| 000 | 00000cam 2200000zi 4500 |
| 001 | 9.962253 |
| 003 | CaOODSP |
| 005 | 20260427122344 |
| 006 | m o d f |
| 007 | cr cn||||||||| |
| 008 | 260427e20260310onc ob f000 0 eng d |
| 040 | |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP |
| 086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2026-10E-PDF |
| 100 | 1 |aLiu, Youming, |eauthor. |
| 245 | 10|aPublic vs. private payment platforms : |bmarket impacts and optimal policy / |cYouming Liu, Edona Reshidi, Francisco Rivadeneyra. |
| 264 | 1|a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |cMarch 10, 2026. |
| 264 | 4|c©2026 |
| 300 | |a1 online resource (45 pages). |
| 336 | |atext|btxt|2rdacontent |
| 337 | |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia |
| 338 | |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier |
| 490 | 1 |aStaff working paper = |aDocument de travail du personnel, |x1701-9397 ; |v2026-10 |
| 500 | |aCover title. |
| 504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 27-28). |
| 520 | 3 |a"We study competition between a welfare-maximizing public platform and a profit maximizing private platform in a two-sided payment market. We characterize the public platform’s optimal pricing and show that it balances the benefits of increased competition against the welfare costs of network fragmentation. While introducinga public platform generally raises aggregate welfare and financial inclusion, the competing private platform may respond by raising its fees, disadvantaging merchants that continue to accept payments from the private platform. Finally, we show that cost-recovery and zero-fee mandates constrain public pricing, making welfare improvements uncertain and conditional on network effects, user switching behavior, and the degree of platform differentiation"--Abstract. |
| 650 | 0|aPayment|xEconometric models. |
| 650 | 6|aPaiement|xModèles économétriques. |
| 710 | 2 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body. |
| 830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2026-10.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
| 856 | 40|qPDF|s684 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2026/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2026-10-eng.pdf |