Broker routing decisions in limit order markets / by David A. Cimon.: FB3-5/2016-50E-PDF
"The primary focus of this paper is to study conflict of interest in the brokerage market. Brokers face a conflict of interest when the commissions they receive from investors differ from the costs imposed by different trading venues. I construct a model of limit order trading in which brokers serve as agents for investors who wish to access equity markets. I find that brokers preferentially route marketable orders to venues with lower liquidity demand fees, driving up the execution probability at these venues and lowering adverse selection costs. When fees for liquidity supply and demand are sufficiently different, brokers route liquidity supplying orders to separate venues, where investors suffer from lower execution probability and higher costs of adverse selection"--Abstract.
Permanent link to this Catalogue record:
publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.828456&sl=0
| Department/Agency | Bank of Canada. |
|---|---|
| Title | Broker routing decisions in limit order markets / by David A. Cimon. |
| Series title | Staff Working Paper, 1701-9397 ; 2016-50 |
| Publication type | Series - View Master Record |
| Language | [English] |
| Format | Electronic |
| Electronic document | |
| Note(s) | "November 2016." Includes bibliographical references. Abstract in French. |
| Publishing information | [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, c2016. |
| Author / Contributor | Cimon, David A. |
| Description | ii, 53 p. : graphs. |
| Catalogue number |
|
| Subject terms | Investments Market analysis Financial analysis |
Request alternate formats
To request an alternate format of a publication, complete the Government of Canada Publications email form. Use the form’s “question or comment” field to specify the requested publication.- Date modified: