000	01981nam  2200337zi 4500
001	9.882837
003	CaOODSP
005	20221107170413
006	m     o  d f
007	cr cn|||||||||
008	191212t20192019oncd    obs  f000 0 eng d
040	|aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
043	|an-cn---
086	1 |aFB3-5/2019-47E-PDF
100	1 |aAhnert, Toni, |eauthor.
245	10|aLoan insurance, market liquidity, and lending standards / |cby Toni Ahnert and Martin Kuncl.
264	1|a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2019.
264	4|c©2019
300	|a1 online resource (ii, 58 pages) : |bfigures, charts (some colour).
336	|atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337	|acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338	|aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
490	1 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2019-47
500	|a"December 2019."
504	|aIncludes bibliographical references (page 40).
520	3 |a"We examine insurance against loan default when lenders can screen in primary markets at a heterogeneous cost and learn loan quality over time. In equilibrium, low-cost lenders screen loans, but some high-cost lenders insure them. Insured loans are risk-free and liquid in a secondary market, while uninsured loans are subject to adverse selection. Loan insurance reduces the amount of lemons traded in the secondary market for uninsured loans, improves liquidity, and lowers lending standards. This pecuniary externality implies insufficient loan insurance in the liquid equilibrium. Therefore, a regulator achieves constrained efficiency by imposing a Pigouvian subsidy on loan insurance"--Abstract, page ii.
650	0|aCredit insurance.
650	6|aAssurance-crédit.
710	2 |aBank of Canada.
830	#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2019-47.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
856	40|qPDF|s2.05 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2019-47-eng.pdf