87-13E

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ISSUE DEFINITION

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

   A. Historical Background

   B. Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament
      1. The United Nations
         a. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
         b. Chemical and Biological Weapons
         c. Conventional Arms
      2. Alliance Negotiations
         a. Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
         b. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

   C. Open Skies

   D. Bilateral (Superpower) Arms Control and Disarmament
      1. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
      2. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
      3. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Agreement
      4. Short Range Nuclear Weapons

PARLIAMENTARY ACTION

CHRONOLOGY

SELECTED REFERENCES

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT*

ISSUE DEFINITION

In the post-war era, discussions of the prospects for a continued peace, or the eventuality of war, inevitably converged on the arms race. As most believed the arms race to be inherently dangerous and ultimately destabilizing, the West found itself confronted with something of a paradox. On the one hand, it believed that strength deterred aggression; on the other, it seemed equally convinced that the arms race itself might be a cause of war. Underlying much of the discussion on arms control, we find the widely accepted orthodoxy that arms races are by nature a kind of "action-reaction" phenomenon. Opposing states’ responses to each other’s buildups and attempts to reap advantage lead to destabilization and heightened tension. If war should come, it is argued, it will do so accidentally, in a climate of intensifying suspicion and as the result of critical misperceptions during a crisis. Controlling the arms race is, then, deemed a necessary element in the promotion of international stability. Critics argue, however, that in fact arms control does little to contain the arms race - it simply codifies it.

The international arms control structure that developed during the postwar period can best be understood as three layers: first in terms of interest and importance were the bilateral (usually nuclear) negotiations between the superpowers; second were alliance-based negotiations, mainly on conventional armed forces in Europe; and third were broader multilateral negotiations centred on the United Nations. The post-Cold War period has seen a change in the agenda of arms control. While Cold War treaties must be adapted to new realities, attention has focused mainly on multilateral attempts to halt the further proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.

This Current Issue Review provides a brief overview of the various forums in which arms control negotiations take place, some of the accomplishments achieved and, where appropriate, Canada’s contribution to these.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

   A. Historical Background

The problem of arms control and disarmament is not peculiar to the modern era. People have been concerned about war and its destructive potential for centuries. The Old Testament prophets hoped for the day when swords would be beaten into ploughshares. Pope Innocent II, in 1139, called an international conference to discuss the possible means of controlling what then was considered an awesome new weapon - the crossbow. Today, the death of millions would require only 30 minutes: the flight time for an intercontinental ballistic missile between the United States and Russia. It is the relatively short period of time in which death and destruction can be wrought that distinguishes the nuclear era from those that preceded it.

One should note that the terms "arms control" and "disarmament," though often used as synonyms, are not so in fact. "Disarmament" refers to the elimination of weapons systems, a far more comprehensive goal than "arms control," which seeks to reduce the risk of war, its destructiveness should it occur, and the cost of military defence through agreements between states to regulate the development, production and deployment of weapons systems and military forces.

Wars conducted prior to the twentieth century were, by and large, limited in both their scope and methods, notable exceptions being the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War. During this period, statesmen favoured limited warfare to preserve the existing international order. Casualties were counted in the thousands rather than in millions and when World War I broke out, most expected a short-lived, small conflict.

The pre-twentieth century period was marked by what we would call the "Clausewitzian" concept of war. Clausewitz, who published his work On War in 1832, viewed war as a rational instrument of national policy; something to be pursued with a well-defined goal in view and an evaluation of the costs and benefits involved, and something whose ultimate objective should be to advance the interests of the nation state. Clausewitz also insisted that the civilian authority should always be dominant and that war was never to be pursued for its own sake.

The twentieth century has witnessed four revolutions in warfare. The first was ushered in with the improved technologies of World War I, including machine guns, tanks, submarines and poison gas. During 1915 alone, the French suffered 1.4 million casualties while, at the battle of Verdun during 10 months in 1916, Germany lost 336,000 men. The second revolution, in World War II, along with massive civilian casualties included major developments such as large airforces, aircraft carriers, the strategic bombing of civilian targets, and the German pioneering of rockets in warfare. The explosion of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the third revolution; a quantitative and qualitative change from those that had preceded it.

The final revolution in twentieth-century warfare came with the development of the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM). Prior to the development of ICBMs, the geographic location of the United States had shielded it from attack, afterwards it was vulnerable to attack as never before in its history. The technological developments of the Second World War and after, democratized death by making all equally subject to the ravages of war.

Subsequent to World War I, public opinion called for the creation of institutions and international agreements that would prevent any recurrence. The League of Nations, however, was hamstrung from the start due to American unwillingness to join. At the same time, the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, initiated by the United States, was probably the most significant attempt to control major weapons prior to the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements of 1972. The 1922 treaty limited the growth of capital ships among the major powers for over a decade. Unfortunately, several classes of ships, including submarines and aircraft carriers, were not controlled by the treaty, a fact which helped lead to its eventual demise.

