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
Standing Committee on International Trade

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Tuesday, October 6, 2026

Chair: Judy A. Sgro



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• (1530)

[English]

The Chair (Hon. Judy A. Sgro (Humber River—Black Creek, Lib.)): I'm calling the meeting to order. This is meeting number 46 of the Standing Committee on International Trade.

Before we get into our work plan for today, I'm going to turn to Mr. Mantle for a minute or two on an issue that we need to resolve.

Jacob Mantle (York—Durham, CPC): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I apologize to our witnesses.

If members of the committee recall, we were discussing a motion that I put on notice back in April with respect to asking for the production of the SIMA handbook, which is the CBSA's policy guide for the Special Import Measures Act. Last year, the CBSA decided to make that document private. It's a document that's essential for the trading community—for customs brokers, counsel and freight forwarders—to understand how the Canadian government operationalized the Special Import Measures Act.

Over the course of the week, I've been in contact with Mr. Naqvi. I'll turn it to him to provide an update on his work.

Madam Chair, we've had some progress, so perhaps we can come back to this issue after our next constituency week.

I'll turn it to Mr. Naqvi. I thank him for his work on this, and I think we'll work collaboratively here to reach a good solution.

The Chair: Mr. Naqvi.

Yasir Naqvi (Ottawa Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I want to thank Mr. Mantle for being persistent on this important issue. I appreciate his patience as well.

As I mentioned to you, I've been in contact with the Minister of Public Safety, and his office has been quite helpful in working with the CBSA to make the document public. My understanding is that the CBSA is working on a process to make the document publicly available. I do not have a specific timeline, as I've communicated to Mr. Mantle, but I understand that the work is happening. We've agreed to touch base again after the Thanksgiving week to get a better understanding of that, but I think we are on a satisfactory path to making that particular document publicly available.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you both for doing such excellent work. We look forward to this issue being resolved after Thanksgiving.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, June 9, 2026, the committee is resuming its study of Canada's clean energy, clean technology and critical mineral exports.

With us today, we have, from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, David Moroz, director general, directorate of security and safeguards; and Pascale Bourassa, director, non-proliferation and export controls.

From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have a witness we see frequently, Sara Wilshaw, senior assistant deputy minister, international trade, and chief trade commissioner of Canada; and Jay Allen, director general, trade negotiations.

From the Department of Natural Resources, we have Isabella Chan, senior assistant deputy minister, lands and minerals sector; and Drew Leyburne, assistant deputy minister, energy systems sector.

That's quite a group. Welcome to you all.

I need to remind you, witnesses, that committee members may ask questions in French or English. If you will need interpretation, which I doubt you will, please take a moment now to prepare your earpiece and select the listening channel you need in advance.

We will start with opening remarks and then proceed with rounds of questions.

Ms. Wilshaw, I understand that you will be giving the opening remarks for the group, so the floor is yours.

• (1535)

[Translation]

Sara Wilshaw (Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, International Trade and Chief Trade Commissioner of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Standing Committee on International Trade on its study on Canada's clean energy, clean technology and critical mineral exports.

I'm joined today by my colleagues from Natural Resources Canada, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and Global Affairs Canada. They look forward to contributing to the discussion and answering questions from committee members.

[English]

Canada is exceptionally well positioned to benefit from the growing global demand for clean energy, clean technologies and critical minerals. Countries around the world are seeking reliable partners to strengthen energy security, diversify supply chains and support economic growth. Canada offers a unique combination of abundant natural resources, world-class expertise, strong environmental and regulatory standards, and a highly skilled workforce. These sectors are already important contributors to Canada's economic prosperity and trade performance.

Canada's minerals and metals sector exported approximately 162 billion dollars' worth in 2025, representing roughly 22% of Canada's merchandise exports. Canada is also the world's second-largest producer and exporter of uranium, with approximately 90% of its production destined for international markets, valued around \$3 billion in 2025.

In addition, Canada is recognized internationally as a trusted supplier of responsibly sourced critical minerals and as a leader in areas ranging from nuclear technology and clean fuels to battery materials, energy storage and advanced clean technologies, including AI applications. As demand continues to grow, Canadian companies are increasingly well positioned to expand their presence in international markets and participate in the supply chains that will underpin the global economy for decades to come.

As Canada's chief trade commissioner, I lead the trade commissioner service. It's a global network of more than 1,000 trade professionals in over 160 cities worldwide. Every day, our teams help Canadian companies identify opportunities, connect with customers and investors, navigate international markets and grow their exports.

[Translation]

We're working in close collaboration with partners throughout the trade and investment ecosystem, including those seated before you and people in organizations at all levels of government, and those who have appeared or who will appear before committee in the course of this study. Our work directly contributes to supporting employment and growth right across the country.

[English]

As you know, diversification is a central objective of Canada's trade agenda. Canada's extensive network of 15 free trade agreements covering 51 countries provides Canadian businesses with preferential access to markets around the world, representing 61% of global GDP. We are in the midst of one of the most ambitious negotiating agendas in recent memory. These agreements help Canada compete in an increasingly complex global economy by not only creating opportunities for Canadian exporters but also supporting investment, reducing barriers and strengthening Canada's economic relationships with key partners across Europe, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and the Americas.

Such agreements, along with the network of partnerships that Canada is building and strengthening across the globe, also help to attract significant investment into Canada in critical minerals, clean technology, clean fuels, nuclear energy and broader energy value chains. These investments strengthen Canada's industrial capacity and competitiveness. They create high-quality jobs, reinforce North American supply chains and position Canada as a partner of choice for allies and partners seeking secure and reliable sources of energy and critical inputs.

[Translation]

We know we must do more and we must do it more rapidly. Major investments have been made to move projects forward more rapidly, strengthen capacity and attract needed capital.

[English]

The opportunities before Canada are significant. The global demand for clean energy, clean technologies and critical minerals is expected to continue growing, and our objective is to ensure that Canada is well positioned to seize these opportunities by expanding exports, attracting investment, strengthening supply chains and deepening our commercial relationships around the world.

We look forward to discussing these opportunities with the committee and answering your questions. Thank you.

● (1540)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll move on to our committee members.

We'll go to Mr. McKenzie for six minutes, please.

David McKenzie (Calgary Signal Hill, CPC): Thank you, Madam Chair.

First of all, the government makes much of the number of agreements that have been signed. I feel sometimes the references made are a bit misleading. Trade and co-operation agreements are really preliminary.

Mr. Allen, you might be able to enlighten us on some expected time frames to move those agreements from "let's be friends" to "here are some hard data and hard facts around actual trade agreements". What are your priorities in that regard right now?

Jay Allen (Director General, Trade Negotiations, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development): Could I ask for a clarification on the question? Do you mean our existing agreements? Those are quite concrete, and they have built those relationships. Are you talking about the next—

David McKenzie: Not the existing ones. I mean the things that have been signed in the last year and a half in particular—you might appreciate that time frame—and where we expect to get those to full free trade agreements.

Jay Allen: We are negotiating with a number of partners now. As you know, we've recently concluded an agreement with Ecuador and one with Indonesia. Those are in the process of being ratified. We expect those to be ratified in the fullness of time.

We are also negotiating with India, the Philippines and ASEAN, and we're about to launch with Turkey. Those agreements will come to fruition, again, in the fullness of time. We are negotiating three of them—India, the Philippines and ASEAN—with expedited timelines. I can't give you an exact deadline for when they will be done, but we are working on them to bring them to fruition very quickly.

David McKenzie: For Canadians listening at home, and I'm sure there are thousands upon thousands, that's what I'm trying to get to: what your priorities are and when we can expect to see some firm agreements. ASEAN, in particular, has been under way for quite some time.

Jay Allen: I have had the pleasure of being the ASEAN chief negotiator who launched it in 2021. I left for a couple of years and came back. I'm now the chief negotiator again.

It's one that we are working on. We are very, very close. I think it is not a state secret that this is an agreement we want to get finished this year. The Prime Minister has referenced that. The minister has referenced that. It is certainly my goal to get it done this year. The Philippines is in the same boat.

David McKenzie: Thank you very much.

Ms. Wilshaw, you were talking about the trade commissioner service. You know that a great deal of time ago, I was part of that federal civil service.

I wonder if you could talk a bit about our domestic network of trade commissioners and how they're assisting Canadian companies. One of the determinations that have to be made occurs when companies are succeeding domestically but may not have the capacity to be part of our exporting business framework, and when they become ready for export capacity, how that factors into things that the trade commissioner service is otherwise supporting.

Sara Wilshaw: I'm happy to talk about that.

What we had in terms of a domestic network may have been different in your time, but we currently have around 150 trade commissioners stationed across the country. We have six main offices and some satellites making sure that we have coverage across the whole country. Their job is to try to find export-ready Canadian companies.

To your point, that may occur at different times in the life cycle of a company. Some companies are, as they say, born global and are ready to go international even before they have a domestic sale. That occurs from time to time, but most start locally, and we try to find those gems. Really, we're bringing them the opportunities from the international side all the time.

We have folks out in the field. Their job is to find those opportunities, bring them back, match them with Canadian capability and then try to help those Canadian companies take their products and services globally.

