BP-456E
DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION,
AND PARLIAMENTS
Prepared by:
Jack Stilborn
Political and Social Affairs Division
July 1997
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
PART I: THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE AND
THE
IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
COMPETITIVE AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES
A. The Institutions of Government
B. International Institutions
IDEOLOGICAL PRESSURES
SOME
IMPLICATIONS
A. A Pessimists Vision
B. Discussion
1. The "Erosion of
Politics" Argument
2. The "Irrelevance
of Politics" Argument
PART II: MEANS OF
ACTION AVAILABLE TO PARLIAMENTARIANS
FOR STRENGTHENING
DEMOCRACY
THE CONSTITUENCY LEVEL
A. Safety Valve
B. Information Provider
C. Local Dignitary
D. Advocate
E. Benefactor
F. Powerful Friend
G. Promoter of Constituency Interests
LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS
A. Political Parties
B. The Electoral System
C. The House of Commons
1. The Legislative
Process and the Committee System
2. The Budgetary
Process
3. Party Discipline
D. Direct Democracy
1.
Referendums and Initiative
2. Recall
CONCLUDING REMARKS
DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION,
AND PARLIAMENTS*
SUMMARY
The paper is organized in two parts: Part
I, on the implications of economic integration for democracy, and Part II, on the means
available to parliamentarians to strengthen democratic processes.
Part I argues that economic integration is
a process extending far beyond the integration of markets and limitations to the autonomy
of governments in taxation and fiscal policies.
Competitive and financial pressures on
governments include the needs to attract investment and skilled professionals, to provide
enterprises with skilled workforces and a favourable regulatory environment, and to
maintain social policies that facilitate adjustment and contribute to social and political
stability.
Institutional pressures to maximize
efficiency and effectiveness in public services favour the development of a client-driven
public sector culture, the implementation of consultative government, heightened emphasis
on coordination and interdependence at the administrative level, and full participation in
(and responsiveness to) international institutions.
Ideological pressures on governments arise
from a new orthodoxy centering on "free markets and sound money." Among its
tenets are the need for autonomous central banks, the importance of professional and
ethical civil services, the value of privatizing the commercial activities of government,
and the application of economic logic to the internal distribution of government powers
and functions.
When economic integration is understood to
put an extended range of pressures on governments, it can be seen to have effects on the
health of democracy going beyond the erosion of the powers of national governments and
consequent trivialization of politics emphasized by pessimists. Economic integration
encourages the progress of democracy because it is associated with vastly improved global
communications, more responsive public sector organizations, increased emphasis on
education, more consultative government and the increased exposure of practices in
individual countries to world scrutiny, and competition among countries for investment;
all of which ultimately favour democracy.
Part II reviews the two central
roles of parliamentarians -- constituency service and participation in the legislature --
to identify the major means available to them for strengthening democratic values and
practices.
The constituency roles of parliamentarians
provide obvious opportunities for strengthening democracy and act as a safety valve for
discontented citizens. A parliamentarian can be a provider of information about politics,
policy and government; a local dignitary participating in community events; and a promoter
of constituency interests.
Other constituency roles may be either a
means for promoting democracy, or a means of disillusioning citizens. For example, the
parliamentarian can be an advocate of particular interests or groups (including political
parties); a benefactor of local groups or individuals; and a powerful friend acting within
the government on behalf of individual citizens.
In addition to contributing to the
responsiveness of legislatures and governments to the needs of citizens, parliamentarians
have a role in seeking the continuous improvement of processes and practices within
democratic systems.
Political parties play a vital role in the
achievement of democracy, yet problems with their internal practices in Canada suggest the
usefulness of reforms such as open nomination processes, codes of ethics and greater
attention to political education.
Electoral systems are also of central
importance, and where (as in Canada) there is substantial public dissatisfaction with the
way in which they operate, attention needs to be given to reforms (or convincing
explanations) that could allay public concern.
In Canada, recent attempts to enhance the
role of parliamentarians in legislation and the budgetary process illustrate directions of
broader relevance, as do proposals for reduced party discipline.
Populist devices such as increased
reliance on referendums, use of initiatives (which allow citizens to place issues on the
agenda of the legislature), and recall (which provides dissatisfied constituents with a
means to remove a parliamentarian from office between elections) are also receiving
increased attention in Canada.
Participation in international
associations, while not a role of parliamentarians to the same extent as constituency work
and legislative participation, provides an important opportunity for the sharing of
experiences and the maintenance of shared democratic values.
This paper is organized in two parts,
reflecting the two conference workshop themes relating to democracy. Part I considers the
implications of economic integration for the citizens involvement in decisions made
by public authorities, and for the future of democracy. In Part II, discussion focuses
more specifically on the means available to parliamentarians for strengthening democratic
processes and institutions.
PART I: THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
This Part deals with the implications
of economic integration for democracy through an examination of the major pressures that
emerge from the process of integration, followed by a discussion of their probable impact
on democratic values, processes and institutions.
