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CANADA

BECOMING A CANDIDATE IN AN ELECTION: A REVIEW OF THE CRITERIA

**Report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and
House Affairs**

Chris Bittle, Chair

**MARCH 2026
45th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION**

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**Chris Bittle
Chair**

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NOTICE TO READER

Reports from committees presented to the House of Commons

Presenting a report to the House is the way a committee makes public its findings and recommendations on a particular topic. Substantive reports on a subject-matter study usually contain a synopsis of the testimony heard, the recommendations made by the committee, as well as the reasons for those recommendations.

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THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON ON PROCEDURE AND HOUSE AFFAIRS

has the honour to present its

TWENTIETH REPORT

Pursuant to its mandate under Standing Order 108(3)(a)(vi), the committee has studied the actions of the "Longest Ballot Committee" in recent Canadian elections and has agreed to report the following:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS	1
BECOMING A CANDIDATE IN AN ELECTION: A REVIEW OF THE CRITERIA	3
Background	4
A. What is the Longest Ballot Committee?	4
B. Electoral Laws Pertaining to Becoming a Candidate	5
Evidence	6
A. Observations About the Actions of the Longest Ballot Committee	6
B. Challenges to Voting Caused by the Longest Ballot Committee	10
1. Accessibility Issues and Strains on the Electoral Process	10
2. Reducing the Credibility of the System	13
C. Allegations of Questionable Practices by Longest Ballot Committee in Nominating Candidates	14
D. Potential Reforms to the <i>Canada Elections Act</i> Raised by Witnesses	17
1. General Considerations	17
2. Create a Limit on the Number of Nomination Papers That an Elector May Sign	19
3. Limit the Number of Candidates an Official Agent May Represent	23
4. Increase the Number of Signatures Required on Nomination Papers	24
5. Reinstatement of a Mandatory Monetary Deposit by Candidates	26
6. Provide for Penalties When Signatures Are Obtained on a Nomination Paper Before a Candidate Has Been Identified	27
7. Changes Relating to Signatures Made in the Presence of a Witness	28
8. Requiring Groups who Coordinate to Nominate Candidates to Register as Political Parties	28
E. Other Miscellaneous Matters That Arose During the Study	29
1. Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation	29

2. Journalism	33
3. Foreign Interference and Political Financing	34
4. Role of Political Parties in Canada's Democracy	35
Discussion	36
APPENDIX A: LIST OF WITNESSES	39
APPENDIX B: LIST OF BRIEFS	41
REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE	43
SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF CANADA	45
SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION OF THE BLOC QUÉBÉCOIS	47

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of their deliberations committees may make recommendations which they include in their reports for the consideration of the House of Commons or the Government. Recommendations related to this study are listed below.

Recommendation 1

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to prohibit signing more than one candidate's nomination paper, and that this prohibition be subject to penalties. 37

Recommendation 2

That Elections Canada add disclaimers to candidate nomination papers which state that it is an offence under the *Canada Elections Act* to sign more than one candidate's nomination paper. 37

Recommendation 3

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to make it an offence to induce anyone to sign more than one candidate's nomination paper, and that this offence be subject to penalties. 37

Recommendation 4

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to make it an offence for a candidate to submit false or misleading information on a candidate nomination paper, and that this offence be subject to penalties. 37

Recommendation 5

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to prohibit individuals from serving as the official agent for more than one candidate per electoral district, and that this prohibition be subject to penalties. 37

Recommendation 6

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to provide for penalties when signatures are obtained on a nomination paper before a candidate has been identified. 37

Recommendation 7

That prohibitions under the *Canada Elections Act* be expanded to penalize anyone who counsels, engages in a conspiracy, or acts as an accessory after the fact to a violation or an offence in the act.

37

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada introduce a bill before Parliament to enact the Committee's recommendations regarding its concerns about the integrity and accessibility of Canada's elections caused by the activities of the Longest Ballot Committee.

38



BECOMING A CANDIDATE IN AN ELECTION: A REVIEW OF THE CRITERIA

On 2 October 2025, pursuant to its mandate under Standing Order 108(3)(a)(viii), the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) agreed to study the actions of the longest ballot committee (LBC) in recent elections, with a view toward providing the government with recommendations.¹

During its study, PROC heard from 11 witnesses during 4 meetings. It wishes to thank all of the witnesses for contributing their testimony to this study.

PROC heard testimony from Tomas Szuchewycz, official agent of the LBC supported candidates,² who described the group's objectives and operations.

PROC also heard testimony from former and current election administrators, including Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) of Canada;³ Jean-François Blanchet, CEO of Quebec;⁴ and Jean-Pierre Kingsley, CEO of Canada from 1990 to 2007.⁵

Witnesses from academia, politics and journalism also appeared before PROC. It heard testimony from Holly Ann Garnett, Class of 1965 Professor in Leadership, Royal Military College of Canada;⁶ Peter Loewen, Harold Tanner Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Cornell University;⁷ Jon Pammett, Distinguished Research Professor, Political Science, Carleton University;⁸ and Lori Turnbull, Professor, Faculty of Management,

1 House of Commons, *Minutes of Proceedings*, 2 October 2025.

2 House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC), *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025 (Tomas Szuchewycz, Official Agent, Longest Ballot Committee).

3 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025 (Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada).

4 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025 (Jean-François Blanchet, Chief Electoral Officer of Quebec, Élections Québec).

5 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025 (Jean-Pierre Kingsley, Chief Electoral Officer of Canada from 1990 to 2007).

6 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025 (Holly Ann Garnett, Class of 1965 Professor in Leadership, Royal Military College of Canada).

7 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025 (Peter Loewen, Harold Tanner Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Cornell University).

8 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025 (Jon Pammett, Distinguished Research Professor, Political Science, Carleton University).



Dalhousie University.⁹ PROC also heard testimony from Louis-Philippe Sauvé, former member of Parliament for LaSalle-Émard-Verdun;¹⁰ David Moscrop, a politics writer,¹¹ and Ryan Davies from Northern Perspective.¹²

BACKGROUND

A. What is the Longest Ballot Committee?

The LBC does not have any repository which definitively explains its purpose, organization, operation, finances or membership, although information can be found about them on Wikipedia, Bluesky and an inactive X account (formerly Twitter).

Canada's CEO encapsulated the LBC's actions in a letter dated 18 September 2024, to then Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc. In it, Mr. Perrault stated that the LBC was a protest movement that sought to field a number of candidates in an electoral district that was significantly higher than is the norm in Canadian federal elections.¹³

Mr. Szuchewycz told PROC that the reason for its actions was that members of the House of Commons are in an inherent conflict of interest when it comes to federal electoral law, as they both participate in elections and stand to benefit from the results. Further, as lawmakers, members create the legislation under which federal elections are held.

As such, Mr. Szuchewycz expressed the view that all members of the House should formally recuse themselves from creating federal electoral laws. Instead, he proposed that Parliament establish a permanent, independent and non-partisan body to carry out the task of creating federal electoral law. He stated that democracy would be best managed using strict, non-partisan impartiality.

9 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025 (Lori Turnbull, Professor, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University)

10 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025 (Louis-Philippe Sauvé, former member of Parliament, LaSalle-Émard-Verdun).

11 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025 (David Moscrop, Politics writer).

12 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025 (Ryan Davies, Northern Perspective).

13 Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, [Letter to Minister LeBlanc \(names on ballots\) – CEO appearance on Bill C-65, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act \(Electoral Participation Act\) before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs – Elections Canada](#).

In support of his viewpoint, he cited the existence of Elections Canada and Canada's federal electoral boundary commissions as non-partisan, independent and trusted entities that have served citizens well. According to Mr. Szuchewycz, this reform proposed by the LBC would shield members from being accused by the public of creating self-serving electoral laws.¹⁴

Mr. Loewen described the LBC as self-proclaimed democratic reformers who assert that Canada should adopt a different electoral system, despite Canadians themselves having consistently demonstrated that they do not want an alternative to the current system. However, he stated that the LBC's contention that members of the House should not write their own rules of election was unobjectionable.¹⁵

According to Mr. Moscrop, the LBC and its actions are both a protest and a stunt. Its goal is to raise awareness about the inadequacies and distortions inherent in the first-past-the-post electoral system, and that politicians create the electoral rules that they stand to benefit from. To bring about change, the LBC has weaponized election rules meant to facilitate public access to the ballot.¹⁶

Mr. Davies stated that, in his view, the LBC was not a protest. Rather, they are a coordinated campaign of mischief designed to make a mockery of Canada's democratic process by violating Canadians' section 3 rights under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (the Charter).¹⁷

Mr. Pammett told PROC that the LBC is a protest group that favours a citizens' assembly to carry out electoral reform. In his view, this was a reasonable goal. However, the LBC's tactic of overloading the electoral mechanisms caused inconvenience and annoyance. These negative outcomes were accentuated by the fact that the LBC's tactics do not have a clear relation to its overall goal and, if anything, undermine that goal.¹⁸

B. Electoral Laws Pertaining to Becoming a Candidate

According to the *Canada Elections Act* (CEA), to run as a candidate in a federal election, a person must:

14 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1105 (Szuchewycz).

