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WEIGHTY AND HEFTY RESPONSIBILITIES:

Junior Canadian Army Officers, Ideal Leadership and the Second World War

CRAIG LESLIE MANTLE
Research Officer (History)
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute
Canadian Defence Academy

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In everything, the ideal is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. During the Second World War, the Canadian Army, through a variety of written and verbal means, but especially through the *Canadian Army Training Memorandum*, endeavoured to communicate to young men the archetype of junior officer leadership. Above everything else, the army expected its newly commissioned officers to be paternalistic toward their men, competent in the execution of their duties and beyond reproach in their personal conduct. This was meant to help nascent leaders forge strong and effective teams that performed well in battle (or that executed their sundry duties in a credible manner if committed to a non-combatant role). By articulating and constantly reinforcing what junior officers should be, the Canadian Army demonstrated the ideal, the very lofty ideal, to which it hoped all would aspire and, with time and practice, become.

SOMMAIRE

Pour quoi que ce soit, il est difficile, voire presque impossible d'atteindre l'idéal. Pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, l'Armée canadienne s'est employée, par divers moyens écrits et verbaux, mais particulièrement à l'aide du *Canadian Army Training Memorandum*, à communiquer aux jeunes hommes l'archétype du leadership pour l'officier subalterne. Plus que tout, l'Armée canadienne s'attendait à ce que les nouveaux officiers commissionnés se montrent paternalistes envers leurs soldats, s'acquittent avec compétence de leurs fonctions et adoptent une conduite personnelle irréprochable. De telles attentes visaient principalement à aider les nouveaux leaders à former des équipes solides et cohésives, qui avaient un bon rendement sur le champ de bataille (ou encore qui réalisaient leurs diverses tâches de façon efficace et efficiente dans un rôle de non-combattant). L'Armée canadienne a défini et renforcé constamment ce que devrait être les officiers subalternes et par conséquent, a montré l'idéal, le très grand idéal, que tous les officiers subalternes pouvaient espérer atteindre avec le temps et la pratique.

INTRODUCTION

> "In the British tradition the only occasion upon which a junior officer may release himself from the obligation of thinking of his men and his task is when he is on leave."[1]
>
> "It is always necessary to prove your worth to hold the King's Commission, to be willingly accepted by men as worthy to be their leader."[2]

Irrespective of whether leaders are born or made, Canada's army prior to and during the Second World War employed various means – official publications, formal lectures, professional journals, special addresses – to instruct junior officers on that most essential of all military requirements: leadership, or in the parlance of the day, man management. Holders of the King's commission were expected to gain the full confidence and absolute respect of the men under their command such that all would perform effectively and efficiently, whether in battle or not. The army assumed that followers, who believed in their leaders and held them in high esteem, would more willingly obey so as not to disappoint. The 'trick' for officers, therefore, was to secure their men's faith in their position as their legitimate and rightful leader. This monograph discusses how that was accomplished.

Whether in Canada, England or an active theatre of operations, the Canadian Army expected junior officers to acquire the cheerful, willing obedience of their subordinates by: a) adopting a 'style' of leadership that can best be described as paternalistic, wherein the interests of their men were put before all else; b) demonstrating competence appropriate to their rank and trade; and c) conducting themselves according to the highest moral principles. Officers' responsibilities did not end there, however, being enjoined as they were to train their subordinates and keep them in both good discipline and high spirits.[3] Taken together, this was the classic technique of 'man management' as taught to officers. It was the approved method of securing the 'willing compliance' necessary to make soldiers risk their lives.[4]

LIMITATIONS AND PURPOSE

Much can be learned through a survey of the literature as it pertains to the ‘type’ of junior officer the Canadian Army desired.[5] The majority of the material consulted for the purposes of this work was written for those officers who occupied the lower end of the spectrum. These would be cadets and lieutenants who, theoretically, had the most to learn about leadership. As a consequence, the focus of this monograph is on junior officers exclusively, with the treatment of more highly-ranked officers and issues of ‘higher command' having to wait for a separate venue. As well, little mention is made herein of the manner in which the army actually produced paternalistic, technically competent and virtuous officers; training is not the focus *per se*. The present discussion deals primarily with the ends of leadership instruction (the principles by which the ideal officer was to live – the ultimate goal) rather than the means (the process by which the ideal officer was gradually developed – the how).

Without doubt, an investigation of the processes by which reciprocal relationships – enthusiastic obedience in return for competent leadership – could initially be cultivated and then sustained over time, lays bare some of the assumptions held by the army about officer-man relations and the dynamics by which inter-personal affairs could be actuated.[6] Assessing the type of leadership that the Canadian Army desired of its junior officers, in both the post-First World War and Second World War eras, provides insight into Canada’s military culture of the early- to mid-20th century. Analyzing materials related to leadership contributes to an understanding of how the army viewed its junior officers not only in terms of their overall responsibilities, but also in terms of their obligations to those over whom they exercised command. And finally, such an approach facilitates the establishment of a baseline about inter-rank relationships, in other words, the elucidation of the ideal or archetype to which all were encouraged to aspire.

SECTION 1: MEANS OF INSTRUCTION

Throughout the interwar and wartime periods, young Canadian officers (or cadets soon-to-be officers) were exposed to a variety of publications that expressed opinion on matters of leadership. Whether authors wrote in an official or unofficial capacity, nascent leaders witnessed a remarkably consistent set of ideas concerning the best means to interact with subordinates. Particular details may have differed, but general concepts remained largely the same. Of interest, not all material was of Canadian origin. To populate its professional military journals, such as the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (*CDQ*) published between 1923 and 1939, and the *Canadian Army Training Memorandum* (*CATM*) issued monthly between 1941 and 1947, Canada borrowed heavily from the United Kingdom and its imperial possessions, from the United States and even from Germany.[7] Journals from which material specific to leadership was taken included *Defence* (UK), *Field Artillery Journal* (US), *Infantry Journal* (US), *Journal of the Royal Artillery* (UK), *Military Review* (US) and various Army Training Memoranda from both Australia and India.

Regardless of provenance, material gleaned from other publications and reprinted in either *CDQ* or *CATM* had the potential to influence readers simply by its presence. The impact of *CDQ* on leadership during the Second World War was probably minimal owing to its supersession by other more focused and widely available publications. While pre-war officers would have benefitted to a degree, the impact of *CDQ* would have been less on those joining after hostilities had commenced when early issues of *CDQ* could only be found on the shelves of dusty libraries. For these officers, the *CATM* was in a much greater position to effect good leadership given its frequency of publication, easily accessible content and broad distribution. The *CATM* truly fulfilled a seminal function.

