HOUSE OF COMMONS
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
CANADA


45th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development

EVIDENCE

NUMBER 047

Wednesday, October 28, 2026



Chair: Ahmed Hussen

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development

Wednesday, October 28, 2026

● (1635)

[*English*]

The Chair (Hon. Ahmed Hussen (York South—Weston—Etobicoke, Lib.)): Colleagues, I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 47 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on October 21, 2026, the committee is meeting regarding its study on the effectiveness of international institutions.

Before I proceed to introducing our experts, I want to go over the SDIR budget.

Earlier this afternoon, the clerk circulated three draft budgets from the subcommittee on international human rights for the following studies: For the situation of human rights in China, there is a $7,750 budget. For the global impacts of artificial intelligence on human rights movements, there is a $7,750 budget. For the briefing on gender-based violence against Ukrainian women in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there is a $5,900 budget.

Is it the will of the committee to adopt these budgets?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the first hour.

From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have Jay Allen, director general, trade negotiations and multilateral trade policy; Martin Larose, director general, international security policy and strategic affairs bureau; Alexandra MacKenzie, director general, international organizations and human rights bureau; and Shawn Steil, director general, strategy.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we'll proceed to rounds of questions.

I now invite Mr. Shawn Steil to deliver his remarks for no more than five minutes.

Welcome.

Shawn Steil (Director General, Strategy, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development): Thank you, Chair.

Let me first thank the committee for having my colleagues and I from Global Affairs Canada here to support this important work.

International institutions have long been vehicles for Canada to promote our interests and contribute to a more secure, peaceful and prosperous world, but as the committee has already heard from expert testimonies this week, the world has changed, and many of the institutions and the norms they protect are under enormous strain.

The landscape of international institutions is vast and varied in scope, formality and function. Many parts of Global Affairs Canada are either dedicated to or engaged in the work of international organizations. Many other parts of government also lead Canada's participation in important institutions. As director general for the strategy bureau, I play a role in developing policy and ensuring coherence in Canada's international priorities.

I'm joined by colleagues who oversee, amongst other things, Canada's engagement in key institutions.

Alexandra MacKenzie is director general of the international organizations and human rights bureau with a view over some UN entities as well as the Commonwealth and l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie.

Martin Larose is director general of the international security policy and strategic affairs bureau. Among many other things, he is a focal point for Canada's policy and engagement in NATO.

As director general for trade negotiations and multilateral trade policy, Jay Allen leads Canada's engagement in the World Trade Organization.

Before we proceed to questions for my colleagues on the international institutions they oversee, I will make a few comments on how we consider the effectiveness of international institutions for Canada's multilateral engagement in a more contested global context.

Judging the effectiveness of an international institution for Canada requires a long-term view, considering at least four factors: the extent to which its mandate aligns with Canadian interests; its effectiveness in delivering outcomes, including the internal dynamics between its members; Canada's ability to shape decisions and outcomes; and the extent to which Canada can leverage the opportunities available to advance its interests.

Universal, formal institutions have the advantage of global legitimacy and provide fora for Canada to engage most comprehensively. Some of these bodies face considerable pressures, including major financial constraints and increased polarization, reducing the scope for consensus-based decision-making, but many entities continue to function and to provide key forums for Canada to advance its interests and to reinforce key partnerships.

Formal technical institutions within the UN, like ICAO and the ITU, and outside of it, like the OECD and the IEA, are essential to the development of norms and standards in critical areas and they provide the monitoring and analysis to inform collective decision-making. This is critical in a fast-changing and volatile world. For example, in March 2026, the 32 member countries of the International Energy Agency agreed to a coordinated release of 400 million barrels from the strategic oil reserves in response to major disruptions to energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.

Less formal select groupings like the G7 and G20 can move more quickly and easily to build consensus and take action in response to emerging issues. Under our G7 presidency in 2025, for example, we launched the critical minerals production alliance to build collective defence against economic coercion and resilience in the supply of the minerals needed to sustain economic growth and competitiveness.

Looking forward, Canada's focus on strategic autonomy and national resilience will require us to be agile in building practical partnerships that secure our economic future. That means working within and alongside existing international institutions. It also means building coalitions on the basis of shared interests and deepening the co-operation with trusted partners.

Minister Anand noted in her speech to the UN General Assembly last month, “As we build new coalitions, we must also strengthen the multilateral system.” That is the challenge ahead.

Thank you.

● (1640)

The Chair: Thank you very much for your statement.

I will now open the floor to questions, beginning with MP Lawrence.

You have six minutes.

Philip Lawrence (Northumberland—Clarke, CPC): Thank you very much.

My questions will focus around international development. I suspect Ms. MacKenzie will answer them, but I'm happy to take answers from any of the panel.

I believe, as I'm sure most Canadians believe, that Canada is a force for good in the world and that many great things can be accomplished through international development. However, we can't ignore the domestic reality.

The domestic reality is that we are facing an affordability crisis. When I walk around in the neighbourhoods of Port Hope or Cobourg in my riding, I see that folks have challenges, serious challenges. Many can't afford to feed their families.

When the subject is international development—in common parlance, it would be foreign aid—it can often be a difficult conversation. If I say to them, “Your tax dollars that the government takes from you are going to be the difference between a child surviving or starving,” they want that dollar to go, but when we go off into different tangents and different ideological channels, that's where their support often wanes.

I'm going to ask you a series of questions about various different grants and loans, and I'd like to hear how you can possibly justify this—having millions of dollars flowing out the door—at a time when Canadians are struggling just to feed their families.

The first thing I'd like to talk about is the Canadian climate resilience accelerator for Latin America and the Caribbean. The project aims to use “private sector investments in climate change mitigation and adaptation across Latin America and the Caribbean while promoting gender-responsive, sustainable economic development.” Up to $500 million will be committed to Global Affairs through the Inter-American Development Bank. As of yet, the results are showed on your website as N/A.

Could you please explain why Canadian tax dollars are going to fund this project?

Alexandra MacKenzie (Director General, International Organizations and Human Rights Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development):

Mr. Chair, perhaps I should start with a bit of a caveat, which is that my responsibilities focus on some parts of the UN, which, as I'm sure many members know, is a large organization with many facets. There are some parts of the UN that I work on, and then there are other parts that extend beyond my remit. What I can say about Canadian assistance through the United Nations would perhaps be helpful.

With regard to the specific contribution to the Canadian climate resilience accelerator, I'm not able to answer the specifics of that question, but we could follow up after this.

I'd be happy to speak more about the United Nations and contributions that we make through that.

● (1645)

Philip Lawrence: I would appreciate if you could follow up there.

Mr. Steil, do you have any comments on that?

Shawn Steil: If the chair will allow it, I can make a general comment.

The issues that you raised about the value and perspectives of international assistance are significant. I'm speaking just from experience from working in the G7 last year and from my previous job as a sous-sherpa. The discussions within the G7 about ensuring that international assistance is effective and connected with domestic economic interests.... That is something that's starting to take hold and something that Canada is also considering along with how we can make mutually beneficial partnerships really part and a focus of that development assistance.

Philip Lawrence: Okay. I'll go through a couple of other different projects, and if you want to respond generally, that's fine. At the very least, these will help you with the context of the questions and what I'm looking for.

Once again, I do think that Canada has a role for good in the world through humanitarian and international development.

Quickly, here are a couple of other ones.

First, on the project, greening our rice: gender-just, low-carbon, rice value chains in Vietnam, there was $8.2 million spent without any results achieved as of yet. Your website says that no major development outcomes were reported.

The more recent announcement was a $50-million loan to the Khan Bank in Mongolia to support climate initiatives, women-owned businesses and small enterprises. Once again, this is without any sort of direct results.

Like I said, when I'm in the neighbourhoods of Port Hope and Newcastle and I tell people that their tax dollars which they work so hard for are the difference between a child surviving or not, they're okay with that. However, when we start talking about things that are ideological in nature, it's a real challenge.

Maybe you could just comment in general, whether it be on funding through the UN or otherwise, about the need to focus aid.

Alexandra MacKenzie: Mr. Chair, I'd be happy to talk about the important point of making sure that the United Nations and its agencies are effective and delivering results for Canadians.

We have been very much a founding member of the United Nations and have been supporting the UN through its work over more than eight decades. Most recently, the current UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, launched an effort to reform the UN. The UN80 reform effort is focused on trying to make sure the United Nations' agencies across the board and the entire UN system are working hard and being very effective at the country level across the world.

We are members of the UN General Assembly and also active on governing boards for the bodies that we are on. We are able to exercise an influence there in helping to make sure that they are streamlined and working to achieve results with dollars that we contribute.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Next we have MP Clark.

You have six minutes.

Braedon Clark (Sackville—Bedford—Preston, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.

I want to continue on the theme of the United Nations, because I think if you ask 100 random Canadians to name an international institution, the UN would certainly be the one that the majority would mention.

As you said, Ms. MacKenzie, Canada is a founding member of the United Nations. On my way down here, I walked past Prime Minister Pearson's portrait. He almost became the first secretary-general, so we have a historical appreciation for the institution as much as any country in the world.

