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| 01951nam 2200325za 4500 |
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| 001 | 9.847809 |
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| 003 | CaOODSP |
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| 005 | 20221107153526 |
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| 007 | cr ||||||||||| |
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| 008 | 171127s2017 oncd #ob f000 0 eng d |
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| 040 | |aCaOODSP|beng |
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| 041 | |aeng|bfre |
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| 043 | |an-cn--- |
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| 086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2017-51E-PDF |
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| 100 | 1 |aShcherbakov, Oleksandr. |
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| 245 | 10|aIdentifying the degree of collusion under proportional reduction |h[electronic resource] / |cby Oleksandr Shcherbakov and Naoki Wakamori. |
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| 260 | |aOttawa : |bBank of Canada, |c2017. |
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| 300 | |aii, 48 p. : |bgraphs |
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| 490 | 1 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2017-51 |
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| 500 | |a"November 2017." |
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| 504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references. |
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| 520 | |a"Proportional reduction is a common cartel practice in which cartel members reduce their output proportionately. We develop a method to quantify this reduction relative to a benchmark market equilibrium scenario and relate the reduction to the traditional conduct parameter. Our measure is continuous, allowing us to have an intuitive interpretation as the “degree of collusion” and nesting the earlier models in the existing literature. Furthermore, our methodology addresses Corts’ (1999) critique by estimating time-varying degree of collusion from a short panel of firm-level observations, exploiting firms’ ex post heterogeneity. We illustrate the method using the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel data."--Abstract, p. ii. |
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| 546 | |aText in English, abstract in English and French. |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aIndustry analysis |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aCompetition |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aMarkets |
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| 700 | 1 |aWakamori, Naoki. |
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| 710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
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| 830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2017-51.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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| 856 | 40|qPDF|s1.43 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2017-51-eng.pdf |
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