Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search / by S. Mohammad R. Davoodalhosseini. : FB3-5/2017-15E-PDF

“Constrained efficient allocation (CE) is characterized in a model of adverse selection anddirected search (Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010)). CE is defined to be the allocation that maximizes welfare, the ex-ante utility of all agents, subject to the frictions of the environment. When equilibrium does not achieve the first best (the allocation that maximizes welfare under complete information), then welfare in the CE is strictly higher than welfare in the equilibrium allocation. That is, equilibrium is not constrained efficient. Under some conditions, welfare in the CE even attains welfare in the first best. Finally, sufficient conditions are provided under which equilibrium is not constrained Pareto efficient, either. Cross-subsidization is the key to all these results. In an asset market application, the first best is shown to be implementable through tax schedules that are monotone in the asset prices"--Abstract, p. ii.

Lien permanent pour cette publication :
publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.835936&sl=1

Renseignements sur la publication
Ministère/Organisme Bank of Canada.
Titre Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search / by S. Mohammad R. Davoodalhosseini.
Titre de la série Bank of Canada staff working paper, 1701-9397 ; 2017-15
Type de publication Série - Voir l'enregistrement principal
Langue [Anglais]
Format Électronique
Document électronique
Note(s) "April 2017."
"This paper was previously circulated under the title “Constrained Efficiency with Searchand Information Frictions”"--Acknowledgements, p. i.
Includes bibliographical references.
Includes abstract in French.
Information sur la publication [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, 2017.
Auteur / Contributeur Davoodalhosseini, S. Mohammad R.
Description ii, 80 p. : col. charts
Numéro de catalogue
  • FB3-5/2017-15E-PDF
Descripteurs Capital markets
Financial institutions
Regulation
Policy
Demander des formats alternatifs
Pour demander une publication dans un format alternatif, remplissez le formulaire électronique des publications du gouvernement du Canada. Utilisez le champ du formulaire «question ou commentaire» pour spécifier la publication demandée.
Date de modification :