BP-456E

 

DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,
AND PARLIAMENTS

 

Prepared by:
Jack Stilborn
Political and Social Affairs Division
July 1997


TABLE OF CONTENTS


SUMMARY

PART I: THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

COMPETITIVE AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES

INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES

   A. The Institutions of Government

   B. International Institutions

IDEOLOGICAL PRESSURES

SOME IMPLICATIONS

   A. A Pessimist’s Vision

   B. Discussion

      1. The "Erosion of Politics" Argument

      2. The "Irrelevance of Politics" Argument

PART II: MEANS OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO PARLIAMENTARIANS
FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY

THE CONSTITUENCY LEVEL

   A. Safety Valve

   B. Information Provider

   C. Local Dignitary

   D. Advocate

   E. Benefactor

   F. Powerful Friend

   G. Promoter of Constituency Interests

LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

   A. Political Parties

   B. The Electoral System

   C. The House of Commons

      1. The Legislative Process and the Committee System

      2. The Budgetary Process

      3. Party Discipline

   D. Direct Democracy

      1. Referendums and Initiative

      2. Recall

CONCLUDING REMARKS

 


DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,
AND PARLIAMENTS
*

SUMMARY

The paper is organized in two parts: Part I, on the implications of economic integration for democracy, and Part II, on the means available to parliamentarians to strengthen democratic processes.

Part I argues that economic integration is a process extending far beyond the integration of markets and limitations to the autonomy of governments in taxation and fiscal policies.

Competitive and financial pressures on governments include the needs to attract investment and skilled professionals, to provide enterprises with skilled workforces and a favourable regulatory environment, and to maintain social policies that facilitate adjustment and contribute to social and political stability.

Institutional pressures to maximize efficiency and effectiveness in public services favour the development of a client-driven public sector culture, the implementation of consultative government, heightened emphasis on coordination and interdependence at the administrative level, and full participation in (and responsiveness to) international institutions.

Ideological pressures on governments arise from a new orthodoxy centering on "free markets and sound money." Among its tenets are the need for autonomous central banks, the importance of professional and ethical civil services, the value of privatizing the commercial activities of government, and the application of economic logic to the internal distribution of government powers and functions.

When economic integration is understood to put an extended range of pressures on governments, it can be seen to have effects on the health of democracy going beyond the erosion of the powers of national governments and consequent trivialization of politics emphasized by pessimists. Economic integration encourages the progress of democracy because it is associated with vastly improved global communications, more responsive public sector organizations, increased emphasis on education, more consultative government and the increased exposure of practices in individual countries to world scrutiny, and competition among countries for investment; all of which ultimately favour democracy.

Part II reviews the two central roles of parliamentarians -- constituency service and participation in the legislature -- to identify the major means available to them for strengthening democratic values and practices.

The constituency roles of parliamentarians provide obvious opportunities for strengthening democracy and act as a safety valve for discontented citizens. A parliamentarian can be a provider of information about politics, policy and government; a local dignitary participating in community events; and a promoter of constituency interests.

Other constituency roles may be either a means for promoting democracy, or a means of disillusioning citizens. For example, the parliamentarian can be an advocate of particular interests or groups (including political parties); a benefactor of local groups or individuals; and a powerful friend acting within the government on behalf of individual citizens.

In addition to contributing to the responsiveness of legislatures and governments to the needs of citizens, parliamentarians have a role in seeking the continuous improvement of processes and practices within democratic systems.

Political parties play a vital role in the achievement of democracy, yet problems with their internal practices in Canada suggest the usefulness of reforms such as open nomination processes, codes of ethics and greater attention to political education.

Electoral systems are also of central importance, and where (as in Canada) there is substantial public dissatisfaction with the way in which they operate, attention needs to be given to reforms (or convincing explanations) that could allay public concern.

In Canada, recent attempts to enhance the role of parliamentarians in legislation and the budgetary process illustrate directions of broader relevance, as do proposals for reduced party discipline.

Populist devices such as increased reliance on referendums, use of initiatives (which allow citizens to place issues on the agenda of the legislature), and recall (which provides dissatisfied constituents with a means to remove a parliamentarian from office between elections) are also receiving increased attention in Canada.

Participation in international associations, while not a role of parliamentarians to the same extent as constituency work and legislative participation, provides an important opportunity for the sharing of experiences and the maintenance of shared democratic values.

 

This paper is organized in two parts, reflecting the two conference workshop themes relating to democracy. Part I considers the implications of economic integration for the citizens’ involvement in decisions made by public authorities, and for the future of democracy. In Part II, discussion focuses more specifically on the means available to parliamentarians for strengthening democratic processes and institutions.

PART I: THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

This Part deals with the implications of economic integration for democracy through an examination of the major pressures that emerge from the process of integration, followed by a discussion of their probable impact on democratic values, processes and institutions.