At the outbreak of the war, Canada's army was by any measure tiny; the victim of continual budgetary reductions in the immediate post-First World War era and throughout the Depression that followed. Government apathy during the 1920s and 1930s, compounded by a war-weary and disinterested public, all but ensured that the army was under-funded, under-equipped, under-trained and under-manned upon the declaration of war in September 1939. Canada's contribution, originally pegged at only a single division, had by 1942 grown to an entire army (First) comprised of two corps (I and II) and all the support that that entailed. When the war was over, the army's 'total intake' numbered more than 730,000 persons[8], and enlistments in the Canadian military *in toto* (navy, army and air force) numbered an impressive one million from a population only eleven times that size.[9] Perhaps the most important statistic, at least for present purposes, was that 42,613 commissions had been granted to hopeful leaders between 1939 and 1946.[10]

With so many new officers, the *CATM* (and allied publications) provided one venue through which a quick introduction to leadership could be obtained. Being required reading for every holder of the King's commission – "Every officer in the Canadian Army in Canada should receive a copy"[11] – this monthly tract offered short and pithy articles that introduced officers to the expectations of proper and acceptable conduct regarding their interactions with subordinates. In essence, successive issues of the *CATM* endeavoured to highlight the salient aspects of

officer-man relations and to give officers a solid grounding in how to elicit the best from their men. That being said, the *CATM* was also the Canadian Army's professional journal of the day and did not limit itself solely to discussions of leadership, although articles dealing with man management were indeed frequent. Commentaries on topics such as techniques of instruction and enemy weapons gave practical advice to young officers attempting to master every angle of their new profession, while contemporary operational narratives from campaigns throughout the world kept the fare interesting and varied.

If these two Canadian journals – *CDQ* and *CATM* – had an impact on Canadian officers, so too did British publications that dealt with leadership in one way or another. Since Canada generally followed Great Britain's lead in matters military, War Office (WO) documents frequently appeared under separate Canadian cover. Occasionally, in the interest of economy and efficiency no doubt, Canadian authorities simply re-issued a British publication with a short notice affixed to the inside cover that pointed readers to the most relevant and pertinent sections. One pamphlet contained the following note: "has been approved for use in the British Army but much of it is applicable to the Canadian Army."[12]

As an aside, some of the various Canadian and British publications directed towards officers, in the hopes of making them better leaders, at times appear (at least from a modern Canadian perspective) somewhat presumptuous, even condescending. No doubt ghost-written by officers, perhaps very well-placed and educated officers, many pamphlets spoke *for* and from the perspective *of* the common soldier. For example, statements were made about what the common soldier does and does not like; how he will act when faced with a particular situation; what his beliefs are; how profoundly his emotions vary; what his preferences in terms of drink are; and so forth. The 'soldier' as portrayed in many training documents comes across as a touch simple, somewhat naïve and just waiting for leadership (exercised by an 18-, 19- or 20-year old no less!). In other words, who the common soldier was, was a foregone conclusion. When talking to their soldiers, for instance, officers were cautioned to: "Speak shortly and to the point. Use plain words of one or two syllables. … Avoid eloquence as a rule." At other times, they were to: "Write letters for the men, as their education rarely fits them to conduct official correspondence."[13]

The consistency of human nature undoubtedly ensured that some pieces of advice were sound and broadly applicable – who wouldn't like a hot meal, a warm bath and a comfortable bed at the end of a hard day's work? Yet some pamphlets conveyed the impression that officers would only be leading simple-minded soldiers, who had a few basic needs. If those needs were met, so the argument ran, leaders would find themselves in command of loyal, dedicated, respectful and highly obedient followers. In a rapidly expanding army, such an approach was perhaps inevitable. The soldier was reduced to the lowest common denominator, and proffered advice was non-descript and simple. The need to train officers quickly, apparently necessitated that advice be generic and not overly complex. An officer would have to deal with those soldiers who did not fit the mould, on an individual basis as conveyed through his training materials.

Within the *CATM* in particular and other training documents more generally, the assumption that officers could be made and that leadership could be taught was indeed omnipresent. New officers had much to learn. Limited training days passed all too quickly and were filled with a variety of

subjects. Leadership or man management, important as it was, could only receive a fixed amount of attention. Officers were therefore required, indeed expected, to study independently[14], and a host of publications appeared throughout the war to facilitate their learning.
An examination of training syllabi illustrates the demands placed on nascent officers. At the Brockville Officer Training Centre, for instance, Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. Whitelaw, a Permanent Force officer from The Royal Canadian Regiment who had served on the pre-war General Staff, kept his students busy. Under his direction, traditional military pursuits were important with drill, marching and map reading each taking up 20 out of over 200 training periods; field engineering consumed 15 periods; organization and administration, mechanical transport (cadets learned how to ride a motorcycle and drive a Bren gun carrier), gas protection, and rifle drill each accounted for 12 periods; and bayonet fighting occupied another eight. By contrast, in 1941 just four training periods were devoted to the twin topics of leadership and morale, one of which dealt with the 'Customs of the Service and Mess Conduct,' while another focussed on the 'Duties of a Platoon or Equivalent Commander in Barracks & Camp.'[15] Officers who passed through Brockville no doubt recalled little from these two instructional periods as they led their soldiers in battle against an aggressive, determined and mechanized enemy.

Such a wide variation in emphasis at an establishment designed to turn civilians into competent wartime leaders, not surprisingly, aroused participant comment. George Blackburn, for instance, later recounted that his days at Brockville were concerned too much with drill and too little with leadership.[16] Wilfred Smith, on the other hand, held an entirely different opinion, offering that the heavy focus on the technical as opposed to the personal served a distinct and beneficial purpose:

> …this knowledge and ability in infantry skills were particularly important in the Canadian Army, where egalitarian principles were so firmly entrenched that officers received little automatic respect by virtue of their rank alone. Respect was accorded when officers were considered to deserve it on the basis of knowledge, performance, and leadership.[17]

In the eyes of this officer at least, technical competence was just as important as the ability to foster sound interpersonal relations. Few men would follow a leader, no matter how friendly and personable, who could not fire his pistol, read his map or deploy his soldiers properly.

To further instruct on the topic of leadership, the spoken word frequently supplemented the written. On special occasions where large numbers of impressionable young officers were present, both civilian and military dignitaries frequently offered their opinion on how best leadership could be effected. Whether the minister of national defence, the commandant of a training school (like Whitelaw above) or a distinguished soldier sporting rows of ribbons, various speakers all made an effort to imbue their listeners with a sense of the profound, namely that they would soon be in a position of great responsibility in which only competent leadership would truly suffice. The comments of each individual varied of course, as did their quality and brevity, but each address, in its own way, strove to motivate and to reinforce the concepts to which the young listeners had already been, or would soon be, exposed. Although perhaps not of the same value as publications due to the infrequency and transient nature of these events, special addresses certainly bolstered the importance of certain leadership concepts and made more than clear what senior leaders expected of subordinates. Upon taking command at Brockville in June

1942, for example, Milton Fowler Gregg, VC, of First World War fame, addressed a new class of cadets. His comments were such that one observer favourably remarked:

> Quietly, without rant or histrionics, [Gregg] brought home to the men their responsibility and duty; that which they owe their country, their superior, the men they would lead and, above all, their responsibility to democracy and civilization. His talk was stirring, a dare and a challenge. A challenge that all men passing through Brockville must accept. The junior leaders of the Canadian Army owe an incalculable debt to Colonel Gregg, not only for his conscious fine work but for the type of leadership which he exemplifies on which so many unconsciously model themselves.[18]

