



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
CANADA

# **AMPLIFYING CANADA'S AFRICA STRATEGY**

**Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and  
International Development**

**Honourable Ahmed Hussen, Chair**

**JUNE 2026  
45th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION**

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## **Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development**

**Hon. Ahmed Hussen  
Chair**

**JUNE 2026**

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## **NOTICE TO READER**

### **Reports from committees presented to the House of Commons**

Presenting a report to the House is the way a committee makes public its findings and recommendations on a particular topic. Substantive reports on a subject-matter study usually contain a synopsis of the testimony heard, the recommendations made by the committee, as well as the reasons for those recommendations.

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# **THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

has the honour to present its

## **NINTH REPORT**

Pursuant to its mandate under Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, September 23, 2025, the committee has studied Canada's Africa Strategy and has agreed to report the following:



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## LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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*As a result of their deliberations committees may make recommendations which they include in their reports for the consideration of the House of Commons or the Government. Recommendations related to this study are listed below.*

### **Recommendation 1**

**That the Government of Canada strengthen whole-of-government coordination in the implementation of its Africa Strategy, including through enhanced interdepartmental collaboration. 23**

### **Recommendation 2**

**That the Government of Canada strengthen the capacity of – and better promote the services offered by – its Africa Trade Hub. 23**

### **Recommendation 3**

**That the Government of Canada establish the diaspora engagement mechanism announced in its Africa Strategy. 23**

### **Recommendation 4**

**That the Government of Canada ensure that its Special Envoy for Africa and Special Envoy for the Sahel are provided with adequate financial and human resources to effectively carry out their mandates. 23**

### **Recommendation 5**

**That the Government of Canada proceed, in a timely manner, with the establishment of a full embassy in Benin and high commission in Zambia. 23**

### **Recommendation 6**

**That the Government of Canada organize a high-level visit to Africa, led by the Prime Minister, to signal Canada’s long-term commitment to the continent and to advance trade, investment and diplomatic relationships with key partners. 24**

**Recommendation 7**

**That the Government of Canada organize regular trade promotion activities with key African markets, including through trade missions and diaspora engagement.** 24

**Recommendation 8**

**That the Government of Canada pursue trade agreements with African countries – including countries of La Francophonie – that have strong commercial ties with Canada, on an expedited basis.** 24

**Recommendation 9**

**That the Government of Canada ensure the timely conclusion of foreign investment promotion and protection agreement negotiations with African countries, as appropriate.** 24

**Recommendation 10**

**That the Government of Canada focus its international assistance to Africa in sectors where Canada has expertise and demonstrated leadership, including health, human rights, democratic reforms, women’s leadership, and women, peace and security.** 24

**Recommendation 11**

**That the Government of Canada ensure that its trade promotion and development finance activities reflect and leverage Canada’s advantages, including its strong people-to-people ties and its English and French linguistic ties with the African continent, as well as its expertise in energy and the environment.** 24

**Recommendation 12**

**That the Government of Canada study the issue of African sovereign debt.** 24

**Recommendation 13**

**That the Government of Canada establish clear benchmarks to assess progress in implementing its Africa Strategy and report on those results.** 25



# AMPLIFYING CANADA'S AFRICA STRATEGY

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## INTRODUCTION

In recent years, significant international attention has been devoted to Africa's geopolitical weight, economic growth, and youthful demography. Longstanding and emerging partners have been expanding their diplomatic, trade, investment, and security relationships with African countries and institutions. As Canada's Special Envoy for Africa and Ambassador to the African Union (AU), Ben Marc Diendéré, observed in his appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Africa's geopolitical significance is not an unrealized idea, over the horizon. It is "the continent of today." As he put it, "everybody is in Africa."<sup>1</sup>

The Government of Canada has sought to strengthen its engagement with Africa "in a spirit of equal and mutually beneficial relations."<sup>2</sup> To that end, on 6 March 2025, after two years of consultations with more than 600 stakeholders,<sup>3</sup> the government released *Canada's Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security*.<sup>4</sup> The strategy was described as a "robust new foreign policy designed to benefit Canadian and African partners."<sup>5</sup>

The government's strategy followed this Committee's November 2024 report, *A New Era of Partnerships: Canada's Engagement with Africa*. The report revealed a landscape that had taken shape over 20 years, during which Africa had become "more strategically significant" even as Canada's profile, presence, and relevance on the continent had "diminished."<sup>6</sup> The Committee stressed that, going forward, Canada's long-term success

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1 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE), *Evidence*, 27 January 2026, 1620 (H.E. Ben Marc Diendéré, Ambassador, Permanent Observer African Union and Canada's Special Envoy for Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development).

2 FAAE, *Evidence*, 20 November 2025, 1540 (Cheryl Urban, Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development).

3 Global Affairs Canada (GAC), *Global Affairs Canada's 2024–25 Departmental Results Report*.

4 GAC, *Canada's Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security*.

5 GAC, *Canada launches its first global Africa Strategy: A partnership for shared prosperity and security*, News release, 6 March 2025.

6 FAAE, *Canada's Approach to Africa*, News release, 7 November 2024.



in Africa would require consistent and targeted engagement backed by “investment in the means of implementation.”<sup>7</sup>

The Committee’s 2024 report put forward 27 recommendations and reflected information that was gathered from 40 witnesses and 18 written briefs.<sup>8</sup> The first recommendation called on the Government of Canada to publish a comprehensive strategy for Africa that would achieve policy cohesion. Second, the Committee wanted the strategy to be based on “the principles of partnership, mutual interests, and shared priorities,” and focused on “the convergence of Canada’s skills and assets with African priorities, as identified in [the AU’s] Agenda 2063.” Third, the Committee urged the inclusion of strategic objectives as well as short- and long-term benchmarks for success.<sup>9</sup> In this parliamentary session, the Committee set out to update its work, evaluate the government’s strategy, and determine if these recommendations regarding cohesion, partnership, and accountability for results were being met.<sup>10</sup>

## THE COMMITTEE’S STUDY

To inform its assessment of the government’s Africa Strategy, the Committee heard from government officials, stakeholders and experts over three meetings held between 20 November 2025 and 27 January 2026. Through this work, it became clear to the Committee that the strategy’s release was not an end point, but an important marker on the way to a recalibrated and future-oriented relationship. As will be explained in the sections that follow, the Committee believes that the findings set out in this report will need to be addressed if Canada is to realize the Committee’s original and ambitious vision of a “new and mutually beneficial era of partnerships.”<sup>11</sup>

Many of these findings are focused on the Government of Canada’s increasing emphasis on economic ties with the African continent. Although the rationale behind this pivot is clear, the second key message from the Committee’s study is that Canada has acquired expertise and been active in non-commercial aspects of its relationships with African countries and institutions, which remain important. This includes the delivery of programming to help fragile states and vulnerable peoples, including in the areas of

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7 FAAE, [A New Era of Partnerships: Canada’s Engagement with Africa](#), Twenty-eighth report, 44<sup>th</sup> Parliament, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, November 2024.