You touched on UN80. Obviously, the UN is a huge institution. Over the decades that it's existed, in some decades it was more functional than others, but we do want to see progress. You mentioned the minister's speech last month. She said, “the UN is not—and should not be—a static organization.” I think we all can agree with that.

I'm curious, Ms. MacKenzie, if you could lay this out for us. From your perspective, what kinds of reforms should we be looking at? What are practical things where Canada can play a positive role in making sure that the UN continues to function well and functions better?

● (1650)

Alexandra MacKenzie: Mr. Chair, as I mentioned, the UN80 initiative was launched in March 2025. This is an attempt by the Secretary-General to make sure the UN is responding to the constraints it's facing right now.

As was mentioned in the opening remarks, the geopolitical context is very difficult. The UN is under strain also because of the financial situation and reduction from some UN members. This unprecedented pressure has required the UN and the Secretary-General to make efforts to push for renewed discipline and effectiveness across the organization.

In terms of how that works in practice, there are three interconnected work streams that are tackling a whole range of efforts. One is focused on efficiencies within the UN system. One is focused on mandates to make sure there isn't duplication, and one is focused on structural realignment. All of these are very complex pieces of work, but Canada has been a very important player in those efforts.

As I mentioned, it's been since March 2025, and we're starting to see some good results from it in terms of reduced budget and also some changes to mandate and focused efforts. We are seeing meaningful reform come through. This is all with a view to strengthening the effectiveness of the UN and making sure that it's able to be even more accountable and more able to address the global challenges we talked about.

Braedon Clark: Is there a timeline or anything attached to those goals for when we can assess the metrics and the improvements that have been made?

Alexandra MacKenzie: The timeline is very interesting because, as I think many of you will be aware, the UN secretary-general is up for change this year. There will be a focus on looking at this issue again and trying to ensure that there's continued reform, even with the change in secretary-general.

I think Canada will continue to push for those reforms with whoever the new secretary-general is, and then we'll see what the new timelines are after that appointment.

Braedon Clark: Thank you very much.

Mr. Chair, through you, another point that was raised earlier, which came up in our previous meeting on this topic as well, is around communication, metrics and results. That's fair. I think Canadians expect that of all institutions and all government expenditures.

Perhaps this isn't a question for you, Ms. MacKenzie. Whoever is best suited to answer it, could you give us a sense of how Global Affairs assesses the return on the investments that we make on a whole host of programs and projects that are incredibly vast in their applications? How do we measure those to make sure that, when we are talking to our constituents, as we all do, we can give a good explanation for what these programs actually do around the world?

Shawn Steil: Thanks, Chair, for the member's excellent question.

The question of measuring results in global affairs and foreign policy is always a bit of a bugbear because when you look at short-term and long-term measures of what you're doing, in the short term, we're looking at our outputs. What kinds of investments are we making? What kinds of activities, engagement and expertise are we building? Then you look at what the outcomes might be. When you get into those longer outcomes that you're striving for, you start to recognize that your direct influence over those is so heavily dependent on partnerships with others, with outcomes from various different directions. We try to do both—measuring what we can control, then looking and hoping that those results point in the right direction.

As you've seen over the last few years, the levels of uncertainty and unpredictability are becoming more difficult. I think my colleague can comment on how we look at the effectiveness in measuring the results within international organizations. However, I think it's always a challenge, and we just look at ways where we can aim for the right direction, then have a long-term measure of whether or not things have been moving in that way.

● (1655)

The Chair: Thank you.

Next we go to MP Brunelle-Duceppe.

[*Translation*]

You have the floor for six minutes.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe (Lac-Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses from the department for being with us today.

Ms. MacKenzie, I'll ask you the question, but if one of the other witnesses wants to answer for you, that's fine with me. Could you tell us what the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine is?

[*English*]

Alexandra MacKenzie: Mr. Chair, the question about the doctrine of Gérin-Lajoie relates to the Francophonie, as well as to....

[*Translation*]

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: The Gérin-Lajoie doctrine is not related to the francophonie. It is to a certain extent, but the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine is much broader. Could you explain to us what that is?

[*English*]

Alexandra MacKenzie: I'm sorry. I don't think I have the background on that, Mr. Chair.

[*Translation*]

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Ms. MacKenzie, you're the director general of the international organizations and human rights bureau at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. Is that your—

[*English*]

Alexandra MacKenzie: I am the director general for the international organizations and human rights bureau.

[*Translation*]

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: You can't explain to us what the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine is. Is that correct?

[*English*]

Alexandra MacKenzie: Mr. Chair, I'm sorry, but I'm not going to be able to answer that one at this time.

[*Translation*]

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Could another witness from the department do that? The witnesses are from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, so they are necessarily familiar with the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. However, no one here today can explain what the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine is. Is that correct?

Martin Larose (Director General, International Security Policy and Strategic Affairs Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development): Mr. Chair, I'm sorry, but on behalf of my colleagues, I'm also unable to explain the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine to committee members. That said, we can certainly provide a written response to the committee afterwards.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Mr. Chair, that wasn't a trick question at all. I really wanted to set things up for the rest of my questions, and I imagined, very honestly and quite sincerely, that senior officials from the federal government's Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development could quickly explain and summarize what the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine is.

Witnesses, isn't it rather absurd and unfortunate that none of you can do that? Believe me, it wasn't a trick question at all. I really just wanted to set things up for later, and I have a number of questions coming up. Honestly, no one here can tell me what the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine is, even though you are senior officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. Can you answer that question? No one here is able to answer yes or no. Is that correct?

[*English*]

The Chair: They've already told you that it's not possible at this time, but they've made the commitment to get back to you after this session, so I would urge the member to continue.

[*Translation*]

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Okay. Mr. Chair, you have just seen a flagrant and extremely unfortunate example of the two solitudes.

I imagine that, if I were to ask you the question, since you are the chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, to find out whether you know what it is, I have the impression that I already know the answer. I won't ask you.

Ladies and gentlemen, witnesses, the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine deals with Quebec's place at the international level when it comes to shared jurisdictions or exclusive jurisdictions in Quebec that are discussed on the international stage. That, in a nutshell, is the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. I hope you will read about it. Excuse me, I'm a bit taken aback by this lack of response and this ignorance on the part of senior officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and International Development about this doctrine that is so important for Quebec. That fascinates me, and I think you really need to do some research on that. Again, it wasn't a trick question at all; it was really to position what was coming.

Indeed, Canada generally presents its foreign policy as being based on a number of principles such as multilateralism, the inclusion of affected actors in discussions that affect their interests and co-operation, which involves governments working together. That's why I mentioned the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine.

Can you tell us what mechanisms the federal government uses to ensure that Quebec and the provinces can assert their interests when agreements are negotiated through international institutions such as the United Nations, or the UN, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, or UNESCO, or the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, or OIF? How does the federal government go about enabling Quebec and the provinces to participate, through the machinery of government, in these international institutions?

● (1700)

[*English*]

Shawn Steil: Perhaps I could start with a general response in terms of multilateralism and our approach there.

Consultations with the provinces and with first nations communities are an essential part of major policy moves that Global Affairs Canada makes. The competence of foreign policy lies with the federal government, of course, but the duty and the opportunity to consult with the provinces is key. That happens not only in Ottawa; it also happens in parts of our international network abroad where Quebec has a presence.

The member raised the issue of UNESCO. That's a special case, and I'll ask my colleague to talk about that.

Alexandra MacKenzie: Further to the point about UNESCO, we do coordinate very closely with the Province of Quebec in particular at UNESCO. For obvious reasons, they have representation within our mission, and we have very tight coordination to ensure the interests of Canada and Quebec are pursued through that body.

The Chair: Thank you.

Alexandra MacKenzie: In addition, for the Francophonie, we have several members, including Canada and the provinces that have full membership within the Francophonie. Quebec, of course, is one of those full members within Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, as is New Brunswick.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We go next to MP Duncan.

You have five minutes.

Eric Duncan (Stormont—Dundas—Glengarry, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here. Thank you for your work at Global Affairs.

I want to focus some of my questions on looking at the financial estimates for the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.

As we know, in the Liberals' last budget, they had departments reducing their expenditures by 15% over three years.

Can you provide me with the overall number of the expected savings or how much savings you found at Global Affairs during that period?

Shawn Steil: Mr. Chair, I can comment briefly.

This isn't entirely the area of competence of members of the panel here, but I do know, through the comprehensive expenditure review process, that Global Affairs Canada has committed to reduce its budget by $1.1 billion by 2028-29. That's being done through a variety of means, including a reduction in the workforce.

Eric Duncan: I appreciate that.

There's one area that concerns me and that I want to focus on, among a few others, when we look at the transfer payments and the payments to various organizations. Frankly, we've had a lot of commentary from witnesses and members of this committee about the functionality of the United Nations these days and how it's getting increasingly frustrated and static. That's a word I'm trying to avoid, but it seems to be very static right now. There's a lot of frustration with getting necessary reforms. UN80 was launched last year. There have been efforts on that, with very little progress to date that Canadians can see.

