Supervising financial regulators / by Josef Schroth.: FB3-5/2016-52E-PDF
"How much discretion should local financial regulators in a banking union have in accommodating local credit demand? I analyze this question in an economy where local regulators privately observe expected output from high lending. They do not fully internalize default costs from high lending since deposit insurance cannot be priced fairly. Still, output net of default costs across the banking union is highest when local regulators are rewarded rather than punished. Regulators with lower current lending receive more discretion to allow higher lending in the future, but regulators with higher current lending may not experience any limit to their discretion"--Abstract.
Permanent link to this Catalogue record:
publications.gc.ca/pub?id=9.828464&sl=0
| Department/Agency | Bank of Canada. |
|---|---|
| Title | Supervising financial regulators / by Josef Schroth. |
| Series title | Staff Working Paper, 1701-9397 ; 2016-52 |
| Publication type | Series - View Master Record |
| Language | [English] |
| Format | Electronic |
| Electronic document | |
| Note(s) | "November 2016." Includes bibliographical references. Abstract in French. |
| Publishing information | [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada, c2016. |
| Author / Contributor | Schroth, Josef. |
| Description | ii, 49 p. : graphs, figs. |
| Catalogue number |
|
| Subject terms | Banks Economic analysis |
Request alternate formats
To request an alternate format of a publication, complete the Government of Canada Publications email form. Use the form’s “question or comment” field to specify the requested publication.- Date modified: