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| 02582cam 2200349zi 4500 |
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001 | 9.878552 |
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003 | CaOODSP |
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005 | 20221107165254 |
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006 | m go d f |
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007 | cr |n||||||||| |
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008 | 190827t20192019onc #ob f000 0 eng d |
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040 | |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP |
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043 | |an-cn--- |
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086 | 1 |aFB3-5/2019-30E-PDF |
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100 | 1 |aAllen, Jason, |eauthor. |
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245 | 10|aResolving failed banks : |buncertainty, multiple bidding & auction design / |cby Jason Allen [and three others]. |
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246 | 2 |aResolving failed banks : |buncertainty, multiple bidding and auction design |
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264 | 1|aOttawa : |bBank of Canada, |c2019. |
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264 | 4|c©2019 |
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300 | |a1 online resource (ii, 54 pages). |
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336 | |atext|btxt|2rdacontent |
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337 | |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia |
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338 | |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier |
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490 | 1 |aBank of Canada staff working paper, |x1701-9397 ; |v2019-30 |
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500 | |a"August 2019." |
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504 | |aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 41-43). |
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520 | |a"The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) resolves insolvent banks using an auction process in which bidding is multidimensional and the rule used to evaluate bids along the different dimensions is proprietary. Uncertainty about the scoring rule leads banks to simultaneously submit multiple differentiated bids. This resolution mechanism typically results in considerable losses for the FDIC—$90 billion during the financial crisis. The objective of this paper is to see whether the mechanism could be improved. To do so, we propose a methodology for analyzing auction environments where bids are ranked according to multiple attributes chosen by bidders, but where there is uncertaintyabout the scoring rule used to evaluate the different components of the bids. Using this framework, which extends structural estimation techniques for combinatorial auctions, and FDIC data summarizing bids, we back out the underlying preferences of banks for failed institutions. With these we perform counterfactuals in which we eliminate uncertainty and/or multiple bidding. Our findings suggest that the FDIC could reduce the cost of resolution by around 17 percent by announcing the scoring rule before bidding begins"--Abstract. |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aFinancial institutions |
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692 | 07|2gccst|aStatistical analysis |
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710 | 2 |aBank of Canada. |
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830 | #0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|x1701-9397 ; |v2019-30.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221 |
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856 | 40|qPDF|s1.45 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2019-30-eng.pdf |
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