00000nam 2200000za 4500 9.833265 CaOODSP 20221107150202 cr ||||||||||| 170302s2017 onc ob f000 0 eng d CaOODSP eng eng fre n-cn--- FB3-5/2017-4E-PDF Raykov, Radoslav S. Stability and efficiency in decentralized two-sided markets with weak preferences [electronic resource] / by Radoslav S. Raykov. [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, 2017. ii, 36 p. Bank of Canada staff working paper, 1701-9397 ; 2017-4 "February 2017." Includes bibliographical references. "Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of acentral authority. A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. I show that when agent tastes are independent, the random stable match in a large-enough market is asymptotically Pareto efficient even with weak preferences. In fact, even moderate-sized markets can attain good efficiency levels. The average fraction of agents who can Pareto improve is below 10% in a market of size n = 79 when one side of the market has weak preferences; when both sides have weak preferences, the inefficiency falls below 10% for n > 158. This implies that approximate Pareto efficiency is attainable in a decentralized market even in the absence of a central matchmaker"--Abstract, p. ii. Includes abstract in French. gccst Markets gccst Modelling Bank of Canada. Staff working paper (Bank of Canada) 1701-9397 ; 2017-4 (CaOODSP)9.806221 PDF 661 KB https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2017-4-eng.pdf