Any consideration, in the late 1990s, of
the impact of economic integration on politics must recognize that the process of economic
integration is far from having run its course, nor is it clear what its full course might
be. The final character of this process, including its consequences for politics, will
likely not be completely understood until well after it is over. Indeed, only then will it
be is truly possible to determine whether what is now taking place is indeed economic
integration, or merely an early phase of some development that has yet to come fully into
view.
History is full of illustrations of this
caveat. For example, the mechanical clock was invented in the Benedictine monasteries of
the twelfth century for the purpose of ensuring that the requisite seven periods of
devotion would be included in each day. Its ultimate significance, however, was to enable
the synchronization and control of human actions required for the emergence of industrial
capitalism, which in turn gave a powerful impetus to forces of secularization. Similarly,
the introduction of the printed Bible by Gutenberg was initially assumed to be a
development that would strengthen the Catholic faith, by making the Bible widely
available. Only after the fact did it emerge that its significance was rather in shifting
authority away from the Catholic church, by equipping each individual with means to form
personal judgements.(1)
At it appears today, however, economic
integration, driven by technological change in areas such as communications and
transportation, is progressively reducing the economic distances among countries. This has
multiplied the sources for most kinds of economic competition, and produced global markets
for capital and many goods and services. Governments, with only a few conspicuous
exceptions, are responding (at varying speeds) to these developments by dismantling
policies that inhibit cross-border commerce, and developing fiscal and monetary policies
that respond to influences outside national borders. The full story of economic
integration, however, requires attention to a range of less obvious indirect pressures.(2)
COMPETITIVE AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES
As countries around the world reduce their
barriers to investment and to the movement of people, goods and services, each individual
jurisdiction (including the national, sub-national and municipal in countries where
jurisdiction is divided) is under pressure to ensure its attractiveness to investors and
professionals with skills in short supply. This competition for the newly mobile factors
of production introduces new constraints upon governments in many policy areas, notably
the design of taxation systems.
Potential investors pay close attention to
a range of locational factors, including the cost of obtaining and retaining an adequately
trained workforce and the costs associated with regulations, ranging from local zoning to
environmental controls. Cost considerations are weighed, particularly by enterprises
relying on highly mobile professional workforces, against such attractions as sensible
zoning, a healthy environment, and other amenities contributing to quality of life.
Economists arguments relating to the
competitive pressures faced by governments mostly focus on fiscal management issues, but
some have argued that well-designed social policies facilitating adjustment and promoting
investment in the health and skills of the population also constitute good economic
policy. Such policies can increase productivity and reduce social tension, thereby making
the country more attractive to investors and highly-skilled people. Such arguments
indicate that technological change and globalized commerce are producing new criteria that
will be applied to what may once have been seen as primarily internal policy issues.
Governments also need to address a range of new public policy issues, including
intellectual property rights and international crime.
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES
Institutional pressures emerging from (or
greatly exacerbated by) economic integration are of two kinds. First, are pressures for
structural and functional changes in the institutions of government, notably public
services. Second, are pressures brought to bear on governments by other institutions,
especially international agencies and organizations.
A.
The Institutions of Government
In a 1993 lecture delivered shortly before
the election of the government in which he was to participate, Marcel Massé commented
that governments around the world have in recent years moved to reduce the size of public
sector organizations and increase their efficiency.(3)
Simultaneously, growing numbers of
traditional government programs are being turned over to the private sector. While the
original motivation to reduce the size of public sector institutions and cut the costs of
programs was the need for deficit reduction, other factors will continue to propel it even
after the battles of deficit cutting have been won. Among these factors are pressures
linked to the profound changes in the external and internal environments of government
being brought about by economic integration.
Major domestic factors identified by Mr.
Massé are increased levels of education and the much greater accessibility of
information. These developments are linked to the process of economic integration: the
global marketplace drives the high wage economies of the developed countries towards
greater and greater reliance on knowledge-based work, requiring workers with progressively
higher levels of education and training, and the technological changes behind the trends
towards globalization revolve around increased capacities to transmit and access
information.
The consequence of these developments for
governments lies in the fact that members of the general public are far less inclined
today, even than in the recent past, to accept from on high governmental dictates
affecting their day-to-day lives. The desire of growing numbers of citizens and groups to
be consulted and to participate in the decision-making processes of the public sector has
created needs for a broader and more effective consultative process linking governments
and the governed within democratic societies.
The information explosion associated with
new technologies of communication and access has direct implications for how policies are
assessed, and by whom. Within governments, fewer and fewer problems are self-contained and
can be addressed with solutions involving only one traditional sector of government
activity. As a result, there is a growing need to expand the dimensions of public sector
organizations. A further impact of economic integration is that, in the absence of
consultations, governments have become unable to understand problems in their full
complexity, or to devise solutions that take adequate account of the needs of multiple
stakeholders.
B.
