COMMENTARY
CHRONOLOGY
OF DEVELOPMENTS
ABORIGINAL TITLE:
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA DECISION
IN DELGAMUUKW V. BRITISH COLUMBIA
INTRODUCTION
In December 1997, the Supreme
Court of Canada issued a groundbreaking ruling containing its first definitive statement
on the content of Aboriginal title in Canada. The decision in Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia(1) also
describes the scope of protection afforded Aboriginal title under subsection 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982; defines how Aboriginal title may be proved; and outlines the justification
test for infringements of Aboriginal title.
This paper provides a summary
review of selected noteworthy findings in the Supreme Court decision on Aboriginal title.
The review is preceded by background information on common law Aboriginal title and the
constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights by subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982, concepts that meet in the Delgamuukw ruling. The prior judgments of the
British Columbia courts are also briefly canvassed.
BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Delgamuukw
Definitions of Aboriginal Title
British and Canadian courts have sought to
define the nature of the legal interest in the land of Canadas Aboriginal peoples
for many years. Under now long-established general principles developed in the case law,
the Aboriginal interest in land may be surrendered or alienated only to the federal Crown,
at which point it passes to the provincial Crown (assuming surrender outside the
territories) as an unencumbered Crown title.
Of more immediate relevance,
the courts had, by the 1970s, begun to acknowledge the existence of Aboriginal legal
rights in the land other than those provided for by treaty or statute. In particular, the
1973 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (the Court) in Calder v. The
Attorney General of British Columbia(2) ruled that "Indian title"(3) was a legal right,
independent of any form of enactment, and rooted in Aboriginal peoples historic
"occupation, possession and use" of traditional territories. As such, title
existed at the time of first contact with Europeans, whether or not it was recognized by
them.
Although some subsequent case
law provided a certain amount of guidance as to how the existence of this common law
Aboriginal title might be established,(4) it was less than fully informative as to the scope
or content of title. In the 1984 case Guerin v. The Queen,(5) four members of the Court described it
as a unique interest in land "best characterized by its general inalienability,
coupled with the fact that the Crown is under an obligation to deal with the land on the
Indians behalf when the interest is surrendered." In its 1988 decision in Canadian
Pacific Ltd. v. Paul,(6)
the Court affirmed that its analysis of Aboriginal title to that point led to the
"inescapable conclusion
that the Indian interest in land is truly sui
generis [the only one of its kind]. It is more than the right to enjoyment and
occupancy, although,
it is difficult to describe what more in traditional property
law terminology."
B. Section 35 Interpretation
The
constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights by subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982 created a new legal framework for addressing longstanding Aboriginal claims,
including claims to Aboriginal title. Because the provision recognizes and affirms, but
does not define, the "existing Aboriginal and treaty rights" of the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada, the task of determining the nature and scope of these rights has fallen
to the courts.(7)
The
Courts section 35 Aboriginal rights decisions prior to Delgamuukw largely
involved Aboriginal fishing rights. General interpretive principles stated in the
Courts groundbreaking 1990 decision, Sparrow v. R.,(8) and refined in subsequent rulings
through 1996(9) include
the following:
In subsection 35(1), the
term "existing" refers to rights that were "unextinguished" in 1982, i.e.,
not terminated or abolished;
Courts should approach the
rules of evidence in Aboriginal rights matters, and interpret the evidence presented,
conscious of the special nature of Aboriginal claims and of the evidentiary difficulties
associated with proving a right or rights originating when there were no written records.
As outlined below, the land issues raised
in the Delgamuukw case provided an opportunity for the Court to apply and adapt
these principles to Aboriginal title as a "distinct species" of constitutional
Aboriginal right.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
A. The Claim
In 1984, 35 Gitxsan and 13
Wetsuweten Hereditary Chiefs instituted proceedings against the Province of
British Columbia. They claimed, both individually and on behalf of their respective
Houses, ownership (unextinguished Aboriginal title) and resulting jurisdiction
(entitlement to govern by Aboriginal laws) over separate portions of territory in
northwest British Columbia totalling 58,000 square kilometres. The plaintiffs acknowledged
the underlying title of the Crown to these lands, but asserted that their claims
constituted a burden upon that title. Alternatively, the plaintiffs claimed unspecified
Aboriginal rights to use the territory. Compensation for lost lands and resources was also
sought.
The province counter-claimed,
arguing that the plaintiffs had no right or interest in the land, and that their claim for
compensation ought to be against the federal government.
B. The British Columbia Courts
1.
Decision at Trial
In March 1991,
Chief Justice McEachern of the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued a sweeping and
highly controversial ruling(11)
dismissing the plaintiffs claims to Aboriginal title, self-government and Aboriginal
rights in the territories at issue. Reduced to its essence, the 400-page decision:
considered the concept of
title as interchangeable with that of Aboriginal rights, and characterized the latter as
limited to those "arising from ancient occupation or use of land, to hunt, fish, take
game animals, wood, berries and other foods and materials for sustenance and generally to
use the lands in the manner they say their ancestors used them";
held that title to the land
became vested in the Imperial Crown upon its assertion of sovereignty over the mainland
colony of British Columbia in the early or mid 19th Century, and indicated
that, in any event, the plaintiffs post-contact ancestors had not exercised
jurisdiction over the territory even before that assertion;
ruled that since its entry
into Confederation in 1871, the Province of British Columbia had title to the soil of the
province, the right to dispose of Crown lands unburdened by Aboriginal title, and the
right to govern the province within the terms of section 92 of the Constitution Act,
1867;
acknowledged that the
provincial Crown did have a fiduciary obligation to permit the plaintiffs, subject to the
general law of the province, to use unoccupied Crown lands for subsistence purposes until
such time as they were put to another purpose, and not to limit such use arbitrarily;
Under Chief
Justice McEacherns reasoning, the Aboriginal title and Aboriginal right of
self-government claimed by the plaintiffs had been erased over a century previously, and
as such were precluded from qualifying as "existing" rights under subsection
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. His ruling was seen by many as seriously at
odds with Supreme Court of Canada rulings dealing with constitutional Aboriginal and
treaty rights, and was also criticized for its apparent bias in both tone and analytic
approach.(13)
2.
Decision on Appeal
The scope of
the trial courts negative findings was somewhat attenuated by the June 1993 decision
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.(14) In it, the five members of the appellate panel
were unanimous in rejecting McEachern J.s finding of "blanket
extinguishment" of all the plaintiffs Aboriginal rights by colonial or
provincial enactments,(15)
but differed as to the merits of other elements of his decision.
In the end, a 3-2 majority of
the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal only on the above point, issuing a declaration that
the Gitxsan and Wetsuweten "have unextinguished non-exclusive aboriginal
rights, other than a right of ownership or a property right," which were protected by
the common law and, since 1982, by subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982, in a large portion of the area claimed. The precise scope, content and
consequences of these rights of use and occupation were not defined by the majority, which
referred those issues back to the trial judge for determination, while recommending that
the parties resolve their differences through consultation and negotiation. All other
aspects of the plaintiffs claim were dismissed. In the view of the dissenting
justices, on the other hand, the plaintiffs Aboriginal rights to Aboriginal title or
to land and their rights of self-government had not been extinguished by the assertion of
either British or Canadian sovereignty. They, too, urged settlement of outstanding issues
by negotiation and political accommodation.
C.
The Treaty Process
In March 1994,
the Gitxsan and Wetsuweten and the Province of British Columbia were granted
leave to appeal and cross-appeal the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada. The parties then requested and obtained an adjournment of
proceedings to enable them to seek a negotiated treaty settlement. In February 1996, the
Province of British Columbia suspended negotiations with the Gitxsan owing to
"fundamental differences ... over aboriginal rights." The provinces
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs considered there was "little chance of progress in
negotiating
with the Gitxsan without further direction from the Supreme Court of
Canada."(16)
Subsequent to this breakdown, litigation was resumed. Despite some progress in their
negotiations with the province to that point, the Wetsuweten remained parties
to the proceedings.
