MR-116E
NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Prepared by:
William Murray
Science and Technology Division
14 December 1993
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF NAFTA
THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CO-OPERATION
A. Overview of the Agreement
B. Dispute Procedure
C. Enforcement
D. Considerations
NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), details of which are given in Library of Parliament BP-237E, enters into force on
1 January 1994. Conceptually, NAFTA is one of the "greenest" trade documents
ever negotiated. According to one of the conclusions of the 1992 Canadian Environmental
Review of NAFTA:
The NAFTA establishes a new benchmark for
environmentally sensitive international trade and economic relations. The environmental
provisions of the NAFTA would go well beyond those of any previous free trade agreement.
The Free Trade Agreement between Canada
and the United States does not embrace the same degree of commitment to environmental
protection. NAFTA opponents, however, point out that Canada and the United States are
highly developed industrial nations that enjoy similar levels of environmental protection,
standard of living, civil rights, labour standards, health care and education. Mexico, as
a developing nation, stands in contrast to them. On the other hand, it should be noted
that in 1988 Mexico enacted the Federal Law on Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental
Contamination. This comprehensive law provides strict rules for protecting the Mexican
environment and is considered to be every bit as stringent as Canadian or American
legislation. Unfortunately, Mexico lacks the financial resources to fully enforce these
regulations.
NAFTA critics maintained that, without
mechanisms or provisions to enforce the environmental ideals outlined in the agreement,
there would be migration of industry and jobs from Canada to pollution havens in Mexico,
accelerated deterioration of the Mexican environment, and a race by all three countries to
the lowest common denominator of environmental protection. This paper examines the 1992 Canadian
Environmental Review of NAFTA, and The North American Agreement on Environmental
Co-operation, the environmental "side deal" designed to help enforce the
environmental objectives of NAFTA.
CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF NAFTA
Responsibility for conducting the
environmental review was assigned to a working group made up of representatives from nine
federal departments, some of which had acted as lead departments in Canadian NAFTA
negotiations. NAFTA critics claim that the review therefore lacks objectivity.
The review contends that it is a generally
accepted principle that expanding trade is a source of increased wealth and diffusion of
technology, which will enhance a country's ability to protect and upgrade its environment.
The review states: "As openness of foreign trade and investment increases, there is a
corresponding decrease in the amount of pollution per unit of output."
NAFTA critics point out, however, that ten
years of industrial investment in the maquiladora region of Northern Mexico has had the
very opposite effect. Multinational companies freely pollute the Mexican environment,
while suppression of the labour movement and human rights has prevented Mexican workers
from achieving the benefits of industrialization. Workers in the maquiladora region
receive the lowest manufacturing wages in Mexico and are subjected to poor air quality and
to some of the most environmentally degraded land and water in the country.
Environmentalists contend that, given
Mexico's lower costs and much cheaper labour force, a multinational company could build a
non-polluting plant in Chihuahua at less cost than in Toronto. Thus, they claim that the
weak economic situation of Mexico could facilitate, rather than hinder, the ability of a
foreign company to conduct itself in an environmentally responsible manner. The
environmental review describes a number of international studies that indicate "there
is likely to be minimal, or no, relocation of Canadian industry due to the projected
differences in pollution abatement costs."
Lacking in the review, however, are
environmental data pertaining to companies that have relocated from Canada to the
maquiladora region of Mexico since 1982. It has been suggested, that, in lieu of
recounting less applicable international studies, the environmental review might have more
usefully investigated the waste management activities of industries that have moved from
Canada to Mexico. Specifically, are these companies in full compliance with Mexican law?
If not, do these companies financially benefit from the poor enforcement of Mexico's
environmental regulations?
The environmental review also argues that
the costs of environmental compliance for industries with high pollution abatement
requirements, seldom exceed 2% of value added. NAFTA opponents agree that it is unlikely
that an established company would incur new capital expenses if the sole purpose of
relocation was avoidance of pollution abatement costs; however, the dual incentives of
avoiding these costs and gaining access to a labour force paid, in many cases, one-tenth
the hourly wage of Canadian factory workers are together indeed strong inducements for the
migration of capital investment to Mexico.