15 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1100 (Loewen).

16 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1100 (Moscrop).

17 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1105 (Davies).

18 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1205 (Pammett).



- be a Canadian citizen;
- be at least 18 years old on election day;
- not be an official agent or auditor of any candidate in an ongoing federal election; and
- not be ineligible according to a list of ineligible individuals found in section 65 of the CEA.¹⁹

In addition, candidates must

- appoint an official agent and may need to appoint an auditor (depending on contributions received, expenses incurred and votes garnered);²⁰ and
- collect names, addresses and signatures from at least 100 people who reside in the riding and are qualified electors (the requirement is 50 people if the riding is designated by Elections Canada as large or remote).²¹

Of note, the right of every Canadian citizen to stand for election is constitutionally protected under section 3 of the Charter. However, like other rights guaranteed by the Charter, this right is subject to reasonable limits, as provided for in section 1. As such, the CEA imposes certain, limited conditions for standing as a candidate in federal elections, including a minimum age requirement and incompatibilities with certain positions, such as the CEO, judges and members of a provincial or territorial legislature.

EVIDENCE

A. Observations About the Actions of the Longest Ballot Committee

Mr. Perrault noted that the LBC had made statements about its actions being intended to create pressure for electoral reform. These reforms are to be carried out by an independent body. Mr. Perrault stated that, despite allegations by the LBC that members of the House of Commons were in a conflict of interest, the majority of electoral reforms

19 [Canada Elections Act](#) (S.C. 2000, c. 9), s. 65.

20 Elections Canada, "[Step 3. Appointing People to Your Campaign](#)" in *Becoming a Candidate – Manual for Candidates in a Federal Election*.

21 Elections Canada, "[4.4. Collecting Electors' Signatures](#)" in *Becoming a Candidate – Manual for Candidates in a Federal Election*.

over the past 25 years have come as the result of recommendations made by Elections Canada. These were subsequently referred to PROC for study. In his view, this process, involving a neutral policy review by Elections Canada followed by a parliamentary review, was sound and should be maintained.²²

Mr. Perrault also noted that, while unanimous consent of members is not and should not be required to amend election laws, efforts had nevertheless been made in recent decades to secure multiparty support for reforms. He further stated that meaningful amendments have been proposed by various stakeholders over the years.²³

Mr. Kingsley criticized the method used by the LBC to advance electoral reform. He pointed out that groups seeking such reform could, within the existing framework, create or join a political party that could propose such reforms in its platform. He also noted that these groups could hold informal citizens' assemblies.²⁴

Mr. Szuchewycz told PROC that the LBC's message – that politicians should not be in charge of the rules of their own election – has resonated with regular citizens, many of whom understood and agreed with it.

He stated that the LBC's actions had been very successful. To illustrate, he cited the overall media attention given to the LBC, his invitation to appear before PROC, and the many positive messages the LBC had received from people who had expressed an interest in joining the LBC in future electoral contests.²⁵

Mr. Loewen stated that the actions by the LBC "clearly violate the spirit of holding competitive elections."²⁶ He told PROC that elections ought to be contested between candidates:

- who have real intentions of entering Parliament;
- who have mustered some minimum level of local support; and
- who are ready to actively compete against other candidates.

22 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1125 (Perrault).

23 Ibid.

24 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1105 (Kingsley).

25 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1140 (Szuchewycz).

26 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1100 (Loewen).



To that end, Mr. Loewen noted that the “ballot is much more than a petition, and so it should require more than shenanigans to get on it.”²⁷

Mr. Loewen reminded PROC that an important feature of Canadian elections was that non-major party candidates consistently step up and run in elections despite likely knowing their chance of winning is low. Further, in his view, Canadians have shown themselves very disinclined to vote for candidates who appear on the ballot because of a signature-harvesting exercise.²⁸

According to Mr. Loewen, most Canadians would find it curious that the current federal electoral rules allow a single agent to act on behalf of multiple candidates. He noted that elections are competitive processes between candidates. In the parlance of sports, the idea that one coach or one manager could serve multiple teams strikes people as contrary to the competitive spirit of an election and suggests that someone other than the candidates may influence the contest.²⁹

He noted that every referendum held to date, in Canada, on changing the electoral system, had been defeated, including those which involved a citizen’s assembly. Further, he noted that the 2025 court case *Fair Voting BC V. Canada (Attorney General)*³⁰ had affirmed the constitutionality of Canada’s electoral system. Despite these precedents, Mr. Loewen argued that the LBC nonetheless decided to gum up Canada’s electoral system at the level of the ballot to promote its agenda of reform. However, he stated that the LBC acts like a third party or a political party, yet it does not subject itself into the required regulatory framework for such entities.³¹

Ms. Turnbull told PROC that, when compared with all of the current matters that could imperil democracy, the actions of the LBC do not keep her awake at night. At the same time, she indicated that it was undesirable to have election ballots flooded intentionally with names of people who have no real intention of representing a riding. Indeed, such actions risked making a mockery of the ballot, while also constituting a waste of time and resources.³²

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 1120.

29 Ibid., 1135.

30 *Fair Voting BC V. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2025 ONCA 581.

31 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1115 (Loewen).

32 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1205 (Turnbull).

She noted that the LBC's contention about members of the House being in a conflict of interest over writing their own election rules was a fair comment and one that was interesting to think about. However, the concept became problematic when applied in the extreme. As politicians make all federal laws, would that not almost always place them in a conflict of interest for having written the rules by which they, and all in Canada, must abide?

Ms. Turnbull noted that an advantage of the current system for making laws was that members of the House are accountable to the public for the decisions they make. By contrast, members of a theoretical citizens' assembly would not be similarly answerable to the public.³³ Further, she stated that no better process for creating electoral laws was known to her. She observed that Canadian citizen assemblies for electoral reform were largely unconvincing to the public.³⁴

Mr. Sauvé stated that everyone he met while campaigning during the 2024 by-election had expressed their dismay at the sheer ridiculousness of the actions of the LBC. Many informed him that they were unaware that the LBC's demands were connected to reforms to the current system.³⁵

Mr. Pammett laid out the following set of concerns that he holds about the LBC:

- could be a physical deterrent to voting for electors with disabilities, and a psychological deterrent to others, which could lower voter turnout rates;
- drew attention away from local issues in constituencies;
- made it more difficult for voters to inform themselves about who the candidates were and what they stood for;
- had a negative impact on local media that were attempting to cover the election; and
- created obstacles for local community associations that might have sought to organize all-candidates meetings.³⁶

33 ibid., 1215.

34 ibid., 1205.

35 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1220 (Sauvé).

36 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1205 (Pammett).



Ms. Garnett told PROC that, in her view, the LBC appeared to act as a third-party advocacy organization. That is, the LBC had overloaded the ballot with candidates to advocate for specific policies and proposals. However, she reported that the LBC did not appear to be working as a political party. While the LBC had run multiple candidates in the same riding, the LBC's goals do not appear to include contributing to the conversation in an election campaign or getting elected.³⁷

On the question of members of the House being in a conflict of interest for making electoral laws, Ms. Garnett reminded PROC that any process for reforming the current electoral system was going to have political interests involved. She noted that studies have shown that citizens assemblies can be useful and constructive in finding solutions to technical proposals. However, she stated that it was incorrect to assert that the use of citizens' assemblies to create electoral law would somehow eliminate political considerations from the work.³⁸

B. Challenges to Voting Caused by the Longest Ballot Committee

1. Accessibility Issues and Strains on the Electoral Process

Several witnesses took issue with the adverse impact that the LBC's actions had on the accessibility of elections and the voting process.

With respect to accessibility, Mr. Blanchet emphasized the need to ensure that voting remains accessible to all voters, including seniors, people with disabilities and people with low literacy levels.³⁹ Mr. Perrault identified several accessibility-related impacts associated with long ballots, including:

- voters with certain disabilities or dexterity issues may have difficulty handling, marking and folding long ballots;⁴⁰ and
- voters with visual impairments or low literacy levels may have difficulty reading and understanding long ballots.⁴¹

37 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1245 (Garnett).

38 Ibid., 1225.

39 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1100 (Blanchet).

40 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100 (Perrault); Elections Canada, [Report on the 45th General Election of April 28, 2025](#), 15 September 2025.