DELGAMUUKW v. BRITISH COLUMBIA
The Court heard
arguments in the case on 16 and 17 June 1997 and released its decision on 11 December
1997. Although the six members of the Court taking part in the judgment(17) were unanimous in their
conclusions, distinct sets of reasons issued by Lamer C.J. (Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.
concurring) and La Forest J. (LHeureux-Dubé J. concurring, with McLachlin J. in
substantial agreement) differed somewhat as to the appropriate methodology to be used for
proving Aboriginal title. Only the former set of reasons is considered below.
A.
Preliminary Issues Requiring New Trial (par. 73-108)(18)
Lamer C.J. considered that the Court was
precluded from dealing with the merits of the Gitxsan and Wetsuweten claims
for two reasons. First, the individual claims originally brought by each House had been
amalgamated into two communal claims, but had not been formally amended. Because this
procedural defect was prejudicial to the provinces rights as a litigant, the correct
remedy was a new trial.
Second, a new trial was
necessary so that the complex and voluminous factual evidence in the case could be
assessed in accordance with principles having specific application to Aboriginal claims
such as those of the Gitxsan and Wetsuweten.(19) In essence, these principles require trial courts
to adapt the rules of evidence in light of difficulties of proof intrinsic to the
adjudication of Aboriginal claims,
so that the aboriginal perspective on
their practices, customs and traditions and on their relationship with the land, are given
due weight by the courts. In practical terms, this requires the courts to come to terms
with the oral histories of aboriginal societies, which, for many aboriginal nations, are
the only record of their past
[and which] play a crucial role in the litigation of
aboriginal rights (par. 84).
Lamer C.J. found that the
trial judges treatment of the various forms of oral history presented by the
plaintiffs to prove traditional occupation and use of the territories claimed had failed
to satisfy these principles which, as he noted, had been formulated subsequent to the
trial decision.(20)
B. Aboriginal Title
in Canada (par. 109-139)
The Chief
Justice disagreed with both parties characterization of Aboriginal title, that of
the Gitxsan and Wetsuweten for being too broad, that of the province for being
too narrow. In his view, the content of Aboriginal title "lies somewhere in
between" (par. 111).
1. Features of
Aboriginal Title (par. 112-115)
Lamer C.J. identified the sui generis [i.e.,
unique] nature of Aboriginal title as the unifying principle underlying its various
dimensions. These are:
inalienability, in that
lands held pursuant to Aboriginal title may be transferred or surrendered only to the
Crown: this does not mean, however, that Aboriginal title "is a non-proprietary
interest which amounts to no more than a licence to use and occupy the land and cannot
compete on an equal footing with other proprietary interests" (par. 113);
source, in that Aboriginal
title arises from (1) occupation of Canada by Aboriginal peoples prior to the Royal
Proclamation of 1763: under common law principles, the physical fact of occupation is
proof of possession in law; and (2) the relationship between common law and pre-existing
systems of Aboriginal law;
These features cannot be
explained fully under either common law rules of real property, or property rules of
Aboriginal legal systems.
2. Content of
Aboriginal Title (par. 116-132)
a.
Includes right to exclusive use/occupation of the land for
various
purposes (par. 116-124)
The Chief
Justice cited three grounds for rejecting the provinces restriction of Aboriginal
title to the right to use the land only for activities arising from practices or
traditions that were integral to the distinctive culture of the group claiming title.
First, the Canadian case law in the field made it clear that Aboriginal title is not
limited to such uses. Second, legal principles governing the Aboriginal interest in
reserve lands and in lands held pursuant to Aboriginal title are the same and, under the Indian
Act, the uses and benefits to which reserve lands can be put are very broad, and in no
way confined as suggested. Third, the Indian Oil and Gas Act providing for oil and
gas exploration on surrendered reserve lands presumes that the Aboriginal interest in land
includes mineral rights, which are themselves included in Aboriginal title. Lands held
pursuant to Aboriginal title should be capable of the same forms of non-traditional
exploitation.
b.
Land use must be compatible with the nature of attachment to
the
land (par. 125-132)
Lamer C.J.
described limits on the content of Aboriginal title as reflecting its sui generis
nature. In relation to prior occupation as the source of Aboriginal title, the applicable
law seeks both to determine historic rights and "to afford legal protection to prior
occupation in the present day" in "recognition of the importance of the
continuity of the relationship of an aboriginal community to its land over time"
(par. 126). Since continuity of relationship also applies to the future, lands subject to
Aboriginal title cannot be put to uses that are "irreconcilable with the nature of
the occupation of that land and the relationship that the particular group has had with
the land which together have given rise to aboriginal title in the first place" (par.
128). For example, a group successfully claiming Aboriginal title to land that was
occupied as a hunting ground may not use the land in such a way as to destroy its value
for hunting.
In the Chief
Justices view, these considerations are also relevant to the inalienability of lands
held pursuant to Aboriginal title, in that alienation would terminate both entitlement to
occupy the land and any special relationship with it. Inalienability suggests that the
lands in question are more than a commodity. Rather, they hold inherent value for the
community with Aboriginal title and cannot be put to uses by that community that would
destroy that value.
Significantly,
Lamer C.J. emphasized that this general limitation on the use of lands does not
restrict land use to traditional activities, since this would amount to a "legal
straitjacket" on those having a "legitimate legal claim to the land." That
is, a full range of uses of the land may be undertaken, subject to the "overarching
limit" arising from the special nature of the Aboriginal title in the land in
question (par.132).
The Chief Justice also noted
that nothing in this approach precludes the surrender to the Crown of lands held pursuant
to Aboriginal title; in fact, such lands must be surrendered and converted into non-title
lands if Aboriginal peoples wish to use them in a manner incompatible with their title.
3. Aboriginal
Title and Section 35 (par. 133-139)
Delgamuukw confirmed
that common law Aboriginal title, recognized as a common law Aboriginal right
prior to 1982, was "constitutionalized
in its full form" by section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 (par. 133).(21)
Lamer C.J.
reiterated the Courts previous findings describing Aboriginal title as distinct from
other Aboriginal rights under subsection 35(1) "because it arises where the
connection of a group with a piece of land was of a central significance to their
distinctive culture" (par. 137). The degree of connection with the land is pivotal in
determining the scope of constitutional Aboriginal rights claimed. At one end of the
spectrum of rights are those practices or traditions integral to a distinctive Aboriginal
culture, but where the use and occupation of land on which the activities occur do not
support a claim of Aboriginal title. In the middle, such traditional activities may be
intimately related to a specific piece of land, so that a group is able to demonstrate a
"site-specific" right to engage in those activities, but not to establish title
to that land. Both forms of activity are protected by subsection 35(1). Finally,
At the other end of the
spectrum, there is aboriginal title itself.
[A]boriginal title confers more than
the right to engage in site-specific activities which are aspects of the practices,
customs and traditions of distinctive aboriginal cultures.
What aboriginal title
confers is the right to the land itself. (par. 138) (emphasis added)
C. Proof of
Aboriginal Title (par. 140-159)
The Chief Justice noted that
assessment of Aboriginal title claims required adaptation of the Courts existing
"test" for Aboriginal rights claims relating to activities on the land.
Aboriginal title, on the other hand, is a right to the land, which may itself be used for
activities that, being "parasitic on the underlying title," need not be
individually protected by subsection 35(1) (par. 140). Both tests, however, shared broad
similarities.
1.
The land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty (par. 144-151)
a. Applicable Time Frame
(par. 144-145)
Lamer J.
concluded that the period prior to contact, used in adjudicating Aboriginal
rights claims to engage in activities, is an inappropriate time frame in Aboriginal title
cases:
Later circumstances may be
relevant to title, for instance in cases of dispossession of traditional lands occurring
after sovereignty.
b. Occupancy (par. 146-151)
To Lamer C.J.,
both the common law and the Aboriginal perspective on land, including but not limited to
Aboriginal legal systems, are relevant for purposes of establishing occupancy. With
respect to the former, the fact of physical occupation proves legal possession of the
land, which in turn grounds title to it. Such occupation can be established in many ways,
including construction, cultivation and resource exploitation; when assessing whether
occupation is sufficient to ground title, factors such as the size, manner of life,
resources and technological capacity of the claiming group should be considered.
