Parliamentary Research Branch

MR-114E

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CRUISE MISSILES

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

CRUISE MISSILE TESTING IN CANADA

CONCLUSION

Modern cruise missiles are descendants of the German V-1 "Buzz Bomb" of World War II. They use wings to take advantage of aerodynamic lift, can be powered by jet engines or rockets, and in effect resemble un-piloted aircraft. By the 1980s both the United States and the Soviet Union had several models of accurate cruise missiles with ranges of over 2,000 kilometres which could be armed with either nuclear or conventional warheads and launched from land, sea or air.

During the Cold War, the cruise missile was almost always considered in terms of its impact on the nuclear balance. Advocates argued that, because it was accurate and difficult to detect, the cruise missile increased the uncertainty of Soviet military planners and contributed to the nuclear deterrent capability of the West. Critics agreed that the missile would heighten Soviet uncertainty, but argued that this was dangerous in a nuclear-armed world, and that the deployment of what they saw as a "first strike" weapon such as the cruise would contribute to the further escalation of the nuclear arms race.

With the end of the Cold War, many of the arguments for and against cruise missiles have become outdated. Since almost all of the previous debate was framed in terms of the East/West conflict and the impact on the nuclear balance, the collapse of this framework has changed the significance of cruise missiles. Ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) were banned under the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement. In 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev agreed to remove nuclear sea-launched cruise (SLCM) and other tactical missiles from all surface ships and submarines at sea. The future deployment of nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) was limited under the START treaties, and production of the newer "stealth" air-launched Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) ended in July 1993 at 460 missiles, some 1,000 fewer than had originally been planned.

While the nuclear aspect of the cruise debate diminished, the importance of conventionally armed cruise missiles was highlighted by their first operational use in the Gulf War in early 1991. Until 1992 it had been believed that the only conventionally armed version of the cruise missile was the sea-launched Tomahawk, but it was revealed at that time that a number of air-launched cruise missiles had been converted to carry conventional warheads under a previously secret program, and that 35 of these (AGM-86Cs) had been used in the war. Critics maintain that the accuracy of cruise missiles in the Gulf War has been exaggerated, but there is general agreement that the missiles performed well.

The United States continues research to upgrade the guidance and propulsion systems of its air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, particularly the sea-launched Tomahawks. The current status of Russia's programs remains unclear, but a long-range cruise missile capability undoubtedly remains.

As the understandable preoccupation with Superpower nuclear cruise missiles has diminished over the past several years, more attention has been paid to shorter-range and much simpler cruise weapons. While not comparable to the long-range systems of the United States and Russia, shorter-range cruise (mainly anti-ship) systems are currently in service in a number of countries and even more countries have programs from which cruise missiles could be developed. According to reports, some U.S. officials feel cruise missiles will become an important proliferation threat in the future, and research continues to improve the capability to track them. In April 1992, MIT physicist Kosta Tsipis argued in The New York Times that while tremendous attention has been paid to the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, accurate cruise missiles could pose a much greater threat in the future. According to Tsipis, basic technology in the form of commercial jet engines, gyroscopes and autopilots is now widely available to anyone who wants it. In his words, "Any country that can manufacture simple aircraft can construct a cruise missile that can carry a ton of cargo at least 300 miles and land no more than 30 feet from its target."

Following informal contact between Canada and the United States on a weapons testing agreement, the two countries established the Canada-U.S. Test and Evaluation Program in an exchange of notes on 10 February 1983. The agreement, which was for a period of five years, allowed the United States to request the testing of unarmed air-launched cruise missiles and certain other military systems in Canada. In July 1983, the Canadian government announced that in response to a U.S. request it had agreed to allow the testing of the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile in Canada.

The testing of cruise missiles in Canada proved very contentious. The government explained its decision in both political and technical terms. Politically, testing demonstrated alliance solidarity over the modernization of NATO's nuclear deterrent. Technically, testing the missile over terrain similar to that of the northern Soviet Union would improve its effectiveness, and allow the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) to develop an anti-cruise capability. The tests would take place in a 2,200-kilometre test corridor that included parts of the Northwest Territories, British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan. Tests could involve either releasing the missile in a "free flight" to its target, or allowing its guidance system to direct both the missile and the launch aircraft to the target in a "captive carry" test. The tests take several hours, and involve a number of aircraft in both Canada and the United States, from tankers to fighters to Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes. After the first few years of tests, attention shifted from monitoring the missile itself to attempting to track and intercept it. In order to simulate the climate of the northern Soviet Union, most cruise missile tests in Canada have taken place in the winter months.

In February 1988 the testing agreement was automatically extended for a further five years when neither party exercised its right of withdrawal on twelve months' notice. In early 1989, the United States requested and received permission to test the Advanced Cruise Missile (AGM-129A) in Canada. In February 1993, the Canadian government announced that it had signed a renegotiated and improved 10-year testing agreement with the United States. To date, some 23 cruise missile tests have taken place in Canada (an average of two to three per year), with the most recent having taken place in March 1993.

With the end of the Cold War, old arguments on both side of the cruise missile debate have lost much force. Put simply, cruise missiles are no longer needed to deter the Soviet Union, nor will they provoke it to escalate the nuclear arms race. The missiles to be tested in Canada may be designed to carry a nuclear warhead, but the conventional role of the cruise seems likely to dominate future debate. Arguments over the wisdom of continued cruise missile testing in Canada reflect minimalist and maximalist positions on both sides of the broader military debate. Those who oppose continued cruise testing argue that ending such tests would serve both symbolic and practical functions, since the Soviet threat that cruise missiles were developed to counter is gone. Those who support continued testing cite the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent and the ability to track and intercept cruise missiles as a hedge against the possibility of future policy changes in the former Soviet Union. More generally, they argue that as long as Canada elects to continue its broad defence cooperation with the United States, cruise missile testing represents a continuing contribution to the defence of the continent.