00000nam 2200000za 4500 9.867624 CaOODSP 20221107162350 cr ||||||||||| 190125s2018 onc #o f|0| 0 eng d CaOODSP eng eng fre n-cn--- FB3-5/2018-60E-PDF Xie, Erhao. Inference in games without Nash equilibrium [electronic resource] : application to restaurants’ competition in opening hours / by Erhao Xie. [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, 2018. iii, 59 p. Bank of Canada staff working paper, 1701-9397 ; 2018-60 "December 2018." Includes bibliographic references. "This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming thatplayers have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions. I show that in games where one player has more actions than the other player, the payoff function is partially identified with neither equilibrium restrictions nor the usual exclusion restrictions. Furthermore, if the cardinality of players’ action sets varies across games, then the payoff and belief functions are point identified up to scale normalizations and the restriction of equilibrium beliefs is testable"--Abstract. Includes abstract in French. gccst Statistical analysis gccst Market analysis gccst Restaurants Bank of Canada. Staff working paper (Bank of Canada) 1701-9397 ; 2018-60. (CaOODSP)9.806221 PDF 1.56 MB https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2018-60-eng.pdf