It's sometimes a challenge, though, as you say. Oftentimes, it's difficult for folks to find the networks, the financing and the support. That's what we try to do, and that's what our offices across the country are designed to do. We connect people with a “no wrong door” approach and help them find all the supports and services.

There are a lot of people out there in this game who can help support them, such as the regional development agencies. It might be PrairiesCan or ACOA that could give them the support, or provincial authorities or organizations—which are really good at this—like STEP or Québec International. There are lots of players. Included as well are BDC, Business Development Canada; Export Development Canada; and the Canadian Commercial Corporation.

We try to assess their needs and then match them up with the people who can help them get to success the fastest.

● (1545)

David McKenzie: Thank you.

I have a very short time left. I want to ask about nuclear technology. As we take a much closer look again in Canada at nuclear technology, there are choices of technology, like the CANDU reactor and Westinghouse's technology, which I believe has been acquired by Cameco. We might be hearing a bit more about that. Who can tell me what the government's position is on these choices of technology?

Drew Leyburne (Assistant Deputy Minister, Energy Systems Sector, Department of Natural Resources): There are a few places where that question is particularly acute, and the most acute of those in the Canadian setting is obviously Ontario, with its technology decision. They intend to make that in the coming months, and the federal government's position on Ontario's choice is that it is Ontario's choice.

We are involved because of course Canada, the federal Crown, has the IP ownership for CANDU. We are involved on that side of it, ensuring that there is a CANDU design that has a viable path to being selected. Ultimately, it is Ontario's choice, and we're pretty clear on that. It will be up to Ontario to choose.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Madame Lapointe, go ahead.

[Translation]

Linda Lapointe (Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, Lib.): Thank you very much, Madam Speaker.

Welcome to our witnesses. Thank you for joining us today.

Ms. Wilshaw, you just mentioned the “no wrong door” approach. For entrepreneurs listening to us today, I'd like you to explain what you mean by that.

Sara Wilshaw: Thank you for the question.

I meant that if an entrepreneur contacts one of our points of service in Canada and we're unable to assist them at that time, we'll direct them to another point of service. In other words, we'll support them in finding another more appropriate point of service to respond to their initial concerns.

Linda Lapointe: I felt it was important to hear more about that.

My riding is in the Lower Laurentians, north of Montreal, and Quebec has a great deal of expertise in technology and clean energy. Earlier, you mentioned Canada's 51 trade agreements. You also talked about the supply chain. In your opinion, which markets represent the best opportunities for our companies?

Sara Wilshaw: First, I'd say that the U.S. remains the biggest clean technology export market for Canada. Nearly 76% of our exports go to the U.S. However, those exports have declined slightly since 2023, when the figure was closer to 80%.

According to Statistics Canada, the top 10 clean technology export markets for Canada are the U.S., China, India, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, Norway, Germany, South Korea and Mexico. However, a much smaller percentage of our exports goes to these other countries than to the U.S., which therefore remains the most attractive market for most of our exporters.

Linda Lapointe: In your opinion, could the federal government do more to actually help Quebec and Canadian SMEs in exporting to new markets? I wonder if there is anything more we could be doing.

Sara Wilshaw: Naturally, we're doing our best to help them. We're providing financial assistance through programs such as CanExport. We're also working in close collaboration with our partners on this. We have programs such as Team Canada missions. There are also a number of trade missions taking place around the world, in which our missions abroad are involved. Additionally, there are programs such as the advancing international clean technology demonstrations initiative under Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy. This initiative promotes diversification by reducing the risks associated with market entry through the identification and support of pilot projects and demonstrations. It is designed for smaller businesses that are exploring international markets. There are a number of programs and services, then, for businesses.

Naturally, it's always possible to do more and to take more decisive action to speed up market entry, but it also depends on companies' interests. It's always the case: they're very interested in the U.S., but we encourage them every day to diversify their exports.

• (1550)

Linda Lapointe: Do I have any time left, Madam Chair?

[English]

The Chair: You have 57 seconds.

[Translation]

Linda Lapointe: Perfect.

Ms. Chan, when it comes to natural resources, you know that not only Canada but also Quebec has a number of critical minerals. How can we ensure we further process these resources here, in Quebec, before they are exported?

Isabella Chan (Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Lands and Minerals Sector, Department of Natural Resources): Thank you very much for the question.

I'd like to start by underscoring the fact that the challenges involved in further processing these resources here in Canada are multi-faceted.

[English]

First of all, I think there's a capital market challenge here. We're looking at many critical minerals with a lot of price volatility. For many of the project proponents to get to a final investment decision, they need long-term price stability to enter the market. That's challenge number one.

Another challenge related this is processing and the impact, whether it's on social licensing or the environment. We recently did a call for proposals for a copper smelter. Not only are we looking at a western copper smelter in terms of the location and assessing where project proponents could be, but we're also looking at technology. Rather than using the traditional pyrotechnology, we're looking at using hydromet and some of the chemicals.

A third challenge when it comes to doing more processing domestically is the fact that we are competing with a dominant player that has put in export control when it comes to technology exports. I use lithium as the example. Right now, we're—

The Chair: I'm sorry, but I have to interrupt. Members only have five minutes, and the time goes quickly.

Mr. Simard, go ahead, please.

[Translation]

Mario Simard (Jonquière—Hébertville—Pays-des-Bleuets, BQ): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. Wilshaw, this is the first time we've met. I hope I will leave a good impression on you. I'll make sure that's the case.

In your opening remarks, you spoke about the importance of economic diversification. In response to Ms. Lapointe, you also mentioned the importance of the U.S. market for clean technology exports. However, I'd like to hear your thoughts on what I'm about to say, because I'm struggling to follow the government's logic.

Yesterday, I met Ms. Lisa Baiton, the president of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, and I asked her the following question. We export 91% of our crude oil to the U.S. The federal government says we need to invest in oil and gas infrastructure to be more resilient. I wonder how we can be more resilient when we invest in infrastructure largely owned by U.S. interests. In fact, 60% of the major oil companies belong to U.S. interests. We're investing in infrastructure owned by U.S. interests to conduct trade that mostly flows to the U.S. Those oil companies made record profits last year. We estimate this flight of capital to be around \$12 billion annually.

When it comes to economic diversification, are you not looking to reduce oil exports to the U.S.? Do you have any data on this? Do you want to lower this 91% to export more oil to other countries?

Otherwise, I don't get it. Oil is the only product not subject to tariffs. We're investing in oil and gas infrastructure that is mostly owned by Americans. They're the ones making money, which they send back home. I'm having trouble seeing how we benefit from this.

• (1555)

[English]

Sara Wilshaw: Perhaps I can start.

[Translation]

Then I'll turn the floor over to my friends at Natural Resources Canada.

It's absolutely true that the majority of our exports go to the U.S. This is to be expected given our geography, the ease of trade, the agreements we have in place and the partnerships that have been forged over decades, if not centuries. So, there are strong ties, and that won't change much in the coming years. However, it is an absolute priority to diversify our exports and create concrete, real opportunities for exporters across all sectors of our economy, including the oil sector. There are also new markets opening up. This is particularly true for TMX, which began operations one year ago, but also as part of the first phase of the LNG Canada project, which has started exporting to Asia.

Mario Simard: I just want to make sure I understand this correctly. You just said it's true that the majority of our oil exports go to the U.S. You just said that.

When the Prime Minister says we need to invest in the Pacific Link project to export more oil, I understand we'll be exporting more oil to ensure American energy security, but we won't be any more resilient against the U.S. economy. They'll still be the biggest owners of oil companies, and this will still serve their needs.

How will investing \$40 billion in pipeline infrastructure help Canada during a tariff crisis? I can't figure it out.

What the Prime Minister should say when he talks about this is that we're heavily dependent on the U.S. market. Perhaps the best approach is to invest our resources somewhere other than the United States. That's where I see a glaring inconsistency. We're investing in a primary natural resource that goes directly to the U.S. I don't see how we can talk about diversification on that basis.

[English]

Sara Wilshaw: I apologize for speaking in English.

One of the challenges is that we don't have the infrastructure at this moment, as much as we would like, to supply other parts of the world with those resources. That's the challenge.

[Translation]

Mario Simard: Excellent.

Now I'll come back to my first question. Do you have any figures on this? Are you able to provide the committee with analyses showing that, by 2030, we aim to reduce exports to the U.S. from 91% to 75% and increase our exports to Europe, Asia or wherever? Do any government analyses make this calculation or provide this evidence?

Otherwise, it's just smoke and mirrors: we're going to pay for a pipeline that will keep us dependent on the U.S.

[English]

The Chair: I don't know how to ask for a short answer to a long question, but it's an important question. You have three seconds remaining in your time. Please take the time you need, but be as brief as you can.

Drew Leyburne: First of all, it's not governments that decide where the oil goes. In investing in the Pacific link, we are buying option value so we can make a choice. Producers and shippers can make a choice about where their product goes, a choice that is currently much constrained by the capacity of the infrastructure we have now. That's what we're buying here. We're buying the ability to, over time, diversify when it makes sense.

Yes, these pipelines can send oil anywhere. One of the advantages of the Pacific link is that it can avoid places like the Strait of Hormuz in getting to major Asian markets, for example. That's why there is a legitimate interest, both on the buyer's side outside of the U.S. and for Canada, in buying this option value in the form of this pipeline.

