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008	200428t20202020onca    ob   f000 0 eng d
040	|aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
086	1 |aFB3-5/2020-11E-PDF
100	1 |aDavoodalhosseini, S. Mohammad R., |eauthor.
245	10|aOptimal taxation in asset markets with adverse selection / |cby Seyed Mohammadreza Davoodalhosseini.
264	1|aOttawa, Ontario, Canada : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2020.
264	4|c©2020
300	|a1 online resource (iii, 31, 16 pages) : |bcolour illustrations.
336	|atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337	|acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338	|aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
490	1 |aStaff working paper = Document de travail du personnel, |x1701-9397 ; |v2020-11
500	|a"Last updated: April 3, 2020."
504	|aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 30-31).
520	3 |a"Constrained efficiency is characterized in an asset market, subject to search frictions, where sellers are privately informed about the type of their asset. The type determines the opportunity cost of the asset for sellers and the quality of the asset for buyers. The constrained efficient allocation can be implemented using a sales tax schedule. The role of these taxes is to redistribute resources between different types of sellers to relax incentive constraints. The optimal tax schedule strictly increases welfare compared with the laissez-faire equilibrium, can sometimes lead to an allocation that Pareto dominates the equilibrium, and can sometimes lead to the first-best allocation (i.e., taxation can correct all inefficiencies caused by adverse selection). The shape of the optimal tax schedule is also investigated. If the quality of assets for buyers is a monotonic function of the sellers' opportunity cost (e.g., more distressed sellers have lower-quality assets), the schedule requires that the trading of low-quality assets be subsidized and trading of high-quality assets be taxed, although the schedule is not necessarily monotone in the quality or price of the assets. Otherwise, trading of some low-quality assets may be taxed and trading of some high-quality assets may be subsidized"--Abstract, page iii.
650	0|aEfficient market theory|xEconometric models.
650	0|aSales tax|xEconometric models.
650	6|aHypothèse du marché efficient|xModèles économétriques.
650	6|aTax de vente|xModèles économétriques.
710	2 |aBank of Canada.
830	#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|v2020-11.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
856	40|qPDF|s1.20 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2020/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2020-11-eng.pdf