding paragraph of the message. You will recall that this suggestion proceeds from the assumption that a unilateral cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam by the Americans would be the only means of bringing about a de-escalation of the hostilities, and that to convince the Americans of this proposition "it would no doubt be necessary, as General Norstad suggested to Ignatieff, for an important group of Chief of States which are allies of the U.S.A. to put pressure on the President to this end". The Embassy suggests that such an initiative might be discussed with the French by the Minister when he is next in Paris.

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[72] See previous document./Voir le document précédent.

[73] The statement Pearson presented to Cabinet was not made public. For press coverage of the Cabinet meeting, see Anthony Westell, "Ordered to Keep Quiet or Quit, Gordon Shuts Up," *Globe and Mail*, 18 May 1967, p. 1.
La déclaration faite au Cabinet par Pearson n'a pas été rendue publique. Pour consulter la couverture médiatique de la réunion du Cabinet, voir Anthony Westell, « Ordered to Keep Quiet or Quit, Gordon Shuts Up », *Globe and Mail*, 18 mai 1967, p. 1.

2. In the event that the Minister raises this matter with you, the following notes may be of some use.

3. In the first place, the suggestion advanced by our Embassy is not the same as General Norstad's proposal which comprised two main elements:

(a) The President should designate a time and place where he would meet with the leaders of all countries and parties involved in the Vietnam conflict with a view to bringing about peace in Vietnam;

(b) The President should order a unilateral cessation of the bombing without any condition of reciprocity on the understanding, however, that he would be justified in escalating the war if the negotiating effort failed.

You will recall that in a memorandum of May 8 (copy attached) it was pointed out to the Minister that such an approach was not likely to achieve the results intended.

4. Our Paris Embassy's suggestion is much less specific than General Norstad's. It seems to involve consultations or even a meeting of leaders of countries enjoying close relations with the U.S.A. (Canada, France, Britain for example?) which would result in joint or concurrent representations (or a public appeal?) to the President urging that the bombing of North Vietnam should stop.

5. As far as we can judge there is nothing particularly new in this idea. You will recall that there have been discussions in the past about the possibility of the International Commission issuing such an appeal either as a Commission or as joint action by the three member governments; this idea has not however evoked any interest whatever on the part of the Poles or the Russians who might be supposed to have seen at least propaganda advantage in it. More recently, Goldberg put forward substantially the same idea as our Paris Embassy in his discussions with the Minister in New York a few weeks ago. (Permis telegram 1087 of April 28, attached). From the tone of this report, it seems fair to judge that Goldberg did not have much faith in the efficacy of such a move, but seemed rather to be casting about for almost any gesture which would focus attention on possibilities for reversing the course of events in Vietnam.

6. The real problem, as we see it, is that any appeal or concerted action, especially if publicly mounted by political leaders of countries allied to the U.S.A., would be seen as "ganging up" and would be deeply resented by the President. If it had any effect at all, it would probably be to harden the U.S. attitude and it might even have unpleasant side effects in the form of "retaliation". If the U.S.A. is ever to stop the bombing unilaterally (which seems highly unlikely at the moment), we are convinced that it will be necessary that this be done (or at least be seen to be done) as an autonomous gesture rather than as a response to an appeal by others or as a capitulation to pressure from Washington's closest friends.

K. Goldschlag

558.
Extract from Cabinet Conclusions
Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet
RG2, vol. 6323

Secret.
[Ottawa,] May 23, 1967

Present

The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) in the Chair,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Winters),

The Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill),
The President of the Queen's Privy Council (Mr. Gordon),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Sharp),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. McIlraith),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Teillet),
The Minister of Industry and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Drury),
The Minister of National Revenue and President of the Treasury Board (Mr. Benson),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Greene),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Côté),
The Registrar General of Canada (Mr. Turner),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Trudeau),
The Minister without Portfolio (Mr. Chrétien).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Robertson),
The Assistant Secretaries to the Cabinet (Mr. Stoner), (Mr. Wall).

[...]

POSSIBLE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE ON VIET NAM

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that there was a possibility that the Official Opposition might move a motion, during supply, to have a debate on Viet Nam. This raised the question of whether the Government should take some initiative to introduce a resolution to request a pause in the bombing and encourage negotiations. There were procedural difficulties with the Government introducing such a resolution but unless the Government acted they might be faced with more drastic and more embarrassing resolutions.

Mr. Martin read a proposed resolution which expressed deep concern at the situation and indicated that the Canadian Government would support efforts to find a basis for withholding the bombing and stopping the infiltration from the North, thus leading to negotiations. The statement went on to say that Canada was prepared to play a role in Viet Nam, including participation in its economic reconstruction.

The President of the Privy Council said that the statement did not go as far as an earlier statement of government policy which the Prime Minister had introduced at Cabinet the previous week.

The Prime Minister said that it was important to keep a distinction between the Government's policy to pursue vigorously but quietly efforts to bring about a pause in the bombing and the public posture it assumed. It was important that any resolution from Parliament should be balanced and not appear to condemn the United States unilaterally. *Mr. Pearson* said that he and Mr. Martin were convinced that it would be much more effective to use the channel of quiet diplomacy to make Canada's views known to the United States Government. The British Labour Government had taken a very careful position in dealing with a similar matter in their Parliament despite very strong pressures in the Labour Party against the bombing.

During the discussion, these points emerged:

(a) Several Ministers felt that it would be a mistake for the Government to introduce any resolution at all.

(b) One Minister suggested that the previous statement of Ambassador Goldberg with respect to negotiation should be re-examined to see if that provided a basis for a Government resolution.

(c) It was emphasized that any possible role for Canada in the future with respect to peacekeeping would have to be based on the assumption by Hanoi that Canada still had influence in Washington. A resolution that unilaterally condemned United States bombing would destroy any such premise.

(d) Several Ministers were opposed to the Government introducing a resolution in the Supply Debate and suggested that it was preferable to seek unanimous consent on Motions to deal with the matter.

(e) It was noted that the debate might lead to a request for a resolution condemning the sale of arms by Canada to the United States unless there were assurances that these arms would not be used in Viet Nam.

The Cabinet noted the remarks of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs regarding a possible debate on Viet Nam in the House and decided not to take any action at that stage to introduce the Government resolution regarding the Viet Nam situation.

559.
Briefing Note
Note d'information
RG25, vol. 10085, 20-USA-9/2

Secret.
[Ottawa,] May 25, 1967

PRIME MINISTER PEARSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON: VIETNAM

It will be of interest to us to know how the President sees the evolution of the situation in Vietnam. The scale of the conflict appears to be rising. There is evidence of greater intransigence in Hanoi. For the first time in seventeen months, there appear to be no diplomatic moves in train to seek a way out of the present impasse.

The North Vietnamese apparently regard a cessation of the bombing as an essential condition of direct talks with the United States. The United States have made it clear that they will not cease the bombing without some measure of military reciprocity. We accept the United States position as justifiable on grounds of equity and having regard to the whole sequence of developments in Vietnam. We have resisted pressure on the Government to make a public appeal for a unilateral halt in the bombing.

At the same time we have wondered whether the United States might not feel justified in taking such a step unilaterally to see what happens; to see whether in present circumstances this might just conceivably create a basis for unravelling the Vietnam problem. Of course, if this were done, it should be done by the United States autonomously. Its impact on Hanoi would be less if it were seen to be done in response to outside pressure.

We understand that such a move would not be without military drawbacks in terms of maintaining pressure on Hanoi. We had thought at one time that the North Vietnamese might be asked, as a minimum, to undertake not to take advantage of a bombing cessation to increase the level of their infiltration. We wonder, however, whether such an undertaking, even if it could be extracted from the North Vietnamese, would add sufficient weight to the balance to make the proposition substantially more attractive from the American point of view.

We believe that the United States would stand to gain considerably in terms of international public support for its objectives if it were to cease the bombing as a test of the sincerity of the other side. It could help, in our view, to give Soviet influence in Hanoi some chance to assert itself in favour of a peaceful solution of the Vietnam conflict. It would make it clear that United States purposes in Vietnam are limited and that the United States is itself prepared to make a major concession in the interests of bringing the conflict to the negotiating table.

We realize that all these arguments were put to the United States prior to the bombing pause in December 1965 but that matters turned out otherwise. We suspect that there may have been some evolution in attitudes in Hanoi since that time. In particular, we do not think that Hanoi would default on what was first intimated to Mr. Ronning by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister in March 1966 and what has since been stated explicitly by the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister in January of this year: namely, that if the bombing stopped there could be talks.

Of course there is a risk that things might again go sour. Hanoi has said that it is prepared to have talks; it has not gone so far as to say that it is prepared to go into a full-fledged negotiation on the basis of a bombing cessation alone. It may make impossible demands on the United States as a pre-condition to any eventual settlement. Sooner or later the United States may feel that it has to resume military action against the North. We have no intention of under-rating these risks or the pressures which might then be put on the United States to continue to hold Hanoi immune from the consequences of its actions.

But it does seem to us that these risks are worth taking in a situation which shows no early promise of resolving itself and as a means of enlisting the efforts of others who might be counted upon, in those circumstances, to exert their concerted pressure in favour of an equitable accommodation in Vietnam.

560.
Diary of Prime Minister
Journal du premier ministre
MG26-N6, vol. 36, Johnson, President Lyndon B.

[Ottawa,] May 26, 1967

PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON
AT HARRINGTON LAKE, MAY 25, 1967

After luncheon, the President and I remained behind for coffee – as I thought it would be useful to have some time alone with him.

[…]

The other matter was Vietnam

Here the President gave me the usual "*apologia pro mea guerra*".

He was calm and relaxed about this matter and took a good deal of credit for resisting his own military "super-hawks" who were pressing for more action and more military resources for that action. He warned me that this pressure was increasing, and that popular sentiment for stronger action was also increasing. He seemed to think the public opinion polls were increasingly in favour of present policy or a tougher one. I told him that that wasn't the case in Canada. He then expressed sincere appreciation for the Government's helpful attitude over Vietnam, even though we differed in respect of bombing.

I then – because there were only a few minutes left before we joined the others – put very frankly to him the proposition that he should stop the bombing without any conditions of time or anything else, merely that he would now meet the other side without delay to discuss a ceasefire, an armistice and peace. This would put the Communists on the spot and remove their last proclaimed excuse for refusing to begin negotiations.

He didn't seem too upset over this suggestion which he said he would consider.

Later when we joined the others, however, when Vietnam came up again he was more vigorous in his defence of the present policy of bombing and more reluctant to consider proposal of any kind for a change which was not associated with a concession of some kind on the part of the North. He repeated the old well-worn arguments; we stop bombing, they go on killing.

I admitted the logic of this position – in the military sense – but pointed out that the victory to be won now had to be a political one – for political objectives, as the USA had recognized by limiting its own use of military power. Therefore the only question was would a military decision to stop bombing do more good politically than it could do harm militarily. L.B.J. was not much impressed. Their boys would continue to be killed, and some because of the restraints imposed by their own Government. In any event, ending the bombing would not stop the war. The fighting would go on. I said this might well be so, and it was a worrying thought, that perhaps we were attaching too much importance to the end of bombing as an element in ending the war. We might be wrong about this and the Communists would find some other excuse to refuse negotiations and continue fighting.

Nevertheless such a move might have diplomatic results which would more than compensate for any military disadvantages if it failed.

Johnson showed no sign of being convinced: so I asked him what he thought of the proposition, that the U.S.A. announce not merely that they were going to stop the bombing but that they were going to stop fighting at such and such a time and ask the Secretary-General or the Pope to arrange for peace talks at once. I didn't think that in such circumstances the North could continue any offensive operations, at least for a time.

I don't think, however, L.B.J. thought this was a very good idea either!

All I can hope from putting forward these ideas is that he may have been persuaded to ponder over them.

My feeling is however that he has made up his mind to continue along the present line; neither reducing nor extending it because

(1) The Chiefs of Staff would raise "public hell" if he didn't; with the backing of the Pentagon and all those who are for a decisive and quick military victory.

(2) Politically, he feels he would be in more trouble than he is now if he showed "weakness".

(3) He is convinced that the Vietnam elections in September – which Bunker is looking after – will show the purity of US intentions and the strength of new democratic processes in Vietnam; and that this will help swing world opinion over to his side.

As a postscript, I can only add that the President's views on Vietnam gave no ground for optimism that any new move of any kind is likely to break the present deadlock. But with a person like L.B.J. it is rash to predict anything. He operates on instinct and his assessment of domestic political currents. He is more concerned with opinion polls than diplomatic strategy, or so it would seem.

One of the aspects of the Vietnam struggle which seems to interest him most is the progress that Bunker is making (he is very high in Presidential favour at the moment) in conditioning the present rulers of South Vietnam for democracy and for "free" elections in September.

When the President first mentioned to me the importance of the forthcoming elections on the Vietnam situation, I got a sinking feeling that he was referring to the USA 1968 elections and that the threat to global peace in Vietnam was subordinate to his return to office. I was relieved to learn that he was thinking of Saigon not Washington though I thought he was pretty naïve in his optimism about the progress being achieved there in bringing about democratic institutions.

Worrying also, in terms of the hard realities of the situation, was his tendency to think of every proposal in terms of how many of "our boys" would be killed or saved by it next week.

A bombing pause or cessation is looked at in these narrow, if human, terms. We stop bombing and kill our own boys by doing so. "One of Luci's friends was badly wounded during a pause in the bombing." "What can I say to him?"

The fact that the loss of 50 more "boys" next week might save 5,000 the next few months didn't seem to occur to the President.

He has an intense human emotionalism about the conflict which does him credit as a man, but could be a great handicap in dealing with international political strategy and tactics.

He is emotional and warm but tough and obstinate. He seemed to take an intense satisfaction in the steps taken – with which he was personally deeply concerned – to ensure that the bombing was so directed as to do the minimum damage to "civilians"; spare the people even if it meant sacrificing some effectiveness and planes. This is highly laudable but has helped hardly at all in reducing criticism of the bombing as cruel and heartless. All it has meant is that the Americans are getting the worst of both worlds. The President won't stop bombing but he wants it to be humane bombing!

I wonder whether he really has control over these matters or whether – to keep the military from "going full speed ahead, and damn the torpedoes" from China or anywhere else – he has decided not to interfere in any of their existing military tactics, including bombing, in the hope of achieving good political results.

To me the President is more of an enigma than ever, only he is now an older and more impatient and irascible enigma; feverish in his insistence on activity, verbal and physical: moving so much and so fast in the hope, perhaps, that movement is progress; that you can be jet-propelled to peace and all the good things for everybody which he has seen granted to Texans and which everybody in Vietnam and other far-off places like Canada should also have.[74]

561.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

No. 1982
Washington, May 26, 1967
Confidential. No Distribution. Immediate.
For USSEA only.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S VISIT: VIETNAM

In discussions after lunch, Prime Minister indicated his serious concern over Vietnam situation and he wondered whether stopping bombing might not repeat not open up some possibilities.

2. President responded at some length. He said people tend to forget that Americans have their pride too, that they can hardly be expected to accept every suggestion for unilateral action when other side has repeatedly shown no repeat no readiness to do anything. If one side was going to stop anything it was essential that both sides should stop something. President considered that past pauses had been very costly and had produced no repeat no results. There had been no repeat no response from North Vietnamese.

3. President emphasized that he did not repeat not expect bombing to stop infiltration of personnel or supplying of goods. It would however make these things more difficult. In President's view any cessation of bombing costs lives of Americans and their allies because enemy is able to kill more people more effectively. He said it had to be realized that any time he called a halt blood of Americans and their friends who were killed was "on his hands".

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[74] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. XII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), document 340.

4. President claimed that whenever in past he had made a conciliatory move, he received plenty of criticism from those who disapproved but he got no repeat no support from those who had been advocating such action. Such people are very willing to urge a truce or a cessation of bombing but when it happens and is criticized, they don't show up to defend President's action, he said.

5. President said "We are willing to stop anything we are doing if it will get any response". (Later he made it clear that he did not repeat not consider a mere readiness to talk as an adequate response to cessation of particular military action.) President went on that "what that fellow (presumably Asian Communist leadership generally) wants is Vietnam, Thailand and other countries around there". He added that "we should get it into our heads that nothing short of that will satisfy him". He then went back to matter of bombing and said that if he were not repeat not to bomb North Vietnam, more Americans would be killed. He said "If our casualties go up from 337 a week to 1037, I am one who will be responsible".

6. When it was suggested that Communists had been very effective in their campaign to concentrate attention on bombing as really villainous activity, President replied that other side was helped not repeat not just by Communist propaganda but even by comments of "our friends" (in which he clearly included critics in USA). President added that those who tended to link publicly Middle East and Vietnam situations were giving some hope to Ho that requirements of Middle East might weaken position of USA in Vietnam.

7. President came back again to matter of bombing and said emphatically that so far USA actions had been very measured. President added that if anyone doubted this, they should be with him on some of occasions [when?] he meets with his military advisers. Those advisers who had military responsibility thought him unwise to limit actions of USA and its allies. (Later on plane Walt Rostow indicated that President had resisted strong pressures for more extensive bombing operations. He had insisted upon a very restricted selection of targets. In particular he had made it clear that there was to be no repeat no bombing of dykes around agricultural areas or of ports or import routes, for example those from China. President had also never been prepared to contemplate bombing of civilian housing areas.)

8. President Johnson said he thought USA was reasonable in its objectives. It had made it clear that it did not repeat not want any territory and did not repeat not want to destroy North Vietnam's form of government. It only wanted an opportunity for those in South to be able to elect their own chosen government. USA had a contract with South Vietnam as it had with some 41 other countries. It intended to keep its word.

9. Prime Minister said military attitude was understandable but it had to be recognized that no repeat no purely military victory was possible. Important thing was to achieve a satisfactory political settlement. Accordingly, a readiness to enter into serious political discussions might justify a stopping of bombing even though other side was not repeat not prepared to make any corresponding military concession. If such a stopping of bombing accompanied by negotiations were to work, it was undoubtedly true that some lives would be lost in process but painful as that might be it could still be worthwhile. Number of people who might be killed would not repeat not be as many as would be lost if war were to go on indefinitely.

10. President said that if he stopped bombing he would be giving up "greatest deterrence with minimum cost".

11. Minister expressed view that if bombing were to be stopped there would be less loss of American lives than if war continues and escalates.

12. President still thought it unreasonable for anyone to suggest that only one side should make any military concessions. He said "If I stop, I know what he will do. He has done it six times".

13. Prime Minister then asked what President would do if he were to be satisfied that armistice talks would in fact be undertaken.

14. President said that he would respond to a willingness on part of other side to talk with an equal willingness on his side to talk. He thought that one thing should be matched with another thing of same kind. He did not repeat not think that it was fair for one party to be expected to stop bombing and talk while other side simply undertook to talk while it kept on killing as it did during Panmunjom negotiations. He asked what would be thought in a situation where Canada and Mexico were at each other's throats and somebody suggested that Canada should stop if only Mexico would agree to talk while still holding Canada by throat.

15. A reference was made to Pope's proposals for a complete stop of fighting and initiation of talks. President said he was interested but he added he would "not repeat not talk at expense of more lives".

16. President thought it essential in most conflicts to require something equivalent from both antagonists. He said this was true of Vietnam or Middle East or his hypothetical case of Canada and Mexico.

17. On helicopter journey from Harrington Lake to Ottawa, President spoke with great feeling to Prime Minister about loss of lives in bombing pauses and about pressures on him to do more. In connection with pauses in bombing he repeated example which he had given earlier in day about boyfriend of his daughter who had received serious head wound during one recent pause and had expressed his forthright views on foolishness of giving North Vietnamese a bombing respite. President also expressed his concern over impact on USA politics of return and demobilization of hundreds of thousands of USA veterans of Vietnam. He thought that when some of them became active in USA politics they would by comparison "make Joe McCarthy look good". President reiterated need for him to push back or hold back his military people.

18. Also on helicopter flight Prime Minister referred to effects of some of stories and pictures brought back from Vietnam and published in press or put on TV. President remarked that this was first war in which USA had ever attempted to fight without any controls or restraints. No repeat no censorship of any kind was imposed. He added that attempts to meet requirements of reporters for stories and pictures sometimes cost lives of American soldiers. He obviously did not repeat not intend to do anything to interfere with them.

19. At one point in conversation (probably in helicopter), President said that he was fully aware of risks involved in USA military operations. He knew that some of their planes going 1,200 miles an hour were carrying out operations within one minute of Chinese border and he realized that when pilots were occupied with other things sixty seconds could go very quickly and an incident could result. He recognized risks involved. He added that pilots being used on bombing sorties over North Vietnam were exceptionally experienced and well trained. Their bombing raids and their other operations were being carried out with greatest care.

[A.]E. Ritchie

562.
Letter from Secretary of State of United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lettre du secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/15

Washington, May 31, 1967

Dear Paul [Martin]:

Thank you for sending me through Ambassador Ritchie copies of Commissioner Dier's report on his Hanoi conversations.

As you know, we are always most interested in learning whatever we can about the thinking of North Vietnamese leaders, and we value highly the firsthand reports which your representatives obtain. In this instance, as you note, Pham Van Dong offered nothing substantively new, although it was encouraging that he seemed to assume a continuing Canadian presence on the ICC, in contrast to some of the threatening remarks of subordinate DRV officials recently.

We shall continue to give careful consideration to your analyses and proposals affecting a peace settlement. I also look forward to a chance to review the Viet-Nam situation with you in person.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,
Dean Rusk

563.
Record of Conversation between Prime Minister and Prime Minister of United Kingdom
Compte rendu de la conversation entre le premier ministre et le premier ministre du Royaume-Uni
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/16

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] June 1, 1967

VIETNAM

1. The Prime Minister said that President Johnson felt that he should get more credit for holding back his military 'hawks'. The Prime Minister got the feeling that the President sees the whole problem in almost personal terms.

2. Mr. Wilson said that the Americans were now apparently switching their tactics and hitting closer to populated centers. He recalled that on behalf of his Government he had regretted the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi.

3. The Prime Minister continued to refer to his recent conversation with Mr. Johnson and said that he had found him distressed because it was not appreciated to what extent he was exercising restraint in using force. The Prime Minister recalled the vivid description by the President of the extraordinary courage of U.S. pilots who were flying with extra-special precautions so as to hit only military targets and who were being shot at in the process. The Minister said the restraint did not do him any good in the sense that as long as the hostilities continued on a major scale, with or without the application of stringent restraints, casualties could not be avoided. When military operations affected populated centers, there were bound to be casualties. And while it was true that the President was taking unusual precautions, this had the result that many of his "boys" were being killed in the process. He was therefore getting the worst of both worlds.

4. Mr. Martin went on to say that Vietnam was one of the most disturbing problems which we were facing. He felt that as a result of the President's visit, we did not seem to know a great deal more than before as to how the U.S. intended, in practical terms, to approach a settlement. The President kept saying that if he stopped bombing his losses would increase. Without minimizing the importance of this fact for the President, we thought that a wider perspective might impart a different relative importance to it; what was of major importance was not so much the casualties that would be incurred during a pause but the very substantial savings in lives which would be effected if, as a result, a negotiated settlement could be achieved. The Prime Minister supported this view very strongly. Mr. Martin added that the Vietnam situation was a major concern for many countries, including Canada, even though not directly involved, but that we seemed to be getting nowhere in dealing with it.

5. The Prime Minister expressed the fear that the mood in Hanoi might be hardening and that the North Vietnamese, rather than being put on the spot to enter into talks by a suspension of the bombing, might now be emphasizing other conditions as well. Mr. Wilson thought that for a moment during Kosygin's visit to London there might have been some prospects for a solution. Unfortunately, that opportunity (i.e., for a suspension of the bombing) was missed. The Prime Minister said that the President would probably get a good deal of comfort from Mr. Holt who was now visiting him in Washington. Mr. Johnson probably felt that Mr. Holt was as all other leaders should be. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that Mr. Wilson, in the course of his visit to Washington, would have an opportunity of underlining some of the points which we had tried to put to the President here.

564.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/16

No. 26
Luxembourg, June 13, 1967
Secret. Flash.

VIETNAM

I had a talk with Rusk at noon today about Vietnam, having earlier raised in Council our concern about the continuing war there and its effect on relations with the Soviet Union.

2. Probably as a result of the Middle East crisis, Rusk was more worried than I have seen him in a long time about Vietnam and more receptive to suggestions that the bombing be stopped. He admitted that USA had no repeat no further military interest in bombing targets in the North. He himself threw out the idea of a proposition whereby the USA would stop the bombing permanently in exchange for an undertaking from Hanoi that they would accept an international force in the demilitarized zone. He said that the USA believe the Indonesians for one would be prepared to contribute to such a force.

3. In answer to my question regarding what we might do to explore this idea further, he specifically endorsed our putting it to North Vietnam through our Commissioner in Saigon.

4. I should like the Department to give some thought to this suggestion, examine its feasibility and let me have their views preferably before this meeting ends.

[Paul] Martin

565.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to North Atlantic Council
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/16

No. Y-396
Ottawa, June 13, 1967
Secret. Flash.
Reference: Your Tel 26† Jun 13.
For Minister.

VIETNAM

We find Rusk's reaction as reported in reference telegram extremely interesting since it appears to constitute USA willingness to consider the essentials of the first phase of four-phase suggestions you advanced on April 11 to External [Affairs] Committee.

2. Copies of text of your presentation at that time are available to Delegation and Paris can make available text of our telegram Y-296 April 18 which you authorized as background guidance to a number of our missions for use in discussing your April 11 suggestions with governments to which they are accredited.

3. Rusk's thinking appears to differ from our own in only two respects: in mentioning a "permanent" cessation of the bombing and a "international force" in the DZ. With regard to the former, we had never envisaged asking the USA to give any private or public undertaking relative to permanency of suspension of bombing since we thought that this would be entirely unacceptable to USA. If, however, they now feel that this is a practical possibility from their point of view, we certainly would not repeat not argue against it since it would undoubtedly go a long way towards meeting Hanoi's stated requirements.

4. With regard to injecting an international "force" into DZ, we doubt whether this is a practical possibility or whether it would prove acceptable to North Vietnamese since it would introduce an entirely new element into Vietnam situation. Canadian suggestions of April 11 were firmly rooted in principle of "legitimacy" (i.e., established framework and modalities of 1954 Ceasefire Agreement). Within this framework, International Commission is the only body which could undertake DZ control assignment and in so doing be seen to be doing nothing more than carrying out the duties specifically given to it under the 1954 Agreement. (We have doubts whether in any case Indonesians would be acceptable to the North Vietnamese and to the Chinese.)

5. If Rusk's reaction on latter point is not repeat not firmly fixed and he would be prepared to consider having Canada enter into contact with North Vietnamese on basis of first phase of April 11 suggestions, we think prompt action would be warranted.

6. As we envisage it, Canadian presentation to North Vietnamese would take following form:

A. As North Vietnamese Government is aware, SSEA on April 11 advanced series of four suggestions looking to a de-escalation of the conflict based on the idea of a progressive reapplication of the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Ceasefire Agreement. As a first step, it was envisaged that the bombing of North Vietnam might cease and at the same time, or as soon as was possible in practical terms, the International Commission in cooperation with the local parties would resume its responsibilities in controlling DZ and would undertake such surveillance activities as would be necessary to assure the two sides that the other was not repeat not violating status of DZ. This would not repeat not involve any admissions on either side, but only an expressed willingness (and measures of practical cooperation) to see the International Commission verify that the DZ is in reality demilitarized. The "bargain" envisaged would thus not repeat not be an overtly reciprocal one. The Canadian Government is aware of the North Vietnamese position on the reciprocity principle and has attempted to take it (no repeat no less than the USA position) into account in formulating this suggestion.

B. The Canadian Government is also aware of the negative reaction of Prime Minister Pham Van Dong as conveyed to a Japanese journalist (Chief Editor, Asahi Shimbun) in Hanoi on April 22, in rejecting the suggestion the USA Government put forward subsequent to SSEA's April 11 speech, in which it was proposed that DZ might be widened without reference to a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.[75] Canadian Government is aware that such a proposal would not repeat not correspond to scheme we had in mind which was clearly based on concepts of 1954 CFA without significant alterations. Canadian Government

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[75] See/Voir "Hanoi Rejects Broader DMZ," *Washington Post*, 22 April 1967, p. 12.

now has reason to believe that USA Government might be prepared to consider implementing first phase of April 11 suggestions as envisaged if North Vietnamese Government were prepared to lend its full cooperation to International Commission in undertaking effective controls in both northern and southern sectors of DZ.

C. It is of course only the North Vietnamese Government that can decide what it is prepared or not repeat not prepared to do in the light of its own definition of its self-interest. But it seems reasonable to Canadian Government that a scheme such as this, which if implemented would result in a cessation of the bombing and a guarantee that the scope of hostilities would not repeat not expand, could only benefit both sides to the conflict. It would also make possible direct contacts between USA and North Vietnamese representatives to discuss basic issues at stake in the conflict.

7. From point of view of procedure, we think that Saigon-Hanoi channel might be difficult in present circumstances for following reasons:

A. It would be noticeable in that Dier's first visit took place not repeat not long ago and a return trip for no repeat no apparent reason might attract undue attention.

B. Because of ICC airline schedule and possible delays it might take more time to carry through than other possible contacts e.g., Paris representative of NVN Government.

C. Canadian Commissioner's presence in Hanoi might prompt snap NVN reaction, in negative terms, if he were to express willingness to wait in Hanoi for comment. Conversely, visibility problem would arise if he were to return to Saigon and then shortly thereafter go back to Hanoi at latter's request.

8. All things considered, we believe it would give all concerned greater manoeuvrability, and would be less visible, if initial approach were made in Paris where North Vietnamese Delegation Gen. Mai Van Bo is one of most capable representatives Hanoi has abroad. It occurs to us that USSEA if he went to Paris could make this contact since his activities would be less likely to attract notice than SSEA's or Ambassador's. In concluding Canadian presentation it could be said that we would be prepared to receive any indication of North Vietnamese response in Paris (through Ambassador) or alternatively we would be prepared to authorize our Commissioner in Saigon to proceed to Hanoi for this purpose (by that time a second visit to Hanoi by Dier would be less noticeable).

566.
Telegram from Delegation to North Atlantic Council to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/16

No. 41
Luxembourg, June 14, 1967
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-396 Jun 13.

VIETNAM

Unfortunately, Rusk had to leave NATO meeting before lunch en route to Washington and time did not repeat not permit Minister to discuss matter further on basis of reference telegram. However, Minister gave Rusk copy of telegram and Rusk promised very early reply.

You will doubtless wish to inform Ritchie of this exchange as Rusk will have it on his mind when he gets to Washington.

567.
Telegram from Delegation to North Atlantic Council to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/16

No. 49
Luxembourg, June 14, 1967
Secret. Limited Distribution. Priority.
Repeat for Information: NATO Paris, London, Washington, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Hague (Priority); Delhi (Priority) from London; Saigon (Priority) from Delhi.
By Bag: Oslo, Copenhagen, Athens from Paris; Warsaw, Moscow from London; Lisbon from Ottawa.

VIETNAM

In restricted ministerial session June 14, SSEA said that although he had had benefit of recent private discussions with Secretary Rusk he regretted that there had been no repeat no opportunity for frank exchanges among NATO Ministers on Vietnam problem. A number of Ministers had expressed privately to him a desire for such exchanges. He thought it was unfortunate that on infrequent occasions when all Ministers were together there seemed to be a reluctance to get to grips with international problem which was of concern to all.

2. Rusk said that USA continued to be interested in comments from other governments and underlined USA concern about problem. USA intended to keep its commitments in Vietnam as it would do in Europe if aggression took place. USA would meet Hanoi more than halfway if Hanoi were genuinely desirous of peace talks.

3. Brown questioned usefulness of talks in NATO forum at present time. He acknowledged existence of public relations problem for some governments but did not repeat not think talks in NATO would help to solve these. Harmel, Belgium, suggested that procedures for ministerial meetings might be re-examined to make more time available for private discussions among Ministers. Secretary-General wondered whether SSEA's point would be met by special meeting of NATO Permanent Council on Vietnam problem. SSEA said this would not repeat not meet his point. As reported in telegram 41, SSEA subsequently had brief word with Rusk.

568.
Telegram from Permanent Mission to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
MG32-B12, vol. 227, 25

No. 1835
New York, June 22, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, DISARMDELGNEVA, Rome; CANFORCEHED (CDS, DGI, DOPS), Canberra from Ottawa; Moscow, Delhi, Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Wellington from Canberra; Hong Kong, Tokyo, Tehran from Ottawa; Cairo, Beirut, Tel Aviv from Paris.

VIETNAM AND MIDDLE EAST: SSEA TALK WITH POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER

SSEA had hour's discussion with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki at Polish Mission p.m. June 22. Conversation began with discussion of Vietnam when SSEA asked whether he thought there was any possibility of progress towards reduction of hostilities and specifically whether members of ICSC could help. In a tone of resigned despondency, Rapacki reviewed developments of last November and December in familiar terms, emphasizing that in his view USA had aborted proposed discussions with North Vietnam in advance by complicating outlines of political settlement which were to be negotiated following ceasefire proposed at that time, while at same time making discussions impossible by escalating bombing of North Vietnam. He said that Lodge had understood very well formulation of political settlement which was to be negotiated and Rapacki had concluded that USA had not repeat not been prepared at that time to enter into meaningful negotiations. Rapacki said that in these circumstances he felt he could not repeat not dare to urge North Vietnam to cooperate in renewed effort to open negotiations.