The inter-war period was also witness to the Geneva Protocol (1925) on the prohibition of poison gas and bacteriological weapons, to which Canada became a signatory on 6 May 1930. Although the United States had introduced the protocol, the U.S. Senate did not ratify it until 10 April 1975. In 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed; it bound the signatories to renounce the use of aggressive war and pursue peaceful means of resolving disputes, but made no provision for sanctions. In 1932, the League of Nations sponsored an international disarmament conference, but by this time the great powers were incapable of coming to a consensus on what weapons should be limited. Soon after coming to power (1933), Adolf Hitler ordered the withdrawal of Germany from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations and two years later, he announced that Germany would no longer abide by the clauses of the Versailles Treaty that prohibited that country from rearming. By the late 1930s, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States and Great Britain had all embarked on significant military construction programs.

Following World War II, the United States presented the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission with a rather bold plan for the control of nuclear power. The Baruch Plan (1946) called for the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear bombs, the disposal of existing U.S. bombs, and the creation of an international agency that would be given all information concerning the production of nuclear energy. The proposal was to be implemented only when both a means of verification and a system of sanctions had been agreed upon.

The Soviet Union, however, would not be denied the development of its own nuclear capability and rejected the American proposal. With the failure of the Baruch Plan, any internationalist solution to the arms race was out of the question and any significant agreement on arms control would henceforth have to be sought within the recognized bipolar pattern of U.S.-Soviet rivalry. If the history of arms control has taught us anything, it is that arms control is a reflection of overall political relations rather than a cause of international peace.

Canada was "present at the creation" of contemporary arms control, as Britain and the United States agreed to limit naval forces on the Great Lakes in the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817. In the postwar period, Canada’s concerns in arms control matters have, perhaps, tended to carry more weight than those of most middle powers because of our substantial and pioneering role with the U.S. and Britain in the development of nuclear energy. Today, Canada has a seat at every multilateral arms control and disarmament forum.

   B. Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament

      1. The United Nations

In the postwar period, most (although not all) multilateral arms control agreements have been sponsored by the United Nations, which has developed a range of specialized arms control and disarmament machinery. With the end of the Cold War, the UN undertook a review of its disarmament machinery, and member states were asked to comment on a report of the Secretary-General entitled New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era. The Government of Canada "strongly agree(d) with the Secretary-General that the time is ripe for a thorough reassessment of the UN disarmament machinery in order to ensure that it is able to meet new realities," and pointed out the need to liberate the term "arms control and disarmament" from its Cold War preoccupation with numbers of weapons.

The first resolution ever passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations called for the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the peaceful use of atomic energy. The General Assembly has passed hundreds of resolutions on this subject in the past 50 years, but some have contained conflicting ideas and recommendations. The General Assembly has held three Special Sessions on Disarmament. While the first, in 1978, resulted in a 129-paragraph Final Document declaring that the final objective of the international community was to be "general and complete disarmament under effective international control," subsequent special sessions in 1982 and 1988 added little. Led by the Non-Aligned states, many countries now agree with the idea of holding a fourth special session, to discuss a disarmament and security agenda for the 21^st century.

The First Committee (FC) of the General Assembly, which includes all members of the General Assembly, deals with arms control, disarmament and international security issues. It is a deliberative body that prepares recommendations and draft resolutions for submission to the General Assembly; resolutions are adopted on the basis of majority vote. Given the composition of the FC, it is difficult to achieve consensus on controversial issues, and further work in other forums is usually needed.

The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was established by the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. It deals with a smaller number of items than the First Committee and in greater detail. In 1998, for example, the UNDC was to consider nuclear weapon free zones, the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament. Like the First Committee, however, the Commission attempts through study and the exchange of ideas to develop common viewpoints and guidelines for action.

The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the most practical of the major UN-mandated organs, focusing on negotiating treaties. While it is funded by the UN and reports to the General Assembly, the CD sets its own agenda and need not follow General Assembly recommendations. Much of the work of the CD over the years has been carried out by ad hoc working groups created to pursue specific issues.

         a. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The centrepiece of multilateral arms control is undoubtedly the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), drafted by the CD’s predecessor, the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament. The goal of this Treaty and the regime it created is prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Over the years, a number of developing states have begun to view the NPT as a discriminatory means of denying nuclear capability to developing states while preserving that of developed states. Four preparatory conferences were held in preparation for the NPT Review and Extension Conference in April 1995, at which the length of the NPT extension (to be either indefinite or fixed-term) had to be decided. Despite long-standing disputes, in May 1995 the Conference agreed without a vote to extend the NPT unconditionally and indefinitely; it also called for the completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996, provided for more enhanced regular NPT Review Conferences, and adopted a Statement of Principles to re-dedicate those states party to the Treaty’s non-proliferation and disarmament goals.

