|
000
| 01708cam 2200301za 4500 |
|---|
| 001 | 9.828464 |
|---|
| 003 | CaOODSP |
|---|
| 005 | 20221107145041 |
|---|
| 007 | cr ||||||||||| |
|---|
| 008 | 161201s2016 oncd ob f000 0 eng d |
|---|
| 040 | |aCaOODSP|beng |
|---|
| 041 | |aeng|bfre |
|---|
| 043 | |an-cn--- |
|---|
| 086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2016-52E-PDF |
|---|
| 100 | 1 |aSchroth, Josef. |
|---|
| 245 | 10|aSupervising financial regulators |h[electronic resource] / |cby Josef Schroth. |
|---|
| 260 | |a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada, |cc2016. |
|---|
| 300 | |aii, 49 p. : |bgraphs, figs. |
|---|
| 490 | 1 |aStaff Working Paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2016-52 |
|---|
| 500 | |a"November 2016." |
|---|
| 504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references. |
|---|
| 520 | 3 |a"How much discretion should local financial regulators in a banking union have in accommodating local credit demand? I analyze this question in an economy where local regulators privately observe expected output from high lending. They do not fully internalize default costs from high lending since deposit insurance cannot be priced fairly. Still, output net of default costs across the banking union is highest when local regulators are rewarded rather than punished. Regulators with lower current lending receive more discretion to allow higher lending in the future, but regulators with higher current lending may not experience any limit to their discretion"--Abstract. |
|---|
| 546 | |aAbstract in French. |
|---|
| 692 | 07|2gccst|aBanks |
|---|
| 692 | 07|2gccst|aEconomic analysis |
|---|
| 710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
|---|
| 830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2016-52|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
|---|
| 856 | 40|qPDF|s526 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2016-52-eng.pdf |
|---|