Canadian officers were therefore inundated from various quarters with advice and suggestions concerning leadership – truly a wealth of information from which lessons could be absorbed and potentially employed.[19] All in all, the various publications and addresses to which aspiring officers were exposed contended that leadership was very much a function of human relations …obviously and naturally! Each in their own way, however, offered insight into the fundamentals of this relationship and suggested means by which its dynamics could be influenced. The material presented in lectures and published articles took a number of different forms. By and large, the majority of discussions proffered advice and suggestions, generally instructing young officers as to what actions they should take, and by extension, what actions they should avoid. Much of this dialogue offered a 'checklist' of sorts that would ensure success, so it was assumed, if aggressively pursued.[20]

Officers were expected to possess very specific qualities – magnanimity, gregariousness, a sense of honour, justice and fair play – and the instructions that they received would help bring these qualities to the fore. Second, discourses on leadership also informed officers in no uncertain terms what their men expected of them. Knowing what subordinates desired of superiors encouraged the latter to interact with the former in a very deliberate and particular manner to meet these sundry requirements.[21] And finally, some material attempted to explain the psychology of the soldier. By understanding soldiers' motivations and their anticipated behaviour, officers could theoretically impose themselves on these thought processes to greatest effect. Appreciating how subordinates thought, so the assumption ran, would make it easier for a leader to influence and encourage certain behaviours.[22] Whether deliberate or not, these three 'types' of material, that provided advice, explained expectations and explored psychology, allowed officers to see the complex issue of leadership from different perspectives, all of which would hopefully aid in their understanding.

So what specifically did the Canadian Army encourage in regards to leadership in order to cultivate and maintain strong officer-man relations? What type of officer was desired? How were officers expected to interact with their men? It is not intended here to simply list every action that an officer could take to gain the confidence and respect, and thus the willing compliance of his soldiers, because the resulting list could theoretically have no end and would ultimately serve very little purpose. And the same can be said of subordinates' expectations of superiors. Pamphlets and special addresses serve those purposes all too well. Rather, the main themes of the literature will be identified and briefly discussed in order to understand in broad terms what the Canadian Army viewed as the pre-requisites for good, effective leadership. It is better to not

give undue importance to details while overlooking essentials. Whatever their individual nature, particular actions flowed from these general principles, and so it is of greater utility to place more emphasis on the latter than the former. As will be seen, the type of officer that the army desired was one who: a) cared for his men in every respect; b) was competent in the execution of his duties; and c) upheld a high moral standard. If such was achieved, he, and the army in turn, would be well on their way to success.

SECTION 2: PATERNALISM

Paternalism in Theory

Both prior to and throughout the Second World War, the Canadian Army encouraged leaders to adopt a paternalistic attitude toward subordinates in the hopes of enmeshing all, in a close, sympathetic relationship. The concept of paternalism was certainly not unknown. As historians Gary Sheffield, Helen McCartney, David Englander, Richard Holmes and John Baynes have all illustrated, it mediated officer-man relationships during the Great War.[23] In a corpus of work dealing with the manner in which subordinate and superior interacted with one another, these authors have discussed the paternalistic exchange in the context of the British Expeditionary Force between 1914 and 1919, taking into account such complicating factors as class, type of unit (Regular, Territorial or New Army) and pre-war social influences, amongst others. Quite simply, the non-commissioned offered loyalty and deference to the commissioned in return for competent leadership, both behind the lines and in battle, and a high degree of care, wherein superiors looked out for the interests and welfare of subordinates.

Noblesse oblige stood as paternalism's credo in that privilege entailed responsibility. Benefitting from more comfortable and favourable conditions of service, those befitting a gentleman, officers were to play the role of father figure; gain an understanding of and empathy for their men; show concern for their lives; and see to their needs before their own, whatever they may be.[24] If such was the case and an officer was at the same time paternal and competent, his soldiers would theoretically follow him with more enthusiasm than another officer who was less so on either account…or both. A paternalistic style of leadership was certainly in evidence in the British Army of the First World War and was probably present in the Canadian Expeditionary Force too. At present, the underdeveloped state of the literature on this point prevents the drawing of any firm conclusions. However, it seems likely, based on preliminary investigations, that such was indeed the case.[25] If paternalism was present in Canada's army of the Great War, as it most surely was in one form or another, then it should come as no surprise that such a style was also in evidence during the Second World War.

Paternalism in Practice

The paternalistic approach, in which officers ensured that the basic physical and psychological needs of their men were met, was intended neither to be indulgent nor pampering. Actions along paternalistic lines were meant to encourage loyalty, trust, confidence and respect; all of which would hopefully translate into obedience at the crucial moment. Paternalism was very much intended to create the type of relationship, based on strong bonds of mutual affection, in which quick obedience was freely given in recognition of, and in return for, good treatment. The army itself acknowledged during the Second World War that paternalism served a utilitarian, even self-serving, purpose and did not aim to make subordinates happy just for happiness sake. "The main object of welfare," as one pamphlet made explicitly clear, "is to keep the men as happy and contented as possible, so that they may be at all times fighting fit and fit to fight."[26] One *CATM* article further observed:

> Besides the duty we owe in looking after them, it [paternalistic leadership] forms the basis of discipline. It ensures the ready response for the extra bit of effort when required. If men remember the times you have gone out of your way to help them, and that you always put their interests before your own, you have made them your debtors and your appeal has more authority and force, as few men like not to repay debts of this kind.[27]

A junior officer was expected to fill a number of different roles with his men – advocate, provider, defender, confidant, friend and aide. This entailed the sacrifice of an officer's spare time in the interest and service of his men.[28] To reinforce this notion, one wartime publication noted:

> The more you ask of your men in the way of effort and resistance, the more must you see to their comfort and welfare, and a good officer will ask a lot from his men, at the same time doing a lot for them. You cannot ask without giving, and you ought to give before asking.[29]

Seeing to their 'comfort and welfare' encompassed a broad range of activities and was indeed unlimited. Anything that could be done was to be done. It included, but was not limited to, ensuring that leave was administered properly; that men ate wholesome meals with the rations on hand; that they received correspondence and were able to write letters to their kinfolk; that their private affairs were in order; that they had a chance to speak with their officer about any subjects of concern; that their health was maintained; that they participated in sports and games; that their sexual lives were not misguided; that they were entertained; that they had the chance to further their education; and that their religious beliefs were supported.[30] Officers were therefore encouraged to often ask themselves: "What little thing more can I do for my men?"[31] In everything, and at all times, an officer was to be 'for' his subordinates. In a very real sense, their troubles were his troubles. By seeing to their varied interests, he could foster the confidence and respect upon which the ideal officer-man relationship was based and ensure that his soldiers at all times remained focussed on the task at hand.[32] It was for this reason that at Brockville, George Blackburn and his fellow cadets "had it pounded into you by every instructor during officer's training that the welfare of the men always comes before your own."[33]