Furthermore, since the requirement of pre-sovereignty occupation is sufficient to
establish the central significance of the land to the culture of the claiming group, the
test for Aboriginal title need not explicitly include the latter element.
2.
In certain cases, there must be continuity between present and
pre-sovereignty
occupation (par. 152-154)
In
recognition of the potential scarcity of conclusive evidence of pre-sovereignty
occupation, the Chief Justice stipulated that a group claiming Aboriginal title may prove
such occupation through evidence of present occupation, supplemented by evidence of
continuity. The claiming group need not establish "an unbroken chain of
continuity," but rather "substantial maintenance of (their) connection"
with the land (par. 153). Provided this substantial connection has been maintained, a
claim to Aboriginal title need not be precluded by alterations in the nature of the
occupation between sovereignty and the present.
3.
Occupation must have been exclusive at sovereignty (par. 155-159)
Lamer C.J.
noted that this requirement, like occupation, is proved with reference to both common law
and Aboriginal perspectives. Thus, notwithstanding the common law principle of exclusivity
linked to fee simple ownership, the test for exclusive occupation in Aboriginal title
claims must consider the context of the Aboriginal society in question at sovereignty. In
this light, exclusive occupation can be demonstrated, depending on the circumstances, even
if other Aboriginal groups were present on or frequented the lands claimed. In addition,
the exclusivity requirement need not preclude the possibility of joint title shared
between two or more Aboriginal nations, for instance where more than one group shared a
particular piece of land, recognizing each others entitlement to the exclusion of
others. Moreover, evidence of non-exclusive occupation may still establish shared,
site-specific Aboriginal rights short of title, for example on lands adjacent to those
subject to a title claim and shared for hunting by a number of groups.
D.
Justification of Infringements of Aboriginal Title (par. 160-169)
1. General Principles (par.
160-164)
a.
The infringement must further a compelling/substantial
legislative
objective (par. 161)
The Chief
Justice reiterated his view that substantial legislative objectives are those directed at
the purposes underlying the constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights, i.e.,
recognition of Aboriginal peoples prior occupation of North America, and
reconciliation of that occupation with the Crowns assertion of sovereignty. The
latter purpose is particularly relevant at the justification stage: because Aboriginal
societies are part of a broader community over which the Crown is sovereign, limitations
on Aboriginal rights will sometimes be justified in the pursuit of objectives of
importance to the community as a whole, and are a necessary part of the reconciliation of
Aboriginal societies with the broader community.
b. The
infringement must be consistent with the fiduciary
relationship
(par. 162-164)
The nature
of the Crowns fiduciary duty toward Aboriginal peoples depends, in Lamer C.J.s
view, on the legal and factual context at issue. While that duty may sometimes demand that
Aboriginal interests be given priority, in other contexts it may involve further questions
such as whether the infringement is minimal, whether fair compensation is available, and
whether the Aboriginal group has been consulted. The degree of scrutiny of infringing
measures required by the fiduciary duty will also vary depending on the nature of the
Aboriginal right at issue.
2. Application
to Aboriginal Title (par. 165-169)
a.
A broad range of legislative objectives may justify infringement
(par.
165)
Lamer C.J.
held that most of these objectives relate to reconciling Aboriginal peoples prior
occupation with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, and thus, to the situation of
Aboriginal societies within the broader Canadian community:
(T)he
development of agriculture, forestry, mining and hydroelectric power, the general economic
development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or
endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign
populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with
this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringement of aboriginal title. (par.
165)
The question of whether an
infringing measure is related to such objectives will require assessment on a case by case
basis.
b.
The nature of the fiduciary duty is determined by the nature of
the
title (par. 166-169)
The Chief
Justice pinpointed three aspects of Aboriginal title as relevant in this respect. First,
the right to exclusive occupation and use of the land influences the degree of scrutiny of
infringing actions. For instance, a fiduciary duty requiring that Aboriginal title be
given priority does not entail an absolute requirement, but rather a government
demonstration that the process of resource allocation and the actual allocation reflect
the prior interest of the holders of Aboriginal title. Examples of such a demonstration
include accommodating Aboriginal participation in resource development, conferral of fee
simple or resource exploitation authorizations that reflect prior occupation, reduction of
economic barriers to Aboriginal uses of their lands, and so forth. This issue may involve
an assessment of the various interests at stake in the resources; difficulties in
determining the value of the Aboriginal interest in the land may also be expected.
Second, the
fact that Aboriginal title includes the right to choose the uses of land suggests that the
fiduciary relationship may be satisfied by involving Aboriginal titleholders in decisions
respecting their lands. While the Crown always has a duty of consultation, the nature and
scope of that duty vary with the circumstances. Lamer C.J. stressed that even in rare
cases of minor infringement, "when the minimum acceptable standard is consultation,
this consultation must be in good faith, and with the intention of substantially
addressing the concerns of the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. In most cases,
it will be significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even require the
full consent of an aboriginal nation" (par. 168).
Third, as a result of the
"inescapably economic aspect" of Aboriginal title, fair compensation will
ordinarily be required to fulfil the Crowns fiduciary duty when Aboriginal title is
infringed. The amount of compensation will vary according to the nature of the Aboriginal
title in question, the severity of the infringement, and the extent to which Aboriginal
interests are accommodated.
E. Right of Self-Government
(par. 170-71)
The Chief
Justice observed that the need for a new trial precluded the Court from dealing with this
aspect of the plaintiffs claim. Furthermore, under the Courts previous case
law, self-government claims "cannot be framed in excessively general terms" as
had been done in the present case (par. 170).
F.
British Columbias Cross-Appeal (par. 172-183)
Lamer C.J.
rejected the provinces claim that it had enjoyed the power to extinguish Aboriginal
rights, including Aboriginal title, from the time it joined Confederation in 1871 until
the entrenchment of subsection 35(1) in the Constitution. His reasons include findings
that:
Subsection 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867 gave the federal government exclusive legislative authority in relation to
"Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians," which encompasses the jurisdiction to
legislate in relation to Aboriginal title, including its extinguishment;
Although, under the terms of
section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, underlying title to lands in the
province vested with the provincial Crown, the provision makes provincial ownership
subject to "any Interest other than that of the Province" in those lands:
Aboriginal title is such an interest;
Provincial laws of general
application, i.e., which do not single out Indians for special treatment, do apply
to Indians and Indian lands, but may not have the effect of extinguishing Aboriginal
rights, in part because such laws would be unable to satisfy the "clear and plain
intent" standard for the extinguishment of rights without exceeding the
provinces jurisdiction;
Section 88 of the Indian
Act incorporates by reference provincial laws of general application which would not
otherwise apply to Indians, but does not allow these laws to extinguish Aboriginal rights:
not only does the provision not contain the required "clear and plain intent,"
but its explicit reference to treaty rights suggests a clear absence of intention to
undermine Aboriginal rights.
G. Conclusion and
Disposition (par. 184-186)
Lamer
C.J. allowed the appeal in part, dismissed the provinces cross-appeal, and ordered a
new trial. He explicitly did not encourage a resumption of litigation, however, advising
the parties to settle their dispute through negotiations instead. In the Chief
Justices view, "[t]hose negotiations should also include other aboriginal
nations which have a stake in the territory claimed. Moreover, the Crown is under a moral,
if not a legal, duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in good faith."
Negotiated settlements "with good faith and give and take on all sides" would,
he concluded, achieve the reconciliation purpose of subsection 35(1) (par. 186).
COMMENTARY
The
Supreme Court of Canadas Delgamuukw decision was expected to have
significant, if undetermined, repercussions on the future negotiation and settlement of
comprehensive land claims based on Aboriginal title, land use policy and Aboriginal title
litigation in those regions of the country where traditional Aboriginal lands have not
been ceded by treaty. These include not only most of British Columbia, but also, for
example, parts of Quebec and Atlantic Canada.
