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008190402t20192019oncd   #ob   f000 0 eng d
040 |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
041 |aeng|bfre
0861 |aFB3-5/2019-9E-PDF
1001 |aHommes, Carsien Harm, |eauthor.
24510|aInflation targeting and liquidity traps under endogenous credibility / |cby Cars Hommes and Joep Lustenhouwer.
264 1|aOttawa, Ontario, Canada : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2019.
264 4|c©2019
300 |a1 online resource (ii, 35 pages) : |bgraphs.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
4901 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2019-9
500 |a"February 2019."
504 |aIncludes bibliographical references.
5203 |a"Policy implications are derived for an inflation-targeting central bank, whose credibility is endogenous and depends on its past ability to achieve its targets. This is done in a New Keynesian framework with heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations. We find that the region of allowed policy parameters is strictly larger than under rational expectations. However, when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is accounted for, self-fulfilling deflationary spirals can occur, depending on the credibility of the central bank. Deflationary spirals can be prevented with a high inflation target and aggressive monetary easing"--Abstract, page ii.
546 |aIncludes abstract in French.
69207|2gccst|aMonetary policy
69207|2gccst|aInflation
69207|2gccst|aInterest rates
7001 |aLustenhouwer, Joep‏, |eauthor.
7102 |aBank of Canada.
830#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2019-9.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
85640|qPDF|s1.21 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2019-9-eng.pdf