• (1600)

The Chair: Well done. Thank you very much.

Mr. Au, go ahead.

Chak Au (Richmond Centre—Marpole, CPC): Thank you very much.

I have some questions about the free trade agreements. I was in Southeast Asia this summer visiting several countries and trying to learn about our trade expansion. I also attended the CPTPP senior officials' dialogue in Vietnam.

They talked a lot about free trade agreements. However, I also learned that very often, those free trade agreements are not necessarily implemented. That means they need to get approval from their own countries in order to be executed. I was also told that very often, there were non-free trade agreements being brought forward in the process of approving those agreements. Each country may set out some non-free trade agreements in the process.

You mentioned the over 50 free trade agreements that Canada has entered into. How many of those have actually been implemented in the sense that both countries have already approved them?

Jay Allen: Canada has 15 FTAs in place that are approved and fully implemented. Those are all the FTAs we have negotiated.

I'm curious about which partners it was that you heard have not implemented them. I know, for example, it has taken some of the ASEAN countries longer to implement some of their FTAs, but all of the bilateral FTAs that Canada has negotiated so far have been implemented by both sides.

Chak Au: Do you know if Indonesia has approved the FTA or not?

Jay Allen: Indonesia is completing its domestic process. We expect and hope that it will be done this year.

Chak Au: It's not yet approved.

Jay Allen: That's right. It was just negotiated.

It takes time. There's always a domestic process to ratify these things. In Canada, for example, we have to pass legislation in Parliament. Other countries have to do the same. Indonesia is taking all the steps it needs in order to ratify and implement it.

Chak Au: Exactly. This is my question.

Out of the 50-something free trade agreements, how many of those have already gone through the approval process in both countries?

Jay Allen: There are 15 that Canada has that are in place. We've completed agreements with the U.A.E., Ecuador and Indonesia. All of those still have to go through both the Canadian and foreign ratification processes. Those three were completed very recently. They're all in various stages of being implemented.

Canada has passed the necessary legislation to bring Indonesia into force. We're waiting for Indonesia to bring it in, and we expect that will happen this year. We have three out there that have not yet been ratified by both sides because they've just been negotiated.

Chak Au: When was the last one approved?

Jay Allen: When was the last one...?

Chak Au: You said there are three remaining. When was the last one fully implemented?

Jay Allen: When was the last FTA that was fully implemented with Canada? I would have to get back to you on that. It was probably the Canada-U.K. TCA. That would have been just after Brexit. I don't have an exact date on that.

Chak Au: What I'm trying to say is that having an FTA is good, but it doesn't mean that we are really benefiting from FTAs, for now.

Jay Allen: To be clear, every one that we have negotiated has been implemented. We have three that are in the process of being implemented because they have very recently been negotiated. U.A.E. was concluded just two months ago, Indonesia was concluded earlier this year and Ecuador was at the very beginning of the year, so we're still within the year. It takes a while for these processes to take place.

The Chair: Fifty seconds remain, sir.

Chak Au: Okay. I'll give them up.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Ehsassi, go ahead, please.

• (1605)

Hon. Ali Ehsassi (Willowdale, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Perhaps I'll ask a question of Mr. Moroz.

Mr. Moroz, you are the director general of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, which, of course, is an independent nuclear regulator. As I understand it, when it comes to the export of nuclear material or devices, your organization is responsible for putting in safeguards and guardrails to make sure they are used appropriately. Could you unpack for us what that process is like and what some of the provisions of those agreements would be?

David Moroz (Director General, Directorate of Security and Safeguards, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission): The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, as its role, has to implement Canada's international obligations with respect to non-proliferation. I think a lot of what you're talking about gets into the world of non-proliferation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in particular, but there is also the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which apply to the security of nuclear materials and other codes of conduct that apply internationally.

Hon. Ali Ehsassi: I'm talking about the obligations. What are some of the provisions? I assume that some people might be interested in this particular issue. I'm trying to give you the opportunity to set them at ease by saying that we are fully complying and that these provisions actually have teeth.

David Moroz: The international obligations are the baseline, but we review every nuclear export against the set criteria. Those involve looking at the recipient, the foreign regulatory body and the stated end use, and checking to make sure that it's going to be used peacefully and is going to meet security requirements and safety requirements in the destination country.

Hon. Ali Ehsassi: How do you enforce these great objectives that you are discussing? Could you give us a few examples, just to familiarize everyone with this?

David Moroz: We have bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements, which we work on with Global Affairs Canada. It sets the government-to-government legal treaty level framework with potential bilateral partners. Underneath that, the CNSC concludes administrative arrangements, which tell the two governments, the responsible parties and usually the CNSC in Canada, with the regulator in the foreign country, how they're going to work in terms of notifications of exports, notifications of receipts, annual reports, etc.

In terms of our work within Canada, we also work across government with other government departments on the permitting process for a particular application, ensuring that it is aligned. We use all sources of information available within the Government of Canada.

Hon. Ali Ehsassi: Is any inspection work done just to make sure?

David Moroz: We have follow-up and compliance activities. We have inspections. We have desktop reviews. We will also follow up with CBSA at the border, for example. From time to time, the Canada Border Services Agency detains an export or import and comes to us for an inquiry, and then we have our own graduated enforcement within that. That could be anything from a letter to a revocation of export privileges for certain types of activities to monetary penalties.

Hon. Ali Ehsassi: Thank you.

I'm not quite sure whether you're the right person for me to ask about SMRs. As a country, we've been talking about SMRs for quite a few years now. What does the global industry look like, and who would some of the other producers be?

Does that go to Ms. Chan? Is that correct?

Drew Leyburne: I can jump in on this one.

Hon. Ali Ehsassi: Could you give us a sense of the global landscape and who our competition would be?

Drew Leyburne: Canada is not just talking about SMRs; it's actually the first country in the G7 to be building one, at Darlington. It is a model that.... I'm sorry. Maybe I'll start with this: The number of SMR producers around the world is changing quite a bit. There are more SMR producers than there are large reactor producers. The technology we're using in Ontario may or may not be applicable in another province in Canada that might want to use small modular reactors for other purposes.

Canada is not yet an SMR producer. We are an SMR builder, and we are learning a lot. Ontario Power Generation is becoming a world expert on how to build SMRs and is already exporting that expertise around the world.

We could certainly follow up with a list of the SMR producers around the world. I don't think I could catalogue them for you because there are quite a few.

• (1610)

Hon. Ali Ehsassi: You talked about timelines as to when we're going to be producing. How are other countries faring with respect to those timelines?

The Chair: Could you give us a brief answer, please?

Drew Leyburne: There are only a handful of SMRs built and operating around the world. When I talk about a handful, it's fewer than five. As I said, we would be the first in the G7. There are a number of others that are likely to come on in or around the same time, in the early 2030s.

A decade from now, we'll have a much better and more exact picture of the success rate, but the interest in SMRs continues to grow.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Simard, go ahead, please.

[Translation]

Mario Simard: Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Ms. Wilshaw, one of the government's initiatives to diversify the Canadian economy was the well-known 2026 Canadian Investment Summit. Were you involved in planning that summit?

Sara Wilshaw: I was in Toronto but not in the room where the conference was held.

Mario Simard: Let me be more specific—sorry.

When I looked at the booklet that was distributed to participants, there were 180 projects listed in it, including projects related to critical minerals. I found that a bit surprising because, out of those 180 projects, only 20 were from Quebec. So, considering our population size, there's a clear disparity.

What bothered me even more was that I'd been closely following the phosphate issue when it was added to the list of critical minerals. We did that work with the government, and I'm very grateful for that. However, the only phosphate project that appeared on the list was the one in British Columbia. As anyone familiar with the subject knows, that is sedimentary phosphate, not igneous phosphate. There is an important distinction to be made here. Sedimentary phosphate produces radioactive tailings. It's a bit less appealing to people than igneous phosphate. Furthermore, the most advanced projects are in Quebec. First Phosphate and Arianne Phosphate are the most advanced projects. Why, in the report, were the phosphate projects from Quebec—which are advantageous and already have European partners—not included, while the project in B.C., which is the least advanced, has no European partners, and is the least likely to get off the ground in the short term, was included?

So, I don't know whether you were involved in this, but clearly, in my humble opinion, someone who wasn't very familiar with the phosphate sector insisted on including the project in B.C.

Sara Wilshaw: I can't answer that question because Global Affairs Canada didn't compile the list that became the prospectus distributed to investors.

Mario Simard: Thank you for your response. What I want to know is this: What was the government's basis for this decision? It was supposed to be the largest initiative aimed at attracting European and foreign investors. However, you're telling me that the department with the most expertise wasn't involved. That's quite surprising, to say the least.

Sara Wilshaw: Invest in Canada was tasked with compiling the list of these projects. I believe—though this is something that might need to be confirmed—this organization asked the entire country, including the provinces, to provide lists of projects they wanted to present to investors. I'm not sure then that I can say exactly how this prospectus was produced.

Mario Simard: Thank you very much.

[English]

The Chair: You're almost a minute over, Mr. Simard, but I didn't want to prevent you from trying to get the answer you were looking for.