The decisions of France, South Africa and China to adhere to the NPT in recent years strengthened the Treaty somewhat, but North Korea’s March 1993 threat to withdraw from it was a more sobering development. North Korea suspended its withdrawal announcement in June 1993, but continued to refuse to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) permission to inspect two sites suspected of being undeclared nuclear facilities in North Korea. Following a series of discussions between the United States and North Korea and a visit to the latter by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, an agreement was reached on 13 August 1994. Under the terms of this agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program and abide by the provisions of the NPT in exchange for further discussions with the U.S. over diplomatic recognition, a U.S. pledge never to use nuclear weapons on North Korea, and a plan to provide North Korea with a nuclear reactor less suitable for the construction of nuclear weapons. A final "Agreed Framework" was signed on 21 October 1994, but the issue remains to be resolved.

In May 1998, India tested some five nuclear weapons; Pakistan followed with its own tests several weeks later. Since India and Pakistan were two of only four states (the others are Israel and Cuba) that have not signed the NPT, their actions technically did not violate the Treaty. Many feel international reaction to these tests was too muted, however. The very fact that these states chose to carry them out represents a dangerous signal as the international community prepares for the next NPT Review Conference, in the year 2000.

In January 1994, the CD gave its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a general mandate to negotiate a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This treaty would extend to underground tests the prohibition on testing in the atmosphere that had been established by the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963. While an informal moratorium on nuclear testing had been observed by most states with nuclear weapons since late 1992, China had continued to test, and France had interrupted its moratorium long enough to carry out a series of tests in the South Pacific in 1995-96. The 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference had called for the conclusion of a CTBT no later than 1996; when China and France announced that they would sign such a treaty, it was expected that completion of a CTBT would be relatively easy. Despite strenuous negotiations and the acceptance of a draft treaty by the five nuclear-weapon states, India refused to accept the completed draft treaty because it did not contain a fixed timetable for complete disarmament by those states.

In an unprecedented move, Australia and others introduced the Treaty for signature at the United Nations without India’s agreement; over 80 countries signed it in the first several days. By December 1998, over 150 states had signed the treaty and 27 – including Canada – had ratified it. The Treaty cannot enter into force until it is signed by 44 named countries with nuclear power reactors, including India and Pakistan. Diplomatic pressure on these states has continued, but by late 1998 the international community was also considering convening a Conference, as provided for in Article XIV(2) of the Treaty, "... to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty" nonetheless.

In 1993, the General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution aimed at negotiating a cutoff on the production of fissionable material used in nuclear weapons. At the May 1995 NPT Review Conference, the five nuclear-weapon states committed themselves to the "early conclusion" of such negotiations. In August 1998 the CD finally agreed to begin talks on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.

An issue that has received more attention in recent years is the abolition of nuclear weapons. Following the commitments made during the NPT extension in 1995, 1996 saw an Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons; the Report of the Australian-sponsored Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; and a public statement in favour of abolition by a number of prominent retired military officers. In the fall of 1996 the Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade to look at Canada’s policies in this area in light of these and other developments. The Committee’s work was delayed by the general election of 1997, but between February and June 1998 it held over a dozen public hearings and received over 200 written submissions on this issue. Its report, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-first Century, was tabled in December 1998.

         b. Chemical and Biological Weapons

Agreement on a Chemical Weapons Convention was difficult because of a lack of agreement on verification procedures. The 1990 U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreements on information sharing and stockpile destruction helped the multilateral process, and, in June 1992, the CD produced a draft treaty to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Verification would be carried out by an International Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons based in Holland. The long-sought Chemical Weapons Convention was signed in January 1993, and was expected to come into effect in 1995, 180 days after 65 nations had ratified it. Despite opposition, the U.S. officially ratified the Convention four days before its entry into force in April 1997. Russia followed later that year.

A Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention negotiated in the early 1970s entered into force in 1975; however, its lack of verification procedures has left it ineffective. Concern about biological weapons has increased in recent years in view of revelations about their development in the Soviet Union and Iraq, yet negotiations to strengthen the Convention have proceeded slowly.

         c. Conventional Arms

Apart from alliance negotiations, the issue of controlling conventional arms sales or transfer has been addressed several times in the past decades. In the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union held four rounds of Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks to agree on ways to limit the growing conventional arms trade. Despite early progress, these talks bogged down in 1978. Throughout the 1980s, the international arms trade flourished due to demand driven by conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war. The value of the arms trade began to taper off in the late 1980s as a result of increasing Third World debt levels and the end of the Iran-Iraq war. The end of the Cold War accelerated this trend. The total value of international arms deliveries fell from an estimated $82 billion (U.S.) in 1987 to $27 billion in 1994; 1995 saw an increase to $32 billion, however, suggesting that the decline may have reached bottom.

