| 000 | 00000nam 2200000za 4500 |
| 001 | 9.833270 |
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| 003 | CaOODSP |
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| 005 | 20221107150202 |
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| 007 | cr ||||||||||| |
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| 008 | 170302s2017 oncd ob f000 0 eng d |
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| 040 | |aCaOODSP|beng |
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| 041 | |aeng|bfre |
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| 043 | |an-cn--- |
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| 086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2017-7E-PDF |
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| 100 | 1 |aCimon, David A. |
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| 245 | 10|aBanking regulation and market making |h[electronic resource] / |cby David A. Cimon and Corey Garriott. |
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| 260 | |a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada, |c2017. |
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| 300 | |aii, 59 p. : |bcharts |
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| 490 | 1 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2017-7 |
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| 500 | |a"February 2017." |
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| 504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 32-33). |
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| 520 | 3 |a“We present a model of market makers subject to recent banking regulations: liquidity and capital constraints in the style of Basel III and a position limit in the style of the Volcker Rule. Regulation causes market makers to reduce their intermediation by refusing principal positions. However, it can improve the bid-ask spread because it induces new market makers to enter. Since market makers intermediate less, asset prices exhibit a liquidity premium. Costs of regulation can be assessed by measuring principal positions and asset prices but not by measuring bid-ask spreads"--Abstract, p. ii. |
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| 546 | |aIncludes abstract in French. |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aBanks |
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| 692 | 07|2gccst|aRegulation |
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| 700 | 1 |aGarriott, Corey. |
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| 710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
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| 830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2017-7|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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| 856 | 40|qPDF|s672 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2017-7-eng.pdf |
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