000 02231nam  2200361zi 4500
0019.902838
003CaOODSP
00520221107180054
006m     o  d f      
007cr |n|||||||||
008210825t20212021oncd    ob   f|0| 0 eng d
040 |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
043 |an-cn---
0861 |aFB3-5/2021-21E-PDF
1001 |aSchroth, Josef, |eauthor.
24510|aOptimal monetary and macroprudential policies / |cby Josef Schroth.
264 1|aOttawa, Ontario, Canada : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2021.
264 4|c©2021
300 |a1 online resource (ii, 41 pages) : |bcharts.
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
4901 |aStaff working paper = |aDocument de travail du personnel, |x1701-9397 ; |v2021-21
500 |a"Last updated: May 7, 2021."
504 |aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 38-41).
520 |a"This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where banks make risky loans to firms and provide liquidity services in the form of deposits to households. For given bank equity, market discipline implies that banks can take more deposits when assets are safer or more profitable. Banks respond to loan losses by making their balance sheets safer—i.e., they reduce risky lending sharply and accumulate more safe bonds. In contrast, a social planner would respond by making banks temporarily more profitable such that a riskier balance sheet can be maintained. A planner would temporarily reduce the expansiveness of monetary policy to avoid bonds becoming too liquid in support of the liquidity premium banks earn via deposits. Specifically, when bank equity is low, then optimal monetary policy stabilizes output by supporting bank lending rather than employment"--Abstract, page ii.
650 0|aMonetary policy.
650 0|aBank loans.
650 6|aPolitique monétaire.
650 6|aPrêts bancaires.
7102 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body.
830#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|v2021-21.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
85640|qPDF|s459 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2021/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2021-21-eng.pdf