8 FAAE, “[Canada’s Approach to Africa](#),” *Work*, 44<sup>th</sup> Parliament, 1<sup>st</sup> Session.

9 FAAE, [A New Era of Partnerships: Canada’s Engagement with Africa](#), November 2024.

10 FAAE, [Minutes of Proceedings](#), 45<sup>th</sup> Parliament, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, 23 September 2025.

11 FAAE, “[Conclusion](#),” *A New Era of Partnerships: Canada’s Engagement with Africa*, November 2024.

security, health, the environment, and human rights. The third point is repetition from the Committee's 2024 study. There remains a sense that Canada must act with urgency, consistency and determination to solidify its presence and deepen its relationships on the continent. The fourth point also echoes the Committee's previous work, but now in the context of reviewing – rather than anticipating – a published strategy. Testimony called for resources that are commensurate with Canada's policy objectives for Africa and the machinery of government that can deliver them.

## THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA'S AFRICA STRATEGY

The Committee's findings are influenced both by the content of the Government of Canada's Africa Strategy, as well as by broader geopolitical trends and considerations. The strategy itself was released on 6 March 2025, on the eve of the 44<sup>th</sup> Parliament's dissolution. The strategy is organized around five pillars, or "strategic areas," which were informed by consultations and aligned with the AU's Agenda 2063. These are:

- strengthening diplomatic engagement and people-to-people ties;
- enhancing economic cooperation;
- reducing poverty, supporting economic development, empowering youth, and addressing humanitarian crises and climate adaptation;
- bolstering partnerships for peace, security, and human rights; and
- advancing shared priorities through increased engagement on the global stage.<sup>12</sup>

To solidify the first pillar, the government committed to expanding Canada's diplomatic footprint on the continent by establishing a full embassy in Benin and a full high commission in Zambia.<sup>13</sup> Building on Canada's previous appointment of a Permanent Observer to the AU, the government appointed a Special Envoy for Africa and a Special Envoy for the Sahel. The strategy also promised a new African-Canadian diaspora

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12 GAC, *Canada's Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security*.

13 At the time of the Africa Strategy's publication, Canada had 22 embassies and high commissions in Africa, as well as five diplomatic offices, including the offices in Benin and Zambia.



engagement mechanism, as well as activities designed to strengthen relationships with pan-African institutions, regional economic communities, and parliamentary bodies.<sup>14</sup>

Under the second pillar, which is focused on economic cooperation, the government committed to organizing a high-level trade mission that would prioritize innovative sectors, infrastructure, and critical minerals. The strategy also announced the establishment of an Africa Trade Hub to coordinate Canada’s economic diplomacy with the continent, as well as the negotiation of foreign investment promotion and protection agreements. Furthermore, the government indicated that it would continue to support the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA). Once implemented, the strategy notes, the AfCTA “will be the largest free trade area in the world by number of participating countries, creating an integrated market of 1.3 billion people.”<sup>15</sup>

As concerns the third pillar, which addresses development objectives, the strategy indicates that a larger proportion of Canada’s international assistance to Africa is going to be “directed toward sustainable economic development and youth employment.”<sup>16</sup> Some commitments under this pillar reiterate existing Canadian initiatives, such as the Government of Canada’s \$5.3 billion climate finance envelope and its 10-year, \$1.4 billion annual commitment to global health and rights, more than 60% of which has been invested in Africa.<sup>17</sup> Added to this existing support is the new Africa Trade and Development Program. This pillar of the Strategy also emphasizes innovative and blended financing instruments.<sup>18</sup>

The strategy’s fourth pillar summarizes Canada’s multidecade work in support of institutional capacity and good governance. It states that a “critical component” of this pillar will be support for African-led peace operations and conflict prevention mechanisms. The pillar also highlights the promotion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the Youth, Peace and Security agenda, as well as Canada’s intent to invest in resilient electoral systems, democratic electoral processes, human rights protections, and societal inclusion. Furthermore, the strategy suggests that Canada will pursue a

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14 GAC, [Canada launches its first global Africa Strategy: A partnership for shared prosperity and security](#), News release, 6 March 2025.

15 GAC, [Canada’s Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security](#).

16 Ibid.

17 GAC, [10-Year Commitment to Global Health and Rights: Annual Report for 2022–2023](#).

18 GAC, [Canada’s Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security](#).

revised approach to the Sahel region of West Africa, which has grappled with rising authoritarianism and violent extremism.<sup>19</sup>

The strategy's final pillar is focused on Africa's place in the international system. It indicates that Canada will continue to "support increased African participation and influence in multilateral spaces" and will work with African partners, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to address global challenges and opportunities. As with the fourth pillar, however, the means of achievement are expressed in less tangible terms. They include high-level commitments to working with African partners to advance shared interests across the United Nations system and advocating for reform of the United Nations Security Council "to redress Africa's historic exclusion from the council and secure due and substantial representation for African countries."<sup>20</sup> Additional commitments focus on supporting the AU in its role as a permanent member of the G20, strengthening partnerships with African members of the Commonwealth and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, and engaging with African partners to contribute to efforts related to climate change and climate security.<sup>21</sup>

## THE COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS

### Pivoting to Mutually Beneficial Partnerships

Most of this report is focused on the Government of Canada's central objective, which is building mutually beneficial partnerships with African countries and institutions. This approach has economic dimensions and is tied to the government's broader concerns about Canada's economic security and trade diversification. It is also responsive. The Committee heard in 2024 and again in 2026 that African partners are seeking engagement that goes beyond aid and that is built on equality and shared interests. According to the testimony, to get there, Canada will need a two-way vision and one that reflects policy coherence.

