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| 01880nam 2200313za 4500 |
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| 001 | 9.828456 |
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| 003 | CaOODSP |
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| 005 | 20221107145040 |
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| 007 | cr ||||||||||| |
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| 008 | 161201s2016 oncd ob f000 0 eng d |
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| 040 | |aCaOODSP|beng |
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| 041 | |aeng|bfre |
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| 043 | |an-cn--- |
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| 086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2016-50E-PDF |
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| 100 | 1 |aCimon, David A. |
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| 245 | 10|aBroker routing decisions in limit order markets |h[electronic resource] / |cby David A. Cimon. |
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| 260 | |a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada, |cc2016. |
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| 300 | |aii, 53 p. : |bgraphs. |
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| 490 | 1 |aStaff Working Paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2016-50 |
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| 500 | |a"November 2016." |
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| 504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references. |
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| 520 | 3 |a"The primary focus of this paper is to study conflict of interest in the brokerage market. Brokers face a conflict of interest when the commissions they receive from investors differ from the costs imposed by different trading venues. I construct a model of limit order trading in which brokers serve as agents for investors who wish to access equity markets. I find that brokers preferentially route marketable orders to venues with lower liquidity demand fees, driving up the execution probability at these venues and lowering adverse selection costs. When fees for liquidity supply and demand are sufficiently different, brokers route liquidity supplying orders to separate venues, where investors suffer from lower execution probability and higher costs of adverse selection"--Abstract. |
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| 546 | |aAbstract in French. |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aInvestments |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aMarket analysis |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aFinancial analysis |
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| 710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
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| 830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2016-50|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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| 856 | 40|qPDF|s608 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2016-50-eng.pdf |
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