41 Ibid.

Alternatives, such as the blank ballot used in the Battle River—Crowfoot by-election, can mitigate the impact of the LBC’s actions on accessibility. However, Mr. Perrault noted that voters with low literacy skills or who have difficulty writing or handling a pencil may find it difficult to fill out a blank ballot.⁴² Mr. Perrault, Mr. Kingsley and Mr. Blanchet also pointed out that long ballots impacted voting and vote counting in the targeted ridings, including that:

- Long ballots make it more difficult for voters to find their chosen candidate among a long list. This can increase wait times to vote.⁴³
- Each ballot box can normally hold thousands of conventionally-sized ballots. However, these same ballot boxes can only hold about a hundred long ballots. The increase in the number of ballot boxes that election officials have to manage can unnecessarily lengthen the voting process.⁴⁴
- Long ballots complicate the counting of votes, as they are more complex for election workers and candidate representatives to handle and examine. In some constituencies targeted by the LBC, vote counting took until 5:00 a.m.⁴⁵
- The additional workload caused by long ballots could hinder the recruitment of election workers in targeted ridings. During the 2025 election, several election workers said that they did not want to work in a riding targeted by the LBC.⁴⁶

In Mr. Loewen’s view, while the overall effects of having a ballot with an unwieldy number of candidates on it would be minimal, voter frustration caused by such a ballot would likely be high.⁴⁷ Further, he noted that the LBC’s efforts to overload ballots created problems for both electors and election workers.

42 Ibid.

43 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1100 (Blanchet); PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1105 (Kingsley); and PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100 (Perrault).

44 Ibid.

45 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100 (Perrault).

46 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1125 (Blanchet); PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1105 (Kingsley); and PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100 (Perrault).

47 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1135 (Loewen).



He stated that, in Canada, elections were highly localized and depended on volunteers and minimally paid, part-time workers for their smooth conduct. Election workers faced challenges in explaining the ballot to electors, how to cast their vote according to their intentions, and in counting the ballots. Meanwhile, electors were forced to search for competitive, sincere candidates among dozens or even hundreds of names of insincere candidates.⁴⁸

Ms. Turnbull noted that the effects of the LBC's actions were most acutely felt by the election workers who are responsible for counting the ballots. Still, the LBC's actions have not affected election outcomes because the number of people voting for candidates associated with the LBC is minimal.⁴⁹

In assessing the overall impact that the LBC, Mr. Sauvé stated that its actions are not ideal but did not have a significant impact on the outcome of any riding. However, he had observed that excessively long ballots created challenges, including that:

- ballot boxes filled far quicker than normal and had to be changed out frequently; and
- it lengthened the time it took to count votes.⁵⁰

Further, he recounted the experience of one election worker who was involved in counting ballots in the riding of LaSalle—Émard—Verdun during the 2024 by-election. Because of the unwieldy length of the ballots prolonged the counting, the worker did not return home until 4:15 a.m. and unable to attend her regular job the day after the election.

Mr. Sauvé reminded PROC that election workers are often working-class students and seniors who care deeply about democracy and who want to earn a little extra money. Additional hardships, such as the actions of the LBC, should not be inflicted upon them.⁵¹

Like other witnesses, Ms. Garnett noted that lengthy ballots made the vote counting process more difficult and susceptible to technical errors. Further, the burden of

48 Ibid., 1110 and 1115.

49 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1240, 1240 (Turnbull).

50 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1230 (Sauvé).

51 Ibid., 1220.

counting long ballots was placed on a temporary workforce who chose to assist in this important aspect of democracy at the end of a long workday.⁵²

2. Reducing the Credibility of the System

Mr. Kingsley emphasized that elections are the process by which the very legitimacy of Parliament and its members is established.⁵³ He stated that the LBC's actions undermine the fundamental principle that all voters must be able to vote under the same rules and processes. In his view, the electoral process must remain as simple as possible for all voters.⁵⁴

Further, Mr. Blanchet argued that the LBC's actions were detrimental to the conduct of elections, as they were an irritant for voters. He said that their actions discredited the electoral system and risked undermining voter confidence.⁵⁵

In Mr. Moscrop's view, Canada has one of the best electoral machines in the world, owing to its simplicity and mechanical nature. He stated that the system's effectiveness partly depends on participants exercising restraint to uphold electoral integrity. That is, there are actions that may be legal or permitted, but participants should not engage in them because to do so would undermine the spirit of the laws and regulations that govern the process.⁵⁶

In the absence of Canadians exercising this forbearance, in his view, the net outcome could be deleterious on the public good of elections, even if the stated aims of certain actions are perceived to be rooted in other, complementary public goods. He worried that a protest that elongated the size of the ballot in order to accommodate countless unserious candidates, at scale, could:

- undermine Canadians' trust in elections and chip away at their quality;
- make life more difficult for election officials;
- discourage marginal voters from turning out;

52 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1215, 1250 (Garnett).

53 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1105 (Kingsley).

54 Ibid.

55 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1100 and 1120 (Blanchet).

56 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1100 (Moscrop).



- heighten challenges for voters with disabilities; and
- discourage voter turnout and potentially even shape the outcome of a race or races.⁵⁷

Further, Mr. Moscrop expressed the view that now was the worst possible time to be messing around with Canada’s elections. He warned that, to do so, Canadians could lose the institutions that bind the country together.⁵⁸

C. Allegations of Questionable Practices by Longest Ballot Committee in Nominating Candidates

During PROC’s study, questions arose about the process that the LBC employed to gather signatures on the requisite candidate nomination papers provided by Elections Canada. Specifically, PROC heard allegations that the LBC had used nomination papers for which the candidate’s name on the form was left blank at the time signatures were gathered.

Mr. Szuchewycz told PROC that the process followed by the LBC for nominating candidates was done “by the book” (or according to the legal exigences of the CEA).⁵⁹ He explained that candidates were first recruited. On the requisite Elections Canada nomination paper, the LBC either listed the candidate’s name or wrote “all candidates,” and then collected the requisite signatures on behalf of the candidates.

He stated that the LBC had not, at any point, collected signatures on nomination papers that had a blank in the candidate field. He noted that the CEO, in his appearance before PROC, had testified that Elections Canada had not found any credible evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of the LBC.⁶⁰

Mr. Szuchewycz noted that, in one instance where the LBC had put forward candidates to run in an electoral riding, that riding’s returning officer (RO) determined that the LBC’s candidates were not acceptable and, consequently, were not permitted to run. Mr. Szuchewycz told PROC that the RO’s decision was based on the nomination papers that the LBC had provided.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 1140.

59 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1100 (Szuchewycz).

60 Ibid., 1115.

Further, Mr. Szuchewycz told PROC that neither he, nor the LBC:

- had ever received a reprimand;
- had no intention of misleading anyone; and
- that they have nothing to hide.⁶¹

At the same time, some members of PROC called into question the veracity of Mr. Szuchewycz's contention the LBC had not gathered signatures on nomination papers that had the candidate's name left blank. To that end, some members of PROC raised with Mr. Szuchewycz that:

- On 18 August 2024, the LBC posted a video on YouTube that shows Mr. Szuchewycz appealing to potential candidates for the LaSalle—Émard—Verdun by-election, asking them to run, and saying that the LBC had already collected 100 signatures on their behalf; and
- On 22 January 2024, the LBC posted a YouTube video on the website X in which an LBC nomination paper with signatures and a blank entry for the candidate's name could be seen.

In response, Mr. Szuchewycz stated that these contentions were not accurate and that the LBC had never collected signatures with blank candidate names.⁶²

Mr. Davies told PROC that he had compiled evidence of what he considered to be breaches of the CEA and had provided it in an electronic package to Elections Canada on 25 July 2025.⁶³

Mr. Davies stated that he had obtained internal LBC communications from an individual who had been approached by the LBC to run as a candidate. Using these communications, along with publicly available information about the LBC, Mr. Davies provided PROC with the following observations:

61 *Ibid.*, 1145.

62 *Ibid.*, 1110.

63 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1105 (Davies).



- The LBC, in his view, functioned like a political party apparatus rather than a decentralized protest group. However, the LBC are not registered as a political party.
- LBC organizers told potential candidates who had not even agreed to run in an election that the LBC had already gathered the requisite signatures needed to register on their behalf. He alleged that this was a violation of section 67 of the CEA.
- Signatures were collected from electors by individuals who had not been appointed by candidates to act on their behalf. He alleged that this was a violation of sections 67 and 480.1(1)(e) of the CEA, and potentially forgery under the *Criminal Code* as well.⁶⁴
- Generally, there was substantial and sustained overlap between the activities of the LBC and that of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada.

Mr. Davies told PROC that, as of 9 October 2025, he had received no response from Elections Canada regarding the information that he had provided.

