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| 01939nam 2200361zi 4500 |
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001 | 9.919028 |
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003 | CaOODSP |
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005 | 20230111152443 |
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006 | m o d f |
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007 | cr |n||||||||| |
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008 | 230111t20232023oncd ob f|0| 0 eng d |
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040 | |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP |
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041 | |aeng|beng|bfre |
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043 | |an-cn--- |
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086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2023-3E-PDF |
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100 | 1 |aCheng, Yuteng, |eauthor. |
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245 | 10|aMandatory retention rules and bank risk / |cby Yuteng Cheng. |
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264 | 1|a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2023. |
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264 | 4|c©2023 |
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300 | |a1 online resource (ii, 61 pages) : |bcharts. |
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336 | |atext|btxt|2rdacontent |
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337 | |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia |
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338 | |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier |
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490 | 1 |aStaff working paper = Document de travail du personnel, |x1701-9397 ; |v2023-3 |
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500 | |a"Last updated: January 5, 2023." |
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504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 38-41). |
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520 | |a"This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the unintended consequences of mandatory retention rules in securitization. The Dodd-Frank Act and the EU Securitisation Regulation both impose a 5% mandatory retention requirement to motivate screening and monitoring. I first propose a novel model showing that while retention strengthens monitoring, it may also encourage banks to shift risk. I then provide empirical evidence supporting this unintended consequence: in the US data, banks shifted toward riskier portfolios after the implementation of the retention rules embedded in Dodd-Frank"--Abstract. |
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546 | |aIncludes abstract in French. |
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650 | 0|aAsset-backed financing. |
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650 | 6|aTitrisation. |
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710 | 2 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body. |
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830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|v2023-3.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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856 | 40|qPDF|s1.00 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2023/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2023-3-eng.pdf |
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