2. In response to SSEA's inquiry as to whether there was any sign of flexibility and whether there could be any progress towards negotiable settlement without China's concurrence, Rapacki professed to see no repeat no signs of flexibility on either side. This subject was reverted to again later in discussion.

3. Turning to Middle East, Rapacki said that he considered Israel had taken action she did based on estimation if not repeat not clear assurance that she would have approval and perhaps support of Western powers. He professed to be certain that Nasser had given assurances that Gulf of Aqaba would be open to all shipping including Israeli shipping within three weeks and that this had been conveyed to Israelis who had rejected it out of hand. Mr. Martin said this was first time he had heard of any such offer by UAR and Rapacki was not repeat not more explicit but he particularly asked that this info be kept confidential at least for time being as it was "property of others".

4. He went on to refer to "mechanical momentum" built into situations like that in Middle East where military force was used and related this to increasing spiral of escalation in Vietnam. When he spoke of resulting deterioration in atmosphere which made initiatives in either situation next to impossible, Mr. Martin asked whether he thought it would be possible for Kosygin and Johnson to meet in an effort to bring about necessary atmosphere by indicating that they were at least prepared to cooperate in resolving these two major problems and said that he had urged Kosygin to make every effort to meet Johnson. Rapacki said that Kosygin had told him that SSEA had argued persuasively in this respect but he was very non-committal and even evasive as to his own attitude. On other hand, it was clear that he considered Johnson-Kosygin meeting was important prerequisite to any attempt at solutions and he said that meaningful meeting posed difficult problems for both sides.

5. Finally, Mr. Martin asked directly whether Rapacki thought there was any possibility that members of ICSC in Vietnam could take any initiative in near future to help in process of reducing hostilities there adding that Canada was ready to join with India in an appeal to both sides or in any other way. Rapacki at first seemed to suggest that present time was not repeat not propitious for reasons we had mentioned earlier but he very quickly then asked Mr. Martin when he would be able to see him again. SSEA said that he was returning to Canada this weekend but could return to New York on Tuesday evening. Rapacki said he had not repeat not yet decided how long he would stay in New York but wished to keep open possibility of seeing Mr. Martin next week. He seemed to have some definite purpose related to Mr. Martin's inquiry in mind although he was not repeat not specific. We will get in touch with Rapacki on Monday afternoon June 26 to see whether meeting next week would be useful.

6. SSEA expressed hope that Rapacki would be able to visit Canada soon. Although Rapacki responded warmly, he did not repeat not give any indication that he could discuss specific date in near future.

569.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/16

[Ottawa,] June 26, 1967

VIETNAM

I understand that you have received a letter from Escott Reid† covering a statement on Vietnam. The statement carries the signatures of Doug LePan and Wynne Plumptre in addition to Escott's.

2. It is their intention to send copies of the statement to Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Douglas to reach them on June 27. The statement is to be released to the press for publication on the same date.[76]

3. I am attaching a reply† for your use in case the matter of the statement is raised in the House later this week. I am also attaching a brief analysis of the statement in the event that Escott wants to discuss it with you at your lunch for the President of India. I note that Escott is not pressing for a reply either to his letter or to the statement. You may wish to consider, nevertheless, whether it would not be in the Government's interest to react formally to the statement.

4. You might like to know that this statement has been germinating for some weeks and that Escott has sought the comments and reactions of officials to previous drafts. In the light of his expressed hope that the statement would be helpful to the Government, I should make it clear that officials did not say anything to Escott which was calculated to encourage him to expect that it would.

P[aul] M[artin]

Enclosure: Memorandum
Pièce jointe : Note

[Ottawa, n.d.]

ANALYSIS OF ESCOTT REID'S STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

The statement proceeds from the assumption, which is by now pretty widely shared, that nothing is likely to happen in Vietnam until there has been a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam by the Americans.

The statement assumes that, if the bombing were stopped, this would pave the way for "negotiations on a cease-fire and a peaceful settlement". This assumption is unwarranted.

What the North Vietnamese have said is that, if the bombing were stopped, there could be "talks" with the Americans. They have not spoken of "negotiations" and everything we know suggests that they see these as lying some considerable distance down the road to a settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

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[76] See/Voir "'U.S. Objective in Vietnam Can't Be Gained by Bombing,'" *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 June 1967, p. 6.

What the North Vietnamese are prepared to discuss with the Americans is likely to be circumscribed in two ways. First, they would not be willing to discuss with the Americans matters which they are concerned to picture as coming within the purview of the Vietcong. Second, they would probably not be willing to envisage a cease-fire until they had concluded that the fruits of a political settlement were likely to meet at least their minimal requirements. In other words the situation in respect of a cease-fire would be very much what it was in 1954.

Be that as it may, there obviously has to be a starting point somewhere and we have always felt that the opening of direct talks between the Americans and the North Vietnamese would be as good a starting point as any. The dilemma here has been that the North Vietnamese have insisted on an unconditional cessation of the bombing as a pre-condition to any such direct talks while the Americans have been unwilling to stop the bombing without some measure of military reciprocity.

The Reid proposals really do not help us overcome that dilemma. If they are seriously meant they envisage a package which, as we have had occasion to tell Escott informally, was offered by President Johnson to Ho Chi Minh on February 7 and turned down by the latter. If, on the other hand, they are intended merely to provide a cover for an unconditional and unilateral cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, then they are no more likely to be acceptable to the United States at this stage than the many other proposals along the same lines which have been urged on the Americans both publicly and in private.

In all the circumstances, we can see little advantage in the Canadian Government making these proposals its own and enlisting the support of other governments on their behalf. As Mr. Martin's recent discussions with Mr. Rusk suggest, there may be considerably more promise in some formula based on the Canadian proposals of April 11.

570.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/16

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] July 7, 1967

VIETNAM

This may be a useful time to determine the point which has been reached in efforts to find an approach to a Vietnam settlement and to consider the nature and timing of our next steps.

I believe it is still true to say that third parties will have a limited role to play in bringing about a settlement in Vietnam. The major points at issue between the two sides in Vietnam will have to be negotiated directly by them and both the Americans and the North Vietnamese have made this clear. That is not to say, of course, that there is not a useful role for third parties in this matter. On the contrary, I continue to think that it may well fall to third parties to help create the conditions in which the two sides are prepared to enter into bilateral contact. This has been the main thrust of Canadian efforts over the past sixteen months and I believe that it is the direction in which our efforts should continue to be employed.

The dilemma we are facing is focussed on the question of the bombing of North Vietnam. We can now be reasonably certain that, if the bombing were stopped, the North Vietnamese would be prepared to engage in bilateral talks with the Americans.[77] These talks would not,

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[77] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
? P[aul] M[artin]

however, amount to anything like a Geneva-type negotiation and it is open to question whether the North Vietnamese would not use the talks to tie down the Americans diplomatically without having any serious intention to arrive at any sort of accommodation. Accordingly, while we cannot afford to underestimate the importance of the question of the bombing, we would be wrong to attach excessive importance to it.

I believe there is some tendency to concentrate too heavily on this question of the bombing. In part, this is because it is held to involve risks of an uncontrollable spread of the conflict. In part, it is felt that the bombing is unprofitable if not unjust. Above all, however, the bombing has assumed importance because it is now seen to be the key to a reversal of events in Vietnam.

The fact remains, however, that a cessation of the bombing would at best be only a first step. It would unlock opportunities for discussion, but it would not take us any closer to a solution of the real issues. And we have no evidence to indicate that there will be any inclination on the part of the North Vietnamese to compromise on the real issues. At best, we can assume no more than a willingness to allow the Americans to save face.

Still, it would obviously be a counsel of despair to accept a continuation of the present course of developments merely because a political accommodation may well elude the parties to the conflict. Accordingly, we are bound to address ourselves to the problem of the bombing on which the next steps appear to hinge. As it presents itself in concrete form, the problem is to reconcile the position of the North Vietnamese, who insist on an unconditional and permanent cessation of the bombing, with that of the Americans who have not shown themselves willing so far to consider such a cessation in the absence of some measure of military reciprocity on the other side.

Of course, it is possible that the Americans may decide to stop the bombing unilaterally. On all counts this would be the best solution. It continues, however, to be resisted by the military and the President made it clear, in his recent discussions with the Prime Minister, that he would regard such a unilateral move as being both inequitable and costly in terms of prospective losses of American lives. So long as these views are held by the President and other influential and highly placed members of the Administration and among the military, I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by putting public pressure on the Americans to stop the bombing without reciprocity. In fact, I am inclined to think that, if there were ever to be an unreciprocated cessation of the bombing, this should come about and be seen to come about as an autonomous American action. If it were to come about or appeared to have come about as a result of international pressure, I believe that this would play strongly into the North Vietnamese assumption that time is on their side and might by the same token serve to prolong the course of the war.

As matters stand, therefore, we would probably be best advised to base our further efforts on the assumption that some minimal token of reciprocity at least will have to be extracted from North Vietnam if the bombing is to be stopped and bilateral contact to be established between the Americans and the North Vietnamese.

One promising formula, as far as the Americans are concerned, is the coupling of a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam with a return to the *status quo ante* in the demilitarized zone which you put before the External Affairs Committee on April 11. You will recall that Mr. Rusk expressed an interest in this formula when you saw him in Luxembourg during the NATO meetings. We have since learned that it has been the subject of intensive staff studies within the United States Government and that the results of these studies are about to be assessed at senior level.

The question which we have to consider is how far, given the intrinsic merit of our formula, we should press the Americans at this time. Mr. Bundy has expressed the view that the present may not be a particularly good time for floating the ideas we have put forward. There are one or two considerations which would appear to support this judgment.

In the first place, the demilitarized zone has lately become a scene of intensive fighting. It is too early to say whether this presages a major North Vietnamese offensive across the 17th parallel. It is clear, however, that until the military position at the demilitarized zone has assumed clearer shape, there is little to be gained by pushing a formula which envisages the re-demilitarization of the zone since this would in present circumstances amount to arranging a major cease-fire and disengagement operation.

In the second place, there are many signs pointing to the prospect of a serious American reassessment of their position in Vietnam. Casualties have been mounting. The budgetary cost of sustaining a conflict on this scale of magnitude has again come under critical scrutiny. The pacification effort, on which the course of events in Vietnam is going to depend in the long run, is not going all that well. All in all, there are reports that the President is less than satisfied with the progress of the war.

Mr. McNamara arrived in Vietnam today. He is due to stay there for five days. I believe this is his ninth first-hand review of the situation. While one of the purposes of his visit may be to form a personal assessment of the need for reinforcing United States troop strength, which stands at 464,000, this is unlikely to be the only purpose of his going to Vietnam at this time. In fact, I should not be at all surprised if Mr. McNamara's report to the President were to form the focus of new and conceivably quite far-reaching decisions as regards future American strategy in Vietnam.

In my judgment, we would be well advised to allow this review to proceed some distance before we press our ideas on the Americans. It is not [to] be excluded that, as a result of this review, the Americans may decide on their own account to do something about the bombing. Alternatively, they may develop formulas of their own for bridging the gap between themselves and the North Vietnamese which may involve a Canadian intermediary. Or they may decide that the formula you developed before the External Affairs Committee is the one best calculated to meet their preoccupations. In any of these eventualities, we have little to lose and much to gain in giving the Americans time to reshape their thinking if that is what is in prospect.

In the meantime, I believe that we should try not to lose touch with the situation. I think it would be useful for Mr. Ritchie to follow the development of American thinking closely, particularly during the period after Mr. McNamara's return from Vietnam. He should also make sure, in his discussions over the next few weeks, that our ideas are not lost sight of in the process. I understand that, in any case, Mr. Bundy has committed himself to make contact with us again just as soon as he has had an opportunity to discuss this whole matter with Mr. Rusk.

All this is couched very much in terms of the American side of the equation. We cannot, I think, assume that our ideas will be acceptable to the North Vietnamese without what may be substantial modifications. In actual fact, of course, we have never taken the North Vietnamese over the detailed ground of our April 11 proposals and I would not be averse to seeing this done as soon as we can do so with the assurance of American acquiescence. If no progress can be made on that basis, we might also want to take another look at one of our earlier ideas which envisaged a cessation of the bombing (and presumably a freeze on the existing American military establishment in Vietnam) against a tacit North Vietnamese undertaking not to take advantage of the resulting situation by increasing the pace and scale of their infiltration of men and materials into the South.

I am not sure whether there is any flexibility in the North Vietnamese position at this time. Whether there is or not, however, we know that the North Vietnamese are concerned to avoid any contrary assumption. This suggests that, if and when the time comes for another Canadian approach in Hanoi, we should proceed as discreetly as we can. I think it would be a

pity if we forced the North Vietnamese into a prematurely adverse reaction to any proposition we might make to them merely because we put them in a position where, for public and presentation reasons, they felt they had no option but to react in that way.[78]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

571.
Telegram from Embassy to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassade aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/17

No. 2667
Washington, July 14, 1967
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 2539† Jul 6.
Repeat for Information: Saigon (Commissioner only) (Immediate) from Ottawa.
SSEA and USSEA only.

VIETNAM

William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, asked me to call today to discuss proposed initiative which grew out of SSEA's conversation with Rusk on June 13 in Luxembourg. Essence of what Bundy told me was that State Department had studied seriously and carefully implications of stopping bombing in exchange for demilitarization of DZ under adequate ICC control.[79] Department had reached conclusion after much thought and Rusk had asked Bundy to inform us that now was not repeat not time to launch such initiative.[80]

2. Bundy then offered detailed account of reasoning which had led to this conclusion. First consideration was that study in depth of proposition had raised many problems and difficulties which made State Department uncertain whether substance of plan would be acceptable to USA. There was problem of what would constitute effective supervisory force in DZ and how it could be raised. Second, even if DZ were demilitarized and supervised, infiltration routes through Laos would remain open and would doubtless be used. USA would not repeat not wish to make move toward limitation of war in Vietnam at cost of larger war in Laos. For these and other reasons Bundy said he was unable to make definitive pronouncement on acceptability or otherwise of substance of proposal.

3. However, apart from its substance there were other reasons for considering present time inopportune. First, although nothing new about Vietnam had emerged from Johnson-Kosygin talks at Glassboro,[81] these and other USA-Soviet exchanges in recent months had led USA to think Russians might be contemplating another attempt to move Hanoi towards negotiation.[82] There was not repeat not much doubt Hanoi was concerned about what was

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78 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
For your conversation with the P[rime] M[inister]. J.G. H[adwen]

79 See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), documents 204, 227.

80 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
The idea, of course, was Rusk's. P[aul] M[artin]

81 See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968*, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), document 216.

82 Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This fits in with [what] Mark Gayn told us. P[aul] M[artin]

going on in China and evidence of such concern which Russians must share probably led Russians to believe rightly or wrongly that their own influence in Hanoi was increasing. Second reason for not repeat not wanting to inject new element into situation at this time was that USA needed to know before moving what other side wanted to talk about, what terms of reference of negotiations would be, what agenda and objectives would look like, how Communists envisaged settlement. There was now some evidence that Hanoi might be considering these very questions. At present time all DRVN representatives of any consequence abroad were back in Hanoi presumably for consultations. USA had no repeat no info on what consultations were about but they were able to recall that similar Ambassadorial conclave had taken place in March/66 and about this conclave USA had advantage of some knowledge through well-known captured documents at least one of which was version of what had been worked out in March/66 meeting. Conclave of this kind again could indicate thorough policy review was going on.

4. Some of representatives abroad who had been summoned back for current meeting (e.g., Ambassador in Peking) were politically influential and would be included in any discussion likely to lead to serious decisions. Others appeared to have little political weight but had been used in past in pursuit of various tactical objectives. For example, after Trinh-Burchett interview in January/66 [*sic*] Vietnamese representatives all over world had made point of getting Trinh's message through to USA by way of neutral intermediaries. Representatives in, for example, Delhi and Jakarta had been particularly active and both of these were included in present conclave.

5. Third reason was that role and status of NLF might be in process of changing. NLF recognition of Cambodian frontiers and subsequent recognition of NLF by Cuba had given Front enhanced standing. It was possible DRVN would think further enhancement desirable. In this respect, much depended on how Hanoi saw outcome of September RVN election which was important event for them as for USA.

6. If there was validity in three-point analysis outlined above, it was possible to envisage three corresponding directions of movement by DRVN. First, there might be serious move towards negotiation and settlement. This was not repeat not likely; Communists were probably not repeat not sufficiently worried by what was going on in China, by bombing, or by progress of war in South to consider serious move at this time. Second, there might be tactical move. Hanoi might for example say they would have representatives next week in Geneva if bombing were stopped. To put it another way, they would dot i's and cross t's of Trinh-Burchett interview. In Bundy's view this was most likely direction of movement. Third, they might do something about NLF. There was no repeat no doubt NLF were feeling left out as result of Trinh interview and Johnson-Ho exchange.

7. I interrupted Bundy's account at this point to ask whether it was really possible to distinguish between "serious" move and "tactical" one as he had done. Could not repeat not indication of willingness to go to Geneva and talk be preliminary to more serious intentions? Bundy agreed that categories could not repeat not be absolute and what was tactical now might of course become serious. However, USA was not repeat not prepared "to put to sea in rowboats unless there were buoys marking channel". USA wanted to know before sitting down what was going to be talked about, where talks were going to lead.[83] USA also wanted to know that other side would not repeat not be in position to take military advantage of prolonged negotiation. We will put to sea in rowboats, Bundy said, only when we see channel clearly marked.

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[83] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This is where the U.S. are wrong. P[aul] M[artin]

8. State Department had taken SSEA's conversation with Rusk in Luxembourg very seriously and had studied proposal deeply. They had come to conclusion that now was not time to launch initiative.

9. I asked Bundy if he did not repeat not think it possible even if Russians might be planning some exploration in Hanoi and even if important political decisions were being taken there that initiative launched at this moment would do some good. Did developments in Hanoi or in DRVN relations with USSR really alter situation insofar as search for peaceful solution was concerned? In reply Bundy said he hoped we did not repeat not think Secretary's discussion of proposal had meant he had thought it wholly acceptable. There were as Bundy had said before reservations on substance. It might be argued that initiative launched now would clarify rather than further confuse situation but USA view was opposite. There was some chance that in ten days or so we might get indication of what was going on in Hanoi. State Department thought we should wait for these indications to emerge. Lines of USA approach were sufficiently clear to Hanoi.[84]

10. There followed inconclusive discussion about situation in DZ. Bundy pointed out that DZ was significant element in infiltration from North. Bringing this infiltration to end would be significant for both sides but it would be no repeat no advantage to USA if Communists merely walked round end of DZ through Laos. I pointed out that SSEA's four-point proposal in his April 11 statement included proposal for freezing of military activity at given level which would presumably mean Communists would have to cease infiltration by whatever route. This was not repeat not of course envisaged in first step. Bundy continued that it had been found impossible to construct any effective physical barrier through mountainous terrain in western end of DZ and would be equally impossible across border in Laos even if Souvanna would agree to such step. Meanwhile, Communists had greatly reinforced their fire power in and near DZ and USA was doing same to deal with this threat.

11. Bundy concluded by reasserting that he expected no repeat no serious move from Hanoi until after election in South.

12. I thanked Bundy for his explanation and expressed hope that idea would not repeat not simply be allowed to die. I suggested that before long it might be worthwhile getting USA officials together with some of our own, perhaps Collins and Seaborn, to have closer look at what was and was not repeat not possible. Bundy seemed reasonably receptive to this idea.[85]

572.

Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/17

Secret.
[Ottawa,] July 27, 1967

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[84] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Klaus [Goldschlag], speak to me at once. P[aul] M[artin]

[85] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Speak to me at once. P[aul] M[artin]

VIETNAM

You will recall that during Mr. Ritchie's last conversation with William Bundy in Washington (copy of Washington telegram No. 2667 of July 14 attached) the latter said that they were watching with considerable interest the meeting of a number of DRVN foreign representatives who were brought back to Hanoi earlier this month. Bundy speculated that in the period following this conference we might get some indication as to whether there was any shift in the direction of North Vietnam's thinking on the central question of negotiation vs. continuation of the war.

2. We know that the Americans, like ourselves, have been watching very closely for any signs of such a shift, but we would agree with them that so far at least it has not appeared. You will have seen as part of our own examination of the subject the attached telegram No. Y-463† of July 25 to Orme Dier asking him and his Permanent Representative in Hanoi to be on the look-out for any signs which might indicate either a shift in policy or differences of opinion on policy matters within the top leadership of the DRVN.

3. It may be a week or two before Dier is able to give an interim report and that may well be very thin. It occurs to us, however, that it might be worthwhile to have Dier himself pay his next regular visit to Hanoi in the fairly near future in order that we may have the direct first-hand impressions of our Commissioner as to the current mood in North Vietnam.

4. A possibly useful occasion for such a visit would be the DRVN National Day which is on September 2nd. For the last few years at least, it has been the practice for our Commissioner not to attend this National Day but to send his senior military adviser in his place. The rationale has been to mark the distinction in our relations with the DRVN and with the Republic of Vietnam.[86] This is not, however, a major consideration and, provided Dier mentioned to the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister in advance that he intended to be present at the DRVN National Day, and explained that he was doing so in order to sound out the mood in Hanoi, such a visit should not cause misunderstanding in South Vietnam nor attract undue attention. The Polish Commissioner in any event may be expected to journey to Hanoi for the purpose and probably the Indian Commissioner also, so that Dier's presence could merely indicate an act of Commission solidarity.

5. I should emphasize that we do not think that any detailed or specific instructions need be sent to Dier in this connection. In the light of Bundy's last conversation with Ritchie, it is clear that, for the present at least, the Americans are not interested in having us pursue with the North Vietnamese the idea which you discussed with Mr. Rusk in Luxembourg, namely sounding them out on point one of the four-point proposal in your April 11 Statement (the cessation of the bombing in conjunction with a re-demilitarization of the DZ). I hope that we can at a later stage, possibly some time after the South Vietnamese elections have been held early in September, re-arouse American interest in this idea. But for the moment it seems to be a non-starter and it could be damaging to later chances of favourable consideration in Hanoi if we were to have Dier raise it with the North Vietnamese during his next trip there.

6. If you agree with the foregoing paragraphs, we shall ask Dier to make his plans accordingly. We shall, of course, inform Washington in advance that we are doing so in case there are any signs and portents in the political scene in North Vietnam on which they would particularly appreciate Dier's comments.[87]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[86] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I would like to discuss this with Seaborn. [Paul Martin]

[87] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
This [will have?] to be considered carefully in the light of Hanoi's latest action to expel a Canadian officer. J.G. H[adwen]

573.
Record of Conversation between Prime Minister, Secretary of State for External Affairs and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Soviet Union, August 14, 1967
Compte rendu de la conversation entre le premier ministre, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et le premier vice-président du Conseil des ministres de l'Union soviétique, 14 août 1967
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/17

Confidential.
[Ottawa, n.d.]

VIETNAM

The Prime Minister invited Mr. Polyansky to outline current Soviet thinking on the Vietnam situation, saying that he felt he could speak to him just as frankly as he did to the President of the United States.

2. In response Mr. Polyansky said that the situation in Vietnam was becoming increasingly complex. The Soviet position nevertheless remained unchanged. Like "all sound-minded people" the Soviet leaders believed that no military solution was possible. The United States on the other hand continued to escalate the scale of the conflict, seeking to enlist increasing aid from other countries and pushing its military build-up in Vietnam to fabulous proportions. But despite the demands it made on its allies – South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand – and an expenditure of some $100 million a day, military success was still impossible. The United States was suffering heavy losses of manpower and had already lost four thousand aircraft. It still could not break down the will of the freedom-loving Vietnamese people with weapons.

3. Mr. Polyansky said that in Soviet judgment the so-called peaceful intentions of the United States were no more than a bluff intended to mislead world opinion. The United States was making no really meaningful efforts toward peace but was engaging only in diplomatic "bluff". The USSR considered that it was possible to solve the Vietnamese problem peacefully by political means, and Mr. Polyansky asserted that this was also the wish of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States could take tangible and meaningful steps if it approached the situation soberly on the basis of actual circumstances. It must recognize that its troops were on foreign territory as invaders and that they were employing barbarous methods. According to Mr. Polyansky, the position was made entirely clear in the Five and Four-Point Programmes of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Last January the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had reiterated the position of his Government and no further clarification was necessary.

4. The Soviet Union and "all progressive humanity" provided aid of all kinds to Vietnam in response to the United States military build-up. It was obvious that there was a serious threat of world war arising from the situation and it was the duty of all Governments to do everything within their power to avert such an outcome.

5. The Prime Minister replied that, although the Canadian Government did not have the same understanding of all the facts as the Soviet Union, we both agreed that the conflict was disturbing for all concerned, that it could not be solved by military means alone, and that it must be brought to an end. He pointed out that he had stated this view to the United States even though it may have been unwelcome. He himself had been the first leader in the Atlantic Coalition to advocate the end of the bombing of North Vietnam (and had done so in the United States). Canada would certainly do everything within its power to bring this stupid conflict to an end.

6. Since it was the Soviet view that the United States was bluffing in claiming to seek a peaceful solution, the Prime Minister suggested that it would be wise to call the bluff[88] – that is, to respond that if the United States would stop the bombing and the fighting in Vietnam (except in self-defence) the parties concerned would meet to begin the process of resolving the issues, including that of withdrawal of United States troops. If this were done the pressure to accept from world opinion would be irresistible for the United States. If a categorical undertaking to negotiate were forthcoming from Hanoi, in public or private, Canada would be prepared to press as strongly as it could in Washington for a positive response.

7. The Prime Minister expressed the view that the danger was becoming even more acute in view of the chaotic situation in China and the consequent risk of adventurism abroad by the Chinese Régime. Notwithstanding Canada's desire to avoid a humiliation for the United States, which would be an undesirable result for all concerned, we were therefore prepared to exert any pressure we could in the direction of peace. It was for that reason that Canada continued to serve on the International Supervisory Commission in Vietnam, although in some respects, the Commission seemed farcical at present. But the course which Mr. Polyansky proposed for the United States – that of halting the bombing and indeed the fighting unconditionally in the hope that negotiations would follow carried with it a significant risk. If the United States did halt the bombing and the fighting and negotiations did not in fact follow, the pressure on the President from those United States military leaders who believed a military solution was possible would become extremely difficult to resist.

8. Mr. Polyansky replied that these apprehensions were unfounded. The Vietnam problem could be solved but the solution depended on the United States. There must be an immediate end of the bombing and the allies of the United States must apply pressure to ensure that the cessation was unconditional. No self-respecting victim of aggression could ever agree to conditions for its cessation. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was sovereign and would solve its problems irrespective of what happened in China. Mr. Polyansky said he was sure that if the United States did halt the bombing "certain prerequisites would be available for a peaceful settlement".

574.

Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam

Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam

RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/17

No. Y-504
Ottawa, August 18, 1967
Secret. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-482† Aug 4.
Repeat for Information: Washington.

NEXT VISIT TO HANOI

Minister has agreed that your next visit to Hanoi should coincide with DRVN National Day September 2. You should therefore make appropriate plans looking to a visit of no repeat no more than five days or a week, depending on courier flights.

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[88] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
But no further. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

2. Participation by Canadian Commissioner in National Day observances Hanoi is new departure since in recent years at least it has been normal practice for SMA to represent Candel on this occasion. Apart from reflecting our continuing interest in having you maintain more or less regular personal contacts in Hanoi, your visit at this time will provide about the best opportunity we know of to "take a reading" of political atmosphere in Hanoi; although scope of celebrations may be limited because of military situation, some top leaders are usually at least "visible" on this occasion. Finally, participation by Canadian Commissioner would be fully in line with modified instructions issued earlier this year dealing with social relations with representatives of Communist bloc countries abroad (see circular document A6/67† of May 11 paragraph 10).

3. In order to avoid misunderstanding among South Vietnamese, you should call on Foreign Minister and explain that it is now some months since your first visit to Hanoi and you wish to maintain contacts. More important however, in terms of specific timing, is our interest in attempting to assess mood in Hanoi, and National Day celebrations provide one of rare occasions in which senior personalities are at least seen in public. It is unfortunate that this will necessitate your absence from South for forthcoming elections but we hope that South Vietnamese Government will not repeat not attach any political significance to this fact which is accidental, and they may be sure that we will be following the progress and results of these elections with an interest undiminished by your own absence in Hanoi. (We would not repeat not however consider it necessary to mention circular document instructions referred to in preceding paragraph.) Without indicating that you are asking for a "special assignment" you might conclude by asking Foreign Minister for his own assessment of Hanoi's position and of any shifts in leadership (as these have been subject of recent speculation) by way of providing you with helpful background for Hanoi visit.

4. With regard to visit itself we have no special instructions for you. Our main interest will be in what you are able to observe yourself and glean from conversations with others. We have nothing further to add to our telegram Y-463 July 25 in this connection.

5. In your initial call on PAVN Mission on arrival Hanoi, you should indicate, in accordance with normal practice that you would be at disposal of Prime Minister should he wish to see you. Beyond that you should express interest in having an opportunity to pay courtesy calls on Foreign Minister and indeed other persons interested in Commission and relations with Canada whom you did not meet on first visit. In any interviews at this level that may ensue, we do not repeat not believe that it would be useful to initiate discussion of SSEA's April 11 proposals but if North Vietnamese raise this subject you should give as detailed an account as possible on basis of info outlined our telegram Y-296 April 18.

6. In your discussions with PAVN Mission it is likely that MacFie case may arise.[89] We hope that by that time Commission action may have been initiated. In any event, you should simply draw attention to denial issued Ottawa July 30 in SSEA's name,[90] and explain that if we had clearer idea of any Vietnamese regulations governing movements in Hanoi it would help ensure that future misunderstandings of this nature would not repeat not recur.

7. We are aware that you do not share sense of importance your predecessor attached to possibility of replacing Commission courier aircraft. If, however, this question is to be reviewed in future you will recall that we require (and have asked PAVN Mission for) info regarding technical characteristics of Gia Lam airfield since this info would be necessary in deciding type of aircraft that could be used as alternative to present equipment.

For Washington:

8. You may wish to inform State Department (keeping in mind Smyser's particular interests as indicated your telegram 2742† July 20) of Dier's plans and of sense of foregoing guidance.

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[89] See/Voir "Canadian on Control Unit Expelled by North Vietnam," *New York Times*, 30 July 1967, p. 2.

[90] See/Voir "Hanoi Security Claim Denied by Ottawa," *Globe and Mail*, 31 July 1967, p. 2.

575.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/18

No. Y-537
Ottawa, September 8, 1967
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Washington, NATO Paris, Saigon, London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow.

VIETNAM: 22ND UNGA: SSEA'S VISIT TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON SEPTEMBER 7 FOR CANADIAN-USA CONSULTATIONS

Most of discussion with U.S. Delegation New York on morning of September 7 centred on Vietnam and especially Goldberg idea of having non-permanent members introduce resolution into Security Council which would call for negotiations under Geneva Conference auspices. Two points of central importance emerged in course of discussion.

2. First was that objective of USA was two-fold and related to domestic politics as well as to substance of Vietnam problem. Goldberg was frank in admitting that one purpose was to meet criticism stemming particularly from Senator Mansfield that administration had not repeat not done enough to use U.N. to try to solve Vietnam problem. Second purpose he initially described as continued search for political initiative which might lead to acceptable solution and help break out of present position of political stalemate. Under further questioning, especially regarding possible Soviet reactions, Goldberg indicated that substantive aspect of initiative was to smoke out what Russians would do in certain circumstances. He was particularly interested in Soviet behaviour during recent Middle East crisis: despite very strong anti-USA line they had taken in public they had shown willingness to enter into useful substantive discussions in private with USA with view to finding reasonable solution. It was worth ascertaining whether same might apply to Vietnam.

3. USA was not repeat not sure, said Goldberg, that USSR would necessarily veto resolution acceptable to USA. Even if it did, there was question as to whether Moscow would not repeat not subsequently go to Hanoi as it had to Arabs in Middle East crisis and say "we've done our best to protect your position in the U.N. but the situation is thus and so and you'll have to start to adapt yourselves to it". Earlier attempts to get USSR to take positive action (with possible exception of message communicated by Russians to Hanoi at time of Kosygin-Wilson meeting in February 1967) had always led Russians to respond in terms of what Hanoi would accept and do. Now Goldberg was anxious to find out what Moscow would be prepared to do. Russians would certainly engage in vituperative attacks on USA in any U.N. debate but they might behind this cover be prepared to do something constructive. Goldberg admitted there were dangers in scheme and said USA was not repeat not willing to run risks unless a "fair" resolution would emerge.

4. Goldberg said USA was willing to have reference to suspension of bombing in resolution provided two elements essential to USA were included: (a) that it be coupled with a firm assurance that fruitful talks not repeat not just filibustering talks would ensue, and (b) that neither side be "disadvantaged" in military sense during talks. He felt confident majority in U.N. community would accept this position as equitable and would not repeat not endorse a resolution which would give advantage to one side only and which would not repeat not contribute to peace. USA was willing to take first step to halt bombing but had to know what would follow.