When questioned about the receipt of Mr. Davies' complaint, Mr. Perrault said that it had been caught and held by Elections Canada's IT security filters due to possible contamination of the hyperlinks in the email. As a result, the complaint was not forwarded to the Commissioner of Canada Elections (CCE) at the time it was received. Mr. Perrault said he became aware of the complaint only after appearing before PROC in October 2025.⁶⁵

In a letter to PROC, Mr. Perrault stated that the CCE had nonetheless received other public complaints which referred to Mr. Davies' allegations and that this information had been made public. These complaints were received between 31 July 2025 and 11 August 2025.⁶⁶ During his testimony, however, Mr. Perrault emphasized that the alleged cases of nomination papers signed without the candidate's name on it does not constitute a violation of the CEA as it is currently drafted. However, he stated that this matter was one that "needs to be addressed."⁶⁷

64 Ibid., 1105 and 1110.

65 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1105 and 1110 (Perrault).

66 Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer, *Letter to the Chair of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs*, 4 November 2025.

67 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1140 (Perrault).

Further, Mr. Perrault stated that he had instructed his team to review the existing processes for receiving complaints to ensure that none were excluded for reasons related to IT security. He noted that this was the first time that such a situation had been brought to his attention. To his knowledge, no other complaints had been overlooked for similar reasons, although a review was necessary to confirm this.⁶⁸

According to Mr. Perrault, following the April 2025 general election, the Office of the CCE received approximately 18,000 complaints alleging violations of the CEA, nearly 2,000 of which were forwarded by Elections Canada.⁶⁹

D. Potential Reforms to the *Canada Elections Act* Raised by Witnesses

With the exception of the LBC representative, the witnesses all agreed on the need to prevent and limit the harm caused by actors seeking to artificially increase the number of candidates on the ballot in certain ridings. However, opinions differed as to which approach ought to be implemented to achieve this. The options raised by witnesses are summarized below.

1. General Considerations

Several witnesses emphasized that the right to stand for election and the right to vote were constitutionally protected rights. Mr. Perrault cautioned that any proposed legislative amendments needed to be appropriately balanced with these rights in mind.⁷⁰

Mr. Blanchet also stated that in implementing solutions to the problem of long ballots, it was necessary to do so without harming those wishing to run for office. In his view, nomination rules should not vary according to a candidate's political affiliation (for example, independent candidates or candidates affiliated with major or minor parties). He also said that measures, such as having one unique official agent per riding, ought to be put in place to prevent future actions similar to those of the LBC.⁷¹

68 Ibid., 1150.

69 Ibid., 1110.

70 Ibid., 1120 and 1155.

71 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1145 (Blanchet).



In response to a question, Mr. Perrault said he supported amending the CEA to create an offence for conspiracy attempts, counselling contravention or being an accessory after the fact to a violation of the act.⁷²

Mr. Kingsley stated that the CEA should sanction people who make a mockery of the electoral system. In his view, the CCE should have the authority to determine whether conduct should be sanctioned by a compliance agreement, a fine or prosecution before the courts. He further stated that candidates who knowingly participate in schemes similar to those of the LBC should be prosecuted.⁷³

When asked about the hierarchy of interests to be considered in proposing electoral reforms, Mr. Blanchet said that voters should be put first, followed by candidates and election workers.⁷⁴ Mr. Kingsley agreed.⁷⁵

Mr. Loewen stated that it was hard to sustain an argument that the LBC's actions in recent federal elections were desirable for democracy. At the same time, he noted that dealing with these actions may not be a high priority issue for PROC or Parliament. As such, PROC could recommend legislation be passed to constrain or deter future incidents, or it could maintain the status quo in the hopes that future incidents do not recur.⁷⁶

He raised with PROC that a challenge existed in creating a legislative response from Parliament. The legislation needed to set a level of mandatory obligations for those seeking to become candidates in a federal election, which was high enough to prevent actions that gum up the system, yet were not so high that sincere candidates, including independents, could still get over the bar.⁷⁷

Ms. Turnbull was asked by a member of PROC for her view about whether the CEA should include a general provision which would prohibit conduct that would make a mockery, distortion or gross misrepresentation that disrespects or undermines the spirit, rules or integrity of the contest. In response, she stated that she liked the idea of protecting the integrity of elections, provided the language of the provision did not go too far.⁷⁸

72 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1145 (Perrault).

73 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1120 (Kingsley).

74 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1125 (Blanchet).

75 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1130 (Kingsley).

76 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1150 (Loewen).

77 Ibid., 1135.

78 Ibid., 1245.

Mr. Moscrop stated that Parliament ought to take corrective actions to protect citizens' long-term trust in elections, without overreacting to the LBC's stunt. In his view, the best outcome would be that the LBC recognize that their conduct is doing harm to Canada's elections, is damaging to their stated goals, and that they simply cease their actions and move on.⁷⁹ He emphasized that should the LBC continue to demonstrate no forbearance, then they are inviting a response from Parliament and the public that works against their desired outcomes. That is, it will make life more difficult for people to engage in electoral democracy.

Mr. Davies recommended that a review be undertaken of the CEA to determine what controls are missing over the existing legislation. He stated that one of the biggest problems Canada has, currently, was that the laws are not enforced.⁸⁰

For his part, Mr. Szuchewycz recommended that Parliament establish a permanent, independent and non-partisan body mandated to create and amend federal electoral law. However, in response to a question which sought details about how he viewed the process for establishing such a body, including its membership, Mr. Szuchewycz responded that he was confident parliamentarians could devise something very reasonable.⁸¹

2. Create a Limit on the Number of Nomination Papers That an Elector May Sign

Some witnesses told PROC that the CEA should be amended to prohibit an elector from signing more than one nomination paper. Notably, Mr. Perrault held this view and provided recommendations about such a prohibition.⁸² Mr. Kingsley supported Mr. Perrault's recommendation.⁸³

On the other hand, Mr. Blanchet stated that there may be challenges in implementing such a prohibition. He noted that an elector may wish to sign more than one nomination paper for various reasons, including to encourage an individual to enter into politics

79 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1120 (Moscrop).

80 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1140 (Davies).

81 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1155 (Szuchewycz).

82 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100 (Perrault).

83 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1110 (Kingsley).



without endorsing that person's party. However, in his view, there was a difference between signing two nomination papers and signing a hundred.⁸⁴

Mr. Perrault explained that nominations and the confirmation process are conducted under very tight deadlines. Currently, ROs review signatures to verify their number and to confirm that signatories reside in the riding in which the candidate is running. According to Mr. Perrault, the time provided under the CEA does not permit for a systematic comparative examination of all the signatures.⁸⁵ Similarly, Mr. Blanchet said that a systematic review should not necessarily be required, but rather that verifications should be carried out if there was any doubt that an individual may be encouraging others to sign multiple papers.⁸⁶

However, Mr. Kingsley indicated that it would be feasible to assign any such additional responsibilities to ROs. To the extent possible, he would like signatures to be verified before the election is held. Mr. Kingsley pointed out that it would also be possible to publish the signatures online for review by members of the public.⁸⁷ On this point, Mr. Perrault noted that signatures on nomination papers can currently be reviewed by the public at the ROs' offices, but are not available online.⁸⁸

With respect to penalties, Mr. Perrault said that it would be appropriate to levy administrative monetary penalties on individuals who encourage others to sign multiple nomination papers. However, he did not rule out the possibility of having no penalties be attached to the prohibition.⁸⁹

Mr. Perrault also cautioned PROC that a criminal, rather than an administrative, penalty regime would increase both the cost and duration of investigations, given the higher standard of proof required. He emphasized that proceedings involving criminal penalties often take years to resolve and may be discontinued due to prosecutorial priorities. He further noted that courts frequently impose penalties that are less severe than those available under an administrative penalty regime.⁹⁰

84 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1130 (Blanchet).

85 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1120 and 1140 (Perrault).

86 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1130 (Blanchet).

87 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1135 and 1150 (Kingsley).

88 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1145 (Perrault).

89 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100, 1110 and 1120 (Perrault).

90 *Ibid.*, 1110.

According to Mr. Perrault, candidates do not possess the means of ensuring that a person has not signed more than one nomination paper, potentially through inadvertence. As such, he cautioned that rejecting a candidate's nomination on this basis would be ill-advised. Rejecting a nomination due to identical signatures would also raise technical questions, including which nomination paper should be considered valid—the first one received by the RO or the first one signed by the elector.⁹¹

Mr. Kingsley agreed that a duplicate signature should not automatically result in the rejection of a candidacy. However, he said that where a candidate was elected by utilizing tactics similar to that of the LBC, the CEA should allow the matter to be referred to a court to determine whether the election should be annulled. In less serious cases, such as where a person inadvertently signed two papers, the CCE should be empowered to make a decision.⁹²

When asked whether a single-signature requirement would withstand legal scrutiny under section 1 of the Charter, Mr. Perrault stated he believed it would. In his view, such a requirement would not complicate the nomination process and would have only a minimal impact on an individual's right to stand as a candidate. He also said that he believed this type of restriction was necessary to protect the integrity of the electoral process.⁹³

Mr. Kingsley agreed that a single-signature requirement could survive a legal challenge, as it would not infringe the right to vote or the right to stand for election.⁹⁴

Mr. Perrault further noted that a single-signature requirement would limit a signatory's ability to express support for more than one candidate, but considered this limitation reasonable. He emphasized that the nomination process was not intended as a means of expression for the signatories, but rather as a way of ensuring that a candidate can demonstrate a certain level of support.⁹⁵ Similarly, Mr. Kingsley noted that signatories are already perceived as supporting the candidate in question and that the possibility of multiple signatures does not alter this perception.⁹⁶

91 Ibid., 1100, 1110 and 1120.

92 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1120 and 1150 (Kingsley).