Attempts to restrain the conventional arms trade in recent years have focused on the idea of an international arms transfer register, which would catalogue the trade in conventional arms between states. In 1988, a Colombian initiative co-sponsored by Canada was accepted by the General Assembly. Under this initiative, states were to: (1) submit their views and proposals on international arms transfers to the 1989 General Assembly session; and (2) carry out a subsequent expert study on ways and means of controlling the conventional arms trade. This study, in which Canada participated, was completed by August 1991, and in December the United Nations established an international arms transfer register. Some 90 states have consistently submitted data to the register (93 in 1997), although this is only roughly half of the UN’s membership. In 1991, Canada proposed a World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction, designed largely to curb the conventional arms trade. While the proposal received wide support in Canada, the reaction of the United States and other major powers was decidedly lukewarm.

In July 1996, 33 countries, including Canada, formally approved the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods. On one level, the Wassenaar Arrangement was simply an updating of the COCOM (Co-Ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) arrangement through which the West had prevented the export to East bloc nations of strategic goods and military technology. At the same time, the Arrangement also goes some way toward addressing the issue of conventional arms transfers that led the five permanent Security Council members (P-5) to engage in three rounds of talks after the Gulf War. Under the new arrangement, the states party to it will meet on a regular basis and exchange information that will lead to a common understanding of any risks associated with the sale of arms and dual-use technologies to regions, and will also exchange information on completed arms deliveries every six months.

In recent years, another conventional arms issue, anti-personnel landmines, has assumed greater prominence. According to a 1994 U.S. State Department estimate, 110 million of these mines have been laid in 64 countries, with some 500 casualties being reported each week. The United Nations estimated that another 2-2.5 million mines were laid in 1995, while only 100,000 were cleared. Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) regulates the use of anti-personnel landmines but applies only to their use in international, not the more frequent internal, conflicts. The United Nations General Assembly passed a unanimous resolution on the issue in December 1994, and in May 1996 negotiators at the first review conference for the CCW approved a revised landmine protocol (Protocol II) which places new limits on the use, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

In January 1996, Canada announced a comprehensive unilateral moratorium on the production, export and operational use of landmines. Frustrated with the lack of progress made on the issue, Canada and a small "core group" of states began to explore alternative ways to achieve a global ban on anti-personnel landmines. In October 1996 Canada launched the "Ottawa Process," to complete a legally binding treaty to destroy stockpiles and prohibit the use, production and transfer of these mines by December 1997. The Ottawa Process continued to gain momentum through 1997: more than 75% of the UN General Assembly participated in the Brussels Conference in June 1997, and 106 countries supported the initiative by August. The United States had long opposed the Ottawa Process, preferring instead to negotiate a ban through the Conference on Disarmament. In August 1997, President Clinton announced that the United States would support the Ottawa Process, although it still hoped to negotiate exemptions which critics argued would weaken the final treaty.

In December 1997, 122 states signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, known as the Ottawa Convention. Following the fortieth ratification — by Burkina Faso in September 1998 — the Convention will enter into force on 1 March 1999, and become binding international law on those who have ratified it; some 64 states had done so by October 1998.

      2. Alliance Negotiations

In the postwar years, conventional arms control efforts focused mainly on attempts to defuse the alliance buildups in Europe. Canada participated in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks from their beginning in 1973 until their end in 1989. The talks, which involved nations from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, resulted in little substantive progress over the years. The issues on which NATO focused included the pursuit of parity in military power, effective methods of verification, and the need for collective action on reductions and limitations.

         a. Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

The follow-up to the MBFR were the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Talks, which began in Vienna in March, 1989. While CFE was composed of the same participants as MBFR and considered the same issues, progress was swift. Unilateral Soviet force reductions announced at the United Nations in December 1988 presented a challenge to NATO, which had originally intended to focus only on reductions in tanks, heavy artillery and troop carriers. The effect of these unilateral moves was to rule out the massive conventional surprise attack from the East which had long preoccupied NATO planners.

At the NATO summit in May 1989, President Bush presented proposals which acknowledged that troops and aircraft would be included in negotiations, and envisaged completion of an agreement in six months to a year. Critics argued that by focusing on bloc-to-bloc negotiations at a time when the East European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) were unilaterally demanding the withdrawal of Soviet forces from their soil, NATO was constraining itself unnecessarily. In fact, any mechanism which regulated the builddown of forces in Europe was more valuable than unilateral chaos, and, accordingly, CFE was pursued. As the political situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe continued to shift, the USSR seemed hesitant to complete the CFE agreement, since the WTO hardly constituted a credible bloc.