5. SSEA said criticism in Canada of USA policy in Vietnam was mounting, especially regarding bombing of North. It was getting increasingly difficult for Canadian Government and for him personally to resist demands that Government condemn bombing outright. As for Goldberg initiative, SSEA's basic concern (apart from wanting to know USA objective in having such a resolution introduced into Security Council) was that predictable amendments and process of debate itself would lead to great pressures to stop the bombing without qualification and this would put Canada and other friends of USA in very difficult spot.

6. To this Goldberg said USA "could not repeat not live with" such a resolution and would expect its friends not repeat not to support it.

7. With respect to other members approached, Goldberg said British foresaw danger of resolution separating Britain from USA position and would be willing to support move if 9 non-permanent members were in full agreement. Latin American countries and Republic of China would support USA but there had been no repeat no reaction yet from Denmark and Japan. SSEA said Secretary-General remained unattracted by idea of Security Council resolution.

8. In discussion with Rusk in Washington later same day, SSEA put in blunt terms his chief concern about Security Council resolution, viz, that others would not repeat not accept USA terms for cessation of bombing, that an amendment would be put forward calling for unconditional cessation and that it might be all but impossible for Canada and other Western countries to fail to support such a call. Questioned by Rusk on this statement, SSEA said he based his judgment on an essential political fact, that people thought USA should stop bombing.

9. In addition to considerations put forward earlier by Goldberg in N.Y., Rusk said failure of U.N. to take any meaningful and balanced action would lead to further USA cynicism towards and even reaction against U.N. itself especially in Congress and this could be very serious. Noting in passing that "not repeat not a week passes without some sort of contact direct or indirect with Hanoi" but that none had been encouraging, Rusk said if resolution were actually before Security Council it might lead to more efforts behind the scenes, e.g., by Russians or Secretary-General. USA did not repeat not, however, want matter to be raised and not repeat not inscribed on agenda nor if inscribed lead to one-sided action which would destroy U.N.

[10.] [indecipherable/illisible] SSEA said he had expressed his first reaction to [indecipherable/illisible] [idea?] in very frank terms but we would continue to examine it.

11. Conversations with Goldberg, Rusk and senior officials gave no repeat no indication that USA is in any way looking for formula or face-saving device to enable it to stop bombing. Indeed, major point which Rusk was at pains to emphasize was USA determination not repeat not to abandon its objectives in Vietnam, and this not repeat not only for effect such action would have in area but also for credibility of stated USA commitments in eyes of USSR. USA continues to insist strongly on cessation of bombing being coupled with some military counterpart so USA will not repeat not be "disadvantaged" during any ensuing talks. In these circumstances we do not repeat not at present see that any resolution acceptable to USA could be adopted by Security Council or could contribute to resolution of Vietnam problem.

12. Informal conversation with William Bundy and other senior officials during dinner tended to confirm our suspicion that main object of Goldberg initiative at least as far as Washington is concerned is that it may help get domestic critics off administration's back. Bundy at least seemed to share fully our fear that once resolution was introduced, situation could get out of hand and end up in way which would be greatly to disadvantage of USA. He was skeptical of possibility that USSR might work more responsibly behind the scenes as it had to some extent in recent Middle East crisis and agreed that Soviet interests in Middle

East and Vietnam were greatly different. He would not repeat not we think be unhappy if Goldberg proposal were to fail to gain sufficient support from non-permanent representatives to risk launching it.

13. Only references to contacts with Hanoi in paragraph 9 and to Bundy's views in paragraph 12 should be regarded as Canadian Eyes Only.

576.
Record of Conversation between Prime Minister and President of Italy, September 12, 1967
Compte rendu de la conversation entre le premier ministre et le président de l'Italie, 12 septembre 1967
RG25, vol. 10082, 20-ITALY-9/2

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa, n.d.]

President Saragat was accompanied by Foreign Minister Fanfani and officials, while the Prime Minister was accompanied by Mr. Martin and several Canadian officials. The talks, which were very cordial, lasted from 11.00 a.m. to 12.20 p.m. and covered the following subjects: Italian immigration to Canada, NATO, the NPT, Vietnam, relations with France, the Middle East and the situation in Greece.

Mr. Pearson began by welcoming the opportunity to talk with such distinguished and knowledgeable visitors as President Saragat and Foreign Minister Fanfani. President Saragat replied that he had met many distinguished Canadians. As Ambassador in Paris he had known General Vanier;[91] last year in Rome he had talked with Mr. Martin. Now, it was a pleasure to meet the Prime Minister. Mr. Pearson replied that he had not visited Rome recently, although he had done so many years ago as President of the Atlantic Council. He hoped to be able to do so again one day. The President replied that he wished to take advantage of this opportunity to invite Mr. Pearson, as well as Mr. Martin, to visit Rome. The Prime Minister thanked the President and indicated that he would study the possibility.

[…]

Mr. Saragat said he thought another similarity lay in the way Italy and Canada viewed the situation in the *Far East*, about which Italy was deeply worried. His country's concern sprang partly from the friendship it felt for the United States; it was also due to a fear that if things went on the way they were going now a further extension of the conflict seemed likely. This in turn could lead, first to an upset of the world equilibrium and, second to damage to the position of the United States itself.

Mr. Pearson agreed and said he viewed the present conflict in Vietnam as the most critical aspect of the world situation and the source of greatest strain for the [Atlantic] Alliance. Like Italy, Canada did not want to strain its relations with the United States or see it humiliated or damaged. But we did want to see the war liquidated before it spread any more. We had received many visitors this past summer from the Soviet Union and other East European countries and each time they had emphasized that if only peace could be brought to Vietnam, many other problems could be solved. We had told the United States that we thought it unwise to extend the war. Mr. Pearson himself had gone to the United States and, somewhat undiplomatically, had made this point in public. Most of our efforts had, however, been made discreetly, by diplomatic channels, through the Secretary of State for External Affairs. We were not too hopeful at the moment. The American political scene was complicated by

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[91] Georges P. Vanier (1888–1967) served as Canada's ambassador to France from 1944 to 1953.
Georges P. Vanier (1888-1967) a été ambassadeur du Canada en France de 1944 à 1953.

reason of the forthcoming elections. The division of public opinion was also giving comfort to the other side and leading them to be more intransigent. Canada was doing what it could and he knew Italy was too.

Mr. Martin added that Canada had exercised great discretion in expressing its views on the war publicly because of a desire not to embarrass the United States. What we told the Americans stayed amongst ourselves and we did not intend to raise these matters in public. At the same time he thought it important to speak very frankly to the Americans in private. He had talked with Rusk for four hours the previous week and also with Goldberg. Rusk had said that at the last NATO meeting Canada had been the only country to voice concern about Vietnam. Mr. Martin had replied that, though they had said nothing, he knew *all* the other members of NATO were every bit as concerned as Canada was.

At a later stage in the talks Mr. Pearson concluded the discussion of the Vietnam war with a reference to President Johnson's brief visit here this summer, during which he and the President had had a frank talk about the war. There had been some developments since then but the basic positions were about the same. Mr. Pearson said that it might be of some assistance to the Italian visitors to see the report on his talks with President Johnson before they went to Washington to talk with him.

[…]

577.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/18

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] September 15, 1967

VIETNAM INITIATIVE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATIONS

In a letter to you dated September 5, Mr. Ales Bebler, President of the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA), has outlined an initiative he is taking, and in which Canada is involved by virtue of his letter, aimed at getting some form of negotiations on Vietnam started.[92]

2. In brief outline Mr. Bebler's initiative is as follows: he has written to the heads of governments of the USSR and the UK (as the co-chairmen powers of the Geneva Conference) and of India, Poland and Canada (as the member nations of the International Commission in Vietnam), urging that representatives of these five countries which have special responsibilities in connection with Vietnam meet at the highest possible level, in order to consult and work out a line of common action with a view to securing peace in Vietnam. Although the agenda for such a five-power meeting would obviously have to be negotiated and agreed by the participants, Bebler suggests that it might include (and it is to be inferred that these would be matters of first priority) the following items:

(i) the necessity of discontinuing the bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and

(ii) the possibility of convening a full-fledged Conference on Vietnam, to be attended by all at present involved as well as all directly interested.

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[92] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
P[rime] M[inister] – Mr. Bebler's letter was released to press Sept. 13/67. [Author unknown/ Auteur inconnu]

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has been informed of the fact that the five countries mentioned above have been approached along these lines; President Johnson and President Ho Chi Minh are also being kept informed.

3. The WFUNA initiative is interesting on several counts:

(i) It recognizes that the possibilities for meaningful discussions, consultations or negotiations on Vietnam are probably greater in a Geneva Conference context than they would be through formal U.N. action, although by keeping the Secretary-General "informed" it might be possible to maintain some type of link with the U.N. on a problem which is obviously of legitimate interest to the world organization.

(ii) It highlights the assumptions behind this assessment by suggesting that the first steps towards a negotiated settlement might be taken by the two Co-Chairmen powers and the three Commission member countries, the five nations which have a continuing *locus standi* under the 1954 Geneva arrangements. Bebler's proposals are therefore unique in omitting reference to *all* possible Vietnamese participants in the first stages of the process, in order to avoid running headlong into the seemingly intractable problem of Viet Cong representation.

(iii) The five-power meeting Bebler has suggested would obviously be a preparatory one aimed at arranging terms and conditions for the convening of a more formal conference on Vietnam at a later date.

(iv) Although the precise formula is unique, the WFUNA proposal, in spirit and in purpose, is not too different from suggestions put forward in the past by the Secretary-General and ourselves looking to the possibility of the International Commission being able to play a helpful role in reactivating the Geneva machinery and in getting preliminary discussions or a more formal Conference going. You will recall that in January of 1966 the Secretary-General had under active consideration a number of ideas of this character. His suggestions coincided with our own tentative thinking about the possible uses that might be made of the International Commission in a "good offices" capacity. Again, in November and December of last year we entered into extensive diplomatic explorations principally with the Indians, of the possibility of convening a meeting of the three Commission powers in Delhi which, if successfully begun, might have expanded to include other interested parties. As you know, of course, none of these possibilities has ever fully materialized in concrete terms. The fact remains however that there appears to be broad agreement that an approach based on the Geneva machinery, in accordance with one formula or another, is potentially interesting; even the Poles, in the many discussions we have had with them on these matters, have never repudiated these basic assumptions and have concentrated their reservations instead on questions of timing especially as this relates to a possible cessation of the bombing of the North.

4. Although I am not unduly optimistic about the prospects for success flowing from the WFUNA initiative, it is nevertheless one of the more realistically formulated proposals among the many which appear from time to time. Moreover its sponsorship is respectable and its terms are reasonable enough to at least suggest to me the possibility that it may have been inspired or blessed in advance by the Secretary-General. I believe therefore that there might be advantage in reacting positively to this proposal for the following reasons:

(i) Such action would be fully consistent with Canadian thinking and with earlier proposals of our own.

(ii) It would provide an opportunity to demonstrate that we are prepared to continue our efforts and to support any reasonable and realistic suggestions.

(iii) It would provide an opportunity to "smoke out" the Russians (and the Poles) with respect to their willingness to cooperate in moving towards negotiations. When I was in New York last week this was one of the reasons adduced by Arthur Goldberg in support of possible action in the Security Council. Although I entertain no great hopes that the WFUNA

proposal is more likely than possible Security Council action to produce immediate and constructive results, I believe that the former is less potentially dangerous, and in certain respects rather more realistic as a basis for ultimate action than the latter.

(iv) Knowledge of the WFUNA initiative has been made public and reports have already been carried by the press here. In due course it is conceivable that we may be asked in the House or elsewhere to outline our reaction to these suggestions. I am sure you agree that if at all possible we would wish to indicate that some kind of Canadian support had been forthcoming.

5. I think that the most appropriate form our immediate reaction could take would be messages to the other recipients of Bebler's letter indicating that if general agreement can be reached, Canada would be prepared to cooperate fully by participating in the proposed five-power meeting. I am therefore attaching for your signature if you agree a series of telegrams along the following lines:

(i) A message in identical terms to Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Cyrankiewicz, and in almost identical terms to Mrs. Gandhi.

(ii) A separate and slightly more forthcoming message to Mr. Wilson.

(iii) A telegram to New York authorizing our Permanent Representative to keep the Secretary-General informed, and to Washington authorizing our Ambassador to discuss these questions with the State Department.

6. I am also attaching a draft acknowledgment which someone in your office may wish to send to Bebler indicating that his ideas have been noted with interest and that he may expect a further reply in due course; the nature of the ultimate reply will depend, of course, upon the responses from Moscow, Warsaw, Delhi, and London.

M[arcel] C[adieux] [for Paul Martin][93]

P.S. Yesterday Earnscliffe gave us a copy of Prime Minister Wilson's reply to Mr. Bebler (attached).† The proposed message from you to Mr. Wilson has accordingly been redrafted to take this into account.

The U.S. Embassy here has passed to us, informally, an indication of Washington's generally favourable reaction to this non-governmental initiative.

578.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/18

No. Y-546
Ottawa, September 19, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Our Tel Y-537† Sep 9.
Repeat for Information: Permis New York, NATO Paris, London, Paris; Saigon from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London.
Following for Far Eastern Division from Martin.

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[93] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Approved by Mr. Martin. M[arcel] C[adieux]

VIETNAM IN THE UN: CONSULTATIONS WITH USA

Would you please pass following message from Minister to Secretary of State Rusk.

Text begins: During our very useful discussion in Washington on September 7, I expressed to you my initial reactions to suggestion put to us by Arthur Goldberg that non-permanent repeat non-[permanent] members of Security Council might introduce a balanced resolution on Vietnam, key point in which would be an appeal for reconvening of Geneva Conference. I expressed to you and to Arthur Goldberg some reservations which we had about dangers which we could foresee in such an exercise and our doubts as to whether it was likely at this time to do anything substantial to help us towards a solution of Vietnam problem. I was also very frank with you in explaining that if in course of discussion resolution were amended in such a way as to give considerable stress to a simple call for suspension of bombing of North Vietnam (that call not repeat not being balanced by any mention of reciprocal and comparable action by North Vietnam itself), Canadian Delegation might well feel obliged to vote in favour of resolution.

2. I have given further consideration to Goldberg suggestion since returning to Ottawa and in particular have tried to see whether there was any variation of it which would run fewer risks and have a greater chance of making a real contribution to solution of Vietnam problem. My conclusion is that it would on balance be unwise to have a resolution of kind you have in mind introduced into Security Council at this time. I do not repeat not think that a resolution of type you envisage has any chance of being passed by Security Council or even by General Assembly unless something can be done to break present impasse with respect to link between suspension of bombing and reciprocal action by North Vietnam.

3. It is our impression that at least some of other non-permanent repeat non-[permanent] members of Security Council whose support would be needed to have a resolution inscribed on Council agenda share our reservations about such an initiative and would equally find themselves in a difficult position if in course of discussion resolution were amended along lines I outlined earlier. Furthermore, our conversations with Soviet delegation in New York indicate that USSR remains strongly opposed to Security Council consideration of Vietnam question and this fact in itself seems likely to doom any such initiative to failure.

4. All this notwithstanding, I am as you know willing and determined to take any action, public or private, which is likely to contribute to an end to hostilities and establishment of an equitable peace in Vietnam. I trust that as in past you and I may keep in very close and frank contact so that each of us may assist each other in achievement of what I know to be a common objective. Signed Paul Martin. Text ends.

[Paul] Martin

579.
Telegram from Prime Minister to President of World Federation of United Nations Associations
Télégramme du premier ministre au président de la Fédération mondiale des associations pour les Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/18

Unnumbered/Non numéroté
Ottawa, September 22, 1967

My dear President,

I was happy to receive your letter of September 5 in which you put forward a suggestion for convening a five-power meeting with a view to trying to work out the conditions for bringing to an end the tragic war in Vietnam.

I agree with you that the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and the three countries who are members of the International Control Commission for Vietnam have a special opportunity for constructive action in this regard. It is also my conviction that the Geneva machinery is likely to provide the most effective framework for an eventual settlement.

The Canadian Government stands pledged to make every effort to secure a just and lasting peace in Vietnam and to support the efforts of others in any move which holds out a reasonable prospect of leading us in that direction. Without, therefore, attaching any pre-conditions as to the possible agenda of the proposed five-power meeting, I can assure you that Canada would be prepared to take part if agreement as to its utility can be reached with the others to whom you have addressed your suggestions, and especially with the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. I understand Prime Minister Wilson has already responded favourably to your initiative. I would be prepared to attend the meeting myself if the decision were that it be held at the level of Prime Ministers; if the level of Foreign Ministers were thought preferable, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs would most certainly be available.

I have already communicated to the other potential participants Canada's readiness to take part in such a meeting. I have expressed the hope that we might find a measure of common ground between ourselves and, if so, encourage the parties directly engaged in the hostilities to modify existing positions and policies in the direction of a peaceful settlement. I shall be in touch with you again upon receipt of their replies but in the meantime I would have no objection to your making available to all the recipients of your original letter the contents of this reply.

Yours most sincerely,
L.B. Pearson

580.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/18

No. 2490
New York, September 22, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome; CANFORCEHED, Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo from Ottawa; Delhi from London; Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Jakarta from London; Kuala Lumpur from Canberra.

SSEA'S TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER OF JAPAN

SSEA called on new Foreign Minister of Japan Miki on September 21. Discussion focussed on possible Security Council action on Middle East, Chinese representation and Vietnam. In addition to Foreign Minister, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Japanese Permanent Representative at UN were also present.

[…]

7. SSEA then asked how Miki viewed effect of Chinese policy on Vietnam. Miki said that although USSR was main source of supply of arms and ammunition, Chinese were main source of supply of food. On other hand, Hanoi wished to be independent of China and if Chinese influence and pressure reached beyond point of tolerance there would be break

between Hanoi and Peking. Asked whether he could confirm that there were thousands of Chinese techs in North Vietnam as suggested by USA sources, Miki thought that this was exaggerated and if there were techs they were mainly civilians. As regards flow of food supplies, Miki said that this was going ahead without interruption despite events in China.

8. Conversation then turned to breaking stalemate in Vietnam war. SSEA reviewed recent Canadian position and recalled that Foreign Minister of Denmark had gone further in public than any other Western leader in calling for halting of bombing as first step towards negotiations.[94] It might be necessary for Canada to say something of same sort. Hanoi had made it clear to Canadian representatives like Ronning as early as March 66 that if bombing stopped they would give careful consideration to engaging in talks. On other hand, Hanoi would not repeat not accept condition [of] action on their part to obtain cessation of USA bombing.

9. In reply to question how war might come to end, SSEA said that there were various views. End might come as in Korea through diplomatic initiative on Communist side; on other hand, war might go on indefinitely and just peter out. It was difficult to see from present indications how Hanoi would move towards negotiation unless USA bombing stopped. Chances of obtaining negotiations probably justified taking risk of halting bombing. SSEA in respect of Vietnam as in other Asian matters said position of Japan was crucial.

10. It was at this point that Foreign Minister Miki said why could not repeat not ten or fifteen countries friendly to USA tell both USA and Hanoi "to stop this silly business".

11. SSEA tried to probe to what extent this represented new or considered initiative bearing in mind that something of sort had been under consideration in Ottawa. He recalled various attempts which Canada had made with ICSC to appeal for negotiations and Geneva-type conference. He also referred to WFUNA initiative.

12. Miki said that Japan fully appreciated Minister's activities both in UN and outside to try to bring about peaceful settlement in Vietnam. He also appreciated Canada's key role because of its membership in ICSC. Obviously, more needed to be done and what he was suggesting was purely personal thinking that occurred to him on spur of moment.

13. When SSEA asked whether he intended to pursue idea, Miki recalled that he would like to consult further on question. He repeated that ten or more countries known to have friendly relations with USA should in his view consider launching appeal to end war. In conclusion, SSEA stressed that he would follow up idea; that he just wanted to open up exchange with new Foreign Minister of Japan and to indicate some of concerns and priorities in Canadian foreign policy. Miki agreed to maintain close contact and thanked SSEA for having taken initiative to arrange meeting.

14. As regards Vietnam suggestion, SSEA would like to have suggestion followed up in respect of (a) what should Canadian reaction be to suggestion; (b) what possible countries might be approached in regard to suggestion; (c) what might be done in respect of consulting USA.

[George] Ignatieff

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[94] This was likely a reference to Danish Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag's comments on Vietnam in his statement before the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September 1967. See United Nations General Assembly, 22nd session, 1562nd plenary meeting, 21 September 1967, New York, p. 8, https://docs.un.org.
Il s'agit probablement des commentaires du ministre des Affaires étrangères du Danemark Jens Otto Krag sur le Vietnam dans sa déclaration à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies le 21 septembre 1967. Voir Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, 22e session, 1562e séance plénière, 21 septembre 1967, New York, p. 8, https://docs.un.org.

581.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/18

No. Y-575
Ottawa, September 25, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel 2490 Sep 22.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris, Geneva, Rome, CANFORCEHED, Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, Delhi, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

SSEA'S TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER OF JAPAN

Idea put forward tentatively by Japanese Foreign Minister that group of countries call on Washington and Hanoi to cease hostilities and come to conference table is not repeat not new one. It has been examined in various forms and at various times beginning with non-aligned appeal in spring of 1965.[95] Consideration given over last few weeks to possible usefulness of resolution in Security Council was closely akin to same idea of appealing to participants to stop war.

2. Canadian reluctance to encourage Security Council initiative was based on assessment that *inter alia* such an appeal was unlikely to lead to chief desired result i.e., it was likely to be ignored by principal participants. What we would regard as balanced appeal would likely be rejected by Hanoi and Moscow on well-known grounds that full responsibility lies on American "aggressor" to de-escalate the war and that North Vietnam has no repeat no obligation or intention to take reciprocal military action to obtain cessation of bombing. Moscow's reported rejection of WFUNA initiative to convoke five-power meeting on Vietnam (which was not repeat not to be conditional on prior cessation of bombing) and Polish dismissal of it as unproductive (your telegram 2506† September 23) are not repeat not encouraging signs.

3. What we would regard as an unbalanced appeal which simply called on USA to suspend bombing without any suggestion of reciprocal action by other side would not repeat not only in all likelihood be rejected by USA as unacceptable but might also incline USA to "go it alone" on grounds that even best friends had deserted them and turned hostile. President Johnson has been at pains both publicly and privately to emphasize his unwillingness to suspend bombing of North without comparable military de-escalation by other side and has stated emphatically that he will not be moved by appeals from outside to suspend bombing without obtaining *quid pro quo*. We do not repeat not have evidence to indicate that there has been shift in USA position. Despite attempt made by Goldberg in his address to UNGA September 21 to put best possible interpretation on American policy towards Vietnam (and we think he has succeeded fairly well in this) fact remains that read in its entirety, Goldberg speech does not repeat not indicate any shift from known American position on central question of suspension of bombing.[96]

4. If contrary to our assessment USA were to respond to outside pressure to suspend bombing, North Vietnam might well take this as sign of USA weakness and either raise ante further before agreeing to enter into talks or drag talks out while continuing unabated their support of military activities in South Vietnam. Failure of suspension of bombing to lead to

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[95] See/Voir doc 251.

[96] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 992–995.

early and meaningful talks would heighten hawkish pressures on USA administration to intensify war effort including bombing still further. It could also diminish likelihood that administration would yield to domestic pressures, which might later build up, to suspend bombing again.

5. If idea of appeal to Washington and Hanoi is to be pursued with any thought of bringing about substantive results, it would be essential that USA be informed and preferably consulted in advance so that there might be at least some possibility of favourable American reaction when appeal was made public. Discussions in New York and Washington on September 7 by Minister and members of his party do not encourage us to think that initiative of this kind would currently be welcomed by USA. If USA would not welcome initiative even by countries well disposed towards it, then there is little substantive advantage to be derived from the exercise.

6. On other side of consultation coin are Moscow and Hanoi. These two on basis of their public and private positions are even less likely to yield to balanced appeals to stop fighting than is Washington. If Washington were to indicate in advance its readiness to respond positively to public appeal but Moscow and Hanoi were to refuse to do so, there is risk that whole operation would appear as nothing more than attempt to gain propaganda advantage for USA by demonstrating that it was not repeat not Washington's fault if fighting did not repeat not stop.

7. If, notwithstanding formidable reservations about technique of making appeal to Washington and Hanoi, we were to pursue Miki's idea, we might sound out some non-permanent members of Security Council who might be considered at least not repeat not ill-disposed towards the USA. In addition to Japan (and Canada) this could include Denmark, India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Argentina and Brazil. Additional countries which might be interested in the idea are Ceylon, Pakistan, Tunisia, Norway, Ireland and Mexico. Risk of course as in other operations of this kind is that in the course of collective drafting of appeal it might be difficult to resist pressures even from within such a group to call on Washington to suspend bombing without any comparable appeal to Hanoi. Such a situation would be almost bound to lead to rejection by USA and would not indeed correspond to what Miki had in mind i.e., a call to Washington *and* Hanoi.

8. Please bring foregoing message to Minister's attention on arrival.

582.
Telegram from Permanent Mission to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/19

No. 2559
New York, September 27, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris; Moscow from London.

UNGA XXII: TALK WITH UK FOREIGN SECRETARY BROWN

SSEA had a half hour discussion with Foreign Secretary Brown before latter's speech in UNGA September 26. […]

2. Mr. Brown suggested that on Vietnam, UK and Canada had similar views. Mr. Martin disagreed to extent that we had decided that time had come for drastic steps to end conflict. When asked by Mr. Brown whether he meant to end it in negative sense of withdrawal or in sense of obvious alternative of escalation to extent necessary to bring about a military victory, Mr. Martin said that in our view it was necessary first to stop bombing in hope that

this would be necessary first step toward a negotiated settlement. Mr. Brown immediately said that he would not repeat not go so far as to urge USA in public to take this first step partly because he did not repeat not expect USA could yield to that sort of pressure applied publicly and partly because as he would say in his speech, North Vietnamese had never unequivocally stated that they would engage in discussions if bombing stopped. He then drew Mr. Martin's attention to fact that he would be returning from New York almost directly to a party congress and expressed hope that in Canadian speech in this connection there would be nothing which could be used as ammunition against him by Labour Party members who were urging him to adopt a more anti-American line.

3. Referring to his discussion on Saturday, September 23 with Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Brown said there had been "no repeat no joy at all" on Vietnam. Mr. Gromyko had been amiable and relaxed but had brushed aside any reference to negotiations on Vietnam in Geneva context as a "waste of energy". (We learned afterwards from Donald Murray who accompanied Mr. Brown on his talk with Mr. Gromyko that Gromyko's reaction had been related specifically to UK urging that Geneva Conference be reconvened. Reaction had been so negative and categorical that Mr. Brown had decided it would be inopportune and unproductive to discuss Bebler/WFUNA initiative.)

4. With reference to various suggestions that had been made that some or all of great powers meet anyway in effort to start negotiations and to suggestion (renewed by Japan) of an appeal by various groupings of friendly or nonaligned powers, Mr. Brown's comment was only that it may be that at some stage such proposals would be all there was left to offer in an effort to help USA establish negotiations and that such steps would only be useful when it was clear that either or both sides "wanted to get off hook".

[…]

583.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/19

No. 1055
Saigon, September 30, 1967
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Hanoi Tel CH-344† Sep 10.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London; Washington, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Paris, Geneva from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London; Vientiane, Hanoi, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VISIT TO HANOI – TALKS WITH HA VAN LAU

As reported in our telegram I had several informal discussions with Col. Ha Van Lau, Head of Liaison Mission in Hanoi, and paid a formal call on him on afternoon of September 4. On all occasions he and his staff were cordial and correct. They stayed until near the end of the small reception I gave and seemed relaxed and at ease with all the Canadians and other foreigners present. He and Lt Col. Vu went out of their way to apologize for the inconvenience my wife and I had to undergo in the journey to and from the airport but characteristically blamed this on "the aggressive American air pirates".

2. On my formal call I was accompanied by Lt. Col. Cloutier and Maj. Légère, the incoming and outgoing Permanent Representatives. In addition to Lau, Vu and Maj. Trinh were present with an interpreter. I noticed immediately that the reception we received was

perceptibly warmer than had been the case on my previous visit but Lau is a pleasanter personality than his second-in-command who had received me previously in Lau's absence in Europe. The latter also seems much more sure of himself. During the exchange of preliminary courtesies, I took the opportunity to thank Lau for the reception he had given for the ICC on the previous Saturday and expressed appreciation for the generally favourable content of his short speech on that occasion. He in turn commented on the remarks I had made in reply which in brief covered the peace-keeping potential of the ICC and in particular the sincerity of its members, especially Canada, in the search for "a just, peaceful Vietnam".

3. Getting down to business Lau then launched into a long statement on the general war situation which was very similar to the harangues I had heard from Vu and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on my previous visit. In essence he stated that the Americans were carrying out a steadily escalated aggressive war in Vietnam but regardless of the damage and loss of life, his country would continue the struggle until complete and absolute independence was achieved. Lau referred to the long historical resistance in Vietnam to outside aggression and affirmed that the USA imperialists are learning through their military losses that the Vietnamese are a proud and determined people. He repeated that the only solution acceptable would have to confirm Vietnam's sovereignty and right to self-determination, but he did not repeat not refer specifically to the immediate reunification of the two parts of the country. He did stress strongly, however, that the DRVN will never consider any moves towards a possible solution until the Americans unconditionally stop the bombing and other acts of war against the North. In this connection he referred to the speech given by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on the occasion of the National Day celebrations and suggested that we study it carefully as it sets forth very clearly the position, policies and intention of his Government.[97]

4. With respect to the ICC, he said he and his administration had from the beginning worked for good relations with it because respect for and proper implementation of the Geneva Agreements had been the objective of DRVN for 13 years. Lau then stated that at times his Government had been unhappy over the conduct of some members of the ICC because on occasions they had either exceeded their well-defined mandate or had not repeat not displayed a proper understanding of their responsibilities. When I enquired if Canadians were included in this accusation, he replied that I must be aware of incidents in the past which had caused considerable dissatisfaction in Hanoi. It was at this point he reiterated that "if the ICC cannot repeat not do anything good it should not repeat not do anything bad". I quietly defended the Canadian record in the ICC and pointed out that my country had no repeat no strategic, economic or political interests in Vietnam – our deep and abiding concern was peace. Lau replied that he fully accepted my sincerity as a true reflection of Canadian policy. He said it is the wish of the DRVN to maintain the "present normal relations with Canada" for which I thanked him and stated this was fully reciprocated.

5. I then asked him if the elections just completed in SVN could possibly have any effect on the present situation. Predictably, Lau scoffed that these were "a farce and a fraud controlled by the Americans". He characterized Thieu and Ky as "puppets and traitors". When I enquired about the week's bombing pause promised by Thieu during the election campaign, Lau dismissed it as just another trick. When I persisted by asking what the DRVN would do if such a pause were initiated, he dismissed the question by stating that the policy of his Government is well known and is clearly set forth in the DRVN Four Points.

6. As the hour was getting late, I asked Lau if I could discuss two additional matters of importance to the Candel – the MacFie incident and why Maj. Légère had not repeat not been invited to the DRVN National Day reception. As to the former, I referred to Minister's public statement at the time and affirmed that none of my officers would knowingly violate any rules or regulations. I then asked if the Liaison Mission could provide us with more specific

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[97] See/Voir "End Raids, Then Talk, Hanoi Says," *Washington Post*, 1 September 1967, p. A14.

definitions concerning restricted areas in Hanoi and thus avoid possibilities of a repetition of this incident. Lau said this was not repeat not necessary because it is well known that there are places in the city which are of importance to the security of the country. It was obvious he was not repeat not going to budge on this point and in view of your instructions I did not repeat not press him further. He answered in the affirmative to my suggestion that the MacFie incident could now be considered closed as far as the Candel is concerned.

7. Concerning the snub to Légère, I have nothing to add to the info in Hanoi telegram CH-350† September 11. I would have no repeat no objection if that telegram were given wider distribution at this time but I believe the Canadian Eyes Only classification should be retained.

8. By the time the meeting ended, darkness had fallen accompanied by a power cut, but candles were provided. The conversation proved helpful in two ways as it served to clarify the DRVN present attitude toward the ICC and Candel. Suspicion still exists on both counts but the stormier seas of some months back have subsided into a somewhat uneasy calm. Lau made no repeat no mention of the ICC resolutions to which such strong objections had been taken nor repeat nor did he raise the matter of Canadian export of arms to the USA or whether these topics have been permitted to slide into limbo or whether they are merely stockpiled for possible future use is not repeat not clear. However, the talk was discouraging in that it reconfirmed the adamant and unyielding position of the DRVN concerning any move toward cessation of hostilities except on their own terms. In fact, I felt their position had hardened under the increased pressure of the last five months since my previous visit. I do not repeat not think this display of determination was staged for my benefit and I believe it would be a mistake to question either the sincerity or fortitude of DRVN leaders.

9. On my departure I asked Col. Lau if he could arrange calls for me on the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and any other senior officials that might be available. Pham Van Dong allegedly was tied up with visiting delegations but Foreign Minister Trinh received me later in the week. Report on these talks in separate telegram.

[Ormond W.] Dier

584.

Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/19

No. 1064
Saigon, October 3, 1967
Confidential. Immediate from Delhi.
Reference: Our Tel 1055 Sep 30.
Repeat for Information: Delhi, London; Washington, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Paris, Geneva from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London; Vientiane, Hanoi, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

HANOI – CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER

As mentioned in my telegram from Hanoi September 10, my meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh on September 6 was briefer than the long session I had with Van Lau two days before. I was cordially received in the palace of the former representative of the Emperor which lent a regal air to the proceedings but contributed

little to the substance of our discussions. I had suggested to the Liaison Mission that Maj. Légère accompany me but the word came back that I was expected alone, although when I arrived the Foreign Minister had one of his secretaries present in addition to the interpreter. I conveyed the customary greeting from the Canadian Prime Minister and SSEA which were acknowledged and returned in a friendly manner. Trinh said he was sorry he was absent on my first visit and trusted that we would have a "useful" relationship. He welcomed my wife's presence in Hanoi with the comment that he hoped, as a woman, she would appreciate the tragedies being inflicted on the people by the "barbarous assaults of the American air pirates".

2. I said I was sorry I had missed the National Day celebrations which had been held earlier than anticipated because my presence would have been in earnest of my Government's goodwill toward his country and of our deep-seated desire to do everything possible to end the troubles in this land. He said he appreciated my intention but again American aggression necessitates many adjustments in the routine life of the DRVN. Trinh then said that he had been informed of my conversation with Ha Van Lau and since we had discussed a number of problems at some length at the meeting, he hoped that I was fully aware of the DRVN attitude toward questions which would be of legitimate interest to us as a member of the ICC. I agreed but added that in addition I hoped he fully comprehended that I spoke also for my Government which has no repeat no designs or ulterior motives on Vietnam but is ready, willing and, we trust, able to assist in some manner in the search for peace and in the reconstruction of the nation when hostilities end.

3. Trinh said he appreciated Canada's goodwill and was fully aware of SSEA's efforts in the course of peace but any proposals put forth (he apparently was referring to the Canadian four points of last April) should not repeat not "be made in Washington". He then went into an abbreviated version of the DRVN position which by constant repetition he obviously knows by rote. He made no repeat no points which I have not repeat not previously reported but in his quiet way he conveyed a strong sense of conviction and determination. Like Lau, he also mentioned Pham Van Dong's recent speech as a definitive exposition of present DRVN policies. I must emphasize that Trinh has no repeat no hint of any kind that his Government is working to modify or even consider minor variations in the objectives as set forth in North Vietnam's Four Points enunciated by Pham Van Dong on April 8, 1965. He also reaffirmed categorically that the DRVN would never enter into talks of any kind until there is an unconditional cessation of American bombing. I noted that Trinh, like Pham Van Dong in his policy speech, did not repeat not use the word "permanent" but this subtle variation in context I do not repeat not believe to be significant because it seems obvious that the word "cessation" is used in the absolute sense.

4. At this point in the conversation I was somewhat disconcerted to be asked by Trinh if this was my first diplomatic assignment. He seemed intrigued to learn that NVN was the ninth country in which I had served officially so I threw in the additional fact that at one time I had been an officer in the anti-aircraft artillery and later a qualified pilot. If he drew any conclusions from this he made no repeat no comment. I was about to ask about his diplomatic experience when I remembered he took over as Foreign Minister just two years ago.

5. Next Trinh stood up to indicate the interview was over. He said he had a meeting to attend and added that he was sorry it had not repeat not been possible to arrange for me to call on Prime Minister Pham Van Dong but hoped this would be possible on my next visit. As you can deduce, I found the meeting interesting but nothing of substance emerged from it except further evidence that the DRVN leaders are determined to show no repeat no sign of give in the present situation.

[Ormond W.] Dier

585.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/19

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] October 5, 1967

VIETNAM

Messrs. Scott and Johnson of the United States Embassy called on the Department October 5 to seek clarification of Canada's policy with respect to Vietnam.

2. Scott opened by saying he had detected a significant difference between the Vietnam section of the letter from the Prime Minister to Mr. Kosygin (copy attached†) and what you had said in your speech to the UNGA concerning the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.[98] (You will recall from my memorandum of September 1† that we informed Scott orally of the proposed paragraph on Vietnam which was to go into the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Kosygin.) Scott said he interpreted the Prime Minister's letter to mean that Mr. Pearson was in agreement with the view that a suspension of bombing could take place only if there was an advance assurance (though quite possibly a private one) concerning a comparable military move by North Vietnam. In your speech to the UNGA, however, you had called for a halt to the bombing as a first step which would have to be taken if there was to be any hope of talks and had not insisted that there must be some comparable military gesture made concurrently by North Vietnam. Scott wanted to know whether this indicated a shift in Canadian policy. If so, was it based specifically on information which we had from our sources in North Vietnam or was it related more to domestic political considerations?

3. We told Scott that there had indeed been a shift in the Canadian position in the sense that, since preparing the Prime Minister's letter for Mr. Kosygin, it had been decided that we should speak out publicly and in more direct terms than heretofore about the importance we have for some time attached to a suspension of bombing. The decision to speak in those terms in the UNGA was related to a growing feeling in the country, in Parliament and within the Government, that these views must be stated publicly. It also reflected our assessment that it was extremely unlikely that it would be possible to get any advance commitment from the North Vietnamese as to what would happen in the event that the bombing were suspended, certainly not a public commitment and possibly not even a private one. Therefore, if there was to be any hope of getting talks started there might have to be this act of faith which could help to break out of the present impasse. We did not have any recent private indications from Hanoi as to what might follow upon the suspension of the bombing, and in fact our private talks there tended to confirm the most recent restatement of the North Vietnamese position by Pham Van Dong on August 31.

4. We went on to say that your statement on stopping the bombing should be read in the context of your full speech and particularly the long paragraph which followed the short one on the bombing itself. It clearly recognized that, unless the decision to suspend the bombing were to lead to some tangible concessions by North Vietnam, the chances of any resultant talks leading to fruitful results would certainly be diminished. Nor had we by any means lost sight of the fact that a suspension of the bombing which did not lead to fruitful results ran the

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[98] See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 67/30, 27 September 1967. Voir Ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Déclarations et discours*, 67/30, 27 septembre 1967.

distinct risk of a subsequent and perhaps more dangerous intensification of the war. Nevertheless, we could not see any way out of the present bombing/talks impasse other than by taking the calculated risk of what might have to be a unilateral suspension.[99]

R.E. C[ollins] for M[arcel] C[adieux]

586.
Telegram from Ambassador to Soviet Union to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/19

No. 3626
Moscow, October 5, 1967
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Reference: Your Tel S-1168† Sep 21.
Repeat for Information: London; Paris, NATO Paris, Bonn, Washington, Permis New York, Delhi, Cairo from London; Saigon from Delhi; Tel Aviv from Paris.
By Bag: DISARMDELGVA, Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw from London; Berlin from Bonn; Beirut from Paris.

INTERVIEW WITH KOSYGIN

Chairman of Council of Ministers received me in Kremlin this morning for 40-minute conversation. I transmitted letter of Prime Minister and at Kosygin's request made a brief summary of it, then requesting his comments. Kosygin's reply covered Soviet-Canadian relations, Middle East and Vietnam.

[…]

Vietnam

8. Bulk of conversation, at choice of Kosygin, was devoted to this problem. I had mentioned that unfortunately there did not repeat not seem to be anything very new that could be said on this subject. Taking this up in his reply he said on contrary there were new elements, on both sides. There was new programme of SVNLF which he described as an important document which we in Canada should study most seriously.[100] And on the other side, there was constant and dangerous escalation of war.

9. Kosygin referred to his visit to UN last June and to meeting at Glassboro. He said he was convinced majority of American people detested war in Vietnam and most of political leaders were also uneasy about it. It was becoming personal war of President Johnson and Pentagon. He had not repeat not been in least bit convinced that war was necessary for USA security and on contrary he himself had seen effect it was having on USA political and social life.

10. Fact remained, however, that USA, in face of increasing opinion inside and outside country, including Canada, opposed to bombing of DRVN, was nevertheless continuing to increase size and intensity of its attack on DRVN. Yet it was absolutely clear that cessation of bombing was essential first condition for solution of problem of Vietnam. In same breath he referred again to programme of SVNLF as being a sound and popular plan for South whereas no repeat no matter how many men and how much money USA poured into "rotten and unpopular puppet regimes" in Saigon they would never be able to establish a stable and popular Government which ignored SVNLF.

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[99] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Discuss with me. P[aul] M[artin]

[100] See/Voir Bernard Weinraub, "Vietcong's Stand is Nationalistic: Issue of Communism Muted in New Political Program," *New York Times*, 2 October 1967, p. 3.

11. Although it was difficult to interrupt monologue, I intervened at this point to refer to his recent speech at Kishinev two days ago in which he had seemed to imply that what was now required to get negotiations going was not repeat not only cessation of bombing of North but also acceptance of programme of SVNLF.[101] Noting that, as he had told Prime Minister Wilson and Polyansky had suggested to Mr. Pearson, if bombing were stopped negotiations would follow, I asked if he were now saying that the programme of the National Liberation Front had to be accepted as well.

12. Kosygin replied this was not repeat not for others, but for Vietnamese themselves to say. The programme was, however, "a new factor of great political importance". (He repeated this for emphasis.) What was at issue was the future of Vietnam. The SVNLF's programme provided for an independent state in which all elements could unite. It was a programme all countries interested in peace could support. Canada was a great and independent country; Canada could itself take a stand for the programme. This would be a serious act which could have wide repercussions.

13. I said our recent soundings in Hanoi had led to conclusion end to bombing might bring negotiations. This was one of factors in Canadian decision to say so publicly. Again Kosygin replied it was for Vietnamese to say whether negotiations would start if bombing stopped. There had been statement by Pham Van Dong that way to bring about negotiations was to stop bombing. But this new programme for political structure of Vietnam put forward by the real forces of South Vietnam and not repeat not by puppet government was also a fact. South Vietnamese Government were bandits who would not repeat not exist were it not repeat not for USA support; they were afraid to leave towns where they lived under USA protection. But NLF programme reflected authentic South Vietnamese opinion and South Vietnamese would fight for it. This was new element other governments should not repeat not overlook.

14. When I asked about Bebler's proposal, Kosygin said they could not repeat not reply yet to Prime Minister's letter on this subject. Before convening a five-power conference, it was important to ensure such a conference would produce useful results; otherwise, there would be disappointment. In present circumstances it was very difficult to reply.

15. As you will see Kosygin avoided a direct answer to my question about likelihood of negotiations following cessation of bombing. Since he was given a second opportunity by me to do so, it almost looks as if Russians may be shifting away from the line they took as late as August when Polyansky spoke to Prime Minister. In any event, stress laid on programme of SVNLF as a key factor in situation appears to me new, although I leave it to our Vietnamese experts to evaluate it properly.

[R.A.D.] Ford

587.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/19

No. Y-602
Ottawa, October 6, 1967
Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Permis New York, Paris, Saigon (Immediate).
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Geneva, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.
For Ambassador.

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[101] See/Voir "Peace Sought – But...," *Province* (Vancouver, B.C.), 3 October 1967, p. 3.

VIETNAM: USA POLICY

It is always difficult to decide whether in policy statements a change of phrase or a change in formulation of an idea represents in fact a change in policy or even a deliberate shift of emphasis among established component elements of policy. Nevertheless, recent statements by Goldberg at UNGA and President Johnson at San Antonio[102] contain some curious turns of phrase which can form the basis of at least legitimate speculation as to whether some modification is taking place in USA thinking on problems involved in cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.

2. In the past, USA Government has been at pains to emphasize, as President Johnson did in his talks with Prime Minister and SSEA at Harrington Lake towards the end of May, that USA would be prepared to "trade talks for talks" (i.e., they would be prepared to talk unconditionally and without any change in pattern of military activities on either side) or they would be prepared to trade a military gesture (i.e., a cessation of the bombing) against a military gesture by North Vietnam (presumably a cessation of infiltration or reduction of infiltration rate) but that they would not trade talks for a military gesture in the form of cessation of bombing. This appears to have been the continuing rationale behind the many USA Government statements insisting on reciprocal military gestures by North Vietnam and Mr. Rusk's favourite paradox about stopping half the war.

3. Against this background, the key paragraph in the form of a question in Goldberg's UNGA speech naturally arouses a certain amount of curiosity when examined in light of his September 25 TV interview. The opaque and involuted phraseology of this paragraph refers to the possibility of a cessation of bombing leading to negotiations under circumstances where neither side would be at a disadvantage. We are not entirely sure what meaning, in practical military terms, the concept of disadvantage has in this formula, and how it would be measured. It could on one hand mean a policy declaration from Hanoi, or a visible withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South. It would, however, be something less than realistic to expect a commitment to either or both of these possible reactions especially in advance of a cessation of bombing. Again, it could mean a reduction in the infiltration rate or a willingness at least not repeat not to step up the infiltration rate, though in the final analysis this could be subject only to USA observation and interpretation. In any event we believe that the North Vietnamese are as unlikely to admit openly or in a "secret message" that they were prepared to regulate flow of infiltration as they would be unwilling to be seen to withdraw forces from the South.

4. It seems to us that the only meaningful interpretation of the concept of disadvantage can be made in terms of scale and scope of hostilities on the ground in the South. If this is the case, we wonder whether the Goldberg formulation may have been intended to reflect this possibility. An understanding of some sort that the scale and scope of hostilities would not repeat not increase could of course be regarded as "reciprocal military gesture" but it would obviously be something of its own kind.

5. Following closely on Goldberg's UNGA speech, President Johnson's speech at San Antonio appears the more interesting. The key paragraph expresses USA willingness to stop bombing "when this will lead promptly to productive discussion" (i.e., a bargain between talks and a cessation of bombing). The next sentence states that the USA would assume that North Vietnam would not take advantage of such a cessation. In other words there is no mention of reciprocity in the operative sentences describing the bargain; such North Vietnamese contribution as might be made is left unspecified (i.e., the sentence concerned is left hanging by not concluding with some such idea as "to increase their forces in the South"

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[102] See/Voir "Address on Vietnam Before the National Legislative Conference, San Antonio, Texas, September 29, 1967," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967*, Book II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 876–881.

or "to improve their relative military potential in the South"); and the whole idea of a North Vietnamese contribution is relegated from a USA demand to a USA assumption. This seems to us to be a far cry from formula expressed by President Johnson at Harrington Lake.

6. As far as North Vietnamese position is concerned, it has been reasonably clear since Ronning's first visit to Hanoi [in] March 1966 that "informal talks and a cessation of attacks against North Vietnam go together". This formulation was given by Pham Van Dong to Ronning and subsequently conveyed to USA in piece of paper (paragraph 13 your telegram 838 March 21[103]). Since that time, Hanoi has said much the same thing publicly, most recently in Pham Van Dong's August 31 speech.

7. It seems to us that what the North Vietnamese have been saying is that the USA must stop the bombing without any formal commitment of any kind from Hanoi. This would include a commitment to talk just as it would include a commitment to make a reciprocal military gesture. In other words, Hanoi has been saying that it cannot or indeed will not agree, in advance of a bombing cessation, to talk as part of a bargain to get the bombing stopped. But once it has stopped, we believe it would be very difficult for the North Vietnamese to avoid talks in the light of their own commitments and the undoubtedly heavy pressures on them from most quarters. We realize of course that there has not been a firm and precise commitment by the North Vietnamese Government nor even a promise; but it seems to us that Pham Van Dong's August 31 speech can mean nothing else, especially when seen against the background of slow evolution of North Vietnamese position. And we think it has evolved. It was made clear to Ronning that Four Points were not preconditions, and while these still have a current relevance (i.e., as agenda items for talks) they do not usually appear in precisely the same context as the "cessation of bombing/talks" link. Moreover, the North Vietnamese seem to have abandoned the idea of the USA issuing a declaration to the effect that bombing was being stopped unconditionally. It is possible to argue that this reflects increasingly realistic assessment in Hanoi of impossibility of such a declaration ever being issued by USA.

8. It is of course true that these North Vietnamese modifications (if they prove to be such) are pretty minimal from substantive point of view. What interests us most at the moment, however, is whether the recent Goldberg and Johnson speeches do in fact signal any substantive change in USA position and whether a new degree of flexibility is making itself felt in Washington's attitude towards a cessation of bombing.

9. I should be grateful if you could explore this problem with any senior personalities who might be able to provide insight into current thinking of President.

[Paul] Martin

588.
Memorandum from Head, European Division, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Europe au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
MG32-B12, vol. 229, 46/3

Confidentiel.
[Ottawa,] le 6 octobre 1967

[103] See/Voir doc. 380.

ENTRETIEN DE M. MARTIN AVEC LE DÉLÉGUÉ APOSTOLIQUE, MONSEIGNEUR CLARIZIO

L'entretien d'hier entre le Ministre et Mgr. Clarizio débuta par les courtoisies d'usage et le regret exprimé par M. Martin que Sa Sainteté n'ait pu visiter le Canada cette année, tout en reconnaissant que le Saint-Père ne pouvait se déplacer que pour des cérémonies à caractère religieux. Le Délégué s'excusa en disant que la santé du Saint-Père ne permettait d'emblée qu'il se déplace de Rome. Il ajouta qu'il s'était entretenu avec le Saint-Père à titre privé avant de partir pour le Canada et que celui-ci avait exprimé des doutes sérieux quant à son état de santé. Cependant, le Délégué fit remarquer que l'état du Saint-Père s'était bien amélioré et qu'il avait confiance qu'il ne s'agissait que d'une épreuve passagère. Puis, la conversation tourna sur trois sujets, nommément le Vietnam, la Chine, et les consultations avec les représentants du Vatican.

Le Vietnam

2. En guise d'entrée en matière, le Délégué Apostolique félicita M. Martin pour son dernier discours à l'ONU et se fit témoin de l'admiration du Saint-Père pour l'attitude courageuse du Canada vis-à-vis des grandes questions internationales qui nous préoccupent tous. Croyant que la remarque du Délégué portait sur l'attitude du Canada envers le Vietnam, M. Martin a dit qu'une initiative de la part du Canada nous paraissait nécessaire pour tenter de briser l'impasse actuelle. Il fit part à Mgr. Clarizio qu'il s'était entretenu de ce problème avec Sa Sainteté lors de sa visite à Rome en novembre dernier et qu'il avait dit au Pape que le Canada entendait prendre une initiative dans ce sens.[104] Il rappela qu'il avait mandaté à deux reprises M. Chester Ronning pour faire des sondages auprès des autorités de Hanoi en vue d'un règlement au conflit. M. Martin ajouta que le Nord-Vietnam nous avait dit que si les bombardements au Vietnam cessaient, des conversations pourraient s'engager sur le règlement.

3. Le Délégué Apostolique dit alors qu'avant d'assumer ses fonctions au Canada, un ami, dont il n'a pas révélé le nom, qui avait connu une longue expérience au Vietnam, lui avait soumis un mémoire sur la question. L'opinion émise dans ce mémoire illustrait la contradiction fondamentale du gouvernement américain et qu'il était clair que le Nord-Vietnam n'engagerait pas la discussion avant que ne cesse les bombardements. M. Martin acquiesça et enchaina en disant que nous avions informé les autorités américaines des vues rapportées par M. Ronning mais qu'elles n'avaient pas influencé les Américains. De plus, il fit voir la contradiction du discours de M. Goldberg à l'ONU qui avait prétendu que les autorités de Hanoi n'avaient jamais fait un signe pour démontrer leur volonté d'entamer les négociations. Mgr. Clarizio démontra à l'aide d'exemples tirés de son expérience en République Dominicaine, que cette contradiction n'était pas nouvelle et qu'il avait été témoin de multiples cas semblables au plus fort de la crise dominicaine, il y a quelques années.

4. M. Martin laissa entendre que M. Johnson qu'il connait depuis longtemps, semblait buté et qu'une intervention personnelle par une haute personnalité religieuse pourrait peut-être agir sur lui. Après tout, dit le Ministre, la fille de Johnson s'est convertie au Catholicisme, peut-être qu'une personne de grande sagesse pourrait le convaincre de la nécessité d'un changement de politique américaine vis-à-vis du Vietnam. Lorsque le Délégué suggéra le nom du Cardinal Spellman, M. Martin précisa que le Cardinal ne serait pas en mesure de jouer ce rôle, étant donné son attitude antérieure sur la question. Le Ministre insista auprès de Mgr. Clarizio et l'invita à réfléchir sur ce problème. (Mgr. Clarizio dit à l'agent du ministère qui le raccompagnait que cette idée de M. Martin l'intéressait beaucoup et qu'il allait étudier la question).

[…]

J.G.H. Halstead

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[104] See/Voir doc. 475.

589.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/19

No. 3750
Washington, October 13, 1967
Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tels Y-602 Oct 6 and Y-610† Oct 12.
Repeat for Information: London, Permis New York, Paris, Geneva (Immediate); Delhi (Immediate) from London; Saigon (Immediate) from Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM: INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM BUNDY

I called today on William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to explore current administration thinking concerning Vietnam negotiations and in particular to ascertain whether Goldberg's September 21 UNGA speech and President Johnson's September 29 San Antonio speech represented any significant shift in USA policy.

2. Bundy characterized San Antonio speech as a deliberate attempt on part of USA to convey a conciliatory impression. It became clear in course of conversation that shift was at least somewhat substantive and not repeat not simply semantic in nature. Bundy's opening comments did tend to be rather Delphic but as we progressed in our discussion of specific meaning of President's San Antonio speech, Bundy became more exact in his definition of current USA negotiating requirements.

3. I pointed out that until recently we had understood that USA would exchange talks for talks or military concessions for military concessions but that it would not repeat not mix two categories. We were inclined to think on basis of two most recent statements that USA was now prepared to stop bombing of North Vietnam in return for prompt and productive talks and that a balanced military concession by North Vietnam which had previously been a pre-condition of any cessation of bombing had now become a simple assumption. Put another way, President's remarks could be taken to mean that USA would stop bombing if it were reasonably sure that promising talks would ensue rather quickly and that North Vietnam would not repeat not take advantage of cessation by stepping up its infiltration of South beyond current rate. Bundy stated that this interpretation would be "a fair gloss" on President's statement. He emphasized, however, that administration would not repeat not put this gloss on statement publicly and that his confirmation was given to us strictly on a private basis.

4. In elaborating on USA position, Bundy said that their requirements concerning North Vietnamese military activity had been in effect converted, in legal terminology, from a condition precedent to a condition subsequent. For their part USA would not repeat not step up flow of reinforcements into South Vietnam beyond current and planned rate. USA was not repeat not demanding any precise commitments from DRVN although it did require some indication that cessation of bombing and talks could take place in atmosphere of "good faith" on both sides.

5. We asked Bundy whether he thought Hanoi had got message. He replied that he assumed that they were aware of significance of President's words.

6. I then asked whether it was not repeat not possible that only way USA could determine whether Hanoi would accede to new formula would be to stop bombing and await developments. Bundy admitted that this was one way to test Hanoi. On other hand it would be very difficult course of action unless USA had some prior indication that DRVN took seriously USA assumption or expectation. If after two or three weeks ("and that would be a long time") there was no repeat no readiness on part of Hanoi to start talks, USA would be

faced with extremely difficult decision. On one hand, administration would be faced with demands for resumption of bombing on intensified scale. On other hand, critics of bombing would not repeat not have been satisfied. "If I thought that reasonable men would recognize that Hanoi's refusal to talk despite a cessation of bombing removed onus from us I would see more merit in a blind cessation" was gist of his comment. On basis of events following last major suspension of bombing (when in Bundy's view USA was given no repeat no credit for suspension but only criticism for resumption) Bundy obviously felt "blind cessation" without some prior understanding with Hanoi would open administration to increased criticism from all sides.

7. I made available to Bundy paragraphs 8-15 of Moscow telegram 3636[105] amended in accordance with your telegram Y-608† October 12. Bundy was very grateful for Ford's report on conversation with Kosygin. Soviet emphasis on SVNLF programme tied in with various comments he had heard from other sources. (He asked Isham to obtain complete text of programme for him "just in case there is something significant in it which we have missed".) He was struck by your suggestion that emphasis on Front programme might be part of preparation for next stage of negotiations.

8. In summary, therefore, USA position as it emerges from Bundy's remarks appears to hinge on some indication from Hanoi that a cessation of bombing could be followed by talks at an early date and would not repeat not be used by DRVN as opportunity to step up flow of men and materials into South Vietnam. USA is not repeat not asking for a cessation or even a reduction in present flow to South and is not repeat not demanding a formal repeat formal undertaking either privately or publicly from Hanoi to this effect. On other hand, Bundy made it clear that a "blind" cessation with no repeat no "atmosphere of good faith" established would be dangerous not repeat not only from point of view of USA but also in terms of prospects for continued reduction of hostilities or lasting ceasefire.

[A.]E. Ritchie

590.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/20

No. Y-633
Ottawa, October 24, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Our Tel Y-572† Sep 22 to Permis New York and subsequent telegrams.
Repeat for Information: Moscow, Delhi, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Warsaw, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, CANFORCEHED.

VIETNAM: WFUNA INITIATIVE

Prime Minister has received further letter from Bebler dated October 14 indicating that he has now received reply from Indian Prime Minister (Prime Minister Wilson's reply was conveyed earlier) but no replies from Prime Ministers of USSR and Poland. (Since then there has been reply from Kosygin which rejects idea of meeting such as Bebler proposed on grounds that bombing continues and that neither DRVN nor SVNLF would be represented.)

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[105] This was likely a reference to Moscow telegram 3626. See doc. 586.
Il s'agit probablement du télégramme nº 3626 de Moscou. Voir doc. 586.

Bebler has also received letter from President of Polish UNA taking standard line that only unconditional termination of bombing can create atmosphere conducive to negotiations. Bebler's letter reads in part as follows: "On the basis of all this correspondence, in my opinion, highly revealing in many ways, one has to conclude that: (1) No progress towards the restoration of peace in Vietnam can be achieved unless, and so long as, the bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the United States Air Force is continued; (2) As soon as this bombing is discontinued, practically that very day, the process of restoring a complete and stable peace could start, possibly with the above-mentioned five powers playing a prominent role.

I shall inform the other four Heads of Governments of these conclusions of mine. I shall also inform President Johnson of these conclusions and shall appeal to him to reconsider his position on the question of bombing, to accept the ever more widespread opinion that the key to peace in Vietnam is in his hands, to use this key by issuing the necessary orders to stop the bombing and to do this without delay and without conditions".

2. Although we naturally welcome any move which might contribute to peace in Vietnam, it seems to us that Bebler has considerably exceeded such mandate as he may have thought to derive from writing to five Prime Ministers in question in that he has now in letter to President Johnson coupled report of his correspondence with plea to stop bombing. We consider that he has done so entirely on his own authority and not repeat not on basis of Canadian reply to his earlier letter. You will recall (see our reference telegram) that Prime Minister Pearson signified willingness to take part in preliminary Geneva meeting of five powers, though he emphasized that it was necessary not repeat not to attach any pre-conditions as to possible agenda.

3. Bebler's appeal to President Johnson aside, we are surprised at his categorical statement that as soon as the bombing is discontinued the process of restoring a stable peace could start. It does not repeat not appear to us that there is any such assurance to be found in any of the correspondence which Bebler has made available to us. If Bebler has received from Hanoi any assurance as to what would follow cessation of bombing, this would of course be an important new element in situation. We are recommending that Prime Minister Pearson reply in this sense to Bebler.

[Paul] Martin

591.
Letter from Prime Minister to President of World Federation of United Nations Associations
Lettre du premier ministre au président de la Fédération mondiale des associations pour les Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/20

Ottawa, October 24, 1967

My dear President,

Thank you for your letter of October 14 with which you enclosed a copy of the letter you received from the Prime Minister of India and also extracts from the letter from the President of the United Nations Association of Poland. Since then, as you know, there has been a reply from Prime Minister Kosygin of the Soviet Union which, unfortunately, rejects the idea of a meeting such as you proposed.

I have read with interest the conclusions which you have drawn from the correspondence which originated with your letters of September 5 to Britain, the USSR, India, Poland and Canada. I share your conviction that no progress is likely to be made to restore peace in Vietnam unless as a first step a way can be found to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. I am somewhat less confident than you apparently are, however, that once the bombing is stopped

talks will be set in train which will lead to a complete and stable peace in that area. I would hope that this might be the case and indeed I believe that the pressures on the Government of North Vietnam to enter into productive talks would be great if the bombing were stopped. Nonetheless, I can find nothing in the correspondence which you have been having with the other Prime Ministers (nor in other information available to me) which would permit the conclusion that an end to the bombing will without question lead to peace talks and negotiations. If, however, you have clear and firm indications to that effect from the Government of North Vietnam or from another Government speaking on its behalf, I would be most anxious to learn of it as this would be to my mind a development of major importance with respect to the resolution of the Vietnam problem.

Your sincerely,
L.B. Pearson

592.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/20

Secret.
[Ottawa,] October 27, 1967

VIETNAM: U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S POSITION

In the attached telegram from our Permanent Mission in New York Mr. Cox has reported some indications he has picked up informally to the effect that the Secretariat, evidently in line with U Thant's own wishes, is reviewing the Secretary-General's position on Vietnam in the hope that a new and potentially more constructive approach might be devised.

2. It would appear that one of the specific areas of current interest is the possibility of the International Commission being brought into play in a constructive way. As you know the Secretary-General, from the beginning, has been kept closely informed of our own thinking in this connection and has taken a generally positive view of this possibility. We would therefore be interested in cooperating to the fullest possible extent with the Secretariat and the Secretary-General himself as their thinking may evolve on these matters.

3. In indicating our interest and willingness to exchange views and information with them based on our first-hand Commission experience, however, we believe that it would be wise to suggest at an early stage that if anything helpful is to emerge from a new approach, the most careful consideration would have to be given to resolving the difficulties which past experience has shown are inherent in formal U.N. action and in attempts to bring the Commission into play in a significant way. Because we believe that the latter could, in the right political circumstances, be extremely useful, we would be reluctant to see it used too soon and in ways which would not enhance its long-term credibility. The idea of a Commission appeal is obviously attractive and might offer considerable advantage in due course. At the same time it must be admitted that present circumstances are not such as to encourage us to believe that any Commission initiative as such is likely to be heeded unless it is very carefully coordinated and balanced. We believe that at this stage in particular a Commission initiative which is flatly rejected by one or both sides, or which simply goes unheeded, would be worse than taking no initiative at all because of the negative effect it would have on future possibilities. If however the Secretariat and the Secretary-General have

any suggestions for a special Commission role which is balanced and which offers the prospect of being mutually acceptable to both sides, we would of course be interested in exploring such possibilities as a matter of priority.

4. In the light of these considerations we are sure you would agree that it would be in our interests to maintain a dialogue with the Secretariat on these matters. The attached telegram, for your authorization and release if you agree, has been drafted with this end in view.[106]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

593.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/20

Confidential. Canadian Eyes Only.
[Ottawa,] November 16, 1967

VIETNAM: DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. MIKI

Our Embassy in Washington has informed us that the State Department was anxious that you should be aware of the U.S. Government's reaction to the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Miki, prior to your discussions with Mr. Miki.

2. The Americans regard the Japanese visit as signalling the most significant development towards a "new look" since the end of the war in Japanese policy. As a result of the recently concluded discussions in Washington, they believe that Japan is now on the verge of assuming an increasingly heavy burden of international responsibility and a more active foreign policy on a wide range of international political problems. The Americans have been most encouraged by impressions they derived from their discussions and they are naturally anxious to do everything possible to support and promote these new tendencies on the Japanese Government's part.

3. Although we have not yet had a full account from our Embassy in Washington of the American-Japanese discussions and do not therefore know what form American encouragement will take across-the-board, we do know that one specific and immediate manifestation was the favourable hearing Mr. Rusk gave to Mr. Miki's ideas about an exchange of guarantees as a first step towards a Vietnam settlement. Mr. Miki is reported to have told Mr. Rusk that he was thinking in terms of Japan and Canada acting as guarantors on behalf of the United States, while two Eastern European countries would act in the same capacity vis-à-vis Hanoi. Mr. Rusk has encouraged Mr. Miki to explore these possibilities further.

4. It is of course heartening that the Americans have shown an interest in this initiative and that in general terms they would probably be prepared to see it go forward. At the same time it must be recognized that Washington is clearly very interested in finding outlets through which Japan's more active foreign policy interests can express themselves. Given the importance to the U.S.A. of good working relations with Japan, it would be very much in Washington's interest to adopt a positive attitude towards Japanese foreign policy initiatives even if the U.S.A. did not entertain undue substantive expectations from such initiatives. As you know from our earlier memorandum analysing Mr. Miki's suggestions, there are

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[106] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Yes, it might be useful if we have had discussions with the Secretariat. I am prepared to participate personally in such talks. P[aul] M[artin]
Tel[egram] Y-640† signed by SSEA and sent Oct. 30/67. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

some important areas of difficulty implicit in Miki's suggestions which will have to be cleared up if such an initiative is to have any chance of success. We believe the Americans are aware of these problems, but we do not have any information about the manner in which they may see the answers emerging.

5. In all the circumstances therefore it may be that Mr. Rusk's interest in Mr. Miki's suggestions is as much presentational as it is substantive. By endorsing the Japanese approach the Americans would not only be encouraging a more active and responsible Japanese interest in international problems but they would also be seen to be supporting yet another attempt to find a peaceful settlement in Vietnam even if they do not believe it has much chance of success.