### Mutual Prosperity

When Global Affairs Canada officials testified in 2026, they described a geopolitical situation that had changed fundamentally since the Committee's 2024 study. The "rise in global economic turbulence and widening global fault lines," the Committee heard, has

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19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.



caused the Government of Canada to focus on “Canadian productivity and economic prosperity and protecting Canadian sovereignty and security.”<sup>22</sup> This new outlook has informed specific commitments, including Canada’s intention to “increase exports with non-U.S. markets and to diversify trade.”<sup>23</sup> The department believes that the Africa Strategy aligns with these government-wide objectives. The African continent, they noted, is home to “fast-growing economies, a growing middle class and a dynamic youth population that is driving innovation and entrepreneurship.”<sup>24</sup>

Taking these factors into account, Global Affairs Canada characterized the Africa Strategy as a “pivot towards more economic co-operation and mutually beneficial partnerships between Canada and African countries.”<sup>25</sup> Two years of consultations revealed that African interlocutors were seeking partnerships that are “more multi-faceted” and that have a greater emphasis on trade and investment. As part of this pivot, the government “is moving towards using international assistance to do more economic growth activities and trade and development.”<sup>26</sup> That said, the Strategy is not intended “to completely leave behind all past investments or priorities.”<sup>27</sup> As foreign aid programs are being scaled back globally,<sup>28</sup> Canada is evaluating its aid effectiveness and considering different models, including “peer-to-peer” engagement, as well as mechanisms that can incorporate the private sector.<sup>29</sup>

## New Tools

Canada’s engagement in Africa builds on decades of history, but the Government of Canada is putting in place new tools to advance economic cooperation. These include the Africa Trade Hub. According to Global Affairs Canada, the trade hub “has been instrumental in coordinating with Canada’s missions in Africa to support Canada’s private sector on the continent and trade policy priorities such as ongoing foreign investment promotion and protection agreement negotiations with Zambia and

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22 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1535 (Cheryl Urban).

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 [Ibid.](#), 1545.

26 [Ibid.](#), 1645.

27 Ibid.

28 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), [A historic decline in foreign aid: Preliminary 2025 ODA data](#), Data explainer, 9 April 2026.

29 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1650 (Cheryl Urban).

Tanzania.”<sup>30</sup> In addition to this coordination role, the trade hub is also intended to help with market prioritization.<sup>31</sup> In this regard, the department conveyed that, at present, Canada’s “trade and investment relationships are predominantly with eight to 10 countries on the continent.”<sup>32</sup>

The Committee heard about another tool, FinDev Canada, which is Canada’s development finance agency. It was established in 2018 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Export Development Canada (EDC) and is designed to complement Canada’s existing development toolkit. It does so by providing support through the private sector in the form of financing, investment and blended finance arrangements, as well as technical assistance. Sub-Saharan Africa represents close to 37% of FinDev Canada’s portfolio, which the Committee was told “translates to more than \$1 billion in funding and investment for 20 clients.”<sup>33</sup> Chief Executive Officer Lori Kerr characterized FinDev Canada as a “distinct tool” because it is designed to “provide a bridge to commercial opportunity,” including through greater risk tolerance.<sup>34</sup>

While not specifically focused on Africa, Ms. Kerr referenced the GAIA climate loan fund as an example that illustrates how such financing can have a catalytic effect. By working with Japan’s largest financial group and the Green Climate Fund, a US\$75 million investment from FinDev Canada is contributing to a loan fund that has a target size of almost US\$1.5 billion.<sup>35</sup> Most of the capital is being generated by private sector investment, including from pension funds, insurance companies and global banks.<sup>36</sup> The majority – 70% – of this blended finance platform is intended to provide loans for climate adaptation activities, and it is designed to reach some challenging markets in least-developed countries and small island developing states.<sup>37</sup>

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30 [Ibid.](#), 1535.

31 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1610 (Andrew Smith, Director General, Pan-African Affairs Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development).

32 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1540 (Cheryl Urban).

33 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1645 (Lori Kerr, Chief Executive Officer, Development Finance Institute Canada (DFIC) Inc.).

34 [Ibid.](#), 1650.

35 [Ibid.](#), 1710. Also see [FinDev Canada Transaction Summary: GAIA Climate Loan Fund](#); and, MUFG, [GAIA Climate Loan Fund achieves USD 600 million first close to finance climate adaptation and mitigation projects across emerging markets](#), News release, 3 November 2025.

36 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1710 (Lori Kerr).

37 [Ibid.](#)



## Limited Scale

It was reiterated to the Committee that Canada has strengths in specific sectors, including agriculture and education, which can make it a partner of choice in Africa. Canada also has important linguistic and people-to-people ties with the continent. Yet, testimony suggested that the new tools highlighted in the government’s Africa Strategy are relatively modest and that more could be done to leverage Canada’s advantages.

The capacity of the Africa Trade Hub and FinDev Canada’s activities on the African continent contributed to this assessment. Lori Kerr acknowledged that FinDev Canada is still a relatively new organization and that some equivalent European agencies have 10 times the capitalization.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, FinDev Canada is “not receiving additional resources on an annual go-forward basis from the government, other than the capital contributions that have been promised before.”<sup>39</sup> Fulfilling a commitment in Canada’s Africa Strategy, FinDev Canada is opening a new regional office in Cape Town, South Africa, in 2026.<sup>40</sup>

Broader comparative analysis provides additional perspective. Ndidi Nwuneli, President and Chief Executive Officer of the ONE Campaign, noted that other countries, notably China and India, have engaged with Africa according to comprehensive strategies. These have been backed by “affordable financing for their entrepreneurs to trade and build companies and also to ensure value addition.”<sup>41</sup> According to Ms. Nwuneli, “FinDev Canada’s commitment to Africa and the amount of resources they have to invest in Africa pales in comparison.” She said: “It’s not even enough for one country investment.”<sup>42</sup>

Even with the resources FinDev Canada was given, some questions were raised regarding the alignment of its activities with the Government of Canada’s vision for the continent and its understanding of Canadian strengths. Departmental officials described Canada’s place among francophone nations as a “comparative advantage” that allows Canada “to leverage partnerships with francophone African countries in terms of both trade

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38 [Ibid.](#), 1655.

