Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion / by Shota Ichihashi. : FB3-5/2019-10E-PDF
"This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of the designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I solve a problem of how to maximize a receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information: Whenever the designer can increase the receiver’s payoffs by restricting the sender’s information, the receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of the game in which the receiver persuades the sender"--Abstract, page ii.
Lien permanent pour cette publication :
publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.870922&sl=1
Ministère/Organisme | Bank of Canada. |
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Titre | Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion / by Shota Ichihashi. |
Titre de la série | Bank of Canada staff working paper, 1701-9397 ; 2019-10 |
Type de publication | Série - Voir l'enregistrement principal |
Langue | [Anglais] |
Format | Électronique |
Document électronique | |
Note(s) | "February 2019." Includes bibliographical references. Includes abstract in French. |
Information sur la publication | Ottawa, Ontario, Canada : Bank of Canada = Banque du Canada, 2019. ©2019 |
Auteur / Contributeur | Ichihashi, Shota, author. |
Description | 1 online resource (ii, 24 pages) : graphs. |
Numéro de catalogue |
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Descripteurs | Economic policy Information policy Models |
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