International Institutions
The second aspect of the institutional
pressures associated with economic integration are those brought to bear on individual
countries by international agencies and other institutions. Advanced economies like
Canadas are subject to relatively little direct pressure from international
institutions. Countries that never have to borrow from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), for example, are not subject to direct sanctions for ignoring IMF advice. To say
that there are no direct pressures, however, is not to say that there are no pressures at
all. Canada, for example, usually benefits from international agreements that oblige
signatories to follow a transparent set of rules; thus as a signatory it agrees to
restrict its own ability to act unilaterally.
To accept obligations under international
agreements, or to multilateral institutions, however, is not the same as transferring
sovereignty to a higher body. The autonomy of governments is being reduced by the
pressures of international competition, global financial markets, and the consequent need
for agreements. The enhanced decision-making authority of international institutions is
perhaps a consequence of these same developments, rather than of a transfer of
sovereignty. Indeed, far from reducing their role by devolving responsibility to
international institutions, governments are acquiring new responsibilities (to make them
function effectively, for example) and will have to work harder to overcome the inherent
difficulty of making and enforcing global arrangements.
It is noteworthy, as well, that countries,
ranging from New Zealand to a variety of less developed countries that have required
direct assistance from the IMF or other international institutions, experience a
considerably higher level of direct intervention than do countries such as Canada. The
intervention associated with dependency on international institutions as a result of
financial crisis cannot, however, be seen as a consequence of international economic
integration unless it is established that integration actually creates the crises.
IDEOLOGICAL PRESSURES
Paul Krugman has summarized the prevailing
ideological consensus as "free markets and sound money."(4) In his view, this is frequently seen as a consensus founded on
American ideas, where it is recognized that "American" connotes not only the
American government, but "...all those institutions and networks of opinion leaders
centred in Washington: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, think tanks,
politically astute investment bankers... all those who meet each other in Washington and
collectively define the conventional wisdom of government."
This consensus rests on assumptions
broadly reflective of current economic thought, including the virtues of savings and
investment, the need to shift government spending towards infrastructure, health and
education; the desirability of non-distortionary forms of revenue-raising (i.e., general
income and value-added taxes rather than specific taxes or exemptions); and the
superiority of market-based pricing, fiscal balance over time, non-inflationary money
expansion, and government reliance on fiscal rather than regulatory measures to influence
activities. These assumptions have implications for government policy at all levels.
According to Ian D. Clark, a recent executive director of the International Monetary Fund,
the key implications are:
responsibilities should be allocated
among levels of government so as to maximize efficiency and responsiveness (i.e.,
functions should be performed at the lowest level possible, unless there are economies of
scale, risks which need to be pooled, spillovers that need to be internalized which
warrant moving them to a higher level).(5)
SOME IMPLICATIONS
In recent years, considerable attention
has been paid to the impact of economic integration on national sovereignty. A major
conclusion is that the independent action of nations is being significantly reduced
(although, as argued above, this is not to be equated with an erosion of sovereignty in
its strict legal sense). Central to this trend is the migration of issues upwards, beyond
the boundaries of the nation-state, to multilateral or global institutions.(6) As has been seen, this results partly from a new
recognition of national interdependence, fostered by the emergence of communications and
information technologies, and partly from new relationships created by economic
integration.
A. A
Pessimists Vision
The pessimistic response to these
developments was set out by the French commentator Jean-Marie Guéhenno several years ago,
in a book that prompted wide discussion.(7) Guéhenno
argues that the migration of major political decisions beyond the boundaries of the
nation-state has fostered the progressive trivialization of political debate and the
democratic process within states. Rather than giving a central role to public discussion
of substantive policy options, contemporary politics focuses on the management of issues,
perceptions and symbols. The purpose is to stimulate the transitory sentiments that have
become all that is necessary to ensure electoral victories, and minimize conflicts between
governments and citizens between elections. The contemporary media foster this development
by distilling political discourse into 30-second sound bites and visual images, while the
result is the declining importance of the territorially defined nation-state. Since
political decision-making within the nation-state is increasingly unable to affect the
matters that determine the character of peoples lives, no compelling reason exists
for people to make more extensive demands on the media.
Nor, according to Guéhenno, does the
migration of problems to the multilateral level promise much for the future of democratic
values and practices. At this level, if substantive problems are engaged at all,
decision-making becomes a highly complex process of brokering deals and arranging
compromises, typically in order to create the impression of decisiveness where, in
reality, little is being accomplished. The vast distance between decision-makers and
members of the public tends, furthermore, to exacerbate the anti-democratic
characteristics of politics which are already present within states. The result is a
largely symbolic process, devoid of both significant change and accountability.
Projecting these developments into the
future, Guéhenno foresees that nation-states will be replaced by amorphous empires with
shifting boundaries, which will be substantially devoted to material and commercial
pursuits in conditions of social and political conformism.
B. Discussion
There are several reasons for questioning
the view that economic integration is necessarily associated with the decline of
democratic institutions and values, although it is difficult to deny that this is one
possible outcome.
