Library of Parliament

LS-304E

 

BILL C-13:  AN ACT TO AMEND THE
PARLIAMENT OF CANADA ACT
(COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF INTERNAL ECONOMY)

 

Prepared by James R. Robertson
Law and Government DivisionDivision
31 October 1997

 

 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF BILL C-13

 

HOUSE OF COMMONS

SENATE
Bill Stage Date Bill Stage Date
First Reading: 29 October 1997 First Reading: 30 October 1997
Second Reading: 29 October 1997 Second Reading: 5 November 1997
Committee Report: 29 October 1997 Committee Report: 6 November 1997
Report Stage: 29 October 1997 Report Stage:  
Third Reading: 29 October 1997 Third Reading: 18 November 1997


Royal Assent:  27 November 1997
Statutes of Canada 1997, c.32






N.B. Any substantive changes in this Legislative Summary which have been made since the preceding issue are indicated in bold print.
 

 

  

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND

DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

COMMENTARY

BILL C-13: AN ACT TO AMEND THE PARLIAMENT OF CANADA ACT
(COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF INTERNAL ECONOMY)

 

BACKGROUND

Bill C-13, An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act, was introduced and received first reading in the House of Commons on 29 October 1997. By unanimous consent, the bill also received second reading, was dealt with in the Committee of the Whole, and received third reading the same day.

Bill C-13 would amend the composition of the Board of Internal Economy to permit representation of all recognized parties in the House of Commons. It would also make provision in the event of the death, disability or absence of the Speaker of the House, who ordinarily chairs the Board.

The Board of Internal Economy is responsible for all financial and administrative matters respecting the House of Commons and its Members. A similar body has existed since before Confederation, but, until 1985, it was composed only of members of the Privy Council, which, in practice, meant only Cabinet Ministers.

In 1984, the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (the McGrath Committee) expressed concern about the base of support for the internal management of the House. It stated:

Your Committee believes it is essential that the House of Commons Act [now the Parliament of Canada Act] be amended to restructure the Board of Internal Economy. We do not feel that it is appropriate for only Cabinet Ministers to be responsible for the internal management of the House of Commons. The House of Commons is a community of many interests. They should be reflected in the way Commissioners are appointed.

Consequently, your committee proposes that a new Board of Internal Economy be set up… The draft bill is aimed at modifying the makeup of the Board by enlarging the range of its members to ensure the participation of Members of Parliament who are not Cabinet members. The Board would in the future be composed of the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker, two Ministers of the Crown, the Leader of the Official Opposition or a Member designated by the Leader, and four others: two Members appointed by the government caucus, and two from the opposition caucuses including at least one from the Official Opposition. The draft bill does not specify how the representatives of each caucus are to be chosen. We recognize that this is a question to be dealt with by each caucus independently, but we favour the idea of organizing elections within each caucus for the purpose.

With the establishment of the proposed new Board of Internal Economy, the input of private members would be present in the principal management body of the House. Members would be able to question the Board in the House through a designated member of the Board. Private members would have an effective voice in the decisions governing the management of the House.(1)

In 1985, Parliament implemented the proposed changes.(2) Subsequently, in 1991, when amendments to be the Parliament of Canada Act were passed by Parliament, it was clarified that the second opposition member of the Board would be appointed by the second largest opposition party, provided it had at least 12 seats in the House.(3)

Following the 1997 federal general election, the House of Commons consisted of five "recognized" parties, including four in opposition to the government. This was the first time since the concept of "recognized" party was developed in the early 1960s that so many parties had official status. Certainly, since the 1985 provisions regarding the Board of Internal Economy, the House had functioned on the basis of three recognized parties. Under the terms of the Parliament of Canada Act, the two smaller opposition parties – the New Democratic Party and the Progressive Conservative Party – are not entitled to representation on the Board. It is this situation that Bill C-13 is designed to address.

DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

Clause 1 of Bill C-13 would amend sections 50(2) and (3) of the Parliament of Canada Act regarding the composition of the Board of Internal Economy. The new section 50(2) provides that the Board would consist of the Speaker, two members of the Privy Council (i.e. Cabinet Ministers), and the Leader of the Opposition or his or her nominee. It goes on to provide that where there was only one recognized opposition party in the House of Commons, the caucus of that party could appoint two members of the Board and the government caucus could appoint one. Where there was more than one recognized opposition party, however, each opposition caucus could appoint one member of the Board; the government caucus could appoint a number of members of the Board that was one less than the total number appointed by the opposition caucuses.

The net effect of these provisions would be an equal number of government and opposition representatives on the Board of Internal Economy, plus the Speaker of the House, who chairs the Board. Under the current legislative provisions, there are nine members of the Board. Under the formula set out in Bill C-13, and given the current composition of the House, there would be 11 members: the Speaker, two cabinet ministers, the nominee of the Leader of the Opposition, one representative from each of the four opposition caucuses (Reform, Bloc Québécois, NDP, and Progressive Conservative), and three members appointed by the government caucus.