39 [Ibid.](#), 1705.

40 Prime Minister of Canada, [Prime Minister Carney meets with President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa](#), News release, 23 November 2025; and GAC, [Canada’s Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security](#), p. 15.

41 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1130 (Ndidi Nwuneli, President and Chief Executive Officer, ONE Campaign).

42 [Ibid.](#)

exchanges and political alliances, including in multilateral organizations such as the International Organisation of La Francophonie.”<sup>43</sup> Indeed, at the end of March 2026, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs “formally presented Canada’s official letter of candidacy to host the 2028 Francophonie Summit, underscoring Canada’s commitment to promoting the French language, cultural diversity and multilateral cooperation across La Francophonie.”<sup>44</sup> While the Committee knows that FinDev Canada is a Crown Corporation, whose investments are guided by the evaluation of commercially viable opportunities,<sup>45</sup> it also learned that only around 7% of the agency’s portfolio in Africa involves francophone countries.<sup>46</sup>

Referencing the government’s Africa Trade Hub, Ndidi Nwuneli stated that there is a need for “easier and more transparent trade pathways.”<sup>47</sup> She conveyed that “Canadian businesses and entrepreneurs need clearer support to expand into the African market.”<sup>48</sup> Chris W. J. Roberts, a Political Science Instructor at the University of Calgary, remarked that he has not “seen any evidence of the promising ideas around the Africa trade hub concept,” which – he noted – was “intended to shift the mandate of our trade commissioner service to a more integrated approach that facilitates two-way trade and investment rather than the traditional focus on simply promoting Canadian exports.”<sup>49</sup>

Then there is the Strategy’s promise of a new mechanism for diaspora engagement.<sup>50</sup> The Committee was not provided any details regarding the status of its implementation. Departmental officials reaffirmed that diaspora engagement is a “very important” part of supporting Canadian enterprises that are looking to get into the African market,<sup>51</sup> and they indicated that such engagement “has intensified.”<sup>52</sup> In his comments, Chris Roberts described Canada’s diverse African diaspora as a “huge advantage” whose

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43 FAAE, *Evidence*, 20 November 2025, 1535 (Cheryl Urban).

44 GAC, *Minister Anand announces Canada’s candidacy to host the 2028 Francophonie Summit and renewed support for La Francophonie*, News release, 25 March 2026.

45 FAAE, *Evidence*, 27 January 2026, 1715 (Lori Kerr).

46 *Ibid.*, 1700.

47 FAAE, *Evidence*, 9 December 2025, 1110 (Ndidi Nwuneli).

48 *Ibid.*

49 FAAE, *Evidence*, 9 December 2025, 1120 (Chris W. J. Roberts, Political Science Instructor, University of Calgary, As an Individual).

50 FAAE, *Evidence*, 20 November 2025, 1610 (Cheryl Urban).

51 FAAE, *Evidence*, 20 November 2025, 1610 (Andrew Smith).

52 FAAE, *Evidence*, 20 November 2025, 1540 (Cheryl Urban).



empowerment in connection to the Africa Strategy “remains a work-in-progress.”<sup>53</sup> His hope is that the government’s commitment “will end up as something more than a web portal, occasional consultations, or a Global Affairs Canada presence at diaspora-organized events.”<sup>54</sup>

## Unmet Potential

Beyond these tools, the Committee’s study pointed to a larger issue, which is the unrealized potential of Canada’s economic relationship with the African continent. Ndidi Nwuneli believes that, if “trade diversification and strengthening collaboration with reliable partners are current priorities, countries on the African continent must be central to Canada’s plan.” To make the pivot real, she stressed that the African continent must be seen as an “opportunity” and one that “presents a great return on investment,” rather than a risk.<sup>55</sup>

The ONE Campaign published a report in May 2025, which revealed the significant room for growth in economic relations. Among its points, the report indicated that less than 1% of Canada’s exports went to Africa in 2023, and less than 2% of its imports came from the continent.<sup>56</sup> The report suggested that this low baseline is incongruent with the continent’s trajectory. In its written submission to the Committee, the ONE Campaign elaborated: “If Canada traded with Africa at the level expected considering shared languages, geography, friendly ties, and Africa’s growing economy,” it said, Canadian businesses could earn \$2.7 billion more in exports by 2030 and Canadian importers could source \$3.3 billion more from African countries.<sup>57</sup> Echoing the findings of the Committee’s 2024 report, Ms. Nwuneli underscored that Africa has “the youngest and fastest-growing population in the world.”<sup>58</sup> As noted, it is also in the process of implementing a continent-wide free trade area.

The Government of Canada recognizes the political significance of these developments. Ben Marc Diendéré, Canada’s Special Envoy for Africa, told the Committee that Canada has made “unprecedented strides” in deepening its relations with the AU Commission

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53 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1120 (Chris W. J. Roberts).

54 Ibid.

55 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1105 (Ndidi Nwuneli).

56 Elise Legault and Mohamed Khalil Larhrib, [Why Canada Should Trade More with Africa](#), ONE Data, ONE Campaign, 23 May 2025.

57 ONE Campaign, [written brief](#), 15 December 2025.

58 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1105 (Ndidi Nwuneli).

and its specialized agencies.<sup>59</sup> A third high-level dialogue with the Commission is scheduled for fall 2026. Canada has also supported the “design and implementation of the African continental free trade area,” which the Special Envoy called “a flagship project of [the AU’s] Agenda 2063.”<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, to help drive economic integration and open new markets, Canada has contributed to the African Trade Policy Centre. As such, and when considered alongside these diplomatic initiatives, the findings from the ONE Campaign’s report would seem to point to an ongoing need to connect Canadian businesses and supply chains with the opportunities that may be unlocked by this continental architecture.