Any consideration, in the late 1990s, of the impact of economic integration on politics must recognize that the process of economic integration is far from having run its course, nor is it clear what its full course might be. The final character of this process, including its consequences for politics, will likely not be completely understood until well after it is over. Indeed, only then will it be is truly possible to determine whether what is now taking place is indeed economic integration, or merely an early phase of some development that has yet to come fully into view.

History is full of illustrations of this caveat. For example, the mechanical clock was invented in the Benedictine monasteries of the twelfth century for the purpose of ensuring that the requisite seven periods of devotion would be included in each day. Its ultimate significance, however, was to enable the synchronization and control of human actions required for the emergence of industrial capitalism, which in turn gave a powerful impetus to forces of secularization. Similarly, the introduction of the printed Bible by Gutenberg was initially assumed to be a development that would strengthen the Catholic faith, by making the Bible widely available. Only after the fact did it emerge that its significance was rather in shifting authority away from the Catholic church, by equipping each individual with means to form personal judgements.(1)

At it appears today, however, economic integration, driven by technological change in areas such as communications and transportation, is progressively reducing the economic distances among countries. This has multiplied the sources for most kinds of economic competition, and produced global markets for capital and many goods and services. Governments, with only a few conspicuous exceptions, are responding (at varying speeds) to these developments by dismantling policies that inhibit cross-border commerce, and developing fiscal and monetary policies that respond to influences outside national borders. The full story of economic integration, however, requires attention to a range of less obvious indirect pressures.(2)

COMPETITIVE AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES

As countries around the world reduce their barriers to investment and to the movement of people, goods and services, each individual jurisdiction (including the national, sub-national and municipal in countries where jurisdiction is divided) is under pressure to ensure its attractiveness to investors and professionals with skills in short supply. This competition for the newly mobile factors of production introduces new constraints upon governments in many policy areas, notably the design of taxation systems.

Potential investors pay close attention to a range of locational factors, including the cost of obtaining and retaining an adequately trained workforce and the costs associated with regulations, ranging from local zoning to environmental controls. Cost considerations are weighed, particularly by enterprises relying on highly mobile professional workforces, against such attractions as sensible zoning, a healthy environment, and other amenities contributing to quality of life.

Economists’ arguments relating to the competitive pressures faced by governments mostly focus on fiscal management issues, but some have argued that well-designed social policies facilitating adjustment and promoting investment in the health and skills of the population also constitute good economic policy. Such policies can increase productivity and reduce social tension, thereby making the country more attractive to investors and highly-skilled people. Such arguments indicate that technological change and globalized commerce are producing new criteria that will be applied to what may once have been seen as primarily internal policy issues. Governments also need to address a range of new public policy issues, including intellectual property rights and international crime.

INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES

Institutional pressures emerging from (or greatly exacerbated by) economic integration are of two kinds. First, are pressures for structural and functional changes in the institutions of government, notably public services. Second, are pressures brought to bear on governments by other institutions, especially international agencies and organizations.

   A. The Institutions of Government

In a 1993 lecture delivered shortly before the election of the government in which he was to participate, Marcel Massé commented that governments around the world have in recent years moved to reduce the size of public sector organizations and increase their efficiency.(3)

Simultaneously, growing numbers of traditional government programs are being turned over to the private sector. While the original motivation to reduce the size of public sector institutions and cut the costs of programs was the need for deficit reduction, other factors will continue to propel it even after the battles of deficit cutting have been won. Among these factors are pressures linked to the profound changes in the external and internal environments of government being brought about by economic integration.

Major domestic factors identified by Mr. Massé are increased levels of education and the much greater accessibility of information. These developments are linked to the process of economic integration: the global marketplace drives the high wage economies of the developed countries towards greater and greater reliance on knowledge-based work, requiring workers with progressively higher levels of education and training, and the technological changes behind the trends towards globalization revolve around increased capacities to transmit and access information.

The consequence of these developments for governments lies in the fact that members of the general public are far less inclined today, even than in the recent past, to accept from on high governmental dictates affecting their day-to-day lives. The desire of growing numbers of citizens and groups to be consulted and to participate in the decision-making processes of the public sector has created needs for a broader and more effective consultative process linking governments and the governed within democratic societies.

The information explosion associated with new technologies of communication and access has direct implications for how policies are assessed, and by whom. Within governments, fewer and fewer problems are self-contained and can be addressed with solutions involving only one traditional sector of government activity. As a result, there is a growing need to expand the dimensions of public sector organizations. A further impact of economic integration is that, in the absence of consultations, governments have become unable to understand problems in their full complexity, or to devise solutions that take adequate account of the needs of multiple stakeholders.