Delgamuukw
continues to represent a momentous affirmation of the existence and constitutionally
protected status of Aboriginal title in Canada. It seems important, however, to underscore
the fact that the Court did not rule on the merits of the Gitxsan and
Wetsuweten Aboriginal title claim. The effects of its decision are therefore
more directive than conclusive. Delgamuukw provided government, Aboriginal
claimants, and the lower courts with comprehensive new guidelines for the future
settlement or litigation of the Gitxsan and Wetsuweten and other comprehensive
land claims.
In practical
terms, the various parties responses to the Delgamuukw decision remain to be
fully played out in terms of policy developments, negotiation processes and the frequency
of recourse to the judicial system. Given the history of land claim negotiations, the fact
that the Court recommended that ongoing land claim disputes be resolved through
negotiation offers no assurance that its guidelines will in fact facilitate the
negotiation process or preclude litigation in relation to individual claims. On the other
hand, the Delgamuukw ruling provided a compelling impulse to the parties to
reaffirm the treaty process through negotiation.
In short, the Delgamuukw
decision established an unprecedented theoretical framework that represents the basis for
developing the law of Aboriginal title in Canada, rather than the culmination of the
laws development. The law of Aboriginal title will continue to evolve as principles
of the Delgamuukw framework are implemented.
CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENTS
The concluding
portion of this document lists some noteworthy post-December 1997 developments that are
related, directly or indirectly, to the Supreme Court of Canadas Delgamuukw ruling.
January 1998
The British Columbia Treaty
Commission (BCTC)(22)
urged federal and provincial governments and First Nations to "work together to
re-invigorate the treaty process or face the likelihood of increased economic uncertainty
through litigation and renewed confrontation." The then Chief Commissioner
characterized the Delgamuukw decision as "already having a major impact on the
B.C. treaty process" in which approximately 50 B.C. First Nations were engaged. He
acknowledged both that "[n]ew mandates and approaches, given the complexity of issues
facing [the parties], wont happen overnight," and that Delgamuukw could
be seen by First Nations as "strengthening their positions and lowering the
traditional barriers to litigation as an alternative to negotiation."(23)
February 1998
The BCTC noted that the two
levels of government and the First Nations Summit, the Aboriginal party to the creation of
the BCTC regime, had agreed to collaborate in identifying changes to the treaty process
that might be required by the Delgamuukw ruling. In its view, all parties involved
recognized that "the Supreme Court left many questions unanswered which are best
answered through negotiations. A court may declare aboriginal title to a specific area,
but there will still be a need to negotiate jurisdiction and to reconcile aboriginal and
non-aboriginal interests."(24)
March 1998
The federal Minister of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the B.C. Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and the
Grand Chief of the First Nations Summit Task Group announced the anticipated joint review
of the B.C. treaty process in light of the Delgamuukw ruling, with the principal
objective identified as "finding ways to expedite the reconciliation of the interests
of Canada, British Columbia and First Nations." The parties also agreed on the need
to engage third parties and business leaders in a broader dialogue about the Supreme Court
ruling. A senior-level committee was mandated to meet over a two-month period to examine
the decisions impact on the treaty process and to "improve the treaty process
to achieve the agreements necessary for economic and social stability in B.C."(25)
The Confederacy of Nations
of the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) adopted resolutions calling, in part, for
implementation of Delgamuukw principles through reform of federal comprehensive
land claims policies, and for the replacement of "offensive" federal laws and
policies by measures consistent with the Courts directions in Delgamuukw.(26)
April 1998
The treaty process review
commenced, with senior officials for Canada, B.C. and First Nations meeting in two
three-day sessions, during which working groups were established on specific issues.
Issuing from this round, the participants agreed to recommend an Action Plan to their
Principals for review. Topics addressed in this plan included Aboriginal title,
accelerated negotiations on certain treaty components, capacity-building, and certainty.(27)
May 1998
Participants in the annual
Business at the Summit forum of First Nations and non-Aboriginal businesspeople
acknowledged that the Delgamuukw decision had increased uncertainty about investing
in B.C. They also, however, saw the ruling as supportive of developing partnerships
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities.(28)
June 1998
The Leader of the Opposition
called on the federal government to enact legislation to end uncertainty resulting from
the Delgamuukw decision, and establish rules on Aboriginal title.(29)
In its annual report, the
BCTC named the Delgamuukw decision as the defining event of 1997-98, and identified
some matters that were under discussion in the tripartite review, such as recognition that
land, resource and cash issues should be addressed earlier in the treaty process, and the
need to improve the current-six stage process. In addition, the BCTC stated that
overlapping claims and the implications of Delgamuukw for consultation processes
and interim measures were also outstanding issues requiring the parties attention:
Delgamuukw
has escalated First Nations demands for a role in dealings by government over lands
and resources within their territories. There are too many First Nations in the process
for that to be achieved through treaties alone. Other means must be found. Delgamuukw
suggests consultation processes become negotiation processes so that interim measures and
economic development agreements become treaty building blocks.
The BCTC urged the parties to
re-establish the tripartite review process, which was described as being at a standstill
owing to B.C.s decision to engage Canada and the First Nations Summit Task Group in
bilateral talks. It further noted that, while nearly all First Nations in the B.C. treaty
process preferred negotiation, they also "expect government mandates and approaches
to change in response to Delgamuukw."(30)
July 1998
In what was described as the
first court case to deal with B.C. land claim issues since Delgamuukw, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the denial of an interlocutory injunction to the Kitkatla
Band, which had sought to prevent logging on land to which they claim title, pending a
trial on the title question. In making its decision, the Court took the position that
nothing in the Delgamuukw ruling had changed the law relating to injunctions. Of
central importance to the Kitkatla Bands case was the scope of the provincial
Crowns obligation to consult in cases where Aboriginal title is asserted but not yet
established. The B.C. courts recognized this as a serious issue.(31)
In keeping with the
parties recognition of the need to address issues related to First Nations
capacity, the federal government announced the formation of a thirteen-person Capacity
Panel with representation from Aboriginal communities (interior and coastal), the resource
sector, the BCTC and other fields.(32) The
role of the Panel is described as
[looking] at existing programs
and, through consultation with industry and First Nation communities, [identifying]
capacity enhancement needs. Based on this information, the panel will: (1) make
recommendations on how current programs might be readjusted to better fit the needs; (2)
identify areas where there are gaps between current programs and capacity
enhancement needs; (3)
identify joint opportunities to enhance First Nation
capacity to negotiate and implement treaties and manage land and resources; and, (4)
assess funding requirements for additional capacity initiatives.(33)
The Panel was expected to
present its recommendations to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development by
the end of 1998. The federal government indicated that, over the next three to five years,
resources would be made available to support initiatives recommended by the Panel; basic
financial support to assist First Nation capacity-building would be approximately $3
million per year.(34)
September 1998
In an Accord Between the
Province of British Columbia and The Hereditary Chiefs Of The Wetsuweten
People, the parties agreed to address issues raised by the Delgamuukw ruling and to
"reinvigorate" treaty discussions. The agreement includes commitments to work
together in resource planning and development and economic development; focus on economic
development as a priority for two existing bilateral working groups studying lands and
resources and human services; collaborate on job training and development initiatives;
possibly involve local government and industry in bilateral discussions; and ensure that
Canadas fiduciary obligations with respect to activities resulting from the Accord
are fulfilled.(35)
A Reconciliation Agreement
Between Her Majesty In Right Of British Columbia And The Hereditary Chiefs Of The Gitxsan
was also signed to enable the parties to deal with issues related to the Delgamuukw
decision. The Agreement provides for three levels of discussion: between B.C. and the
Gitxsan on issues such as wildlife and habitat management, forestry, mining and economic
development; between Canada and the Gitxsan in areas such as fisheries, capacity-building
and compensation; and among B.C., Canada and the Gitxsan on trilateral matters, subject to
Canadas agreement to resume treaty discussions on the basis of the Gitxsan framework
agreement reached in July 1995 before negotiations were suspended.(36)
The B.C. government released
operational guidelines designed to assist provincial ministries and agencies, particularly
in the land and resource sectors, to meet the Delgamuukw requirement for
consultation of First Nations on proposed Crown land activities that might infringe
Aboriginal title. The process does not involve a determination of the existence of
Aboriginal title, which must be proved by First Nations. In announcing these guidelines,
the provincial Minister of Aboriginal Affairs commented that "[t]his is not the
provinces comprehensive response to Delgamuukw. We will continue to discuss
consultation requirements
with First Nations organizations and the federal
government."(37)
October 1998
The BCTC reported the
parties agreement to continue the tripartite review process on issues including
Aboriginal title and certainty, the role of the BCTC, consultation, negotiation financing
for First Nations and interim measures. On the last issue, the BCTC reiterated its view of
the importance of negotiated interim measures agreements as a means of balancing interests
pending the conclusion of treaty negotiations, and listed recent agreements. The BCTC also
commented on challenges associated with negotiating such agreements on land and resource
issues, and the parties recognition of "the importance of coming to
arrangements to deal with [these matters] where they are key to the negotiation of
treaties."(38)
The BCTC also noted that
both the Nisgaa Final Agreement and the Delgamuukw decision signal the
importance of resolving overlapping land claims and reported that a number of First
Nations had concluded agreements on boundaries or agreed on a process for resolving
overlaps, with other agreements pending. In addition, a 1997 First Nations Summit protocol
to assist First Nations to resolve overlaps was being studied, while the parties agreed to
include the overlap issue in their tripartite review. The BCTC proposed that agreements in
principle be signed only if key guidelines in the area of overlapping claims were
followed.(39)
BCTC Commissioners indicated
that no B.C. First Nations had officially left the treaty process since the Delgamuukw
decision, although several were pursuing litigation concurrently.(40)
December 1998
Based in part on Delgamuukws
affirmation of the economic aspect of Aboriginal title and its assertion that "fair
compensation [would] ordinarily be required" for infringements of title, the AFN
Confederacy of Nations adopted a resolution calling on the federal and provincial
governments to "adopt new treaty mandates that explicitly recognize that they will
negotiate fair compensation for past and present infringements of Aboriginal title as a
substantive issue in the B.C. treaty process."(41)
January 1999
The Post-Delgamuukw
Capacity Panel formed in July 1998 submitted its Final Report to the Minister of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development.(42)
Focusing on means to expedite negotiations in substantive areas, as well as to address the
need for capacity building, the Panel recommended, inter alia, that governments
offer settlements of land, resources and cash more quickly, where the parties agree; that
the parties undertake additional analysis of issues such as the staged implementation of
treaty benefits, the usefulness of interim measures, and the sharing of benefits flowing
from business arrangements; and that the parties study the possibility of reaching
agreements on land, resources, cash and aspects of governance, and deferring other, less
pressing issues. In a further key proposal, the Panel recommended the "establishment
of a 7 - 9 member, First Nation majority, stand-alone committee to review and recommend
proposals for capacity building initiatives, and the utilization of an existing delivery
system to maximize efficiencies and minimize administrative costs."(43) The Panel declined to outline criteria for the evaluation
of proposals for capacity initiatives, because of its view that such criteria would more
appropriately be developed by the proposed committee.
February 1999
In the context of a
conference on "Delgamuukw: One Year After," the AFN British Columbia
Regional Vice-Chief claimed that the Courts decision had not changed the federal and
provincial approach to treaty negotiations. In his view, "[i]ts time for
aboriginal people to get organized around Delgamuukw and around the fact of our
title and then the governments will be compelled to deal with us in a meaningful
way." Professor Frank Cassidy, who chaired the conference, was also quoted as stating
that federal and provincial governments were using treaty negotiations to undercut Delgamuukw.(44)
March 1999
The British Columbia Supreme
Court ruled on the question of whether the Crowns "moral" obligation to
negotiate treaties in good faith, affirmed by the Chief Justice in Delgamuukw, was
also a legal obligation. The case against Canada and B.C. by the Gitanyow First
Nation,(46) which had been engaged in treaty
negotiations since 1993, had been initiated in the context of the imminent conclusion of
the Nisgaa Final Agreement, which recognizes as Nisgaa territory
portions of the territory in the Nass watershed that are claimed by the Gitanyow.(47) The Court held that, while the federal and
provincial Crowns were not under an obligation to enter into treaty negotiations with the
Gitanyow, as they had done so their fiduciary obligations toward Aboriginal peoples
resulted in "a duty to negotiate in good faith" that was binding on all Crown
representatives.(48) The Gitanyow case
raised the overlap issue that affects many claims in British Columbia, as underscored by
the BCTC. In deciding a preliminary procedural matter in the case, the Supreme Court judge
noted that "myriad Court applications seem inevitable unless the treaty negotiation
process deals with overlapping claims." In his view, "if the parties fail to
deal with [this] conspicuous problem, they may well face Court imposed settlements which
are less likely to be acceptable to them than negotiated settlements."
April 1999
Canada and British Columbia
appealed the Gitnayow ruling on the basis, inter alia, that subjecting the treaty
process to court supervision could turn negotiations into an avenue for litigation. The
federal Minister of Indian Affairs announced a three-year, $15-million investment to
finance initiatives for enhancing the capacity of British Columbia First Nations to take
part in land and resource management negotiations and consultations. British Columbia also
committed $2 million for the 1999-2000 fiscal year. In keeping with the recommendation of
the Post-Delgamuukw Capacity Panel, a nine-person Capacity Initiative Council (CIC)
was also formed. Composed of a majority of First Nations representatives, together with
representatives from business and the labour sector, the CIC is to assess project
proposals and recommend funding allocations, based on guidelines it establishes for
defining the criteria and conditions that determine eligibility for funding. Any B.C.
First Nation with an unresolved land claim may respond to the CICs call for
proposals, whether or not it is involved in the BCTC process. Capacity enhancement
proposals to be considered for funding may pertain to individuals, institutions, or
businesses.(49)
May 1999
At a Fraser Institute
conference on "The Delgamuukw case: Aboriginal Land Claims and Canadas
Regions," academics, politicians and Aboriginal leaders expressed a range of opinion
on the present and potential impacts of the Courts ruling.(51) For example, while participants generally agreed that
British Columbia remained the region most directly affected by the decision, the
possibility that it might enable non-B.C. First Nations to re-negotiate existing land
surrender treaties was also raised. The ruling was variously characterized as "an
invaluable lever" for Quebecs Aboriginal communities, as having created an
unworkable regime for reconciling economic development and Aboriginal rights in British
Columbia, as a victory for Aboriginal people, and as a "recipe for bureaucratic
paralysis." Other views advanced included a proposal that federal legislation be
enacted that would "come very close" to extinguishing Aboriginal title, as long
as compensation was provided. It was also argued that Delgamuukw had not destroyed
British Columbias ability to govern, since the decision enables governments to
infringe Aboriginal title.(52)
June 1999
The Gitanyow and the federal
and provincial governments agreed to resume active treaty negotiations on an accelerated
basis and to place in abeyance the second question raised by the Gitanyow case against the
federal and provincial Crowns: whether the signing of the Nisgaa Final
Agreement was contrary to the Crowns duty to negotiate in good faith with the
Gitanyow in light of their overlapping claim.(53)
Lack of consultation with
the affected Klahoose First Nation led to the withdrawal of a Sunshine Coast forestry
development plan by the British Columbia Ministry of Forests and International Forest
Products Ltd., and to their agreement not to log the area in question for a minimum
five-year period. The Ministry further agreed to consult the Klahoose on future forestry
management decisions. Acknowledging that the Ministry is responsible for ensuring that
Aboriginal peoples are consulted on development issues involving their traditional
territories, a forestry official noted that First Nations have varying expectations with
respect to the Delgamuukw consultation requirement, and that it is not simple for
the Ministry to ensure that all its legal obligations are met.(54)
The BCTC Annual Report,
noting that the full impact of Delgamuukw is not yet known, commented that
"[o]ne result of the decision is enough uncertainty on all sides to make treaty
negotiations a more attractive option than litigation." In this respect, it reported
that recommendations developed through the tripartite review process were under
consideration, and described the focus of the review as being
to find ways to accelerate negotiations
around land, resources, cash and the financial components of treaties. First Nations who
are borrowing large sums of money to finance their treaty talks have become frustrated. As
negotiations drag on, they see the resources in their territories being depleted or
alienated and they fear there will be little left with which to meet their treaty
expectations. They are seeking assurance that treaties will leave them better off than
they are now. Delgamuukw and its confirmation of aboriginal title heightened First
Nations expectations that their concerns would be addressed. Resolving issues around
land and resources sooner rather than later will restore confidence in the treaty process.