### A Two-Way Street

To translate commercial potential into tangible opportunities, private sector actors require predictability and enabling environments. Companies that are investing in the mining sector, for example, typically communicate the need for “clear standards, clear business practices and reduced corruption.”<sup>61</sup> These conditions, which can improve private sector entry and enable market connections, can be facilitated by international assistance.<sup>62</sup> Highlighting the role that such assistance can play, Kate Higgins, Chief Executive Officer of Cooperation Canada, emphasized that mutually beneficial partnerships are “grounded in shared values, including inclusive and sustainable growth, and high standards of transparency, environmental protection and human rights.”<sup>63</sup> While the Committee was reminded that investment in development “helps stabilize and grow economies,” and can help countries “become better trade partners for Canada,” it learned that Germany spends almost 10 times more than Canada on development projects that are designed to support trade.<sup>64</sup>

As part of the ONE Campaign’s recommendations, Ndidi Nwuneli called for greater alignment between trade policy and development objectives. She suggested that a coherent approach would “not only enable more Canadian businesses to expand into African markets but also support African businesses in their efforts to build partnerships

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59 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1540 (H.E. Ben Marc Diendéré).

60 Ibid.

61 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1545 (Ryan Clark, Director General, Central, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development).

62 Ibid.

63 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1110 (Kate Higgins, Chief Executive Officer, Cooperation Canada).

64 ONE Campaign, [written brief](#), 15 December 2025, pp. 5–6.



with Canadian customers and sell their products in Canada.”<sup>65</sup> Ms. Nwuneli also suggested that Global Affairs Canada should be directed “to organize at least one formal trade mission to Africa by the end of 2026.”<sup>66</sup> She remarked that, “if Canada wants to send a strong signal that it’s ready for business, Prime Minister Carney himself should visit the continent again.”<sup>67</sup> (The Prime Minister visited South Africa for the G20 Summit in November 2025.) Another important milestone could be the launch of negotiations for Canada’s first free trade agreement with a major African economy.<sup>68</sup>

In addition to the need for momentum, other testimony highlighted the importance of consistency in relation to international standards and internationally recognized human rights. When it comes to critical minerals and natural resources, Stephen Brown, Professor in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, said that Canada must take a balanced approach, and avoid narrow, or self-interested, agendas. After registering his concerns about the reputational risks associated with the operations of Canadian mining companies, he noted that the position of Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise “is now vacant,” and said that the Government of Canada “is giving no indication of what it intends to do next.”<sup>69</sup> More generally, Professor Brown called for greater clarity regarding the ultimate goal that Canada’s Africa policy is meant to achieve. He asked the Committee to consider whether that was the advancement of Canadian interests or poverty reduction.<sup>70</sup>

Those objectives do not have to be seen as a binary choice. Ndidi Nwuneli reiterated the power of Canadian values in her call for increased transparency and accountability in relation to the critical minerals sector. She believes that values “should follow Canadian investment in Africa.”<sup>71</sup> This would manifest through an “insistence that where Canadian companies come alongside African investors, they also pay credible livable wages, provide all the social protections to the employees and prioritize African employees in value addition on the continent.”<sup>72</sup>

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65 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1105 (Ndidi Nwuneli).

66 Ibid., 1110.

67 Ibid.

68 Canada has “15 Free Trade Agreements in force covering 51 countries, but none with an African country.” See ONE Campaign, [written brief](#), 15 December 2025, p. 3.

69 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1145 (Stephen Brown, Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual).

70 [Ibid.](#), 1150.

71 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1210, (Ndidi Nwuneli).

72 Ibid.

## Systemic Challenges

Expectations for what Canada can achieve in Africa also need to be grounded in an understanding of the continent's long-standing challenges. One of these is debt. Kate Higgins indicated that, "[m]ore than half of low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa are in or at high risk of debt distress, with some spending more on debt service than on health or education."<sup>73</sup> As she said, "trade and investment alone cannot unlock development when countries are trapped in unsustainable debt."<sup>74</sup>

Another impediment is the lack of energy. According to Chris Roberts, the African continent requires a "massive provision of affordable, reliable and accessible energy for both household and industry."<sup>75</sup> Yet, he informed the Committee that many African countries have domestic sources of energy that are currently underused. He believes this situation is partly related to restrictions on investment in African fossil fuels, which he said have been put in place by Western countries at the bilateral level and through some of the international financial institutions.<sup>76</sup>

Departmental testimony suggested that other inefficiencies – including limited electrification – are key factors. Nigeria, for example, is an oil-exporting nation, but it "has tens of millions of people who don't have access to electricity."<sup>77</sup> Canada could, therefore, play a role through exports of energy technology.<sup>78</sup> The ONE Campaign suggested that Canada could support a "flagship initiative" of the World Bank and African Development Bank, known as Mission 300, which aims "to provide electricity to 300 million people on the continent."<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, Canada could launch "bilateral partnerships on energy with one or more African countries—thus realizing Canada's vision of becoming a true global energy superpower."<sup>80</sup>

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73 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1110 (Kate Higgins).

74 Ibid.

75 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1120 (Chris W. J. Roberts).

76 [Ibid.](#), 1215.

77 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1655 (Andrew Smith).

