00000nam 2200000za 4500 9.828464 CaOODSP 20221107145041 cr ||||||||||| 161201s2016 oncd ob f000 0 eng d CaOODSP eng eng fre n-cn--- FB3-5/2016-52E-PDF Schroth, Josef. Supervising financial regulators [electronic resource] / by Josef Schroth. [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, c2016. ii, 49 p. : graphs, figs. Staff Working Paper, 1701-9397 ; 2016-52 "November 2016." Includes bibliographical references. "How much discretion should local financial regulators in a banking union have in accommodating local credit demand? I analyze this question in an economy where local regulators privately observe expected output from high lending. They do not fully internalize default costs from high lending since deposit insurance cannot be priced fairly. Still, output net of default costs across the banking union is highest when local regulators are rewarded rather than punished. Regulators with lower current lending receive more discretion to allow higher lending in the future, but regulators with higher current lending may not experience any limit to their discretion"--Abstract. Abstract in French. gccst Banks gccst Economic analysis Bank of Canada. Staff working paper (Bank of Canada) 1701-9397 ; 2016-52 (CaOODSP)9.806221 PDF 526 KB https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2016-52-eng.pdf