| 000 | 00000nam 2200000za 4500 |
| 001 | 9.847797 |
| 003 | CaOODSP |
| 005 | 20221107153524 |
| 007 | cr ||||||||||| |
| 008 | 171127s2017 oncd #ob f000 0 eng d |
| 040 | |aCaOODSP|beng |
| 041 | |aeng|bfre |
| 043 | |an-cn--- |
| 086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2017-48E-PDF |
| 100 | 1 |aCarter, Thomas. |
| 245 | 10|aOptimal interbank regulation |h[electronic resource] / |cby Thomas J. Carter. |
| 260 | |aOttawa : |bBank of Canada, |c2017. |
| 300 | |aii, 63 p. : |bgraphs |
| 490 | 1 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2017-48 |
| 500 | |a"November 2017." |
| 504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references. |
| 520 | |a"Recent years have seen renewed interest in the regulation of interbank markets. A review of the literature in this area identifies two gaps: first, the literature has tended to make ad hoc assumptions about the interbank contract space, which makes it difficult to generate convincing policy prescriptions; second, the literature has tended to focus on ex-post interventions that kick in only after an interbank disruption has come underway (e.g., open-market operations, lender-of-last-resort interventions, bail-outs), rather than ex-ante prudential policies. In this paper, I take steps toward addressing both these gaps, namely by building a simple model for the interbank market in which banks optimally choose the form of their interbank contracts. I show that the model delivers episodes that qualitatively resemble the interbank disruptions witnessed during the financial crisis. Some important implications for policy then emerge. In particular, I show that optimal policy requires careful coordination between ex-post and ex-ante interventions, with the ex-ante component surprisingly doing most of the heavy lifting. This suggests that previous literature has underemphasized the role that ex-ante interventions have to play in optimal interbank regulation."--Abstract, p. ii. |
| 546 | |aText in English, abstract in English and French. |
| 692 | 07|2gccst|aBanks |
| 692 | 07|2gccst|aRegulations |
| 692 | 07|2gccst|aInternational finance |
| 710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
| 830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2017-48.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
| 856 | 40|qPDF|s890 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2017-48-eng.pdf |