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| 02037nam 2200361zi 4500 |
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001 | 9.902917 |
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003 | CaOODSP |
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005 | 20221107180109 |
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006 | m o d f |
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007 | cr |n||||||||| |
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008 | 210827t20212021oncd ob f|0| 0 eng d |
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040 | |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP |
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043 | |an-cn--- |
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086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2021-30E-PDF |
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100 | 1 |aAhnert, Toni, |eauthor. |
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245 | 10|aBank runs, bank competition and opacity / |cby Toni Ahnert and David Martinez-Miera. |
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264 | 1|aOttawa, Ontario, Canada : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2021. |
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264 | 4|c©2021 |
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300 | |a1 online resource (iii, 50 pages) : |bcharts. |
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336 | |atext|btxt|2rdacontent |
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337 | |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia |
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338 | |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier |
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490 | 1 |aStaff working paper = |aDocument de travail du personnel, |x1701-9397 ; |v2021-30 |
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500 | |a"Last updated: June 22, 2021." |
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504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 37-41). |
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520 | |a"We model the opacity and deposit rate choices of banks that imperfectly compete for uninsured deposits, are subject to runs, and face a threat of entry. We show how shocks that increase bank competition or bank transparency increase deposit rates, costly withdrawals, and thus bank fragility. Therefore, perfect competition is not socially optimal. We also propose a theory of bank opacity. The cost of opacity is more withdrawals from a solvent bank, lowering bank profits. The benefit of opacity is to deter the entry of a competitor, increasing future bank profits. The excessive opacity of incumbent banks rationalizes transparency regulation"--Abstract, page iii. |
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650 | 0|aBank failures. |
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650 | 0|aCompetition. |
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650 | 6|aBanques|xFaillites. |
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650 | 6|aCompétitivité (Économie) |
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710 | 2 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body. |
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830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|v2021-30.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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856 | 40|qPDF|s880 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2021/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2021-30-eng.pdf |
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