   B. International Institutions

The second aspect of the institutional pressures associated with economic integration are those brought to bear on individual countries by international agencies and other institutions. Advanced economies like Canada’s are subject to relatively little direct pressure from international institutions. Countries that never have to borrow from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, are not subject to direct sanctions for ignoring IMF advice. To say that there are no direct pressures, however, is not to say that there are no pressures at all. Canada, for example, usually benefits from international agreements that oblige signatories to follow a transparent set of rules; thus as a signatory it agrees to restrict its own ability to act unilaterally.

To accept obligations under international agreements, or to multilateral institutions, however, is not the same as transferring sovereignty to a higher body. The autonomy of governments is being reduced by the pressures of international competition, global financial markets, and the consequent need for agreements. The enhanced decision-making authority of international institutions is perhaps a consequence of these same developments, rather than of a transfer of sovereignty. Indeed, far from reducing their role by devolving responsibility to international institutions, governments are acquiring new responsibilities (to make them function effectively, for example) and will have to work harder to overcome the inherent difficulty of making and enforcing global arrangements.

It is noteworthy, as well, that countries, ranging from New Zealand to a variety of less developed countries that have required direct assistance from the IMF or other international institutions, experience a considerably higher level of direct intervention than do countries such as Canada. The intervention associated with dependency on international institutions as a result of financial crisis cannot, however, be seen as a consequence of international economic integration unless it is established that integration actually creates the crises.

IDEOLOGICAL PRESSURES

Paul Krugman has summarized the prevailing ideological consensus as "free markets and sound money."(4) In his view, this is frequently seen as a consensus founded on American ideas, where it is recognized that "American" connotes not only the American government, but "...all those institutions and networks of opinion leaders centred in Washington: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, think tanks, politically astute investment bankers... all those who meet each other in Washington and collectively define the conventional wisdom of government."

This consensus rests on assumptions broadly reflective of current economic thought, including the virtues of savings and investment, the need to shift government spending towards infrastructure, health and education; the desirability of non-distortionary forms of revenue-raising (i.e., general income and value-added taxes rather than specific taxes or exemptions); and the superiority of market-based pricing, fiscal balance over time, non-inflationary money expansion, and government reliance on fiscal rather than regulatory measures to influence activities. These assumptions have implications for government policy at all levels. According to Ian D. Clark, a recent executive director of the International Monetary Fund, the key implications are:

  • fiscal and monetary policy should be separated, and central banks should be operated at arms length from government;

  • civil service hirings and promotions should be governed by the merit principle, and government service should be made attractive to talented and motivated people who are motivated (and enabled by adequate remuneration) to adhere to well-defined standards of probity;

  • commercial operations of government should be privatized, within a framework which avoids the creation of private sector monopolies; and

  • responsibilities should be allocated among levels of government so as to maximize efficiency and responsiveness (i.e., functions should be performed at the lowest level possible, unless there are economies of scale, risks which need to be pooled, spillovers that need to be internalized which warrant moving them to a higher level).(5)

SOME IMPLICATIONS

In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to the impact of economic integration on national sovereignty. A major conclusion is that the independent action of nations is being significantly reduced (although, as argued above, this is not to be equated with an erosion of sovereignty in its strict legal sense). Central to this trend is the migration of issues upwards, beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, to multilateral or global institutions.(6) As has been seen, this results partly from a new recognition of national interdependence, fostered by the emergence of communications and information technologies, and partly from new relationships created by economic integration.

   A. A Pessimist’s Vision

The pessimistic response to these developments was set out by the French commentator Jean-Marie Guéhenno several years ago, in a book that prompted wide discussion.(7) Guéhenno argues that the migration of major political decisions beyond the boundaries of the nation-state has fostered the progressive trivialization of political debate and the democratic process within states. Rather than giving a central role to public discussion of substantive policy options, contemporary politics focuses on the management of issues, perceptions and symbols. The purpose is to stimulate the transitory sentiments that have become all that is necessary to ensure electoral victories, and minimize conflicts between governments and citizens between elections. The contemporary media foster this development by distilling political discourse into 30-second sound bites and visual images, while the result is the declining importance of the territorially defined nation-state. Since political decision-making within the nation-state is increasingly unable to affect the matters that determine the character of people’s lives, no compelling reason exists for people to make more extensive demands on the media.

Nor, according to Guéhenno, does the migration of problems to the multilateral level promise much for the future of democratic values and practices. At this level, if substantive problems are engaged at all, decision-making becomes a highly complex process of brokering deals and arranging compromises, typically in order to create the impression of decisiveness where, in reality, little is being accomplished. The vast distance between decision-makers and members of the public tends, furthermore, to exacerbate the anti-democratic characteristics of politics which are already present within states. The result is a largely symbolic process, devoid of both significant change and accountability.

Projecting these developments into the future, Guéhenno foresees that nation-states will be replaced by amorphous empires with shifting boundaries, which will be substantially devoted to material and commercial pursuits in conditions of social and political conformism.

   B. Discussion

There are several reasons for questioning the view that economic integration is necessarily associated with the decline of democratic institutions and values, although it is difficult to deny that this is one possible outcome.