78 Ibid.

79 ONE Campaign, [written brief](#), 15 December 2025, p. 4.

80 Ibid.



## Known Pitfalls

Elise Legault, Senior Director of Policy for North America at the ONE Campaign, agreed with the government’s assessment that African stakeholders and leaders want “an equal partnership,” and that they want “trade and commerce.”<sup>81</sup> Even so, she said, there are pitfalls to avoid, which have been identified through years of evidence-based analysis. These include the practice of making aid conditional on the purchase of goods and services from the donor country (i.e., “tied aid”),<sup>82</sup> which Canada did away with years ago.<sup>83</sup> This was done for a reason, as Kate Higgins explained. It was understood that tied aid “distorts priorities, limits impacts and reduces value for money.”<sup>84</sup>

Aid effectiveness is also a multifaceted concept. While recognizing the positive aspects of better integrating trade and development, Ms. Legault remarked that not every aid project can or should be focused on trade. One major stream of aid, humanitarian assistance, is exclusively designed and delivered to save lives.<sup>85</sup> In cases like Sudan, which has experienced a “catastrophic conflict, marked by mass displacement, famine and governance collapse,” Kate Higgins emphasized that “development is not optional; it is often a lifeline.”<sup>86</sup>

Even when it comes to development projects, delivered in non-emergency settings, there is a need to match programming with evidence. Professor Brown cautioned the Committee “to be careful about jumping on the bandwagon of innovative and blended finance, whose contributions to poverty reduction are a lot less clear than the proponents claim.”<sup>87</sup>

## Consolidating Gains

Global Affairs Canada indicated that, while the Africa Strategy is a pivot towards economic growth activities, it will build on priorities and sectors in which Canada has

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- 81 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1200 (Elise Legault, Senior Director of Policy, North America, ONE Campaign).
- 82 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1110 (Kate Higgins).
- 83 Government of Canada, [Canada Fully Unties its Development Aid](#), News release, archived, 5 September 2008.
- 84 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1110 (Kate Higgins).
- 85 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1200 (Elise Legault).
- 86 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1110 (Kate Higgins).
- 87 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1115 (Stephen Brown).

already invested.<sup>88</sup> They referenced Canada's "proud history" of prioritizing maternal, newborn and child health, and the "legacy" of Canada's leadership in gender equality, which was anchored by the Feminist International Assistance Policy.<sup>89</sup> Regarding the gains that have been made, it was noted that programs such as the Women's Voice and Leadership initiative are "real examples" of localized support where relatively small investments in monetary terms can contribute to meaningful change.<sup>90</sup> The Equality Fund is another such example of localized support. The department stressed that "investing in women is a very important way" to achieve both economic and security objectives, and officials underscored that Canada's history of investing in health programs has helped to form many of the partnerships that Canada currently has on the continent.<sup>91</sup>

Mozambique provides an example of the results that have been generated by Canada's rights-based approach. The Women's Voice and Leadership program has focused on building the capacity of women's organizations at the grassroots level that might not otherwise have received grant-based funding. Canada has worked to strengthen hundreds of women's groups across the country, despite challenges that include operating in a Portuguese-language environment. The department noted that this support became particularly significant in the context of post-electoral violence, when a strong civil society was needed to support reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts.<sup>92</sup>

Initiatives related to peace and security were also noted as part of Canada's long history of engagement with the African continent, and they were identified as critical components of the Africa Strategy.<sup>93</sup> Departmental officials highlighted Canada's various programs, including those aiming to counter terrorism and to support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Other programs have aligned specifically with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Leadership on these files has been seen through the National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security, the Elsie Initiative for Women

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88 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1645 (Cheryl Urban).

89 [Ibid.](#)

90 [Ibid.](#), 1550.

91 [Ibid.](#)

92 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1555 (Sara Nicholls, Director, Central and Southern Africa Bilateral Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development).

93 GAC, [Canada's Africa Strategy: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity and Security](#).



in Peace Operations, and the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers.<sup>94</sup>

As noted, there was a significant decline in official development assistance globally in 2025, with multiple donor governments scaling back their programs, including the United States.<sup>95</sup> In this context, Ambassador Diendéré cautioned that Canada cannot replace U.S. aid, given its previous scale. At the same time, he suggested that Canada can continue to play a meaningful role in targeted areas, particularly climate change. The ambassador noted Canada's support for organizations such as the Global Green Growth Institute and African Risk Capacity, which help countries adapt to climate-related risks.<sup>96</sup>

One specific example in this sector is Canada's \$5 million contribution to the Africa Adaptation Initiative. It was launched at COP21 in 2015 by the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change in support of its Food Security Accelerator.<sup>97</sup> In a written submission to the Committee, the Initiative stated that this initial investment is already delivering results across key pillars of Canada's Africa Strategy and urged continued support, including through better alignment with FinDev Canada's Africa portfolio and the Initiative's own engagement strategy for Francophone Africa. The submission underlined that Canada's contributions to the Initiative "are not aid – they are strategic investments that leverage private capital, strengthen Canada's influence within the African Union and deliver measurable, attributable results that Canadian taxpayers can point to."<sup>98</sup>

As noted above, other sectors where Canada has played an important role include locally led development, civil society engagement and gender equality, which Kate Higgins believes "must be important parts of the Africa strategy."<sup>99</sup> That is because African civil society plays a critical role in democratic resilience and inclusive development. She also emphasized that gender equality is a driver of economic transformation, accountable governance and sustainable peace, and pointed to Canada's

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94 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1550 (Cheryl Urban).

95 OECD, [A historic decline in foreign aid: Preliminary 2025 ODA data](#), Data explainer, 9 April 2026.

96 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1610 (Ben Marc Diendéré).

97 Environment and Climate Change Canada, [Minister Guilbeault supports advancing climate ambition in New York City](#), News release, 22 September 2023.

98 Africa Adaptation Initiative, [written brief](#), 24 March 2026.

99 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1110 (Kate Higgins).

longstanding leadership in the area, including through initiatives such as the appointment of an ambassador for Women, Peace and Security.<sup>100</sup>

When discussing the impact of cuts to aid programs, Professor Stephen Brown drew attention to the need for sustained support in sectors where funding was already limited, including LGBTQI+ rights.<sup>101</sup> In his view, the government's Africa Strategy rightly emphasizes Canada's leadership in advancing health. However, he questioned how this broader emphasis – and the attention Canada specifically devoted to sexual and reproductive health and rights – can be reconciled with funding reductions that have been announced for health programming.<sup>102</sup>

Providing specifics that elaborate on this concern, the ONE Campaign noted Canada's pledge to the eighth replenishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which the government framed as a recalibration to pre-pandemic levels of funding.<sup>103</sup> The pledge nonetheless amounted to a 16% reduction from Canada's 2022 pledge.<sup>104</sup> From the perspective of Kate Higgins, the \$2.7-billion cut to Canada's overall international assistance, which was announced in Budget 2025 for implementation over the coming five years, undermines "Canada's ability to honour commitments at a time of escalating humanitarian needs."<sup>105</sup>

## Engaging for the Long-Term

Ambassador Diendéré reminded the Committee that Canada is one of only a handful of countries that has a dedicated ambassador who is accredited to the African Union, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In his view, his position is evidence that Canada is "really engaging."<sup>106</sup> At the same time, Ambassador Diendéré acknowledged that Canadian engagement – both at the governmental and private sector levels – has not reflected the market opportunities across a continent of 54 countries and 1.3 billion people. While significant business opportunities exist, he remarked that Canadian companies tend to find barriers that competitors from other countries do not,

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100 [Ibid.](#), and [1140](#).

