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008170302s2017    onc     ob   f000 0 eng d
040 |aCaOODSP|beng
041 |aeng|bfre
043 |an-cn---
0861 |aFB3-5/2017-4E-PDF
1001 |aRaykov, Radoslav S.
24510|aStability and efficiency in decentralized two-sided markets with weak preferences |h[electronic resource] / |cby Radoslav S. Raykov.
260 |a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada, |c2017.
300 |aii, 36 p.
4901 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2017-4
500 |a"February 2017."
504 |aIncludes bibliographical references.
5203 |a"Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of acentral authority. A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. I show that when agent tastes are independent, the random stable match in a large-enough market is asymptotically Pareto efficient even with weak preferences. In fact, even moderate-sized markets can attain good efficiency levels. The average fraction of agents who can Pareto improve is below 10% in a market of size n = 79 when one side of the market has weak preferences; when both sides have weak preferences, the inefficiency falls below 10% for n > 158. This implies that approximate Pareto efficiency is attainable in a decentralized market even in the absence of a central matchmaker"--Abstract, p. ii.
546 |aIncludes abstract in French.
69207|2gccst|aMarkets
69207|2gccst|aModelling
7102 |aBank of Canada.
830#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2017-4|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
85640|qPDF|s661 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2017-4-eng.pdf