The BCTC further observed that
Delgamuukw made it clear that a single cash payment to individual Aboriginal people
is not an option for resolving treaty issues, because Aboriginal title is held by groups,
not individuals. Therefore governments must settle claims with First Nations that hold
title, rather than with First Nation members.(55)
The Report commented that a
"statement of mutual recognition" might satisfy, at least in part, Delgamuukws
clear directive that treaty negotiations must reconcile Aboriginal title with Crown
title, and noted that a joint statement by Canada, British Columbia and the First Nations
Summit was expected. The BCTC again stressed that the need for effective interim measures
underscored in Delgamuukw "has become more pressing."(56) It predicted that an anticipated interim measure cost-sharing
agreement between the provincial and federal governments would "ease the way to
treaties" for First Nations, and protect their interests pending the conclusion of
treaties.(57)
The BCTC underscored First
Nations need for "adequate funding to negotiate on an equal footing with Canada
and British Columbia," and further observed that "[t]he increase in First
Nations in Stage 4 [37 B.C. First Nations were then in AIP negotiations] and the shrinking
total budget, has resulted in significantly decreased allocations." Forecasting that
$38.4 million would be required to support First Nations negotiations during the
2000-01 fiscal year, the BCTC said it had "informed Canada and BC that, without more
funding, many First Nation treaty offices and research efforts will falter. Even those
First Nations nearing completion of agreements in principle or otherwise making progress
in negotiations will find it difficult if not impossible to sustain the pace of
negotiations."(58)
The survey of B.C. First
Nations in the BCTC process indicated that negotiations with the Wetsuweten
Nation were proceeding, while the Gitxsan had not yet resumed tripartite negotiations.(59)
Reactions to the BCTCs
Annual Report were mixed. Leaders of the First Nations Summit welcomed the Reports
findings related to the need for increased funding to support negotiation and improved
interim measures, and requested a meeting with the federal Minister of Indian Affairs and
the provincial Minister of Aboriginal Affairs to discuss these issues.(60) The President of the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs reportedly stated
that 45% of the provinces Aboriginal people disagree with the treaty process, which
he described as leading to extinguishment of title and greater economic uncertainty for
First Nations. In his view, the Delgamuukw ruling clearly recognized the existence
of Aboriginal peoples legal interest in and title to B.C. land and resources.(61)
July 1999
The Capacity Initiative
Council established in April 1999 approved 74 of 167 applications for funding in fiscal
year 1999-2000. The successful proposals, which are eligible for funding at the same
levels over the following fiscal year, were allocated various amounts up to $75,000, with
a total commitment of $5 million. The moneys were to be distributed monthly as of
October 1999, contingent upon the recipients meeting accountability requirements
through regular reports. Many of the approved projects fall under the heading of land and
resource management, and are designed to build capacity for post-treaty management, as
well as to enable First Nations to deal better with current consultation matters.(62)
The AFN General Assembly
resolved to initiate the "Delgamuukw Implementation Process" to
"review the 1986 federal Comprehensive Claims policy with a view to developing an
alternative approach which is based on recognition of Aboriginal title consistent with the
Delgamuukw decision." The resolution was based, in part, on the AFNs
view that the "Government of Canada refuses to change the Comprehensive Claims policy
to recognize Aboriginal title in conformity with the Delgamuukw case," but
rather "continues to use the AFN/DIAND National Delgamuukw Review as an excuse
for not changing its Comprehensive Claims policy," As a result, the review "has
become prejudicial for those First Nations who assert Aboriginal title and who want the Delgamuukw
decision implemented."(63)
September 1999
A B.C. Chiefs Report,
released concurrently with a meeting of the First Nations Summit, called on Aboriginal
leaders to begin considering alternatives to the B.C. treaty process in light of
disagreement between Aboriginal and government parties on issues of compensation and
Aboriginal title.(64)
Following unsuccessful
negotiations to obtain a provincial logging permit, members of the Westbank First Nation
carried out unlicensed logging on Crown lands to which it claims title in south-central
British Columbia. This initiative was seen by some as the tip of the iceberg of Aboriginal
dissatisfaction with the provinces perceived failure to address the implications of
the Delgamuukw decision.(65) In an unprecedented
alliance, both the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs and the First Nations Summit
endorsed Westbank logging activities,(66) as did
numerous other local, regional and national Aboriginal groups.(67) First Nations in various parts of the province declared intentions
to follow the Westbank example; some, citing Delgamuukw, did so. The province
petitioned the British Columbia Supreme Court for orders directing Westbank loggers to
comply with a stop-work order issued by the Minister of Forests but, on 28 September,
the Court ruled that a court would first have to deal with conflicting issues of
Aboriginal and Crown title. At the Courts request, the Westbank First Nation
voluntarily ceased logging activity. The province sought leave to appeal the ruling.(68)
The B. C. Cabinet approved
"Treaty-Related Measures" to "revitalize the existing B.C. treaty process
and ensure [Canada] contributes its fair share to making treaty negotiations work."
It called on the federal government to follow suit and finalize cost-sharing arrangements.
Government documentation suggested that "Treaty-Related Measures" might advance
the treaty process more effectively than the interim measures policy for which the
province had assumed the full cost. It described the measures as "designed to help
expedite treaty negotiations. They also help the province meet its legal obligations
arising from Delgamuukw and related court cases, resolve conflicts over land and
resource use, and facilitate economic development. They could also include land and
resource protection."(69) At least some B.C.
Aboriginal leaders viewed the announced measures as unlikely to renew the treaty process.(70)
October 1999
B.C. Interior First Nations
leaders planned to travel to the United States and Europe to argue for a boycott of B.C.
forest products that are, they allege, illegally taken from Aboriginal lands. A Council of
Forest Industries spokesperson acknowledged that such a boycott threatened the industry.(71)
The First Nations Summit
convened an extraordinary special assembly to address B.C. First Nations
disappointment with treaty negotiations and perceived lack of commitment to the treaty
process on the part of both levels of government. Grand Chief Edward John described the
negotiation process as at a "crossroads." In his view, "[t]he governments
continue to come to the ... table with unilateral preconditions that are clearly
unacceptable ... and it flies in the face of the principles of good faith
negotiations."(72)
a commitment to table
agreement-in-principle offers expeditiously;
a provincial contribution of
$20 million towards a Treaty-Related Measures fund, cost-shared 50-50 with the federal
government;
a willingness to resume
discussions with the First Nations Summit on the issue of achieving certainty through
treaty settlements;
a commitment to listen to
First Nations views on revenue sharing, co-management and compensation; and
an invitation to First
Nations and the forest industry to discuss the establishment of a First Nations steering
committee on access to timber.(73)
Addressing the issue of
compensation, the Minister acknowledged First Nations belief that treaties "are
intended as settlements of past claims," and stated the provinces willingness
to discuss the issue with the other parties to negotiations.(74)
Following the assembly, the
First Nations Summit remained critical of both levels of government, citing the issue of
compensation(75) and the ongoing alienation of
traditional lands and resources. The BCTC Chief Commissioner remarked that the First
Nations in attendance had not voted to suspend the treaty process, suggesting that they
were not prepared to leave a process it had taken so long to obtain. He noted that
"[a]fter Delgamuukw, the parties agreed to make changes to invigorate the
treaty process. Those changes will affect treaty negotiations in the coming months and
test the political will of the parties. It is too early to tell if those changes will be
sufficient to bring about agreements."(76)
November 1999
The British Columbia Supreme
Court granted the petition of the Minister of Forests for interlocutory relief to prevent
a number of First Nations from continuing to log on Crown land, pending determination of
their claim to Aboriginal title and a right to log.(77)
In a related case, the Court ordered that the dispute between the provincial Ministry of
Forests and the Westbank First Nation be sent to trial on an expedited basis rather than
being dealt with by way of summary hearing. In the judges view, a trial was
necessary owing to the complexity of issues of accommodation and justification described
in Delgamuukw that also arose in this case. Furthermore, "[t]he question of
the [First Nations] title is not uncontested. It is clear ... that the [Crown] is
not prepared ... to concede that the [First Nation has] title or rights over the area
claimed and will challenge such claims."(78)
(1) [1997]
3 S.C.R. 1010.
(2) [1973] S.C.R. 313.