One item I was surprised to find was that for the UN organization, Canada was spending in 2024-25 $126 million. In 2026-27 that will go up by 20%. I have here that it's an increase to $151 million. Again, that's a $25-million increase in the UN budget being allocated. I'm just wondering about value for money. What are we going to get more for that 25%? We talk a lot about frustrations. We're trying to get change, and we're providing that much more money. What tangible benefit in value for money are we going to get for that extra $25 million a year?

Alexandra MacKenzie: Mr. Chair, with regard to the contributions that Canada provides to the UN, we provide both assessed and voluntary contributions. Some of the assessed contributions are obviously fixed. For the UN regular budget this year, Canada contributed $114 million Canadian, approximately 2.5% of the UN regular budget.

We're very proud that we contribute in full, on time and without preconditions to the UN. That's because we see this universal organization as being one that really helps to serve Canadian interests by pursuing prosperity and stability around the world but is also obviously contributing to those things for Canadians at home.

● (1705)

Eric Duncan: Would you be able to provide a breakdown of how much is assessed and how much is voluntary for us? Perhaps you can get that to us in writing afterwards.

Alexandra MacKenzie: We can certainly provide that after this session. I don't have it here with me.

Eric Duncan: When we go back and talk about value for money and the effectiveness of international institutions, I think Canadians look at value for money. This is one where our not going in with preconditions gets very frustrating, because there's been a lot of frustration about the effectiveness of the UN. We're seeing now fractured multilateralism around the world. We're seeing Canada being involved in many other new organizations. New alliances are being found to try to tackle the most pressing problems in the world.

I would just go back to the 20% increase over a couple of years at a time when the budget of Global Affairs Canada is to be reduced by $1.1 billion or whatever the number is. Such a large increase well above inflation, going to the overall UN organization without any strings attached, I think could be used as leverage to go and try to get some of those reforms that are stubbornly being held back.

I'll ask again: Are we putting any conditions on even our voluntary aid to say, look, Canada is not going to keep funding—the definition of insanity—without seeing fundamental change?

Alexandra MacKenzie: Mr. Chair, I think I explained this a little bit earlier, but I'll put more emphasis on it.

The contributions that Canada is making to the UN reform effort are really important. We do have a strong voice in helping to ensure that the UN agencies are ensuring better alignment and streamlining and that mandates are revisited. We are really contributing in a significant way to help make sure there is good value for money.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We go next to MP Zuberi for five minutes.

Sameer Zuberi (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

I want to pick up on a line of questioning that was started by my colleague Mr. Clark. It's about reforms in the United Nations. The Secretary-General has called for the Security Council to have reform. We also have pushed for the effectiveness of the Security Council and greater representation of emerging and developing countries.

Can you expand a bit on that concept for our benefit?

Alexandra MacKenzie: Mr. Chair, the UN Security Council has definitely faced significant challenges in delivering on its fundamental mandate of maintaining international peace and security. That's largely due to the gridlock that stems from the use of the veto in the Security Council.

There is broad agreement among UN member states that the Security Council really should reflect more contemporary geopolitical realities and be more representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable.

At the same time, reforming the Security Council is very hard to do, and that's because amendments to the UN charter would require the support of two-thirds of the member states, and that's 190-some member states. Plus, all five permanent members of the Security Council would also need to agree.

Given that constraint, we're also looking at what kinds of practical things can be done on an interim basis. One of those things is looking at how we can influence the council's working methods. Restraint in the use of the veto is one thing that Canada has also been supporting. These kinds of pragmatic things are what we're trying to do in the absence of a charter change.

Sameer Zuberi: How can we restrain the use of the veto? What ideas have been put forth thus far to restrain that use?

Alexandra MacKenzie: There has been a lot of discussion and resolution on the topic. It's something that's live. It's about influencing the five permanent members and encouraging them to basically not use their vetoes. Some of the five permanent members do effectively uphold that.

Sameer Zuberi: I guess it's an ongoing conversation. As you mentioned, a lot of the actors aren't playing ball, which is part of the reason we are having this conversation about the UN and its effectiveness and where we are today. Would you agree with that?

Alexandra MacKenzie: The Security Council is quite particular in regard to the veto gridlock.

The other parts of the UN system, which is very complex, as we mentioned, have lots of specialized agencies that are very effective. ICAO in Montreal, of course, is one we know well, as the host state. It does very good and effective work every day.

It's quite variable across the UN system.

● (1710)

Sameer Zuberi: Certainly.

As much as people critique the Security Council, etc., can you speak a moment about the effectiveness of these agencies within the UN—how they're effective and important how they do critical work?

Alexandra MacKenzie: I'd be happy to speak about the work of the specialized agencies.

They really do have an impact on the day-to-day experience of Canadians and lots of people around the world, whether they're getting on an airplane or mailing a letter. The specialized agencies help to set norms and standards. They really do very important work. There are many of them.

They also, of course, implicate lots of other government departments. Global Affairs Canada is only really looking—

Sameer Zuberi: Can I lean into a question?

I appreciate what you're expanding upon, but I want to get to the concept of AI. Are there conversations around international treaties, covenants or potential future agencies to deal with the emergence of AI?

Shawn Steil: I could answer that.

There are, and some of those conversations are fragmented.

Earlier discussions within the G7 have led to some organizations around other questions of the governance of AI.

At the summit in Évian, for example, both Prime Minister Carney and President Macron raised the possibility of more coordinated governance around the safety of AI, and there continue to be conversations around that.

China has led some initiatives with its own particular view about governance around AI. As well, within the G20, those discussions are happening. I don't think there's been a cohesive movement in a single direction on that front yet.

The Chair: Thank you.

We will go next to MP Brunelle-Duceppe.

[*Translation*]

You have the floor for two and a half minutes.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Allen, at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, you are the director general responsible for trade negotiations and multilateral trade policy. Mr. Larose, you're the director general responsible for international security policy and strategic affairs. Ms. MacKenzie, you're the director general responsible for international organizations and human rights. Mr. Steil, still with the same department, you are the director general responsible for strategy.

When I asked each of you what the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine was, none of you were able to answer me, since you aren't familiar with it. At the same time, you also told me that collaboration and consultation with Quebec and the provinces were super important for you when the time came to represent Canada, and therefore Quebec and the provinces, in international institutions.

However, how can we take this consultation and collaboration with Quebec seriously when directors general like you at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development are unable to explain to us what the Government of Quebec's biggest and most important international relations policy is? How are we supposed to take seriously what you told us earlier when you represent us on the international scene, when you're unable to respond to us about this policy that is so important, not only for the Government of Quebec, but for all Quebeckers? How are we supposed to view such ignorance on the part of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development?

[*English*]

Shawn Steil: Mr. Chair, part of the role of the committee in its hearings is to raise the awareness of Canadians regarding particular interests of the members, aspects linked to foreign policy and other issues. I think the honourable member has done that. He raised a question about the doctrine of Gérin-Lajoie, and we appreciate that.

I'm not sure that we, as witnesses, are here to defend our knowledge or lack thereof. If there's a specific question about our multilateral policy or the international organizations we represent, we will be very pleased to answer it.

● (1715)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We go next to MP Mantle.

You have five minutes.

Jacob Mantle (York—Durham, CPC): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for appearing. I appreciate their testimony. I'll let them decide who's best placed to answer my questions.

Global Affairs lists 24 key multilateral institutions. Included in that list are various development banks. By December 31, 2025, Canada had made a total contribution to the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank of just over $1.36 billion, of which $273 million was paid via cash transfer. Canada continues to have a legal obligation to pay the remaining $1.09 billion if called upon. In June 2023, Canada suspended its governmental activities with the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank after a Canadian, Bob Pickard, blew the whistle on what he considered to be Chinese control of the bank. At the time, he said, “It's a resource to the geopolitical goals of the PRC...in practice, I believe it serves China's interest”.

It has been three years since the government announced a review of its participation in the bank. Has that review been completed?

Shawn Steil: Mr. Chair, I don't believe anyone on the panel of experts here today has knowledge of the latest developments on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. However, we can commit to getting back to the member with the latest information we have, at a later date.

Jacob Mantle: I would appreciate it if the witnesses could provide that, and I'd like this noted in the minutes as well.

Similar to my colleague from the Bloc, I will express my disappointment. This is not a small organization. It is listed as one of the key 24 multilateral institutions that Canada contributes to.

Can I assume, then, that you will not know the answer to the following question? Do you know when the review will be complete?

Martin Larose: Mr. Chair, I will just indicate that none of us here are responsible for this bank. Therefore, we do not have the information the member of the committee would like to have.

As was indicated, we have committed to getting back to the committee in writing.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you.

Jacob Mantle: I want to ask a couple of questions on the bank, which you can respond to in written form. I'd like to put them on the record.

I'd like to know when the review will be completed. In the time of the three-year review, has Canada exercised any of its voting rights at the bank? Have any Canadian officials attended bank meetings? Has Canada made any further payments or financial contributions to the bank in that time?

If you would provide written responses to those questions, I would appreciate it.

I want to shift gears slightly and talk a little bit about development assistance.

There's $30,000 for empowering a recycling culture in Ho Chi Minh City. There's $27,000 for Ho Chi Minh City citizens' awareness of ocean plastic pollution. There's $49,000 to empower Lebanese, Syrian and Ethiopian women leaders through participatory theatre performances. There's $52,000 to increase participation resilience for youth in Jordan through theatre and life skills training. There's $23,000 to promote healthy lifestyles and the consumption of locally produced fruits in Belize.