1. The "Erosion of
Politics" Argument
First, at least some of the challenges
posed by the emerging world order are analogous to those already somewhat met by federal
systems of government. The division of the functions of government among international,
national, and sub-national and/or local levels poses problems for democratic
accountability which resemble those raised in attempts to combine federalism and
democratic institutions. Inevitably, certain decisions require the approval of both
federal and provincial or state governments and must be undertaken in intergovernmental
forums; thus, legislatures are in danger of being relegated to the role of rubber-stamping
agreements after the fact. As federal systems have evolved, the class of decisions falling
wholly or partly into this category has tended to broaden, as governments have moved to
occupy policy fields not envisioned when federal constitutions, such as Canadas,
were drafted.
Modern federal systems have, however,
developed various formal and informal arrangements that help to preserve democratic
accountability. For example, government leaders can give statements of general policy to
the legislature, which can subject them to immediate examination and discussion, and
prompt scrutiny of government activity in a policy field. For example, in late 1995, when
the Canadian Prime Minister publicly committed his government to a series of measures
related to Quebec and other provinces, including the devolution to some provincial
governments of some federal administrative responsibilities in the areas of manpower
training and social housing. A second example is the involvement of a parliamentary
committee in refining the constitutional proposals of the government in 1991 and 1992,
prior to the initiation of formal federal-provincial discussions. These strategies
enhanced the role of parliamentarians in decisions before the intergovernmental phase,
which tends to result in complex trade-offs that cannot be modified by a legislature
without unravelling entirely.
Another, although less satisfactory,
approach is to involve parliament in the review of agreements before they are ratified.
This provides at least a theoretical opportunity for governments to be held accountable
for what they have done, although the likelihood of significant change to government
policy is minimal, at least in Westminster systems.
Finally, but arguably most significantly,
politicians within federal systems play an indispensable role in calling one another to
account in public for actions taken within intergovernmental forums. While there is
evidence that Canadians have a limited tolerance for what may appear as counter-productive
intergovernmental infighting, federal-provincial conflict can be an occasion for
substantive debate. It also plays an important role in allowing citizens to decide whom to
hold accountable for what, in a system where relative levels of federal and provincial
responsibility changes from issue to issue.
If the upward migration of issues beyond
the nation-state really represents an inevitable erosion of the process and substance of
democratic debate, one might expect to see signs of this within federal states. There is
no evidence, however, that federal states are, or are seen by their citizens to be, less
democratic than unitary states. On the contrary, federal states occupy a prominent place
on the list of established democracies. Indeed, their internal processes may show how
political accountability can be maintained in an era that promises the steadily increasing
importance of multilateral institutions.
2. The "Irrelevance of
Politics" Argument
Pessimistic views of the implications of
economic integration also argue that, even where political debate remains vibrant, the
narrowing autonomy available to nation-states will make such debate increasingly
irrelevant to the lives of citizens. This argument relies, however, on an excessively
narrow understanding of economic integration.
Earlier sections of this paper have argued
that economic integration consists of a great deal more than merely the integration of
markets and governments recognition that they cannot tax and spend without
considering impacts on global competitiveness. Instead, economic integration must be seen
as part of a pervasive technologically driven process of change with implications across
the entire range of social, as well as economic, policy. Furthermore, these implications
cannot be detached from changes to the role of public organizations, the character of
public administration, and the dominant ideas that guide both policy and administration.
Within the larger process of global change
associated with economic integration, a number of elements are powerfully favourable to
democracy, starting with the vastly improved capability of individuals to communicate
directly with one another, and to share knowledge of democratic practices and standards,
which are encouraged by certain views: that public services should be
"client-driven" and respond to public demands with the alacrity of businesses;
that education is a vital component of a nations infrastructural investment; that
governments should consult with broadening constituencies of groups and individuals before
making decisions; that practices within individual countries should be exposed to
international inspection according to transnational standards; and that private
enterprises should search for locations that combine low production costs, attractiveness
to employees and long-term social and political stability.
When the full implications of economic
integration are recognized, the pessimism of Guéhenno and others, though useful as a
warning, may seem to be unwarranted. This is not only because of the above deficiencies,
but also because of the progress being made in the contemporary world. If economic
integration militates against democracy, then we would hardly be seeing the recent trend
in favour of democracy around the globe. Yet, in the words of historian and journalist
Gwynne Dyer:
...the apparently irresistible spread of
democracy around the planet is not (mere speculation). It spread relatively slowly in the
first century and a half and was confined in large part to the Western societies which
were then the sole possessors of the means of mass communications. There were many false
starts ... but looking back from 1996, as the dust begins to settle, you can see that even
the least successful and least democratic of these revolutions - Mexico in 1910, Russia in
1917, China in 1949 - did form part of the broader pattern.(8)
PART II: MEANS OF ACTION
AVAILABLE TO PARLIAMENTARIANS
FOR STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY
This section is organized according to
the two major responsibilities of parliamentarians: constituency work and work within, or
relating to, the legislative process. A concluding section relates this discussion to the
activity of parliamentarians within parliamentary associations.