The CFE treaty was finally signed in Paris on 19 November 1990, after less than two years of negotiation. The treaty mandated the reduction to equal levels of NATO and WTO forces from the Atlantic to the Urals across five categories of weapons: armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters and tanks. Since the WTO nations possessed numerical superiority in most of these categories, they were required to make the largest cuts. Provisions were also made in the treaty for an advanced verification regime, which included intrusive on-site verification and data exchanges.

While the CFE treaty is very important, it is not perfect. Troop levels were dropped from the negotiations, and were to be addressed in follow-on CFE 1(A) negotiations. (A CFE-1(A) agreement was signed in July 1992.) Even with the CFE reductions, total forces in Europe would remain very large, larger than those deployed at the outbreak of World War II, for example. The most serious controversy surrounding the treaty, however, resulted from perceived Soviet attempts to evade its provisions. A large number of weapons systems were moved behind the Ural Mountains in the months preceding the treaty and, while permitted, this seemed to some to be evading the spirit of the agreement. More serious was the designation of certain forces in the treaty area as naval forces, thereby exempting them from the provisions of the treaty. These issues were eventually settled by mutual agreement. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the successor states hesitated to have their future military forces constrained by a treaty signed by the former regime. By January 1992, all had agreed "in principle" to ratify CFE, and in March the ex-Soviet republics and the NATO allies pledged that they would ratify and bring CFE into force by July. On 5 June 1992, the parties to the treaty formally acknowledged the appearance of a number of new states in place of the USSR, and noted the agreements reached between them on the apportionment of the CFE rights of the Soviet Union. The CFE treaty officially came into force in November 1992, and by the time its 40-month reduction period had ended in November 1995 the parties had eliminated some 50,000 weapons and withdrawn 15,000 more. The CFE Treaty was also used as a model for the regional arms control settlement in the former Yugoslavia.

In September 1993, Russia asked the CFE signatories to consider ways to permit it to deploy more ground weapons on its southern flank, citing continued instability in the Transcaucasus. In late 1994 and early 1995, this issue became more pointed as Russia claimed it could not comply with the CFE flank limits until the war in Chechnya had ended. The Western allies rejected Russia’s arguments for a change to the CFE’s flank limits for over a year; however, by March 1995 they had reached agreement among themselves that they would consider the issue at the first CFE Review Conference in May 1996. At that Conference, agreement was reached to modify the flank limits for Russia and Ukraine, and to begin negotiations on further enhancements and adaptations of the Treaty. In July, 1997, parties agreed on certain "Basic Elements" to provide a framework for the adaptation talks.

         b. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

With the beginning of the period of detente, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began in the early 1970s. While its negotiations included traditional security issues, the states involved also agreed to discuss human rights and economic issues, the so-called "three baskets." In retrospect, it was these broader discussions which helped prepare the way for the renewal of the East-West relationship in recent years. As the most advanced of the multilateral European security frameworks, the CSCE was seen by many as the most likely forum for future security discussions.

Following the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the work of the CSCE was carried on in follow-up conferences in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna. At the Madrid meeting in 1984, it was decided to establish the Conference on Cooperation and Security Building Measures in Europe (CCSBMDE), known more generally as the CDE. Confidence-building measures are a tool to reduce distrust between nations by sharing military and other information. Building on the limited CBMs agreed to in the CSCE, the parties agreed to five major Confidence and Security building measures, which were collectively known as the Stockholm Document. These obligatory measures included prior notification of large military exercises, provisions for observation, constraining, compliance and verification and provision of an annual calendar of exercises.

The introduction of annual calendars was a completely new idea in confidence-building measures, requiring, by 15 November each year, an exchange of annual calendars forecasting notifiable military activities for the following year. Subsequent more detailed notification 42 days in advance was designed to confirm their routine nature and the calendar forecast.

With respect to compliance and verification, provision was made for on-site inspection with no right of refusal. It was now possible to have on-site inspection carried out on the ground, from the air, or both if a state believed that the provisions of agreed CSBMs were not being complied with. The acceptance of on-site inspection was considered a significant breakthrough, signifying the possibility of advancing openness in military affairs. In June 1989, Canada mounted its first challenge inspection under the provisions of the Stockholm agreement. Four Canadian Forces inspectors conducted a 48-hour inspection of a Czechoslovakian military activity and reported on it to all signatories of the Stockholm agreement.

At the Vienna follow-up meeting in 1989, it was decided to establish another forum for discussing CSBMs, the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures. Two seminars on military doctrine held in 1990 and 1991 helped the negotiations, which resulted in the Vienna Document of 1990. In March 1992, the CSCE adopted the Vienna Document 1992, which integrated both the 1986 Stockholm Document and the 1990 Vienna Document, and introduced a new "qualitative" dimension to arms control.