(3) It is only relatively recently that the
courts ceased using the term "Indian" - appearing in subsection 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867 and the Indian Act - as both subject and descriptor, in favour of the
more inclusive "Aboriginal people(s)" and "Aboriginal." The term
"Aboriginal" refers to the original inhabitants of a territory. Section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, defines the "Aboriginal peoples of Canada" to
include Indian, Inuit and Métis.
(4) See, in particular, the Federal Court of
Canada (Trial Division) decision in Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian
Affairs, which set out cumulative criteria relating to Aboriginal title: [1980] 1 F.C.
518, additional reasons at [1981] 1 F.C. 266.
(5) [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
(6) [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654.
(7) Parliamentary Research Branch
publications providing a more comprehensive review of Aboriginal rights issues are Aboriginal
Rights by Jane May Allain, Current Issue Review 89-11E, Aboriginal Fishing Rights:
Supreme Court Decisions by Jane May Allain, Background Paper 428E, October 1996.
(8) [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
(9) These include, notably, the
"trilogy" of B.C. commercial fishing rights decisions (R. v. Van der
Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R.
672; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723) as well as Quebec fishing rights
cases (R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, R. v. Adams, [1996]
3 S.C.R. 101).
(10) See R. v. Pamajewon, [1996]
2 S.C.R. 821, a case raising self-government issues in relation to high-stakes gambling.
(11) (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185.
(12) The action against the federal Crown,
which had been joined as a defendant for procedural reasons, was also dismissed.
(13) For a more exhaustive review of the
reasons for decision of the B.C. Supreme Court, see the Parliamentary Research Branch
publication prepared by Wendy Moss and entitled B.C. Aboriginal Title Case (Delgamuukw
v. The Queen), Background Paper 258E, May 1991.
(14) (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470.
(15) It is worth noting that the blanket
extinguishment argument advanced before the trial judge on behalf of the Social Credit
administration was abandoned on appeal by the newly elected government of the New
Democratic Party.
(16) Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, News
Release, "Province Suspends Treaty Negotiations with Gitxsan [sic],"
1 February 1996, available via ministry web site at
http://www.aaf.gov.bc.ca/aaf/news/1996/fe0196nr.htm.
(17) Sopinka J. heard arguments in the case
but did not take part in the judgment.
(18) Par. 1 through 72 introduce the claim,
provide a summary historical overview of the Gitxsan and Wetsuweten people,
and review the judgments of the B.C. courts.
(19) See heading "Section 35
Interpretation" (p. 2).
(20) For instance, the implications of the
trial judges failure to give one form of oral history any independent weight, or of
casting doubt on its authenticity, would be that such histories "would be
consistently and systematically undervalued by the Canadian legal system, in contradiction
of the [Courts] express instruction to the contrary" (par. 98). Similarly, his
expectation that a second form would furnish conclusive or precise evidence of pre-contact
Aboriginal activities would "be almost an impossible burden to meet" (par. 101).
Finally, the effect of the trial judges rationale for excluding a third form of
evidence based on oral history "may be that a society with such an oral tradition
would never be able to establish a historical claim through the use of oral history"
(par. 106).
(21) The Chief Justice further noted that
constitutionalization of common law Aboriginal rights does not signify that these rights
exhaust the content of subsection 35(1) (par. 136).
(22) In B.C., the treaty-making process and
governing principles for negotiations were set out in the BC Claims Task Force Report of
1991 and incorporated in the tripartite Treaty Commission Agreement of 1992. In accordance
with the terms of the Agreement, federal and provincial statutes were enacted to establish
the British Columbia Treaty Commission. The BCTC is responsible for facilitating treaty
negotiations in the province, not including the recently concluded Nisgaa
negotiations. It accepts First Nations into the treaty making process; assesses when the
parties are ready to start negotiations; allocates funding, primarily in the form of
loans, to First Nations; monitors and reports on the progress of negotiations; identifies
problems and offers advice; and assists the parties in resolving disputes. Two of the
BCTCs five Commissioners are appointed by the First Nations Summit, while Canada and
British Columbia each appoints one. The Chief Commissioner is appointed by agreement among
the parties. The present Chief Commissioner, Miles Richardson, began a three-year term in
November 1998.
(23) British Columbia Treaty Commission, News
Release, "Treaty Commission Urges Changes to Safeguard Treaty Process,"
Vancouver, 28 January 1998. The text of this and other BCTC documents are available online
at http://www.bctreaty.net/.
(24) British Columbia Treaty Commission, Newsletters,
"Supreme Court Decision Underlines Need for Negotiation," Vancouver, February
1998.
(25) Government of Canada, Government of
British Columbia, First Nations Summit, News Release, "Canada, British
Columbia and First Nations Agree to a Joint Review of the B.C. Treaty Process,"
Vancouver, 13 March 1998.
(26) Resolutions 2/98 and 3/98 of
11 March 1998, affirmed in June 1998 by AFN General Assembly Resolution 34/98. All
AFN resolutions are available online at http://www.afn.ca/eng_main.htm
(27) Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development (DIAND), Backgrounder, "Increased Federal Government
Support for British Columbia Treaty Negotiations," 7 July 1998. The text of this and
other documents issued by DIAND are available online at http://www.inac.gc.ca.
(28) Federal Treaty Negotiation Office,
"Business Opportunities Abound in Post-Delgamuukw Environment," Treaty
News, June 1998, available online at
http://www.inac.gc.ca/pubs/treaty/june98/index.html.
(29) Office of the Leader of the Opposition,
News Release, "Time to Legislate an End to Delgamuukw Uncertainty,"
Ottawa, 8 June 1998.
(30) British Columbia Treaty Commission,
Annual Report 1998¸ "Challenges - Delgamuukw Decision Defining Event
of 1997," Vancouver, June 1998.
(31) Kitkatla Band v. British
Columbia (Minister of Forests), [1999] 2 C.N.L.R. 170. See text under June 1999
heading and associated footnote.
(32) Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development, News Release, "Canada Demonstrates Commitment to
Revitalizing Treaty Process," Vancouver, 7 July 1998.
(33) Backgrounder, note 27.
(34) Ibid.
(35) Government of British Columbia, Ministry of Aboriginal
Affairs, News Release, "Agreement Reinvigorates Treaty Discussions with
Wetsuweten," Smithers, B.C., 14 September 1998. The text of this and
other documents issued by the provincial Ministry are available online at http://www.aaf.gov.bc.ca/aaf/.
(36) Government of British Columbia,
Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, News Release, "Agreement Renews Treaty
Discussions with Gitxsan First Nation," Hazelton, B.C., 15 September 1998.
(37) Government of British Columbia,
Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, News Release, "Province Releases First Nations
Consultation Guidelines for Government Staff," Victoria, 29 September 1998. See Consultation
Guidelines at Ministry website under Delgamuukw heading.
(38) British Columbia Treaty Commission, Newsletter,
"Interim Measures Keep Peace," Vancouver, October 1998.
(39) Ibid., "Overlap Agreements
A Must in Treaty Negotiations."
(40) Ibid., "Commissioners
Respond to Questions About Treaty Process."
(41) Resolution 72/98
of 9 December 1998.
(42) The Post-Delgamuukw Capacity Panel
Final Report is available online via the DIAND website.
(43) Ibid., Executive Summary.
(44) Ian Dutton, "B.C. Ignoring Court,
Natives Say: Negotiators Dont Recognize Title Despite Delgamuukw, Leader
Charges," Victoria Times Colonist, 19 February 1999, p. A3.
(45) "Delgamuukw National Process," Backgrounder,
undated, available online via the AFN web site under "Links."