In defence of NAFTA, it should be noted
that economic development in the maquiladora region might have been faster and dirtier had
NAFTA been rejected. The existence of maquiladoras is due to a partial exemption of
tariffs on goods produced in the Mexican border region. The elimination of tariffs by
NAFTA will theoretically make maquiladoras obsolete. Failure to include maquiladora
arguments in the Canadian Environmental Review of NAFTA has, however, undermined the force
of the document.
THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CO-OPERATION
A. Overview of the Agreement
The environmental side agreement (1)
establishes the Commission for Environmental Co-operation, (2) details the obligations of
Canada, the United States and Mexico to ensure compliance with domestic environmental laws
and policies, (3) provides a mechanism for consultation and the resolution of disputes,
and (4) promotes a broad cooperative work plan for the environment. Initially, the work
plan will focus on establishing limits for specific air and marine pollutants, conducting
environmental assessments of projects with transboundary implications, and developing
reciprocal court access for damage or injury resulting from transboundary pollution.
The Commission for Environmental
Co-operation will consist of three sections: a Council, comprising a cabinet-level
representative from each country; a central Secretariat, to be located in Canada; and a
Joint Public Advisory Committee. The Council will be responsible for the work plan, and it
may consider and develop recommendations on such environmental issues as scientific
research and technology, eco-labelling, pollution prevention techniques and strategies,
and public awareness of the environment. In addition, the Council will address
environmental questions and disputes, work to improve environmental laws and regulations
in all three countries, and cooperate with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission on
environment-related matters.
The Secretariat will act as the support
group for the Council and will receive complaints from any person or non-governmental
organization that alleges the non-enforcement of domestic environmental laws. The
Secretariat will develop factual records and prepare reports for consideration by the
Council.
The Joint Public Advisory Committee, which
is to comprise five representatives from each country, will assist the Secretariat by
providing technical and scientific advice. The Committee is also expected to assist in the
preparation of the Secretariat's annual work program and budget.
B. Dispute Procedure
Any country may request consultations with
any other country to discuss perceived failures to enforce domestic environmental laws.
Should the problem not be resolved, or if a country demonstrates a persistent pattern of
non-enforcement, the Council will take action. The Council may create working groups or
committees to study the problem, attempt dispute resolution procedures and/or make
recommendations. If the problem persists, the Council, by a two-thirds vote, may convene
an arbitration panel whose investigation will be open to public scrutiny; it is hoped that
publicity and moral pressure will induce the offending country to comply.
C. Enforcement
If the arbitration panel concludes that a
country has shown a persistent pattern of failure to enforce its domestic environmental
law effectively, and if the country does not correct the problem, the panel may impose a
fine of up to $20 million (U.S.), for the first year. In subsequent years, the fines are
to be no greater than 0.007% of the total tri-national trade of goods. Under the
agreement, Canada is to be subject to a fining mechanism distinct from that used for
Mexico and the United States. A fine imposed upon Canada would be ultimately enforceable
by domestic courts. In contrast, failure by Mexico or the United States to pay a fine
would result in suspension of NAFTA benefits and the imposition of a duty, based on the
amount of the fine. Accordingly, the United States and Mexico potentially face trade
sanctions, while Canada does not.
D. Considerations
It appears that the Commission for
Environmental Co-operation will be an effective body, empowered with the strength
necessary to safeguard the environmental objectives of the world's greenest trade
agreement. Not only will the Commission work to ensure that each country complies with its
own environmental laws, it will also attempt to raise environmental standards and
cooperation across North America. The benefits of the environmental side agreement,
however, come at the price of potential infringement on national sovereignty. In August
1993, the Quebec Minister of International Affairs pointed out that an individual or group
in Canada not satisfied with a particular ruling of the Canadian judicial system could now
go to an international commission for recourse. Accordingly, there is the possibility that
federal and provincial laws could be subjugated by the actions of the Commission for
Environmental Co-operation.
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