In an attempt to determine the next steps for arms control in Europe, the CSCE decided to convene a Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) to discuss and negotiate new arms control, confidence-building and other measures. The FSC opened in Vienna in September 1992. In order to emphasize its more permanent post-Cold War role, in December 1994 the CSCE changed its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

   C. Open Skies

In September 1989, agreement was reached to hold a Canadian-sponsored conference in Ottawa to discuss the U.S. "Open Skies" initiative. Originally proposed by President Eisenhower in the 1950s, the plan to build confidence and increase cooperation between East and West by allowing short-notice military overflights of other nations was revived in 1989 by President Bush. As a result of Canadian lobbying and encouragement, the first high-level Open Skies meeting took place in Ottawa in mid-February 1990. (As a prelude to the conference, a Canadian military aircraft chose its own flight plan over Czechoslovakia and Hungary in early January 1990 to demonstrate the feasibility of the plan.) Agreement on Open Skies proved more difficult than had been expected, however, and negotiations continued. In May 1992, the Open Skies Treaty was finally signed in Helsinki. The treaty permits short-notice overflights of any signatory state’s territory by the unarmed surveillance aircraft of another signatory state. It represented the first time a confidence-building agreement had been applied to territory in North America and eastern Russia, as well as Europe. The Open Skies Treaty will enter into force after a total of 20 states, including Russia, Ukraine and others with high active quotas have deposited their Instruments of Ratification.

   D. Bilateral (Superpower) Arms Control and Disarmament

      1. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

The SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms were signed by Soviet General-Secretary Brezhnev and U.S. President Nixon on 26 May 1972. The SALT negotiations had begun in 1969; because the parties could not reach a final agreement on strategic offensive arms limits, they agreed to make the ABM treaty separate and of unlimited duration while signing an interim agreement on offensive arms limitations.

The ABM Treaty prohibits either side from deploying a nationwide Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and originally limited each to two ABM deployment areas, though this was amended to one area on 3 July 1974. The Treaty also puts restraints on radars and interceptor missiles and prohibits the development, testing or deployment of sea, air, space or mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. A Standing Consultative Committee to deal with questions of Treaty interpretation and compliance is also provided for, as are extensive verification measures. In 1975, the U.S. dismantled its BMD system in Grand Forks, North Dakota, though the Soviet Union maintained its BMD deployment around Moscow.

In March 1983, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). According to the Americans, SDI was a necessary response to Soviet BMD development. The U.S. showed particular concern about the construction of a phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk. The Treaty permits the construction of such radars but only on the periphery of the country and only if they are oriented outwards. The U.S. contended that the new Soviet radar did not meet these criteria, and that it might indeed be an element of a future nationwide ABM system. The Soviets, on the other hand, claimed that the radar was intended for space-tracking and was therefore permitted under the Treaty. In 1989, the U.S.S.R. admitted that the radar was a violation of the Treaty, and stopped construction on it.

In the fall of 1985, the United States announced that the "legally correct" (or "broad") interpretation of the ABM treaty did not prohibit SDI testing or deployment. In July 1993, the Clinton Administration repudiated this interpretation of the ABM Treaty, accepting the traditional (or "narrow") interpretation instead.

Encouraged by the success of the patriot missile defence system in the Gulf War of 1991, the Clinton Administration pursued a number of missile defence systems designed to protect allied nations and U.S. troops abroad from short-range missile attacks. Critics claimed that such systems would violate the ABM treaty and threaten achievement of further long-range missile reductions, but the U.S. and Russia began negotiating to "clarify" the ABM treaty to allow some theatre-defence systems to be tested without formally amending the treaty.

Negotiations continued on the demarcation between permitted lower-velocity systems and those limited by the ABM Treaty. In September 1997, representatives from the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kayakhstan and Ukraine signed a series of agreements designed to clarify a number of issues pertaining to the ABM Treaty. Fear of the proliferation of ballistic missiles to North Korea or elsewhere grew in the United States during 1998 At the end of the year the Administration announced that while a decision on whether or not to deploy a National Missile Defence system still would not be taken before the year 2000, it was adding funds to the military budget to ensure that the US could be ready to deploy such a system; if necessary, it would withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to do so.

      2. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

During the January 1985 meeting between then Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Shultz it was agreed that negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union would include three areas of discussion: strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms and defence and space weapons. The talks themselves began on 12 March 1985, with agreed-upon objectives including the prevention of an arms race in space, the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, and the strengthening of strategic stability, leading ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

These talks proved particularly important as they brought the superpowers back to the negotiating table. While the START talks had begun in 1982, they had been suspended due to Soviet criticisms of NATO’s Euromissile deployments. At their summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to accelerate not only the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms but also the efforts to conclude a chemical weapons convention. While the summit did not produce any tangible ACD breakthroughs, the meeting did improve the atmosphere of relations and, perhaps more important, established a political framework for ACD discussions between the two dominant powers.

