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001	9.889525
003	CaOODSP
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006	m     o  d f
007	cr |n|||||||||
008	200720t20202020oncd    ob   f000 0 eng d
040	|aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
043	|an-cn---
086	1 |aFB3-5/2020-30E-PDF
100	1 |aArifovic, Jasmina, |d1959- |eauthor.
245	10|aTen isn’t large! Group size and coordination in a large-scale experiment / |cby Jasmina Arifovic, Cars Hommes, Anita Kopányi-Peuker and Isabelle Salle.
264	1|aOttawa, Ontario, Canada : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2020.
264	4|c©2020
300	|a1 online resource (ii, 67 pages) : |bgraphs.
336	|atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337	|acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338	|aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
490	1 |aStaff working paper = Document de travail du personnel, |x1701-9397 ; |v2020-30
500	|aCover title.
500	|a"Last updated: July 6, 2020."
504	|aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 46-49).
520	0 |a"This paper provides experimental evidence on coordination within genuinely large groupsthat could proxy the atomistic nature of real-world markets and organizations. We use abank-run game where the two pure-strategy equilibria “run” and “wait” can be ranked bypayoff and risk-dominance and a random sequence of public announcements introducesstochastic sunspot equilibria. We find systematic group size differences that theory fails topredict. In the presence of strategic uncertainty, the behavior of small groups is uninformative of behavior in large groups: in contrast to groups of 10, large groups only coordinate on the safest but Pareto-inferior “run” strategy and never coordinate on sunspots. Our results entail a series of theoretical and experimental implications"--Abstract, page ii.
650	0|aEquilibrium (Economics)|xSimulation games.
650	6|aÉquilibre (Économie politique)|xJeux de simulation.
710	2 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body.
830	#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|v2020-30.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
856	40|qPDF|s2.16 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2020/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2020-30-eng.pdf