      1. The "Erosion of Politics" Argument

First, at least some of the challenges posed by the emerging world order are analogous to those already somewhat met by federal systems of government. The division of the functions of government among international, national, and sub-national and/or local levels poses problems for democratic accountability which resemble those raised in attempts to combine federalism and democratic institutions. Inevitably, certain decisions require the approval of both federal and provincial or state governments and must be undertaken in intergovernmental forums; thus, legislatures are in danger of being relegated to the role of rubber-stamping agreements after the fact. As federal systems have evolved, the class of decisions falling wholly or partly into this category has tended to broaden, as governments have moved to occupy policy fields not envisioned when federal constitutions, such as Canada’s, were drafted.

Modern federal systems have, however, developed various formal and informal arrangements that help to preserve democratic accountability. For example, government leaders can give statements of general policy to the legislature, which can subject them to immediate examination and discussion, and prompt scrutiny of government activity in a policy field. For example, in late 1995, when the Canadian Prime Minister publicly committed his government to a series of measures related to Quebec and other provinces, including the devolution to some provincial governments of some federal administrative responsibilities in the areas of manpower training and social housing. A second example is the involvement of a parliamentary committee in refining the constitutional proposals of the government in 1991 and 1992, prior to the initiation of formal federal-provincial discussions. These strategies enhanced the role of parliamentarians in decisions before the intergovernmental phase, which tends to result in complex trade-offs that cannot be modified by a legislature without unravelling entirely.

Another, although less satisfactory, approach is to involve parliament in the review of agreements before they are ratified. This provides at least a theoretical opportunity for governments to be held accountable for what they have done, although the likelihood of significant change to government policy is minimal, at least in Westminster systems.

Finally, but arguably most significantly, politicians within federal systems play an indispensable role in calling one another to account in public for actions taken within intergovernmental forums. While there is evidence that Canadians have a limited tolerance for what may appear as counter-productive intergovernmental infighting, federal-provincial conflict can be an occasion for substantive debate. It also plays an important role in allowing citizens to decide whom to hold accountable for what, in a system where relative levels of federal and provincial responsibility changes from issue to issue.

If the upward migration of issues beyond the nation-state really represents an inevitable erosion of the process and substance of democratic debate, one might expect to see signs of this within federal states. There is no evidence, however, that federal states are, or are seen by their citizens to be, less democratic than unitary states. On the contrary, federal states occupy a prominent place on the list of established democracies. Indeed, their internal processes may show how political accountability can be maintained in an era that promises the steadily increasing importance of multilateral institutions.

      2. The "Irrelevance of Politics" Argument

Pessimistic views of the implications of economic integration also argue that, even where political debate remains vibrant, the narrowing autonomy available to nation-states will make such debate increasingly irrelevant to the lives of citizens. This argument relies, however, on an excessively narrow understanding of economic integration.

Earlier sections of this paper have argued that economic integration consists of a great deal more than merely the integration of markets and governments’ recognition that they cannot tax and spend without considering impacts on global competitiveness. Instead, economic integration must be seen as part of a pervasive technologically driven process of change with implications across the entire range of social, as well as economic, policy. Furthermore, these implications cannot be detached from changes to the role of public organizations, the character of public administration, and the dominant ideas that guide both policy and administration.

Within the larger process of global change associated with economic integration, a number of elements are powerfully favourable to democracy, starting with the vastly improved capability of individuals to communicate directly with one another, and to share knowledge of democratic practices and standards, which are encouraged by certain views: that public services should be "client-driven" and respond to public demands with the alacrity of businesses; that education is a vital component of a nation’s infrastructural investment; that governments should consult with broadening constituencies of groups and individuals before making decisions; that practices within individual countries should be exposed to international inspection according to transnational standards; and that private enterprises should search for locations that combine low production costs, attractiveness to employees and long-term social and political stability.

When the full implications of economic integration are recognized, the pessimism of Guéhenno and others, though useful as a warning, may seem to be unwarranted. This is not only because of the above deficiencies, but also because of the progress being made in the contemporary world. If economic integration militates against democracy, then we would hardly be seeing the recent trend in favour of democracy around the globe. Yet, in the words of historian and journalist Gwynne Dyer:

...the apparently irresistible spread of democracy around the planet is not (mere speculation). It spread relatively slowly in the first century and a half and was confined in large part to the Western societies which were then the sole possessors of the means of mass communications. There were many false starts ... but looking back from 1996, as the dust begins to settle, you can see that even the least successful and least democratic of these revolutions - Mexico in 1910, Russia in 1917, China in 1949 - did form part of the broader pattern.(8)

PART II: MEANS OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO PARLIAMENTARIANS
FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY

This section is organized according to the two major responsibilities of parliamentarians: constituency work and work within, or relating to, the legislative process. A concluding section relates this discussion to the activity of parliamentarians within parliamentary associations.