93 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1125 (Perrault).

94 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1150 (Kingsley).

95 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1135 (Perrault).

96 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1130 (Kingsley).



On the technical side, Mr. Perrault noted that the prohibition on signing more than one nomination paper could be clearly stated on the form itself. He also suggested that individuals collecting signatures could be asked to exercise due diligence. Further, the form could specify that a signature does not constitute a commitment to vote for the candidate. He cautioned, however, that the form should not be overloaded with information. Otherwise, signatories will tend not to read the form.⁹⁷ Mr. Kingsley stated that he would place information about any such prohibition next to the signature box on the form to ensure that all signatories read the prohibition.⁹⁸

On the topic of limiting the number of candidate nomination papers that an elector could sign, Ms. Turnbull stated that, in her view, democracy would not suffer in a case where, for example, she signed the nomination papers, in good faith, of two candidates whom she knew and considered to be serious, viable candidates.

At the same time, she said she could see the reason for creating a restriction against coordinated efforts that obtained the same 100 signatures to endorse multiple candidates, whom the signatories do not even know. She likened such an effort to a stunt which served no democratic purpose. She stated that such a restriction would be unfortunate but not cumbersome and could be justified.⁹⁹ Ms. Turnbull also acknowledged that limiting the ability of an official agent to act for more than one candidate was sensible.

For his part, Mr. Sauvé stated that he did not favour imposing a restriction which would prevent citizens from signing more than one nomination paper, because it would create a barrier for small parties, such as the Rhinoceros Party, to put forward a candidate.¹⁰⁰

Mr. Moscrop considered it reasonable to introduce some limit on the number of nomination papers that an elector could sign, perhaps three to five, in order to have the candidate demonstrate a bit more grit to get on the ballot and prevent future electoral stunts.¹⁰¹ He added that, in his view, problems with nomination signatures need to be caught prior to a candidate's name being placed on the ballot. Should Parliament seek to place further controls on nomination signature requirements, these must be enforceable

97 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1135 (Perrault).

98 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1110 (Kingsley).

99 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1210, 1230 and 1235 (Turnbull).

100 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1225, 1240 (Sauvé).

101 *Ibid.*, 1115.

and funded. He noted that this was not the case with the current nomination signature requirements.¹⁰²

Mr. Davies recommended that the CEA be amended to disallow electors from endorsing more than one candidate's nomination paper in a given riding. Further, he proposed requiring candidates to sign an affidavit affirming their genuine intention to run in the election, while imposing a fine of, for example, up to \$2,000 for non-compliance.¹⁰³

Both Mr. Pammett and Ms. Garnett told PROC that they considered it reasonable to amend the CEA to require each candidate to collect 100 unique signatures on their nomination paper.¹⁰⁴

3. Limit the Number of Candidates an Official Agent May Represent

In ridings targeted by the LBC, a single individual acted as the official agent for dozens of independent candidates. PROC heard from a number of witnesses who supported imposing a limit on the number of candidates an official agent may represent. Two approaches were discussed. These were:

- allowing an official agent to represent only one candidate across all electoral districts; or
- allowing an official agent to represent only one candidate per electoral district (thereby allowing the agent to represent up to 343 candidates nationally).

Mr. Perrault expressed his support for the proposal to limit the number of candidates an official agent may represent to one per electoral district. However, he did not support the proposal to restrict an official agent from only representing one candidate nationally. In his view, it was incompatible with the nature of elections for candidates running in the same electoral district to share an official agent. However, he noted that it was common for an official agent to represent multiple candidates in different electoral districts, which he considered "perfectly reasonable."¹⁰⁵

102 *ibid.*, 1125.

103 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1105 (Davies).

104 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1210 (Pammett); and PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1215 (Garnett).

105 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100 and 1120 (Perrault).



Mr. Blanchet agreed with Mr. Perrault's opinion. Mr. Blanchet stated that requiring each candidate in an electoral district to secure a separate official agent would demonstrate the seriousness of the candidacy. He also indicated that such a restriction would be easier to enforce than other potential legislative measures, such as a single-signature requirement. Mr. Blanchet agreed with Mr. Perrault that the same official agent should be able to represent candidates in several electoral districts, noting that during provincial elections in Quebec, it was common for a single agent to represent all of a party's candidates.¹⁰⁶

Likewise, Mr. Kingsley supported the proposal to limit an official agent to representing one candidate per electoral district. However, he stated that he did not wish to comment on the possibility of allowing an agent to represent more than one candidate nationally, as he was not familiar with party practices in this regard.¹⁰⁷

Mr. Sauvé recommended that the CEA be amended to impose more restrictions on official agents.¹⁰⁸

Mr. Moscrop recommended that a person be appointed as an official agent for no more than one candidate. In his view, allowing a person to be the official agent of more than one candidate is absurd and an extraordinary oversight. To that end, he noted that the LBC's use of one official agent for multiple candidates put them in a conflict of interest.¹⁰⁹

Both Mr. Pammatt and Ms. Garnett told PROC that they considered it reasonable to amend the CEA that there be a unique official agent for each candidate.¹¹⁰

4. Increase the Number of Signatures Required on Nomination Papers

Witnesses who appeared before PROC discussed the possibility of increasing the number of signatures required on nomination papers, as it would make it more difficult for groups, such as the LBC, to field a large number of candidates. Among the options discussed were:

- increasing the required number of signatures (e.g., 1,000 signatures); and

106 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1100 and 1115 (Blanchet).

107 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1110 and 1115 (Kingsley).

108 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1240 (Sauvé).

109 Ibid., 1145.

110 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1210 (Pammatt); and PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1215 (Garnett).

- setting the signature threshold as a percentage of the population of an electoral district (e.g., 0.5%).

Some witnesses disagreed with the proposal to increase the number of signatures required under the CEA. Notably, this view was shared by Mr. Perrault, who said that he did not support this idea because “becoming a candidate should remain accessible to Canadians.”¹¹¹ He stated that there is no “magical number”¹¹² of signatures and that he saw no need to amend the existing requirements. Mr. Kingsley stated that the current number of required signatures was reasonable,¹¹³ while Mr. Blanchet said that requiring 1,000 signatures would be “excessive.”¹¹⁴ Other witnesses, such as Mr. Moscrop¹¹⁵, Mr. Pammett¹¹⁶ and Ms. Garnett¹¹⁷, also found the 100-signature requirement to be reasonable. Ms. Garnett also stated that “[g]etting closer to a larger percentage of the electorate could be a means of dissuading those with fewer networks from being on the ballot.”¹¹⁸

Ms. Turnbull stated that if Parliament were to legislate in response to the actions of the LBC, it should do so without making life more difficult for serious independent candidates. She noted that, for example, should Parliament increase the number of signatures a candidate needs to obtain to be nominated, independent candidates would face greater difficulties than candidates who represented a political party.¹¹⁹

Mr. Sauvé recommended that the CEA be amended by increasing the required number of signatures on nomination papers.¹²⁰

111 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100 (Perrault).

112 Ibid., 1110.

113 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1145 (Kingsley).

114 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1145 (Blanchet).

115 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1145 (Moscrop).

116 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1245 (Pammett).

117 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1245 (Garnett).

118 Ibid.

119 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1210 (Turnbull).

120 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1240 (Sauvé).



5. Reinstatement of a Mandatory Monetary Deposit by Candidates

Section 67(4)(a) of the CEA used to require a candidate to deposit \$1,000 along with their nomination paper.¹²¹ This requirement was challenged before the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in 2017. The Court of Queen’s Bench concluded that the deposit requirement was unconstitutional, as it infringed on section 3 of the Charter and could not be justified under section 1.¹²² In response to this decision, the deposit requirement was removed from the CEA when the *Elections Modernization Act* came into force in 2019.¹²³

Some witnesses raised the idea of reimposing a deposit but in an amount lower than the \$1,000 that had been invalidated by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. However, questions remain as to whether a reduced deposit would withstand scrutiny under section 1 of the Charter.