If a junior officer was to be successful in any of his sundry roles, he first had to know his subordinates on more than a superficial level. He simply could not do his job properly if he did not know each man under his command. In addition to mere vital statistics, an officer was to be familiar with the personality, intelligence, family circumstances and abilities of all of his soldiers. Personal knowledge could be gained in any number of ways,[34] but participation in sports was universally advocated, so much so that even adjutants, the principal staff officers of individual units, were encouraged to partake in collective physical recreation.[35] Only by knowing his subordinates could a superior even begin to address their difficulties or act on their behalf.[36]

A number of dignitaries took hold of this particular theme, referring to it often during addresses to which officer cadets were exposed (or in their opinion, no doubt, subjected!). Speaking to a class at Brockville in 1942, Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart, the Chief of the General Staff, remarked that studying and getting "to know each one of your men" was one of the real "delights

of regimental soldiering." Like any artful skill, however, it required constant and repetitious practice: "If you can strike the right note, you can get the results you wish from any individual. Your problem is to keep on playing your notes until you strike the right one."[37] Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston offered similar counsel to graduates in the fall of 1942: "set yourself to learn immediately the names of the men, where they come from and a little something at least of their background, what they did before they came into the Army, what their fathers did, something about their families and something about their ambitions." He commented further that learning their personal details "will make you more human. It will help you get the best out of them." The minister continued, not incorrectly:

> A man who has to keep aloof from his men to maintain his [prestige] isn't the kind of stuff to make a good Canadian officer. They [the soldiers] don't want to be babied, but they have a right to expect your constant and vigilant interest in their welfare.[38]

Such intimate knowledge better positioned an officer to assist his men when personal problems arose, thereby ensuring that they remained focussed on their immediate task, be it training or operations. A soldier simply could not concentrate on his military duties if he was constantly distracted by problems of a more personal nature.[39]

By knowing his subordinates' feelings, an officer was better able to maintain discipline. Understanding how each man felt allowed issues of concern to be resolved early with ease rather than corrected later with difficulty.[40] It is for this reason that: "An officer must be always readily accessible to his men, both for interviews and the hearing of complaints."[41] Officers were required to create within their respective commands a conducive environment, one that was both encouraging and facilitative, in which subordinates felt free to approach their superior: "The men must feel that they can come and talk to their officers naturally about their private difficulties, and must know that when they do so they will get sympathetic hearing."[42]

Furthermore, because some men needed gentle persuasion to perform, while others required forceful direction and others required no prompting at all, knowing what 'technique' worked best with each individual allowed an officer, when time and opportunity allowed, to tailor his words and actions to connect with his subordinates in a manner that resonated with them best. This knowledge of the men could only be gained through prolonged and meaningful contact. Indeed, "The more one knows of the men's characters, the easier will it be to handle them."[43] An officer could certainly begin the process of forging strong relationships by taking an active interest in his men and using that knowledge to greatest effect.

To further the creation of affective bonds based on mutual loyalty and respect, junior officers were encouraged to allow their men an opportunity to come to know them as individuals too. Because remaining distant and aloof would not facilitate either the creation or continuance of strong relationships, "the officer must go out of his way to know the men personally and let them get to know him and see that he is not really such a bad fellow after all."[44] As a result of the powerful bonds that were created in the process of coming to know one another, men were more likely to follow an officer with whom they had developed a friendly, yet professional, rapport. Whether owing to tradition, human nature, a pervasive military culture or something else altogether, men frequently viewed their officers with a healthy dose of suspicion and reserve, one

publication going so far as to assert that some men are "terribly suspicious about the honesty of their officers."[45] The heavy emphasis on inter-rank contact was therefore intended to break down such psychological barriers, to show the former that the latter was really on their side and was not to be feared. As one article made clear:

> You must have a cheerful, unhesitating obedience of all the men under your command. This can only be obtained by knowing your men and they knowing you. Appreciate the situation of each man under your command. Show them that you are 100% for them at all times and you will get 100% co-operation at all times from them.[46]

The foregoing was perhaps a little optimistic, but the underlying idea was sound.

Acting on behalf of their soldiers had its limits however. Officers were cautioned that in this most essential of duties, "friendliness is not to be confused with familiarity, which must always be an enemy of good discipline."[47] A certain distance had to be maintained if appropriate respect was to exist between superior and subordinate. Practically speaking, too close a relationship might have impaired the imposition of discipline, since one's friends would have been much harder to punish than one's soldiers. Officer and man could be close acquaintances, but they certainly could not be close friends.

In order to create and maintain strong relationships that could withstand the trials and difficulties of battle, the army also encouraged superiors to respect subordinates – their person, their intelligence, their sense of fair play. Meeting the sundry psychological needs of the non-commissioned could take many forms, but interwar and wartime publications, along with various speeches and addresses, frequently emphasized the need for officers to listen, to explain, and to be just. In the army's opinion, "The soldier does not mind a severe code [of discipline] provided it is administered fairly and reasonably."[48] Members of McGill University's Canadian Officers' Training Corps were similarly instructed:

> Officers, W.O.'s [Warrant Officers] and N.C.O.'s [Non-Commissioned Officers] will adopt towards subordinates such methods of command and treatment as will not only ensure respect for authority, but also foster the feelings of self-respect and personal honour essential to military efficiency. They will avoid intemperate language or an offensive manner.[49]

By treating soldiers as individuals and with a modicum of respect, rather than as mere automatons at the complete disposal of the army, as a resource as it were, officers could further encourage the loyalty and confidence so essential to effective officer-man relations. All in positions of authority were frequently enjoined to "regard and treat...subordinates with the courtesy and respect which is peculiarly due to every person who cannot defend himself against discourtesy and disrespect."[50]

With the full force of military law behind them, officers could theoretically expect their men to instantaneously obey their orders without question. Yet, the army realized (and so too did the best officers it would seem) that a more willing obedience would result if leaders took the time to explain to their followers the reasons behind particular courses of action, if feasible. Although

not obligated to do so, the benefits in performance that oftentimes resulted encouraged such an approach. As Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, General Officer Commanding II Canadian Corps, saw it, “If you explain to the Canadian soldier what is required of him and give him a good reason for it he will produce the goods every single time and do it twice as well as any other individual.”[51] Again, perhaps a little optimistic, but the idea resonates. Letting the men know how they fit into the overall plan was equally motivating. Simonds likewise believed that “Officers must keep their troops in the picture at all times. The Canadian soldier does not give his best when he is not in the picture.”[52] Explanations along these lines also ensured that soldiers knew enough of the overall plan to improvise and to rely on their own initiative to achieve the objective if circumstances demanded.[53]

Rather than treat soldiers as mere instruments of war, officers were encouraged to regard their men as members of a larger team, a team to which in reality they all belonged. As one lecturer instructed:

> I don’t want you to go away, however, with the idea that the men must be treated like dogs – very far from it. You don’t want to curse or damn every time you notice things go wrong. Sometimes a word of encouragement, or a patient listening to an explanation, or a smile when pointing out the fault will go a long way. Remember that, though we are officers and the men are privates, still we are all comrades in the great dangers and the great struggle; make the men feel that you realize this comradeship *and love it*.[54]

Or in other words:

> Ours is a force of men who have voluntarily offered themselves to serve their country in the cause of democracy, and it will do discipline no harm if officers and N.C.O.’s recognize that men of all ranks are fellow-workers in a common cause, to be treated with the respect which one man owes to another in a free country.[55]

Like other leadership practices, respecting one’s subordinates could encompass a multitude of different actions. All in all, however, the army recognized that an officer who acknowledged his men’s intelligence, abilities, role, insights and so on, could increase the strength of attachment between them. A relationship based on such respect, so the army contended, would be more robust than one in which respect was lacking. A ‘know-it-all’ leader who remained aloof, who treated his subordinates with contempt and who demanded strict obedience would surely be less successful than his *confrere* who was the exact opposite in every respect.