Mr. Mantle, go ahead.

Jacob Mantle: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing.

Thank you, Ms. Wilshaw, for returning to our committee. My first question is for you.

Last year, the government signed, as we heard, an agreement with the U.A.E. At the same time, there was an announcement about an investment of \$50 billion U.S., or \$70 billion Canadian, by the U.A.E. government. How much of that has been deployed in Canada as of today?

Sara Wilshaw: Unfortunately, I don't have an answer for that.

Jacob Mantle: Would you be able to check and provide a written response to the committee?

• (1615)

Sara Wilshaw: We can do our best to find that information.

Jacob Mantle: Okay. Thank you.

I noted this because when you were at the committee last November, you mentioned that one of the three things you are focused on is FDI in Canada, even though you work with the trade commissioner service and align yourself with the other federal departments to get that money into Canada. To my colleague's questions, we want to ensure that's actually happening, so we look forward to your response.

Please, go ahead.

Sara Wilshaw: Thank you. I'm sorry to interrupt.

If I might add, several major investors came in for the Canada investment summit from the U.A.E., including some of the government representatives and heads of state-owned enterprises—their pension fund equivalent or sovereign wealth fund. They were here, so I know there is a great deal of interest in where they can invest the money they committed to bringing into Canada.

Jacob Mantle: Thank you for that.

I understand that public reporting at the time was that Canada said that we are not ready for their investment, so we want to follow up and make sure that that does take place.

To my friends at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, I presume that the CNSC was involved in or consulted on Canada's nuclear energy strategy, which was recently released. Is that correct?

David Moroz: It's not our strategy, but yes, we were consulted.

Jacob Mantle: Understandably, it's the government's strategy, but I assume you would have been consulted.

Natural Resources, were you consulted as well?

Drew Leyburne: Yes. It was my part of Natural Resources Canada that wrote the strategy.

Jacob Mantle: That's excellent.

Then maybe you can help me, Mr. Leyburne. Were other government departments involved in providing input into or strategizing on that document?

Drew Leyburne: Yes, we reached out across the federal family. I would say that probably about a dozen departments and agencies across the federal family were most directly implicated.

Jacob Mantle: You don't have to name all 12, but can you give me some examples of those?

Drew Leyburne: A few of them are at the table here, of course. There was Health Canada on the isotope side, Environment Canada on the interface with electricity regulations, Public Safety on issues related to nuclear facilities, all of the regional development agencies, and the industry department, ISED, on fusion and other technology plays. That probably gets me close to the dozen. There was also National Defence, which is engaging in a microreactor project.

Jacob Mantle: How about the Prime Minister's Office?

Drew Leyburne: The Prime Minister's Office, yes. The Prime Minister, no.

Jacob Mantle: What do you mean by that?

Drew Leyburne: The nuclear file is subject to the Prime Minister's conflict of interest provisions. There were very stringent measures put in place to ensure that any decisions taken on a nuclear strategy were taken outside of... The PM himself was not involved.

Jacob Mantle: Can you describe those measures that you took for us, please?

Drew Leyburne: Mostly, that's managed through the Privy Council Office. The general conflict of interest regime involves proxies, not of the Prime Minister, but people who represent the Prime Minister and take decisions as an alternate to him on certain files.

It varies depending on the file, but the indication we got as we went through the process was that the Prime Minister found out about the content of the strategy at the same time as the public did.

The Chair: There are 24 seconds remaining.

Jacob Mantle: I have one last question, then.

You're probably aware that in the next panel, we have two Canadian companies that work in this area. My understanding is that both of those companies, Westinghouse and Cameco, would require authorizations from CNSC or Natural Resources to operate certain of their activities in Canada, whether that's mining, milling or refining. Is that right? Those companies are dependent on authorizations from your organization, CNSC, or Natural Resources. Do I have that correct?

The Chair: Give a brief answer, please.

David Moroz: To be clear, I'm here for export controls, which is within my area, but yes, CNSC does license nuclear activities and facilities in Canada such as the ones you're talking about.

Drew Leyburne: Could I add to that, Chair?

The Chair: Yes.

Drew Leyburne: NRCan is not a regulator itself for nuclear, but we have a number of policies, including the non-resident ownership policy and others, that influence how the market operates.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Fonseca, please go ahead for five minutes.

• (1620)

Peter Fonseca (Mississauga East—Cooksville, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses.

Welcome back, Ms. Wilshaw.

My question is about the strategic exports office, which we established this past July. This new initiative strengthens the team Canada approach in securing some international commercial opportunities. Can you take us through how it would work and how it is used? We're looking at possible opportunities in nuclear with Poland and Turkey. In that realm, how would this office help in terms of securing those commercial agreements?

Sara Wilshaw: I'm happy to talk about that.

The strategic exports office is an idea that starts with some of the areas where we have not been as focused as a government on proactively promoting exports around the world. They require a whole-of-government wraparound approach.

Nuclear is a really great example. Defence is another great example, where it's often that you're doing a B2G, with a Canadian company or exporter trying to sell to a foreign government. In order to do that, you might need a government-to-government agreement, like a nuclear co-operation agreement, to be in place. Therefore, the government has to be involved. You might need a sovereign-backed guarantee of performance, so the Canadian Commercial Corporation might be an appropriate party to bring into that kind of an export. You might need financing, so Export Development Canada might need to be part of that. You might absolutely need advocacy from our embassies, consulates general and high commissions around the world, which are on the ground and engaged with the ministries, which may be required for permits on the other side, for understanding the local environment or for just having the bilateral engagement already established.

Having a place in Canada with our team of trade commissioners and within the trade department.... It's really great to have a focal point to bring all of that together and then to also coordinate activities among the key players. We establish really close relationships with the key players and companies but also with our partners in the federal family and with the provinces that might be involved in those activities.

It's really about having a hub and a coordination office that can lead on what I call strategic exports.

Peter Fonseca: Thank you.

The United States excluded critical minerals from its 50% broad tariffs. What does that demonstrate in terms of the strategic importance of our critical minerals?

I don't know if that would go to Ms. Chan—would you like to answer that?—or Mr. Leyburne.

Isabella Chan: To answer this question, we need to understand what we're facing in terms of the global market when it comes to critical minerals. We have one dominant country that is willing to use its critical minerals dominance in some of its trade tools. As such, many of our allied countries are facing export controls and, in some cases in previous years, export bans.

Critical minerals are definitely an important export for Canada. They play an important role not only for the U.S. but for other allied countries as well.

Peter Fonseca: This is also on critical minerals. What are the biggest remaining barriers to getting Canada's critical mineral projects into production, and what can the federal government do about that?

Isabella Chan: As I noted earlier, one of the key things is the lack of capital, or the fact that the capital market still looks at critical minerals from a risk-based lens because many of the capital investment firms still have to make a return.

How can government tools help de-risk some of these projects? That's why the government announced the critical minerals accelerator, a \$2-billion fund that is supposed to catalyze private capital into bringing some of these critical minerals projects online.

Peter Fonseca: How about our ports and our trade infrastructure? Would they also be a barrier right now? Once we've mined those critical minerals, would we need investments in our ports in order to diversify and get them out to those markets?

Isabella Chan: That's precisely why the government announced the \$1.5-billion first and last mile fund. The target there is to build the infrastructure needed not only for our exports but also for our domestic capabilities.

• (1625)

Peter Fonseca: Do I have time for a final one, or no?

The Chair: You have 12 seconds.

Peter Fonseca: What does success look like for us in the next five years in critical minerals with respect to jobs, exports and investment? What do you see?

Isabella Chan: I would say we already have some successes. Since October 2025, we have announced 69 different transactions and partnerships under the G7 critical minerals resilience and production alliance, which was launched under Canada's G7 presidency. That is a proof of concept as to how G7 allies can work together to support the critical minerals market.

Peter Fonseca: Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Thank you to our valuable witnesses. That was very informative and very much appreciated.

We will suspend for a moment while our other panel comes in and this panel exits.

• (1625)

(Pause)

• (1630)

The Chair: Welcome back.

In this section, we have with us, as an individual, Jeff Mahon, director, geopolitical and international business advisory. From Cameco Corporation, we have Dale Austin, managing director, government relations. From Westinghouse Electric, we have John Gorman, president, Westinghouse Canada.

You all know to have your earpiece on and ready so that when someone is speaking in French, you don't lose time understanding what's being said.

Welcome to you all.

We will start with opening statements of up to five minutes.

Mr. Mahon, you have the floor.

Jeff Mahon (Director, Geopolitical and International Business Advisory, As an Individual): Thank you for the invitation to speak today. It is an honour to be here.

My statement will outline some general thoughts on the adequacy of existing international trade and investment frameworks and will offer some specific observations on the sectors included in your study. The key take-away is that Canada should pursue novel forms of sector-specific trade agreements.

Geopolitics, climate change and technological revolutions have converged with global demographic and development dynamics to create a contested and highly competitive international trade environment. While this can be a cause for crisis, I see the promise of opportunity.

Canada is in a unique position to compete and partner to meet global demand, all while advancing economic development and industrial upgrading at home. To achieve this, Canada must rethink

its international trade policy, its objectives, and the tools used to pursue them.

