000	02700nam  2200385zi 4500
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008	240829t20242024onca    ob   f000 0 eng d
040	|aCaOODSP|beng|erda|cCaOODSP
041	0 |aeng|beng|bfre
086	1 |aFB3-5/2024-24E-PDF
100	1 |aHoelzemann, Johannes, |eauthor.
245	10|aNon-parametric identification and testing of quantal response equilibrium / |cby Johannes Hoelzemann, Ryan Webb and Erhao Xie.
264	1|a[Ottawa] : |bBank of Canada = Banque du Canada, |c2024.
264	4|c©2024
300	|a1 online resource (ii, 48, 4, 6, 5, 12, 14 pages) : |billustrations (chiefly colour).
336	|atext|btxt|2rdacontent
337	|acomputer|bc|2rdamedia
338	|aonline resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
490	1 |aStaff working paper = Document de travail du personnel, |y1701-9397 ; |v2024-24
500	|aISSN assigned to different series.
500	|a"Last updated: June 17, 2024."
504	|aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 46-48).
520	3 |a"We study the falsifiability and identification of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) when each player's utility and error distribution are relaxed to be unknown non-parametric functions. Using variations of players' choices across a series of games, we first show that both the utility function and the distribution of errors are non-parametrically over-identified. This result further suggests a straightforward testing procedure for QRE that achieves the desired type-1 error and maintains a small type-2 error. To apply this methodology, we conduct an experimental study of the matching pennies game. Our non-parametric estimates strongly reject the conventional logit choice probability. Moreover, when the utility and the error distribution are sufficiently flexible and heterogeneous, the quantal response hypothesis cannot be rejected for 70% of participants. However, strong assumptions such as risk neutrality, logistically distributed errors and homogeneity lead to substantially higher rejection rates"--Abstract, page ii.
546	|aIncludes abstracts in English and French.
650	0|aEquilibrium (Economics)|xEconometric models.
650	0|aGame theory|xEconometric models.
650	6|aÉquilibre (Économie politique)|xModèles économétriques.
650	6|aThéorie des jeux|xModèles économétriques.
710	2 |aBank of Canada, |eissuing body.
830	#0|aStaff working paper (Bank of Canada)|v2024-24.|w(CaOODSP)9.806221
856	40|qPDF|s3.74 MB|uhttps://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2024/banque-bank-canada/FB3-5-2024-24-eng.pdf