101 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1115 (Stephen Brown).

102 [Ibid.](#), and [1145](#).

103 GAC, [Canada announces commitment to the global fight against HIV, tuberculosis and malaria](#), News release, 21 November 2025.

104 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1105 (Ndidi Nwuneli).

105 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1110 (Kate Higgins).

106 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1630 (Ben Marc Diendéré).



suggesting that Canadian firms may be less equipped, or more hesitant, to operate in African markets. Nevertheless, the ambassador stressed that many Canadian companies are interested in doing business in Africa and contributing to Canada’s trade diversification objectives. To that end, he urged both the Government of Canada and the private sector to do more to support those efforts, stating that “we have to wake up” and “help the ones who want to do it.”<sup>107</sup>

Other Global Affairs Canada officials underscored that Canada requires a sustained presence on the continent and acknowledged that countries such as China and Russia have deepened their footprints in Africa. Given this context, the department believes that maintaining Canada’s diplomatic network in a range of countries, including in West Africa, which has seen a series of military coups, provides “a counterbalance and a Canadian influence,” while also allowing Canada to remain engaged on issues of concern.<sup>108</sup> At the same time, departmental testimony reflected the realism of the situation. In countries like Mali and Burkina Faso, where Canada currently has a relatively limited presence, it can be difficult to “keep those doors of communication open” and identify opportunities for meaningful engagement.<sup>109</sup>

From the vantage point of the continent as a whole, Chris Roberts used trade data to illustrate the degree to which Canada has fallen behind. When the 21<sup>st</sup> century began, Canada’s two-way trade with Africa was comparable to that of China, at approximately \$20 billion. While Canada’s trade has grown modestly since then, China’s has increased tenfold and has been accompanied by tens of billions of dollars in investment – a trend this Committee highlighted in its 2024 report. Although the results are less dramatic, other countries have also intensified their engagement with the continent. Mr. Roberts believes that Canada will only be able to achieve comparable results if Africa is made a priority at the political level. Other countries, he said, are “miles ahead” in coordinating both public sector action and engagement with the private sector.<sup>110</sup>

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107 [Ibid.](#), 1620.

108 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1625 (Cheryl Urban).

109 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1630 (Susan Steffen, Director General, West Africa and Maghreb Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development).

110 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1130 (Chris W. J. Roberts).

## Allocating Resources and Delivering Results

It is the government's view, as expressed by Global Affairs Canada, that Canada's Africa Strategy can be implemented "with existing resources."<sup>111</sup> Officials indicated that the Strategy's objectives can be achieved through targeted measures, streamlined processes, the use of new technologies, and improved coordination across government, even in a context of consolidated government operations and reduced expenditures. Progress will be reflected in Global Affairs Canada's results reports, which are tabled annually and cover the department's activities around the world.<sup>112</sup> Other witnesses were less convinced that the Strategy's objectives can be realized without new funding.

Professor Stephen Brown expressed his concerns in direct terms. He told the Committee that he finds it difficult to reconcile the idea that Canada can do new things in Africa without any additional resources or without abandoning any existing activities.<sup>113</sup> While Global Affairs Canada officials indicated that the commitment to open a full embassy in Benin and high commission in Zambia would be fulfilled in "short order,"<sup>114</sup> Professor Brown questioned how such statements align with broader discussions about the consolidation or closure of Canadian missions abroad.<sup>115</sup> Chris Roberts said that from his own experience visiting Zambia in 2025, but also based on information available on government websites at the point of his testimony, he "could not find any substantive movement on the promise to convert our modest office in Lusaka into a full-fledged resident high commission—and apparently the same goes for Benin."<sup>116</sup>

In a similar vein, Mr. Roberts suggested that the appointment of special envoys for Africa and the Sahel did not represent new capacity. Rather, he characterized these roles as "titles" that have been added to "overworked ambassadors and their tiny staffs" without corresponding increases in financial or human resources.<sup>117</sup> Ambassador Diendéré did not dispel this concern when he noted that he has one Canadian foreign service officer and one locally engaged staff in Addis Ababa. As he said, "that's it," beyond the support

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111 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 20 November 2025, 1540 (Cheryl Urban).

112 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1605 (Susan Steffen).

113 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1115 (Stephen Brown).

114 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1605 (Susan Steffen).

115 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1115 (Stephen Brown).

116 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1120 (Chris W. J. Roberts).

117 Ibid.



provided by departmental headquarters in Ottawa and Canada’s heads of mission around the continent.<sup>118</sup>

In this context, Mr. Roberts urged the government to deliver on what he calls the “modest promises” of the Africa Strategy as quickly as possible. He also recommended the government consider reinstating a secretary of state for Africa position – one that he believes “coincided with that last golden age of African attention in Ottawa, in the late 1990s and early 2000s.”<sup>119</sup> As a point of comparison, the ONE Campaign highlighted Canada’s “successful” Indo-Pacific Strategy, which was given \$2.3 billion over five years. From their perspective, this example “shows why a credible strategy requires attached funding, clear timelines, and a concrete plan of action.”<sup>120</sup>

A more nuanced view was provided in the written submission of the Canada-Africa Chamber of Business, which is “funded entirely by private sector sponsors operating in both Canada and Africa.”<sup>121</sup> At a time of “competing budget priorities and fiscal constraints,” the Chamber believes that success in Africa does not necessarily require “large amounts of taxpayer funding or subsidies.” What it does require is “consistent, credible engagement in trade and investment.”<sup>122</sup> The Chamber stressed that Canada remains a partner of choice for Africa and that there are significant opportunities for Canada–Africa trade and investment.<sup>123</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Ambassador Diendéré acknowledged that Canada’s Africa Strategy has faced some criticism regarding its timing, level of ambition, and execution. He emphasized, however, that the Strategy should not be understood as an endpoint, but as “the starting point for a conversation to build real bridges between Canada and the 54 countries in Africa.”<sup>124</sup> The Committee also recognizes that Canada’s approach to the continent is not limited to the Strategy itself. In fact, Global Affairs Canada officials indicated that, as

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118 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1605 (Ben Marc Diendéré).