The following discussion refers directly to Canadian political institutions and experience, but its conclusions about the means available to parliamentarians are readily transferable to other systems. It needs to be recognized, however, that strengthening democracy requires different strategies in different systems.

The Westminster model of democratic government places few institutional limits on the capacity of the government to act, making democracy centrally dependent on adversarial partisan debate within (and outside) the House to ventilate issues and on aroused public opinion to act as a brake on government. Within the congressional system, the health of democracy depends more on the efficacy of consensus-building in a relatively non-partisan environment and the avoidance of obstacles to government responsiveness to pressing needs. While parliamentarians from all countries can share in the strengthening of democratic cultures, the fact that systems differ (in many cases combining elements of both the Westminster and congressional models) necessarily requires a local view. It requires careful attention to the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of unique individual systems, and an awareness that vital remedies within one context can easily turn out to be ineffective, or actively harmful, within another.

THE CONSTITUENCY LEVEL

In all systems, the responsibilities of constituency service have grown steadily over the years and, particularly in those that conform to the Westminster model, work within the constituency presents significant opportunities for enhancing both the culture of democracy and the effectiveness of institutions. These opportunities can best be identified with reference to a number of distinguishable roles that parliamentarians may play within their ridings.(9)

   A. Safety Valve

For citizens faced with geographically, psychologically and sometimes culturally distant governments, the local parliamentarian serves as a visible political figure to whom grievances and points of view can be expressed. Even the act of expressing views may provide relief, particularly if it prompts a response from the parliamentarian or local office staff.

The expectations of citizens will determine the effectiveness of this role in promoting their adherence to democratic values and processes however. In Canada and elsewhere, there is increasing evidence that the expectations of citizens now focus on tangible results. Merely passive attention to citizens’ views may actually increase public frustration or disillusionment.

   B. Information Provider

As governments become more complex, the role of the local parliamentarian as a source of information about politics, policy and government services has undoubtedly grown more important. This role can do even more to promote democratic values and adherence to democratic processes, if the parliamentarian makes a conscious attempt to link the specific information given to its democratic implications. Modern information technologies, including the Internet, can make the offices more accessible to constituents and enhance their capacity to obtain information.

   C. Local Dignitary

The local parliamentarian is often invited to official functions and other events within the constituency. Interestingly, some public opinion polling (which documents growing voter cynicism about politicians in general) suggests that voters’ respect for their own local parliamentarians remains relatively intact, although somewhat diminished in recent years.(10) This may suggest that the mere existence of a representative locally familiar may, in and of itself, contribute to citizens’ positive feelings about such abstractions as democracy. Parliamentarians could use local events to highlight the importance of the culture of democracy, and democratic institutions, thereby strengthening such feelings.

   D. Advocate

When parliamentarians play the role of "advocate," they give their names in support of a particular cause or interest championed by constituents. Thus, virtually all parliamentarians promote the cause of their own political party. Indeed, in Westminster systems parliamentarians are sometimes characterized as being representatives of political parties rather than of their constituents. This suggests a danger that applies equally to all sorts of advocacy: to the extent that a parliamentarian is seen as an advocate of particular individuals or groupings within the constituency, he or she may lose credibility as a representative of the interests of the constituency as a whole.

   E. Benefactor

A parliamentarian acting as a benefactor for constituents serves as the local dispenser of patronage, whether this consists of honours or more tangible benefits. The parliamentarian’s role as head of a local patronage network has been historically significant, but has declined in importance during the past 50 years in Canada, the U.S., and other established democratic systems.

Parliamentarians in most countries actively continue to seek prominence in announcements of grants, loans and other benefits to local businesses and interests, and in some cases work strenuously to ensure that local interests obtain such benefits. Like the advocacy role, however, this activity has ambiguous implications with respect to the strengthening of democratic values and institutions. Where benefits are generally recognized as allocated according to public interest considerations, and fairly distributed to worthy recipients, they can celebrate democratic values and processes. On the other hand, some benefits can reflect the persistence of pre-democratic patron-client relationships and patronage networks.

   F. Powerful Friend

A parliamentarian may intervene in a dispute between a constituent and a public body, or even a private body, in order to redress a grievance. Again, the implications of the role of "powerful friend" depend heavily on whether the achievement reflects the just entitlements of citizens, or undue influence and preferential treatment. In the former case, it will confirm the value of democratic principles and practices, and will predictably strengthen popular attachment to them. In the latter case, however, it will likely do the opposite.

   G. Promoter of Constituency Interests

While the heterogeneity of the modern constituency often makes it difficult to detect genuinely common interests among constituents, some issues, such as the potential loss of a major local employer or the need to attract new industry and jobs, are likely to prompt universally strong responses. Parliamentarians typically combine various roles in dealing with such issues. Their impact can be heightened if they make a point of linking positive outcomes to the operation of the democratic processes, or, just as importantly, of providing full explanations of less favourable outcomes.

