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| 02047nam 2200313za 4500 |
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001 | 9.827039 |
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003 | CaOODSP |
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005 | 20221107144723 |
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007 | cr ||||||||||| |
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008 | 161107s2016 oncd ob f000 0 eng d |
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040 | |aCaOODSP|beng |
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041 | |aeng|bfre |
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043 | |an-cn--- |
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086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2016-46E-PDF |
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100 | 1 |aKuncl, Martin. |
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245 | 10|aFragility of resale markets for securitized assets and policy of asset purchases |h[electronic resource] / |cby Martin Kuncl. |
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260 | |a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada, |cc2016. |
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300 | |aii, 57 p. |
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490 | 1 |aStaff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2016-46 |
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500 | |a"October 2016." |
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504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 35-37). |
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520 | 3 |a"Markets for securitized assets were characterized by high liquidity prior to the recent financial crisis and by a sudden market dry-up at the onset of the crisis. A generalequilibrium model with heterogeneous investment opportunities and information frictionspredicts that, in boom periods or mild recessions, the degree of adverse selection in resale markets for securitized assets is limited because of the reputation-based guarantees by asset originators. This supports investment and output. However, in a deep recession, characterized by high dispersion of asset qualities, there is a sudden surge in adverse selection due to an economy-wide default on reputation-based guarantees, which persistently depresses the output in the economy. Government policy of asset purchases limits the negative effects of adverse selection on the real economy, but may create a negative moral hazard problem"--Abstract, p. ii. |
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546 | |aIncludes abstract in French. |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aCapital markets |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aFinancial crisis |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aGovernment policy |
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710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
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830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2016-46|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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856 | 40|qPDF|s722 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2016-46-eng.pdf |
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