What possible foreign policy objectives do these types of grants from Global Affairs achieve?

Shawn Steil: Mr. Chair, I don't think we have the information in front of us that would allow us to speak to individual projects and the funding for those individual projects.

As I happen to have been, in a previous life, the ambassador to Vietnam, it sounds like some of the projects that the member has raised are through what's called the Canadian fund for local initiatives, which are small-scale projects in which missions and ambassadors can fund local organizations to do works within specific parameters and goals of a project.

I can't speak to it in any more detail than that.

Jacob Mantle: Thank you.

The question I'm getting at is the objectives for these.

I'm not the only one to raise this. You'll recall that, in 2023, the Auditor General reviewed several billion dollars of assistance and found that Global Affairs was unable to provide any information on outcomes-based reporting. In fact, the AG at the time said that 24 of 26 indicators that Global Affairs uses did not measure outcomes at all. Now, the agency provided a progress report in 2024 that did not address these.

Can you give us an update on whether you've addressed those Auditor General concerns about outcome-based performance?

● (1720)

The Chair: Can you tie that to international organizations? If it's not connected to that, then you're veering into the effectiveness of international aid directly to communities, for example. I don't know if that's the—

Jacob Mantle: I can, very easily, Mr. Chair.

The Auditor General reviewed over, I believe, $1.5 billion of assistance to various multilateral institutions and bilateral grants and contributions. It was part of the feminist foreign policy that the Auditor General reviewed.

Can you give us an update? Have you addressed those concerns that the Auditor General raised?

As of 2024, when you reported to, I believe it was PROC, the procedures and House affairs committee, you had not addressed those.

The Chair: MP Mantle, we're over the time. I'm sorry.

Jacob Mantle: I'm sorry; I had a few seconds left when you interrupted me.

The Chair: We are 37 seconds over.

Jacob Mantle: You interrupted me to ask me—

The Chair: I didn't interrupt you. I wanted you to make sure that you were relevant to the topic.

Jacob Mantle: You interrupted me to ask a question, and I responded.

The Chair: I'll let them respond.

Jacob Mantle: Thank you.

Shawn Steil: Mr. Chair, once again, I think, for the line of questioning that was on the agenda today, we don't have the experts in the room who can properly answer that question.

Philip Lawrence: I have a point of order.

The Chair: Yes. Go ahead.

Philip Lawrence: I know we'll go into committee business, but that is in camera.

I'd just like to put it on the public record that, at some point, the Conservatives would very much support additional meetings on the subject on the areas of international development and the Francophonie.

The Chair: Thank you for that.

MP Sari, go ahead for five minutes.

[*Translation*]

Abdelhaq Sari (Bourassa, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the four witnesses for being with us today.

I would like to make a few remarks before asking you a couple more questions if I have time.

As you know, the Prime Minister presented a fairly clear global vision in Davos. He advocated for a more pragmatic Canada, one that engages with the entire world despite the current differences that exist there.

I'd like to hear your thoughts on how this vision presented by the Prime Minister can be implemented.

[*English*]

Shawn Steil: Canada's foreign policy is going through a review right now, largely based on changes to the international environment that require us, as the honourable member said, to be more pragmatic and more diversified in our bilateral relationships. How we become more pragmatic and diversified in our bilateral relationships is something we're all working on and trying to articulate more fully, but it means putting Canada's interests first in a way that allows us to co-operate with a wide variety of partners where we can find common interests. That might be in cases where we have disagreements or difficulties in relationships, but we'll still try to find ways to have effective and mutually beneficial partnerships. For Global Affairs Canada, that means engaging more strategically and also more broadly with a wider variety of partners.

I have one final comment. The Prime Minister said, not just in Davos, but in his speech at Lowy Institute, and then again in Strasbourg before the European Parliament, that Canada will build its strength at home in order to be a better international partner. Part of what he's talked about is ensuring that Canada has access to the supply chains we need to power our economy.

Looking for the partners that will reduce our dependencies and have capabilities that we require, and partnering strategically with them are among the core functions of being pragmatic and diversified.

[*Translation*]

Abdelhaq Sari: In terms of that pragmatism, you spoke of shared benefits. I really appreciate that expression. However, efforts at multilateralism have also been discussed on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly.

Can you explain this initiative and what it will actually change? Furthermore, is Canada, as a country, in a good position to lead it?

[*English*]

Alexandra MacKenzie: The effort to reinforce the partnership for multilateralism is looking at the UN system as well as other opportunities. My colleague talked about being pragmatic and strategic in working with partners on issues that concern us. The UN system is one such platform within which we can do that, but there are other opportunities as well. The Commonwealth and la Francophonie are two other examples.

Yes, they are opportunities for us to connect, pursue common interests and address global challenges together.

● (1725)

[*Translation*]

Abdelhaq Sari: It's really nice to hear from you, but I only have five minutes.

I'd like to wrap up by discussing a topic that's very important to me: AI. You mentioned China, and you also mentioned the G20, where there is a certain degree of openness.

My colleague asked you a question about that. I'd really appreciate it if you could take the time to provide us with more information or, at the very least, respond in writing if possible. That's something I'd like to explore further. AI can take on many dimensions. In particular, it can be approached from the perspective of an international alliance we might form to promote greater democracy or greater freedom, values that these new technologies could undermine.

[*English*]

Shawn Steil: We would be happy to come back to you.

Canada, of course, has passed an AI strategy with a primarily domestic focus, but it's also international. Those very questions you've raised about AI and democracy are part of the discussions, for example, that were had in Évian at the G7 summit.

[*Translation*]

Abdelhaq Sari: I have 20 seconds left, so I want to thank you.

Regarding that point, I'm particularly interested in knowing whether there are other countries that have approached us about forming some kind of alliance or that have shown an openness to the idea, given that in Montreal, Toronto or Edmonton, we do have some fairly interesting technology hubs, and we have the potential to influence things. If you've had any requests in that regard, please let us know in writing. We would greatly appreciate it.

[*English*]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

On behalf of all of the members, I want to thank all of the witnesses for their appearance before the committee and for their testimony.

We will now briefly suspend in order to prepare for the next panel.

● (1725)

_____(Pause)_____

● (1735)

The Chair: I call this meeting back to order.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the second hour.

[*Translation*]

I would now like to welcome the next panel of witnesses for the second hour of the meeting.

[*English*]

We have Dr. Geneviève Dufour, full professor and research chair on sustainable, responsible and inclusive trade law at the faculty of law at the University of Ottawa. We have Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, incoming dean of the school of public policy at the London School of Economics, joining us by video conference. From B'nai Brith Canada, we have Richard Robertson, director of research and advocacy, who is also joining us by video conference.

Welcome.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we'll proceed to rounds of questions.

I now invite Dr. Geneviève Dufour to make an opening statement of no more than five minutes, please.

Thank you.

[*Translation*]

Geneviève Dufour (Full Professor and Research Chair on Sustainable, Responsible, and Inclusive Trade Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual): Members of the committee, thank you for the invitation. It's always an honour to have the opportunity to speak with you and address you.

Today, I would like to present three observations on the effectiveness of international institutions, followed by a recommendation on the role Canada could play in redefining international institutions.

The first observation is that international institutions are undergoing a profound crisis. Violations and blockages are nothing new, of course, but their increasing frequency and intensity at this time are certainly undermining these institutions.

The second observation is that, despite this crisis, institutions continue, on the whole, to perform essential functions and produce results. The WTO, the World Trade Organization, is an excellent example. Despite the paralysis of its appellate body since 2019, its members continue to bring cases before the dispute settlement body. Above all, despite the trade war launched by the Trump administration, more than 70% of international trade continues to take place under the most favoured nation principle. I think that's a very telling example.

The third observation is that maintaining this effectiveness also depends on the adaptability and resilience of states. To return to the example of the WTO, faced with the blockage in the appellate body—driven by Canada and the European Union—several members established a provisional appellate arbitration mechanism. As a result, they used the possibilities offered by existing law to preserve a function that was at risk.

It could also be said that WTO members are currently negotiating a possible reform of the organization. Just a few days ago, on October 23, they were working on substantial proposals. Consequently, these efforts show resilience but, above all, signal a redefinition of our international institutions, the outcome of which remains uncertain for the time being.

This is where my recommendation comes in, dear members of the committee: If this transformation gains momentum and accelerates, Canada needs to be ready, and it needs to be prepared to help lead. It can play a role in setting the standard.

We know that, in the past, Canada has often played a significant role in bringing about major transformations, but it must be said that Canada has taken a back seat in recent decades. The ambition expressed in Davos by Prime Minister Carney, the ambition for concerted action by middle powers, now calls for a sustained investment in our capabilities. I think the impetus is there for us to move forward.

I therefore propose a four-part strategy for establishing a global presence and providing international legal expertise.