6. We believe, therefore, that it would be advisable to adopt a cautious position in discussing Mr. Miki's suggestions with him. Without being sceptical, or indeed critical of the U.S.A., it should be possible to ascertain from Mr. Miki how seriously and genuinely interested Washington may be in the substance of these proposals, and how the Americans may believe that the difficulties inherent in the Japanese approach may be overcome. If it is evident that the Japanese are not fully aware of the potential pitfalls or that their thinking has not yet been given a sufficient degree of clarity or precision to enable joint diplomatic action to be taken, it will be important, I think, to emphasize to Mr. Miki the need for caution. It would, for example, be a pity if Canada and Japan were to dissipate their potential usefulness in the Vietnam context by undertaking an initiative which has not been carefully planned, which does not offer reasonable prospects of acceptability to the other side and in which U.S.A. interests may be primarily presentational in the sense that if it were tried but failed to yield results, it would still add one more item to the list of peace bids rejected by Hanoi.

7. Until we know more about Japanese intentions and, equally important, about U.S. thinking on these particular matters (as this will be available from Mr. Miki's assessment and from the further discussions we will be having in Washington), our best course of action might be to register sympathetic interest and willingness, in principle, to co-operate. At the same time I think we should emphasize the utmost importance which attaches to careful advance preparation with a view to establishing how far the Communist countries concerned (and in this context it would seem that only the U.S.S.R. has sufficient influence) may be prepared to co-operate and whether such an exchange of guarantees would be in any way acceptable to Hanoi. We would therefore wish to keep in close touch with the Japanese both here and in Tokyo over the coming weeks in the hope that something really useful may develop along the lines of Mr. Miki's suggestions.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

594.
Memorandum by Department of External Affairs
Note du ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 8921, 20-JPN-1-3-VIET

Confidential.
[Ottawa, n.d.]

VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER MIKI OF JAPAN NOVEMBER 17, 1967
VIETNAM

Japanese Position

According to the latest reports from our Embassy in Tokyo (Tokyo telegram 1346† November 10), the Japanese consider that, while the military situation in Vietnam is improving, political stability is still far off and the pacification programme is merely holding

its own. No decisive military victory can be expected, and therefore a solution will be found as a result of compromises by both sides. The Japanese want an "honourable" settlement for the Americans, not a USA "defeat", as they are anxious to ensure the future USA presence in Asia.

2. Japan sees no evidence that the cessation of bombing is likely to lead to early talks and fears that a suspension could ultimately worsen the situation by facilitating increased infiltration from the North and thereby inviting a strong USA riposte. Hence the Japanese idea of an examination of a possible exchange of guarantees as something which should precede pressures to stop the bombing.

3. When Foreign Minister Miki first spoke with the SSEA in New York on September 21 (Permis New York telegram 2490 September 22), he seemed to have in mind an appeal to end the war launched by a number of countries having friendly relations with the United States. We reacted cautiously to this suggestion (our telegram Y-575 September 25) on the grounds that it was likely to be ignored by the principal participants: Hanoi and Moscow would reject a balanced appeal on the grounds that full responsibility lies on the American "aggressor" to de-escalate the war, whereas Washington would reject an unbalanced appeal which merely called on the United States to suspend the bombing without any clear indication that the other side would make a reciprocal military gesture or express an unmistakable willingness to enter into serious talks.

4. Subsequent to this discussion in New York, Mr. Miki developed his views further in an address to the American-Japan Society in Tokyo on October 5, and put forward his idea of mutual guarantees (Tokyo telegram 1170† October 6). After rejecting the idea of an unconditional halt to the bombing ("a dangerous gamble [which] contains the risk of further escalating the war"), he urged that (a) friends of North Vietnam guarantee that cessation of bombing would lead the DRVN to the conference table for productive talks, and (b) friends of the United States guarantee that the USA does not seek to maintain permanent bases in Vietnam, does not wish to destroy the Hanoi Government, will withdraw its troops when peace is attained and will recognize the principle of peaceful self-determination for Vietnam. Miki also said that informal talks (Washington and Hanoi, Saigon and the SVNLF) would have to precede a wider and more formal international meeting such as a Geneva Conference.

5. In subsequent conversations with the Gaimusho, it has been admitted that the Japanese have not yet worked out how guarantees might be sought or conveyed to Hanoi and probably will not do so until after Prime Minister Sato's return from Washington. They consider, however, that any negotiations must be based on certain assumptions about the nature of an eventual settlement in Vietnam and that reciprocal guarantees would help create the necessary trust between parties which does not exist now.

6. It is also worth keeping in mind that, during his recent Southeast Asian tour, Prime Minister Sato came down quite firmly in support of the American position by equating infiltration from the North with bombing of the North, and by insisting on the necessity for reciprocity from the North in return for suspension of the bombing. He is also said to believe that this is not a propitious time to put forth an offer of mediation.

7. Nevertheless, Mr. Miki apparently feels that efforts must be made now to prepare the ground for a political settlement (Tokyo telegram 1346† November 10). He will, therefore, want to discuss with you the idea of mutual assurances or guarantees. Japan will not want to act alone and Miki may well seek Canadian assistance in this regard.

Comment

8. There are no present indications that the United States is prepared to halt the bombing without a prior assurance from Hanoi that it will at least enter into meaningful talks, nor does Hanoi seem prepared to give any prior and unambiguous assurances about what will follow suspension of the bombing. The impasse therefore continues and for that reason if for no other, it would seem worthwhile to explore Mr. Miki's ideas further, despite the obvious difficulties which he himself recognizes.

9. If the guarantees Miki has in mind could be obtained and convincingly conveyed to the principal protagonists, this might well lead to talks and negotiations. It should be recognized, however, that there is a fundamental disparity between the two sides of the equation in the sense that North Vietnam is asked only to signify in advance its willingness to enter into productive talks (and, perhaps to refrain at minimum from increasing its infiltration rate when the bombing stops), but not to say anything about its terms for a final settlement, while the United States on the other hand is asked to signify, in advance, not just its willingness to stop the bombing (and not to reinforce its military position while the talks go on), but its willingness also to withdraw from Vietnam and to permit "self-determination" in South Vietnam with no indication of how that self-determination in South Vietnam is to be expressed.

10. A second major difficulty, and an entirely practical one, about the Miki proposals is who would seek to obtain the reciprocal guarantees (provided agreement can be reached on what constitutes reciprocity) and how they would be conveyed convincingly to the other side. Our repeated efforts to obtain from Hanoi assurances *explicit enough to satisfy Washington* as to what would happen if the bombing stopped have been to no avail, and we therefore had to fall back on an appeal to take the calculated risk of a bombing pause in the hope that this would lead to talks. Similarly, our repeated efforts over several years to persuade Hanoi that Washington does not seek to overthrow the Communist regime in the North, does not wish to maintain troops and bases permanently in Vietnam, would abide fully by a free decision of the South Vietnamese (not under pressure of terrorism) as to their future political orientation whatever it might be and would be willing to contribute generously to the economic development of the area – all these efforts have been to no avail. Canada, like Japan, is clearly regarded by Hanoi as closely associated with the USA, and while this close relationship has its distinct advantages (as in the case of the Ronning missions) it might also make it more difficult for Canada and Japan to appear to be taking too active a part at this stage in *initiating* a project which would require some kind of concession from North Vietnam. (It must not be forgotten either that Vietnam was occupied by the Japanese for a time during World War II, and this together with Japan's close relations with the United States might arouse Hanoi's suspicions.) Ultimately, both countries could of course play a helpful role in promoting any feasible scheme of guarantees, and in ensuring that it would work, but for the moment we are inclined to believe that Hanoi, as it has done in the past, would adopt a negative attitude towards any Canadian-Japanese initiatives that were advanced publicly or that became matters of public knowledge.

11. Ultimately, it would appear that the conveying of guarantees (if indeed they can be obtained) would have to be done by a non-aligned country which has the reputation for accuracy as well as impartiality (Switzerland? Sweden? Finland?) or by a Communist country which has influence in Hanoi and in which the United States could have a reasonable measure of confidence for these purposes. The one Communist country which might meet these criteria is the USSR and it has so far steadfastly declined to play an intermediary role. (The Secretary-General of the United Nations would seem to be excluded as he is not sufficiently trusted by the United States, and as the DRVN wants the U.N. to have nothing to do with the Vietnam affair.)

Possible Questions to Put to Mr. Miki

With a view to trying to get greater precision about the Miki idea of mutual guarantees, the following questions might be put to him:

(a) What countries might serve as guarantors for the USA and the DRVN and what special qualifications have they for the role?

(b) How would these countries go about seeking the guarantees and conveying them convincingly?

(c) Is there not a disparity between the guarantees envisaged (paragraph 9 above) in that one side is merely asked to enter into productive talks whereas the other is asked to state its terms for an eventual settlement?

(d) Did Mr. Miki discuss his proposals with Mr. Rusk and others during the recent visit to Washington and if so what was their reaction? Would he object to our discussing the proposals in Washington?

(e) Have the Japanese any indication as to how the idea of reciprocal guarantees would be received in Saigon and in Hanoi?

(f) Has there been any discussion of these ideas with the Russians? Would there be any objection to our discussing them in a tentative way in Moscow, either with or without signifying that the concept is a Japanese one?

595.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 11427, 20-1-2-USA/8

No. 4254
Washington, November 17, 1967
Secret. No Distribution. Immediate.
For SSEA and USSEA only.

RUSK'S VIEWS ON USA-CANADIAN RELATIONS

At a Nepalese reception on November 2, Secretary Rusk had spoken with me rather vigorously about his worries over future of USA-Canadian relations.[107] He said it was his impression that "we were headed for trouble". I expressed surprise at this assessment of prospect since I said I was much impressed with number of very constructive things that we were doing together at present time. I thought these were much more important in total than any differences that we might have. Rusk repeated his gloomy forecast and suggested that we get together fairly soon for a frank talk about outlook. I said I would welcome such an opportunity. A few days later, Rusk's office arranged for me to see him on late afternoon of November 16.

2. At my interview with Rusk on November 16,[108] I found him considerably more relaxed. Our whole conversation was low-keyed and Rusk's attitude seemed friendly throughout. I do not repeat not think however this should be taken as meaning that his concern about our future relations has by any means disappeared. I think main factors explaining difference in mood are: (1) Passage of time since some public statements from Canada about Vietnam bombing which were undoubtedly fresh in his mind and were disturbing him considerably on November 2; (2) Removal at least temporarily of one or two items which had been upsetting him at time of our earlier conversation (for example the then current proposal for air traffic rights at Gander for Soviet aircraft en route to Cuba); (3) Fact that he had since received a comprehensive memo from his officials which if it had not repeat not had effect of convincing him that our relations on balance are in reasonably good shape may at least

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[107] For the views of the US Embassy in Ottawa on this question, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. XII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), document 342. Pour connaître le point de vue de l'ambassade des États-Unis à Ottawa sur cette question, voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. XII (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 2001), document 342.

[108] See/Voir ibid., document 344.

have led him to be rather more cautious until he could consider carefully all points involved; and (4) An awareness of fact that he would be having an opportunity in a few weeks' time to talk with SSEA about our relations on occasion of NATO meeting.

3. At beginning of our interview yesterday, Rusk apologized that he had not repeat not had much time recently to reflect on USA-Canadian relations. He referred to lengthy memo from his Department officials and said that he hoped to digest it before seeing Minister in Brussels. He indicated that even though he had not repeat not been able to collect his thoughts ahead of time he welcomed this further talk with me to supplement brief exchange which we had had on earlier social occasion.

4. When I started to say that I hoped rather severe judgment which he had expressed earlier might be modified by a recognition of many constructive things that we were doing, he interrupted to say that he knew that we were collaborating on many important matters such as trade negotiations, foreign aid, etc., but he asked whether there was not repeat not at present time a wave of anti-Americanism in Canada.[109]

5. I replied that there undoubtedly was a fairly critical attitude towards USA on some matters. I added that this was not repeat not all that unusual in history of our relations over past century or so. No repeat no doubt there were misgivings in Canada as there were here about some aspects of war in Vietnam but I certainly did not repeat not consider that this reflected any general hostility towards USA.

6. Secretary Rusk remarked that Canada's role in relation to Vietnam had not repeat not in his view turned out quite [the] way that had been expected. When supervisory commissions were being established, concept was that India would be neutral and that Poland and Canada would be somewhat partisan. In Rusk's view, what we now had was a Commission with only one partisan and with two neutrals. I said that I did not repeat not think this a fair description of our work on Commission. It was true that we had attempted to be reasonably objective in our performance but I did not repeat not think this meant that we were neutral. Objectivity could well work to advantage of USA over other side. In any event it had seemed to us that we were most likely to have some degree of effectiveness in work of Commission if we adopted and were seen to have adopted a generally objective attitude. I referred to some of specific matters in each of three Commissions where Canadian representative had been fighting good fight for a long while.

7. I then asked Rusk whether his reference to our "neutrality" was really intended to apply to our performance on Commission or to our posture generally. He then said that quite frankly he had been "shaken" by indications that if a proposal were to be made in UN for a cessation of bombing with nothing in return Canadian Delegation would vote for such a resolution. He then asked specifically whether any Canadian official spokesman had given any public support to position stated by President in his San Francisco [*sic*] speech.

8. I said that although I did not repeat not have a full record of all public statements that might have been made in Canada, I had no repeat no doubt that Canadian spokesmen had given public encouragement to moves in direction indicated in San Antonio speech. I asked Rusk whether he was implying that it might have been useful if some spokesmen for Canada had specifically endorsed President's speech. He said he had been thinking of something like that or at least of some statements around that time urging North to be more responsive.

9. Rusk asked why it was that governmental and public opinion in Canada was so different from that in countries nearer to Vietnam. I replied that I was not repeat not of course in a position to weigh all different opinions in Canada on various aspects of Vietnam situation but I thought there was in fact pretty general opposition to continuation of bombing. It seemed to me that there existed in Canada most of currents of opinion and even some of demonstrations

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[109] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
anti-Americanism [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

prevalent in USA. I remarked that one of our general concerns in Canada was that on Vietnam or any other subject scope for expressing indigenous Canadian views and ideas whatever they might be was rather limited and had to face voluminous flow of opinions from USA. As an aside I could not repeat not resist adding that it was this kind of concern which accounted for our desire to strengthen at least slightly position of genuinely Canadian periodicals in Canada. I went on to say that in case of bombing of Vietnam it was not repeat not, however, only a matter of predominant public opinion in Canada but some very responsible people in country including members of Government had grave doubts about wisdom of continuing bombing.

[…]

19. Mr. Rusk then mentioned Cambodia. He asked whether we were represented there. I said we of course had our representative on ICSC. Rusk asked whether we also had an Ambassador. I said that we had no repeat no Ambassadors in any of three Indochinese states but relied on our ICSC Commissioners. Rusk did not repeat not explain his interest in whether or not repeat not we had an Ambassador in Phnom Penh but he remarked that Sihanouk's behavior was proving to be a little strange. Rusk did not repeat not volunteer just which actions of Sihanouk's he had in mind but I had impression he would appreciate any reports from our people about Sihanouk's moods and views.

20. I said Cambodian Commission was one of places I had in mind earlier when I had referred to efforts of our people on ICSC to achieve greater objectivity and effectiveness on part of Commissions. I said I thought this was in line with views expressed by Rusk and Bundy during one of visits of SSEA since my arrival here. At that time, USA had expressed hope that something might be done to control or observe border movements. I said that our representative had been pressing vigorously for a long time to get meaningful control of port of Sihanoukville and supervision over Cambodia's border with South Vietnam. So far we had been unsuccessful through no repeat no fault of our own. Rusk said that this matter had become even more serious since time when he had raised it with SSEA. It was clear that troops from locations in Cambodia were ones principally involved in some of current battles. I asked Rusk whether there was risk that anyone might be tempted to pursue such troops into Cambodia. He did not repeat not reply directly but said that USA was anxious to deal with those troops where they are now and that when such troops had done what they could in battles now going on they would no repeat no doubt expect to retreat back into Cambodia.

[…]

[A.]E. Ritchie

596.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Japan
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade au Japon
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. Y-688
Ottawa, November 22, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Permis New York, Paris, Delhi (Routine).
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Geneva.

VIETNAM: DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MIKI

Vietnam was by far the most important single subject of discussion.

2. In outlining Japan's view of situation, Foreign Minister Miki paid tribute to Canadian and other efforts to find approach to peaceful settlement. It was disappointing that in spite of these efforts prospects for peace seemed as remote as ever and it was the Japanese

Government's impression that even those who were fighting had no idea of where war was headed. As Asian country, Japan was especially sensitive to regional and broader international shadows caused by continuing hostilities. In Asian affairs at the moment he felt that there were three factors of major importance (a) increasing influence of Communist China; (b) greater spirit of nationalism amongst Asian countries; and (c) underdevelopment and poverty of Asian nations. All three elements come together in Vietnam situation, contributing to complexity of the problem and its solution.

3. Japanese Government felt that conclusion of war was to be found in return to 1954 Ceasefire Agreement in that 17th parallel should provide for ability of peoples of North Vietnam and South Vietnam to live together peacefully. It seemed obvious that South Vietnamese Government would not "influence and take over" Government of North Vietnam and reverse proposition was equally true. Vietnamese people in due course should themselves decide their fate and future in circumstances where peace and stability prevail. This was not of course "eternal" settlement but rather a way of embarking on the only path towards a more lasting arrangement.

4. In general exposition of Canadian views, SSEA emphasized closeness of Canada-USA relations and fact that we recognize that US motives in coming into Vietnam were honourable just as we accept sincerity of their desire to find honourable settlement by peaceful means. At same time, continuation of hostilities created grave political problems in Canada just as it did in the USA primarily because two countries were close friends. Hostilities in Vietnam seemed like an impossible war and it was difficult for many Canadians to see clearly how our friends could get out of this situation successfully. In indicating broad agreement with three factors mentioned by Miki, SSEA agreed that influence of Communist China was a factor of great importance but wondered whether the manifestations of Communism in Southeast Asia should not repeat not be judged differently from way in which these were seen in Europe. In any event, Canada saw Japan as one of the two great counterpoises in Asia and saw Japan playing a significant role as a bridge especially in interpreting events in China and in assessing such questions as Chinese influence in Hanoi.

5. SSEA gave extensive summary of Canadian efforts to foster beginnings of approach to peaceful settlement. This included an account of the series of proposals for Commission action we have considered over past two years (i.e., "good offices" exercise, suggested appeals, Indian proposals made at about this time last year for meeting of Commission powers in Delhi and finally Bebler's initiative) as well as Ronning missions. All the information available to us indicated that no progress would be made as long as bombing of North Vietnam continued. In enunciating this statement at UNGA (where Canada was not alone in taking such a position) we were well aware that we were falling back on a "calculated risk" but in circumstances we felt that it would be well worth taking. We had never said, however, that talks would necessarily follow cessation of bombing but we did believe that a new situation would come about which would transfer burden of responsibility for next step towards peace from USA to North Vietnam. As long as responsibility rested or appeared in public mind to rest with USA it would be difficult for friends of USA to act. President Johnson had attached great importance to reciprocal military gesture by North Vietnam and had indicated that he would suffer political defeat rather than concede this principle. Speaking as man with some experience in public life, SSEA found this difficult to believe but President Johnson apparently meant what he said. Nevertheless, SSEA indicated clearly that he thought USA should take first step on its own. Even if North Vietnam did not respond immediately to cessation of bombing he was not repeat not convinced that there would have to be further escalation as result of apparent failure although he acknowledged that US administration would be pressed to escalate. SSEA expressed concern at prospect that Vietnam problem would come before UN since it would probably end up in simple resolution condemning Americans and calling only for halt of bombing. As far as Canadian Government was concerned, it was one thing to make statement of Canadian views in UN and quite

another to cast formal vote. Yet if question emerged in terms of call for cessation of bombing it would be difficult for Canada and many other countries to justify doing anything else but voting in favour. In many ways it would be much better if USA were to halt bombing on its own and for this reason it would be "terrible mistake" if forthcoming holiday season did not involve cessation of bombing, even though past experience with limited pauses had not been notably successful and had probably been violated by both sides. We did not, however, have any indication of what Washington may be planning since they have not been willing to discuss strategy with us, close as our relations may be.

6. Foreign Minister Miki reaffirmed that it was not Japanese policy to advocate or support unilateral cessation of bombing since there was no guarantee that anything else would happen as a result. Japan therefore saw such a move as a dangerous gamble likely to lead to further escalation if it failed. Japan believed that North Vietnam would have to make its own concurrent contribution to a peaceful settlement.

7. First suggestion Foreign Minister Miki put to SSEA concerned action which might be taken in Commission context against background of likelihood that there would be some kind of bombing suspension over holiday season this year as there had been in the past. Sort of scheme he had in mind did not involve any kind of appeal to USA to stop bombing or to North Vietnam to make military gesture towards de-escalation. He wondered, however, if it would be possible for Commission, during whatever pause or pauses came about to approach Hanoi Government for their cooperation in enabling Commission to "observe North Vietnamese situation" by which he meant that Commission should undertake programme of ascertaining whether Hanoi had increased or decreased its infiltration and subsequently report its findings. SSEA replied to this suggestion against background of his outline of earlier efforts we have made to initiate helpful Commission action, at which level we had left no stone unturned. In SSEA's view little would be accomplished by attempting programme Mr. Miki apparently had in mind. Earlier reactions by North Vietnam, Poland and Soviet Union to prospect of Commission initiatives as well as North's reaction to SSEA's April 11 suggestions (which involved the most practical and easily administered version of controls, namely, at the DZ) inclined us strongly to the view that Hanoi would not repeat not allow Commission to do anything whatever especially since Commission's presence was now confined to capital city. Foreign Minister Miki seemed satisfied that this suggestion did not repeat not appear capable of yielding fruitful results.

8. In introducing discussion of his proposal for system of mutual guarantees, Foreign Minister Miki said his thinking was predicated on obvious fact that absence of any element of trust between USA and NVN made it impossible for them to initiate direct talks as first step towards settlement. It therefore seemed necessary to establish a grouping of nations to act as intermediaries and to secure and convey reciprocal assurances. Thus, a few countries friendly to NVN might be able to assure USA of Hanoi's intentions and similarly those friendly to USA could assure NVN of USA's desire to see conflict resolved by peaceful means. Detailed nature of guarantees would be second step. In first instance, it was necessary to see whether guarantor grouping could be established and to this end Foreign Minister Miki wondered whether Canada would approach Poland in confidence to see whether latter would be willing to select those countries which might be prepared to "represent Hanoi's intentions". (Japan would be prepared to cooperate if Canada were to take such an initiative.) Thus, first step would avoid substantive questions such as position of V.C., timing and conditions for withdrawal of US forces etc., but if such a grouping of countries could be organized it would be promising starting point especially if Hanoi appeared interested. As far as substance of guarantees was concerned (as these would be worked out in due course) Foreign Minister Miki confirmed that USA would be asked to stop bombing and to undertake to withdraw its troops from SVN, to remove its bases and to allow peaceful self-determination for Vietnamese people; while Hanoi would be asked to undertake to enter into talks as well as to stop infiltration into South. Although Japan had not yet made any firm assessment of

countries which might act as guarantors (evidently pending results of proposed Canadian initial approach to Poland) Foreign Minister Miki thought that in addition to Japan and Canada, India and/or Britain might act as sponsors for US undertakings while Poland, Romania, and Hungary could do likewise for NVN.

9. SSEA expressed interest in Japanese ideas which would be given careful consideration. If guarantees could be obtained and convincingly conveyed this could lead to talks although such an outcome was far from a certainty.

10. In conveying preliminary Canadian reaction, however, SSEA noted that substance of Foreign Minister Miki's guarantees amounted to balanced appeal in the sense that Hanoi would be asked to stop infiltration and it seemed almost certain that this would be unacceptable to North Vietnam. Parenthetically SSEA noted that Washington, on the other hand, would doubtless react negatively to any appeal or approach which incorporated a cessation of bombing as one element without calling for a reciprocal military gesture or a firm commitment to negotiate from Hanoi. SSEA went on to express personal view that even if substance of guarantees amounted in the end to asking USA to do more than North Vietnam as first step towards settlement, USA could afford to accept the risks involved. More important, however, in SSEA's view was problem of conveying assurances convincingly. Canada had tried repeatedly to convince Hanoi of the sincerity of US intentions but with little success. On the other hand, our efforts to obtain assurances from Hanoi explicit enough to satisfy Washington had likewise been of little avail. Past experience therefore indicated that there would be real problems to be overcome when point is reached where substantive (as opposed to initial procedural) aspects of programme envisaged by Foreign Minister Miki had to be worked out. SSEA noted that Japanese Foreign Minister's suggestions appeared to fit in well with USA position as reflected in Washington policy statements. The really new feature was to be found in the concept that an appeal would be backed up by the guarantees of group of third parties. In reply to SSEA's questions, Foreign Minister Miki indicated that Washington had expressed interest in his ideas, knowing that they were to be discussed in Ottawa with a view to working out practical possibilities for action. Foreign Minister Miki emphasized that one point Washington has been making was that few if any suggestions for resolving Vietnam conflict involved any kind of guarantees and Japanese suggestions were designed to fill this gap.

11. Foreign Minister Miki said that he had not repeat not discussed search for possible guarantors with anyone other than USA and Canada but agreed when SSEA suggested he discuss it with George Brown when British Foreign Secretary visits Tokyo within next few days.

12. SSEA promised immediate and sympathetic consideration would be given to possibilities emerging from discussions and that we would be in touch with the Japanese in near future on this basis.

[Paul] Martin

597.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. Y-717
Ottawa, December 1, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Repeat for Information: Tokyo, London, Permis New York, Paris, Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Geneva, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE CANADIAN-JAPANESE INITIATIVE

I am becoming increasingly concerned over current situation in which, so far as we are aware, no repeat no efforts (other than a possible message from President Nguyen Van Thieu to President Ho Chi Minh) are being made either by principal protagonists or by others acting on their behalf to seek even beginnings of a negotiated solution in Vietnam or any other way of bringing war to an early end. Virtually all indications seem to point to general resignation to continuance of war at least through 1968 presidential elections in USA. Impasse from American side stems from insistence on getting advance word from DRVN that fruitful talks will follow bombing halt and from President's determination not repeat not to be seen to be yielding to domestic criticism of his Vietnam policy by doves (nor so far by hawks either). Impasse from DRVN side stems from their refusal to give unequivocal assurance of willingness to enter into meaningful talks and also apparently from their conviction that domestic criticism in USA is sooner or later going to force President to make major concessions to Communist side before negotiations even begin.

2. Despite great obstacles to be overcome if we are to break out of this impasse, I am determined that no possible avenue of progress be left unexplored, however unlikely it may at first glance appear. At the UNGA, Canada and others called for cessation of bombing as a possible means of getting talks started, admittedly a calculated risk but one which we think worth taking. As Americans are not apparently prepared to take risk at this time, however, I am anxious to explore seriously and urgently the proposals or some variant on them which were discussed recently with Rusk in Washington and in Ottawa between Foreign Minister Miki of Japan and myself.

3. You will be aware from report of our conversation (our telegram Y-688 November 22 to Tokyo) and from earlier examination of Miki proposals on mutual guarantees that we are fully alive to difficulties, particularly that of conveying assurances of USA and DRVN intentions in convincing manner. We are also aware of fairly slim chances of success which Americans would attribute to Miki proposals though they urged Miki to pursue them. They did so on the grounds not repeat not only that this indication of greater acceptance of international responsibility by Japanese was to be encouraged but also that no proposal which might help towards a Vietnam solution should be rejected out of hand (Washington telegram 4236† November 16 and Tokyo telegram 1408† November 24).

4. Miki suggested that procedurally first step might be for Canada to approach Poland in confidence to see whether latter would be willing to select those countries which might be prepared to "represent Hanoi's intentions" as one side of guarantor grouping. We suspect that because it feels or pretends to feel it was let down by USA last December/January in its attempts to act as mediator, Poland will be inclined to shy away from any new suggestion that it undertake this role even as part of a group. In spite of this, we might be prepared to make initial approach to Poland particularly if we could have some assurance from Americans as to their willingness to make a real contribution to the exercise.

5. Rusk told Miki in Washington that Manila communiqué of October 66[110] was firm statement of policy. This as you know probably gives most comprehensive statement of long-term American intentions in the area since enunciation of 14 points at time of American peace offensive during long bombing pause in December 65 and January 66. While communiqué as such may of course be said to commit those who have subscribed to it, something more concrete and up-to-date than that communiqué would be desirable to have in hand if one were to entertain hope in first instance of persuading Poles to go along with Miki proposals and in second instance of cutting any ice with North Vietnamese. We would like to be able to tell Poles that if they were willing to put some real effort into this exercise

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[110] See/Voir "Manila Conference Documents," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 55, No. 1429 (14 November 1966), pp. 730–735.

(in the sense of trying to get DRVN to commit itself unequivocally not only to constructive, serious negotiations leading to compromise solution but also to stop infiltration from North to South) then we could give assurance that Americans were prepared to produce confidential, up-to-date and binding statement as to their long-term intentions. These would relate to troop withdrawals, base dismantlement, principle of self-determination, etc. Statement together with counter-signature so to speak of Canada, Japan and perhaps another country would serve as one side of mutual guarantee. This would in effect be an American guarantee as to sort of thing which USA was, at end of process of negotiation of a settlement, prepared to bind itself to in most solemn manner possible i.e., an international agreement with appropriate control mechanisms which would maximize chances of it being fully adhered to.

6. We fully appreciate that at first glance this may be asking the Americans to go a good bit more than first mile in search for peace. We share, however, Japanese conviction that in light of present impasse described in paragraph one above, and as Americans are apparently unprepared to take calculated risk of bombing suspension, one way to break out of deadlock may be found in system of mutual guarantees if repeat if they can be obtained and convincingly conveyed. It is a big if, but I feel we must try it.

7. Would you therefore at a suitably senior level in State Department explore ideas set forth in this telegram in spirit of trying to give sufficient substance to Miki proposals that we may with any chance of success be able to take even first steps procedurally to implement them.

[Paul] Martin

598.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. Y-718
Ottawa, December 5, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Our Tel Y-717 Dec 1.
Repeat for Information: Tokyo, London, Permis New York, Paris, Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Geneva, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE CANADIAN-JAPANESE INITIATIVE

After reference telegram had gone to SSEA for signature, we received Tokyo telegram 1437 November 30 indicating that Kiuchi realized Miki, in describing guarantees to be demanded from DRVN (undertaking to negotiate and to stop infiltration), went a little beyond what President Johnson himself had required in his San Antonio speech. Kiuchi has now picked up President's idea of DRVN not repeat not taking advantage of bombing pause. In discussion with us in Ottawa last Friday, Suzuki of Gaimusho Policy Planning Council, who is apparently quite close to Miki, also agreed that guarantee to be sought from DRVN should be modified in this sense. We may now consider this as accepted modification of Miki proposal and you should use modified version in talk with State Department.

2. Speaking with SSEA and later with departmental officials, Suzuki indicated that he shares our skepticism and that of Kiuchi as to whether content of mutual guarantees as presently envisaged would be likely to have much present appeal to DRVN even if we could prevail on Poles to sound out Hanoi. SSEA said he would not repeat not want to go to Poles unless we had something useful and productive to propose. Suzuki admitted that USA had been rather negative in commenting on substance of Miki's proposals during latter's trip to Washington because of American doubts as to attitude of Hanoi and of proposed East European guarantors.

3. Suzuki nevertheless thinks that there may be usefulness in at least letting North Vietnamese know that guarantees machinery exists should they want to use it. He seemed impressed by American contention that USA/ARVN forces may be on point of turning the corner militarily. If this is true and if Hanoi appreciates it also then DRVN might begin to show interest in negotiations in advance of USA presidential elections and before military situation turned too strongly in American favour. We expressed skepticism as to whether we were at any such military turning point but admitted that if we were then that could have considerable significance for negotiation prospects, though perhaps in contradictory senses for DRVN and USA.

4. Out of discussion with Suzuki there emerged thought that as alternative to original Miki proposal only step to be taken now might be to try to set up machinery and tell both sides it existed to be used when necessary. Use of machinery to obtain and convey guarantees would be delayed until what seemed to be most propitious occasion. Advantage of this approach is that it would not repeat not totally discredit mutual guarantees concept for future use as might happen if we were to try to implement Miki proposals *in toto* and have them fail. Disadvantage of course is that it does not repeat not take us very far beyond present situation in that it merely sets up additional machinery for possible later use. Mere establishment of guarantees machinery does not repeat not go very much beyond ICC channel which already exists and to which furthermore Canada is quite heavily committed. We are therefore inclined to think this variation has little merit.

5. Another possible variant on Miki proposals would be to set up group of guarantors for USA who would pledge themselves concerning USA intentions in an attempt to persuade Hanoi to modify its distrust of USA. At same time guarantors would express hope that Hanoi would at appropriate moment decide to get group of guarantors for DRVN to convey to USA statement regarding North Vietnamese intentions which would serve to allay USA distrust of DRVN. One difficulty over this variant is that USA might not be willing to give what some would regard as open-ended commitment.

6. You may at your discretion draw on additional ideas which emerged during talks with Suzuki in your discussions with State Department.

For Tokyo:

7. Please do not repeat not yet mention to Japanese that we are discussing Miki proposals with Washington. You may however discuss with Suzuki variants of Miki proposals in same tentative fashion as is set out in paragraphs 4 and 5.