It should be noted, that under the current legislation, the Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons is automatically a member of the Board of Internal Economy; this would not be the case under the provisions proposed by Bill C-13. It is, however, possible that the person holding this office could be appointed to the Board by one of the party caucuses.

Clause 2 of Bill C-13 would replace section 52(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act. The new section provides that, in the event of the death, disability or absence of the Speaker, five members of the Board would constitute a quorum; one would have to be a member of the Privy Council (appointed by the government or the government caucus). The members present would be required to designate a member from among themselves to chair the meeting. This would replace the current provision, which also sets the quorum at five, but provides that the Deputy Speaker or a person designated by the Speaker or Deputy Speaker must be present and shall chair the meeting.

Section 52(1) of the Act would not be amended; thus the quorum for meetings of the Board when the Speaker was present would remain at five, notwithstanding the fact that the membership of the Board would increase to 11. (Similarly, the quorum would be five even if the membership of the Board were seven, in accordance with the scenario set out in proposed new section 50(2)(a), in which there would be only one recognized opposition party.)

Proposed new section 52(2) deals with situations where the Speaker is absent. The Government House Leader explained the intent of this provision during Committee of the Whole consideration of Bill C-13 in the House of Commons: since the bill would result in an equal number of government and opposition members on the Board, the possibility arises that, in the absence of the Speaker, there could be a quorum consisting entirely of opposition members (especially since the Deputy Speaker of the House would no longer be a member of the Board). Hence, there was a need for a requirement that a government member be present.

COMMENTARY

Bill C-13 is the result of much discussion and negotiation among the House Leaders in the House of Commons. It is designed to address the challenge posed by the existence of five recognized parties in the House of Commons. Specifically, it would ensure that the two smaller opposition parties – the NDP and the Progressive Conservatives – have representation on the Board of Internal Economy.

As the Board is the central decision-making authority with respect to administrative and financial matters, problems would ensue if these two parties were not represented. The proposed change is also consistent with the recommendations of the 1994 McGrath Committee to the effect that the House of Commons is a "community of many interests," and that "private members [should] have an effective voice in the decisions governing the management of the House."

Since the Board of Internal Economy is established by the Parliament of Canada Act, and its composition is set out in the statute, any changes must be made by legislation.(4) Committees of the House of Commons are governed by the Standing Orders, which can be amended by motion of the House; indeed, at the beginning of the 36th Parliament, the Standing Orders were changed to provide that standing committees would have 16 members (18 in the case of two committees) to make the membership proportionate to that of the parties in the House.

The government hopes that the formula set out in Bill C-13 will obviate the need for similar legislative amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act in the future. It appears that the new provisions could be applied to different circumstances and could be adapted as the composition of the House changed over time. The 1985 amendments were satisfactory so long the House had only three recognized parties, as it did from 1984 to 1997; problems arose only with the existence of more than three recognized parties.

It should be noted that in Bill C-13 the government has not insisted on having a majority of the seats on the Board of Internal Economy. Under the existing legislative formula, four of the nine members of the Board are appointed by the government or the government caucus, while the Speaker and Deputy Speaker are also usually members of the government party. Under the amendments, the number of government and opposition members of the Board will be equal; in addition, the Speaker of the House, will act as chair.

The amendments in Bill C-13 would continue the rule that a party must have at least 12 Members in the House of Commons in order to be recognized. This has created some difficulties in the past – for instance, when the Bloc Québécois was first formed during the 34th Parliament, and when the NDP had only nine Members in the 35th Parliament. The requirement for 12 Members was originally introduced in 1963 in connection with salaries for party leaders, but has subsequently been applied for other purposes.(5) It has been suggested that the requirement should be reviewed; however, so long as it is in effect, its use in determining representation on the Board appears to be reasonable.

During debate on Bill C-13 in the House of Commons, a member of the Bloc Québécois expressed some disappointment that membership on the Board, as proposed, would not be proportionate to the party standings in the House of Commons; under the proposed formula, the Bloc would have one representative on the Board, the same as the NDP and Conservatives, despite the fact that the Bloc has at least twice as many Members in the House as each of those parties. To achieve proportionality, however, the size of the Board would have to be increased, which presumably was felt to be undesirable.

The Board of Internal Economy is essentially a management body dealing with administrative and financial matters. While it is not entirely non-partisan, its decisions affect all Members of the House. Its effectiveness in the current Parliament would clearly be enhanced by ensuring that its membership reflected all the opposition parties in the House.

(1)  Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, First Report, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 2:10-11.

(2)  See R.S.C. 1985, c. 42 (1st Supp.).

(3)  S.C. 1991, c. 20.

(4)  This is to be contrasted with the situation in the Senate, where the comparable body is the Standing Senate Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration, which is a Senate committee. Changes to the Rules of the Senate can be effected by resolutions of the Senate alone.

(5)  See James R. Robertson, Political Parties and Parliamentary Recognition, Research Branch, Library of Parliament, BP-243.