Mr. Perrault noted that the Court of Queen’s Bench found the deposit requirement problematic because the requirement did not effectively demonstrate the seriousness of a candidacy. Less serious but wealthy candidates could readily pay the deposit, while serious candidates of more modest means could face barriers to participation. Mr. Perrault stated that he considered this reasoning to be sound and did not believe that reinstating a deposit was necessary.¹²⁴

Similarly, Mr. Blanchet observed that in Quebec, the analogous deposit was eliminated in provincial election legislation in 1980 and that there appeared to be no intention to reintroduce it.¹²⁵

Mr. Kingsley stated that he would be reluctant to support a deposit in the amount of \$1,000, but considered that a deposit of a few hundred dollars seemed to him to be more appropriate.¹²⁶

Mr. Moscrop provided his views on whether the re-introduction of a mandatory candidate deposit would help prevent future electoral stunts from occurring. He stated that the current absence of a deposit enables candidates to run who otherwise could not afford it. This approach yields candidates from different backgrounds, and not simply those who are

121 [Canada Elections Act](#), S.C. 2000, c. 9, version of section 67 from 2015-10-27 to 2019-06-12.

122 [Szuchewycz v. Canada \(Attorney General\)](#), 2017 ABQB 645.

123 [Elections Modernization Act](#), S.C. 2018, c. 31.

124 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1120 (Perrault).

125 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1130 (Blanchet).

126 PROC, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1115 (Kingsley).

connected to political parties. However, he noted that while the former \$1,000 deposit was struck down by the courts as an infringement of section 3 of the Charter, a discussion could be held about the merits of requiring a \$100 or \$200 deposit.¹²⁷

6. Provide for Penalties When Signatures Are Obtained on a Nomination Paper Before a Candidate Has Been Identified

Mr. Perrault discussed the possibility of introducing penalties for instances when signatures are obtained on a nomination paper before a candidate has been identified. Currently, a nomination paper would be rejected if, at the time of nomination, it was determined that the signatures were collected before the candidate was identified. Mr. Perrault confirmed that nomination papers have been rejected in the past for this reason, including those for LBC candidates. However, the CEA does not provide for penalties for individuals who collect signatures prematurely when such conduct is discovered only after the nomination.¹²⁸

The CEO drew PROC's attention to a 2022 recommendation made by former CCE, Yves Côté, which was intended to address this legislative gap. The recommendation, along with its explanatory paragraph, was set out in his *Report of Recommendations – 2019 and 2021 General Elections*, and reads as follows:

Currently the [CEA] does not contain a prohibition against providing false or misleading information in nomination papers. It would be useful to have such a provision, particularly since nomination papers with false signatures were filed in the last two general elections. This new provision could be modelled on the existing prohibition against filing false or misleading information in the party's application for registration (see section 408).

Recommendation 2.4 – False or misleading information in nomination papers

Parts 6 and 19

- a) Prohibit anyone from providing information that they know to be false or misleading in support of a nomination paper, or from filing a nomination paper knowing that it contains false or misleading information;
- b) Add the corresponding offence to Part 19 of the [CEA]; and

127 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1140 (Moscrop).

128 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100 (Perrault).



- c) Subject the section creating this new prohibition to the [administrative monetary penalty] regime.¹²⁹

According to Mr. Perrault, establishing a prohibition against false or misleading information on nomination papers would enable the CCE to intervene in cases where signatures are collected prematurely.¹³⁰

7. Changes Relating to Signatures Made in the Presence of a Witness

Under section 66 of the CEA, each signature must be collected in the presence of a witness, who must also sign the nomination paper and provide their name and address. Witnesses who sign nomination papers must also use due diligence to ensure that signatories are electors residing in the electoral district.

According to Mr. Kingsley, the role of the witness could be reconsidered. He noted that, at present, a witness was not required to reside in the candidate's electoral district or be of legal age, which could be changed. Mr. Kingsley further stated that witnesses should be required to sign a declaration certifying that they used due diligence in verifying each signature.¹³¹

8. Requiring Groups who Coordinate to Nominate Candidates to Register as Political Parties

In a brief submitted to PROC on October 26, 2025, the organization Democracy Watch presented a list of recommended amendments to the CEA to prevent organized actions similar to those of the LBC. Among other suggested changes, Democracy Watch recommended that the CEA be amended to require any group of people who coordinate efforts to nominate candidates in an election or by-election to register as a political party, preventing them from nominating more than one candidate per riding. According to Democracy Watch, this change would be the most reasonable and effective solution as it will not increase barriers to running as a candidate.¹³²

129 Commissioner of Canada Elections, *Recommendations Report: 2019 and 2021 General Elections*, 7 June 2022.

130 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1100 (Perrault).

131 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1110 (Kingsley).

132 Democracy Watch, *Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs for its Study of the Actions of the "Longest Ballot Committee" in Recent Canadian Elections*, 26 October 2025.

E. Other Miscellaneous Matters That Arose During the Study

Over the course of the study, some witnesses raised matters or made recommendations about potential reforms to Canada’s electoral law that extended beyond the matter of the actions of the LBC.

1. Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation

Several witnesses addressed the impact of disinformation and developments in artificial intelligence (AI) on electoral processes.

Mr. Perrault told PROC that the rise of AI represented one of the major challenges facing contemporary societies and noted that the situation was evolving rapidly. He noted that the challenges it created were compounded by the growth of social media and the decline of traditional media. However, he stated that AI was not inherently harmful and that rules needed to be developed to prevent it from being used nefariously while allowing for its beneficial applications.¹³³

In response to questions, Mr. Perrault outlined and reiterated recommendations he had made previously, which aimed at adapting the CEA to these new realities:

- Section 480.1 of the CEA provides that every person commits an offence who, with intent to mislead, falsely represents themselves as a participant in the electoral process (CEO, election officer, party representative, candidate, etc.). The same section provides an explicit exemption for the purpose of parody or satire. This offence should be expanded to include deepfakes and manipulation of voices and images, while maintaining the exemption for parody or satire;¹³⁴
- the CEA should be amended to prohibit false information that is being spread with the goal of undermining trust in an election and its results. The prohibition should capture situations where it is shown that the person knew the statement to be false;¹³⁵

133 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1130, 1145 and 1155 (Perrault).

134 Ibid., 1115; Elections Canada, *Protecting Against Threats to the Electoral Process*, 1 November 2024.

135 Ibid.



- the CEA should be amended to move away from a regime that regulates election advertising to one that regulates all election communications, which would be more in line with today’s reality,¹³⁶
- synthetic content used in election communications should be labelled to ensure public transparency,¹³⁷ and
- chatbots on social media platforms should be required to point to authoritative sources of information.¹³⁸

Mr. Perrault stated that, during the most recent election, he had observed an increase in the amount of inaccurate information that was circulating. He cited what he described as a “troubling”¹³⁹ example involving a fake article from the *Journal de Montréal* that was published on social media. The article, which was quickly removed, falsely claimed that voting for 60-year-olds had been postponed by one day. Mr. Perrault stated that incidents of this nature can mislead voters and hinder their participation in elections.¹⁴⁰

In response to a question, Mr. Perrault highlighted the challenges of enforcing offences under the CEA beyond Canada’s borders. In light of these constraints, he stressed the importance of maintaining relationships with social media platforms and relying on those relationships to remove and take down false information about the electoral system. In his view, while the creation of offences to address misinformation was important, it was not sufficient to ensure a healthy electoral process.¹⁴¹

Mr. Perrault explained that Elections Canada reports problematic posts to social media platforms and expects them to act accordingly, without formally requesting removal, which could be seen as state censorship. He noted that, in many cases, correcting the information or limiting its dissemination on the platform was sufficient to resolve the issue.¹⁴²

136 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1155 (Perrault); Elections Canada, *Meeting New Challenges: Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 43rd and 44th General Elections*, 7 June 2022.

137 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1145, 1155 (Perrault).

138 Ibid., 1145.

139 Ibid., 1130.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.

Mr. Kingsley recommended legislative changes to counter the impact of AI and deepfakes on the electoral system, including:

- a message containing an element generated by AI should state the name of its creator and include written permission from the person whose image or voice was imitated. He indicated that it was possible to track down and identify the authors of such deepfakes;¹⁴³
- the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, which regulates broadcast media, should be empowered to monitor social media. In particular, social media entities could be required to register with Canada;¹⁴⁴ and
- the CEA provides for a third-party political financing regime. Foreign social media should be required to register as a third party and be limited in the amount of money that they can spend in Canada. The veracity of the messages they transmit should also be monitored.¹⁴⁵

Mr. Blanchet stated that all Canadian electoral agencies were keeping a close eye on developments in AI and other technologies that could contribute to electoral disinformation or misinformation. He noted that legislative reforms were not keeping pace with the rapidity of technological change. In his view, electoral agencies need to remain in control of accurate information about the system and be prepared to disseminate it to voters.¹⁴⁶

Mr. Blanchet urged PROC to remain vigilant on matters related to AI and act quickly when legislative changes become necessary. In his view, electoral agencies, the media and parliamentarians share responsibility for ensuring public trust in the electoral system.¹⁴⁷ He also cautioned that electoral agencies do not want to start passing judgment on disinformation between candidates and in doing so, end up “playing politics.”¹⁴⁸

143 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1135 (Kingsley).