The following discussion refers directly
to Canadian political institutions and experience, but its conclusions about the means
available to parliamentarians are readily transferable to other systems. It needs to be
recognized, however, that strengthening democracy requires different strategies in
different systems.
The Westminster model of democratic
government places few institutional limits on the capacity of the government to act,
making democracy centrally dependent on adversarial partisan debate within (and outside)
the House to ventilate issues and on aroused public opinion to act as a brake on
government. Within the congressional system, the health of democracy depends more on the
efficacy of consensus-building in a relatively non-partisan environment and the avoidance
of obstacles to government responsiveness to pressing needs. While parliamentarians from
all countries can share in the strengthening of democratic cultures, the fact that systems
differ (in many cases combining elements of both the Westminster and congressional models)
necessarily requires a local view. It requires careful attention to the characteristic
strengths and weaknesses of unique individual systems, and an awareness that vital
remedies within one context can easily turn out to be ineffective, or actively harmful,
within another.
THE CONSTITUENCY LEVEL
In all systems, the responsibilities of
constituency service have grown steadily over the years and, particularly in those that
conform to the Westminster model, work within the constituency presents significant
opportunities for enhancing both the culture of democracy and the effectiveness of
institutions. These opportunities can best be identified with reference to a number of
distinguishable roles that parliamentarians may play within their ridings.(9)
A. Safety Valve
For citizens faced with geographically,
psychologically and sometimes culturally distant governments, the local parliamentarian
serves as a visible political figure to whom grievances and points of view can be
expressed. Even the act of expressing views may provide relief, particularly if it prompts
a response from the parliamentarian or local office staff.
The expectations of citizens will
determine the effectiveness of this role in promoting their adherence to democratic values
and processes however. In Canada and elsewhere, there is increasing evidence that the
expectations of citizens now focus on tangible results. Merely passive attention to
citizens views may actually increase public frustration or disillusionment.
B. Information
Provider
As governments become more complex, the
role of the local parliamentarian as a source of information about politics, policy and
government services has undoubtedly grown more important. This role can do even more to
promote democratic values and adherence to democratic processes, if the parliamentarian
makes a conscious attempt to link the specific information given to its democratic
implications. Modern information technologies, including the Internet, can make the
offices more accessible to constituents and enhance their capacity to obtain information.
C. Local Dignitary
The local parliamentarian is often invited
to official functions and other events within the constituency. Interestingly, some public
opinion polling (which documents growing voter cynicism about politicians in general)
suggests that voters respect for their own local parliamentarians remains relatively
intact, although somewhat diminished in recent years.(10)
This may suggest that the mere existence of a representative locally familiar may, in and
of itself, contribute to citizens positive feelings about such abstractions as
democracy. Parliamentarians could use local events to highlight the importance of the
culture of democracy, and democratic institutions, thereby strengthening such feelings.
D. Advocate
When parliamentarians play the role of
"advocate," they give their names in support of a particular cause or interest
championed by constituents. Thus, virtually all parliamentarians promote the cause of
their own political party. Indeed, in Westminster systems parliamentarians are sometimes
characterized as being representatives of political parties rather than of their
constituents. This suggests a danger that applies equally to all sorts of advocacy: to the
extent that a parliamentarian is seen as an advocate of particular individuals or
groupings within the constituency, he or she may lose credibility as a representative of
the interests of the constituency as a whole.
E. Benefactor
A parliamentarian acting as a benefactor
for constituents serves as the local dispenser of patronage, whether this consists of
honours or more tangible benefits. The parliamentarians role as head of a local
patronage network has been historically significant, but has declined in importance during
the past 50 years in Canada, the U.S., and other established democratic systems.
Parliamentarians in most countries
actively continue to seek prominence in announcements of grants, loans and other benefits
to local businesses and interests, and in some cases work strenuously to ensure that local
interests obtain such benefits. Like the advocacy role, however, this activity has
ambiguous implications with respect to the strengthening of democratic values and
institutions. Where benefits are generally recognized as allocated according to public
interest considerations, and fairly distributed to worthy recipients, they can celebrate
democratic values and processes. On the other hand, some benefits can reflect the
persistence of pre-democratic patron-client relationships and patronage networks.
F. Powerful Friend
A parliamentarian may intervene in a
dispute between a constituent and a public body, or even a private body, in order to
redress a grievance. Again, the implications of the role of "powerful friend"
depend heavily on whether the achievement reflects the just entitlements of citizens, or
undue influence and preferential treatment. In the former case, it will confirm the value
of democratic principles and practices, and will predictably strengthen popular attachment
to them. In the latter case, however, it will likely do the opposite.
G. Promoter of Constituency Interests
While the heterogeneity of the modern
constituency often makes it difficult to detect genuinely common interests among
constituents, some issues, such as the potential loss of a major local employer or the
need to attract new industry and jobs, are likely to prompt universally strong responses.
Parliamentarians typically combine various roles in dealing with such issues. Their impact
can be heightened if they make a point of linking positive outcomes to the operation of
the democratic processes, or, just as importantly, of providing full explanations of less
favourable outcomes.