First, we should anticipate upcoming vacancies and support Canadian candidates with a dedicated team, a budget and diplomatic engagement. In other words, we need to increase the presence of Canadians in key positions. We need to recognize this. Our presence in international institutions remains sporadic and insufficient. No Canadian has ever been nominated as a judge to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, even though we have the world's longest coastline. We haven't had a judge on the International Court of Justice since Justice Read, whose term ended in 1958. Furthermore, since 2016, we have had no Canadians serving on the International Law Commission, the body of the United Nations General Assembly that works to codify and advance international law.

Let's face it: Other medium-sized countries, such as Romania and Tunisia, have fared much better than we have in recent years. They have succeeded in having their judges—their own nationals—elected to major bodies. This did not happen by accident, but as a result of a strategy. In 2024, Global Affairs Canada was considering structured support for candidacies. Where do we stand today?

Second, I think we need to involve university professors more closely in the teams that advise and represent Canada before international bodies, obviously, to complement the expertise of public servants. We should take a cue from countries that systematically include university professors, such as France and Belgium, and that succeed in promoting and gaining acceptance for new ideas.

● (1740)

Third, as a university professor, I cannot overlook the need to develop the next generation of talent. We need secondments, litigation experience and mentorship opportunities, all developed in partnership with universities.

Fourth, this strategy must explicitly include francophone legal professionals and capitalize on Canada's bilingualism. French and English are the official languages or working languages of all the international courts and tribunals and of most international institutions. Canada therefore possesses a tangible advantage and must make the most of it.

In closing, Mr. Chair, we're at a pivotal moment. Institutions are under strain, and a period of redefinition lies ahead. Canada must therefore prepare to help shape that redefinition and seize the current momentum to become one of its leading architects. To that end, it must adopt a strategy aimed, among other things, at securing key positions for Canadians.

Thank you.

● (1745)

The Chair: Thank you for your opening statement.

I now invite Anne-Marie Slaughter to make her opening remarks.

[*English*]

Anne-Marie Slaughter (Incoming Dean, School of Public Policy, London School of Economics, As an Individual): Mr. Chair, and honourable members, it's an honour and a pleasure to be able to speak to you today.

I have been studying, writing about and working with international institutions for 35 years as a professor, as a dean of a public policy school, aa a government official in the U.S. Department of State, and then, as the head of a think and action tank.

In 2022, I was invited to join the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, which was tasked with making recommendations on how to reform international institutions for the pact for the future in 2024. It seems like another world. However, we met for two years. We were 12 people, including the current president of Singapore. We were completely representative of the world's geography and population. We issued a report, which I would recommend to you, given that this is the outset of your investigations. It is entitled “A Breakthrough for People and Planet: Effective and Inclusive Global Governance for Today and the Future”. It is very long—well, not very long for a UN report, but it is long. Nevertheless, I would commend it to you as the distillation of many comments from people all over the world, as well as from experts.

One of the parts of that report, which is much shorter, is that we set out 10 principles for effective multilateralism on one page. I am going to list those, and then I'm going to focus on five of them directly in the context of this moment.

First, effective multilateral institutions must be people-centred. They must be focused on the people they are supposed to serve—not the states but the people within the states. That's how you judge them.

They need to be representative. I'll come back to that.

They need to be transparent. This doesn't mean they need to be completely open, but it does mean their data and content need to be publicly accessible.

They need to be equitable. I will come back to that.

They need to be networked. Again, I will come back to that.

They need to be resourced. That one needs no explanation.

They need to be mission-focussed with a clear mission, which is, in fact, where progress is measurable.

They need to be flexible—and I'll come back to that—accountable and, finally, future-oriented.

There's more on each of these, but it is, I think, a very good framework for thinking about how to design new international institutions.

The principles of representativeness and equity are linked, and the attributes of being networked, flexible and future-oriented are linked, so I'll talk about them that way.

On representation, we cannot have a global institution in 2045 that is run by the victors of 1945. As long as that is the case, the institution is illegitimate and ineffective, and that is what we are seeing now.

Kofi Annan really tried to reform the UN Security Council. He got as close as I think you can get. I don't believe that can happen now. Instead, I think you have to work through the parts of the UN and the UN system that do work, specifically the UN General Assembly.

One of the things we said representativeness means is that stakeholders have a place at the table and a clear voice but also that you must have majority voting, even against the wishes of a minority opposition in matters of global concern. That is a key principle. It's hard to do, but you're not going to be effective without it.

In terms of representation and majority voting, real representation means a far greater role for global south countries in all global institutions, and a real role, not a role where the global north countries get together, and then add a few global south countries at the table. It has to be representative, with genuine input throughout.

Then, we get to representative, equitable, networked, flexible and future-oriented. These, again, all go together.

● (1750)

I want to start here by quoting a late great Canadian, John Ruggie, who was a professor and a dean and worked hard for Kofi Annan. He said back in the 1970s that institutions are not just entities with headquarters and letterhead. They are not just these formal things that we had always studied. Instead, they are collections of rules, norms and decision-making procedures that constrain behaviour, shape agendas and actually prescribe the behaviour of states.

If you look at that definition, when we look at international institutions, we have to include informal institutions, like the Basel committee on central bankers or the International Organization of Securities Commissions, which was actually chartered under the law of Quebec as a non-profit. These are very informal, but many of them are very powerful institutions that bring together the right officials from the right countries, who can then act directly domestically.

The Chair: Thank you, Doctor. We'll have to—

Anne-Marie Slaughter: I have one last statement.

The last thing I would say is that we have to include state and non-state actors, and the members of an institution have to commit themselves with money or action so that they have a stake in the outcome.

Thank you very much.

The Chair: Thank you for your statement.

Richard Robertson, I now invite you to make your opening statement.

Richard Robertson (Director, Research and Advocacy, B'nai Brith Canada): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Honourable committee members, my name is Richard Robertson. I am B'nai Brith Canada's director of research and advocacy.

Established in 1875, B'nai Brith Canada is this country's longest-serving human rights organization. As part of its study on the effectiveness of international institutions and how Canada is meeting its foreign policy priority of strengthening these institutions, it is imperative that the committee examine Canada's present support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, UNRWA.

Canada is one of the largest contributors to UNRWA, having donated over $25 million U.S. In 2025 alone, as part of an over $100-million multi-year funding commitment. Following the October 7 Hamas-led terrorist attacks in Israel, evidence emerged of the links between UNRWA, listed terrorist organizations and the October 7 attacks themselves. As a UN agency, UNRWA has a fundamental obligation to maintain neutrality, to ensure both the integrity of the agency and the success of its operations.

The allegations against UNRWA prompted the UN Secretary-General to commission an independent review of UNRWA in 2024. The review focused on UNRWA's adherence to the international humanitarian principle of neutrality. From January to March 2024, Canada paused its funding to UNRWA while the review took place.

The resulting report, the Colonna report, found that although UNRWA had developed a significant number of mechanisms and procedures to ensure adherence with the principle of humanitarian neutrality, violations of the principle continued to persist. Violations recorded in the report include instances of staff publicly expressing political views, host country textbooks with problematic content being used in UNRWA schools, and politicized staff unions making threats against UNRWA management and causing operational disruptions. The report made 50 recommendations to strengthen UNRWA's neutrality, accountability, oversight and institutional integrity in eight critical areas requiring immediate improvement.

When Canada announced it was resuming funding to UNRWA on March 8, 2024, Global Affairs Canada stated that it was committed to ensuring full accountability, decisive action and the implementation of the necessary reforms within UNRWA. GAC further stated that Canada would work with stakeholders to ensure that the recommendations stemming from the report were fully implemented. GAC affirmed that Canada expects UNRWA to meet its obligation and uphold the UN value of neutrality, an essential component of UNRWA's mandate.

Canada further pledged additional funding to aid UNRWA in the implementation of the Colonna report recommendations. In May 2024, GAC doubled down on its expectations. GAC reaffirmed that Canada expects all the recommendations to be fully and swiftly implemented and that Canada will be monitoring progress closely. It has now been over 30 months since the Colonna report was published, yet publicly available evidence suggests that UNRWA has failed to implement its recommendations.

In July 2026, the Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education, IMPACT-se, published an analysis of UNRWA's response to the Colonna report. IMPACT-se found that in the two years since the Colonna report was published, there had been limited publicly available evidence of meaningful structural change.

The IMPACT-se report noted that UNRWA's implementation reporting contained significant inconsistencies and has increasingly become difficult to assess. This includes evidence that recommendations previously classified by UNRWA as complete now appear to remain incomplete, and UNRWA's repeated requests for additional funding to facilitate the implementation of recommendations that it had already reported as complete.

The IMPACT-se report highlights that despite commitments to review educational materials and remove problematic content, there is limited evidence that such reforms have been undertaken. As an example, IMPACT-se referenced the continued use of educational materials containing anti-Semitic narratives, glorification of violence and encouragement of jihad.

UN Watch, an independent human rights organization accredited with special consultative status to the UN Economic and Social Council, raised similar concerns about UNRWA's implementation of the Colonna report's recommendations.

In September 2026, UN Watch found that UNRWA frequently measured administrative activity instead of meaningful reform and that, at most, 13 of the Colonna report's 50 recommendations had been completed as prescribed. They note that its employees continue to be exposed as members and supporters of terrorist organizations, that hateful educational content persists and that Hamas-dominated unions continue to obstruct neutrality.

