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| 02053cam 2200361zi 4500 |
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001 | 9.870922 |
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003 | CaOODSP |
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005 | 20221107163242 |
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006 | m o d f |
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007 | cr ||||||||||| |
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008 | 190402t20192019oncd #ob f000 0 eng d |
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040 | |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP |
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041 | |aeng|bfre |
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086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2019-10E-PDF |
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100 | 1 |aIchihashi, Shota, |eauthor. |
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245 | 10|aLimiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion / |cby Shota Ichihashi. |
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264 | 1|aOttawa, Ontario, Canada : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2019. |
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264 | 4|c©2019 |
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300 | |a1 online resource (ii, 24 pages) : |bgraphs. |
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336 | |atext|btxt|2rdacontent |
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337 | |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia |
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338 | |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier |
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490 | 1 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2019-10 |
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500 | |a"February 2019." |
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504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references. |
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520 | 3 |a"This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of the designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I solve a problem of how to maximize a receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information: Whenever the designer can increase the receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information, the receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of the game in which the receiver persuades the sender"--Abstract, page ii. |
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546 | |aIncludes abstract in French. |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aEconomic policy |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aInformation policy |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aModels |
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710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
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830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2019-10.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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856 | 40|qPDF|s1.29 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2019-10-eng.pdf |
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