Gaining credibility for inflation targets / by James Yetman. : FB3-2/101-11E-PDF
In this paper, I consider a simple model in which agents learn about the inflation target of a central bank over time by observing the policy instrument or inflation outcomes. Measuring credibility as the distance between the perceived target and the actual target, an increase in credibility is beneficial to the central bank because it brings the policy consistent with attaining the inflation target closer to that required to attain the output target.--Abstract
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Ministère/Organisme | Bank of Canada. |
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Titre | Gaining credibility for inflation targets / by James Yetman. |
Titre de la série | Bank of Canada working paper1701-93972001-11 |
Type de publication | Série - Voir l'enregistrement principal |
Langue | [Anglais] |
Format | Électronique |
Document électronique | |
Autres formats offerts | Papier-[Anglais] |
Note(s) | "In this paper, I consider a simple model in which agents learn about the inflation target of a central bank over time by observing the policy instrument or inflation outcomes. Measuring credibility as the distance between the perceived target and the actual target, an increase in credibility is beneficial to the central bank because it brings the policy consistent with attaining the inflation target closer to that required to attain the output target."--Abstract. The ISSN (1192-5434) for the print edition has been incorrectly copied in this electronic publication. Résumé en français. |
Information sur la publication | Ottawa - Ontario : Bank of Canada July 2001. |
Description | 42p.graphs, references |
ISSN | 1701-9397 |
Numéro de catalogue |
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Descripteurs | Inflation Economic conditions |