● (1755)

Despite evidence from leading think tanks and human rights organizations that UNRWA has failed to implement the recommendations found in the Colonna report, the implementation of which the federal government acknowledged as essential and specifically committed funding towards, Canada continues to fund UNRWA.

If Canada wishes to ensure the effectiveness of international institutions and demonstrate its leadership in this sphere, it must demand an independent review of UNRWA's implementation of the Colonna report recommendations and cease sending Canadian funds to UNRWA until it has been demonstrated that it has successfully undertaken the required reforms.

If it proves incapable of reform, Canada must reconsider its continued support for UNRWA. Continuing to fund UNRWA as it currently exists is both a disservice to Canadian taxpayers and antithetical to Canada's attempts to ensure the effectiveness of international institutions.

The Chair: Thank you very much for your statement.

I will now open the floor for questions, beginning with MP Lawrence.

You have six minutes.

Philip Lawrence: Thank you.

My questions will be for you, Mr. Robertson.

I want to go a little further with respect to some of your testimony. You mentioned the need for an independent review of UNRWA meeting certain requirements. Could you delineate, if you can, specific milestones that you would insist on UNRWA achieving before being satisfied that aid was going to the appropriate places?

Richard Robertson: Absolutely. In June 2026, USAID, an enforcement arm of the United States government's office of international trade, referred 101 staff members at UNRWA for investigation because of their links to listed terrorist organizations or to the October 7 Hamas-led terror attack in Israel.

The educational materials, specifically as highlighted by IMPACT-se, that contain the glorification of terror and inciting and hateful rhetoric continue to be utilized in UNRWA schools throughout UNRWA's mandated region. I think we need to start there.

We cannot be investing as a nation in an organization that has failed to reform at the most basic level, to remove those linked to terror from its staff, and that continues to educate the next generation of citizens within its mandated area with materials that are highly problematic, hateful and encouraging of terror.

Philip Lawrence: Just to confirm your testimony, UN Watch, your organization and other organizations have absolute proof of hatred and antisemitic subjects being taught through UNRWA. Is that correct?

Richard Robertson: Yes. The continued use of these problematic materials in certain UN schools is very well documented. I would refer you to the IMPACT-se report that I mentioned in my opening remarks. The links to terror, I believe, are justified by USAID's recommendation this previous summer.

These are not things that are abstract. These are things that are very real. There are 50 recommendations made in the Colonna report. Those recommendations deal specifically with these problems, and yet these problems persist. The question is, why is Canada continuing to invest in a UN agency that has demonstrated it is incapable of reform?

● (1800)

Philip Lawrence: Thank you.

The next question isn't specific to your organization, and if you don't want to comment, I understand.

Of course, Canada has recognized the Palestinian state, tied on expectations of democratic governance and elections, which have not materialized. Would you like to comment on the fact that the Government of Canada recognized Palestine, based on the fact that—

The Chair: If we can pause for a second, how is that connected to international organizations?

Philip Lawrence: It's been recognized through the United Nations and other multilateral as well as international organizations—

The Chair: Your question dealt with Canada recognizing a state. How is that connected to international organizations?

Philip Lawrence: It did that with other countries. There's international recognition. This is an international.... We are dealing literally by definition with multi-nations together recognizing each other. It's hard for me to say that water is wet.

The Chair: No, no. You talked about a bilateral issue, Canada recognizing.... I just want to make sure folks keep to the topic. Thank you.

Philip Lawrence: I think this is very much a topic at the United Nations, at NATO and at various international organizations.

The Chair: Please continue.

Richard Robertson: I think that we see a pattern when we look at Canada's recognition of a Palestinian state and Canada's continued support for UNRWA. Canada's continued support for UNRWA, by GAC's own releases, was contingent on its reform, which GAC alleged it was monitoring closely, yet we haven't seen those reforms undertaken, just as we haven't seen the Palestinian state meet some of the conditions on which recognition was predicated.

I think this is a theme when it comes to international institutions, in that if Canada wants to play a leading role in strengthening these institutions, we need to hold them accountable when they fail to meet the reforms that are expected of them in order for them to continue to receive our funding in the same way that we must hold the international actors accountable when they fail to meet the prerequisites for things like recognition of statehood.

Philip Lawrence: I don't think anyone denies that there is a humanitarian crisis going on in Gaza right now. Do you have any concerns that the money that's being flowed into Gaza is not going to a humanitarian crisis but to other areas that we would be concerned about?

Richard Robertson: I think that the links between UNRWA and listed terrorist organizations, as have been demonstrated by the reports and as have been demonstrated by USAID, certainly raise concerns over what is being done with the donations that UNRWA receives.

This isn't about whether or not there's a humanitarian crisis or whether or not Canada should support the victims of humanitarian crises around the world. This is about whether or not Canada should continue to invest in a UN agency that has demonstrated that it is incapable of reforms that were recommended by a UN-authorized independent review.

Philip Lawrence: Are there ways that UNRWA could demonstrate to your organization and other organizations, such as UN Watch, that monies are actually addressing the humanitarian crisis?

Richard Robertson: I think that by undertaking to meaningfully complete the 50 recommendations made in the Colonna report and by being open to having a third party attest to the satisfactory completion of those 50 recommendations, UNRWA would go a long way towards re-establishing its credibility within the international realm, but we simply haven't seen that. It's been two years.

The Chair: Thank you.

I'm sorry. We're over time.

MP Fortier, you have six minutes.

[*Translation*]

Hon. Mona Fortier (Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank all the witnesses for being here today.

Professor Dufour, thank you for joining us. I'm pleased that you are working with my alma mater. It's wonderful to see you in the national capital region.

In your opening remarks, you spoke about the issue of effectiveness, among other things. I'd like you to elaborate on that concept in the context you described, namely that Canada could do more, given that it has stepped back somewhat from multilateral engagement.

You also referred to two points that Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé raised with the committee earlier this week about mobilizing Canadian expertise and linguistic capacity. It makes me smile to hear these points raised again. Could you expand on both of them, particularly in terms of how they could strengthen Canada's multilateral presence and effectiveness?

● (1805)

Geneviève Dufour: Canada is a middle power, as we know. We therefore have little choice but to practise multilateralism. We cannot operate through power politics. We must work within a multilateral framework and, ideally, one that reflects Professor Slaughter's 10 principles of multilateralism. We're still a long way from that, but I hope we're headed in that direction.

We're living through a major crisis. Some would say we've been in a permanent state of crisis since 1945. Multilateralism certainly has its flaws, but it has also accomplished many remarkable things. We're clearly reaching the end of a cycle, and some form of redefinition is coming. The question is, to what extent? Will every organization be redefined? Probably not. Some organizations function quite well. Generally speaking, the more technical the organization is, the better it functions. The more political the sphere, however, the more difficult it is to achieve effective results.

Why should Canada play a larger role? To what extent would that make the system more effective and efficient? Historically, Canada has proposed the creation of a wide range of institutions and initiatives that ultimately materialized, even when they didn't directly reflect Canada's own interests. That's why I believe Canada must be a key player. When Canada proposed that the UN create the blue helmets, it was not acting out of self-interest but in the interest of international peace. In the 1990s, Canada was the first country to advance the idea of creating a world trade organization to replace the GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. European countries later took up the idea and tabled a formal proposal. That organization did not necessarily serve Canada's immediate needs, but we recognized that multilateral trade negotiations had stalled and therefore came up with that idea.

I believe Canada is a country capable of proposing solutions that are not inherently partisan. Of course, we won't advocate measures that run counter to our values or our fundamental interests. However, Canada is a country grounded in the rule of law, inclusion and fairness. It promotes fundamental values that matter deeply to humanity. I therefore believe it's important for Canada to play a role in the redefinition that's now under way. We will only fully recognize that redefinition once it's been completed.

Hon. Mona Fortier: In the context of redefining some organizations that function reasonably well and others that require reform, do you see opportunities to create new mechanisms? Based on your experience and expertise, is there anything we should be proposing as a new institution or a new way of doing things?

Geneviève Dufour: It generally takes a major collapse before new institutions can be created. It has to be a major shock or crisis, like the First World War and the Second World War. Both of those events led to major institutions being established. The World Trade Organization, or WTO, emerged from a shock. There was the shock created by the arrival of newly independent developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s. There was also the shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the creation of numerous new states. Shocks are what give rise to new organizations.

That said, we are currently experiencing an enormous shock: invasions, a pandemic, a tariff war, and the world's leading power questioning institutions and established practices. We're therefore living through a shock that's serving as somewhat of a wake-up call.

We've been talking about reforming the WTO for a long time because we know it needs it. Is it finally time to recognize that we may need to reconsider some principles we once thought were firmly entrenched? At the WTO, decisions are adopted by consensus, but should we rethink that approach? Member states continually challenge this principle. At the same time, they remain attached to it, particularly developing countries, because it gives them a voice equal to that of other countries, even though they may not have the financial resources they wish they had. That may therefore be one area where reform efforts should be focused. In international trade, we often speak of the most-favoured-nation principle and non-discriminatory trade. We're now beginning to ask whether those principles may need to evolve.