599.
Telegram from Permanent Representative to United Nations to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. 3875
New York, December 7, 1967
Confidential. Flash.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva; Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh from Delhi; CANFORCEHED, Canberra from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Bangkok from Ottawa.
Advance copies to Messrs. Collins, Robinson and Seaborn.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

At 5:45 p.m. today I attended a meeting called by Goldberg in USA Permanent Mission. Also present were representatives of Brazil, China, Denmark, Japan, UK and Argentina. First part of meeting concerned Goldberg's intention by means of a press briefing this evening to set story straight regarding various misleading press accounts of possible Vietcong attendance in New York and USA attitude towards it. I will deal with this in a separate telegram.†

2. Of more immediate interest was second part of meeting which began with Goldberg saying that Senate resolution on Vietnam[111] had reached President Johnson either yesterday or today. Goldberg therefore was now beginning (and this was first meeting) consultations on question of bringing Vietnam before Security Council again. He remarked that positions of "unfriendly countries" were known: they were against UN consideration.

3. Goldberg then said that he would appreciate urgent answers from those present to following questions in light of fact that USA would like to make move in Security Council in December (if one were going to be made) and in time enough to have a proper discussion: (a) would we all support adoption of agenda containing item on Vietnam which had already been inscribed on agenda of Security Council in January/66: Goldberg remarked that technically USA understood that once Council was seized of an item it was not repeat not necessary to have it adopted on each occasion that it was discussed but practice had in fact grown up in support of this procedure and USA would not repeat not be inclined to challenge it; (b) would we support a very simple draft resolution which would in effect have Security Council assert that a basis for progress towards peaceful settlement would be Geneva Accords and which would contain a simple appeal that Geneva machinery be reactivated so that discussions could take place towards peaceful solution; and (c) would Governments represented at meeting be prepared to resist any move in Council in favour of a simple, unilateral cessation of bombing whether put forward in form of an amendment or a separate resolution. Goldberg then remarked that USA would regard any such move for unilateral cessation of bombing without a reference to ceasefire or negotiations as "hostile to USA interests". Goldberg added that as far as he knew no repeat no Government present had expressed itself in favour of cessation of bombing "in isolation" without reciprocal action to end hostilities.

4. When Japanese representative subsequently asked for explanation of what would be regarded as an unconditional call for cessation of bombing, Goldberg said that USA would stand by formulations set forth in USA public statements, e.g., Goldberg's statement in general debate at twenty-first UNGA; and President Johnson's San Antonio speech this year. USA would also support one of Secretary-General's formulations, i.e., cessation of bombing; ceasefire; talks. USA representatives stressed that reciprocity was key element.

5. In reply to various questions USA representatives said: (a) that for time being they had both 54 and 62 Geneva Accords in mind; (b) that they questioned whether any opposing delegations would submit amendments since this would imply recognition of UN competence; (c) that they were not repeat not certain what explanation was being given to South Vietnam regarding likely USA move to take up question in Security Council (to which Pedersen acknowledged South Vietnam might take a different view); (d) that with Senate action completed, question of whether similar draft resolution in House of Representatives was passed did not repeat not affect USA intentions to go ahead or not repeat not; (e) that USA had no repeat no exact text of a resolution in mind but it would probably be simpler than that outlined in January/66 (as quoted in Goldberg's statement to Senate Foreign

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[111] See/Voir *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 1038–1039.

Relations [Committee] in Washington on November 2); (f) that Security Council itself could not repeat not of course reactivate Geneva Accords but hoped that Security Council endorsement of a move in that direction would be helpful if it could be obtained.

6. Chinese Ambassador remarked that it might be easy to get agenda adopted but after that "where are we going". Goldberg having left by then, Pedersen replied that USA objective was to move situation towards diplomacy and Geneva Conference.

7. In view of urgency attached to question by USA, it was agreed that 8 delegations mentioned above would meet again December 8 at 4:30 p.m. although it was realized that some delegations might not repeat not have received instructions by then.

[George] Ignatieff

600.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. 4573
Washington, December 8, 1967
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tels Y-717 Dec 1 and Y-718 Dec 5.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Permis New York, Geneva; Tokyo from Ottawa; NATO, Delhi from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from London.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE CANADIAN-JAPANESE INITIATIVES

I called yesterday on William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, State Department, to obtain from him USA reactions to possible Canadian-Japanese initiative as outlined your reference telegrams. I explained SSEA's desire to explore Miki proposals and outlined steps which you envisaged might be involved.

2. Bundy, who was obviously fully aware of proposals, immediately said plan was in USA eyes a "perfectly possible variant" of their own efforts to achieve some movement in situation. He saw plan primarily as way of finding out what Russians were prepared to do to facilitate negotiations. At moment he said there was not repeat not much action: Hanoi seemed to be sitting tight along lines of recent Burchett article.[112] Harriman – "man who most hopes stone will move" – sees no repeat no indication that it will. Prior to his recent trip to Eastern Europe Harriman had lunch with Dobrynin in order to open door for Roumanians; despite this, however, he had obtained nothing at all from Maurer. USA assessment is that USSR will continue providing assistance to Hanoi and that latter will hold to its present course.

3. I enquired about reports of NLF approach through UN and asked whether this was interpreted as shift in position of other side. Bundy replied that situation in New York was "utterly nebulous". It was not repeat not clear whether reported approach was taken at initiative of NLF or Hanoi or was simply something "dreamed up by someone in Secretariat". Bundy commented that there were "more than the usual number of ambiguities associated with things from that quarter". He said USA Government, in accordance with HQ's

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[112] This may be a reference to an Associated Press dispatch by journalist Wilfred Burchett published as "Hanoi Is Termed Adamant on Terms for Talks," *New York Times*, 21 October 1967, p. 6.
Il pourrait s'agir de la dépêche de l'Associated Press rédigée par le journaliste Wilfred Burchett et publiée sous le titre « Hanoi Is Termed Adamant on Terms for Talks », *New York Times*, 21 octobre 1967, p. 6.

agreement, would facilitate entry of NLF representatives under rule 39 of Security Council procedures. He made it clear, however, that USA was "not repeat not about to let them come just to lobby in UNGA".

4. Returning to Miki proposals, Bundy repeated that they would pose no repeat no problems for USA. Given current lack of movement "gut nexus" would be whether Canada and/or Japanese could establish contact on other side. If Russians reacted positively to approach something could be worked out on USA side to carry plan forward. Bundy equated undertakings which would be requested from Hanoi with essential elements of President Johnson's San Antonio speech: "from there one could go on to Manila communiqué and Geneva Accords".

5. At end of discussion we outlined concept in following summary and purely hypothetical form: Canada could approach Poles and ask them if under certain circumstances they and one or two other countries could obtain from Hanoi undertaking to enter into constructive and meaningful negotiations and not repeat not to take advantage of a cessation of bombing. If Poles could obtain and vouch for such undertakings we and one or two other countries could indicate that there would be a good possibility of obtaining confidential, up-to-date and binding USA statement concerning long-term intentions. Once Poles were in position to give preliminary reaction both sides would then develop approach one step further and refine and harden undertakings.

6. Bundy agreed with this version of how proposals might be worked out. As he said "one tests the water better by a limited proposal". He went on to suggest that if referee groupings sprang into being on both sides they might conceivably develop into something different from International Commission but performing similar function. He was reluctant, however, to comment much beyond first step since as he put it one rapidly enters a "sea of speculation".

7. It is clear therefore that USA would have no repeat no objections to an approach to Poles designed to give them and their friends an opportunity to respond to balanced set of proposals. Detailed USA guarantees concerning long-term intentions would however have to wait until there was firmer idea of reactions of other side to preliminary feeler.

[A.]E. Ritchie

601.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Permanent Mission to United Nations
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la Mission permanente auprès des Nations Unies
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. Y-736
Ottawa, December 8, 1967
Confidential. Flash.
Reference: Your Tel 3875 Dec 7.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, CANFORCEHED, Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo; Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Delhi; NATO, Delhi from London. By Bag: Geneva, Moscow, Warsaw, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta from London; Bangkok, Hong Kong from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

Since impetus for renewed USA interest in bringing Vietnam before Security Council is to be found in recent passage of Senate resolution urging UN action, it seems clear that USA objective is twofold. First purpose is to meet Senate criticism that administration has

not repeat not done enough to use UN to help solve Vietnam problem, or to put it another way, to demonstrate to Senate that there is insufficient support in UN for what USA would consider balanced and constructive proposal. Second purpose is to encourage almost any political initiative, even one from which substantive results are not repeat not very likely to ensue, at a time when there is clearly dearth of constructive ideas for breaking out of present stalemate.

2. We are ready to examine carefully and sympathetically any proposal however unpromising it may seem at first glance which might possibly constitute first step on road to negotiations and thence to Vietnam settlement. Nevertheless, as I have done previously in talks with Goldberg and Rusk on September 7 and elsewhere, I must point out following reservations I hold concerning Security Council initiative as currently envisaged: (a) Hanoi, Peking and Moscow all consider that UN has no repeat no say in Vietnam problem and are therefore likely to be completely unmoved by any balanced resolution passed by Security Council. (b) Once subject is launched in Security Council, it will be very difficult to avoid amendments to resolution, e.g., in the sense of an appeal for unconditional suspension of bombing. Amendment could well be in such a form that USA would find it unacceptable but several Western powers including Canada would find it very difficult not repeat not to support. (We are less sanguine than Goldberg that USSR would refrain from so amending original resolution or would not repeat not at least strongly encourage Indians, for example, to amend it.) (c) Unless USA is prepared to suspend bombing, it is extremely unlikely that any resolution has chance of moving situation towards talks and negotiations. In short, I still have as I had last September grave doubts about the utility of this initiative. I must in all fairness warn USA that because of state of public opinion here they cannot repeat not count on Canada to support them right down the line regardless of how debate develops in Security Council.

3. If nonetheless USA is determined for whatever reason to proceed with such Security Council initiative, you may tell Goldberg in response to his specific questions: (a) that we would vote for adoption of agenda containing Vietnam item, though with no great enthusiasm; (b) that we would support simple draft resolution along lines suggested in our telegram Y-629 November 22 provided it avoided politically dangerous reference to "Geneva Accords" phrase which means very different things to USA and DRVN; (c) that in view of call which we made for suspension of bombing at UNGA this year, it would not repeat not be possible for us to speak out publicly against resolution calling for simple, unilateral cessation of bombing nor indeed publicly to attempt to modify it; our efforts therefore to work for more balanced resolution would have to be limited to behind[-the-]scenes activity.

4. We cannot repeat not guarantee that regardless of circumstances and phrasing of resolution we would be able to support USA right through to vote if USA found resolution unacceptable. Depending on its eventual wording, we might feel obliged to vote for it or possibly to abstain if it contained some offensive wording.

5. I am fully aware that our inability to promise unswerving support for USA in this matter will be a disappointment to Goldberg and may be regarded as "letting the side down". In view however of what I said privately to Goldberg and Rusk on September 7 and in the light of my own public statement of September 27 to UNGA calling for a suspension of the bombing, I do not repeat not think it will come as any surprise. Please assure Goldberg nevertheless that if USA does decide to go ahead with this initiative, we shall do our very best to influence others and to guide the wording of the resolution in a direction as helpful as possible to USA.

[Paul] Martin

602.
Telegram from Delegation to North Atlantic Council to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. 2836
Brussels, December 11, 1967
Confidential. Immediate from London.
Repeat for Information: NATO, London; Washington, Paris, Permis New York, Geneva, Delhi, Moscow from London; Tokyo, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa; Warsaw from Paris; Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Delhi.

CONVERSATION SSEA-RUSK: VIETNAM

Major part of SSEA's forty-five-minute conversation with Rusk December 11 concerned Vietnam.[113] Discussion ranged freely on numerous aspects of problem with particular reference to possible openings for peace negotiations but no repeat no striking new development emerged in USA thinking. SSEA plans to see Rusk again at some time during current NATO meeting.

2. *Possible action in Security Council*:

Rusk spoke as though USA had not repeat not made final decision to proceed with initiative in Security Council. He had no repeat no trouble with draft text under discussion between Ignatieff and Goldberg but he was clearly preoccupied with difficulties which would be created for USA if resolution were amended to call for unconditional halt to bombing. Referring to Canadian position upon which he had received word of replies to Goldberg's three questions (your telegram Y-736 December 8), Rusk said that if Canada really meant that it would have to support such an amendment he would rather have us vote against inscription of the item. He seemed, however, to remain somewhat skeptical that amendment in these terms would in fact be put forward, especially in view of Soviet and French positions. SSEA said we had grave doubts about wisdom of taking initiative at this time in Security Council and did not repeat not see how Canada could avoid supporting resolution calling for unilateral cessation of bombing. He asked Rusk's opinion of suggestion made privately by Harmel to the effect that Security Council discussion might be managed along lines of recent Council negotiations on Middle East, with object of seeking agreement on appointment of mediator or special representative. Rusk, without showing any marked enthusiasm, said something to effect that he would not repeat not object to such an outcome. SSEA remarked that North Vietnamese and Russians would probably not repeat not cooperate, and Rusk indicated agreement.

3. *Miki ideas*:

SSEA sought Rusk's personal assessment of Miki's idea about mutual assurances. Rusk said that Miki's idea was good in principle but he was skeptical as to its feasibility. SSEA said that the more he looked at Miki's idea, the more doubtful he became as to its prospects. Nevertheless, he had promised Miki to explore possibilities and with this in mind Canadian Government was consulting "certain other countries". He gave the impression that these consultations would be completed before any approach was made to Poland. Rusk concluded discussion on this point by remarking that USA had no repeat no objections whatever to attempts at contacts with Hanoi but he thought Miki's idea was a "one to one thousand shot".

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[113] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. XII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2001), document 345.

4. *Bebler initiative*:

SSEA recalled earlier correspondence with Bebler. Now Bebler had sought to bridge differences revealed in previous exchanges of correspondence. Bebler's idea was to seek an agreement "to begin to stop the war at a given date".[114] The bombing would stop on the given date but the process of ending the war might stretch out considerably. Rusk did not repeat not comment directly on Bebler's suggestion, but at a later stage in conversation rather went out of his way to say that he liked the idea of two Co-Chairmen and the three Commission members making themselves available for whatever contacts or good offices might seem appropriate. He seemed unimpressed with the likelihood of any effective mediatory action by Bebler personally, remarking that relations between Hanoi and Yugoslavia were not repeat not good.

5. *USA position on bombing*:

Rusk remarked that USA minimum position was set forth in President's San Antonio speech. Rusk's summary of position was that bombing would stop if USA could be sure that prompt and productive talks would follow. There might be room for argument about term "productive" but USA attached special importance to talks taking place promptly. Second important point Rusk went on to say was that Hanoi might take advantage of cessation of bombing to build up their military position in the South. SSEA asked if San Antonio speech was in fact a shift in policy from position taken by Goldberg in UNGA in September/66. Rusk again avoided direct answer but said San Antonio speech was designed to give other side the chance to make a reciprocal move *de facto* rather than by agreement. Rusk said that despite obvious importance of San Antonio speech, Hanoi had not repeat not even asked for clarification of amplification of key passages. Significance of this to Rusk was that Hanoi already knew what USA meant by not repeat not taking advantage of cessation of bombing. He referred to discussions between Hanoi and Vietcong on "fight and negotiate strategy" purpose of which was to mount propaganda to get rid of bombing and then go ahead with the war. By way of illustrating Hanoi's current mood Rusk mentioned that two divisions were currently moving into South Vietnam, one from Laos.

6. SSEA asked Rusk what were chances of "pause". Rusk's immediate reaction was difficult to interpret. He commented only that if South Vietnamese decided on pause it would not repeat not be announced in advance. SSEA said that if there were a chance of a cessation of the bombing this could change the outlook for discussion of Vietnam in the Security Council. Prospects of success from USA point of view would be improved if bombing halt was *fait accompli* before debate started. Rusk said that Hanoi would ask if cessation of bombing was permanent and if USA refused to answer, Hanoi would say that it was faced with an ultimatum. Rusk did not repeat not, however, express direct opposition to idea of linking initiative in Security Council with possible halt in bombing.

7. *Vietnam and Cambodia*:

SSEA inquired whether USA might encourage South Vietnamese to improve relations with Sihanouk as part of effort to prevent use of Cambodian territory by North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Rusk said USA was constantly looking for ways to help Sihanouk to keep Communists out of Cambodia. They had sent certain info to Sihanouk recently and Sihanouk had been somewhat quieter since. Rusk did not repeat not pick up SSEA's suggestion that South Vietnamese relationship with Cambodia might hold promise of some cooperation in border control.

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[114] See next document./Voir le document suivant.

8. *Safety of Commission personnel*:

SSEA spoke along lines of brief emphasizing danger to courier plane and to personnel serving in Hanoi. Rusk asked about exact location of Canadians in Hanoi and SSEA undertook to obtain details. Rusk said that there had been no repeat no recent bombing of Gia Lam Airfield. For months now USA bombers had been under instructions not repeat not to drop bombs within ten nautical miles of centre of Hanoi. He wondered if danger both to Commission aircraft and to personnel did not repeat not stem as much from trigger-happiness of local defences. At same time Rusk expressed readiness to examine the matter further.

603.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. Y-742
Ottawa, December 11, 1967
Confidential. Routine.
Reference: Our Tel Y-633 Oct 24.
Repeat for Information: Permis New York, London, Warsaw, Paris, Geneva, CANFORCEHED, Moscow, Delhi, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, NATO.

VIETNAM: WFUNA INITIATIVE

Prime Minister has now received further letter from Bebler dated November 28. Identical letters have been sent to Heads of Government of Britain, USSR, Poland and India and to Presidents Johnson and Ho Chi Minh. Text of letter and Prime Minister's acknowledgement going forward by bag.

2. In latest letter Bebler says that those who refused his previous proposal of five-power meeting did so because they were unwilling to enter into negotiations about Vietnam while bombing continued. He now seeks to break out of vicious circle which he describes as follows: "Whether negotiations can start while the bombing continues or whether the bombing can stop while there are no negotiations". To this end he has put forward three propositions which read as follows: 1. The Heads of Government of the five powers and the Presidents of the United States and of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam agree to choose a date in the near future to be the date of the beginning of the end of the war in Vietnam. 2. The President of the United States agrees that he will order the bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to be definitely stopped on that day. 3. The Heads of Government of the five powers agree to hold on that day the opening session of the five-power meeting with the sole object of organizing without delay negotiations and/or a conference on peace in Vietnam.

3. In view of negative reactions of USSR, Poland and India to Bebler's previous proposals and in view of refusal to date of President of USA to take "calculated risk" of suspending bombing of North Vietnam without advance commitment regarding North Vietnamese response we are rather skeptical that Bebler's latest variation holds out very hopeful prospects. We are also unclear as to significance of Bebler's first proposition in sense that we do not know whether it consists merely of choosing some date on the calendar or whether it is inferred that USA and DRVN would stop doing certain things as of that date in addition to cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.

4. We are nevertheless anxious to examine all proposals regarding Vietnam even those which at first glance may not appear promising. We would therefore ask recipients of this telegram in Washington, London, Warsaw, Moscow and Delhi to seek reactions of respective foreign ministries to latest Bebler proposals. While it may not be feasible for Candel Saigon or Permrep Hanoi to seek to obtain DRVN reaction, we would appreciate it if they would be watching particularly for any reaction which may appear in North Vietnamese press.

604.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to Japan
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade au Japon
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. Y-744
Ottawa, December 11, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Our Tels Y-717 Dec 1 and Y-718 Dec 5 and Washington Tel 4573 Dec 8.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, Permis New York, Geneva, NATO, Delhi.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE CANADIAN-JAPANESE INITIATIVES

You will see from Washington reference telegram that while Americans have expressed some interest in Miki proposal and Canadian modification of it as possible way of finding out what Russians are prepared to do to facilitate negotiations, USA seems not repeat not to be prepared to fall in with our idea that it agree to allow us to inform Communist side of fact that USA is ready to set out detailed guarantee concerning its long-term intentions in area. Bundy has in fact turned our proposal around by saying that if we could obtain from Poles speaking on behalf of Hanoi guarantees as to Hanoi's willingness to enter into constructive and meaningful negotiations and not repeat not take advantage of cessation of bombing then Canada and Japan could express their conviction that they could obtain confidential, up-to-date and binding USA statement concerning long-term intentions.

2. Would you please now pursue this matter at appropriate level in Foreign Ministry explaining that we attempted to get some advance commitment out of USA as to their side of guarantee and were in effect met with suggestion that we try to get Hanoi side of guarantee first. Please enquire whether Japanese consider that it would be worthwhile to make approach to Poles under these circumstances. Our own assessment is that it will be much more difficult to interest Poles in these proposals when we from our side are unable to give any advance commitments about American side of guarantees. With a view however to pursuing any possible road which might lead towards Vietnam negotiations we would at official level be prepared to recommend to SSEA that exploratory approach be made to Poles to see whether there is any sign of willingness there to cooperate.

3. In view of fact that after Miki visit to Ottawa there was some public reference to possible Canadian-Japanese initiative with respect to Vietnam we wonder whether Japanese would agree that it might be desirable if both countries were to approach Poles more or less simultaneously to sound them out. If so, then presumably there would be no great difficulty in instructing Canadian and Japanese Embassies in Warsaw to co-ordinate their approaches and perhaps at approximately same time to call Polish Ambassadors in Tokyo and Ottawa in to the two ministries to back up approach being made in Warsaw itself.

4. We would appreciate learning as soon as possible Japanese estimate of how we might most usefully proceed from this point.

605.
Telegram from Ambassador to Japan to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur au Japon au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. 1487
Tokyo, December 14, 1967
Confidential. Priority.
Reference: Your Tel Y-744 Dec 11.
Repeat for Information: Washington, London, Paris, Permis New York, Geneva (Priority) from Ottawa; NATO, Delhi (Priority) from London.
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow from London; Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Ottawa.

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE CANADIAN-JAPANESE INITIATIVES

In order to maintain momentum, I considered that appropriate level for an approach to the Gaimusho would be Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba who, being already familiar with the Miki proposals, could consult directly with his minister while concurrently requesting at the bureau level an analysis of the factors which are relevant from a Japanese stand-point. Kiuchi of Asian Affairs Bureau was present with Ushiba and Pope accompanied me. With reference to your telegram Y-718 December 5 to Washington, I should explain that Suzuki of the Research and Analysis Division is without responsibility for Vietnam policy and while in Ottawa was speaking from a brief prepared for his use by Kiuchi.

2. I referred to Canada's interest, as conveyed to Mr. Miki during his Ottawa visit, in the idea of reciprocal guarantees and explained that as a first and in our view essential step, we had held conversations with officials in Washington to explore the extent of USA willingness to make "a real contribution to the exercise" along the lines set out in your telegram Y-717 December 1 to Washington. I conveyed to Ushiba the gist of Bundy's reaction together with your comment that our proposal would seem to have been turned around. I emphasized that Bundy had no repeat no objection to an approach being made in confidence to sound out the willingness of the Poles to cooperate in organizing a group of guarantors and that Bundy had in fact stated it would be one way of ascertaining whether USSR was prepared to facilitate any negotiations.

3. Canada was still ready at the official level, I explained, to consider an exploratory approach to the Poles but before raising the question at the ministerial level, we would like to know whether Japan would judge an approach at this time and in the existing circumstances to be worthwhile.

4. Ushiba seemed neither surprized nor disappointed that we had received only limited encouragement from Bundy whom Japanese officials regard as less receptive than many in the State Department to outside initiatives on Vietnam. Ushiba agreed with Bundy's view that if we did undertake this first step, it would have the merit of gauging the degree of Russian interest in helping negotiations to begin.

5. Japanese officials hold the view that the Poles are unlikely to display much interest if we are unable to provide any info about a probable USA response and in fact there would be no repeat no purpose in establishing in cooperation with the Poles the type of machinery envisaged if it later developed that the participating countries would have nothing of substance to communicate. Ushiba thought that in talking to the Poles we could at least refer to the San Antonio speech, the Manila communiqué and Goldberg's speech at the UN as public statements of USA policy which USA could hardly retract. He added however that "we have no repeat no new material". There is the further consideration that the Japanese believe some of the language in these USA statements require clarification.

6. Ushiba thought the present might not repeat not be an opportune time for confidential discussions with the Poles, coming so soon after Gromyko's visit to Warsaw when, he understood, a tough line was agreed, particularly on Germany but also in respect of Vietnam.

7. Ushiba said he would wish to talk to his Minister but could not repeat not speculate on what Mr. Miki's conclusions might be. We both agreed that a decision concerning the next step to be taken, if any, should not repeat not be too long delayed because the approaching holiday season will interrupt work in all of the capitals concerned. Here in Tokyo, for example, the Gaimusho will be closed from December 27 until at least January 4.

8. Now that the Japanese have learned of Canadian conversations in Washington, it would not repeat not be unusual for them to ask their own Embassy to probe the matter with USA officials. This would be consistent with their policy of immediately drawing their representatives abroad actively into any current discussions. In that event, there is the risk that USA officials, not repeat not wishing to discourage the Japanese in one of their first political initiatives, will respond in a more encouraging way than they would in their franker discussions with Canadians.

[H.O.] Moran

606.
Telegram from Ambassador to Japan to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur au Japon au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. 1503
Tokyo, December 19, 1967
Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington from Ottawa.

MUTUAL GUARANTEES

Tonight Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba called me to the Gaimusho and handed me a memo classified secret, text of which follows:

"Vietnam peace proposal:

(1) At some time before Xmas, the Japanese and the Canadian Governments respectively will make the following proposal, as agreed between the two Governments, to the Government of Poland, simultaneously through the Polish diplomatic missions in Tokyo and Ottawa.

The fighting in Vietnam continues without any visible prospect of its coming to an end. This fact is not repeat not only a tragedy from a humanitarian point of view, but also a constant source of threat to world peace. We believe that a misunderstanding of the intention of the other party [o]r inability to judge it are the main obstacles to the initiation of talks for a settlement. We earnestly desire that peace will be brought about in this region at the earliest possible date. We hope, therefore, that a negotiated settlement can be achieved through better mutual understanding between the parties concerned. We are firmly convinced that the sending of troops to South Vietnam by the USA is for the purpose of securing the freedom and independence of South Vietnam. The Government of the USA has stated publicly on a number of occasions that it does not repeat not desire to retain USA troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured and that it does not repeat not want any bases there. The USA has also stated publicly that it supports free elections in South Vietnam in order to enable the people to establish a Government of their own choice; that the question of reunification of Vietnam should be left to the free decision of the Vietnamese themselves; and that South Vietnam can be non-aligned or neutral, if that be its option. We have no repeat no doubt that the above-mentioned points are the true intentions of the USA. We believe that these points will definitely be realized if peace is attained through negotiations. We are well aware that North

Vietnam demands the unconditional cessation of the bombing of the North as a prerequisite to any negotiation. We also believe that the USA cannot repeat not readily agree to stop the bombing of the North because it is not repeat not certain whether such step will lead to negotiations and also because it fears that North Vietnam might take advantage of the cessation to increase the infiltration from the North. In view of the foregoing, would it be possible for your Government, together with the Governments of any other East European countries as might be considered appropriate by your Government to ascertain whether North Vietnam is willing to come promptly to the conference table, without taking advantage of the bombing cessation to intensify infiltration to the South once the bombing of the North is stopped? Should there be any meaningful and reliable indication by North Vietnam of such willingness, the Japanese Government together with the Canadian Government, will seek to persuade the USA to cease the bombing of the North unconditionally. In the event this is realized, the Government of Poland would naturally be requested in inviting North Vietnam to take action on the basis of such indication. Xmas or the new year offers a good opportunity for carrying out this proposal. Since the matter is very urgent, we urge your Government to make every possible effort, with due regard for our strong desire for peace. We also ask you to inform us immediately of any reaction on the part of North Vietnam.

(2) If Poland, acting upon our proposal, informs us, after sounding out North Vietnam, of a favourable response, Japan and Canada jointly and immediately will seek to call upon the USA to cease the bombing of North Vietnam. In the event Poland refuse[s] to use its good offices or North Vietnam responds negatively, both Japan and Canada will continue to seek to contact Poland with patience (or North Vietnam through Poland in the latter's case) to obtain its favourable reaction to our proposal."

2. Immediately following telegram† reports discussion of this memo with Ushiba.

[H.O.] Moran

607.
Telegram from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Japan
Télégramme du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade au Japon
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/21

No. Y-778
Ottawa, December 20, 1967
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tels 1503 and 1504† Dec 19.
Repeat for Information: Washington.

VIETNAM: MUTUAL GUARANTEES

Please inform Ushiba that we are giving careful consideration to ideas (and memo) discussed with you. Promptness with which Japanese have responded to our request for clarification is particularly gratifying.

2. Although we will shortly wish to take up Ushiba's offer to consider any amendments we might propose to text of memo, our main reservation at the moment relates to timing of project. In our view, a number of uncertainties for the immediate future indicate that we might be wiser to postpone any joint action to be taken until early in new year. Absence of President Johnson from USA might complicate matters from Washington's point of view. At the same time, outcome of recent U.S. consideration of possible Security Council action cannot be foreseen with accuracy, although it is reasonable to expect that firm decision one way or another will have been taken by early January. We are sure Japanese would agree with us that it might be unhelpful if the mutual guarantees exercise were launched and then overtaken by onset of Security Council discussion. Finally, we at least do not know for sure

what plans USA may have for holiday season bombing suspension. If a limited pause is to be instituted, it would clearly not contribute to success of joint Canadian-Japanese efforts to have it resumed in the midst of our approach to the Poles or while Poles might be discussing the plan with Moscow and Hanoi. Such a development might well only provide Poles with ready-made excuse for totally negative reply.

3. All things considered, we thus believe that a slight postponement would be in best interests of all concerned. Depending on what happens over next two weeks, it might be necessary to introduce some modifications into the project to take into account any significant changes in overall situation. One other possibility comes to mind. We might wish to give thought to timing our approach to Poles (after careful preparation) to tie in with traditional Lunar New Year truce arrangements in early February in which event it is conceivable that what would be asked of USA would not be cessation of bombing but prolongation of a suspension which would already (we assume on basis of past precedents) be in effect.

[Marcel] Cadieux

608.
Memorandum from Head, Latin American Division, to Far Eastern Division
Note du chef de la Direction de l'Amérique latine à la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] December 26, 1967

APOSTOLIC DELEGATE'S CALL ON THE MINISTER, DECEMBER 21

On December 21, the Apostolic Delegate, Msgr. Clarizio, called on the Minister to leave with him a copy of the Pope's recent message.[115] As Msgr. Clarizio had just returned from a brief visit to Cuba, the Minister asked me to be present. Most of the interview was taken up with a presentation on Cuba by Msgr. Clarizio but, both at the beginning and at the end, there were some references to Vietnam in the context of the broader problem of preserving world peace.

2. Both the Minister and Msgr. Clarizio hoped that President Johnson would visit the Vatican on his way back from Australia. Msgr. Clarizio was of the opinion that such a visit by the President would be more important than another visit by him to Vietnam. The Minister commented that it is, of course, only natural for the President to wish to visit Vietnam where forces of which he is the Commander-in-Chief are fighting.

3. In acknowledging the copy of the Pope's message left with him by Msgr. Clarizio, the Minister paid tribute to the Pope's efforts on behalf of peace. He went on to say that Canada is the only country in the western world which is really speaking out on the Vietnam issue. The communist countries, the Minister added, are also disappointingly cautious in their efforts on behalf of peace in Vietnam.

4. After having remarked that the press reports of the Prime Minister's latest suggestion on Vietnam were misleading,[116] the Minister once again asserted that in his view the only way to move toward peace in Vietnam is to stop the bombing "period" and then wait to see what happens. The Minister repeated this statement at the end of the interview and Msgr. Clarizio said that he would report the Minister's views to the Vatican.

P.A. Bridle

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[115] See/Voir "Text of Pope Paul's Christmas Message Broadcast to the World," *New York Times*, 24 December 1967, p. 2.

[116] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 5, p. 5667.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 2e session, vol. 5, p. 5667.

609.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

No. Y-16
Ottawa, January 9, 1968
Secret. Immediate.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Immediate).

VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS: DRVN POSITION

I should like you to proceed to Hanoi on earliest available courier flight to present to DRVN Foreign Minister a letter from me (text in following telegram,† signed original being forwarded by bag for subsequent delivery to PAVN Liaison Mission by Permrep) and to sound out North Vietnamese authorities on their current attitude towards negotiations.

2. My immediate concern is to seek confirmation of remarks reported to have been made at Mongolian reception [in] Hanoi a few days ago by Foreign Minister Trinh to the effect that NVN "will" enter into talks with USA "on the questions concerned", after USA has stopped bombing unconditionally and all other acts of war against NVN.[117] If Trinh has been accurately reported, this is first time such an unequivocal connection has been drawn by DRVN between a cessation of bombing and agreement to talk. If DRVN means what this says, it would appear to go a long way towards meeting the USA position spelled out by President Johnson at San Antonio on September 29. Concept of "disadvantage" in that speech is not easy to define in concrete terms and it may be that it was left imprecise to give USA Government as much leeway as possible in ability to accept North Vietnamese agreement to talk in return for stopping bombing. Without referring directly to this concept, however, I have noted, in my letter to Trinh, possibility of DZ being re-demilitarized under effective Commission control as a means by which Commission could be helpful to the two sides while talks (if they get started) continue, in interests of providing some element of reciprocal confidence. Acceptance of this form of Commission involvement by NVN would not require any special concession on their part. It would only mean extending cooperation to Commission in carrying out its legitimate functions (i.e., DZ control) which have been made impossible by military actions by both sides in the region. If, however, North Vietnamese have any other practicable suggestions about ways in which Commission could be helpful in relation to situation which would come about if bombing stopped and talks started, we would be prepared to give their suggestions immediate attention and to seek cooperation of Commission partners in implementing them.