That paternalism was central to the officer-man relationship is beyond doubt. A young officer had to concern himself less with his individual approach to leadership, that is to say what form his minute interactions with his men would take, and more with the fact that he was now obliged by virtue of his commission to look out for his subordinates on every account. One Canadian pamphlet that received wide distribution (and was apparently adopted by both British and American forces) asserted that a platoon commander “needs to feel, and must show, interest and concern in *everything* that affects the welfare and comfort of each man.” It continued, “The backbone of good morale remains discipline, but that discipline needs first to be self-discipline.

The platoon officer must be able to count on himself to put all platoon values ahead of his own selfish interests."[56] An officer's particular approach might change from day to day, and from circumstance to circumstance, but the ideal of paternalism remained inviolate and sacrosanct. The regimental historian of Toronto's famed 48th Highlanders of Canada articulately expressed this notion a decade after war's end, writing:

> It was not that the young subaltern had to decide whether a tough, a superior, a conciliatory or a first-name basis was best with the men: he had given some thought to that . . . and could adjust to that. The dismaying change was that everything about each of his men was now his business, whether he was on or off parade, doing fatigue or gone AWL [Absent Without Leave], drunk or sober, and not excluding the condition of his calluses, what to do about his own or his wife's infidelities, and how much rent a soldier's family should pay. The young officer had most to learn about the army way. He had to know the thinking of both the men and the N.C.O.s, and also the attitude of those up above. Not the least thing he must learn was how to stand diplomatically if need be between his men and the top; when they were wrong he would nearly always take the blame. …In a time that was still afar, when officers and men shared the same hazards and hardships [i.e., battle], he would see why this intimate knowledge of his men was wise. It would help him know what to expect, or could demand from his men.[57]

SECTION 3: COMPETENCE AND CONDUCT

Competence

Being 'for' his subordinates, however manifested in practice, did not automatically fit an officer for the weighty responsibilities of command and leadership, especially in battle. An incompetent paternal officer could be a dangerous liability just the same as a bungling martinet. While a paternalistic and respectful disposition certainly aided in securing a cheerful obedience, such an approach was but one component of a much larger and more complex equation. If an officer was to be a leader in the truest and most accurate sense of the term, he had to know his job well. By demonstrating proficiency in all matters commensurate with his rank and trade, whether administrative, supportive or tactical, an officer could gain the confidence, respect and trust of his men. As one publication made clear, "You must know your job. If you do not, you can have no confidence in yourself, and the men can, and will, have no confidence in you either."[58] In a sense, competence was merely an extension of paternalism. If an officer was to care for his subordinates in every respect and attend to their interests, he had to be able to lead them effectively in battle (from the front, it might be added)[59] and ensure that their lives were not needlessly wasted through incompetence or indifference. For non-combatant officers, on the other hand, a high level of competence would ensure that their men's time and effort were not ill-placed. As such, the commissioned were constantly reminded:

> Your men must instinctively look to you. To achieve this end, you must earn their respect, for your knowledge, for your assumption of responsibility, and for your decisiveness of action. If you know what you are doing, your self-confidence will inspire the confidence and respect of your men and be mirrored in their actions.[60]

An officer who was competent and who displayed a genuine interest in his men – two hallmarks of effective junior leadership – was no doubt easy to follow.

Conduct

The army also believed that irreproachable personal conduct would further assist officers in gaining the respect, and thus the willing obedience, of their men.[61] An immaculately turned-out and natty subaltern was supposed to serve this same purpose. As one training document made clear: "To be extremely smart and alert should be the ambition of every CAC [Canadian Armoured Corps] officer."[62] Being the embodiment of the military ethos, officers were expected to set the example for all to emulate so that the sundry components of that ethos – a distinct and proper military bearing, aggressiveness, a corporate spirit, trustworthiness, and so on – might be transmitted to and absorbed by the soldiers whom they commanded. A superior could not (from a moral perspective at least) demand that his subordinates exemplify the military spirit when he himself was not a true and genuine exemplar of that spirit in turn. An officer was very much expected to lead through positive example. It was for this reason that Colonel G. Brock Chisholm observed:

> Everything the platoon officer does or says is discussed. His behaviour on and off parade, in mess, out for the evening, on leave, is reported fully and critically. He is presenting a picture of a soldier to his men. If they can find any defects in his character they will do so, as an excuse for not giving up their own former points of view in favour of his [that is, for adopting the military perspective as their own]. The officer is being judged as worthy of acceptance or not, all the time, 24 hours a day. His behaviour and bearing are determining what kind of soldiers these men will be.[63]

Soldiers in the field held similar views as the erudite colonel. Officers were supposed to be paragons of virtue who were expected to never cross certain behavioural boundaries. Some 'things,' as many found out to their eventual detriment, were simply 'not done' and were definitely 'not on.' Earning the respect of their soldiers was predicated on officers acting in such a manner as to indicate that they *actually deserved* their men's respect. Whatever its individual nature, improper conduct encouraged a certain level of disdain and made it harder for subordinates to willingly offer that respect upon which effective officer-man relations were ideally predicated. George Blackburn recalled that one officer:

> …whose stock-in-trade is dirty jokes, within days after the arrival at the Battery became an object of contempt for many in his troop. On making discreet inquiries, you were told it wasn't that they were put off by the subject matter of the jokes, but rather that their officer would indulge in telling them. They simply expected a man whom they were obliged to salute, and whose orders they had to carry out without question, to be a cut above the average, with an advanced sense of decency and morality.[64]

CONCLUSION

The above commentary on various publications and addresses, which focused on leadership, presents the *ideal*; the type of leader that the army hoped every junior officer would aspire to be and eventually become with time, study and practice. Not only was an officer to be highly competent in the execution of his specific duties and the embodiment of all that was virtuous, but he also was to be paternal towards his subordinates, acting almost as a surrogate father. But where does one go from here? As it turns out, the potential paths are many indeed. With the establishment of the ideal, historians may subsequently opt to 'measure' individual officers against this standard, this very high standard, to determine if in fact the concepts expounded through diverse avenues were actually implemented and became more than just theory. Some officers seem to have approached the archetype to a remarkable degree,[65] yet others most certainly did not and fell far short on many counts.[66] Why did some junior officers fail to approach this ideal? Were the reasons systemic, personal or environmental? Why, by contrast, did others succeed?