Most importantly, trade can no longer be developed in isolation. That much is certain. International trade is my area of expertise, so I tend to speak about it a great deal, but we can't talk about trade without also talking about labour law, respect for fundamental labour standards and the inclusion of women—

● (1810)

The Chair: Thank you, Professor Dufour.

Geneviève Dufour: My apologies. That was a rather long answer. I'm a university professor.

The Chair: Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe, you have six minutes.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Professor Dufour, it is genuinely a pleasure to hear from you. Thank you for being with us today.

I'd also like to thank all the other witnesses.

Professor Dufour, you have spoken extensively about the redefinition of institutions and international organizations. However, in a situation where a number of authoritarian regimes are themselves seeking to reshape those organizations and perhaps gain greater influence within them, what do you see as the principal vulnerabilities of the current system in the face of efforts to redefine it by actors who may be less committed to things like the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights?

Geneviève Dufour: At the moment, at the World Trade Organization, the country that's constantly reminding everyone of the need to uphold the rule of law is China. That's quite striking, because we have long argued that China has violated the principles of international trade law, and it's not always the country that's most closely aligned with our values, whether in terms of human rights or environmental protection.

That's the danger we face right now. The risk is that influence gradually shifts to countries that don't share our values. That's one reason why the Canada-European Union Summit being held in Montreal over the next two days is so important. The objective is to build coalitions that may help compensate for the absence of a country that's not playing the game at the moment. The United States has stepped back from the system. When I say that, it's both true and not entirely true, because the United States remains at the negotiating table and continues to participate in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization and the International Labour Organization. It's still working with those organizations and has paid its assessed contributions. While the United States is no longer playing the role it did for decades, we shouldn't throw up our hands. Middle powers must come together and do so in an inclusive way, precisely to prevent the system from going off the rails.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Yes.

Geneviève Dufour: I would just add that we need to be careful about the partnerships we're pursuing right now. Canada is very active internationally at the moment and is entering into agreements with a number of countries that don't necessarily share its values.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: That's exactly the point I wanted to raise. Let me come back to it, because you mentioned the Davos speech, in which there was discussion of working more closely with middle powers. It would be hard for anyone to oppose such a statement. I myself congratulated the Prime Minister for making it.

However, two days earlier, Mr. Carney was in Beijing shaking hands with Xi Jinping in connection with an agreement. More recently, Canada signed agreements with Turkey, accompanied by what I would describe as an almost Orwellian joint declaration stating that Canada and Turkey share and respect certain values, and then naming them. I don't believe the Erdogan regime lives up to those values. We also recently welcomed, with considerable fanfare, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, MBZ, or Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who isn't exactly known to be a strong defender of human rights. These examples are beginning to add up. The Davos speech contained many fine words. There is, of course, the summit with the European Union, but there have also been some troubling developments recently. What do these actions mean for Canada's credibility within international institutions?

The final point I wanted to raise concerns the United States. It may be that the United States has stepped back, but my impression is that it's the current administration, rather than the country itself, that has done so. Democratic institutions in the United States seem sufficiently strong that the country could eventually return to the role it played previously. Those are two separate questions.

● (1815)

Geneviève Dufour: There are several ways to answer those questions. Given the current stance of the United States, Canada has little choice but to engage with the rest of the world and seek agreements wherever it can. However, as you rightly pointed out, we mustn't lose sight of the fact that Canada stands for certain values and cannot act in ways that undermine them. That doesn't mean we can't build partnerships with countries that do not fully share those values, provided that appropriate safeguards are put in place. Whether those safeguards are in fact being put in place is another question. Canada must be a bridge builder. It must try to attract as many countries as possible.

The pragmatic foreign policy that Mélanie Joly was promoting—

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Perhaps “advancing” rather than “promoting”.

Geneviève Dufour: Yes, the policy she was advancing made that point clearly. We need to remain engaged with countries that do not necessarily share our values. However, when we enter into partnerships and conclude agreements with such countries, I wonder whether this forms part of a genuine long-term strategy. Certainly, Canada is reacting to developments in the United States. Canada already has 17 free trade agreements. We have even more agreements relating to foreign direct investment. We know that Canadian businesses don't take full advantage of all the free trade agreements already in place. Why, then, do we need more? We need investment, but we mustn't sell our soul to the devil.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Has the tariff war with the United States become a justification for virtually everything these days? That's certainly the impression I get. I don't want to drift into extreme partisanship. Far from it. Some people may not believe me.

We nevertheless have a joint declaration with Mr. Erdogan stating that Canada and Turkey share and respect common values like democracy, the rule of law and freedom of expression, even though we know full well that members of LGBTQ+ communities are persecuted there and that opponents of the regime and journalists, among others, have been imprisoned.

Geneviève Dufour: University professors as well.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: Yes, university professors as well.

We can engage in trade, but at some point there's a line that shouldn't be crossed. When I speak about credibility, I'm entirely serious. If Canada then appears before major international organizations, what's the significance of the joint declaration signed by Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Carney?

Geneviève Dufour: Canada is in a trade war. Regardless, it remains a form of conflict and a state of shock. Historically, it is during times of conflict that countries tend to set aside their values, human rights, environmental protection and, sometimes, even most of the time, the rule of law itself.

People often think it's an exaggeration to describe the situation as a trade war, but that's truly what it is. We're living through a trade war that seems to justify almost anything at the moment and that could ultimately prove damaging in the long run. The strategy needs to be much clearer, in my view.

[*English*]

The Chair: Thank you.

MP Duncan, you have five minutes.

Eric Duncan: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our witnesses for joining us this hour.

Mr. Robertson, I have a few questions I want to ask you, if I could.

You highlighted that several recommendations from the Colonna report remain outstanding. Which outstanding reforms should Canada treat as essential conditions for continued funding, rather than as commitments to be fulfilled eventually?

Richard Robertson: That's an excellent question that I actually had anticipated. I have a few of them open in front of me.

Recommendation 34 says, “Review the content of all textbooks and supplements with host countries”.

Recommendation 35 says, “Ban any hate speech, incitation to violence and/or anti-Semitic references from host-country textbooks and locally produced supplements”.

These are, in my opinion, some of the most simple things that UNRWA can do. The UNRWA textbook issue is not a new issue. It is an issue that has been raised for decades, yet UNRWA continues to allow these problematic materials to be utilized in the host nation's schools. This is something that is so simple. Remove the textbooks; utilize new textbooks.

How can we trust this organization with hundreds of millions of dollars in Canadian funds if they are incapable of removing hateful materials from the schools under their jurisdiction?

Eric Duncan: I appreciate that.

What information should Global Affairs Canada be required to publish annually about UNRWA funding, including amounts committed and disbursed, audit findings, identified risks and corrective measures?

● (1820)

Richard Robertson: This is an excellent question.

I think it's not so much about what Global Affairs Canada should be producing in terms of the funding it gives to UNRWA. It's what Global Affairs Canada should be requiring UNRWA to produce. UNRWA claims to have satisfied many of the 50 recommendations from the Colonna report, yet the evidence seems to indicate the contrary. What UNRWA appears to have done is simply lowered the threshold for being able to consider a recommendation completed, without actually taking meaningful steps to satisfy the recommendation.

We, as a nation, with Global Affairs being responsible for that, need to hold the entities that we give funds to accountable. For me, it's not so much a question of what Global Affairs Canada should be responsible for producing. It's what we should require UNRWA to produce in order to continue to receive our financial support.

Eric Duncan: Those are good points. Thank you.

Your organization has argued that Canada should not use UNRWA as its vehicle for delivering aid to Palestinians. Which alternative organizations or delivery mechanisms could provide food, medical care and other essential services, while reducing the risk of diversion to Hamas?

Richard Robertson: I don't think there's a perfect solution for that, but Canada could deliver the aid itself. Canada could deliver the aid in concert with other allies.

Right now, we're putting our funds and our trust, and actually the fate of those who are relying on the humanitarian aid, in an organization that has demonstrated repeatedly that it is ripe for mismanagement, and that it doesn't value the humanitarian principle of neutrality, which is central to its mandate. Once again the question is, why do we continue to trust UNRWA? Why do we continue to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in this UN agency when we could use that money to more effectively deliver humanitarian aid, whether we do it on our own or with other capable partners?

Eric Duncan: My last question is this. What independent monitoring mechanism should Canada require to ensure the textbooks and classroom instruction materials in UNRWA schools meet UNESCO standards and do not promote anti-Semitism or glorify terrorism?

We talked about whether it's them proving it themselves, another international organization or a specific organization that should be doing the independent audit. What does that look like to make sure they're in compliance?

Richard Robertson: The UN brought in an independent review group to produce the Colonna report to make these recommendations, but it hasn't brought in an independent third party review group to ensure whether or not UNRWA has met all of those recommendations. We need an independent third party.

The organization I referenced in my opening remarks, IMPACT-se, is known around the world for its auditing of these textbooks. That is an organization I would highly recommend be involved in working with UNRWA to refine its textbooks. They've already done a comprehensive audit of the textbooks. They've identified the problems in the textbooks.