144 Ibid., 1155.

145 Ibid., 1155.

146 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1120 (Blanchet).

147 Ibid., 1120 and 1125.

148 Ibid., 1140.



Mr. Blanchet noted that, following a recent amendment to Quebec's *Election Act*,¹⁴⁹ any person who disseminates information that they know to be false with the intent to influence the results of an election, to disturb the conduct of the election or to compromise the public's trust in the electoral process commits a penal offence.¹⁵⁰ Mr. Blanchet considered this new offence to be an interesting initiative, while also noting that it would be difficult to establish proof of an offence committed during an election before election day.¹⁵¹ With respect to this amendment to Quebec's electoral law, Mr. Perrault noted that he was in regular contact with provincial election management bodies.¹⁵²

Further, Mr. Blanchet noted that major social media companies were likely to sign agreements and register as a third party in federal elections. At the same time, these companies do not appear to consider provincial and municipal elections to be important. He stated that it was necessary to force the major social media stakeholders to work in a way that respects democracy, while acknowledging that it continued to be difficult to get the last word with those platforms.¹⁵³

Mr. Loewen noted that some of the CEA's rules and regulations can be obviated by the use of AI. For example, he noted that the CEA sets strict limits on spending during election campaigns. However, the use of AI could bring the cost of political communication during election periods down to zero.

Further, he noted that the CEA generally applies to human individuals. However, in the not-too-distant future, people will be able to create non-human agents who will perpetuate speech during elections. For example, he stated that it was not difficult to imagine an AI agent that is designed to create political advertisements that are made available on the internet. In this scenario, it would not be a human individual creating advertisements, rather it would be an autonomous AI agent.¹⁵⁴

Mr. Loewen recommended that broadcasters and platforms be required to only show election advertisements, whether they are created by AI or not, that are labelled as such.

149 Québec, *Election Act*, CQLR, c. E-3.3.

150 Québec, *Bill 98, An Act to amend the Election Act mainly to preserve the integrity of the electoral process*, S.Q. 2025, c. 15.

151 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1120 and 1140 (Blanchet).

152 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1130 (Perrault).

153 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 7, 21 October 2025, 1155 (Blanchet).

154 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1115 (Loewen).

This would aid in bringing AI generated advertisements in line with the requirements placed on third parties under the CEA.

Further, Mr. Loewen recommended that a prohibition be added to the CEA which prevents platforms and networks from disseminating information that looks like election advertising by third parties.

In terms of countering AI-produced disinformation, Ms. Turnbull favoured focusing on education, rather than attempting to control communication. She noted that strengthening civic literacy was an important role that a government could play in countering online disinformation. She stated that the most important thing was that citizens need to be able to practice their own civic self-defence by being able to tell truth from falsehood.¹⁵⁵

She told PROC that AI-produced disinformation is a source of significant concern. She noted that during elections, foreign efforts to affect the conversation has taken place largely at the community level. She stated that it will take a great deal of work with local and diaspora communities to understand what kinds of communications they are receiving and what has been the effect of these communications.¹⁵⁶

2. Journalism

Ms. Turnbull told PROC that education, while a provincial jurisdiction, is a key factor to combatting the spread of disinformation. To that end, she stated that it would be wonderful to see greater resources be allocated toward, for example, journalism programs aimed at helping citizens to build up their civic awareness.

She indicated that there is a relationship between disinformation and polarization. People do not verify their own assumptions against a broader context because they do not have to. She noted that a person could read all day and still only be subjected to a very narrow range of ideas.¹⁵⁷

Mr. Moscrop stated that Parliament ought to give serious thought to the current news and information environment, with a view of displacing bad with better information. He

155 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1220 (Turnbull).

156 Ibid., 1235.

157 Ibid., 1245.



noted that the current environment is structured to provide incentives to push “a new model of media that includes people who, quite frankly, just aren't journalists.”¹⁵⁸

He told PROC that the potential future effects on Canadian democracy of the current information environment makes him nervous. He stated that if anyone were to design a world that was hostile “to making informed, honest, good-faith and rigorous political decisions, it would look exactly like ours.”¹⁵⁹ The current information environment moves way too fast, favours emotional or in-group considerations over rational reasons or the public good, and is driven by a massive corporate incentive to keep eyeballs glued to the information slop that makes corporations money.

Mr. Moscrop favoured an approach which required labelling, so that the public knows what they are looking at and is given a sense about whether to trust it. However, in his view, the onus on labelling would fall, in part, on social media platforms.

He also noted that in the 2025 federal general election, influencers dominated the political discourse. A study conducted by the Media Ecosystem Observatory found that nearly half of the information that was shared about the election came from influencers and not politicians or the media. He recommended that PROC, at some point, ought to give serious thought to the role that influencers play during elections.¹⁶⁰

3. Foreign Interference and Political Financing

Under the CEA, political parties and candidates must keep records of all contributions of funds, goods and services related to an election. However, third parties are required to record only contributions given to them for the purpose of engaging in regulated activities. Other contributions are treated as general revenue and, if subsequently used for regulated activities, are reported as part of the third party's own funds or resources.

Elections Canada noted in a 2022 report that it has observed an increase in the proportion of third-party election funding coming from their general revenue stream. According to Elections Canada, this provides a gap in transparency concerning the true

158 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 6, 9 October 2025, 1150 (Moscrop).

159 Ibid., 1120.

160 Ibid.

origins of third-party resources and “provides a way for large anonymous contributions, or foreign contributions, to make their way into Canadian elections.”¹⁶¹

To address this issue, the CEO has, for several years, recommended that third parties, other than individuals that finance election activities with their own funds, be required to provide Elections Canada with audited financial statements showing that no more than 10% of their revenue in the previous fiscal year came from contributions. Entities exceeding this threshold should have a separate bank account showing the source of donations when used for electoral purposes. When asked about this recommendation, Mr. Perrault stated that it addressed a long-standing concern that was difficult to resolve, as money is fungible, leaving its provenance difficult to ascertain.¹⁶²

According to Mr. Perrault, if Parliament wished to prevent any form of foreign funds from being used for electoral purposes, the CEA must be broadened to apply to individuals or entities that receive, in some cases without their knowledge, funds from a foreign source and to individuals abroad who provide or attempt to provide such funds to election campaigns.¹⁶³

4. Role of Political Parties in Canada’s Democracy

Ms. Turnbull invited the members of PROC to reflect on the role that political parties play in terms of facilitating democracy. She stated that political parties act as gatekeepers of democracy, over which they retain a firm grip. Members of the House are mostly members of a political party, and political parties are disciplined organizations that often have a stance on issues, such as the actions of the LBC. She noted that for matters such as nominations and leadership, political parties make the decisions about who gets to participate.¹⁶⁴

161 Elections Canada, *Meeting New Challenges: Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 43rd and 44th General Elections*, 7 June 2022.

162 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1115 (Perrault). Elections Canada, *Meeting New Challenges: Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 43rd and 44th General Elections*, 7 June 2022; Elections Canada, *Protecting Against Threats to the Electoral Process*, 1 November 2024.

163 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 8, 23 October 2025, 1145 (Perrault); Elections Canada, *Protecting Against Threats to the Electoral Process*, 1 November 2024.

164 PROC, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 45th Parliament, Meeting 5, 7 October 2025, 1205 (Turnbull).



DISCUSSION

The LBC's participation, in targeted ridings, during recent federal elections have raised questions about the desirability and propriety of their actions.

Witnesses who appeared before PROC during its study shared their views on the questions and concerns that they hold about the LBC's actions. On the one hand, the LBC holds concerns about members of the House being in an inherent conflict of interest for creating federal electoral laws. On the other hand, electoral officials and political observers hold concerns about the effect of the LBC's actions on the outcome of the vote, the propriety of the LBC's methods, the impact on voting accessibility, and the overall result on trust and credibility of the electoral system.

The majority of witnesses recommended legislative changes be enacted to limit the ability of organized groups, such as the LBC, to engage in similar tactics in the future.

Under the CEA's current provisions, the practice of collecting signatures on a candidate's nomination paper, prior to identifying a prospective candidate, is not technically illegal.

However, the purpose of having a candidate collect a required number of signatures of qualified electors is to demonstrate that the candidate commands at least a basic level of endorsement from those residents in the riding. Further, compliance with a baseline set of reasonable, accessible, mandatory requirements demonstrates a person's seriousness in participating in the electoral process which is, by its own nature, competitive.

