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008240522t20242024oncd    ob   f000 0 eng d
040 |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
0410 |aeng|beng|bfre
043 |aa-cc---
0861 |aFB3-5/2024-2E-PDF
1001 |aTian, Phoebe, |eauthor.
24514|aThe role of long-term contracting in business lending / |cby Phoebe Tian.
264 1|a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2024.
264 4|c©2024
300 |a1 online resource (ii, 68 pages) : |bgraphs.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
4901 |aStaff working paper = Document de travail du personnel, |y1701-9397 ; |v2024-2
500 |aISSN assigned to different series.
500 |a"Last updated: February 2, 2024."
504 |aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 52-55).
5203 |a"This paper examines inefficiencies arising from a lack of long-term contracting in small business lending in China. I develop and estimate a dynamic model where firms repeatedly interact with the same lender. All loans are short-term. Collateral can be used to deter a strategic default by a firm, but the lender cannot recover the full value of the collateral in the case of a default. The endogenous contract terms—including interest rates, loan size and collateral—reflect a firm’s probability of default in equilibrium. Learning drives the dynamics of contract terms because a firm’s profitability type is unknown. Long-term contracts improve welfare mainly by mitigating the incentives for a firm to default"--Abstract, page ii.
546 |aIncludes abstracts in English and French.
650 0|aCommercial loans|zChina.
650 0|aFinancial institutions|zChina.
650 6|aPrêts commerciaux|zChine.
650 6|aInstitutions financières|zChine.
7102 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body.
830#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|v2024-2.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
85640|qPDF|s1.01 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2024/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2024-2-eng.pdf