I really want to bring this point home: When it comes to UNRWA, this is a body that has, through the Colonna report, demonstrable issues with its oversight. Allowing them to be the judge of whether they have successfully met the recommendations in that independent review is, quite frankly, illogical.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll go next to MP Vandenbeld.

You have five minutes.

Anita Vandenbeld (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to pose my questions to Dr. Dufour.

We've been talking in this committee quite a bit about Canada's state-to-state relationships within intergovernmental organizations like the UN, our diplomatic relationships and the funding that we do. You raised something really important that is a little under the radar when you said that to anticipate vacancies, be strategic and support the placement of Canadian candidates in key positions within these institutions.

I know that, for instance, in the United Nations, NATO and others like that, Canada will wait until a candidate is shortlisted, and then we will start our engagement to try to push for that candidate, but other countries start as soon as something is announced when it's a strategic, key leadership position in a geopolitically sensitive area. Countries like the U.S., China and middle powers, as you mentioned, will target that position, try to get strong candidates and start lobbying right at the outset. What happens is that Canadians are not shortlisted because of all the politics that go on, even before that point.

The other one I wanted to ask you about is OSCE, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. We had a previous study in this committee on the Balkans, and we heard from witnesses who were working inside OSCE that since 2008, Canada has not paid one salary for one Canadian to be placed in any position within OSCE. The way they work is the country has to pay the salary. They second somebody—either from within or outside of Foreign Affairs, but usually outside—and then the organization will pay the expenses. The only people we have within OSCE, to my knowledge, are young interns who don't expect a salary. They'll work just for a per diem, $2,000 a month. This means all of the key positions in this geopolitically strategic part of the world, in Europe where we want to engage more, are not held by Canadians. We don't have presence in these institutions at that level.

I want to ask you this, because you're the first one who has brought that up: How could Canada engage differently by really targeting and strategically trying to put Canadians into these important positions within multilateral organizations?

● (1825)

[*Translation*]

Geneviève Dufour: That's an excellent question.

It requires a strong political commitment. It requires political will, it requires a political strategy and it requires funding. I don't want to criticize anyone, but when appointing ambassadors to international organizations, we need people who are already familiar with the system, who know the network and who come from within it. We cannot expect to secure a seat on the Security Council without doing the necessary behind-the-scenes work. Yes, we must be able to promote values in line with the United Nations Charter, but it's a game of backroom diplomacy. Canada's ambassador to the United Nations must be someone who has been working there for years or decades and who is part of the UN system. The same applies to the World Trade Organisation and other international organizations. So, we need to identify young people early on and promote them. We also need to seek out experienced people within the foreign service and make arrangements to promote them.

We were talking earlier about Canadian values. If we want to promote Canadian values, we need Canadians. These people are independent. A judge at the International Court is independent. Any legal expert within an organization will be independent. Nevertheless, we believe that these people will share certain values with us, or at least have values in common with us. So, values are essential. A strategy is also required.

[*English*]

Anita Vandenbeld: Thank you very much. I think we could take some of those recommendations.

You also talked about entry points for young Canadians. I recall, in the same Balkans study, we heard about the international youth internship program where young Canadians could be placed within these organizations funded by Canada through, say, World University Service of Canada, or something like that. I was one of those interns almost 30 years ago. It launches the career, and it gets young people experience. It also allows them to move up in those organizations.

Could you elaborate a bit on what you meant by that?

The Chair: Unfortunately, we're over time, so we'll have to move to the next person.

Anita Vandenbeld: In writing, maybe....

The Chair: MP Brunelle-Duceppe, go ahead for two and a half minutes, please.

[*Translation*]

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: It's music to my ears when we talk about people within the system for the embassies. In fact, I'm thinking of our new ambassador to the United States. That could also be part of it.

Ms. Dufour, you spoke of extremely important institutions, noting that those appointed to them obviously retain their independence. For the benefit of the committee, could you tell us about the current situation at the ICC—the International Criminal Court—regarding Canada's presence there and what the future holds?

● (1830)

Geneviève Dufour: At the ICC, as you know, certain judges have been individually subjected to U.S. sanctions. Now, it is the ICC as a whole that is under attack. It is a disgrace. It is such an important international institution. Judge Kimberly Prost has been subject to sanctions, but Canada has not reacted. We absolutely must help this judge, who is subject to sanctions that prevent her from carrying on with her daily life and put her in danger. It is important to note that her term ends in a few months, in the spring. Once Judge Prost has left, we will have no one left at the ICC. It is the only major international court where we still had a Canadian. Canada has not announced that it will put forward another Canadian. So this is a major problem.

We were talking about this earlier: It requires a long-term strategy, it requires support, it requires a team to mentor someone. We need to promote this person, and that can take years.

I have a friend who was appointed a judge at the ICC, and I supported him: He is the Tunisian judge. It took him two terms before he was appointed a judge. His country supported him; the president put a team around him. That's how it works.

Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe: At the moment, there's no sign of any preparation for what's coming. In any case, we're not hearing anything.

Geneviève Dufour: Canada has not yet announced or put forward a candidate. Perhaps we should reconsider the agreement we have with Australia and New Zealand. Under this agreement, the three countries have agreed to take turns promoting their respective nationals and to support one another in voting for those nationals before international courts and tribunals.

If we look at the figures I've given you, there hasn't been a judge at the International Court of Justice since the 1950s, and there hasn't been anyone on the International Law Commission since 2016. Furthermore, there has never been anyone on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and from now on there will be no one on the International Criminal Court either. I could name other courts. Well, we do have one female judge at the administrative tribunal, but….

I don't feel that we're coming out on top in this agreement. Perhaps we should review the terms of the agreement.

[*English*]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

On behalf of all the members, I want to thank the witnesses for their appearance before the committee and for their testimony.

Our next meeting will be on Monday, November 2.

Is it the will of the committee to adjourn the meeting?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: The meeting is so adjourned.

Published under the authority of the Speaker of the House of Commons

SPEAKER'S PERMISSION

The proceedings of the House of Commons and its committees are hereby made available to provide greater public access. The parliamentary privilege of the House of Commons to control the publication and broadcast of the proceedings of the House of Commons and its committees is nonetheless reserved. All copyrights therein are also reserved.

Reproduction of the proceedings of the House of Commons and its committees, in whole or in part and in any medium, is hereby permitted provided that the reproduction is accurate and is not presented as official. This permission does not extend to reproduction, distribution or use for commercial purpose of financial gain. Reproduction or use outside this permission or without authorization may be treated as copyright infringement in accordance with the Copyright Act. Authorization may be obtained on written application to the Office of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Reproduction in accordance with this permission does not constitute publication under the authority of the House of Commons. The absolute privilege that applies to the proceedings of the House of Commons does not extend to these permitted reproductions. Where a reproduction includes briefs to a committee of the House of Commons, authorization for reproduction may be required from the authors in accordance with the Copyright Act.

Nothing in this permission abrogates or derogates from the privileges, powers, immunities and rights of the House of Commons and its committees. For greater certainty, this permission does not affect the prohibition against impeaching or questioning the proceedings of the House of Commons in courts or otherwise. The House of Commons retains the right and privilege to find users in contempt of Parliament if a reproduction or use is not in accordance with this permission.

Also available on the House of Commons website at the following address: https://www.ourcommons.ca

Publié en conformité de l'autorité du Président de la Chambre des communes

PERMISSION DU PRÉSIDENT

Les délibérations de la Chambre des communes et de ses comités sont mises à la disposition du public pour mieux le renseigner. La Chambre conserve néanmoins son privilège parlementaire de contrôler la publication et la diffusion des délibérations et elle possède tous les droits d'auteur sur celles-ci.

Il est permis de reproduire les délibérations de la Chambre et de ses comités, en tout ou en partie, sur n'importe quel support, pourvu que la reproduction soit exacte et qu'elle ne soit pas présentée comme version officielle. Il n'est toutefois pas permis de reproduire, de distribuer ou d'utiliser les délibérations à des fins commerciales visant la réalisation d'un profit financier. Toute reproduction ou utilisation non permise ou non formellement autorisée peut être considérée comme une violation du droit d'auteur aux termes de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur. Une autorisation formelle peut être obtenue sur présentation d'une demande écrite au Bureau du Président de la Chambre des communes.

La reproduction conforme à la présente permission ne constitue pas une publication sous l'autorité de la Chambre. Le privilège absolu qui s'applique aux délibérations de la Chambre ne s'étend pas aux reproductions permises. Lorsqu'une reproduction comprend des mémoires présentés à un comité de la Chambre, il peut être nécessaire d'obtenir de leurs auteurs l'autorisation de les reproduire, conformément à la Loi sur le droit d'auteur.

La présente permission ne porte pas atteinte aux privilèges, pouvoirs, immunités et droits de la Chambre et de ses comités. Il est entendu que cette permission ne touche pas l'interdiction de contester ou de mettre en cause les délibérations de la Chambre devant les tribunaux ou autrement. La Chambre conserve le droit et le privilège de déclarer l'utilisateur coupable d'outrage au Parlement lorsque la reproduction ou l'utilisation n'est pas conforme à la présente permission.

Aussi disponible sur le site Web de la Chambre des communes à l'adresse suivante : https://www.noscommunes.ca