000 01939nam  2200361zi 4500
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008230111t20232023oncd    ob   f|0| 0 eng d
040 |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
041 |aeng|beng|bfre
043 |an-cn---
0861 |aFB3-5/2023-3E-PDF
1001 |aCheng, Yuteng, |eauthor.
24510|aMandatory retention rules and bank risk / |cby Yuteng Cheng.
264 1|a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2023.
264 4|c©2023
300 |a1 online resource (ii, 61 pages) : |bcharts.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
4901 |aStaff working paper = Document de travail du personnel, |x1701-9397 ; |v2023-3
500 |a"Last updated: January 5, 2023."
504 |aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 38-41).
520 |a"This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the unintended consequences of mandatory retention rules in securitization. The Dodd-Frank Act and the EU Securitisation Regulation both impose a 5% mandatory retention requirement to motivate screening and monitoring. I first propose a novel model showing that while retention strengthens monitoring, it may also encourage banks to shift risk. I then provide empirical evidence supporting this unintended consequence: in the US data, banks shifted toward riskier portfolios after the implementation of the retention rules embedded in Dodd-Frank"--Abstract.
546 |aIncludes abstract in French.
650 0|aAsset-backed financing.
650 6|aTitrisation.
7102 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body.
830#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|v2023-3.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
85640|qPDF|s1.00 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2023/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2023-3-eng.pdf