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040 |aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
043 |an-cn---
0861 |aFB3-5/2021-59E-PDF
1001 |aLivshits, Igor, |eauthor.
24510|aDemocratic political economy of financial regulation / |cby Igor Livshits and Youngmin Park.
264 1|aOttawa, Ontario, Canada : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2021.
264 4|c©2021
300 |a1 online resource (ii, 51 pages).
336 |atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337 |acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338 |aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
4901 |aStaff working paper = |aDocument de travail du personnel, |x1701-9397 ; |v2021-59
500 |a"Last updated: November 26, 2021."
504 |aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 32-34).
520 |a"This paper offers a simple theory of inefficiently lax financial regulation arising as an outcome of a democratic political process. Lax financial regulation encourages some banks to issue risky residential mortgages. In the event of an adverse aggregate housing shock, these banks fail. When banks do not fully internalize the losses from such failure (due to limited liability), they offer mortgages at less than actuarially fair interest rates. This opens the door to homeownership for young, low net-worth individuals. In turn, the additional demand from these new home-buyers drives up house prices"--Abstract.
650 0|aBanks and banking|xRisk management|xEconometric models.
650 0|aInterest rates|xEconometric models.
650 6|aBanques|xGestion du risque|xModèles économétriques.
650 6|aTaux d'intérêt|xModèles économétriques.
7102 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body.
830#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|v2021-59.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
85640|qPDF|s707 KB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2021/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2021-59-eng.pdf