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| 01991nam 2200349za 4500 |
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| 001 | 9.827041 |
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| 003 | CaOODSP |
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| 005 | 20221123094558 |
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| 007 | cr ||||||||||| |
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| 008 | 161107s2016 oncd ob f000 0 eng d |
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| 040 | |aCaOODSP|beng |
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| 041 | |aeng|bfre |
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| 043 | |an-cn--- |
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| 086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2016-47E-PDF |
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| 100 | 1 |aCociuba, Simona E. |
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| 245 | 10|aManaging risk taking with interest rate policy and macroprudential regulations |h[electronic resource] / |cby Simona E. Cociuba, Malik Shukayev, and Alexander Ueberfeldt. |
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| 260 | |a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada, |cc2016. |
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| 300 | |aii, 51 p. |
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| 490 | 1 |aStaff Working Paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2016-47 |
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| 500 | |a"November 2016." |
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| 504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 33-35). |
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| 520 | 3 |a"We develop a model in which a financial intermediary’s investment in risky assets—risktaking— is excessive due to limited liability and deposit insurance and characterize thepolicy tools that implement efficient risk taking. In the calibrated model, coordinatinginterest rate policy with state-contingent macroprudential regulations, either capital orleverage regulation, and a tax on profits achieves efficiency. Interest rate policy mitigatesexcessive risk taking by altering both the return and the supply of collateralizable safeassets. In contrast to commonly used capital regulation, leverage regulation has strongereffects on risk taking and calls for higher interest rates"--Abstract, p. ii. |
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| 546 | |aIncludes abstract in French. |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aInterest rates |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aInvestments |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aMonetary policy |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aRisk management |
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| 700 | 1 |aShukayev, Malik. |
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| 700 | 1 |aUeberfeldt, Alexander. |
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| 710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
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| 830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2016-47|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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| 856 | 40|qPDF|s1.06 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2016-47-eng.pdf |
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