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      <marc:subfield code="a">Ahnert, Toni, </marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="e">author.</marc:subfield>
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    <marc:datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
      <marc:subfield code="a">Loan insurance, market liquidity, and lending standards / </marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="c">by Toni Ahnert and Martin Kuncl.</marc:subfield>
    </marc:datafield>
    <marc:datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1">
      <marc:subfield code="a">[Ottawa] : </marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="b">Bank of Canada = Banque du Canada, </marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="c">2019.</marc:subfield>
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      <marc:subfield code="c">©2019</marc:subfield>
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      <marc:subfield code="a">Bank of Canada staff working paper, </marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="x">1701-9397 ; </marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="v">2019-47</marc:subfield>
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      <marc:subfield code="a">"December 2019."</marc:subfield>
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      <marc:subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references (page 40).</marc:subfield>
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      <marc:subfield code="a">"We examine insurance against loan default when lenders can screen in primary markets at a heterogeneous cost and learn loan quality over time. In equilibrium, low-cost lenders screen loans, but some high-cost lenders insure them. Insured loans are risk-free and liquid in a secondary market, while uninsured loans are subject to adverse selection. Loan insurance reduces the amount of lemons traded in the secondary market for uninsured loans, improves liquidity, and lowers lending standards. This pecuniary externality implies insufficient loan insurance in the liquid equilibrium. Therefore, a regulator achieves constrained efficiency by imposing a Pigouvian subsidy on loan insurance"--Abstract, page ii.</marc:subfield>
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      <marc:subfield code="a">Credit insurance.</marc:subfield>
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      <marc:subfield code="a">Bank of Canada.</marc:subfield>
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      <marc:subfield code="a">Staff working paper (Bank of Canada)</marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="x">1701-9397 ; </marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="v">2019-47.</marc:subfield>
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      <marc:subfield code="q">PDF</marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="s">2.05 MB</marc:subfield>
      <marc:subfield code="u">https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2019-47-eng.pdf</marc:subfield>
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