Testing collusion and cooperation in binary choice games / by Erhao Xie.: FB3-5/2023-58E-PDF
"This paper studies the testable implications of players' collusive or cooperative behaviours in a binary choice game with complete information. In this paper, these behaviours are defined as players coordinating their actions to maximize the weighted sum of their payoffs. I show that this collusive model is observationally equivalent to an equilibrium model that imposes two restrictions"--Abstract, page ii.
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| Title | Testing collusion and cooperation in binary choice games / by Erhao Xie. |
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| Publication type | Monograph - View Master Record |
| Language | [English] |
| Format | Digital text |
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| Description | 1 online resource (ii, 33 pages) : graphs. |
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