While the theoretical steps to proficient officership seem relatively simple and straightforward, even logical at times, actually applying them was undoubtedly much more difficult, especially in situations where lives and the outcome of individual operations hung precariously in the balance. Much about the complexities and requirements of leadership could be learned through training pamphlets, lectures and the occasional address, offering as they did considerable insight into one of the most challenging responsibilities that officers would ever have to assume. Such an introduction must have been enlightening, especially for those who had never had the opportunity to 'lead' their fellow citizens prior to joining the army. Individuals who came from business, church groups, large families or other social organizations undoubtedly possessed an advantage – some leadership principles apply in all circumstances [67] – yet even they too had much to learn and come to grips with. At the end of their training, officers may have possessed the theory behind good leadership, but only when placed in command could their theoretical understanding be put into practice, elements of which were undoubtedly modified, invented anew or discarded altogether. Theory and praxis are rarely congruent. And so, from this perspective, historians might be inclined to inquire whether the various means of instruction *actually had the desired effect* of turning raw civilians, with no or limited military experience, into competent officers who could lead their soldiers under extraordinarily difficult circumstances and be triumphant in the end. Where, in other words, did subalterns actually learn leadership – during operations against a determined enemy or during preparations for the same? Based on an admittedly incomplete survey of the relevant literature, it would seem that much was learned 'on the fly' when, of course, the consequences of failure were at their highest.

The individual means by which leadership principles were communicated – whether in the form of publications or addresses by distinguished personalities – were infused with a host of assumptions that, when fully explored, will surely provide insight into the social dynamic of the Second World War-era and some of the salient features of Canadian military culture at the time. Assessing the impact of these assumptions would surely be a profitable exercise also. As suggested, the *CDQ*, the *CATM* and other training pamphlets relied heavily on self-development and passive absorption. Officers received these publications and were expected to read, digest

and later implement the contents as appropriate. George Blackburn observed that unless junior officers had attended the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, they "gained their knowledge in a hit-and-miss fashion – as much from their own initiative in studying pamphlets issued by the British War Office as from the loosely structured courses set up by their units."[68] No wonder then, that when faced with the imminent prospect of letting down his regiment in an upcoming exercise, Bert Hoffmeister, from the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, purchased WO pamphlets in Aldershot, England, and taught himself how to write an operation order, so frustrated (and not a little anxious) was he by his own lack of training.[69] With the requirement to quickly train officers to meet the needs of a much-expanded force that, after June 1944 in the case of Northern Europe and July 1943 in the case of Sicily and Italy, was engaged in high intensity combat operations, such an approach was perhaps inevitable, yet what were the consequences? Were junior officers trained too quickly or incompletely? Was too much left to their own devices? Did the quality of leadership at the platoon-level suffer as a result, and if so, how and to what extent?

Other questions that historians might ask are numerous indeed and can certainly not all be listed here. For example, one might inquire what was the impact of the First World War veteran non-commissioned and commissioned officers (who oftentimes served as instructors) on officer-man relations during the 1939-1945 war? Along similar lines, how effective were various training establishments (like Brockville where Whitelaw and Gregg commanded) in producing competent leaders? Difficult, complex and involved questions to be sure, but all questions that must be asked and answered to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of junior leadership in Canada's army during the 'second Great War.' Again, what has been described is merely the ideal, the archetype, to which all were encouraged to aspire, one very small piece of a very large and complex puzzle.

During the interwar period and especially during the Second World War itself, the Canadian Army encouraged young officers to be paternalistic in their relationships, competent in their actions and upright in their deportment. Success in each undertaking was intended to secure the confidence, respect and loyalty of subordinates, all of which it was hoped would encourage a more willing, indeed enthusiastic, obedience. One publication summarized the whole matter succinctly, "Leadership of the highest order is required of every officer."[70] Stated differently, but with no less significance:

> Never forget for a minute that the men in the ranks are the salt of the earth, that they deserve the best possible leadership, and that it is your privilege, as well as your great responsibility, to have the honour of commanding them. Every officer must try his utmost to be worthy of that honour and responsibility.[71]

The responsibility for the 'best possible leadership' was immense, composed as it was of multiple facets that the young leader had to master. Because soldiers were unlikely to follow with any enthusiasm those leaders who treated them poorly, did not know their job sufficiently or failed to act in a manner that encouraged respect – they would follow because they had to, not because they wanted to – the army's heavy emphasis on paternalism, competence and rectitude was very much intended to improve the officer-man relationship to the point where obedience was freely given in exchange for, and out of acknowledgment of, fair treatment. By seeing to their various responsibilities, junior officers were to be more than just an 'ornamental

appendage'[72] within their individual units. The best, it seems fair to suggest, were fatherly and able and virtuous. Effective leadership ultimately required constant attention and effort: relationships had to be continually fostered, skills had to be continually improved, and one's conduct had to be continually monitored. Weighty and hefty responsibilities indeed!