The outline of the START agreement was agreed to during the superpower summits in Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow. Essentially, as with the INF agreement, reductions were to be unequal, with overall limits equal. In other words, the Soviet Union would remove more ICBMs than the U.S. but the number remaining would be equal. Although some confusion remained about bomber weapons, it appeared likely that these would be less strictly regulated, resulting in a U.S. advantage. Overall, START was to result in a reduction of some 30-50% in superpower nuclear arsenals.

The completed START agreement was finally signed at the Moscow summit on 31 July 1991. Under its provisions, the arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union would be reduced by roughly 30%; warheads would be reduced by about 20% and launchers by 27%. Overall, START focused on quantitative reductions while preserving the qualitative basis of the arms race through its protection of strategic modernization programs on both sides. In order to help verify the START agreement, some 12 types of on-site inspection and about 60 types of notification are contained in the treaty. Arms control advocates recommended that a START II agreement focus more on arms modernization than on total numbers.

With the sweeping changes in the international arena, however, START was only the beginning. In October 1991, responding to President Bush’s initiatives to cut tactical nuclear weapons, Soviet President Gorbachev announced that he would reduce the Soviet arsenal by 1,000 more warheads than required by START. In January 1992, President Bush proposed that both sides reduce their total warheads to 50% of the START limits. President Yeltsin of Russia agreed almost immediately and proposed a reduction to 50% of this new level, leaving some 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads on each side. U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney responded that this last level would be "too low." In June 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed in principle on reductions to between 3,000 and 3,500 strategic weapons each by the year 2003. On 28 December 1992, the START II Treaty was signed in Geneva. In the treaty, both the U.S. and Russia agreed to give up land-based ballistic missiles with MIRV capacity.

The breakup of the Soviet Union complicated the START ratification process by effectively increasing the number of states required to approve the Treaty. START I finally entered into force in December 1994, and, by the end of 1996, all nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The U.S. Congress ratified START II in January 1996, but ratification in the Russian Duma has repeatedly been stalled as legislators debated the costs and benefits of the Treaty itself, as well as the impact of U.S. missile defence programs and NATO enlargement on Russia’s security. At their Helsinki Summit in March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to the framework for a START III agreement which would further reduce both sides to a level of 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic warheads each by 2007; negotiations to finalize this agreement will only begin after Russia ratifies START II.

      3. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Agreement

The first significant development to emerge from the new era in bilateral talks was the U.S.-Soviet treaty on the elimination of medium and shorter range missiles, signed at the summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in December 1987. The Treaty, which covers nuclear missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometres required the Soviet Union to destroy 1,752 such missiles and the United States to destroy 859, within a period of three years. On 12 May 1991, the last missiles covered by the INF agreement were destroyed.

      4. Short Range Nuclear Weapons

With the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe, a split emerged in the NATO alliance, primarily between West Germany and the United States, over whether or not to begin negotiations with the Soviets on reducing short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. West Germany, where most of the U.S. Lance missile launchers were located, wanted the U.S. to begin early negotiations. The Bush administration, on the other hand, was intent upon upgrading U.S. defences in Europe by replacing the 75-mile-range Lance with new missiles that could be fired almost four times as far. The U.S. position was backed by Britain, the Netherlands and Turkey, while the West Germans were supported by Italy, Greece and most of the other continental European nations. Other countries, including Canada and Norway, tried to negotiate a compromise.

The U.S. had been maintaining its position for fear that hasty negotiations might open the door for the "denuclearization" of Europe. Such a prospect, it was argued, would make Europe "safe" for a conventional war in which NATO would be hard pressed to meet the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in troops and weaponry.

The Germans, who would suffer most from the consequences of a nuclear "tactical exchange," believed the time was opportune for both sides to remove these missiles.

In May 1989, at the NATO summit in Brussels, a compromise solution was reached: negotiations on "partial reduction" of short-range nuclear forces would take place after an agreement on conventional forces had been reached. Increasing military and political changes in Eastern Europe and German reunification led even the strongest supporters of short range nuclear weapons to rethink their positions. As one West German official put it in the fall of 1989, "What do we need missiles for - to bomb Lech Walesa?"