First, our trade policy should have as its primary objective delivering economic growth through catalyzing and sustaining productive investment and jobs. This seems obvious, but my personal observation is that trade policy, like any policy program, can be subject to inertia that biases traditional practices rather than pursues innovative mechanisms designed to meet changing circumstances.

Canada should thus pursue novel forms of sector-specific or even mega-project-specific compacts or agreements. This is in contrast to the incumbent approach of having comprehensive agreements. While these have their place and have undeniable advantages, sectoral deals can focus attention and capitalize on the salient interests of the partners needed to secure the political will and bureaucratic expertise to make fast and meaningful adjustments that create new markets. Key to success will be targeting countries that have demand for Canadian technology, products, components or services.

As this study's emphasis is on Indo-Pacific partners, Africa and emerging markets, we must recognize that these partners, which are often less developed than Canada, are also looking to advance economic growth and industrial upgrading. Canada should be responsive to these needs and should differentiate itself by offering a comprehensive value proposition.

Sector-specific agreements could be designed to foster mutually beneficial and long-term partnerships with these markets so that while the sector focus may be narrow, the ambition would be deep. For example, sector agreements could cover tariff schedules, regulations, standards, R and D, technology transfer, joint venture rules, labour mobility and trade financing. The goal must be to construct a space for Canadian companies to seamlessly participate in targeted supply chains. The establishment of regulatory working groups mandated to continuously identify and address barriers of mutual concern should also be included.

I will now turn to some specific topical observations, as per the study's focus.

On the clean economy, I'd like to begin with the term "clean economy", which includes clean electricity. I submit that I do not know how this committee defines what is inside or outside this category, so please pardon me if my statement is redundant.

It is imperative that Canada include liquefied natural gas under the headings “clean economy” and “clean electricity”. While the production and use of LNG emit carbon and would by extension add to Canada's per capita emissions, LNG is sought after by the emerging markets targeted in this study. Many of these countries currently utilize coal to meet their rapidly growing energy needs.

These countries see LNG as critical to their future energy stack. Displacing coal with LNG will contribute to improving global trend emissions. Canada should do everything it can to ensure that these countries use Canadian LNG.

On nuclear technology, I note that Canada's recent nuclear strategy has placed an emphasis on CANDU reactors, which has part of its basis in expanding exports of Canadian-developed technology. This is an admirable goal and one that could contribute to value-added exports. However, in advancing the primary objective of economic growth, we should not lose sight of the role that foreign investment and partnerships can play in transferring technology, knowledge and know-how, which also builds Canadian industrial capacity.

Small modular reactor rollout in Canada is still in early stages. Continued SMR rollout has the potential to boost Canadian capacity, which would support Canadian firms' participation in global SMR supply chains and projects.

Finally, I'll turn to critical minerals processing. Critical minerals as a concept are a product of geopolitical tensions and the attendant vulnerabilities created from extreme concentration in a single country: China. Canada, which has vast endowments in this space, has some critical minerals processing capacity, but there's much room for growth. However, one constraint, again, is access to technology, knowledge and know-how.

Ironically, while critical minerals have emerged as a policy imperative from geopolitical considerations regarding China's dominance, one potential solution to the processing challenge would be to carefully manage and condition Chinese participation in the building out of Canadian capacity. This could include, via sectoral agreements, encouraging technology transfer mechanisms such as licensing agreements or non-controlling joint ventures with Canadian processors.

• (1635)

This approach would have the added benefit of seeking to use commercial interests to overcome geopolitical tensions by creating the conditions to manage China's engagements in sensitive sectors, rather than a blanket prohibition on all forms of engagement in such sectors. Additionally, China's receptivity to this approach would provide evidence in assessing its commitment to a long-term improvement in bilateral relations based on fostering mutual trust.

Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Austin, you have up to five minutes.

• (1640)

Dale Austin (Managing Director, Government Relations, Cameco Corporation): Madam Chair, good afternoon. It is my pleasure to appear at committee today on behalf of Cameco.

Canada's nuclear sector assets are strategic export assets. Nuclear energy can be the cornerstone of long-term economic growth, energy security and geopolitical influence. Canada has a rare opportunity to capitalize on the export readiness of its nuclear technologies and expertise and the significant role that our nuclear energy and nuclear fuel supply chains play in delivering secure, stable and clean nuclear energy around the world.

Cameco plays a very large role in every element of the global nuclear energy supply chain. We're a fully integrated nuclear company headquartered in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Electrical utilities in Canada and around the world rely on Cameco to provide uranium, nuclear fuel, and reactor technologies to generate nuclear power.

Cameco's portfolio capitalizes on opportunities that move beyond raw material supply to higher value-added production. Our raw material supply begins with uranium exploration and mining, the majority of which we do in Saskatchewan's Athabasca basin, home of the world's highest-grade uranium deposits. From there, Cameco's capabilities include every value-added component of the nuclear fuel supply chain: uranium refining, conversion and nuclear fuel fabrication.

Cameco is a world leader in turning uranium into nuclear fuel. Our heavy water and light water fuel fabrication facilities produce nuclear fuel bundles that are used in 65% of the western world's nuclear reactors. We also have advanced uranium enrichment technology in our portfolio.

Canada should maximize these nuclear fuel advantages to play a leadership role in enhancing global energy security. A secure nuclear fuel cycle, backstopped by a reliable nation like Canada and operated by a reliable commercial partner like Cameco, is of strategic importance for our allies and trading partners.

Cameco's position as a global leader in the nuclear sector does not end with nuclear fuel. We also own and control the world's leading, fully designed and operating light water nuclear reactor, the AP1000, through our partnership in Westinghouse with Brookfield.

Taken together, Cameco's capabilities deliver exactly what this committee is studying: clean electricity and critical minerals processing that advance Canada's position in secure, resilient and value-added global supply chains. If leveraged appropriately, Cameco's unique portfolio of assets can position Canada to deliver clean and stable baseload power around the world; a secure, allied nuclear fuel supply; a stronger, more resilient domestic supply chain with exportable nuclear capabilities; and strengthened energy and national security.

Increasingly, the critical mineral that international markets are looking to buy is Canadian uranium. Uranium is a unique, highly trade-dependent critical mineral with no substitute. Nuclear reactors cannot operate without it. Canada is the second-largest uranium producer in the world, and Cameco's licensed production annually is 30 million pounds, of which only about 10% is used domestically, as you heard Madam Wilshaw explain earlier. Ninety per cent is exported globally.

The global need for Canada's uranium resources offers significant diplomatic and energy security leverage. That leverage continues to increase as international buyers prioritize stable, rule-of-law jurisdictions like Canada to insulate their supply chains from geopolitical volatility. Nuclear power plants can be constructed anywhere; uranium mining can only occur where there are rich deposits.

At the other end of the nuclear value chain, the export opportunities are even greater. For Canada, the Cameco-owned AP1000 reactor offers clear strategic advantages over relying exclusively on CANDU technology. Diversifying Canada's nuclear sector by deploying the Cameco-owned AP1000 would deliver enhanced national and energy security and provide global supply chain opportunities, trade expansion and diversification.

CANDU remains an important Canadian asset, but adding the AP1000 would diversify Canada's reactor capabilities, strengthen the domestic supply chain and position the country to compete in the largest segment of the global nuclear reactor market, making it the strongest platform for Canada's next phase of growth. Market diversification, supply chain resilience, economic growth, and enhanced energy and national security at home and for our allies will be built on the strengths of the Canadian nuclear industry, technology diversification and the global reach of the AP1000 technology.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Austin.

Mr. Gorman, please go ahead.

• (1645)

John Gorman (President, Westinghouse Canada, Westinghouse Electric Company): Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee.

I am John Gorman, president of Westinghouse Canada. On behalf of my Canadian team and our Canadian owners, Cameco and Brookfield, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you.

You've just heard from my colleague Dale Austin about the front end of Canada's nuclear advantage. I'd like to speak about the other end of that value chain: the reactor itself. My message, I hope, is quite simple. We have the opportunity right now to pair our current

Canadian strengths with modern reactor technology that is proven, operating and ready to deploy.

The AP1000 is a technology that can help Canada meet its clean energy needs, create Canadian jobs, open global markets to Canadian suppliers and strengthen one of Canada's most strategic industries. Your study focuses on export readiness, secure supply chains and priority markets. The AP1000 speaks directly to all three.

In regard to readiness, the AP1000 is not a first-of-a-kind concept. It's a fully developed reactor. We have six units operating right now, 14 under construction and more than 90 under evaluation in markets around the world. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has completed phase two of the vendor design review and has identified no fundamental barriers to licensing the AP1000 in Canada. In nuclear energy, readiness matters, and the AP1000 is ready to deliver.

On jobs and economic growth, independent analysis by PricewaterhouseCoopers found that a four-unit AP1000 project in Ontario would support approximately 125,000 person years of employment, contribute \$28.7 billion to GDP during the construction alone and generate \$7.8 billion in tax revenues. These are not only construction jobs, I want to point out. These are manufacturing jobs, engineering jobs, skilled trades jobs and long-term careers that strengthen Canada's industrial base.

Our commitment is simple. It's to buy where we build. Over the life of the project, we have committed that more than 90% of procurement spending will remain in Canada.