Recent initiatives to improve
communication between constituents and parliamentarians could strengthen some
constituency-related roles. Some political parties and individual MPs have experimented in
recent years with electronic town hall meetings, questionnaires in MPs letters to
constituents, and constituency-based electronic referendums. More ambitious proposals have
included the creation of constituency-based "community parliaments" to select,
review and debate pieces of legislation tabled in the House of Commons. Such an assembly
could recommend a position to the local parliamentarian, track the progress of legislation
through the House of Commons, and report to the constituency on the parliamentarians
performance, thereby perhaps enhancing citizen input into the legislative process and
helping to free Members of Parliament from the pressures of party discipline.(11)
LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS
The procedures governing the legislative
process provide a variety of opportunities for individual parliamentarians to affirm
democratic values and practices. More fundamentally, legislative institutions need to
provide members of the public with continuous and tangible evidence that they do actually
respond to public opinion. Legislative and policy outcomes that reflect public demands are
the most obvious way to accomplish this. It is important to recognize, however, that full
explanations of the reasons for decisions that may not respond to, or even conflict with,
prevailing public opinion can also help. They demonstrate the effectiveness of democratic
institutions in making decision-makers accountable for their actions, and may also enrich
the substance of policy debate and increase the likelihood of ultimate consensus.
The need to consider options for
institutional reform is an integral part of the responsibility of ensuring the
effectiveness of existing institutions. The remainder of this section describes the major
legislative institutions in Canada, and discusses options for reform that are receiving
attention both in Canada and elsewhere.
A. Political Parties
Political parties are key to
representative democracy. They recruit and support candidates for public office, select
political leaders, develop policy alternatives, provide avenues for political
participation and education, and organize electoral competition. Yet political parties
have also been described as "dysfunctional" and as "contributing to the
malaise of voters."(12)
Many complaints about political parties
focus on their inability to fulfil the roles ascribed to them. Thus, rather than
recruiting candidates, parties may discourage many from seeking office. The nomination
process by which parties select candidates has come in for particular criticism. A 1991
Royal Commission (the Lortie Commission) claimed, for example, that close to two-thirds of
the nomination contests were uncompetitive because nomination was by acclamation.(13) Many others view the parties recruitment
practices as the principal cause of the poor representational profile of the House of
Commons. Women, visible minorities, and aboriginal Canadians have had a particularly
difficult time in surmounting the barrier of the nomination process. The selection of
party leaders has also been criticized as being dominated by money and thus fundamentally
undemocratic. Finally, parties that spring to life only during election campaigns fail to
fulfil their promise as vehicles for political participation and education, or as sources
of policy.
The Lortie Commission recognized that
parties are essentially private organizations and should remain so. However, the
Commissioners also believed that changes were called for if parties were to retain their
position as primary political organizations essential to representative democracy. Thus,
the Commissioners recommended that all registered political parties should have
constitutions "that promote democratic values and practices in their internal
affairs," and that are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.(14) Open nomination conventions were
recommended to improve candidate selection processes, as was a series of measures to
encourage more women to run for office. To further help restore public confidence in
political parties, the Lortie Commission recommended that they adopt codes of ethics and
establish ethics committees to enforce these. Finally, the Commissioners proposed that
parties create foundations mandated to engage in political education and to develop and
articulate party policies.
B. The Electoral
System
Canadas electoral system has long
been the target of critics who argue that it produces a House of Commons that is not truly
representative of the Canadian people or of their wishes. They point out that our
single-member plurality (SMP, or the "first-past-the-post") electoral system
tends to distort party standings in the House of Commons; a party can win a majority of
seats and form a government without winning a majority of all votes cast. Parties with
support concentrated in one region can win a significant number of seats, yet parties with
national support that is thinly spread and lacks concentration in any one area may win few
seats or none at all.
How do Canadians view their federal
electoral system? André Blais and Elizabeth Gidengil, who prepared a study of public
opinion for the Lortie Commission, asked survey respondents for their views on the
distorting effects of the system; of those who expressed an opinion, only 42% found these
effects acceptable. All in all, Blais and Guidengil concluded that there is
"dissatisfaction with the way that our electoral system translates votes into
seats."(15)
Clearly, these findings indicate a
problem, although room exists for debate about whether the problem is one of inadequacies
in the SMP electoral system, or lack of information and, perhaps, unrealistic expectations
on the part of the public. One solution would be to convince Canadians of the advantages
often claimed for SMP systems; for example, that they are easily understood by voters,
that they avoid the dangers of minority government or legislative stalemate resulting from
"artificial" majorities, and that they avoid the tendency of some alternative
systems to result in a multitude of narrowly doctrinal or interest group-based parties.
The conclusions of the Lortie Commission recommended against changing the electoral
system.
If Canadians do not become more widely
convinced of the merits of the present system, however, respect for democratic values
would appear to prompt consideration of reform options. The most frequently mentioned of
these is an electoral system based on proportional representation (PR), which accords
seats to parties on the basis of the percentage of the votes they received in a general
election.(16)
C. The House of
Commons
Since the House of Commons is
Canadas pre-eminent democratic institution, it is only natural that it should be a
focus of attention -- and of most reform proposals.
