00000nam 2200000za 4500 9.828456 CaOODSP 20221107145040 cr ||||||||||| 161201s2016 oncd ob f000 0 eng d CaOODSP eng eng fre n-cn--- FB3-5/2016-50E-PDF Cimon, David A. Broker routing decisions in limit order markets [electronic resource] / by David A. Cimon. [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, c2016. ii, 53 p. : graphs. Staff Working Paper, 1701-9397 ; 2016-50 "November 2016." Includes bibliographical references. "The primary focus of this paper is to study conflict of interest in the brokerage market. Brokers face a conflict of interest when the commissions they receive from investors differ from the costs imposed by different trading venues. I construct a model of limit order trading in which brokers serve as agents for investors who wish to access equity markets. I find that brokers preferentially route marketable orders to venues with lower liquidity demand fees, driving up the execution probability at these venues and lowering adverse selection costs. When fees for liquidity supply and demand are sufficiently different, brokers route liquidity supplying orders to separate venues, where investors suffer from lower execution probability and higher costs of adverse selection"--Abstract. Abstract in French. gccst Investments gccst Market analysis gccst Financial analysis Bank of Canada. Staff working paper (Bank of Canada) 1701-9397 ; 2016-50 (CaOODSP)9.806221 PDF 608 KB https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2016-50-eng.pdf