Endnotes

[1] "Knowing Your Job," *Canadian Army Training Memorandum* [*CATM*], 1941 Digest, 5.
[2] "Notes for Young Officers on Leadership," *CATM*, no. 13 (April 1942), 22.
[3] Numerous discussions concerning the association between leadership and discipline, and leadership and morale, and how in both cases specific actions can have either positive or negative impacts, are to be found in the published literature and certain archival collections. See, for instance, Flight-Lieutenant F. V. Heakes, "Discipline," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* [*CDQ*] 11, no. 3 (April 1934), 337-345; Squadron Leader A. A. L. Cuffe, "Leadership and Morale," *CDQ* 7, no. 3 (April 1930), 359-364; Captain M.F. Macintosh, "Morale," *CDQ* 5, no. 3 (April 1928), 325-328; Wing Commander S.G. Tackaberry, "Leadership and Morale," *CDQ* 15, no. 2 (January 1938), 170-177; Great Britain, British Army of the Rhine, *Morale in Battle: Analysis* (Germany, 1946; Canadian Reprint 1947), and, University of Victoria, Special Collections, Walter Bapty, SC008, "Discipline and Leadership," 5 June 1941. The importance of training and officers' responsibilities with respect to the same can be found in official publications on training such as Great Britain, War Office, *Training and Manoeuvre Regulations* (1923), and, Great Britain, War Office, *The Officer and His Job: Morale and Fighting Efficiency* (1940). Neither training nor the maintenance of discipline/morale will be discussed in this monograph. The former is a separate subject unto itself and thus deserves individual treatment, while the latter, it could be argued, falls under leadership in that it would be present when exceptional leadership prevailed.
[4] J. L. Granatstein, "Hoffmeister in Italy," *Canadian Military History* 2, no. 2 (1993), 58. See also J. L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 194.
[5] As can be seen, the 'literature' employed for present purposes consists primarily of published materials. To allay any fears to the contrary, such writings were actually used in the training of officers. Thus, the discussion that follows is not simply related to ethereal literature, literature that existed but was not used, but rather to a functional literature, a literature that was incorporated into training syllabi and had the potential to influence by virtue of its inclusion. As evidence, see *Library and Archives Canada* [*LAC*], Record Group [RG] 24, Vol. 9823, CMHQ, 2/OFFRS TRG/1, Draft "E" Group Training Directive – Officers Training, 15 July 1943, where it is stated that officers will be examined on the contents of many of the individual pamphlets cited herein.
[6] When reciprocal relationships failed, that is, when individuals in positions of authority offered improper leadership, disobedience sometimes resulted. Such a theme is evident in Craig Leslie Mantle, ed., *The Apathetic and the Defiant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1812 to 1919* (Toronto: CDA Press/Dundurn, 2007); Howard G. Coombs, ed., *The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to Present* (Toronto: CDA Press/Dundurn, 2007); and to a lesser extent in Craig Leslie Mantle, ed., *The Unwilling and The Reluctant: Theoretical Perspectives on Disobedience in the Military* (Kingston: CDA Press, 2006).
[7] For instance, one issue of the *CATM* included a translated and condensed excerpt "from a book written by a Company Commander in the German Army which can be read with profit by all officers of the Canadian Army." See *CATM*, no.10 (January 1942), 11 and 39-48.
[8] C. P. Stacey, *The Canadian Army – 1939-1945 – An Official Historical Summary* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948), 308-309.
[9] Ibid.
[10] C. P. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War – Volume 1 – Six Years of War – The Army in Canada, Britain and The Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), 131.
[11] Notice printed below Table of Contents, *CATM*, no. 23 (February 1943), 2, only one of many possible *CATM* issues that could have been cited in support.
[12] See Great Britain, War Office, *The Soldier's Welfare: Notes for Officers* (1941) held at the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, Ontario.
[13] Ibid., 10 and 9, respectively. To be fair, *The Soldier's Welfare* informed another, later pamphlet, namely Great Britain, War Office, *Comrades in Arms – Three Talks to Junior Officers or Officer Cadets to Assist Them in the Handling of Their Men* (June 1942; Canadian Reprint December 1942), especially Lecture No. 3, "Looking After the Men's Welfare," 17-26. In the latter talk, which like all others was designed to help "instruct young officers and cadets in the management and handling of men," the more blunt statements as cited in the above text were for whatever reason omitted. Were these statements indicative of class bias? Was the 'author' simply being economical

in the interest of space, picking the most important tips from the former to include in the latter and nothing more? The tone and content of each pamphlet offers sure scope for a study of the assumptions that informed each.

[14] See *LAC*, RG 24, Vol. 9797, CMHQ, 2/GEN/1/2, "Memorandum on the Instruction of Officers," *circa* 28 October 1940, where it is stated: "It is the Commanding Officer's task to ensure that all officers continue their studies, and that this is done in a way which will encourage them to seek out information for themselves, absorb it, impart it to their sub-units and generally to contribute to the efficiency of the unit as a whole."

[15] Geoffrey Hayes, "'We need leaders – God, how we need leaders.' Exploring Bad Officership in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945," Unpublished paper submitted to the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Contract 091124, 12. Many thanks are given to Dr. Hayes for his kind permission to draw freely and copiously from his unpublished work. Material taken from his manuscript in support of arguments made herein has been attributed to Hayes, rather than to the original source from which it was first gleaned, in order to show direct provenance and to ensure that proper credit is fully given to him. CFLI will publish Dr. Hayes's work in 2012 as a Technical Report.

[16] Ibid.

[17] As quoted in Ibid.

[18] As quoted in Ibid., 13.

[19] Officers also derived information on leadership from other media such as instructional films. This particular format, however, has not been discussed here. One possible example includes "C.A.4 – Winter Training and Man Management."

[20] As a representative example drawn from many, see "Advice for Officers," *CATM*, no. 42 (September 1944), 4.

[21] As a representative example drawn from many, see "What Your Men Will Expect of You," *CATM*, no. 41 (August 1944), 12. See also, "FOLLOW-ship," *CATM*, no. 30 (September 1943), 15-16.

[22] As a representative example drawn from many, see "The Handling of Men," *CATM*, no. 45 (December 1944), 20-21.

[23] Analyses of officer-man relations during the Great War from the British perspective are abundant but scant from the Canadian perspective. Concerning the former, see G. D. Sheffield, *Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 2000); G.D. Sheffield, "Officer-Man Relations, Discipline and Morale in the British Army of the Great War" in Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle, eds., *Facing Armageddon:The First World War Experienced* (London: Leo Cooper, 1996); G.D. Sheffield, "'A very good type of Londoner and a very good type of colonial': Officer-Man Relations and Discipline in the 22nd Royal Fusiliers, 1914-18" in '*Look to Your Front:' Studies in the First World War by The British Commission for Military History* (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999); G. D. Sheffield, "Officer-Man Relations: The Other Ranks' Perspective" in Michael S. Neiberg, ed., *The World War I Reader – Primary and Secondary Sources* (NY: New York University Press, 2007); Helen B. McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David Englander, "Mutinies and Military Morale" in Hew Strachan, ed., *The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Richard Holmes, *Tommy:The British Soldier on the Western Front, 1914-1918* (London: Harper Perennial, 2004); and John Baynes, *Morale: A Study of Men and Courage: The Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 1915* (New York: Praeger, 1967). Unpublished sources from Canada include James Brent Wilson, "Morale and Discipline in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1978) and Isabella Diane Losinger, "Officer-Man Relations in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Carlton University, 1990).

[24] In an instructional pamphlet written for members of McGill University's C.O.T.C. less than a month after the outbreak of war, Brooke Claxton, a First World War veteran and later Canada's Minister of National Defence, remarked on this point specifically: "The officer who recognizes that rank involves responsibilities to be discharged and who acts on that recognition is the kind of officer that superiors and subordinates alike want to have with them." See Brooke Claxton, *Notes on Military Law and Discipline for Canadian Soldiers*, 1st Ed. (Montreal, 1939), 35. A second, revised edition appeared in 1940 under the same title. Such comments were echoed a few years later in a document dealing with the training of reinforcements: "Officers must be taught to appreciate that they are leaders and that rank has its responsibilities. They are not only on duty 24 hours in the day but their actual working time is of necessity a great deal longer than that required by the rank and file." See *LAC*, RG 24, Vol. 9823, CMHQ, 2/OFFRS TRG/1, Draft "E" Group Training Directive – Officers Training, 15 July 1943.

[25] Doctoral research currently underway by the current author is attempting to fill this noticeable void. One of the more insightful discussions of leadership available is found in Tim Cook, *Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918* (Toronto, Ontario: Penguin, 2008), 201-208. Relating to officer-man relations, the inadequate state of the Canadian literature as compared to the British has been traced in Craig Leslie Mantle,

"Stripes, Pips and Crowns: A Review of Canadian and British Literature Concerning Inter-Rank Relations during the First World War," Unpublished term paper for University of Calgary, Dr. P. H. Brennan, STST-613, "Canada and the First World War," 8 December 2006.

