00000nam 2200000zi 4500 9.870922 CaOODSP 20221107163242 m o d f cr ||||||||||| 190402t20192019oncd #ob f000 0 eng d CaOODSP eng rda CaOODSP eng fre FB3-5/2019-10E-PDF Ichihashi, Shota, author. Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion / by Shota Ichihashi. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada : Bank of Canada = Banque du Canada, 2019. ©2019 1 online resource (ii, 24 pages) : graphs. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Bank of Canada staff working paper, 1701-9397 ; 2019-10 "February 2019." Includes bibliographical references. "This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of the designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I solve a problem of how to maximize a receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information: Whenever the designer can increase the receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information, the receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of the game in which the receiver persuades the sender"--Abstract, page ii. Includes abstract in French. gccst Economic policy gccst Information policy gccst Models Bank of Canada. Staff working paper (Bank of Canada) 1701-9397 ; 2019-10. (CaOODSP)9.806221 PDF 1.29 MB https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2019-10-eng.pdf