Similarly, as an export opportunity, 90% of the existing nuclear fleet is light water reactors like the AP1000. This is an important point. Only 5% of the market, or a bit less, is composed of heavy water reactors; 90% are light water reactors. In fact, Westinghouse technology operates in more than half of those reactors. You heard my colleague Dale say that Cameco supplies uranium fuel to over 65% of the world's reactors. Westinghouse, which it owns, has its technology in over 50% of the world's reactors. You can see what a powerful combination that is and what sort of reach that could provide to the Canadian nuclear sector.

When a Canadian company qualifies to supply an AP1000 project, it gains access not only to the work in Canada, but also to opportunities around the world. A Canadian AP1000 program would not simply build reactors here. It would help Canadian companies to participate in a growing global market and expand the reach of a diversified nuclear supply chain for decades. That's exactly the kind of higher value-added export opportunity this committee is examining.

Finally, on Canada's strategic advantage, we are in such a strong position, as you've heard today. We already have what most countries are trying to establish: proven technologies. Just imagine that—two large technologies in a global industry that's burgeoning right now. We have the skilled workforce, a world-class supply chain, uranium in the ground and a regulator that is respected around the world. Through Cameco's ownership of Westinghouse, those strengths are connected in a uniquely Canadian platform, from mine to fuel to the reactor. At a time when countries are seeking secure and trusted supply chains, that is a very important Canadian advantage.

• (1650)

In closing, an energy ecosystem is more than one company or one technology. We know that. It involves jobs, apprenticeships, trades and thousands of suppliers, fabricators and engineers who turn one project into a robust, sustainable industry. Each player in this industry has a different role and interest, yet we all share one goal: to power our economy, create jobs in a supply chain here at home and export that capability around the world. That is how energy policy becomes economic independence.

It is also why Canada should see its nuclear capabilities as a portfolio of strengths. We can sustain and build on our proud CANDU legacy while advancing a proven Canadian-owned AP1000 platform for the large-scale projects where readiness, output and delivery certainty matter most. That is not simply an energy opportunity. It's a Canadian trade opportunity.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Mantle, go ahead, please, for six minutes.

Jacob Mantle: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing.

I extend a special welcome to two great Canadian companies. One, of course, is a long-time Canadian company, and there's a new addition with Westinghouse.

I have a few questions about your agreement with the U.S. government.

I understand that in October of last year, the U.S. government, Brookfield and Cameco entered into an arrangement whereby the U.S. agreed to finance and assist with permitting and approvals for at least \$80 billion in new Westinghouse reactors, primarily the AP1000. Is that correct?

John Gorman: That's correct.

Jacob Mantle: Now, I understand that if that deployment proceeds and the U.S.'s participation interest vests, then the U.S. gov-

ernment is entitled to 20% of Westinghouse's distributions above a \$17.5-billion threshold. After that, if Westinghouse's value exceeds \$30 billion by January 2029, the U.S. government can require an initial public offering and convert its interest to a 20% equity stake. Is that correct?

Dale Austin: That's almost correct.

First off, all of those conditions you outlined have to be met in order for those interests to vest. Should an IPO occur, it will likely not be at 20%. It will be at some number less than that. It will not be a 20% interest. That 20% interest is simply an equity interest in Westinghouse. It does not come with any controlling interest or board seats.

Jacob Mantle: Okay. Thank you for that clarification, Mr. Austin.

Is it fair to say that Cameco and Westinghouse want the deployment to succeed? You want to sell more AP1000 reactors in the United States, and that will increase Westinghouse's value. Is that a fair assessment? You want this agreement to work.

Dale Austin: I would say it's a fair assessment that we would like to sell AP1000s in as many markets around the world as we can.

Jacob Mantle: That's fair enough.

Now, Brookfield, the other partner with respect to the purchase of Westinghouse, has confirmed publicly that its Westinghouse stake sits in its global transition fund I and that the fund's former co-head retains carried interest on the success of that fund. Would a successful U.S. deployment of these new reactors, the AP1000s, across the U.S. increase the value of Westinghouse and consequently the value of that asset in the global transition fund?

Dale Austin: I wouldn't want to speculate on the market outcome of AP1000s. I'll just leave it there.

Jacob Mantle: If Westinghouse is successful with its arrangement with the U.S., will Westinghouse's value increase, yes or no?

Dale Austin: I think that's a fair assumption.

Jacob Mantle: Will the value of Brookfield's asset therefore increase?

Dale Austin: I would say that's likely, yes, but I don't have any knowledge of Brookfield's interests in Westinghouse.

Jacob Mantle: Thank you for that confirmation.

On a slightly different topic, Canada released its nuclear energy strategy just recently. It seemed to be conspicuously silent on the AP1000. I think there was one reference to that technology. As you've pointed out, a large share of the world's nuclear energy is driven by the AP1000. I think the number that was included, or that I saw included, in some of your public disclosures was that 57% of the global fleet of nuclear reactors uses the AP1000 technology.

Do you have a sense of why the government is focused on the CANDU technology rather than the AP1000 technology that you're offering?

• (1655)

John Gorman: First, the nuclear energy strategy was very clear on the point of Westinghouse being a Canadian company with 100% Canadian ownership. It was also quite clear that the trajectory for the export of nuclear technologies would include not only CANDU but also the AP1000, and it spent some time talking about the significant market opportunities that Westinghouse and the AP1000 have.

As I mentioned during my remarks, Mr. Mantle, and as you reiterated, over half of the reactors currently in operation have our technology, and 65% are supplied with fuel by Cameco, so I think we were satisfied with the recognition of those qualities of the Cameco-Westinghouse partnership and its potential for the export market.

Our view, if you don't mind me saying so, is that Canada is in this remarkable position of having two large-scale reactors. Ours opens up 90% of the global market to light water reactors. Why would we not, at this period in time, go after 100%?

Jacob Mantle: Why wasn't there more focus on that?

The Chair: I'm sorry, but your time is up, Mr. Mantle.

Mr. Gorman, you'll have to try to finish that answer after the meeting.

Next is Ms. Acan, please, for six minutes.

Sima Acan (Oakville West, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

As the co-chair of the Liberal nuclear caucus and the electricity caucus, I'm really happy to see you all here today with us.

Mr. Gorman, I'll start by asking some questions of you.

Westinghouse is Canadian-owned through Cameco and Brookfield, although the AP1000 technology and much of its original intellectual property were developed outside of Canada. What specifically makes an international AP1000 sale a Canadian export success?

John Gorman: Thank you for the question. It's such a pivotal question.

Westinghouse is the world's leading nuclear company, and we are in possession—now, Canadian-owned possession—of the most advanced large reactor in the world. Not only is it the most advanced reactor, but it's operating, it's proven and it's ready now. As I said, we have 14 under construction and another 90 that are being built.

What is absolutely key here, in addition to being a Canadian-owned company, is that Canada diversifies its supply chain by

building out the AP1000 at home. We are actually in a position to do that quite rapidly, because Ontario is on the verge of making a decision as to which technologies it builds out. In selecting an AP1000, we will be diversifying our supply chain at a time when the nuclear renaissance is just beginning.

To our mind, it's essential that Canada make the decision now so that we diversify immediately, are ready to go now and can use the Canadian supply chain to participate in our other projects around the world. I think that's the key point.

Sima Acan: How much engineering, manufacturing, life-cycle services and fuel supply would be provided from Canada?

John Gorman: For the AP1000 build-out in Ontario, we've committed to 90-plus per cent of all procurement being done here in Canada. We have over 450 Canadian supply chain companies currently on our list. We have already used the Canadian supply chain in the build-out of AP1000s around the world, and thanks to Export Development Canada, we are placing \$2 billion in business with Canadian suppliers in Poland, so it's quite significant.

I think Dale could speak to the fuel aspect of that.

• (1700)

Dale Austin: I would just add to Mr. Gorman's comments that we fully expect a Canadian fuel supply for AP1000 reactors in Canada as well.

Sima Acan: I was going to ask you about the supply chain. You have signed several memorandums with Canadian suppliers. I was going to ask you how many of those are qualified. You said 450. I understand that you are still developing agreements with Canadian suppliers; it's an ongoing process for you.

Are there any challenges for Canadian nuclear suppliers entering your global supply chain?

John Gorman: I wouldn't say there are challenges, but I'll go back to an important point. By building out an AP1000 here, we truly diversify and deepen our supply chain and enable suppliers to competently participate in over 90% of the build-out here. It's through that exercise that Canada is going to be creating a very strong, diversified supply chain that can compete competitively to help supply the AP1000s that are being built around the world.

I think that's an important point. The Canadian supply chain is strong. It's proven that it can be competitive, and we're very confident that it will be a good part of the AP1000 build-outs globally.

Sima Acan: Cameco's investment in Westinghouse creates an opportunity to connect Canadian uranium and fuel services with the global reactor platform. What Canadian exports and jobs result when Westinghouse secures an AP1000 project in another country?

Mr. Austin, go ahead.

Dale Austin: As John has pointed out, the Canadian supply chain is already actively engaged in AP1000 build-outs around the world, particularly in Poland. We expect that opportunity to increase, as we are deploying AP1000s in multiple countries around the world. That becomes much easier for the Canadian supply chain if it is building AP1000s here in Canada. It builds the skill set and becomes active and engaged in a domestic build program, which then allows it, as John has said, to compete on the global market.