[26] *Comrades in Arms*, 17.

[27] "Notes for Young Officers on Leadership," *CATM*, no. 13 (April 1942), 26.

[28] *The Soldier's Welfare*, 9.

[29] "Notes for Young Officers on Leadership," *CATM*, no. 13 (April 1942), 26.

[30] See *The Soldier's Welfare*.

[31] Great Britain, War Office, *The Officer and Fighting Efficiency* (Canadian Reprint August 1942), available at http://regimentalrogue.com/srsub/fighting_efficiency.htm last accessed 17 March 2009.

[32] *Comrades in Arms*, Lecture No. 1, "The Officer and Man Relationship," 3-8. See also, *Canadian War Museum*, Major Ernest George Moogk, 58A1 172.18, "Duties of Officers," 18 February 1941, where the basic outlines of the paternalistic relationship are listed in point form, to wit, dealing with complaints, giving advice, ensuring men have the "necessaries" required to do their job, knowing men on an intimate level, entering into off-parade activities with them, and so forth.

[33] As quoted in Hayes, "Exploring Bad Officership," 26.

[34] The importance of understanding subordinates, and the techniques that officers could adopt to achieve such an understanding, is outlined in *Comrades in Arms*, Lecture No. 2, "Understanding the Men," 9-16.

[35] CIX, "Letters to An Adjutant," *CDQ* 1, no. 3 (April 1924), Letter No. 6, 91.

[36] Of course, as officers rose through the ranks and assumed responsibility for more and more soldiers with each successive promotion, their ability to truly know each man whom they commanded decreased proportionally.

[37] As quoted in Hayes, "Exploring Bad Officership," 14-15.

[38] As quoted in Ibid., 15.

[39] "How Do You Measure Up?" *CATM*, 1941 Digest, 14-15.

[40] "Notes for Young Officers on Leadership," *CATM*, no. 13 (April 1942), 25.

[41] "Care of Men," *CATM*, 1941 Digest, 9.

[42] *Comrades in Arms*, 20.

[43] "Notes for Young Officers on Leadership," *CATM*, no. 13 (April 1942), 25.

[44] Ibid., 22. In light of such a statement, why were so many of Canada's senior military leaders distant, cold, dull and aloof, the exact opposite of what was actually encouraged? Was it solely due to their personality or did their formative experiences, both civilian and military, play a role as well? Was it somehow a function of rank and appointment? Something else altogether? All are interesting questions that deserve consideration but are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

[45] *Comrades in Arms*, 23.

[46] "Man Management," *CATM*, no. 27 (June 1943), 19.

[47] "What is 'Good Discipline'?" *CATM*, no. 31 (October 1943), 4.

[48] "Leadership," *CATM*, 1941 Digest, 3.

[49] Claxton, *Notes*, 31. Along similar lines, Claxton observed, "Each man must know that he will get a scrupulously fair deal. This must extend outside the orderly-room and into every corner of the soldier's life." Ibid., 35.

[50] "An Officer's Code," *CDQ* 3, no. 4 (July 1926), 479.

[51] Terry Copp, ed., "General Simonds Speaks – Canadian Battle Doctrine in Normandy," *Canadian Military History* 8, no. 2 (1999), Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds to officers of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, 16 July 1944, 74.

[52] Ibid., 76. Some of Simonds's other views on leadership can also be found in Terry Copp, ed., *Guy Simonds and the Art of Command* (Kingston, ON: CDA Press, 2007), especially "Essential Qualities in the Leader," 19 February 1944, 21-24.

[53] Claxton, *Notes*, 33.

[54] "The Duties of an Officer," *CATM*, no. 10 (January 1942), 6. Italics in original. See also *Comrades in Arms*, 4.

[55] Claxton, *Notes*, 35.

[56] Colonel G. Brock Chisholm, *Morale – A Platoon Commander's Responsibility for the Morale of His Men* (Toronto: National Committee for Mental Hygiene, 1941), 4 and 14-15, respectively. Italics added for effect.

[57] Kim Beattie, *Dileas: History of The 48th Highlanders of Canada – 1929-1956* (Toronto: 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1957), 57-58.

[58] "The Duties of an Officer," *CATM*, no. 10 (January 1942), 5.

[59] For one of many possible references, see Great Britain, War Office, *Right or Wrong? Elements of Training and Leadership Illustrated* (1937), Illustrations 74 and 75, page 44, where the obvious implication is made that an officer must be at the front. In this particular scenario, an officer is encouraged to noto direct his patrol from a map, but rather to personally observe the ground over which his patrol will travel and *then* issue his orders.

[60] "Character and Leadership," *CATM*, no. 32 (November 1943), 46.

[61] See "Officers are Gentlemen," *CATM*, no. 39 (June 1944), 21. See also, *LAC*, M. B. K. Gordon Fonds, Manuscript Group 30-E367, Vol. 2, Folder 18, Brigadier A.M. Thomas, 3 Canadian Army Tank Brigade, to Commanding Officer, 27 Canadian Army Tank Regiment, 27 March 1943, on the deportment of officers.

[62] *LAC*, RG 24, Vol. 9823, CMHQ, 2/OFFRS TRG/1, Draft "E" Group Training Directive – Officers Training, 15 July 1943.

[63] Chisholm, *Morale*, 5-6.

[64] As quoted in Hayes, "Exploring Bad Officership," 27.

[65] One such officer might be Sydney Valpy Radley-Walters. 'Rad,' as he is known to many, was a highly competent and decorated (DSO and MC) squadron commander in the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment (SFR), who cared deeply for his soldiers and treated them with great respect. By any account, he exemplified much of the advice that the Canadian Army offered in connection with man management. See Craig Leslie Mantle and Lieutenant-Colonel Larry Zaporzan, "The Leadership of S.V. Radley-Walters: Enlistment to D-Day – Part One of Two," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 4 (2009), 70-80, and Craig Leslie Mantle and Lieutenant-Colonel Larry Zaporzan, "The Leadership of S. V. Radley-Walters: The Normandy Campaign – Part Two," *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no. 1 (2009), 56-67. Available online at http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no4/11-mantle-eng.asp and http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/09-mantle%20zaporzan-eng.asp

[66] One such officer in the SFR remained well to the rear in safety, attempting to direct his soldiers' actions over the wireless. As a result, any respect the men held for him quickly (and no doubt permanently) evaporated. See Lawrence James Zaporzan, "Rad's War: A Biographical Study of Sydney Valpy Radley-Walters from Mobilization to the End of the Normandy Campaign, 1944" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 2001), 223.

[67] Brooke Claxton thought that "Men in the army as elsewhere respond far more readily to encouragement and praise than to censure though that may be necessary on occasion." See Claxton, *Notes*, 35.

[68] As quoted in Hayes, "Exploring Bad Officership," 7.

[69] Douglas E. Delaney, *The Soldiers' General: Bert Hoffmeister at War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 22-23.

[70] *The Officer and His Job*, 5.

[71] *Comrades in Arms*, 26.

[72] *The Officer and His Job*, 8.

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