Alarmed by the prospect of Soviet nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands as the Union disintegrated, on 27 September 1991 U.S. President George Bush announced a dramatic series of unilateral nuclear reductions affecting some 2,500 nuclear weapons and challenged the Soviet Union to respond in kind. Among the Bush initiatives were: the elimination of all ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons worldwide; the removal of all naval tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and submarines and their placement in "central storage areas" in the United States; the downgrading of alert status of B-1B and B-52 strategic bombers at 13 air bases; the removal from alert status of ballistic missiles scheduled for elimination under START, and a pledge to speed their elimination after the treaty entered into force.

On 5 October, President Mikhail Gorbachev responded to Bush’s moves by effectively matching the U.S. cuts (with some 8,000 weapons) and offering more. Apart from the tactical weapons reductions and the downgrading of alert status, Gorbachev announced a reduction of 1,000 more strategic weapons than were mandated under START; the creation of a single armed service to control all strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons; the suspension of Soviet nuclear testing for a year, with a call for a comprehensive test ban; and a proposal for an agreement to cease production of fissionable materials for weapons.

Although President Bush had reaffirmed that NATO would maintain "an effective air-delivered nuclear capacity in Europe," NATO quickly agreed to reduce the number of its nuclear bombs in Europe by 50%.

With these reductions, the threat of the deliberate military use of nuclear weapons in Europe effectively disappeared; in the optimistic words of American nuclear expert William Arkin, these moves marked the beginning of real nuclear arms reductions, and effectively served notice that nuclear weapons were "headed for the trash."

PARLIAMENTARY ACTION

The Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations (June 1986) recommended that Canada "intensify its efforts, multilaterally within NATO, the United Nations and in disarmament forums and bilaterally with the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries, to win acceptance for a comprehensive set of arms control measures." These measures were those already stressed by the government; namely,

• a mutually agreed and verifiable radical reduction of nuclear forces and associated measures to enhance strategic stability. The latter should include, in particular, reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, interpreted strictly as prohibiting all but basic research on defensive systems;

• the maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

• the negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons;

• the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty that will be mutually verifiable;

• the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and

• agreement on confidence-building measures sufficient to permit the reduction of conventional military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

In 1991, the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade established a sub-committee to examine Canadian military production and export. The report of this sub-committee was tabled in the House of Commons in September 1992.

In its November 1994 report, the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canada’s Foreign policy noted the danger of the further proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms. It therefore recommended the government work with like-minded states to: strengthen the NPT regime; press for further nuclear arms reductions; strengthen the UN Conventional Arms Register; and work to control the production, import and export of landmines. The government broadly agreed with these recommendations in its response to the committee’s report, and in its February 1995 foreign policy statement Canada in the World.

In response to a 1996 request by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade began looking at Canada’s nuclear arms control and disarmament policies; its report, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century, containing 15 recommendations for government policy, was tabled in the House of Commons in December 1998.

CHRONOLOGY

1946 - UN General Assembly passed its first resolution, on disarmament and security.

1963 - Partial Test Ban Treaty banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

1968 - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) negotiated.

1972 - Biological Weapons Convention negotiated.

1972 - SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) signed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

1972 - SALT I strategic arms agreement negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union.

1975 - Helsinki Accords signed, creating the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

1979 - SALT II strategic arms agreement negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union. Agreement was never ratified, but both sides adhered to it informally.

December 1979 - NATO adopted the "dual track approach," allowing deployment of U.S. Cruise and Pershing II nuclear missiles in Europe, while at the same time pursuing negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

December 1987 - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) accord reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

November 1990 - CFE Treaty signed.

July 1991 - START I Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

December 1992 - START II Treaty signed by the United States and Russia.

January 1993 - Chemical Weapons Convention signed.

May 1995 - NPT extended indefinitely and unconditionally.

September 1996 - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) introduced for signature at the United Nations after India had blocked its adoption in the Conference on Disarmament.

March 1997 - Agreement reached on a framework START III Treaty.

SELECTED REFERENCES

Arms Control Association. Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security. Washington, 1990.

The Arms Control Association. Arms Control Today. Various issues.

Boulden, Jane and David Cox. The Guide to Canadian Policies on International Peace and Security 1994. Canadian Centre for Global Security, Ottawa, 1994.

Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century. 1998.

Cox, David. "Arms Control." In David Haglund and Michael Hawes, World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990, p. 104-128.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Canadian Reference Guide to the United Nations. Ottawa, 1994.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. "The Wassenaar Arrangement." Strategic Comments. Vol. 2, No. 7, August 1996.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. "Arms Control Faces an Uncertain Future." In Strategic Survey 1995-96. Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 57-68.

Mendelsohn, Jack "Arms Control: The Unfinished Agenda." Current History, April 1997, p. 145-150.

Moyes, Howard. "Arms Control and Disarmament." In A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 50th General Assembly of the United Nations. University Press of America, 1995, p. 87-103.

*  The original version of this Current Issue Review was published in November 1987; the paper has been regularly updated since that time.