We think the opportunities are immense for AP1000 build-outs around the world. You have heard many times today that light water reactors are already more than 90% of the global market. We expect that trend to continue. We would like for the Canadian supply chain to be building AP1000s here in Canada, and then take that expertise and deploy it around the world.

Sima Acan: Mr. Austin, as we export approximately 90% of our uranium, where can we capture the additional value? Is it through conversion, fuel fabrication, enrichment, reactor technology or life-cycle services?

The Chair: Give a brief answer, if possible.

Dale Austin: Cameco is already capturing the majority of that value through our assets across the fuel cycle.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll go to Mr. Simard, please.

[Translation]

Mario Simard: Thank you.

Mr. Austin and Mr. Gorman, I'd like to get a better understanding of the AP1000 reactor. If we try to calculate the cost per megawatt, what would that be? I'm asking so I can compare it to renewable energy. What might that figure look like? Do you have any idea?

[English]

John Gorman: Yes, and I will use concrete examples. Nuclear power has the second-lowest cost of generation in Ontario right now. As you're likely aware, we have almost all technology generations. We're second only to hydro power here in Ontario.

The unique attribute of nuclear is that there's a high capital cost up front, but then the cost is amortized over a very long period of 60 to 80 or 100 years. It's on that basis that the cost of nuclear power is competitive.

[Translation]

Mario Simard: Yes, you put it very well—the costs need to be spread out over about a hundred years.

Personally, I follow the work of Normand Mousseau at the Trotter Energy Institute, as well as that of other energy experts. When I

see the rapid progress of intermittent energy sources, such as wind and solar power—especially when combined—and advancements in battery technology, I wonder if it makes sense today to invest as much money in nuclear power as Canada seems intent on doing. Nuclear power also involves waste management.

On the other hand, I'm seeing developments coming out of China. Electricity now accounts for 32% of its energy mix, which is enormous for China. I see the very rapid progress it's making. China is flooding the market with electrification technologies.

In 10 or 15 years, won't we be stuck with very expensive technologies, when highly competitive clean technologies will be available at much lower costs? Isn't that a concern you have?

• (1705)

[English]

John Gorman: It is not one of my concerns.

If I could take my Westinghouse hat off for a moment, previous to being the president of Westinghouse Canada, I was the president of the Canadian Nuclear Association for six years and prior to that the head of the Canadian Solar Industries Association. I have a real passion for all non-emitting energy sources.

What I can say very confidently is that electricity systems are at their best when they are balanced with various technologies. The clean, non-emitting baseload power that nuclear creates 24-7 is a vital piece of the infrastructure that enables electricity markets to incorporate more renewables and storage. It's therefore vital that both of these things work together.

I think Canada, as we seek to perhaps triple our energy supply over the next 25 years, is going to be able to benefit from bringing in a lot of clean baseload nuclear, whether it's from small or large reactors, to help ensure that we can also deploy a lot of renewables and storage.

[Translation]

Mario Simard: Thank you very much.

Mr. Mahon, last year, I believe, you co-signed a letter with former Quebec premier Philippe Couillard regarding the trade dispute. I'd like to revisit that, because, as I recall, you addressed the thorny issue of aluminum in that letter.

As you know, Quebec is the largest producer of aluminum in North America. The Americans, for their part, are the largest consumers. Quebec is the largest producer of primary aluminum, and the Americans are heavily dependent on us. They are minor producers of primary aluminum. Yet aluminum is still subject to a 50% tariff.

But there's something even more surprising. The government's stance is that we need to consume more Canadian aluminum, but this fails to take into account the fact that we lack the capacity for secondary processing. To use aluminum, you need a rolling mill. Currently, Quebec does not have a rolling mill capable of meeting its needs.

I don't know whether you've looked into this issue. There's a rather remarkable ecosystem in Canada. We should take advantage of the fact that we're the largest producers of aluminum. Yet we're dependent on the United States when it comes to aluminum consumption.

I'd like to hear your thoughts on this. I don't know whether you have any ideas on the matter.

[English]

Jeff Mahon: Thank you for that question. I will answer in English.

[Translation]

I don't speak French. I'm sorry.

[English]

I apologize.

I am mind-boggled at the U.S. decision to hit Canada, particularly in the aluminum sector given the cost competitiveness that Canada has and that I see as a clear advantage. President Trump says the U.S. subsidized Canada, but clearly, when it comes to the aluminum industry, we're offering a pretty healthy subsidization for their industry. To me, it's certainly mind-boggling that that is the case.

The U.S. is a very important market for both steel and aluminum, largely due to its geographic proximity. Also, at the international level, the steel and aluminum industries are subject to very complex competitive forces that have involved a whole range of non-market tools that have flooded the market and made it so that it could be difficult to figure out what exactly the true price is. That makes it difficult for Canadian companies to compete abroad.

That's also one that—

• (1710)

The Chair: Mr. Mahon, I'm sorry. I know you have the floor, but I have to interrupt to get on to the other members.

Mr. McKenzie, you have five minutes.

David McKenzie: Sir, I'm going to ask you to keep going.

Jeff Mahon: Thank you.

I lost my train of thought. I'll come back to it.

When it comes to non-market practices, the flooding of the global supply situation has impacted Canada's ability to compete. This is one reason for some of the measures we've taken with respect to both China and the United States. I believe that in other, third markets, we also have some tariffs or surtaxes in place to ensure that there's a more level competitive field, or at least to prevent foreign sources from coming in and making Canadian companies unable to compete in the domestic market.

The question, if I recall correctly, was with respect to adding some secondary processing capabilities to advance the value-add or create a new range of products with different HS codes so that Canada might be able to find opportunities to compete abroad in the aluminum sector. I concur that we should be looking at these types of policies.

I personally, unfortunately, do not have any direct recommendations today to offer the committee, but I will certainly take this back to consider some ideas on how that could be dealt with.

David McKenzie: Mr. Mahon, I'd like to ask you about dealing with China and transactional versus the comprehensive value proposition, as I noted down. I don't think you used that specifically in reference to China, but how do you see those two going together?

When we enter into transactions with China, China has a tendency to become a customer of ours and then use that position for leverage. It creates some real challenges. How do you see those things going together?

Jeff Mahon: That's an excellent question, Mr. McKenzie.

When it comes to dealing with China, what we need to do is almost hold the mirror back up to China to reflect the same types of policies that China has used quite successfully to advance its own domestic industrial upgrading. That's why I referenced earlier, in relation to the particular issue of critical minerals processing, that we should carefully manage China's integration, including the technology transfer requirements and minority joint ventures. These are the types of policies that China has engaged in, I would say very successfully, to ensure that it is able to build up industrial capacity through international partnerships. I think it would be very prudent and wise for Canada to recognize that this is the type of approach we should take with China.

To your question about comprehensive versus transactional, my proposal for us to engage in sector-specific agreements allows us to break things down so that we can deal with that transactional aspect. I would also say there's a comprehensive approach. That's why I mentioned "narrow but deep". We can look at many different layers of what comprises the supply chain and how companies are able to access it, compete and bolster their position so that we can touch off different policy areas that are outside traditional trade policy like tariffs, but get into the number of different elements that I outlined in my previous statement.

David McKenzie: Thank you. It's much appreciated.

Mr. Austin, I grew up in Saskatchewan. I studied in Saskatoon. I've known Cameco as a great Canadian success story for many decades now. You've had great success and indeed have broadened and deepened your offerings to the market.

In this time of critical importance for critical minerals, you have members of the government on that side of this room and members of the future government on this side of the room listening to you today. What advice do you offer to other Canadian companies to develop as Cameco has?

Dale Austin: Thank you for the kind words about Cameco. We do appreciate them.

The advice I would offer to the current government and to a future government is to recognize where you have both competitive and strategic advantages and then go out and capitalize on those advantages when and where they occur. We're seeing that right now with the nuclear sector. You've heard it today from my colleague John and me. We—Canada, Cameco, Westinghouse—are very well positioned in a burgeoning market.

We've spoken today about critical mineral processing. We do that in the nuclear space. We take uranium from the ground in Saskatchewan, we turn it into nuclear fuel, we make fuel bundles and we supply the reactors. That is a front-to-back, competitive, strategic geopolitical advantage. I would suggest that any government should recognize that when it's in front of them and take advantage.

• (1715)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We'll have Mr. Lavoie, please, for five minutes.

[Translation]

Steeve Lavoie (Beauport—Limoilou, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us today.

Mr. Mahon, I was reading an article in *The Globe and Mail*, one you either wrote or were quoted in, saying that Canada must view its energy and natural resources as a source of economic and geopolitical power and that it must make better use of them to strengthen its international influence. I see that you're nodding to confirm that the article is indeed yours.

You talked at the outset about generating growth and jobs, and promoting major projects and sector-specific agreements. You mentioned liquefied natural gas. We see that an announcement was made on September 29. Jokingly, I thought you were reading the government's economic platform.

