Optimal capital regulation / by Stéphane Moyen and Josef Schroth.: FB3-5/2017-6E-PDF
“We study constrained-efficient bank capital regulation in a model with market-imposed equity requirements. Banks hold equity buffers to insure against sudden loss of access to funding. However, in the model, banks choose to only partially self-insure because equity is privately costly. As a result, equity requirements are occasionally binding. Constrained-efficient regulation requires banks to build up additional equity buffers and compensates them for the cost of equity with a permanent increase in lending margins. When buffers are depleted, regulation relaxes the market-imposed equity requirements by raising bank future prospects through temporarily elevated lending margins"--Abstract, p. ii.
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Department/Agency | Bank of Canada. |
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Title | Optimal capital regulation / by Stéphane Moyen and Josef Schroth. |
Series title | Bank of Canada staff working paper, 1701-9397 ; 2017-6 |
Publication type | Series - View Master Record |
Language | [English] |
Format | Electronic |
Electronic document | |
Note(s) | "February 2017." Includes bibliographical references. Includes abstract in French. |
Publishing information | [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, 2017. |
Author / Contributor | Moyen, Stéphane. Schroth, Josef. |
Description | ii, 38 p. : charts |
Catalogue number |
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Subject terms | Banks Capital Regulation |
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