3. In view of position Canada has taken on question of cessation of bombing, and on political usefulness of Commission, I regard it as matter of urgency that we obtain as much clarification as possible on these questions, of which first is obviously most immediately relevant.

4. On arrival in Hanoi you should inform PAVN Liaison Mission that you have been asked to deliver a letter to Foreign Minister Trinh, and you should make every effort to ensure that you see him personally, using the interview to draw him out as much as possible on these crucial questions.

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[117] See/Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), document 451 (Editorial Note); *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 1055–1057.

5. It would also be useful for us to have your assessment of reactions of key members of Hanoi diplomatic corps.

6. If questions arise locally about your trip to Hanoi, you should say that it is routine visit, but that you will of course attempt to discuss North Vietnamese Government's current position regarding negotiations with Hanoi leaders. You should find an opportunity to explain privately to SVN Foreign Minister that you will be carrying letter from me to Trinh seeking confirmation of his reported statement. In doing so, you should tell Dr. Do that I would be most interested in his own reaction to what appears to be a change of position by Hanoi.

7. In due course, it may be desirable that existence of letter become public knowledge, but I would prefer to have this come about here.

For Washington:

8. You should inform State Department of Dier's visit to Hanoi along lines of paragraph 6 above.

[Paul] Martin

610.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Japan
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade au Japon
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

No. Y-30
Ottawa, January 9, 1968
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel 15† Jan 9.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Warsaw.

VIETNAM MUTUAL GUARANTEES

I would be grateful if you could convey following message to Foreign Minister Miki as soon as possible. Begins: Since our meeting here in Ottawa in November, I have as you know been taking a close personal interest in the "mutual guarantees" project we discussed at that time. It is clear that our thinking on these matters has a good deal in common and I was particularly gratified that we were able to reach agreement so readily on the draft memorandum to be used as a basis for approaching the Poles.

2. If it had not repeat not been for the year-end statement by the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, I would have been prepared to take immediate joint action along the lines we have been discussing in an attempt to see whether an effort by third parties might have been helpful in establishing an atmosphere in which contacts between the two sides might have been undertaken.

3. In the light of Foreign Minister Trinh's statement however, it seems to me that the most immediate requirement has now become one of seeking authoritative confirmation that the Government of North Vietnam will in fact enter into productive talks if the bombing stops. With this end in view, I wanted to let you know personally that I have today instructed the Canadian Commissioner in Vietnam to proceed to Hanoi immediately to seek such confirmation from the Foreign Minister. If this is forthcoming, it may be possible, in my view, for other governments to exercise their influence in a constructive way in relation to the formula in question. In all the circumstances, it has seemed to me that prompt action is desirable and that an attempt should be made to clarify at first hand, that is, with the North Vietnamese themselves, whether a statement made at a diplomatic reception is to be regarded as a firm policy commitment.

4. I would therefore be interested to know whether you would be prepared to postpone joint action along the lines envisaged until such time as our Commissioner has carried out his assignment. At that time, I believe that we would be in a better position to judge what the next step may be in circumstances which seem to be changing if in fact they have not repeat not already undergone a significant change. If, for example, it proves possible for both sides to agree to a "bargain" involving a cessation of the bombing in return for the beginning of talks, the concept of mutual guarantees might well have considerable utility, not repeat not so much as a technique for creating an atmosphere in which talks might begin, but rather as a means of establishing and maintaining an element of mutual confidence while talks are continuing.

5. Alternatively, if current soundings of North Vietnamese attitudes and related efforts to get talks started prove unproductive it would be for consideration whether a renewed effort might not repeat not usefully be made at the time of the Lunar New Year in February.

6. I realize that my suggestion for a postponement of joint action by Canada and Japan may be difficult for you to agree to, and in the circumstances you may decide that you will have to proceed unilaterally, at least with preliminary consultations with the U.S.A. to determine the latter's views on the desirability of pushing ahead at the moment with the initiative we have been considering.

7. If you do so decide, I should be most grateful if you could keep me informed and in turn will do the same with respect to our own soundings in Hanoi.

8. Let me reiterate my belief that whatever developments take place in the immediate future, I continue to regard the general concept of mutual guarantees as a potentially useful one, and I think we should keep in close touch on this aspect (no repeat no less than others) of the Vietnam problem to determine whether there is anything our two countries can do, individually or jointly, to help advance the cause of peace in Vietnam. Ends.

[Paul] Martin

611.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

Secret.
[Ottawa,] January 10, 1968

VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS – DIER'S VISIT TO HANOI
TO EXPLORE DRVN POSITION

You will have noted from Washington telegram 140† of January 9 (copy attached) that yesterday afternoon our Ambassador informed Mr. Bundy of your recent instructions to Dier and the terms of the letter which Dier will be delivering in Hanoi.

Bundy's main point appears well taken. Because of the consultations we had with the Americans prior to and following our earlier efforts to sound out North Vietnamese attitudes, there is a clear possibility that the North Vietnamese might regard Dier's present assignment as more closely related, in direct terms, to U.S. diplomatic activities than is in fact the case. Such an assumption on their part could conceivably influence their reactions to Dier's presentation no less than their reactions to other current American initiatives of which we are not aware.

In the circumstances therefore I believe that it would be wise to instruct Dier to emphasize, in his oral presentation in both Saigon and Hanoi, the exclusively Canadian character of this initiative and the fact that it is being carried out without consultation with (i.e., approval by) the U.S. Government.

Attached for your signature if you agree is a telegram† in this sense to Saigon.[118]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

612.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] January 10, 1968

VIETNAM – BEBLER PROPOSALS

In accordance with your instructions, we have been continuing our enquiries, among the interested parties, with a view to assessing reactions to the second Bebler letter. Unlike the first Bebler proposal which we and others saw as potentially useful, the second initiative does not appear to have been seen by any of the governments concerned as offering a basis on which a new approach could realistically be developed. The British for example were fairly categorical in their assertion that, in their view, there was "no point in pursuing this particular initiative". The Indians for their part showed a notable lack of interest. On the basis of his discussions with the Soviet Foreign Ministry, our Ambassador reported that it was clear that the Bebler proposal was "a non-starter as far as the Russians were concerned", and without Soviet (and Polish) co-operation, of course, the whole initiative could come to nothing.

As far as Washington is concerned, the position taken has involved emphasis on the need to obtain from Hanoi some firm commitment to enter into talks if the bombing stops. It seems clear from this, which follows logically from the President's San Antonio speech, that if Washington is satisfied that talks will come about after the bombing stops, the beginnings will have been created for direct bilateral contacts between North Vietnam and the U.S.A. – in which event the intended purpose of both Bebler initiatives will have been realized. At the moment, therefore, the main substantive focus of interest has come to rest on the Trinh statement, and until this, as well as the North Vietnamese attitudes which surround it, can be assessed with greater accuracy, it appears to us that there is little advantage to be drawn from pursuing other approaches.[119]

M[arcel] C[adieux]

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[118] Marginal notes:/Notes marginales :
Signed and sent Jan. 11. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]
Seen by Minister and approved. 11/1/68 A.S. M[cGill]

[119] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Minister agrees. We should take no further action for time being on this matter. 11/1/68 A.S. M[cGill]

613.
Telegram from Ambassador to Japan to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur au Japon au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

No. 28
Tokyo, January 12, 1968
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-30† Jan 11.
Repeat for Information: Washington from Ottawa; Warsaw from Paris.

VIETNAM – MUTUAL GUARANTEES

I saw Foreign Minister Miki this afternoon to deliver the message contained in your reference telegram and found him somewhat weary having just emerged from several hours of wrangling with the Finance Minister and Treasury over the proposed reductions in the 1968-69 budget for his Ministry. However, he reacted with interest when he learned the subject was Vietnam which next to development assistance to Southeast Asia has a priority claim on his attention.

2. His deepening frown and occasional grunt as he studied the message suggested he did not repeat not like what he was reading and lest he might be pondering whether Canada was making a unilateral move on what he has always regarded as a Miki initiative, I explained that the ICC provided one of the few direct links to Hanoi and was a channel which Canada had used on any occasion which seemed appropriate. In this instance it offered to the Canadian Commissioner a speedy means to seek confirmation that there was an authoritative base for the reported statement of Nguyen Duy Trinh. If such info could be obtained it would be valuable to both Canada and Japan in determining what their next joint steps might be. After some discussion of the contents of your message and a review of your contemplated timetable, Mr. Miki said that your proposals were acceptable to him.

3. He said "the crux of the matter lies in Hanoi" because both Canada and Japan know that the USA earnestly desires an early and just solution to the war in Vietnam but neither of us is aware of the true attitude of Hanoi. The reported statement of Trinh might be important or it might have no repeat no significance whatever. Japan had been endeavouring to obtain a reliable assessment through its representatives in Laos, Cambodia and Moscow but so far nothing helpful had been uncovered. Canada through its Commissioner on the ICC, who enjoyed direct access to Hanoi, was in a more favourable position than Japan to seek confirmation that the Trinh statement reflected official DRVN policy. He concurred in your action in requesting the Canadian Commissioner to proceed to Hanoi for this purpose.

4. Miki agreed also to postponement of joint action along the lines earlier discussed until after our Commissioner had visited Hanoi. Miki said he would be most grateful if he could be supplied as soon as possible with a report of the talks the Commissioner might have.

5. Miki said it would not repeat not be his intention to consult Washington at this time about the desirability of Japan either alone or in concert with others making an approach to the Poles because in his view it would be preferable for Canada and Japan to act jointly in any effort to obtain guarantors on the other side.

6. Mr. Miki told me that the British Foreign Secretary in their conversations two days ago had been unable to supply any factual info about Hanoi's intentions. Brown described the Trinh remarks as "an important statement which deserved careful investigation and study". Brown said that in his conversations with Rusk he expected to learn and would report to Miki such conclusions as the Americans may have reached.

7. Brown had expressed the personal view that Hanoi was now much less certain that the November elections would produce a victory for the doves in the USA and this may have been an influencing factor in prompting a statement such as Trinh is said to have made. Miki was inclined to share this opinion.

8. Mr. Miki asked that I convey his gratitude for your personal message and said he would look forward to further exchanges just as soon as the time is right to consider the next step. I replied that Mr. Martin would, as he had pointed out in his message, keep Mr. Miki fully informed but it might be several days before Dier could obtain an appointment with the authorities in Hanoi.

[H.O.] Moran

614.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to Japan
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade au Japon
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

No. Y-111
Ottawa, January 22, 1968
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel 68† Jan 19.

VIETNAM – MUTUAL GUARANTEES

After making an earlier unsuccessful attempt to proceed with Hanoi assignment (unsuccessful because courier aircraft was unable to complete Vientiane-Hanoi part of its run), Dier arrived in North Vietnamese capital January 19. We expect that visit may be of about one week's duration (but this will depend of course on a number of factors including flight schedules) and we do not/not expect full report from him until after his return to Saigon. You may so inform Japanese but we would prefer to avoid discussing nature of his instructions with the Japanese for the moment.

615.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

Unnumbered/Non numéroté
Saigon, January 24, 1968
Top Secret. Flash.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Flash) from Ottawa.[120]

Following message dispatched by Dier on courier aircraft:

"At four p.m. January 23 I was received by Foreign Minister Trinh to give him your letter. Reception was cordial and talk lasted for an hour. Foreign Minister had studied your letter carefully and as usual expressed appreciation for your interest in the cause of the peace.

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[120] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
See our tel[egram] Y-124† Jan. 25 to Saigon. [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

He then made four points concerning the letter: (1) That his statement of December 29 was a clarification of the policy he had enunciated in January/67 and that the worldwide interest this recent statement had created showed clearly that the Vietnamese people are gaining support in many countries in its struggle against the American aggressors. (2) Only by positive acts would an atmosphere of confidence be engendered so that conversations might begin and in reply to my question "positive acts" must include unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of aggression. (3) Any change in the status of the demilitarized zone must be in accord with the Geneva Agreement and such a change cannot/not take place as long as USA aggression in the DMZ continues; insofar as any useful role for the ICC is concerned he reiterated the old cliché that if it cannot/not do anything positive it should not/not do anything negative, adding that his Government always cooperated with the Commission and would continue to do so although any useful action should wait for a more appropriate occasion. Concerning the last point, he raised the question about Canada as a member of the Commission illegally selling arms to the USA.

2. In summary Trinh made it clear that the basic position of the DRVN concerning cessation of bombing has not repeat not changed but they feel they have gained a lot of propaganda yardage by a simple exercise in semantics. As far as the ICC is concerned the DRVN wishes the status quo to continue.

3. In reply to my question, the Foreign Minister said that matter of a written reply to your letter would be considered when the original is received. We agreed that before the existence of the message or its contents are made public our two offices should consult to ensure compatibility."

616.
Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

Secret.
[Ottawa,] January 24, 1968

VIETNAM: DRVN NEGOTIATING POSITION

You will have seen from Saigon's telegram today (attached) that Dier was cordially received by Foreign Minister Trinh yesterday and that your letter was delivered personally.

2. This is the first report we have had from Dier, who is still in Hanoi, and I expect that we will be receiving further information about his other discussions and his general impressions of the North Vietnamese position after he has returned to Saigon. It is therefore difficult to attempt anything more than a preliminary assessment at this stage.

3. Although Dier's interview with Trinh seems to have gone smoothly, the main impression of North Vietnamese policy emerging from Dier's report is not encouraging. There appears to be little flexibility in Hanoi's position in the sense that Trinh referred to his recent statement as a "clarification" of his interview a year ago with Burchett. If words mean anything in Hanoi, the change from "could" to "will" is clearly a substantive one, yet this is not the emphasis the Foreign Minister has put on it. Moreover, he seemed satisfied that reactions around the world to his December 29 statement suggested increasing support for Hanoi's position.

4. Against the background of this general attitude, it is interesting to note that the Foreign Minister made no reference to how long after the bombing stopped talks would start, nor to the first matters to be discussed once talks are undertaken. Similarly there was no indication

whatsoever of what gestures of military restraint Hanoi might be prepared to consider while talks were continuing. We have always thought that greatly increased surveillance of the Demilitarized Zone by the Commission might be a useful technique in this connection, but you will note that Trinh seemed to dismiss the potential usefulness of the Zone and the Commission in routine North Vietnamese terms, suggesting that they have done little or no rethinking of their position on these questions. This impression is reinforced by the fact that Trinh raised the question of Canadian sales of military equipment to the U.S.A. This is so much a feature of the established North Vietnamese position that its repetition in the interview with Dier has no political significance – except that it indicates yet again how difficult it is to get the North Vietnamese to discuss substantive political matters in terms other than propaganda phrases and concepts.[121]

5. It is thus difficult to avoid the preliminary impression that if there has been any movement in Hanoi's position, it has been strongly influenced by the requirements for a more forthcoming international image; substantive flexibility with respect to the issues at stake is no more apparent now than before.

6. If you agree, I think we might wait until Dier's subsequent reports are received before discussing his visit with the Americans.

M[arcel] C[adieux]

617.
Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/22

No. 151
Hanoi, January 25, 1968
Confidential.
Repeat for Information: London, Washington, Paris, Geneva, Canberra, CANFORCEHED; Delhi from London.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh from Ottawa.
For SSEA.

DELIVERY OF SSEA LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER

By the time this report reaches Ottawa, it will no repeat no doubt be sent direct to Historical Research because I had hoped it could be despatched from Saigon many days ago on my scheduled return from Hanoi.[122] However, as I had promised a fuller report in my reference message,[123] this is at least for the record. I will try not repeat not to repeat the points made in

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[121] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
No comment by Minister. 31/1/68 A.S. M[cGill]

[122] It seems that Dier never changed the date on this report, which he had been drafting for a couple of weeks. He returned to Saigon on 9 February, added the last paragraphs on 10 February, and Saigon telegram 151 was received in Ottawa a few days later. See docs 622, 623.
Il semble que Dier n'a jamais modifié la date de ce rapport, qu'il rédigeait depuis quelques semaines. Il est retourné à Saïgon le 9 février, a ajouté les derniers paragraphes le 10 février, puis le télégramme nº 151 de Saïgon a été reçu à Ottawa quelques jours plus tard. Voir doc. 622, 623.

[123] This is likely a reference to doc. 615.
Il s'agit probablement de doc. 615.

previous message but perhaps a little more background would be useful. I should point out that Foreign Minister Trinh had an interpreter and two aides taking notes but I was not repeat not permitted to take my Permrep for the same purpose, so I have to rely on memory only.

2. After the preliminary courtesies had been exchanged, I immediately made the point that your letter and my personal delivery of it should not repeat not be construed as anything but a Canadian initiative. I stressed the point that we had consulted no repeat no other country and that neither the letter nor my words represented any views other than Canadian. I took the opportunity to remind him of Canada's commendable record in the field of peacekeeping and in particular of our long-standing concern over the Vietnamese problem as expressed through our membership in the ICC and in other ways. I also reminded him that Canada had no repeat no strategic, economic, political interest in Vietnam; our only concern has been and still is to help his country. Trinh responded by stating that he was well aware of Canada's concern and of our record over the years in this area and elsewhere in peacekeeping endeavours. He was most complimentary to you in this regard and mentioned particularly your public statements calling for the cessation of bombing.

3. Referring to your letter, he thanked me for providing him with an advance copy. He said that the fact that he had agreed to meet me soon after my arrival in Hanoi was further evidence that his Government would always be receptive to Canadian views and proposals although we should not repeat not expect it would be easy to achieve common ground. Turning specifically to the contents of your letter, he made the four points outlined in my reference telegram. Trinh spent considerable time emphasizing that his clarification statement of December 29 had engendered widespread international support for Vietnam and equally widespread condemnation of USA aggression. He is a phlegmatic individual but he became almost enthusiastic in enumerating the countries outside the socialist bloc that had acclaimed the Vietnamese "response" to the USA and then in the same manner referred to the anti-war sentiment in America which he claimed would sweep the Johnson Administration out of office in the November elections. He derided the USA concept of reciprocity as merely a trick to confuse the issue because there would never be true reciprocity between an aggressor and the victim, between right and wrong, justice and injustice.

4. On the second point concerning mutual confidence, Trinh said that such trust could only be created by positive acts, e.g., cessation of bombing, but would give no repeat no indication of the time interval required before the necessary confidence would be created in Hanoi. He referred to Johnson's State of the Union message[124] as evidence of USA intransigence and claimed that as long as this attitude prevailed in Washington, the question of confidence would be impossible to solve.

5. Turning to your suggestion concerning the DMZ, Trinh stated that creation of the zone was one of the key elements in Geneva Agreements and any alteration of the present situation must be [in] full accord with those agreements. He accused the USA of grossly violating the DMZ and it was strictly in self defence that DRVN had responded. Only if the USA forces are withdrawn from the area, artillery and air bombardment across and in the zone ceases unconditionally, will it be possible to reconstitute the DMZ into its original and legitimate state as described in the Geneva Accords.

6. There is little to add concerning his fourth point which had to do with a possible constructive role by the ICC. He made it clear that he felt the Commission had a potential role to play but emphasized that any action other than just standing by at the ready should wait for "a more appropriate occasion". His remarks concerning sale of arms to USA were

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[124] See/Voir "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 17, 1968," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–1969*, Book I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 25–33.

couched in relatively mild terms and I deemed it proper not repeat not to make a rebuttal so the question was quietly shelved. As reported, Col. Lau had already made this point on my first call but to my surprise did not repeat not bring it up again, hence my argumentation is still in reserve for another occasion.

7. February 10. Above written before interim reply to your letter received. Basic tenor of talk unchanged except that the point specifically made on written reply that the DRVN is serious with regard to talks I am certain was not repeat not stressed in our conversation. However, in my final talk with Col. Lau he also made this point which would seem to indicate that the events over Tet in SVN may have caused Hanoi to rethink their conception of the credibility gap. They are stubborn even fanatical realists and while they are obviously pleased to be able to operate from at least a propaganda position of strength, nevertheless there has developed over the past three weeks a subtle differentiation which subjunctively [subjectively] assessed may indicate that the DRVN do not repeat not wish to go so far as to make it psychologically impossible for the USA to communicate, thus leading to talks which could lead to negotiations.

8. I am leaving Hanoi with mixed feelings, some despair. Obviously developments in SVN will shape the course of future events in the North. I have now spent a full month delivering your message and while it may appear that it has been an unrewarding exercise I believe that it is incumbent on us to keep trying to do what we can to try to bring this grisly war to an end. I therefore recommend that at the earliest possible occasion you authorize another message for delivery in Hanoi.

[Ormond W.] Dier

618.
Telegram from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/23

No. Y-156
Ottawa, February 6, 1968
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-125† Jan 25.
Repeat for Information: London, Saigon (Immediate).

VIETNAM: DRVN NEGOTIATING POSITION

As you are aware, our earlier preference was to await Dier's return to Saigon and receipt of more detailed reports and assessments before making available to Americans info about his discussions in Hanoi. We had not repeat not anticipated that visit would be so prolonged. Unforeseen circumstances have, however, precluded Dier's early return to Saigon and in present unsettled situation it is at least conceivable that courier flight may not repeat not get to Hanoi even this week.

2. We have therefore concluded that it would probably be in our best interests to explain this situation to State Department and give them general oral briefing based on Dier's first report from Hanoi of discussion with Trinh (Saigon unnumbered telegram January 24) supplemented by such info from his reports of other discussions as you may think would be of interest to them (Saigon telegram 68† January 25 and Hanoi telegram CH-52† January 28). You should let State Department know that when fuller accounts are available to us, we will keep them informed.

3. For your own info we have been concerned at tendencies of the Americans in the past to make public reference to Canadian material thus made available to them. We would not repeat not wish to overemphasize embarrassment this has occasioned for Canadian Government to the point where confidential exchanges of this type of info with USA authorities would be restricted, but we would hope that you could find suitable opening in your conversation about Dier's recent discussions to request that public reference not repeat not be made to them.

[Marcel] Cadieux

619.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/23

No. 646
Washington, February 7, 1968
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-17 Jan 9.[125]
Repeat for Information: Saigon from Delhi.

VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS – DRVN POSITION

I outlined this morning to William Bundy, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, points made to Dier by Foreign Minister Trinh. I explained that we had hoped to have more detail but that since Dier was still marooned in Hanoi we thought we should provide at least bare details of NVN reactions to SSEA's letter.

2. Bundy appreciated receiving info. He expressed special interest in Dier's comment in paragraph two of Saigon telegram January 24 and gave impression that he would be careful in passing info to higher officials who would be sensitive to any evidence that Hanoi might have been engaged in propaganda exercise. He clearly was hoping that Hanoi had not/not simply been engaged in propaganda exercise or, as he put it, that USA "had been diddled all the way".

3. Bundy said he had been glad that without involving USA, SSEA had raised possibility of restoring DMZ to its original status. If circumstances developed in which progress might be made, Bundy thought SSEA's proposal could be "major first step".

4. He said that no/no progress had been made in USA probing of Trinh's December 29 statement. On other hand, he had hunch that some response had been conveyed to the intermediaries involved with instructions not/not to deliver until some later date, as yet undetermined.

5. He confirmed report appearing in *Washington Post* this morning[126] that on August 25 USA had sent to NVN formula which later was set out in President's September 29 San Antonio speech. Relevant excerpts from report by Murrey Marder (whom, Bundy said, he had "put straight") are contained in following telegram.†

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[125] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
Y-156 Feb. 6? [Author unknown/Auteur inconnu]

[126] See/Voir Murrey Marder, "Secret U.S. Bids to Hanoi Revealed: U.S. Tried Secret Bargaining With Hanoi Since Late August," *Washington Post*, 7 February 1968, p. A1.

6. Bundy said that USA is certain that current military operations were planned prior to December 29. Despite implication that Hanoi's declared willingness to talk was part of plan for military escalation, Bundy left me with impression that USA has not/not closed door on possibility of negotiations once military situation in Vietnam settles down.

[A.]E. Ritchie

620.
Telegram from Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/23

No. CH-70
Hanoi, February 7, 1968
Secret. Immediate.
Reference: My Tel CH-72.†
Repeat for Information: Washington from Ottawa.
For SSEA.

Col. Ha Van Lau called me today to present note verbale from Trinh giving text of official reply to your letter, original of which will be forwarded when your original arrives on resumption IC courier flights. No/no mention made [of] publication [at] this stage. Our comments to follow. Text reads:

"The stand of the Vietnamese people is Four Points of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the political programme of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation. It is the basis for the settlement of the Vietnam problem. The USA Government has unceasingly claimed that it wants talks with Hanoi but has not/not received any response. If it really wants talks, the USA must first of all, as was made clear in the January 28/67 statement of the Foreign Minister of the DRVN, stop unconditionally bombing and all other acts of war against DRVN; DRVN will hold talks with the USA on relevant questions. Talks will begin after an appropriate time following unconditional cessation of USA bombing and all other acts of war against DRVN. This is the time to prove that really USA has unconditionally stopped its acts of war against DRVN. Attitude of Government of DRVN with regard to these talks is serious; whether or not/not talks will bring about results, that depends on USA side.

2. Canadian Government has urged USA to stop bombing of DRVN. That is a realistic attitude. However, in statement made by Canadian representatives at UNGA on September 27/67, Canadian Government linked cessation of USA bombing raids against DRVN to "restoration of statute of demilitarized zone". Unwarranted USA bombing and other acts of war against DRVN, an independent and sovereign country, constitute a blatant act of aggression. USA must stop this act of aggression without posing any condition whatsoever. Statute of demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam is part of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam as a whole. Government of DRVN has always scrupulously respected these agreements including statute of the demilitarized zone. USA and its stooges have [for] a long time now, not/not only sabotaged statute of demilitarized zone, they have also torpedoed the whole of 1954 Geneva Agreements in a systematic way. Therefore, the question which arises is to demand that USA respect all provisions of 1954 Geneva Agreements including statute of demilitarized zone.

3. About the need for "an element of confidence between the two parties": a distinction should be drawn between USA which is aggressor and must be held responsible for Vietnam war and Vietnamese people who are victims of an aggression. USA often talks of "peace" but actually keeps intensifying war in both North and South Vietnam and even threatens to expand aggression to Cambodia and Laos. World public opinion cannot believe USA assertions about "peace". It is USA which should respond by actual deeds to demands of peoples of world including American public.

4. Up to now, Government of DRVN has always shown an attitude of serious cooperation with International Commission on basis of 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam. The Vietnamese people welcome efforts of all persons to demand that USA end the war of aggression in Vietnam and restore peace in this area."

621.
Record of Conversation between Prime Minister of United Kingdom and Prime Minister, February 10, 1968
Compte rendu de la conversation entre le premier ministre du Royaume-Uni et le premier ministre, 10 février 1968
MG26-N4, vol. 281, 846/U57 Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson – Secret

Secret.
[Ottawa,] February 12, 1968

The following were present:

Mr. Wilson's group included Sir Henry Lintott, Sir Burke Trend, Mr. A.N. Halls and Mr. M. Pallisser.

On the Canadian side, in addition to the Hon. C.M. Drury, Mr. Charles Ritchie, Mr. O.G. Stoner and the Under-Secretary were in attendance.

Vietnam

Mr. Wilson discussed Vietnam in the context of his visits both to Moscow and Washington.

At the beginning, Mr. Wilson felt that the visits had been badly timed but it turned out otherwise. In fact the Washington visit was the best that he ever had. The visit to Moscow was somewhat rushed as Mr. Kosygin had to leave for India. Furthermore, there was no opportunity to discuss Vietnam with Mr. Kosygin as thoroughly as this had been possible when he had gone to London. Polyansky had attended all the talks with Kosygin; he seemed to be very influential and on his way up. It was interesting to note also that Soviet leaders were making notes of their conversations and that each one knew when he spoke to Mr. Wilson what had transpired before in talks between Mr. Wilson and his colleagues.

Mr. Wilson had found his talks with Brezhnev of very special interest. He had displayed his usual toughness but he was, it seemed, in a very thoughtful mood and his line was less hard than it had been a couple of years ago. On Middle Eastern questions in particular, Brezhnev did not seem to be very difficult. In fact, he wanted to go beyond where the U.K. team was prepared to go. When the discussion turned to Suez, however, difficulties were encountered and the real feelings of the Soviet Government became apparent: they are of the view that Israel is too intransigent.

On Vietnam there were a number of talks, one of them particularly thorough in the course of an opera performance of "Carmen". Kosygin was willing to go further in the privacy of the State Box at the Opera House than he could at more formal meetings with other officials listening in.

Mr. Wilson derived the impression that the Soviet leaders are genuinely concerned about the Vietnam situation and willing to seek a way out. They adhered publicly, of course, to the standard Communist line that talks cannot begin before the Americans stop the bombing. Difficulties arose as the communiqué was being drafted. The Soviet side wanted to include a wording which would have slanted the circumstances surrounding the talks leading to a settlement. They were insisting on a reference to the elimination of outside interference. When the U.K. Delegation mentioned the Chinese intervention in this regard the Soviet side did not press their suggestion further.

Mr. Wilson brought back the impression from his Moscow visit that Soviet leaders had not understood the full scope of the message which was conveyed by the President's San Antonio speech. They were under the impression the United States were trying to blackmail the North in that they were insisting on assurances that there would have to be "productive" talks if the bombing were stopped; this meant, in effect, that the North had to agree in advance to an outcome which would be acceptable to the U.S.A. Mr. Wilson had done his best to assure Soviet leaders that what was intended was that the North should be willing to go to the conference table within a relatively short period; the reference to "productive" talks was intended to describe the expectations that the discussions would be conducted in good faith.

From his Washington visit Mr. Wilson, on the whole, had brought back comforting impressions. The U.S.A. leaders were much more relaxed and confident than he had expected before going there. He had found the President very fit and in good form. As usual, he had not expressed his views in a formal and orderly fashion but rather in an indirect and incidental way. However, if one spends a number of hours listening to the President stating his objections to a number of courses which were suggested to him, at the end of the day, one had a very thorough and full understanding of what was in his mind.

American leaders are optimistic as to the outcome of the struggle. It was still hard to make an objective evaluation of what had transpired in the field. The Americans were quoting tremendous casualty figures but Mr. Wilson thought that those adduced by Mr. Humphrey in terms of weapons and equipment captured were significant. U.S. leaders were also, and with justification, taking comfort from the fact that a general civilian uprising had not occurred in the South and that there had been no large-scale defection of South Vietnamese military units. A definitive assessment could not be made, of course, and new policy decisions made, until it became clear that the Viet Cong would not attempt a second assault against urban centres in the South and until it was known whether this would be coupled or not with an assault against Khe Sanh near the demilitarized zone.

Mr. Wilson was clear that the President and his advisers are cool, calm and set against large-scale escalation of hostilities. The President is still following a middle of the road course. The road is now, naturally, narrower with Senator Kennedy on one side and the hawks on the other. However, the President had shown considerable and similar restraint concerning the Pueblo incident.[127] He was convinced that this was an orchestrated operation and both he and Dean Rusk were somewhat puzzled as to how both situations would develop. He had found no indications in Moscow that Soviet leaders had any intimation as to what the North Koreans had in mind and he was now clearer than ever that the Soviet leaders did not have a controlling voice in Hanoi. His clear impression is that they could not dictate policy. Just as the U.S., in relation to South Vietnam could, on occasion, take a strong line, and he had seen them do this in Australia, they were not in a position of control.

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[127] The *Pueblo* incident involved the capture of the USS *Pueblo*, a US Navy intelligence ship, by North Korean forces on 23 January 1968.
L'incident du *Pueblo* désigne la capture de l'USS *Pueblo*, un navire de renseignement des Forces navales des États-Unis, par les forces nord-coréennes, le 23 janvier 1968.

The significant point to which Prime Minister Wilson returned was that the "hawks" were not on top. While the Americans had returned to their policy of qualitative bombing in the North there was no indication that wholesale escalation of the conflict was contemplated. He had warned U.S. leaders to whom he had spoken not to compare Khe Sanh with Dien Bien Phu. Mr. Wilson agreed with Mr. Pearson that it was difficult not to relate the two situations but it was quite clear that they might well not have the same results. Khe Sanh was less militarily significant. The percentage of U.S. forces there was smaller than the percentage of French forces committed to Dien Bien Phu and the U.S. could bring to bear much more powerful air resources.