While earlier reforms were intended to
increase House efficiency in handling affairs, more recently the focus has been on placing
MPs at the centre of the policy process and restoring the respect of the Canadian people.
With this in mind, the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (the McGrath
Committee), which reported in June 1985, proposed changes (subsequently implemented) to
the structure and operation of standing committees of the House. However, most feel that
these changes were not sufficient; seven years after the McGrath Committee tabled its
report, a group of academics and Members of Parliament meeting to discuss its impact
reached a resoundingly negative consensus.(17) The
desire for institutional reform appears to have taken hold in public opinion, however, and
the need for change is likely to become more pressing.
1. The Legislative Process and
the Committee System
The legislative process in the House of
Commons is a principal source of dissatisfaction, both for many Canadians and their MPs.
In contrast with the United States, most of the important policy decisions in Canada are
made out of the public eye. Pre-legislation negotiations between bureaucracies, between
federal and provincial governments, between governments and affected interest groups, or
government and consulting firms (lobbyists) take place largely in private, before
legislation is tabled in the House of Commons. Once draft legislation is referred to
committee following Second Reading, it is usually changed only minimally before being sent
back to the House of Commons.
Reforms to deal with aspects of this
situation were undertaken in early 1994. Changes to the Standing Orders ended the
practice of automatically referring bills to legislative committees following Second
Reading debate. Now, government has the choice of referring a bill to a standing committee
with the appropriate background knowledge and skills to deal with it. Since February 1994,
legislation can be referred to a committee immediately following first reading, though
only on the initiative of a Minister. This step was intended to allow committees greater
scope for amending legislation.
2. The Budgetary
Process
One of the most important roles of MPs is
that of guardian of the public purse; yet there is universal recognition that the process
of parliamentary examination and approval of government expenditure has been little more
than a pro forma exercise. This is evident in the treatment of the Estimates. Each
year, spending plans for government departments are automatically referred to the relevant
standing committees, which may then examine them until the end of May, at which time they
are declared automatically adopted. In these circumstances, many committees pay only brief
attention to the Estimates, choosing to concentrate their efforts in other areas.
Committees participation in the Estimates process has been enhanced, however, by
their ability to consider and report on future expenditure plans and priorities of
departments in order to allow their views to be taken into consideration during the
preparation of the following years Estimates.
3. Party Discipline
Party discipline in Canada is widely
acknowledged to be extremely stringent. Many Canadians feel that the strong control
exercised by parliamentary parties over their members impedes the ability of their local
MPs to represent their wishes.(18) One academic
describes the impact of party discipline on the outlook of Canadians this way:
as MPs vanish into the disciplined maw of
the parliamentary hierarchies, apparently impervious and indifferent to constituent
beliefs and preferences, the electorate itself becomes disillusioned about the prospects
for democracy and the power of the vote.(19)
Proposals to reduce the influence of party
discipline in the House of Commons are of two kinds: those that would increase the number
of free votes in the House and those that would relax the confidence convention, which
requires a government to resign upon losing a major vote. The latter could be achieved if
the government were to declare in advance which matters it considered to involve
confidence, thus leaving government MPs to vote as they please on all other matters
without the fear that the government might fall as a consequence.
These kinds of changes may be difficult to
achieve, but persisting public resentment of the impact of party discipline may
necessitate them, unless the public can be convinced that party discipline contributes to
the realization of democratic values.
D. Direct Democracy
For some Canadians, internal institutional
reform of the sort proposed for the House of Commons would be insufficient. They perceive
a need for additional mechanisms that would require MPs to consult with their constituents
more frequently or relinquish office.
1.
Referendums and Initiative
Some favour referendums and initiatives (a
device whereby citizens can have certain issues placed on the legislative agenda) to give
Canadians more direct say in the decisions of democratic institutions. While rarely used
at the federal level, referendums (or plebiscites, which are non-binding referendums) have
been employed from time to time in Canada -- most recently with respect to proposed
constitutional change in 1992. Although these devices have strong advocates, it remains to
be seen whether or not they will become an integral part of the way Canadian institutions
construct public policy.
2. Recall
Recall is a device whereby dissatisfied
constituents could remove an MP from office by means of petition before his or her term
expired. Already practised in 15 states in the United States, the concept appears to be
gaining support in Canada; a poll taken in March 1993 showed that it was approved of by
roughly three out of four Canadians.(20)
On 2 February 1994, the House of
Commons gave First Reading to a Private Members bill proposing a recall mechanism
for MPs.(21) The concept was not warmly received by
most Members of Parliament. During two debates on the bill, members of the official
opposition and the government party claimed that such a measure would fail to restore the
faith of Canadians in Parliament, would be costly, and would be likely to provoke endless
litigation. They argued that Canadians should wait until the end of a Parliament before
rendering their final verdict on an MPs performance and that Parliament itself
should exercise its prerogative to discipline dishonest members, if necessary by
dismissal.(22)
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The authors of scholarly work on
parliament and the legislative process do not describe participation in parliamentary
associations as a role for the parliamentarian akin to constituency service and
participation in the legislative process. It may more properly be seen as an adjunct to
the fundamental functions of parliamentarians, which can contribute to their effective
performance by directing attention to common challenges and fostering the sharing of
experiences. As well, international associations provide parliamentarians with a general
forum in which to consider the usefulness of more narrowly mandated committees and working
groups. It is important that this activity be subject to the same tests of effectiveness
and compliance with public expectations as is required by adherence to democratic values,
as stressed above.
