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001	9.870922
003	CaOODSP
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008	190402t20192019oncd   #ob   f000 0 eng d
040	|aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
041	|aeng|bfre
086	1 |aFB3-5/2019-10E-PDF
100	1 |aIchihashi, Shota, |eauthor.
245	10|aLimiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion / |cby Shota Ichihashi.
264	1|aOttawa, Ontario, Canada : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2019.
264	4|c©2019
300	|a1 online resource (ii, 24 pages) : |bgraphs.
336	|atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337	|acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338	|aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
490	1 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2019-10
500	|a"February 2019."
504	|aIncludes bibliographical references.
520	3 |a"This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of the designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I solve a problem of how to maximize a receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information: Whenever the designer can increase the receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information, the receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of the game in which the receiver persuades the sender"--Abstract, page ii.
546	|aIncludes abstract in French.
692	07|2gccst|aEconomic policy
692	07|2gccst|aInformation policy
692	07|2gccst|aModels
710	2 |aBank of Canada.
830	#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2019-10.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
856	40|qPDF|s1.29 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2019-10-eng.pdf