Recent initiatives to improve communication between constituents and parliamentarians could strengthen some constituency-related roles. Some political parties and individual MPs have experimented in recent years with electronic town hall meetings, questionnaires in MPs’ letters to constituents, and constituency-based electronic referendums. More ambitious proposals have included the creation of constituency-based "community parliaments" to select, review and debate pieces of legislation tabled in the House of Commons. Such an assembly could recommend a position to the local parliamentarian, track the progress of legislation through the House of Commons, and report to the constituency on the parliamentarian’s performance, thereby perhaps enhancing citizen input into the legislative process and helping to free Members of Parliament from the pressures of party discipline.(11)

LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS

The procedures governing the legislative process provide a variety of opportunities for individual parliamentarians to affirm democratic values and practices. More fundamentally, legislative institutions need to provide members of the public with continuous and tangible evidence that they do actually respond to public opinion. Legislative and policy outcomes that reflect public demands are the most obvious way to accomplish this. It is important to recognize, however, that full explanations of the reasons for decisions that may not respond to, or even conflict with, prevailing public opinion can also help. They demonstrate the effectiveness of democratic institutions in making decision-makers accountable for their actions, and may also enrich the substance of policy debate and increase the likelihood of ultimate consensus.

The need to consider options for institutional reform is an integral part of the responsibility of ensuring the effectiveness of existing institutions. The remainder of this section describes the major legislative institutions in Canada, and discusses options for reform that are receiving attention both in Canada and elsewhere.

   A. Political Parties

Political parties are key to representative democracy. They recruit and support candidates for public office, select political leaders, develop policy alternatives, provide avenues for political participation and education, and organize electoral competition. Yet political parties have also been described as "dysfunctional" and as "contributing to the malaise of voters."(12)

Many complaints about political parties focus on their inability to fulfil the roles ascribed to them. Thus, rather than recruiting candidates, parties may discourage many from seeking office. The nomination process by which parties select candidates has come in for particular criticism. A 1991 Royal Commission (the Lortie Commission) claimed, for example, that close to two-thirds of the nomination contests were uncompetitive because nomination was by acclamation.(13) Many others view the parties’ recruitment practices as the principal cause of the poor representational profile of the House of Commons. Women, visible minorities, and aboriginal Canadians have had a particularly difficult time in surmounting the barrier of the nomination process. The selection of party leaders has also been criticized as being dominated by money and thus fundamentally undemocratic. Finally, parties that spring to life only during election campaigns fail to fulfil their promise as vehicles for political participation and education, or as sources of policy.

The Lortie Commission recognized that parties are essentially private organizations and should remain so. However, the Commissioners also believed that changes were called for if parties were to retain their position as primary political organizations essential to representative democracy. Thus, the Commissioners recommended that all registered political parties should have constitutions "that promote democratic values and practices in their internal affairs," and that are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.(14) Open nomination conventions were recommended to improve candidate selection processes, as was a series of measures to encourage more women to run for office. To further help restore public confidence in political parties, the Lortie Commission recommended that they adopt codes of ethics and establish ethics committees to enforce these. Finally, the Commissioners proposed that parties create foundations mandated to engage in political education and to develop and articulate party policies.

   B. The Electoral System

Canada’s electoral system has long been the target of critics who argue that it produces a House of Commons that is not truly representative of the Canadian people or of their wishes. They point out that our single-member plurality (SMP, or the "first-past-the-post") electoral system tends to distort party standings in the House of Commons; a party can win a majority of seats and form a government without winning a majority of all votes cast. Parties with support concentrated in one region can win a significant number of seats, yet parties with national support that is thinly spread and lacks concentration in any one area may win few seats or none at all.

How do Canadians view their federal electoral system? André Blais and Elizabeth Gidengil, who prepared a study of public opinion for the Lortie Commission, asked survey respondents for their views on the distorting effects of the system; of those who expressed an opinion, only 42% found these effects acceptable. All in all, Blais and Guidengil concluded that there is "dissatisfaction with the way that our electoral system translates votes into seats."(15)

Clearly, these findings indicate a problem, although room exists for debate about whether the problem is one of inadequacies in the SMP electoral system, or lack of information and, perhaps, unrealistic expectations on the part of the public. One solution would be to convince Canadians of the advantages often claimed for SMP systems; for example, that they are easily understood by voters, that they avoid the dangers of minority government or legislative stalemate resulting from "artificial" majorities, and that they avoid the tendency of some alternative systems to result in a multitude of narrowly doctrinal or interest group-based parties. The conclusions of the Lortie Commission recommended against changing the electoral system.

