00000nam 2200000zi 4500 9.893100 CaOODSP 20221107173343 m o d f cr cn||||||||| 201102t20202020onca ob f000 0 eng d CaOODSP eng rda CaOODSP FB3-5/2020-43E-PDF Schroth, Josef, author. Outside investor access to top management : market monitoring versus stock price manipulation / by Josef Schroth. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada : Bank of Canada = Banque du Canada, 2020. ©2020 1 online resource (ii, 45 pages) : colour illustrations. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Staff working paper = Document de travail du personnel, 1701-9397 ; 2020-43 "Last updated: October 28, 2020." Includes bibliographical references (pages 33-38). "This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, investors rely less on costly unbiased research. As a result, managers are tempted to manipulate the firm stock price more, but investors are better informed because they anticipate manager manipulation. An increase in stock-price informativeness, therefore, has to be traded off against an increase in resources wasted on manipulation. I find that, surprisingly, firm owners grant investors more access to managers that manipulate more strongly. An implication is that the firm cost of capital is negatively related to manager manipulation"--Abstract, page ii. Executives Salaries, etc. Econometric models. Stocks Prices Econometric models. Speculation Econometric models. Salaires Cadres (Personnel) Modèles économétriques. Actions (Titres de société) Prix Modèles économétriques. Spéculation Modèles économétriques. Bank of Canada, issuing body. Staff working paper (Bank of Canada) 2020-43. (CaOODSP)9.806221 PDF 423 KB https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2020/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2020-43-eng.pdf