The role of long-term contracting in business lending / by Phoebe Tian.: FB3-5/2024-2E-PDF

"This paper examines inefficiencies arising from a lack of long-term contracting in small business lending in China. I develop and estimate a dynamic model where firms repeatedly interact with the same lender. All loans are short-term. Collateral can be used to deter a strategic default by a firm, but the lender cannot recover the full value of the collateral in the case of a default. The endogenous contract terms—including interest rates, loan size and collateral—reflect a firm’s probability of default in equilibrium. Learning drives the dynamics of contract terms because a firm’s profitability type is unknown. Long-term contracts improve welfare mainly by mitigating the incentives for a firm to default"--Abstract, page ii.

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Publication information
Department/Agency Bank of Canada, issuing body.
Title The role of long-term contracting in business lending / by Phoebe Tian.
Series title Staff working paper = Document de travail du personnel, 1701-9397 ; 2024-2
Publication type Series - View Master Record
Language [English]
Format Electronic
Electronic document
Note(s) ISSN assigned to different series.
"Last updated: February 2, 2024."
Includes bibliographical references (pages 52-55).
Includes abstracts in English and French.
Publishing information [Ottawa] : Bank of Canada = Banque du Canada, 2024.
©2024
Author / Contributor Tian, Phoebe, author.
Description 1 online resource (ii, 68 pages) : graphs.
Catalogue number
  • FB3-5/2024-2E-PDF
Subject terms Commercial loans -- China.
Financial institutions -- China.
Prêts commerciaux -- Chine.
Institutions financières -- Chine.
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