If Canadians do not become more widely convinced of the merits of the present system, however, respect for democratic values would appear to prompt consideration of reform options. The most frequently mentioned of these is an electoral system based on proportional representation (PR), which accords seats to parties on the basis of the percentage of the votes they received in a general election.(16)

   C. The House of Commons

Since the House of Commons is Canada’s pre-eminent democratic institution, it is only natural that it should be a focus of attention -- and of most reform proposals.

While earlier reforms were intended to increase House efficiency in handling affairs, more recently the focus has been on placing MPs at the centre of the policy process and restoring the respect of the Canadian people. With this in mind, the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (the McGrath Committee), which reported in June 1985, proposed changes (subsequently implemented) to the structure and operation of standing committees of the House. However, most feel that these changes were not sufficient; seven years after the McGrath Committee tabled its report, a group of academics and Members of Parliament meeting to discuss its impact reached a resoundingly negative consensus.(17) The desire for institutional reform appears to have taken hold in public opinion, however, and the need for change is likely to become more pressing.

      1. The Legislative Process and the Committee System

The legislative process in the House of Commons is a principal source of dissatisfaction, both for many Canadians and their MPs. In contrast with the United States, most of the important policy decisions in Canada are made out of the public eye. Pre-legislation negotiations between bureaucracies, between federal and provincial governments, between governments and affected interest groups, or government and consulting firms (lobbyists) take place largely in private, before legislation is tabled in the House of Commons. Once draft legislation is referred to committee following Second Reading, it is usually changed only minimally before being sent back to the House of Commons.

Reforms to deal with aspects of this situation were undertaken in early 1994. Changes to the Standing Orders ended the practice of automatically referring bills to legislative committees following Second Reading debate. Now, government has the choice of referring a bill to a standing committee with the appropriate background knowledge and skills to deal with it. Since February 1994, legislation can be referred to a committee immediately following first reading, though only on the initiative of a Minister. This step was intended to allow committees greater scope for amending legislation.

      2. The Budgetary Process

One of the most important roles of MPs is that of guardian of the public purse; yet there is universal recognition that the process of parliamentary examination and approval of government expenditure has been little more than a pro forma exercise. This is evident in the treatment of the Estimates. Each year, spending plans for government departments are automatically referred to the relevant standing committees, which may then examine them until the end of May, at which time they are declared automatically adopted. In these circumstances, many committees pay only brief attention to the Estimates, choosing to concentrate their efforts in other areas. Committees’ participation in the Estimates process has been enhanced, however, by their ability to consider and report on future expenditure plans and priorities of departments in order to allow their views to be taken into consideration during the preparation of the following year’s Estimates.

      3. Party Discipline

Party discipline in Canada is widely acknowledged to be extremely stringent. Many Canadians feel that the strong control exercised by parliamentary parties over their members impedes the ability of their local MPs to represent their wishes.(18) One academic describes the impact of party discipline on the outlook of Canadians this way:

as MPs vanish into the disciplined maw of the parliamentary hierarchies, apparently impervious and indifferent to constituent beliefs and preferences, the electorate itself becomes disillusioned about the prospects for democracy and the power of the vote.(19)

Proposals to reduce the influence of party discipline in the House of Commons are of two kinds: those that would increase the number of free votes in the House and those that would relax the confidence convention, which requires a government to resign upon losing a major vote. The latter could be achieved if the government were to declare in advance which matters it considered to involve confidence, thus leaving government MPs to vote as they please on all other matters without the fear that the government might fall as a consequence.

These kinds of changes may be difficult to achieve, but persisting public resentment of the impact of party discipline may necessitate them, unless the public can be convinced that party discipline contributes to the realization of democratic values.

   D. Direct Democracy

For some Canadians, internal institutional reform of the sort proposed for the House of Commons would be insufficient. They perceive a need for additional mechanisms that would require MPs to consult with their constituents more frequently or relinquish office.

      1. Referendums and Initiative

Some favour referendums and initiatives (a device whereby citizens can have certain issues placed on the legislative agenda) to give Canadians more direct say in the decisions of democratic institutions. While rarely used at the federal level, referendums (or plebiscites, which are non-binding referendums) have been employed from time to time in Canada -- most recently with respect to proposed constitutional change in 1992. Although these devices have strong advocates, it remains to be seen whether or not they will become an integral part of the way Canadian institutions construct public policy.