(46) The Gitanyow are culturally Gitxsan.
(47) The Gitanyow sought declarations (1) that
in undertaking to negotiate a treaty with the Gitanyow, and in proceeding with those
treaty negotiations, the federal and provincial Crowns are obliged to negotiate in good
faith and to make every reasonable effort to conclude and sign a treaty with the Gitanyow,
and (2) that for the federal and provincial Crowns to conclude a treaty with the Nisgaa
"or to allow the designation for any purpose related to the Nisgaa
Treaty over lands and resources in respect of which Gitanyow, Canada and British Columbia
are involved in a treaty process until treaty negotiations with the Gitanyow are
concluded" would be contrary to the Crowns duty to negotiate in good faith,
significantly undermine the Gitanyow claim to "overlapping" territory in the
Nass Valley and nullify the Gitanyow treaty process. The Gitxsan and Tahltan First Nations
also claim territory in the Nass watershed.
(48) Gitanyow First Nation v. Canada,
[1999] 3 C.N.L.R. 89, par. 70-75.
(49) Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, News Release, "Canada Invests $15 Million to Enhance First
Nations Capacity to Participate in Land and Resource Negotiations and
Consultations," Vancouver, 15 April 1999; Backgrounder, "British
Columbia Capacity Initiative," 15 April 1999; Federal Treaty Negotiation Office,
"$15 million invested in B.C. Capacity Initiative," Treaty News,
June 1999, available online at http://www.inac.gc.ca/pubs/treaty/june99/invest.html.
(50) A summary of the Sechelt AIP is available
online via the DIAND or provincial Ministry website.
(51) Conference information may be found at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/.
(52) Peter ONeil, "Delgamuukw
Decision to Have Wide Fallout on Native Claims: The Ruling on a B.C.
Aboriginal Land Action Is Strengthening Rights Elsewhere, Experts Say," Vancouver
Sun, 27 May 1999, p. A4; "Delgamuukw Decision an Unworkable
Regime: A B.C. Liberal MLA Says the Ruling Has Created a Flawed System in Trying to
Reconcile Aboriginal Rights and Economic Projects," Vancouver Sun, 28 May
1999, p. A6.
(53) Subsequent developments are outlined under
November 1999.
(54) The scope of the Delgamuukw consultation
requirement has been and continues to be raised in numerous court cases; see, for example,
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and
Culture), [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 72 (B.C.S.C.), in which the Court found the duty to
consult had not been met, reversed on other grounds in Kitkatla Band v. British
Columbia (Small Business, Tourism and Culture), File Nos. VO3364 and V03385,
19 January 2000 (B.C.C.A.); Chief Councillor Alice Munro v. British
Columbia (Minister of Forests) et al., File No. A981672, 9 July 1998 (B.C.S.C.); Halfway
River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), File
Nos. CA023526 and CA023539, 12 August 1999 (B.C.C.A.), affirming [1997] 4
C.N.L.R 45 (B.C.S.C.).
(55) British Columbia Treaty Commission, Annual Report
1999, "The Legal and Political Landscape after Delgamuukw," Vancouver, June
1999.
(56) Ibid.
(57) British Columbia Treaty Commission, News Release,
"Several Treaties with First Nations within Reach, Says Treaty Commission Annual
Report Card," Vancouver, 24 June 1999.
(58) British Columbia Treaty Commission, Annual Report
1999, "Negotiation Funding Inadequate."
(59) Ibid., "First Nations in Stage 4."
(60) "First Nations Summit Urges Governments to
Implement Recommendations Contained within the 1999 BC Treaty Commission Annual
Report," Canada News-Wire, Vancouver, 25 June 1999.
(61) "Smooth Road Expected for Aboriginal
Treaties," Regina Leader-Post, 25 June 1999, p. C9. The positions of the UBCIC
on Aboriginal Title and Rights and related issues are available online at:
http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/publications.htm
(62) Federal Treaty Negotiation Office, "First
Nations Receive Funds to Improve Lands and Resources Capacity," Treaty News,
November 1999, available online at
http://www.inac.gc.ca/pubs/treaty/nov99/funds.html
(63) Resolution 5/99, 22 July 1999.
(64) Kim Pemberton, "Immediate Benefits Planned for
Natives," Vancouver Sun, 16 September 1999, p. A10.
(65) For example, it was also reported that the Gitxsan,
likening their situation to that of the Westbank, planned to go to court to argue their
right to cut timber, based on Delgamuukw principles. In March 1999, the Forest
Appeals Board had ruled, in relation to a 1995 charge of trespassing on Crown land to log
and a substantial fine, that the Forests Ministry had failed to take into account the
rights of the Gitxsan: "Gitxsan to Court in Dispute on Logging," Vancouver
Province, 10 September 1999, p. A29.
(66) "First Nations Summit Passes Unanimous
Resolution in Support of Westbank First Nation," Canada News-Wire, 15 September
1999.
(67) Prominent among these was the Carrier Sekani Tribal
Council, whose Chiefs were engaged in seeking to prevent major forestry companies from
transferring into their traditional territory in the absence of interim forestry measures
that would protect their interests prior to an eventual treaty settlement. In their view, Delgamuukw
confirmed their title to the forest resource, and "they will not sit by while their
members remain unemployed and they go into debt negotiating for empty lands": Carrier
Sekani Tribal Council, News Release, "CSTC Supports Westbank First
Nations Title to Their Forests," Prince George, 29 September 1999.
(68) Chuck Poulsen, "Both Sides in Logging Dispute
Hope for Solution," Kelowna Daily Courier, 22 September 1999; "Court
Weighs Logging Dispute," Brantford Expositor, 24 September 1999,
p. A9; Kim Pemberton, "Court Turns Down Victoria Bid to Stop Westbank
Logging," Vancouver Sun, 28 September 1999, p. A4; Suzanne Fournier,
"Westbank Nation Logs Key Victory: Judge Refuses to Halt Timber Cutting on Land in
Dispute," Vancouver Province, 28 September 1999, p. A11;
"Westbank Band Scores Court Victory," Victoria Times Colonist,
28 September 1999, p. A1; Kim Pemberton, "Province Appeals Logging-Ban
Ruling: A Judge Refuses to Grant a Request to Force an End to Cutting, but the Westbank
Band Stops Voluntarily," Vancouver Sun, 29 September 1999, p. B8.
(69) Government of British Columbia, Ministry of
Aboriginal Affairs, News Release, "Cabinet Approves Measures to Revitalize
Treaty Negotiations," Victoria, 29 September 1999.
(70) Suzanne Fournier, "B.C. Resources Overture
Brushed Off by Natives," Vancouver Province, 1 October 1999, p. A44.
(71) "B.C. Chiefs Seek Lumber Boycott Abroad: Leaders
of Three Interior Bands Are Going to Washington, New York and Geneva in a Bid Launch an
International Campaign against the Purchase of B.C. Wood...," Vancouver Sun,
21 October 1999, p. B7.
(72) British Columbia Treaty Commission, Newsletter,
"Changes to Treaty Process May Spur Negotiations," Vancouver, November 1999.
(73) Government of British Columbia, Ministry of
Aboriginal Affairs, News Release, "Treaty Measures Offer Resource
Opportunities for First Nations," North Vancouver, 29 October 1999.
(74) Honourable Dale Lovick, Speech to First Nations
Summit, North Vancouver, 29 October 1999.
(75) The First Nations Summit has identified compensation
as a key issue in treaty negotiations, and has cited governments lack of willingness
to discuss it as a negotiation item as one of the reasons underlying the lack of progress
in the treaty process: see British Columbia Treaty Commission, Newsletter,
"Compensation a Key Issue in Negotiations," Vancouver, November 1999.
(76) British Columbia Treaty Commission, Newsletter,
note 72.
(77) British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan
Indian Band, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2545 (Q.L.), 12 November 1999.
(78) British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Westbank
First Nation, File No. 46440, 12 November 1999.
(79) British Columbia Treaty Commission, "The Treaty
Commissions Role in the Review," After Delgamuukw: The Legal and Political
Landscape, Vancouver, November 1999.