Parliamentarians should share their varied
experience in different countries as they attempt to strengthen democratic values and
practices and maximize the effectiveness of parliamentary institutions. While the
disparity of circumstances makes a universal recipe for success unlikely, this varied
experience offers, perhaps, a richer resource than such a recipe could provide.
* This paper
was originally prepared for the Delegation from the Parliament of Canada to the
Parliamentary Conference of the Americas, September 1997, Quebec City.
(1) See
Neil Postman, Technopoly - The Surrender of Culture to Technology, Vintage Books,
New York, 1993, p. 14 ff.
(2) The
following sections on pressures are based on Ian D. Clark, "Global Economic Trends
and Pressures on Governments," Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 39, No. 4,
p. 447-456.
(3)
Marcel Massé, "Partners in the Management of Canada: The Changing Roles of
Government and the Public Service," The John L. Manion Lecture, 1993, in Optimum,
Volume 24-1, Summer 1993, p. 58 ff.
(4) Paul
Krugman, "Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets," Foreign Affairs 74, No. 4,
July/August 1995, p. 28-44.
(5) Ibid.,
p. 454.
(6) See,
for example, Donald J. Savoie, Gobalization and Governance, Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1993, p. 3 ff.
(7)
Jean-Marie Guéhenno, La Fin de la Démocratie, Flammarion, Paris, 1995.
(8)
Gwynne Dyer, "Globalization and the Nation State," in Behind the Headlines,
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 4, Summer 1996, p. 6.
(9) See
Philip Norton, "The Growth of the Constituency Role of the MP," Parliamentary
Affairs - A Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 47, No. 4, Oct. 1994, p. 705 ff.
(10)
André Blais and Elizabeth Gidengil, in Making Representative Democracy Work: The Views
of Canadians, Vol. 17, Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and
Party Financing, Toronto, 1991, p. 43, find that 78% of Canadians have more trust in their
MPs than their political parties.
(11)
Munroe Scott, "A Rescue Plan for Democracy in Peril," Canadian Speeches:
Issues of the Day, November 1992, p. 32.
(12) Ibid.,
p. 223. For a detailed and provocative discussion on the dysfunctional nature of Canadian
political parties, see John Meisel, "The Dysfunctions of Canadian Parties: An
Exploratory Mapping," in Hugh G. Thorburn, editor, Party Politics in Canada,
6th edition, Prentice-Hall Canada, Scarborough, Ontario, 1991, p. 234-254.
(13)
Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Ottawa, 1991, p. 265. Lynda
Erickson and R.K. Carty ("Parties and Candidate Selection in the 1988 Canadian
General Election," Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXIV:2, June 1991,
p. 331-349) report similar findings. Even in those nominations that were contested,
relatively few party members participated.
(14)
Lortie Commission (1991), p. 246.
(15)
Blais and Gidengil (1991), p. 79.
(16) As
critics of PR point out, however, such a system usually operates on the basis of lists of
candidates put forward by political parties. Candidates appearing at the top of lists are
the first to be allocated seats; thus the role of parties in determining which candidates
get on the lists and in what order is crucial. This suggests that PR would have to be
accompanied by a reformed nomination process if minorities were to be ensured better
representation.
(17)
Paul Thomas, in Canadian Study of Parliament Group Year 7: A Review of the McGrath
Committee Report on the Reform of the House of Commons, Seminar Proceedings, 2 December
1992, p. 14 (1992), p. 14.
(18)
Citizens Forum (1991), p. 101.
(19)
Peter McCormick, "Bring Back the Recall," Policy Options/Options Politiques,
December 1992, p. 28.
(20)
Gallup Canada, The Gallup Poll, 3 March 1994. Only 14% of those polled opposed
recall.
(21)
Bill C-210, An Act to provide for the recall of members of the House of Commons. The bill
was introduced by Miss Deborah Grey, Reform MP for Beaver River. Among its provisions were
requirements that no recall could take place until 18 months after an MP was elected, that
an MP could be subject to only one recall petition during his/her term and that a recall
petition, in order to succeed, must contain a number of signatures equivalent to a
majority of the total number of votes cast in the last election.
(22)
See House of Commons, Debates, 29 April 1994 (p. 3723-3732); 14 June 1994
(p. 5320-5330). The bill was debated but not voted on and was dropped to the bottom
of the order paper after it was debated for the second time.
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