Seriously, though, the government's current decisions really do seem to align with what you're thinking. I don't know if you're familiar with what's in Bill C-39, but I'd like you to tell me if it will provide more predictability. Here at the committee, what we've heard most often in the past year is the lack of predictability for businesses in trade agreements related to investments. I'm thinking of Bill C-39 and other bills that have been introduced by the government. Do you think that this type of government decision will provide investors with more predictability and offer what you men-

tioned earlier, namely, encouraging investment and generating growth?

[English]

Jeff Mahon: That's another excellent question, especially since you included a reference to one of my wonderful op-eds.

When I wrote that piece—I believe it was back in 2024—it was actually quite controversial. I wrote that we needed to grab hold of our energy system to use it as a tool of geopolitical leverage. I concur with you that many things I've seen from the government have very much lined up with what I said in that piece and in other writings.

I have carefully considered the contents of Bill C-39, although not in its entirety. It is a very lengthy bill, but I have read some summaries that my company has produced on it. I believe there is an important opportunity with this bill, and other aspects of what the government and the team is putting together, to try to help Canada.

The short answer is yes, I think this would add to predictability. I think it would also open the space and make Canada a more competitive investment environment. These are precisely the kinds of objectives we need to be pursuing.

[Translation]

Steeve Lavoie: Thank you very much.

I'll move on quickly.

We recently spoke to the Minister of Finance about the mega deduction for businesses. I don't know if you're aware of this measure. It applies to all businesses, whether small, medium or large.

I'd like to quote you again from another article in which you discussed industrial competitiveness. You say that resource development must support Canada's investments and manufacturing capacity. Do you think this type of decision, which is offering mega deductions to businesses so they can benefit from deductions quickly to generate cash flow and reinvest, aligns with your thinking?

[English]

Jeff Mahon: As I mentioned a moment ago, there have been a number of steps the government has taken to improve the business and investment climate in Canada. That is certainly what's needed.

When I think about what I'm seeing in Canada right now, I believe there is an economic transformation under way. The policies that have been put in place in the recent period have synthesized what I'm seeing as both supply-side and demand-side economics in a very new and novel way, which I think is quite exciting. However, the proof will be in the pudding, in the future, on whether that bears economic fruit.

As to what you've been talking about with the past two measures—Bill C-39 and the mega deduction—and also some other things related to the Major Projects Office, which you didn't mention, and some measures to make sure we're not having duplicative reviews, I put those in the bucket of supply-side reform. These are going to make it easier for companies around the world, Canadian companies and investors to invest here to do exactly what I said we need to do, which is get productive investment that sustains jobs and facilitates industrial upgrading.

For this committee, the international trade committee, it's about creating the demand-side aspect by going around internationally and finding partners so that we'll be able to connect them with what Canada supplies. That's also why I've proposed that we explore the sectoral-specific agreements as a way to kick-start and make these highways, these channels, in which Canadian companies can integrate more with international supply chains.

• (1720)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Simard, you have two minutes because I have two other speakers to get to before we close the meeting.

[Translation]

Mario Simard: Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you for your earlier answer, Mr. Mahon.

I still want to emphasize this point because it seems to me that—and I don't want to get into technical details—in the aluminum sector, if you want to engage in secondary processing, you need to have either an extrusion plant or a rolling mill. In Canada, unfortunately, we produce a lot of primary aluminum, but we lack both of these facilities, so we're somewhat limited. Furthermore, I think I detected in the answer you gave earlier that it could be a strategic advantage for Canada to have at least one rolling mill.

However, there remains the well-known issue—and I don't know if you're aware of this—of the Midwest premium, which means we pay the same price for aluminum whether it's shipped from my facility in Arvida to Oswego in the United States or across the street from the primary aluminum plant. The price is the same because the transportation cost is factored into the price, which makes us slightly less competitive.

Do you think it's possible to take advantage of this type of incentive with government support to make us more competitive?

[English]

Jeff Mahon: Unfortunately, I'm not familiar with the Midwest premium and what's being referred to. It is something that I would need to investigate. I would be happy to have a conversation with you about it in more detail afterwards.

The key to getting economic growth to happen is identifying the barriers to growth first. If you don't know what's preventing it from happening, then you're going to have a tough time. We were talking earlier about creating a space with certain types of supply side policies, but if it's not just about tax rates or regulatory aspects but is maybe about—if I understood correctly—some logistical issues,

that means we have to put the microscope on what can be done there to try to make it more competitive, especially if what—

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Au, you have three minutes, please.

Chak Au: Thank you very much.

Mr. Mahon, I have questions for you.

I think you've raised a very interesting point in saying that China should be able to help us in the area of critical minerals and the processing techniques. I have a twofold question.

The first part is that the Chinese are competitors. Why should they come to help us? We know that in every kind of co-operation there is give-and-take. What's their give-and-take? What's our give-and-take in terms of having a partnership or co-operation?

That leads to the second part of my question: How can we avoid dependence on China?

Jeff Mahon: Thank you, Mr. Au. That's also a very good question. I'm glad you brought that up today.

The whole world is a competitive place, but at the same time, we have to co-operate. I know that there is a big push these days about independence and self-reliance, but we need to be careful with that kind of talk, because I believe the fundamental condition of the global economy is interdependency, not independence. Autarchy is not going to get Canada anywhere. I don't think anyone in this room would think that's the route we should be going down.

What we've learned from our relationships with both China and the United States is that dependence can go too far and can create vulnerabilities. There are national security vulnerabilities on the one hand, but also long-term economic competitiveness aspects, where predatory, unfair or non-market practices or the like could create an uneven playing field that puts Canadian companies at a disadvantage.

On question one, how are we going to be able to co-operate with China when they're also competitors? I believe that, one, we have to try. I believe there is an area where there can be mutually overlapping interests.

We've identified critical minerals as a sensitive area because of China's dominance, but China says there's nothing we need to worry about. What we should do is say, "Okay, China, we welcome you to come in and bring some of that technology capacity." We'll open up the space of investment with clear parameters that are decided by Canadian officials to manage both long-term economic competitiveness and national security risks and make it so that Chinese investors can come in, participate and get their own market returns from having those productive activities. That would create a win-win situation.

Would they win as much as they would if they maintained the full dominance picture and were able to export all the process capacity? No, not as much, but we've made it clear that we're not going to let that happen. I think we should try in good faith to open up these discussions, but where Canada controls and manages the access. If China is not receptive to that, we have a data point to tell us that we might need to rethink some of the overtures that are being discussed right now, but I'd say it's worth giving it a try.

• (1725)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Naqvi, you have our final questions.

Yasir Naqvi: Chair, I think Ms. Acan had an unanswered question.

Would you like to ask it now?

Sima Acan: Thank you very much.

Mr. Austin, we were discussing the fuel cycle. I know you are mining in Saskatchewan and refining at Blind River, Ontario, and converting uranium to uranium hexafluoride at Port Hope, but you are also shipping it to the States, Europe and Japan for enrichment.

My question is, as global nuclear demand grows, what would it take for Cameco to invest in that missing part of the fuel cycle in Canada? What would the federal government need to do to make such an investment commercially competitive and strengthen Canada's nuclear export capacity?

Dale Austin: Let me do the second part first in terms of the federal government. In order to enrich in Canada, the federal government would have to undertake a process to change treaties, regulations and policies to ensure that we could enrich under the auspices of the nuclear non-proliferation policy. A significant amount of work would have to be done by the federal government.

In terms of enrichment in Canada, Cameco is a publicly traded company. There would need to be a business case for us to invest in enrichment capacity here. That would likely include a significant number of light water reactors—including the AP1000 reactor and the SMR reactor being deployed at Darlington—being built and operational here in Canada.

Sima Acan: Thank you.

The Chair: You have one minute remaining.

Sima Acan: That was my question.

Go ahead, Mr. Naqvi.

Yasir Naqvi: Thank you very much.

I want to come back to the export potential for Canadian nuclear technology.

Mr. Gorman, I know you have thoughts and views on that. What's the missing piece here? What do we need to do?

We were talking about CANDU. We were talking about Westinghouse technology. I think you talked about collaboration between the two to continue to build a robust supply chain and maintain the supply chain here in Canada.

Can you share with us what the government should be doing to really leverage all the capabilities we have, regardless of the technology, to export this clean technology to other parts of the world?

John Gorman: My advice would be for the government to recognize that it is in the remarkable position right now of owning two large technologies that serve different markets. One, the CANDU, is a heavy water reactor, and the AP1000 is a light water reactor.

We have a strong supply chain in CANDU right now. The key point here is that it's a very strong nuclear supply chain and is very capable of diversifying. We should seize this moment when we are building out likely 20 new reactors across Canada, recognize that there is plenty of space here to diversify and have two technologies in the market, and do that quickly so that the supply chain can participate in 100% of the global market by having both light water reactor and heavy water reactor capabilities.

Yasir Naqvi: Mr. Mahon and Mr. Austin, do you have any specific thoughts on this from your perspective?

Jeff Mahon: Not at the moment, thank you.

Dale Austin: I agree with Mr. Gorman. I think there is a tremendous opportunity for Canada to lead in the global nuclear build-out—through our supply chain, through our technical expertise, through our fuel services and through reactor technologies. It's a tremendous opportunity. We should take advantage of it.

Yasir Naqvi: Thank you.

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