As such, PROC cannot help but consider that the practice of gathering endorsement signatures in support an unnamed candidate runs contrary to the spirit of the electoral process and the law. Indeed, it renders meaningless the act of endorsement.

Moreover, in light of the testimony, PROC is convinced that it is necessary to limit an elector's ability to sign multiple nomination papers. The multiplication of signatures by a single individual on dozens, or even hundreds, of nomination papers undermines the value of the legal requirement to collect a certain level of endorsement from electors.

Finally, the CEA currently does not disallow an official agent from being the representative of more than one candidate in the same riding. This allowance seems to run contrary to the very nature of elections, which are competitive contests, with only one candidate declared the winner in every riding. If anything, having the same official agent for two or more candidates who are competing against each other in the same riding places the official agent in an apparent, if not real, conflict of interest.

Therefore, PROC recommends:

Recommendation 1

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to prohibit signing more than one candidate's nomination paper, and that this prohibition be subject to penalties.

Recommendation 2

That Elections Canada add disclaimers to candidate nomination papers which state that it is an offence under the *Canada Elections Act* to sign more than one candidate's nomination paper.

Recommendation 3

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to make it an offence to induce anyone to sign more than one candidate's nomination paper, and that this offence be subject to penalties.

Recommendation 4

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to make it an offence for a candidate to submit false or misleading information on a candidate nomination paper, and that this offence be subject to penalties.

Recommendation 5

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to prohibit individuals from serving as the official agent for more than one candidate per electoral district, and that this prohibition be subject to penalties.

Recommendation 6

That the *Canada Elections Act* be amended to provide for penalties when signatures are obtained on a nomination paper before a candidate has been identified.

Recommendation 7

That prohibitions under the *Canada Elections Act* be expanded to penalize anyone who counsels, engages in a conspiracy, or acts as an accessory after the fact to a violation or an offence in the act.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
CANADA

Recommendation 8

That the Government of Canada introduce a bill before Parliament to enact the Committee's recommendations regarding its concerns about the integrity and accessibility of Canada's elections caused by the activities of the Longest Ballot Committee.

APPENDIX A: LIST OF WITNESSES

The following table lists the witnesses who appeared before the committee at its meetings related to this report. Transcripts of all public meetings related to this report are available on the committee’s [webpage for this study](#).

Organizations and Individuals	Date	Meeting
As an individual	2025/10/7	5
Peter Loewen, Harold Tanner Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Cornell University		
Louis-Philippe Sauvé, Former M.P., LaSalle-Émard-Verdun		
Lori Turnbull, Professor, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University		
Longest Ballot Committee	2025/10/7	5
Tomas Szuchewycz, Official Agent		
As an individual	2025/10/9	6
Holly Ann Garnett, Class of 1965 Professor in Leadership, Royal Military College of Canada		
David Moscrop, Politics Writer		
Jon Pammett, Distinguished Research Professor, Political Science, Carleton University		
Northern Perspective	2025/10/9	6
Ryan Davies		
As an individual	2025/10/21	7
Jean-Pierre Kingsley, Chief Electoral Officer of Canada from 1990 to 2007		
Élections Québec	2025/10/21	7
Jean-François Blanchet, Chief Electoral Officer of Quebec		
Office of the Chief Electoral Officer	2025/10/23	8
Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer		

APPENDIX B: LIST OF BRIEFS

The following is an alphabetical list of organizations and individuals who submitted briefs to the committee related to this report. For more information, please consult the committee's [webpage for this study](#).

Democracy Watch

REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the committee requests that the government table a comprehensive response to this report.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings ([Meetings Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 22 and 24](#)) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Chris Bittle
Chair

It's Time for the Liberal Government to Act

Supplementary Report of the Conservative Party of Canada

This Supplementary Report reflects the views of the Conservative members of Parliament who serve on the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs: Michael Cooper (Vice-Chair, St. Albert—Sturgeon River), Blaine Calkins (Ponoka—Didsbury), Grant Jackson (Brandon—Souris), and Tako Van Popta (Langley—Aldergrove).

Conservatives support the recommendations proposed by the Committee in the report.

It was a Conservative initiative that led to the Committee's study of the actions of the Longest Ballot Committee. In July of 2025, Pierre Poilievre, Leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, jointly with Michael Cooper, Conservative Shadow Minister for Democratic Reform, wrote a letter to The Honourable Steven MacKinnon, the minister responsible for democratic institutions, demanding that the Liberal Government take action to curtail the disruptive actions of the Longest Ballot Committee in recent federal elections across Canada.

On September 18, 2024, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada wrote to the Liberal Government recommending changes to the *Canada Elections Act* that could have addressed the disruptive actions of the Longest Ballot Committee. Unfortunately, the Liberal Government failed to act, and this failure has allowed these disruptive actions to continue.

Conservatives urge the Liberal Government to quickly introduce and pass targeted, focused legislation to prevent the Longest Ballot Committee or similar groups from disrupting any future Canadian federal elections.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael Cooper, M.P.
St. Albert—Sturgeon River

Blaine Calkins, M.P.
Ponoka—Didsbury

Grant Jackson, M.P.
Brandon—Souris

Tako Van Popta, M.P.
Langley Township—Fraser Heights

Supplementary Report PROC Committee on the Longest Ballot

The Bloc Québécois opposes recommendations 1 and 2 of the report, which propose prohibiting voters from signing more than one nomination form. Several witnesses heard during the study warned the Committee about the unintended consequences of such a measure, which, although intended to limit abuses of the democratic system, actually undermines it by assuming that a voter cannot “change their mind” during an election campaign. Furthermore, limiting a voter to a single signature could be interpreted by some as official support for a candidate. Such a perception could give the impression that a voter’s support becomes public and thus undermine, in the minds of some citizens, the principle of the secrecy of the ballot, possibly prompting them to refuse to sign a nomination form.

Louis-Philippe Sauvé, a candidate in Canada’s 45th general election, explained, for example, that he himself had signed “the nomination paper of an opponent [...] In short, the fact remains that everyone should be given a chance. That is a principle of democracy. When I went to see citizens and asked them to sign my petition, I did not ask them to vote for me, but to give me the chance to be a candidate. That is the spirit in which we must proceed. When I saw the people from the Longest Ballot Committee asking for signatures and approaching me, I refused to sign. Citizens must also, in a republican spirit, take responsibility for the signatures and political actions they take.” (PROC, October 7, 2025, 1225) Professor Lori Turnbull also considered it perfectly normal to sign two nomination papers: “if I’m doing that not as part of some grand scam,” she explains, “but because I believe in the viability of the candidacy of these two people, I don’t think that in that case democracy is suffering for that.” (PROC, October 7, 2025, 1210). In short, for these two witnesses, signing more than one nomination form is a thoroughly democratic act in and of itself, unless it is done with the intent to sabotage the electoral system.

From a purely technical standpoint, we also fear that a ban on multiple signatures would simply be unenforceable. Chief Electoral Officer Stéphane Perreault is explicit on this point when he explains that “This leaves little processing time for the returning [nomination papers to the] officer, who must make a decision within 48 hours. The returning officer generally doesn’t have access to the information. The returning officer would need to conduct a comparative review of all nomination papers. If this type of rule were introduced, I imagine that we would need to determine whether, in the event of duplicate signatures, the paper received first would count, or rather the paper signed first. In any case, it wouldn’t be a fair rule for candidates who have no way of really knowing who signed two nomination papers, whether it happened by mistake, and when it happened.” (PROC, October 23, 2025, 1120)

Furthermore, even if multiple signatures were prohibited, there is no indication that such a measure would effectively prevent a very large number of candidates from running, since submitting a ballot signed by voters who have also signed others should not be grounds for disqualifying a candidacy, according to Messrs. Perrault and Kingsley.

The effectiveness and relevance of such a measure therefore rest on the deterrent effect that could result, for example, from imposing a penalty for encouraging someone to sign multiple ballots—an idea contained in the report’s third recommendation and with which we agree.

These testimonies are ambiguous: the unfortunate experience of the Longest Ballot Committee must lead the government to adopt measures to reaffirm the democratic principle as the foundation of the electoral system, and not to undermine democratic diversity by prohibiting multiple signatures. In our view, recommendations 3 through 7 are, moreover, more than sufficient to counter abuses of the electoral system such as those committed by the Longest Ballot Committee. As Professor Peter Loewen said, we must advocate for “a legislative sweet spot that makes it possible for local people who want to run for the sake of running, even if they're not a part of a major party, to get on that ballot by earnestly seeking a large number of signatures, while tailoring the rules not to allow for the monkeying of ballots by allowing, for example, one individual or one group to capture signatures for hundreds of people.” (PROC, October 7, 2025, 1120)

Christine Normandin, Bloc Québécois