119 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 9 December 2025, 1125 (Chris W. J. Roberts); also see Government of Canada, [Guide to Canadian Ministries since Confederation](#).

120 ONE Campaign, [written brief](#), 15 December 2025, p. 6.

121 The Canada-Africa Chamber of Business, [written brief](#), 30 January 2026.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 FAAE, [Evidence](#), 27 January 2026, 1600 (Ben Marc Diendéré).

implementation proceeds, the department continues to respond to the Committee's broader recommendations from its 2024 report.<sup>125</sup>

Nevertheless, if the Africa Strategy is to serve as a reset – or, as Kate Higgins described it, “a long-needed step toward a more coherent, forward-looking approach to the continent” – the Committee agrees that its success will require, as she put it: “clear investments, measurable goals and sustained diplomatic, economic and international-assistance efforts.”<sup>126</sup> To that end, the Committee makes the following recommendations:

#### **Recommendation 1**

**That the Government of Canada strengthen whole-of-government coordination in the implementation of its Africa Strategy, including through enhanced interdepartmental collaboration.**

#### **Recommendation 2**

**That the Government of Canada strengthen the capacity of – and better promote the services offered by – its Africa Trade Hub.**

#### **Recommendation 3**

**That the Government of Canada establish the diaspora engagement mechanism announced in its Africa Strategy.**

#### **Recommendation 4**

**That the Government of Canada ensure that its Special Envoy for Africa and Special Envoy for the Sahel are provided with adequate financial and human resources to effectively carry out their mandates.**

#### **Recommendation 5**

**That the Government of Canada proceed, in a timely manner, with the establishment of a full embassy in Benin and high commission in Zambia.**

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125 FAAE, *Evidence*, 20 November 2025, 1535 (Cheryl Urban).

126 FAAE, *Evidence*, 9 December 2025, 1110 (Kate Higgins).



#### **Recommendation 6**

**That the Government of Canada organize a high-level visit to Africa, led by the Prime Minister, to signal Canada's long-term commitment to the continent and to advance trade, investment and diplomatic relationships with key partners.**

#### **Recommendation 7**

**That the Government of Canada organize regular trade promotion activities with key African markets, including through trade missions and diaspora engagement.**

#### **Recommendation 8**

**That the Government of Canada pursue trade agreements with African countries – including countries of La Francophonie – that have strong commercial ties with Canada, on an expedited basis.**

#### **Recommendation 9**

**That the Government of Canada ensure the timely conclusion of foreign investment promotion and protection agreement negotiations with African countries, as appropriate.**

#### **Recommendation 10**

**That the Government of Canada focus its international assistance to Africa in sectors where Canada has expertise and demonstrated leadership, including health, human rights, democratic reforms, women's leadership, and women, peace and security.**

#### **Recommendation 11**

**That the Government of Canada ensure that its trade promotion and development finance activities reflect and leverage Canada's advantages, including its strong people-to-people ties and its English and French linguistic ties with the African continent, as well as its expertise in energy and the environment.**

#### **Recommendation 12**

**That the Government of Canada study the issue of African sovereign debt.**

**Recommendation 13**

**That the Government of Canada establish clear benchmarks to assess progress in implementing its Africa Strategy and report on those results.**



## APPENDIX A: LIST OF WITNESSES

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The following table lists the witnesses who appeared before the committee at its meetings related to this report. Transcripts of all public meetings related to this report are available on the committee’s [webpage for this study](#).

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
<p><b>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development</b></p> <p>Sara Nicholls, Director, Central and Southern Africa Bilateral Relations Division</p> <p>Andrew Smith, Director General, Pan-African Affairs Bureau</p> <p>Susan Steffen, Director General, West Africa and Maghreb Bureau</p> <p>Cheryl Urban, Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa Branch</p>	2025/11/20	14
<p><b>As an individual</b></p> <p>Dr. Stephen Brown, Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa</p> <p>Chris W. J. Roberts, Political Science Instructor, University of Calgary</p>	2025/12/09	17
<p><b>Cooperation Canada</b></p> <p>Kate Higgins, Chief Executive Officer</p>	2025/12/09	17
<p><b>ONE Campaign</b></p> <p>Elise Legault, Senior Director of Policy, North America</p> <p>Ndidi Nwuneli, President and Chief Executive Officer</p>	2025/12/09	17

<b>Organizations and Individuals</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Meeting</b>
<b>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development</b> Ryan Clark, Director General, Central, Southern and Eastern Africa Bureau H.E. Ben Marc Diendéré, Ambassador, Permanent Observer African Union and Canada’s Special Envoy for Africa Susan Steffen, Director General, West Africa and Maghreb Bureau	2026/01/27	18
<b>Development Finance Institute Canada (DFIC) Inc.</b> Lori Kerr, Chief Executive Officer	2026/01/27	18

## **APPENDIX B: LIST OF BRIEFS**

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The following is an alphabetical list of organizations and individuals who submitted briefs to the committee related to this report. For more information, please consult the committee's [webpage for this study](#).

**Africa Adaptation Initiative**

**ONE Campaign**

**The Canada-Africa Chamber of Business**



## REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the committee requests that the government table a comprehensive response to this report.

A copy of the relevant *Minutes of Proceedings* ([Meetings Nos. 14, 17, 18 and 35](#)) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Hon. Ahmed Hussen, C.P., M.P.  
Chair

