000 01997cam  2200313za 4500
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008190125s2018    onc    #o    f|0| 0 eng d
040 |aCaOODSP|beng
041 |aeng|bfre
043 |an-cn---
0861 |aFB3-5/2018-60E-PDF
1001 |aXie, Erhao.
24510|aInference in games without Nash equilibrium |h[electronic resource] : |bapplication to restaurants’ competition in opening hours / |cby Erhao Xie.
260 |a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada, |c2018.
300 |aiii, 59 p.
4901 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2018-60
500 |a"December 2018."
504 |aIncludes bibliographic references.
520 |a"This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming thatplayers have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions. I show that in games where one player has more actions than the other player, the payoff function is partially identified with neither equilibrium restrictions nor the usual exclusion restrictions. Furthermore, if the cardinality of players’ action sets varies across games, then the payoff and belief functions are point identified up to scale normalizations and the restriction of equilibrium beliefs is testable"--Abstract.
546 |aIncludes abstract in French.
69207|2gccst|aStatistical analysis
69207|2gccst|aMarket analysis
69207|2gccst|aRestaurants
7102 |aBank of Canada.
830#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2018-60.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
85640|qPDF|s1.56 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2018-60-eng.pdf