      2. Recall

Recall is a device whereby dissatisfied constituents could remove an MP from office by means of petition before his or her term expired. Already practised in 15 states in the United States, the concept appears to be gaining support in Canada; a poll taken in March 1993 showed that it was approved of by roughly three out of four Canadians.(20)

On 2 February 1994, the House of Commons gave First Reading to a Private Member’s bill proposing a recall mechanism for MPs.(21) The concept was not warmly received by most Members of Parliament. During two debates on the bill, members of the official opposition and the government party claimed that such a measure would fail to restore the faith of Canadians in Parliament, would be costly, and would be likely to provoke endless litigation. They argued that Canadians should wait until the end of a Parliament before rendering their final verdict on an MP’s performance and that Parliament itself should exercise its prerogative to discipline dishonest members, if necessary by dismissal.(22)

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The authors of scholarly work on parliament and the legislative process do not describe participation in parliamentary associations as a role for the parliamentarian akin to constituency service and participation in the legislative process. It may more properly be seen as an adjunct to the fundamental functions of parliamentarians, which can contribute to their effective performance by directing attention to common challenges and fostering the sharing of experiences. As well, international associations provide parliamentarians with a general forum in which to consider the usefulness of more narrowly mandated committees and working groups. It is important that this activity be subject to the same tests of effectiveness and compliance with public expectations as is required by adherence to democratic values, as stressed above.

Parliamentarians should share their varied experience in different countries as they attempt to strengthen democratic values and practices and maximize the effectiveness of parliamentary institutions. While the disparity of circumstances makes a universal recipe for success unlikely, this varied experience offers, perhaps, a richer resource than such a recipe could provide.


* This paper was originally prepared for the Delegation from the Parliament of Canada to the Parliamentary Conference of the Americas, September 1997, Quebec City.

(1) See Neil Postman, Technopoly - The Surrender of Culture to Technology, Vintage Books, New York, 1993, p. 14 ff.

(2) The following sections on pressures are based on Ian D. Clark, "Global Economic Trends and Pressures on Governments," Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 39, No. 4, p. 447-456.

(3) Marcel Massé, "Partners in the Management of Canada: The Changing Roles of Government and the Public Service," The John L. Manion Lecture, 1993, in Optimum, Volume 24-1, Summer 1993, p. 58 ff.

(4) Paul Krugman, "Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets," Foreign Affairs 74, No. 4, July/August 1995, p. 28-44.

(5) Ibid., p. 454.

(6) See, for example, Donald J. Savoie, Gobalization and Governance, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993, p. 3 ff.

(7) Jean-Marie Guéhenno, La Fin de la Démocratie, Flammarion, Paris, 1995.

(8) Gwynne Dyer, "Globalization and the Nation State," in Behind the Headlines, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 4, Summer 1996, p. 6.

(9) See Philip Norton, "The Growth of the Constituency Role of the MP," Parliamentary Affairs - A Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 47, No. 4, Oct. 1994, p. 705 ff.

(10) André Blais and Elizabeth Gidengil, in Making Representative Democracy Work: The Views of Canadians, Vol. 17, Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Toronto, 1991, p. 43, find that 78% of Canadians have more trust in their MPs than their political parties.

(11) Munroe Scott, "A Rescue Plan for Democracy in Peril," Canadian Speeches: Issues of the Day, November 1992, p. 32.

(12) Ibid., p. 223. For a detailed and provocative discussion on the dysfunctional nature of Canadian political parties, see John Meisel, "The Dysfunctions of Canadian Parties: An Exploratory Mapping," in Hugh G. Thorburn, editor, Party Politics in Canada, 6th edition, Prentice-Hall Canada, Scarborough, Ontario, 1991, p. 234-254.

(13) Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Ottawa, 1991, p. 265. Lynda Erickson and R.K. Carty ("Parties and Candidate Selection in the 1988 Canadian General Election," Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXIV:2, June 1991, p. 331-349) report similar findings. Even in those nominations that were contested, relatively few party members participated.

(14) Lortie Commission (1991), p. 246.

(15) Blais and Gidengil (1991), p. 79.

(16) As critics of PR point out, however, such a system usually operates on the basis of lists of candidates put forward by political parties. Candidates appearing at the top of lists are the first to be allocated seats; thus the role of parties in determining which candidates get on the lists and in what order is crucial. This suggests that PR would have to be accompanied by a reformed nomination process if minorities were to be ensured better representation.

(17) Paul Thomas, in Canadian Study of Parliament Group Year 7: A Review of the McGrath Committee Report on the Reform of the House of Commons, Seminar Proceedings, 2 December 1992, p. 14 (1992), p. 14.

(18) Citizens’ Forum (1991), p. 101.

(19) Peter McCormick, "Bring Back the Recall," Policy Options/Options Politiques, December 1992, p. 28.

(20) Gallup Canada, The Gallup Poll, 3 March 1994. Only 14% of those polled opposed recall.

(21) Bill C-210, An Act to provide for the recall of members of the House of Commons. The bill was introduced by Miss Deborah Grey, Reform MP for Beaver River. Among its provisions were requirements that no recall could take place until 18 months after an MP was elected, that an MP could be subject to only one recall petition during his/her term and that a recall petition, in order to succeed, must contain a number of signatures equivalent to a majority of the total number of votes cast in the last election.

(22) See House of Commons, Debates, 29 April 1994 (p. 3723-3732); 14 June 1994 (p. 5320-5330). The bill was debated but not voted on and was dropped to the bottom of the order paper after it was debated for the second time.