Banking regulation and market making / by David A. Cimon and Corey Garriott.: FB3-5/2017-7E-PDF

“We present a model of market makers subject to recent banking regulations: liquidity and capital constraints in the style of Basel III and a position limit in the style of the Volcker Rule. Regulation causes market makers to reduce their intermediation by refusing principal positions. However, it can improve the bid-ask spread because it induces new market makers to enter. Since market makers intermediate less, asset prices exhibit a liquidity premium. Costs of regulation can be assessed by measuring principal positions and asset prices but not by measuring bid-ask spreads"--Abstract, p. ii.

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Publication information
Department/Agency Bank of Canada.
Title Banking regulation and market making / by David A. Cimon and Corey Garriott.
Series title Bank of Canada staff working paper, 1701-9397 ; 2017-7
Publication type Series - View Master Record
Language [English]
Format Electronic
Electronic document
Note(s) "February 2017."
Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-33).
Includes abstract in French.
Publishing information [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, 2017.
Author / Contributor Cimon, David A.
Garriott, Corey.
Description ii, 59 p. : charts
Catalogue number
  • FB3-5/2017-7E-PDF
Subject terms Banks
Regulation
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