Mr. Wilson reported that he had reiterated U.K. policy: on the whole, he thinks that Mr. Johnson is right, in his San Antonio approach, provided there is no escalation. He could not see that he should stop the bombing unconditionally. Mr. Pearson recalled that he had urged Mr. Johnson to take a calculated risk but the latter had argued that the North would take advantage of the suspension and he was worried that if the scheme did not work the hawks might be strengthened. Both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Pearson agreed that before the North Vietnamese offensive in the South the gap between the positions of the two sides had been narrowing and only a relatively small gesture would have been required to bring about talks. In the circumstances, the horror of the current operations in the South was all the more difficult for public opinion in the world to accept. Mr. Pearson made the point that the U.S. continued to permit the most ghastly reports to come out of South Vietnam. This almost resulted in the destruction of their whole moral standards in consequence of their propaganda activities. Mr. Pearson felt that long before now the U.S. might well have felt the need to exercise some of the usual wartime restraints on this aspect of the operations. In a way it was a glorification of the democratic process in the U.S. but it was working in such a way that the U.S. were getting no benefits at all, it seemed, from their liberal approach. Both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Pearson concluded that at this time there did not seem to be much room for manoeuvre nor much that anybody could do to expedite a political solution to the conflict.

There was some discussion of public reactions in Canada and the U.K. to the course of hostilities. Both Prime Ministers agreed that before the Viet Cong offensive there was a disposition to be sceptical of U.S. claims and to look at the Viet Cong almost as "Fabian pacifists". This image had been somewhat blurred by Viet Cong operations initially but, again, the stories and the pictures which were coming out of South Vietnam were having an impact on public opinion which was not favourable to the U.S. image. Mr. Pearson pointed out that one of the weaknesses in the U.S. position was a tragic and developing credibility gap. Their friends could hardly believe some of the figures they were releasing concerning casualties. The same deplorable impression was being created in connection with the Pueblo incident. At the beginning U.S. leaders had claimed flatly that the ship had never entered North Korean territorial waters. Now it seemed that even Mr. Goldberg was voicing some doubts in this respect.

Mr. Wilson thoroughly accepted the sincerity of the President as well as that of his Vice-President and Mr. Rusk. He was less sure concerning some of the advisers. Concerning the Pueblo incident Mr. Humphrey had told him that they had literally grilled the generals to get at the truth. There was a real difficulty due to the fact that for a period there had been no contact with the ship. In any case the Commander had strict orders not to get into Korean territorial waters and if it transpired that he had, he and those responsible would be court martialled. Another difficulty was that all the evidence was not yet in. Apparently Mr. Goldberg had received some tapes from Japan and other monitoring agencies in other countries: which gave a fuller picture of what had in fact transpired. Apparently the Pueblo had come to a stop for three or four hours because North Korean ships were trying to compel it to manoeuvre in such a way that it would move into Korean waters.

[…]

[Marcel Cadieux]

622.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Delegation to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à la délégation auprès de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/23

No. Y-178
Ottawa, February 14, 1968
Confidential. Flash.
Reference: Your Tel 151 Jan 25 from Hanoi.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Priority).

DRVN NEGOTIATING POSITION

Grateful for your interesting assessment of DRVN reactions as revealed by text of Trinh's reply and your discussions with him and others.

2. We have interpreted your paragraph 7 to mean that North Vietnamese references to being "serious" reflect some awareness on their part of apparent disparity between Trinh's recent policy statements on one hand, and on the other, Communist military actions in the South. In other words, it might be possible to see in North Vietnamese attitude some recognition (from their point of view) of steering their course between need to establish strongest possible position from which to enter negotiations, and concurrent need not/not to "intimidate" USA (cf. your telegram 125 February 7 from Hanoi) by spectacular if temporary military gestures which could result in USA temporarily losing interest in negotiations until they in turn appear to be one up.

3. Grateful for confirmation by return telegram which will be of help to us in deciding how our discussions in Washington might be handled.

623.
Telegram from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/23

No. Y-179
Ottawa, February 15, 1968
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Dier's Tel 151 Jan 25 from Hanoi.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva, Canberra, CANFORCEHED (Immediate).
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh.

DRVN NEGOTIATING POSITION: DIER'S DISCUSSIONS IN HANOI

Now that Dier's interpretive report on his discussions in Hanoi has been received you should seek early appointment with Bundy to follow up previous discussions with him on this exercise.

2. In your presentation you should give Bundy opportunity to read text of Trinh's reply (Hanoi CH-70 February 7) to SSEA's letter but we would not repeat not wish a copy of text to be left with him.

3. In reviewing Dier's impressions, you may wish to leave with Bundy piece of paper entitled "extracts from Dier's report" based on reference telegram but with following textual amendments:

(a) Delete paragraph one,

(b) Delete word "commendable" paragraph two,

(c) In paragraph two rephrase "to help his country" to read "to help Vietnam and the area as a whole towards stability and a better life",

(d) Delete last sentence paragraph two,

(e) In paragraph six delete "hence my argumentation etc." to end of sentence,

(f) Rephrase second sentence paragraph seven to read "basic themes of talk unchanged by content of letter except etc.", and delete words "I am certain",

(g) Word "subjunctively" in paragraph seven should obviously read "subjectively",

(h) Further clarification of paragraph seven might be given orally in light of our telegram Y-178 February 14 and Saigon reply,

(i) Delete paragraph eight.

4. Our preliminary assessment of the substance of Dier's reports is of course not repeat not encouraging in the sense that there is little or no repeat no evidence to suggest any willingness on Hanoi's part to contribute to a further narrowing of the gap between its position and Washington's. We are particularly discouraged by absence of any comment by Trinh on specific problems such as (a) time lag between cessation of bombing and beginning of talks and, (b) willingness to exercise military restraint as this could be in substantial measure registered and controlled at DZ. It is however difficult for us to make any conclusive assessment of significance of Dier's discussions in absence of fuller information about other exploratory discussions such as Secretary-General's[128] and those reportedly undertaken by "an Eastern European" representative allegedly with some degree of USA involvement.[129] We would therefore be particularly interested in any further information Bundy can provide which may make the pattern of North Vietnamese attitudes clearer and more precise.

[Marcel] Cadieux

624.

Telegram from Commissioner to International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam to Department of External Affairs

Télégramme du commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Vietnam au ministère des Affaires extérieures

RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/23

No. 176
Saigon, February 16, 1968
Confidential. Flash.
Reference: Your Tel Y-178 Feb 14.
Repeat for Information: Washington (Priority) from Ottawa.

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[128] See/Voir "Thant, Mrs. Gandhi Confer Two Times," *Washington Post*, 11 February 1968, p. A15; Henry Kamm, "Thant Ends Talks with Soviet Chiefs on Vietnam: U.N. Chief Flies to London," *New York Times*, 13 February 1968, p. 5; Robert H. Estabrook, "Thant Tells Goldberg of Peace Effort," *Washington Post*, 16 February 1968, p. A14.

[129] This may have been a reference to Romanian First Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu's recent discussions in Hanoi. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Vol. VI (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), document 71.
Allusion possible aux récentes discussions du premier sous-ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Roumanie George Macovescu à Hanoï. Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. VI (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 2002), document 71.

DRVN NEGOTIATING POSITION

Having finally returned from the fog bank of Hanoi to the heavy mists of Saigon…I find it difficult to keep my subjunctives directionally oriented. I cannot/not, at this time, confirm the interpretation mentioned in your reference telegram about the significance or implications of "serious" referred to in my telegram 151 January 25 from Hanoi. The thesis you provided possibly could be valid; it could also be so wide of the mark that it would be detrimental and even dangerous to build too great a superstructure on such a shaky foundation.

2. Despite the cordiality of my reception in Hanoi, you will have seen from my reports that I could detect no/no explicit forward movement toward a more accommodating attitude. Use of the word "serious" may have been used as a deliberate if very subtle indicator; it could also have been used as new grist in the (pwiruwansa?) [*sic*] mill. This does not/not mean that I believe this new facet should be ignored because in the present impasse no/no tern should be left unstoned. I do suggest, however, that your thesis should be treated with care and scepticism especially in Washington discussions. (I just heard on the news that Rusk has stated in a press conference that he does not/not believe Hanoi is serious in speaking of peace talks.) Perhaps after the consequences of recent military actions in the South, both sides will reassess their positions. At the moment, however, it would appear that the status is quo.

[Ormond W.] Dier

625.
Telegram from Department of External Affairs to Embassy to United States
Télégramme du ministère des Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade aux États-Unis
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/23

No. Y-185
Ottawa, February 16, 1968
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-179 Feb 15 and Saigon Tel 176 Feb 16.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva, Canberra, CANFORCEHED (Immediate).
By Bag: Warsaw, Moscow, Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh.

DRVN NEGOTIATING POSITION: DIER'S DISCUSSIONS IN HANOI

In light of Saigon reference telegram (to Ottawa and Washington only) we think it would be advisable to amend "extracts" further as follows: in paragraph seven of Dier's telegram 151 of January 25 delete everything after phrase "their conception of the credibility gap".

626.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/23

No. 825
Washington, February 19, 1968
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Your Tel Y-179 Feb 15.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Geneva; Delhi from London; Saigon from Delhi; Canberra, Wellington, CANFORCEHED from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Bangkok from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM – DRVN NEGOTIATING POSITION

I called on William Bundy, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, this morning to provide him with excerpts from Dier's report and to give him opportunity to read text of Foreign Minister Trinh's reply to SSEA's letter. Bundy appreciated being kept informed and said that reaction we had received from Hanoi was consistent with reports USA had obtained from variety of other channels. He included in this category responses obtained by U Thant and Fanfani. According to Bundy, Hanoi is pushing its approach in a number of Western European capitals as well.

2. Bundy described Hanoi formula as willingness to enter into talks following cessation of bombing and of other acts of war against NVN. Talks would only take place after "an appropriate interval". It was clear from Bundy's remarks that USA does not/not consider that Hanoi has shown any willingness to meet USA preoccupations concerning DRVN military actions following any cessation of bombing. Bundy gave no/no indication that USA had abandoned all hope that gap might be closed. On other hand, I think it safe to infer that USA remains firmly committed to San Antonio formula and that it will not/not contemplate cessation of bombing until it has some reason to believe that Hanoi will exercise some reciprocal restraint in military field.

[A.]E. Ritchie

627.
Telegram from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Embassy to Japan
Télégramme du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassade au Japon
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/23

No. Y-211
Ottawa, February 26, 1968
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel Y-199† Feb 19.
Repeat for Information: Washington, Paris, London, Delhi, Moscow, Canberra, CANFORCEHED (Routine).
By Bag: Warsaw, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Wellington, Hong Kong.

VIETNAM: CANADIAN-JAPANESE DISCUSSIONS

I should be grateful if you could convey following message to Mr. Miki at earliest convenience: Begins:

"After a number of unexpected postponements of his departure from Hanoi due to unsettled local conditions, our Commissioner in Vietnam, Mr. Dier, has reported fully to me on his discussions with the Foreign Minister and other political leaders in the North Vietnamese capital. I have asked our Ambassador, Mr. Moran, to give you an account of Dier's reports and to inform you of the contents of my message to the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister which Dier delivered while in Hanoi as well as the contents of Mr. Trinh's reply to me.

2. It is difficult indeed to derive very much encouragement from this information with respect to the objective our two Governments share, namely, to finding a mutually acceptable basis on which the two sides can enter into negotiations for a peaceful settlement. As I see matters at the moment, the North Vietnamese appear determined to pursue unremittingly their insistence on a unilateral cessation of the bombing. While they have said that talks

"will" follow such a unilateral gesture by the USA, this is obviously not/not enough to meet USA requirements as embodied in the San Antonio formula. I had hoped for example that effective International Commission action in insulating the DZ against military actions by either side as mentioned in my suggestions on April 11 last to the External Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, my UNGA speech on September 27th and in my recent letter to Mr. Trinh, might have been a useful and practicable formula for providing a measure of internationally controlled and supervised restraint. The reaction of the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister as conveyed to me by Dier does not/not lead me to believe that the North Vietnamese Government would be prepared to consider this possibility favourably at the moment.

3. Of more immediate relevance from the point of view of our earlier discussions looking to a system of mutual guarantees, are the comments by Mr. Trinh in his reply to me and in his remarks to Dier on the question of "mutual confidence". Although these comments were made in the context of the possibility of restoring the status of the DZ to its intended character, they appear to reflect a more general attitude in the current North Vietnamese approach to peace talks. I refer specifically to Mr. Trinh's contention that the only way in which any measure of confidence can be established is by unilateral action on the part of the USA. If this is the case, it does not/not in my view augur favourably for a positive response on the part of Hanoi to the sort of mutual guarantee system we had hoped to explore in discussions with the Poles and other Eastern European countries: and obviously, in the final analysis, the success of the mutual guarantee system would depend on Hanoi's attitudes rather than the immediate response which Warsaw and other capitals might register in the first instance.

4. After you have had an opportunity to consider the information which Ambassador Moran will have given to you, I should be most interested in having your assessment of what possibilities may be open to us for joint action in the immediate future. I wish that my own current estimate was more encouraging than it is but I feel that in all frankness I could not/not convey any other impression to you at this time." Ends.

[Paul] Martin

628.

Memorandum from Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs to Head, Far Eastern Division

Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chef de la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient

RG25, vol. 9399, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/24

Confidential.

[Ottawa,] March 8, 1968

VIETNAM

You will have seen that Mr. Diefenbaker raised again in the House of Commons today the suggestion that there might be an all-party resolution urging a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.[130] The Prime Minister replied to the effect that he would take the suggestion under consideration, but he thought any resolution would have to deal with more matters than just the cessation of bombing.

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[130] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 7, p. 7406.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 2e session, vol. 7, p. 7406.

In a brief conversation with the Prime Minister after this exchange in the House, he told me that he would like to have the views of the Department on Mr. Diefenbaker's proposal. I said that I thought our view would be that in present circumstances, particularly in the light of the recent Viet Cong offensive, it would be rubbing salt in the American wounds for the Canadian Parliament to pass such a resolution as Mr. Diefenbaker proposed, and therefore the timing was particularly bad.

The Prime Minister indicated he agreed with this view. In any case any resolution would have to be a balanced one which took account of the fact, as he had pointed out to Mr. David Lewis in the House this morning, that Hanoi had rejected American proposals directed to opening negotiations as well as the rejection by the United States of an unqualified halt to the bombing.[131] Mr. Pearson said he would be glad to consider any bright ideas that our Department might be able to offer on this matter, but he indicated that he was not particularly inclined to pursue Mr. Diefenbaker's proposal seriously.[132]

A.S. McGill

629.
Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister
Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre
MG26-N6, vol. 10, Vietnam – Statements in the House of Commons

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] March 12, 1968

VIETNAM: POSSIBLE RESOLUTION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

You will recall that Mr. Diefenbaker suggested in the House on March 8 that there might be an all-party resolution introduced urging a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. In reply you undertook to consider this possibility but went on to point out that any such resolution to be effective and fair might have to deal with more matters than just the cessation of bombing.

2. Although a suitably balanced and comprehensive resolution, passed with the support of members on both sides of the House, could be useful as a clarification of Canadian views on the Vietnam problem, I am inclined to doubt the wisdom of proceeding with a project of this character at the present time. In the first place it is clear that such a resolution would have little or no effect on the Vietnam situation as such. More important, it could easily complicate Canadian relationships with both sides and particularly with the Americans. It seems to me that following the Tet offensive in Vietnam, Washington is in a rather sensitive and uncertain mood. There is therefore a clear possibility that no matter how balanced and fair a resolution of the Canadian Parliament might be, it could be resented by the Americans and misconstrued as pressure and interference. Of lesser importance but also to be taken into account are possible reactions in Hanoi. Dier's recent discussions and Trinh's letter give a clear impression of inflexibility and unwillingness to give serious consideration to any kind of reciprocal restraining action. Since a call for such action would have to be included,

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[131] See Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 27th Parliament, 2nd session, vol. 7, pp. 7405–7406.
Voir Canada, *Débats de la Chambre des communes*, 27e législature, 2e session, vol. 7, p. 7405-7406.

[132] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
A suitably balanced resolution might not be a bad idea – but could be difficult to frame in light of our [United Nations General] Assembly statement. R.E. C[ollins]

implicitly or explicitly, in the resolution presented to the House, we might, by doing so, only create further difficulties for future exchanges with the North Vietnamese. Finally, even though the government might present a balanced resolution to the House, we might have difficulty in ensuring that it was not amended to emerge as a one-sided appeal to the U.S.A. to stop the bombing. Although my statement to the United Nations General Assembly last September included such an appeal, it also comprised other essential elements; but in present circumstances we might find ourselves under pressure in the House to disregard these other elements and to concentrate only on the cessation of the bombing.

3. From a substantive point of view therefore I believe it would be in our best interests to avoid action at this time on Mr. Diefenbaker's suggestion. If, however, the parliamentary situation is such that you feel it necessary to proceed, I am attaching a proposed text of a resolution† which I consider to be suitably comprehensive and which if passed in this form could be of some help to us.[133]

P[aul] M[artin]

630.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/25

No. 1389
Washington, April 1, 1968
Confidential. Immediate.
Reference: Our Tel 1375† Apr 1.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris, Permis New York, Geneva; Delhi, NATO from London; Canberra, Wellington, CANFORCEHED, Tokyo from Ottawa; Saigon from Washington.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw, Jakarta from London; Bangkok, Hong Kong from Ottawa; Kuala Lumpur from Tokyo; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM – USA POLICY

In his address last night, President Johnson outlined a series of changes in USA Vietnam policy which were clearly designed not/not only to go some way towards meeting Hanoi's conditions for peace talks but also to answer domestic criticism of some aspects of the war.[134]

2. He stopped without time limit bombing and naval bombardment of all parts of North Vietnam except an undefined area north of DMZ where North Vietnam military activities are directly related to allied forces in South Vietnam. President made it clear that this exception was made only because cessation of bombing in this area "would immediately and directly endanger the lives of our men and our allies". Nevertheless, he left clear impression that if North Vietnam activity in this area subsided area of bombing halt would be extended.

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[133] No such resolution was pursued.
Aucune résolution de ce type n'a été présentée.

[134] See/Voir "The President's Address to Limit the War in Vietnam and Reporting His Decision Not to Seek Reelection, March 31, 1968," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–1969*, Book I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 469–476.

3. He made it clear by implication that NLF could have role in future of South Vietnam. On one occasion he said bombing halt was "to permit the contending forces to move closer to political settlement". After expressing hope that North Vietnam would cease its efforts to achieve a military victory, he pointed out that "there may come a time when South Vietnamese – on both sides – are able to work out a way to settle their differences by free political choice rather than by war". After defining USA objective ("to bring about a recognition in Hanoi that its objective – taking over the South by force – cannot/not be achieved") he said that peace could be based on "Geneva Accords" of 1954 – "under political conditions that permit the South Vietnamese – all the South Vietnamese – to chart their course free of any outside domination or interference". Geneva framework was further emphasized by his appeal to UK and USSR, as Co-Chairmen of Geneva Conferences, to contribute to bringing about peace in Southeast Asia.

4. He reaffirmed USA commitment made in Manila communiqué "that we are prepared to withdraw our forces from South Vietnam as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, stops infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides".

5. He modified part of San Antonio formula relating to discussions by asking not/not that cessation of bombing "would lead promptly to productive discussions" but that "talks begin promptly, and that they be serious talks on the substance of peace". In San Antonio formula he had said that USA "would assume" that North Vietnam would not/not take military advantage of USA restraint; last night he said that "we assume that Hanoi would not/not take advantage of USA restraint during those talks".

6. There are reports that USA military opposed any cessation of bombing and that they are unhappy about President's decision. This suggests that President ignored military advice in order to provide Hanoi with opportunity to agree to talks. At same time, he very carefully outlined limited objectives of USA in Vietnam and reiterated USA willingness to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam once need for them no/no longer exists.

7. Administration has been attacked domestically from both right and left about apparent lack of determination on part of South Vietnamese. While making it clear that "the main burden of preserving their freedom must be carried by the South Vietnamese themselves" and that USA and allies "can only help to provide a shield behind which the people of South Vietnam can survive and develop" he outlined in some detail the positive contributions being made by South Vietnamese to their own defence and substantial political progress which he contended has been made since 1965. Although he left no/no doubt that continued and growing efforts by South Vietnamese were essential basis for maintenance of USA support he undertook to speed up the re-equipment of South Vietnam's armed forces. (We have been told by State Department officials that morale of ARVN was seriously affected by fact that it was badly outgunned by Communists during Tet Offensive.) In addition, USA would be sending during next five months 13,500 support troops to back up the 11,000 marine and airborne troops sent after Tet Offensive.

8. In answer to those of his domestic critics who contend that USA has no/no interest in what happens in Southeast Asia he argued that USA goal of peace and self-determination in Vietnam was directly related to future of Southeast Asia where many of the hopeful developments in the field of political and economic cooperation during past three years might not/not have been possible if stand had not/not been made in Vietnam. Cooperation, peace and security in Southeast Asia may become possible and if it does it would be because USA helped. USA's security was directly dependent on ability of nations of Southeast Asia to become "independent, self-sustaining members of the world community – at peace with themselves and with all others".

9. Finally, President met argument that war in Vietnam was undermining confidence in American economy by emphasizing need to bring balance of payments nearer equilibrium and to enact tax increase and "expenditure control" in order to "protect our security, continue our prosperity and meet the needs of our people".

10. President's address represents major attempt to bring about de-escalation of Vietnam war and negotiations about ways of ending it. His designation of Averell Harriman as his personal representative and of Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson as an additional negotiator would make it possible for preliminary talks to start almost immediately. Nevertheless, if Hanoi does not/not take up offer, President made it clear that war would go on and that USA should organize its economy to take account of this fact. Although President could not/not predict terms of any Vietnam settlement, he stated that USA "will not/not accept a fake solution of this long and arduous struggle and call it peace". By removing himself from presidential race, Johnson clearly left himself free to act on Vietnam without too much consideration for requirements of 1968 campaign. At same time, he stole much of the thunder from Kennedy, McCarthy and other advocates of compromise who may find it very difficult politically to go much further than the President did except perhaps in spelling out more explicitly role which they would assign to NLF in future. Nixon cannot/not, on basis of policy so far enunciated, advocate softer approach than that put forward by Johnson and may indeed find it desirable to aim for those who think President has pulled back too far. Hanoi may believe (or be advised) that there is no/no point in negotiating with lame duck President and that its purposes would be better served by waiting until new administration takes power in January 69. Fact remains, however, that Johnson will be President for at least nine more months, that he has set out reasonable invitation to talks and that he will remain in position to adjust USA policy in light of Hanoi's response.

[A.]E. Ritchie

631.
Memorandum from Acting Clerk of the Privy Council to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note du greffier du Conseil privé par intérim au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 12516, 20-1-2-USA/11

Secret.
Ottawa, April 1, 1968

The attached is a personal message from the Prime Minister to President Johnson, the text of which was telephoned to Ed Ritchie about 12 o'clock for immediate delivery to the President. The Prime Minister does not wish this message to be made public. His other public release is also being made available by Ritchie to the White House.

I would think that the Department might wish to confirm by telegram the text of the attached personal message for the purpose of the record.

O.G. S[toner]

Enclosure: Message from Prime Minister to President of United States
Pièce jointe : Message du premier ministre au président des États-Unis

[Ottawa, April 1, 1968]

I have issued an official statement expressing appreciation of what you said last night on Vietnam.[135] I would like to supplement this by a personal message which can express with more feeling how deeply grateful I think the whole world should be for the proposals you

[135] See/Voir "Now It's Up to Communists – Pearson on Bombing Halt," *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 April 1968, p. 1.

have made and for the courage and wisdom you have shown in making them. It is now strictly up to the other side to reciprocate and if they don't, there should be no doubt where the obstacle to peace lies.

I have no right to comment on your other and more personal decision not to seek or accept re-nomination but I hope I may convey my respect and admiration for the motives that caused you to come to a decision which must have been a very difficult one and could only be made understandable to your friends by the spirit which inspired it.

I had wanted to telephone you but I know you will be deluged by calls so I hope you will accept this personal message instead which is sent with my most sincere and warmest good wishes.

Kindest personal regards,

[Lester B. Pearson]

632.
Memorandum from Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs to Far Eastern Division
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/25

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] April 2, 1968

VIETNAM – PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS

The Prime Minister called me in this morning to convey the following comments:

Bombing North Vietnam

Mr. Pearson is gravely concerned about the reports that American planes are continuing to bomb deep into North Vietnam. He wondered if this represented an act of defiance by the military. If so, he hoped the President would exert firm authority immediately.

I told the Prime Minister that Mr. Ritchie was already arranging to call at the State Department and express our concern about the reports of extensive bombing. Mr. Pearson indicated his satisfaction at this.

U.N. Action

Mr. Pearson had just been reading Mr. Ignatieff's report† of the negative reaction from Goldberg to his soundings yesterday. The Prime Minister wished us to understand that when he referred in his statement yesterday to possible U.N. involvement, he had not meant that we should take any immediate initiative in this direction. His thought was that the President's statement had removed one of the major arguments against taking Vietnam to the Security Council, i.e., the possibility of a resolution calling for an unconditional cessation of bombing which the U.S.A. could not accept. Now the onus would be on North Vietnam. In the event that North Vietnam responds negatively to President Johnson's initiative, or the situation seems to be lapsing again into stalemate, Mr. Pearson feels it might be desirable to take the matter to the Security Council as a means of increasing pressure on the USSR and North Vietnam for a favourable response. The Prime Minister does not, however, regard this as something we should actively pursue for the moment.

A.S. McGill

633.
Telegram from Ambassador to United States to Department of External Affairs
Télégramme de l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au ministère des Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/25

No. 1404
Washington, April 2, 1968
Secret. Flash.
Reference: Your Tel Y-335† and Our Tel 1394† Apr 2.
Repeat for Information: London, Paris (Immediate), Geneva; Saigon (Immediate) from Washington; Delhi (Immediate) from London; Canberra, Wellington, CANFORCEHED (Immediate) from Ottawa.
By Bag: Moscow, Warsaw from London; Bangkok from Ottawa; Vientiane, Phnom Penh from Saigon.

VIETNAM – USA POLICY

I called this afternoon on William Bundy, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to seek further info about USA policy on bombing of North Vietnam and to express to him concern of Prime Minister and SSEA along lines of your reference telegram. I emphasized difficulty which military actions yesterday and today posed for Governments which had welcomed President's statement and urged Hanoi to respond, and pointed out improbability of positive North Vietnamese response to President's initiative in these circumstances.

2. I of course made it clear that air attacks as far north as Thanh Hoa represented military activity considerably in excess of what we and many others had expected following President's March 31 address.

3. Bundy recalled that he had told me Sunday that area to be open to bombing would be greater than that immediately contiguous to DMZ – that it ran up the coast for some distance. With some discomfiture he apologized for not/not having told me that northern limit of bombing activity was to be 20th parallel. (He added that within this area major population areas and hinterland would be excluded from bombing, leaving primarily the main road and railway as targets.)

4. He said that Thanh Hoa is the specific area in which major reinforcements are being marshalled and moved through at this moment. Thus, Thanh Hoa and the road and rail lines south of it are all part of North Vietnam's tactical supply line to South Vietnam and are therefore "directly related" to safety of allied forces south of DMZ. (Bundy said that info concerning activity in Thanh Hoa was based on sensitive intelligence and was for our private use only.)

5. Bundy then said that even though he failed to tell us how far north bombing would continue, he had not/not failed to inform "quarters in immediate touch with Hanoi". Therefore, bombing attacks should not/not be considered by Hanoi to be inconsistent with President's statement.

6. I suggested that whether or not/not Hanoi had been informed of bombing limits they could easily take public position others appeared to be taking – i.e., that bombing attacks did not/not fit in with President's announcement.

7. I pointed out that statements made by Prime Minister and SSEA[136] had not/not been easy to make but had been made on assumption that bombing would be limited to area immediately adjacent to DMZ with at most a small piece on the coast. I went on to say that

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[136] See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Press Release*, no. 8, 1 April 1968.
Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Communiqué*, nº 8, 1er avril 1968.

main problem was effect on possibility of de-escalation and peace talks and in this context Hanoi's position was very important. Fact that they privately may have known limits of halt really did not/not help very much. President's speech, as we had interpreted it, had started process of placing onus publicly on North Vietnam for getting talks started and other governments had been helping in this process of bringing pressure to bear on Hanoi. Then, within 24 hours, USA took military action which undoubtedly led many people to consider that USA was going back on proposition enunciated by President.

8. Bundy admitted validity of these considerations and did not/not offer any counter-arguments.

9. I raised possibility that situation might still be retrieved and asked whether attacks as far north as 20th parallel were likely to be repeated. Bundy said that this was conceivable and that he could not/not exclude the possibility. He added, however, that there would not/not be any attacks further north than the 20th parallel.

10. I asked whether it was really so vital that reinforcements be attacked at Thanh Hoa and whether they could not/not be just as effectively interdicted further south near the DMZ. Bundy replied firmly that USA had to attack this specific concentration of forces.

11. Bundy appeared tense, dispirited and apologetic. He offered no/no justification beyond fact that it was considered vital to attack Thanh Hoa area, and that President's statement had been strictly accurate on definition of area subject to bombing in terms of population figures and food-producing districts. He added as a point of some significance that bombing was not/not taking place near Hanoi or Haiphong.

12. Bundy said that Department of Defense would probably be issuing public statement momentarily, defining limits of bombing and nature of targets.

[A.]E. Ritchie

634.
Memorandum from Special Assistant to Secretary of State for External Affairs to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
Note de l'adjoint spécial du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/25

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] April 3, 1968

MINISTER'S MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR

The Soviet Ambassador called on Mr. Martin on April 2 at his (the Ambassador's) request to discuss the non-proliferation treaty.

There was very little discussion of the NPT. […]

The Minister said that he was glad the Ambassador had called on him because he wished to take the opportunity to say a few words about Vietnam. President Johnson's statement on Sunday had been a surprise to Mr. Martin, although he had been urging a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. The cessation announced by the President was not complete but he went ninety percent of the way, and Mr. Martin thought it would be very regrettable if we did not all seek to take advantage of this opportunity to get negotiations started. He urged the Soviet Ambassador to impress upon his Government the Canadian view that we should not let this opportunity go by without getting negotiations started.

The Soviet Ambassador replied that President Johnson's statement was important and should not be underestimated but it should also not be over-estimated. The statement did not bring an end to the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRVN but only provided

for the cessation of some of these acts. Right after the President's announcement there were indications of an intensification of the war by the Americans. It appeared therefore that the deeds of the Americans were along different lines from their statements.

Mr. Martin questioned what the Ambassador meant by "intensification". Mr. Shpedko said that right after the statement there had been a calling up of additional American reserves. (Curiously, the Ambassador did not refer to the continued bombing of targets deep in North Vietnamese territory.)

The SSEA, declining to be drawn into any argument about American action since the Johnson statement, said that calling up reserves did not necessarily mean intensification of the war effort. The Minister went on to say with considerable emphasis that he was convinced President Johnson meant what he said about wanting to end the war and that he had taken a very important step forward in his statement on Sunday. All of those concerned with peace in Vietnam should therefore seize this opportunity to get negotiations under way. Mr. Martin wished the President had announced one hundred percent rather than ninety percent cessation in bombing but nevertheless it was a serious and important gesture. He earnestly hoped there would be a response from the other side. The USSR as one of the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference had an important position in this matter and he hoped they would use their influence to bring about peace negotiations.

The Soviet Ambassador made some reference to the fact that the Soviet Union was not engaged in the war and that it was up to the other side to stop all acts of war against the DRVN. Mr. Martin pointed out that Canada had been very active in seeking to find a path to the negotiating table and had urged a cessation of the bombing. Now that the President of the U.S. had done this, what more could Canada do? Mr. Shpedko retorted that Canada could advise the U.S. to cease completely its military actions against the DRVN.

The interview ended amiably enough with the Soviet Ambassador conceding that Canada and the USSR were both interested in seeing a peaceful solution in Vietnam and that he would report what Mr. Martin had said to his Government.

A.S. McGill

635.
Memorandum from Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Far Eastern Division
Note du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures à la Direction de l'Extrême-Orient
RG25, vol. 9400, 20-22-VIETS-2-1/25

Confidential.
[Ottawa,] April 4, 1968

VIETNAM

This is just to record that on April 3 Joe Scott, the Minister at the United States Embassy, called with a reply to questions which had been put to the United States authorities both here and in Washington concerning the extent of the bombing suspension announced in the President's speech on March 31.

2. Scott said that he had had a telephone call from Bill Bundy, in which Bundy had said that, in talking to our Ambassador on Sunday evening before the President's speech, he (Bundy) "may have left out one sentence" in informing Mr. Ritchie of the main points in the President's speech and their significance. I presume that the one sentence had to do with the northward extension of the strip within which the bombing might still take place.

3. Scott obviously regarded this as a rather inadequate reply to the comments which Mr. Ritchie and I had made on the previous day. Fortunately, however, we were saved from further agonizing by the news which had just arrived that Hanoi had indicated its readiness to enter talks with the United States on the cessation of the bombing.[137]

H.B. Robinson

636.
Letter from President of United States to Prime Minister
Lettre du président des États-Unis au premier ministre
MG26-N4, vol. 278, 380/U58.1 – Secret

[Secret.]
Washington, April 10, 1968

Dear Mike [Pearson]:

I am most grateful for the generous sentiments expressed in your thoughtful letter of April 1.

I have, of course, read your April 1 public statement with great interest and was deeply gratified by your prompt support of our proposals on Vietnam.

I know you plan to turn over the Prime Ministership of Canada to your successor in the near future. I hope we shall nevertheless continue to have the benefit of your wise counsel.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson

[137] Marginal note:/Note marginale :
I spoke to A.E. R[itchie]. [H.B.] R[obinson]

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